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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Lillian Hatheway sued her employer, the University of Idaho, for age discrimination, 
hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge and negligent int1iction of 
emotional distress. Ms. Hatheway, a 61-year-old Administrative Assistant in the English 
Depaltment, was forced from her job after an express policy change at the University to recruit 
young entry level employees to replace older workers, despite her previous exemplary reviews as 
an "outstanding employee." Her work conditions dramatically worsened after complaining to 
the University and the Human Rights Commission, which ultimately resulted in her departure 
and this lawsuit. Despite Ms. Hatheway's evidence of the new "age" policy at the University, 
direct comments and conduct from her supervisors relating to ageist attitudes towards her, and 
the temporal connection with a drastic about-face on her employment evaluations and treatment, 
the trial court impermissibly weighed the evidence and dismissed all of Ms. Hatheway's claims 
on summary judgment. This appeal follows. 
B. Course of the Proceedings in the Hearing Below and its Disposition. 
On October 22, 2008, Plaintiff-Appellant Lillian Hatheway filed a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial against the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho, and the 
University of Idaho, alleging four causes of action (which the District COUlt broke out into five 
separate claims in its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment): 
(1) age discrimination and hostile work environment under state law (the Idaho Human Rights 
Act); (2) unlawful retaliation under state law (the Idaho Human Rights Act); (3) constructive 
discharge; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Following extensive discovery in this case, on August 18,2011, the University of Idaho 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. In 
response, Ms. Hatheway responded to the University's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
submitting supporting affidavits from herself and Dr. Richard K. Howe. as well as deposition 
testimony of Pamela Yenser. Kurt Olsson, Gordon Thomas, Robert Wrigley, Gary Williams, 
Steve Chandler, Mary Blew. Mary Ann Judge. Ronald McFarland, and Jeffrey Jones. 
Ms. Hatheway also brought forward discovery answers and responses from the University of 
Idaho, as weJl as relevant documents including but not limited to her annual evaluations, e-mails, 
and handwritten notes Ms. Hatheway took contemporaneously during her employment. She 
presented evidence as outlined below on her employment history, the abrupt about-face on her 
performance the University took after its new "youth" policy was announced, and direct evidence 
of negative comments and conduct of her superiors, all of which were temporally connected to 
the new policy, and which were unconnected to her previously lauded performance. 
Despite Plaintiffs evidence, on November 10, 2011, District Court Judge Brudie issued 
his written Opinion and Order granting the University's Motion for Summary Judgment holding: 
Age Discrimination Claim 
(T]he Court must consider the third element of an age discrimination claim, 
which requires a showing by Plaintiff that she was discharged or was 
subjected to adverse decisions by her employer and, but for her age, the 
discharge or adverse decisions would not have occurred. Defendants contend 
2 
this element has not been met and is dispositive of her claim. The Court 
agrees. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 679) 
Plaintiff Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was constructively 
discharged or received disparate treatment. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 681) 
(T]he Court is unable to find that a reasonable trier of fact could find she was 
driven from the workplace or that her age played any role in her performance 
evaluations. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 682) 
Ms. Hatheway has simply failed to demonstrate that age was a factor driving 
Dr. Olsson's actions as required in order to establish a prima facie claim for 
age discrimination. 
(R. VoL III, p. 683) 
Hostile Work Environment Claim 
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected 10 age 
discrimination and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that her workplace 
was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment. 
The Court, after considering the record as a whole, is unable to find either 
subjectively or objectively that a hostile work environment was created as a 
result of age discrimination. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 684) 
Unlawful Retaliation Claim 
There is no evidence no evidence that the University retaliated against her 
because she engage in protected activities. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 685) 
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Constructive Discharge Claim 
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was the subject of age 
discrimination. The absence of such a showing is fatal to her claim for 
constructive discharged [sic] based on age discrimination. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 686) 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim 
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate the Defendants breached a duty owed 
to her. There being no breach of duty shown. Ms. Hatheway's claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress thereby fails. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 686) 
In so holding, the District COUlt improperly applied the standards of review for a 
discrimination claim on summary judgment, and improperly granted the University's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. Ms. Hatheway is appealing the 
District Court's grant of complete summary judgment, and requests that the Idaho Supreme 
Court reverse the District COUlt's opinion and order. 
C. Facts. 
The relevant facts of this case on appeal, presented in chronological order, establish that 
genuine issues of fact exist which preclude summary dismissal of Ms. Hatheway's claims. 
1. From November of 1999 to June 30,2005, Ms. Hatheway was viewed 
as an "outstanding" employee. 
In November of 1999, Ms. Hatheway accepted a position as an Administrative 
Assistant II with the University of Idaho, College of Letters and Science, Dean's Office in 
Moscow, Idaho. (R. Vol. II, pp. 302-303) Ms. Hatheway held this position until approximately 
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September 2002, when she accepted a lateral transfer within the University to an Administrative 
Assistant II position with the Department of English. Ms. Hatheway was employed in that 
capacity with the Department of English until she was essentially forced to retire on 
September 12,2008. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 4-8) 
During her time at the University of Idaho, other than Dr. Olsson, all other University of 
Idaho employees and faculty andlor administrators who provided testimony and/or evidence in 
this case stated that they had never had any issues with Ms. Hatheway'S honesty or reason to call 
into question the truthfulness or veracity of Ms. Hatheway. They all generally testified that 
Ms. Hatheway was an honest and pleasant woman. (R. Vol. n, pp. 449,453,470,473,431-432, 
479-480,486-487,491,492-493,497-498 and 502-503) 
In Ms. Hatheway's employment capacity as an Administrative Assistant II for the 
University's Department of English, her supervisor was the Chair of the English Department at 
the University. It was this individual's duty and job responsibility to assess Ms. Hatheway's job 
and work performance and to provide her with her annual evaluation (and any disciplinary 
actions). (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 9-14) 
In her first year with the Depaltment of English at the University, Ms. Hatheway received 
an overall very positive, "Exceeds Requirements" annual review from the Chair at that time, 
Dr. David Barber. Ms. Hatheway received no negative marks or comments. Ultimately, 
Dr. Barber ended his evaluation by stating that "Lillian is a team player and a wonderful asset to 
the college." (R. Vol. II, p. 294, L. 10-14, pp. 335 and 348-353) 
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In her second year with the Depmiment, Dr. Barber rated Ms, Hatheway's overall annual 
performance as "Outstanding," the very best score possible, Dr. Barber stated in that review, in 
part, that "Lillian is one of the best things to happen to the English Department in a long time" 
and "She's a real find for us. Thank you, Dean Zeller!" (R. Vol. II, p, 294, L. 14-18, pp, 336 
and 354-360) 
For Ms, Hatheway'S third year review while with the Department, Dr, Barber again rated 
Ms. Hatheway's overall annual performance as "Outstanding." Dr. Barber stated in the review, 
in part that "Lillian has been a wonderful asset to the English depmiment this past year," and 
that Ms. Hatheway was a wonderful "team player." (R. Vol. II, p, 294, 1" 19-23, pp. 336 and 
360-365) Dr. Barber ended the review by commenting that "[t]he English department has grown 
to depend on Lily and it would be a great loss should she evcr leave." (R. VoL II, p, 294, L. 
19-23, pp, 336 and 360-365) 
On or about March 2, 2005, Ms. Hatheway received her last annual review from 
Dr. Barber. Ms. Hatheway again received an overall "Outstanding" review as she had the two 
previous years, In pertinent parts of that review, Dr. Barber commented that Ms. Hatheway 
demonstrates a strongly positive attitude that greatly enhances the atmosphere in 
the depattmental office ... overall her civility one of her great assets ... Lillian never 
wavered in working to produce a positive overall atmosphere. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 294-295, L. 24-2, pp. 336 and 366-371) 
6 
2. Ms. Hatheway was continued to be viewed as an "outstanding" 
employee, in'espective of her concern regarding an issue of unfair pay 
differential with a new younger employee. 
On or about July 1,2005, the University employed Dr. Kurt Olsson to replace Dr. Barber 
as Chair of the Department of English. (R. VoL II, pp. 403 and 407-408) This meant that 
Dr. Olsson was now Ms. Hatheway's new supervisor. Dr. Olsson was the Chair of the English 
Department and Ms. Hatheway's supervisor for the remainder of Ms. Hatheway's employment 
with the University. During Dr. Olsson's tenure as the Chair of the English Department, 
according to his colleagues, Dr. Olsson was "kind of secretive in how he r[an] things" as the 
Department Chair. (R. Vol. II, p.p. 431 and 434) As of2009, Dr. Olsson is no longer employed 
by the University ofIdaho. CR. VoL II, pp. 403-404) 
Shortly after Dr. Olsson came on-board as the Chair in or around September 2005, with 
the assistance and support of Ms. l1atheway, Dr. Olsson hired Ms. Deborah Allen for the 
position of Financial Technician to the Department of English. CR. Vol. II, pp. 300, 310, 403 and 
409) Ms. Allen was being paid more than Ms. Hatheway, despite the identical pay grade with 
Ms. Hatheway, and Ms. Hatheway's higher "Hay Point"l rating and longer tenure. (R. Vol. II, 
pp. 300 and 310 and p. 319) Ms. Hatheway approached Dr. Olsson and other University officials 
several times regarding the pay rate differential between herself and Ms. Allen's position, 
expressing concern that she was being subjected to age discrimination. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300, 310-
I The Hay Point factor analysis is a method of job measurement used to establish the relative significance of jobs as 
they tit within an organization. At the University of Idaho, it is a way the University establishes pay grades for 
classified employees. Ms. Hatheway, whose job required knowledge of and how to interpret University policies and 
procedures, states that Hay points means that your job is considered a little more difficult and is a scale for the 
University to determine pay. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 310) 
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312) Ms. Hatheway's complaint was not about Ms. Allen as a person, it was about the fact that 
the Financial Tech position, with less "Hay Points," and who was younger with less tenure at the 
University was making more money. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 309) 
Regardless of her inquiries or concerns about this issue, Ms. Hatheway's initial 
professional relationship with Ms. Allen was not soured as a result of this issue.2 (R. Vol. II, pp. 
300 and 311) And Ms. Hatheway continued to be considered an excellent employee. In fact, in 
or around April 2006, Ms. Hatheway was nominated for the University of Idaho Outstanding 
Employee Award, for the year, by Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies for 
the Department of English, Dr. Walter A. Hesford. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 15~21) In Professor 
Hesford's nomination letter, he wrote of Ms. Hatheway: "Lillian is the administrative heart of the 
Department of English. Her skills and warmth are essential to the well-being of our faculty and 
students. She goes far beyond the call of duty to serve and bring us together." (R. Vol. III, p. 
519, L. 15-21, pp. 597-598) In March of 2006, Ms. Hatheway also received another outstanding 
performance evaluation. (R. Vol. II, p. 411, L. 7-10) 
3. On May 1, 2006, former University of Idaho President, Mr. Timothy 
P. White gave his State of the University Address urging older 
University employees to "get out of the way" and "retire" to help the 
University r'ecruit "young entry-level" individuals. 
Shortly after receiving her outstanding evaluation and this nomination, on or about May 
1, 2006, then University ofIdaho President, Timothy P. White, gave a "State of the University" 
address. While Ms. Hatheway was not present for the speech live, she later went to the 
? 
- In fact, Ms. Hatheway testified that she did not have a problem with Ms. Allen as a person. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 
and 329) 
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University's website and listened to a recording of it. (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 313-314) In that 
speech, President White indicated that some of the staff at the school needed to seriously 
consider retirement. President White stated, in his speech, that all employees had a 
responsibility, individually and collectively, to rctire, and that to help the University recruit 
young entry-level or mid-career persons, because "it is time to get out of the way." (R. Vol. III, 
p. p. 519, L. 21-23, pp. 600 and 611) President White further stated that he was going to ask the 
Deans to think about the barriers that are getting in the way of those who may want to go to a 
part-time appointment or to fully retire. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 22-23, pp. 600-613) In hearing 
this speech, Ms. Hatheway recalls feeling anxious and that she felt that she was going to be on 
her way out of the University. (R. Vol. II, p.p. 300 and 313-315) 
4. After President Timothy P. White's State of the University Address, 
Ms. Hatheway's work envit'onment started to become negative and 
hostile. 
After President White's speech, in or around the end of spring of 2006, Dr. Olsson's 
attitude and supervision of Ms. Hatheway changed dramatically. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 24-26) 
From approximately August 2006, until her separation of employment in September 2008, the 
University and its employees started to exhibit a pattern of behavior, conduct and comments 
towards and/or generally about age/older workers and retirement to Ms. Hatheway that sent the 
message to her that due to her age, "it's time to move that girl out." (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 318) 
Dr. Olsson frequently kept his office door shut, avoided communicating with Ms. Hatheway and 
failed to follow-up with Ms. Hatheway on scheduled or required meetings. (R. VoL III, p. 520, 
L. 1-18) Ms. Hatheway was ever increasingly isolated in the office, had her work space changed 
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without her knowledge while she was out of the office, was kept out of office decisions and 
communications that were necessary for Ms. Hatheway to be able to successfully perform her 
job, and had several of her primary job duties and responsibilities taken away from her. (R. Vol. 
III, p. 520, L. 1-18) 
In Ms. Hatheway's Administrative Assistant II position with the Department of English, 
six of Ms. Hatheway's "Essential" responsibilities included, but were not limited to: 
(l) [m]maintaining an up-to-date record of donors to the English department and consulting with 
the chair to send out thank-you letters for gifts; keeping current in Banner Alumni module; 
(2) [w]orking with chair and directors to maintain the departmental Web site and (future) online 
departmental newsletter; (3) [u]ndertaking the periodic inventory of departmental equipment; 
(4) [0 ]rdering supplies for the copier machine, and coordinating with other administrative 
assistants regarding ordering of supplies generally; (5) [p ]rocessing all biweekly payroll time 
entry and maintaining personnel sick, annual compensatory, and other time reports; and 
(6) [i]nterpreting, explaining, and applying department and university policies, regulations and 
procedures to faculty and students. CR. VoL III, p. 520, L. 1-18 and R. Vol. II, p. 294, L. 5-9, pp. 
335 and 339-347) Although those six "essential" duties and responsibilities remained in her job 
description, Dr. Olsson refused to allow her to perform them. 
Dr. Olsson started to not communicate even pleasantries of good-morning or good-bye, 
and often used his office door connected to the hall instead of his office door connected to the 
main office to bypass Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 1-18; p. 517, L. 25-26, pp. 528-544; 
and p. 518, L. 18-20 and R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 412-413) 
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Dr. Olsson acknowledges that Ms. Hatheway did come to him starting in 2006 with her 
concern that she was being kept out of the loop of communication and that he, Dr. Olsson, was 
not communicating to her. (R. VoL II, pp. 403 and 414) Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway 
was "upset" about the issue. However, Dr. Olsson recognized that it was appropriate for 
Ms. Hatheway to come to him with her concerns. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 415) 
5. During an English Department Faculty meeting on October 4, 2006, 
Dr. Olsson made comments that he would only consider "young" 
employees for a new position. 
Five months after President White expressed the new "ageist" policy, on or about 
October 4, 2006, there was an English Department Faculty meeting. During this meeting there 
was a discussion involving Dr. Olsson in regards to the hiring for a lecturer~level position for the 
MFA program. (R. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 19-22) During this discussion, Dr. Olsson made 
disparaging remarks about older workers and expressed his desire to only hire "young and 
energetic" employees. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300, 316, 437 and 440) 
At this meeting was Ms. Pamela Yenser, an approximately sixty-two (62) year-old part-
time instructor in the Depar1ment of English. who at the time was interested in the open position. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 437-439 and 441) After hearing this, Ms. Yenser addressed Dr. Olsson directly 
and said "[y]ou're talking about hiring a young and energetic person. What if there's somebody 
older and wiser and more experienced with a good resume and good qualifications? Wouldn't 
that person be appropriate for this position?" (R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and 440) In response, 
Dr. Olson answered Ms. Yenser back very quickly and said "[n]o. We're looking for someone 
young and energetic." (R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and 440) Dr. Olsson repeatedly made the statements 
II 
about "young and energetic" employees over and over in the meeting. (R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and 
440l After this meeting, Ms. Yenser relayed the events of the Faculty meeting and Dr. Olsson's 
age discriminatory comments to Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 317) Eventually, the 
individual who was hired for the lecturer-level position for the MFA program was Mr. Brandon 
Schrand. At the time of his hire, Mr. Schrand was thirty-six (36) years-old. (R. Vol. II, pp. 509-
516) 
6. Less than six months later, Ms. Hatheway began to receive negative 
performance evaluations from Dr. Olsson, which precluded an 
automatic pay raise. 
In or around March 23, 2007, Ms. Hatheway received her second annual performance 
evaluation from her supervisor, Dr. Olsson. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 383-392) This 
annual performance evaluation was for the rating period of 1-1-2006 to 12-31-2006. Unlike all 
of Ms. Hatheway's previous evaluations, in which she was rated overall as "Outstanding," 
suddenly this year's evaluation was very poor; although Ms. Hatheway had no "Needs 
Improvement" ratings on any previous evaluation, Ms. Hatheway received six (6) "Needs 
Improvement" ratings on her 2006 evaluation. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13. pp. 383 and 385-387) 
Due to Ms. Hatheway receiving at least one "Needs Improvement" rating on her annual 
evaluation, Ms. Hatheway was eligible for being placed on probation, and more detrimentally, 
she was ineligible for an automatic state pay raise. (R. Vol. III, p. 518, L. 21-24, pp. 589-592; 
p. 519, L. 1-3, pp. 594-595 and R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 328; 403 and 419) University policy 
3Eight University employees, including faculty at that hearing, all testified that they had no reason to call into 
question or issues with Ms. Yenser'$ truthfulness or veracity and no reason to doubt Ms. Yenser's recollection of 
Dr. Olsson's statements during the meeting. (R. Vol. II, pp. 431, 433; 449, 464-465; 470 and 476; 479-481; 486, 
488 and 489; 491, 494-495; 497, 499-500; 502 and 504-507) 
12 
3340A-IO(d.) and other University policies and procedures provide that if a classified employee 
of the University, receives at least one "Needs Improvement" rating on their annual evaluation, 
"the employee [is] placed on 90 day probation," and are automatically ineligible for an automatic 
state pay raise. CR. VoL III, p. 528, L. 21-24, pp. 589-592; p. 519, L. 10-3, pp. 594-595 and R. 
Vol. ; R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 328; 403 and 419 
The following day, Ms. Hatheway met with Dr. Olsson about the evaluation. When 
Ms. Hatheway arrived, she was surprised to find Ms. Suzanna Aaron, the University of Idaho 
Director of Administrative & Fiscal Operations in the room as well.4 Not understanding the 
ulterior purpose for Dr. Olsson having Ms. Aaron in the room, Ms. Hatheway did not allow her 
to stay. After Ms. Aaron left, Ms. Hatheway requested specific instances of situations related to 
her performance issues stated in the evaluation, which Dr. Olsson was unable to provide. (R. 
Vol. III, pp. 520-521, L. 25-5, pp. 528-545; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584) Ms. Hatheway stated, 
during this meeting to Dr. Olsson, that she believed that she was being discriminated based on 
her age. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 408) 
In response to this meeting, on March 16, 2007, Dr. Olsson sent April Preston, Director 
of Employment Services at the University, an e-mail summing up his meeting with 
Ms. Hatheway and stating in pali 
[s]he [Ms. Hatheway] wanted names, of course, but backed off immediately when I told 
her I would not provide them. At one point, she touched on age discrimination, but there 
she backed off quickly as well. Near the end of our chat, she said we're both nearing 
4 On or about February 28, 2007, prior to this meeting and prior to even providing Ms. Hatheway with the 
evaluation, Dr. Olsson sent April Preston an e-mail regarding having another individual in the meeting with him 
who was not objective and neutral, but rather someone who simply "may be perceived as neutral and objective by 
Lillian [Ms. Hatheway]." (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 393-395). Emphasis added. 
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retirement and implied, I'm guessing, that she wanted to be in English for the duration. 
The bottom line, however, is that she said she would not sign the evaluation. I assume 
that doesn't tie my hands ... she suggested we meet half-way, but I don't know what that 
means. I don't really want to change a thing. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 393-395) 
When Ms. Hatheway was provided her 2006 annual evaluation, she was also given a 
Performance Development Plan ("PDP") by Dr. Olsson. CR. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 23-24, pp. 615-
617) The PDP stated that fmiher instances of behaviors of Ms. Hatheway, exhibited during 
2006, (the year she was nominated for employee of the year) would not be tolerated. (R. Vol. n, 
p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 383, 391) The PDP also stated that the PDP, together with the annual 
evaluation given in March, 2007, constituted a "final" verbal warning and further instances 
would provide grounds for disciplinary action, yet Dr. Olsson did not give Ms. Hatheway any 
specific examples to determine what behaviors were at issue. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 
383,391) Ms. Hatheway refused to sign it because she did not agree with it. CR. Vol. II, pp. 300 
and 320) And although this was alleged to be a "final warning," Ms. Hatheway had never before 
received any warnings, write-ups, reprimands, or negative evaluations. 
Ms. Hatheway thereafter questioned Dr. Olsson on at least three more separate occasions 
for the reasons andlor specific instances of situations related to the alleged performance issues 
stated in the poor 2006 evaluation and PDP. Dr. Olsson was unable to provide Ms. Hatheway 
with any reasons or instances for the poor performance evaluation ratings and simply stated that 
Ms. Hatheway's work was "outstanding." Following Ms. Hatheway'S second discussion with 
Dr. Olsson regarding her poor 2006 evaluation, Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway needed to 
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"keep quiet and suck it up" and that she needed to "learn a lesson." (R. Vol. III, p. 521, L. 6-15) 
Additionally, after receiving the bad 2006 evaluation and inquiring into the factual reasons for 
her poor ratings, Ms. Hatheway was asked by Dr. Olsson as she was leaving for a vacation, "are 
you coming back?," suggesting that Dr. Olsson expected Ms. Hatheway to retire and not return. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 521, L. 6-15; p. 518, L. 15-17, pp. 575-584; and pp. 528-545.) 
Then, sometime in April 2007, Ms. Hatheway met with Dr. Olsson and University 
Ombudsman, Roxanne Schreiber. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 420-421) During this meeting, 
Ms. Hatheway again requested specific instances for performance problems to support the poor 
evaluation; nonetheless, again, Dr. Olsson was unable to provide any information. Instead, 
Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway's work was "outstanding" and that he, Dr. Olsson, was not 
a communicator. During this meeting, Ms. Schreiber stated to Ms. Hatheway that there was a 
"slim chance that Dr. Olsson would change the evaluation," and how she should just "move on." 
Therefore, the meeting ended at an impasse with no answers provided to Ms. Hatheway. CR. 
Vol. III, pp. 562-566; p. 518, L. 18-2 I, pp. 575-584; and pp. 521-522, L. 19-2) 
7. Despite receiving a poor evaluation, Ms. Hatheway again received a 
nomination for employee of the year at the University. 
Even after receiving her poor evaluation and the PDP from Dr. Olsson, on or around 
April 6, 2007, Ms. Hatheway received notice from the University that she was again nominated 
for the University of Idaho Outstanding Employee Award for the year. (R. Vol. III, p. 521, L. 
16~19, pp. 619-637; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584) 
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8. On April 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a Univel'sity of Idaho Problem 
Solving Request because of her unwarranted and unsupported poor 
annual employment review and Performance Development Plan, 
which worsened her treatment within the Department. 
On or about April 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a Problem Solving Request Form to the 
University, regarding in part, "Age discrimination" and "Retaliation." (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 18-
21, pp. 396-397) Ms. Hatheway believed that the lack of explanation of the unwarranted 
criticism of her performance which led to a disciplinary PDP and lack of pay raise, the continued 
push for "youth" as a University policy, demonstrated age discrimination. 
A few weeks later, on or about May 14,2007, Ms. Hatheway noticed that Ms. Allen had 
been provided with a new door to her office, allowing her the ability to shut-off Ms. Hatheway. 
At some point during that day, Ms. Hatheway heard Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen discussing the 
door to her office. Ms. Hatheway then heard Ms. Allen state to Dr. Olsson that "the door is 
sending up a red flag" in regards to Ms. Hatheway. (R. VoL III, p. 522, L. 3-7 and pp. 528-545) 
Days later, on or about May 18, 2007, Ms. Iiatheway had a meeting with Paul Michaud, 
Assistant V.P. of Human Resources, Dr. Olsson, and Dr. Nicholas Gier, the American Federation 
of Teachers Union President. During this meeting, again, Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway's 
work was outstanding and that he was not a communicator. Lastly, Mr. Michaud stated that 
Ms. Hatheway's complaints of discrimination and retaliation needed to be brought to the 
University of Idaho Human Rights Compliance Office. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 8~14 and p. 518, 
L. 18-21, pp. 575-584) 
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On June 1, 2007, Dr. Olsson provided Ms. Hatheway a response letter to their problem-
solving session of May 18, 2007. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403,422 and 428-429) In his response letter, 
he stated that he would not change her compensation level for the fiscal 2008 year, and that they 
should move forward with the PDP. Dr. Olsson ended his letter by stating that he would like to 
meet with Ms. Hatheway the following week to go over his letter and the PDP; however, 
Dr. Olsson admits that no such meeting ever occurred and they never met again about the PDP. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 403, 423 and 428-429) 
9. On May 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway met with the University of Idaho 
Human Rights Compliance Officer, and her work environment 
worsened. 
As a result of the unsubstantiated and unexplained evaluation and PDP, on or about May 
30,2007, Ms. Ifatheway followed University policy and had her first meeting with Ms. Andreen 
Neukraz-Butler, the University of Idaho I-Iuman Rights Compliance Officer. During this 
meeting, Ms. Hatheway reported her complaint of age discrimination. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 15-
17) 
Approximately a week later, on June 7, 2007, Ms. Hatheway overheard Dr. Olsson and 
Ms. Allen discussing an audit that was happening in the Department. CR. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 18~ 
23 and p. 518, L 1-3, pp. 547-560) During their discussion, Ms. Hatheway heard Dr. Olsson 
state to Ms. Allen that this was the "second go around" in regards to Ms. Hatheway, and how 
they were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 18-23 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 
547-560) Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen then discussed how the person that would replace 
Ms. Hatheway would do a lot of the same work as Ms. Hatheway'S job. CR. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 
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18-23 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Dr. Olsson admits in his deposition that he received a lot 
of information from Ms. Allen concerning Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. n, pp. 403 and 426) He 
stated that he and Ms. Allen "had to sort through these issues [in reference to Ms. Hatheway] if 
we were going to get forward - get anywhere." CR. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 426) 
A short time later, on or about June 27, 2007, as Dr. Olsson was preparing to leave for his 
annual summer vacation, Ms. Hatheway asked Dr. Olsson whether he was keeping her under 
surveillance. In response, Dr. Olsson admitted that he was keeping Ms. Hatheway under 
"continued surveillance" and watching "evidently [her] every move." (R. Vol. III, pp. 522-523, 
L. 24-2 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Thereafter, while Mr. Olsson was on leave for vacation, 
Ms. Allen repeatedly asked Ms. Hatheway when she planned to retire, and suggested that Ms. 
Hatheway should leave by stating to Ms. Hatheway that she would not stay in a place she wasn't 
wanted. (R. VoL III, p. 523, L. 3-6 and pp. 518 and 547-560) 
On or about August 1, 2007, Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson had a meeting to discuss 
Ms. Hatheway'S work environment; she specificalJy asked about Dr. Olsson's Faculty Meeting 
comments that he wanted an employee to be "young and energetic," as well as the numerous 
duties and tasks that were being taken away from her. Dr. Olsson admitted that he made the 
comment and then tried to rationalize it by stating that the employee would need to make a lot of 
phone calls and thus had to have "young energy." Ms. Hatheway then asked Dr. Olsson, based 
on what Ms. Yenser had told her, if he would consider a well-qualified experienced older person 
and he answered "no." (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L. 7·17; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584 and p. 518, L. 
1-3, pp. 547-560 and R. Vol. n. pp. 300 and 317) 
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Also during this meeting, Ms. Hatheway again questioned Dr. Olsson about her isolation 
in the office, not being informed or included in necessary communications needed to do her job, 
and how there had been numerous duties and tasks that he had taken away from her. 
Ms. Hatheway provided Dr. Olsson specific examples of duties and tasks taken away from her 
such as working with alumni, maintaining and creating websites, inventory tracking, and the 
elimination of decision to cross-train her position with the Financial Tech position. Ms. 
Hatheway expressed to Dr. Olsson that the treatment and hostility towards her in the office was 
cruel and that she would never do to a person what he was doing to her. In response, Dr. Olsson 
stated that he would have to rework Ms. Hatheway's job description, yet, that was apparently 
never completed. (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L. 18-26; p. 518. L. 18-21, pp. 575-584 and p. 518, L. 1-3, 
pp. 547-560) 
10. On August 28, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a charge of discrimination 
and retaliation with the Idaho Human Rights Commission and her 
work environment further deteriorated. 
As a result of the above conduct, actions and inactions, on or about August 28, 2007, 
Ms. Hatheway filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation against Defendant University of 
Idaho with the Idaho I-Iuman Rights Commission. (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L 18-26; p. 524, L. 15-
26, pp. 638-641 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Following this filing, Dr. Olsson continued to 
be hostile towards Ms. Hatheway, avoiding communications with her and keeping his office door 
closed. After filing the Human Rights charge, throughout the end of2007 and through the winter 
and spring of 2008, Ms. Hatheway continued to be isolated in her job, left out of critical 
communications and discussions and continued to have numerous job duties and responsibilities 
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taken away from her. Tn addition, other University employees began to approach Ms. Hatheway, 
harass her and make comments to her about retirement. For example, on or about April 3, 2008, 
Ms. Karen Thompsons, a Department of English instructor, approached Ms. Hatheway, allegedly 
on behalf of Ms. Allen, telling her it was probably not comfortable for Ms. Hatheway to be there, 
and so "why don't you get another job?", and asking "how long are you going to stay?" CR. Vol. 
III, p. 524, L. 4-14 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560)5 
11. On Apl'il 29, 2008, Ms. Hatheway received a second negative annual 
performance evaluation which again marked her as an employee who 
"needs improvement;" thereby initially disqualifying her once more 
for an automatic pay raise. 
A few weeks later, on or about April 29, 2008, Ms. Hatheway was provided her 2007 
annual performance evaluation for the rating period of 110112007 to 12/3112007. (R. Vol. III, p. 
524, L. 15-26, pp. 619-637) In light of the administrative procedures that were transpiring, 
Ms. Hatheway's 2007 evaluation was conducted and provided to her by the Associate Dean of 
the College of Letters, Arts, and Social Sciences, Ms. Debbie Storrs; regardless, it still received 
input directly from Dr. Olsson. 
To Ms. Hatheway's dismay, this 2007 evaluation was again another poor evaluation. 
Ms. Hatheway received another, two (2) "Needs Improvement" ratings. The two "Needs 
Improvement" ratings were given in the criteria of "teamwork" and "attendance." Receiving at 
least one "Needs Improvement" rating meant that Ms. Hatheway was again ineligible for the 
automatic state pay raise and eligible to be placed on probation. Therefore, Ms. Hatheway 
5 Dr. Olsson testified that Ms. Thompson approached him and told him that Ms. Hatheway did not like him, that 
Ms. Thompson stated that she herself had a problem, issue, or concern with Ms. Hatheway, and that Ms. Thompson 
and Ms. Allen had a fairly close relationship. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403, 416-417 and 424-425) 
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received a letter for May, 2008, stating that her pay was going to be frozen at the hourly rate of 
$13.03. This was the rate that it had been at since May to,2006. (R. Vol. III, p. 5159, L. 1-3, 
pp. 594-594; p. 524, L. 15-26, pp. 638-641 and pp. 528-545) 
In regards to the basis for receiving two negative marks, Ms. Hatheway's evaluation 
made vague references to "evidence" of unprofessional communication and unclear absences, 
without any specific details or instances provided. In fact, the evaluation stated that "[m)ost 
directors indicated she met or exceeded expectations in regard to teamwork, noting her polite and 
respectful response to requests and Willingness to engage in work that arises." (R. Vol. III, p. 
524, L. 15-26, pp. 619-636) The basis for the negative mark on unprofessional communication 
was from only one of the six evaluators. Yet, that evaluator, Dr. Robel1 Wrigley (whose 
supervisor at that time was also Dr. Olsson), testified, when questioned about his evaluation, that 
Ms. Hatheway "was always someone tremendously cordial, tremendously friendly, extremely 
nurturing." (R. Vol. II, p. 449 and 454) 
Following a meeting regarding her second straight terrible evaluation, on or about June 
12, 2008, Ms. Hatheway was provided an amended annual performance review for the 2007 year 
that still had a needs-to-improve rating on the area of "teamwork.,,6 As a result Ms. Hatheway 
continued to be ineligible for the automatic state pay raise and eligible to be placed on probation. 
However, on or about June 19, 2008, Ms. Hatheway received notification that she would receive 
a pay raise. (R. Vol. III, pp. 528-545 and p. 519, L. 1-3, pp. 594-595) 
6 The amended review had a change of the attendance criteria evaluation to "Meets Requirements." (R. VoL III, p. 
524, L. 15-16, pp. 638·64 J). 
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12. Ms. Hatheway's work conditions caused her bodily, mental and 
emotional injury, resulting in medical treatment, premature retire 
from the University of Idaho. 
The isolation, lack of communication, removal of job tasks, and hostility towards 
Ms. Hatheway in the office by Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen, and baseless poor evaluations leading 
to lack of pay raises caused Ms. Hatheway severe emotional stress and anxiety over her working 
conditions that resulted in dizziness and a rise in her blood pressure. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 
322) 
Due to the symptoms Ms. Hatheway was suffering as a result of the incidents with the 
University, on or about August 21, 2008, Ms. Hatheway sought medical treatment with her 
primary health care provider, Dr. Richard K. Howe, M.D., at Moscow Family Medicine. (R. 
Vol. II, pp. 300 and 306-308 and R. Vol. III, p. 643, L. 4-7, pp. 646-655) Dr. Howe objectively 
assessed Ms. Hatheway with "anxiety [that was] poorly controlled with recent stresses at work." 
CR. Vol. III, p. 643, L 4-7, pp. 646-655) 
A few days later, on or about August 25, 2008, Ms. Hatheway woke up feeling very 
"dizzy" and was unable to go to work; as a result, she returned to Dr. Howe. Dr. Howe then 
assessed Ms. Hatheway with "dizziness for a few days some improvement - possible anxiety 
symptoms" and then placed Ms. Hatheway off of work for a few days. CR. Vol. III, p. 643, L 4-
7, pp. 646-655) 
With being placed on medical leave, discussing her medical issues and work with 
Dr. Howe, and realizing that the University's conduct at work was causing her severe physical, 
mental and emotional troubles, on or about August 28, 2008, Ms. Hatheway decided to provide 
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the University notice that she could no longer work under the conditions and therefore was being 
forced to retire. (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 323-324) Ms. Hatheway testified that simply "the work 
conditions became intolerable." (R. Vol. II, pp. 479 and 482) So on that day, Ms. Hatheway 
provided Dr. Olsson and the University a letter informing them of her intention to retire from the 
University of Idaho on September 12, 2008. The University staff recognized that Ms. Hatheway 
was upset with leaving. CR. Vol. 11, pp. 479 and 482) 
13. Following Ms. Hatheway's forced departure, Dr. Olsson hired a 
replacement for Ms. Hatheway who was thirty-two (32) years old, and 
gave that individual a higher starting salary than Ms. Hatheway had 
at the end of her employment tenure with the University. 
After Ms. Hatheway's constructive discharge from the University, Dr. Olsson embarked 
on hiring Ms. Hatheway's replacement. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 427) On December 8, 2008, 
Dr Olsson hired a woman by the name of Ms. Brittney Carmen. At the time of her hire, 
Ms. Carmen was 32-years-old. (R. VoL II, pp. 509-5] 1) In addition, when Ms. Carmen 
was hired, her starting hourly wage was higher, $13.75 per hour, than Ms. Hatheway'S hourly 
wage at the end of her employment, $13.41. (R. VoL II, pp. 513-516) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's age 
discrimination claims, including disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and constructive 
discharge, under the IHRA? 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's 
retaliation claim under the IHRA? 
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3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim? 
III. A TTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
An award of attorney fees may be granted to the prevailing party on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, when the court is left with the abiding belief 
that the appeal has been brought, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2002); (see, ~, Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
L.L.c., 140 Idaho 354, 365 (2004) (holding that a district COUlt's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of a purchaser was improper, and that therefore attorney fees for the appealing party was 
proper pursuant to LA.R. 41 because it was the prevailing patty on appeal and the saJe agreement 
further provided as such). A plaintiff may be entitled to an award of fees for an appeal under the 
prevailing party standard even though a defendant could ultimately be found to be the prevailing 
party after triaL Bowen v. Heth, 120 Idaho 452 (Ct. App. 1991). Thereby, if the Supreme Court 
determines that the District Court's grant of summary judgment was improper, and 
Ms. Hatheway is implicitly the prevailing party for purposes of the appeal, and Supreme Court 
should award Ms. Hatheway her attorney's fees for having to bring this unnecessary appeal. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Hatheway presented evidence that the University and her direct supervisor voiced a 
policy to promote youthful hiring and removing aging employees, immediately after which she 
began to receive her first ever poor evaluations, was denied pay raises, and significantly lost job 
duties. The University also hired a younger contemporary and paid her more despite University 
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rules. Ms. Hatheway was also treated poorly, and subjected to continued, age-based, harassing 
behavior such as comments about retirement, about her not returning to work, and refusal to 
include her in departmental communications and operations. The evidence presented included 
undisputed statements and speeches from the University President, an undisputed pay differential 
with younger employees, an undisputed change in her performance evaluations, established 
comments from her supervisors on the necessity for young employees, and her own testimony of 
comments and conduct by her supervisor and others for the University. This evidence created 
both direct evidence of discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and constructive 
discharge, as well as establishing a prima facie case to hurdle the ItMcDonnell Douglas" burden 
shifting analysis on pretextual explanation for discriminatory conduct. However, the trial court 
incorrectly applied the burden of proof in a discrimination claim, improperly weighed the 
evidence and made credibility determinations, which led him 10 rule that no issues of fact 
existed. 
v. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard of Review on a discrimination case precludes an aware of 
summary judgment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de 
novo. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008). In such a case, the 
Idaho Supreme Court employs the same standard as that used by the trial court when ruling on 
the motion. Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747 (1995). 
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Summary judgment should be granted only if the court determines that "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." LR.C.P. 56Ce); Sharp v. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 299 (1990); Bonz v. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 (1991). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of 
the nonmoving paI1y, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be 
drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 299; Bonz, 119 
Idaho at 541. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not within the court's 
province to assess the credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can be tested in court 
before a trier of fact. 80hn v. Folev, 125 Idaho 168,171 (Ct.App. 1994); Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 
116 Idaho 708, 711 (Ct.App. 1989). The role of the trial court at the summary judgment stage is 
limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried; it does not 
extend to deciding them. Curlee, 148 Idaho at 396. 
Specifically in employment discrimination cases, there is a high standard for granting of 
summary judgment. Schnidrig v. Colum. Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406,1410 (9th Clr. 1996).7 At 
the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff who alleged employment discrimination's burden is 
not high. Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cif. 2003). Very little evidence is 
necessary to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case because the ultimate question is 
one that can only be resolved through a "searching inquiry" - one that is most appropriately 
7 fdaho and other state courts routinely use federal court decisions interpreting federal anti-discrimination laws such 
as the ADEA for guidance and interpretation of the Idaho Human Rights Act and other state anti-discrimination 
laws. See,~, Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812, (1979); Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33 (1982); 
Pottenger, 329 F.3d 740. 
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conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record. Schnidrig, 80 FJd at 1410; Lam v. Univ. of 
Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cil'. 1994). Ifa rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, 
find that the employer's action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons, summary 
judgment for the defense is inappropriate. Wallis v. lR. SI111plot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
Once a prima facie case is established, summary judgment for the defendant will 
ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a 
[discrimination] dispute is the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. 
Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991). Courts are hesitant to grant summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases, if issues of motive or intent are involved because in such 
cases, genuine issues of fact usually exist. Evans v. Tech. Apnlications & Serv.Co., 80 F.3d 954 
(4th Cil'. 1996); Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982). 
When motive and intent are involved, the summary judgment standard is to be applied rigorously 
in employment discrimination cases because intent and credibility are frequently crucial issues. 
Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 FJd 353 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, summary judgment is not 
proper if the plaintiff has produced more than a scintilla of evidence that the employer's motive 
for the adverse action was illegitimate. Flavel v. Svedala Indus., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994). 
Thus, because of inherently factual nature of the employment discrimination inquiry, a 
plaintiff need produce very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of 
fact. Any indication of discriminatory motive may suffice to raise a question that can only be 
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resolved by a fact-finder. Unfortunately, in granting the University of Idaho's motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court did assess the credibility of affiants, decided genuine 
issues of material fact, and did not construe disputed facts liberally in favor of the non-moving 
patty, Ms. Hatheway. 
B. There are genuine issues of material fact, credibility determinations, and 
issues of motive and intent which should have precluded summary judgment 
on Ms. Hatheway's IHRA age discrimination claims. 
The facts and evidence presented in this case establish a genuine issue of fact that 
Ms. Hatheway was subjected to intentional age discrimination (as opposed to unintentional, 
disparate impact discrimination) by the University ofIdaho. 
To establish a prima facie case of her age discrimination claim Ms. Hatheway must show 
that: (1) she is at least 40 years of age; (2) she was qualified for her position and performing her 
job in a satisfactory manner; (3) she was discharged (including constructive discharge) or her 
employer took adverse employment actions against her; and (4) her position was filled by a 
younger person of equal or less qualifications. The third element of the prima facie case above 
may be found by a sub~claim of constructive discharge, which Ms. Hatheway has alleged (in 
addition to other adverse employment actions). Under a constructive discharge claim, the 
plaintiff must show that "a reasonable person in [the employee's] position would have felt that 
(the employee] was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working conditions. 
Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1411; Waterman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667 (2009). 
Ms. Hatheway soundly meets all elements of the prima facie cases set forth above. 
Particularly considering that the proof required to establish a prima facie case on an employment 
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discrimination claim is "minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance 
of the evidence." Chuang v. Onlv. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 
2000) (detennining that remarks about "two chinks" in reference to Chinese-American professor 
seeking tenure at university was sufficient to create issue of fact as to professor's prima-facie 
case for race discrimination). The prima facie case may be based either on direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent or a presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas, which allows indirect evidence to establish a prima facie case where there 
may not be direct motive of discrimination. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (citing Lowe v. City of 
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985). 
As stated in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Gross v. FEL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 
U.S. 167 (2009) "plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must 
prove [at trial], by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the 
challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer 
to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced 
some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision." Gross, Inc., 557 U.S. at 180. 
However, Gross does not place a heightened evidentiary requirement on ADEA plaintiffs to 
prove that age was the sole cause of the adverse employment action. Jones v. Oklahoma City 
Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277-1278 (lOth Cir. 2010). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Ms. Hatheway is over forty and was replaced by a 
younger employee under forty. Furthermore, the District Court in this case found, and 
Ms. Hatheway takes no issue with the District Court's Opinion and Order in regards to the 
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second element of the prima facie case of age discrimination that "whether Ms. Hatheway was 
performing her job in a satisfactory manner is factually disputed and as such is not conducive to 
a determination on motion for summary judgment." (R. Vol. III, p. 679) 
Therefore, the crux of the dispute of the ease on summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's 
age discrimination claims and constructive discharge claim are: (l) whether there are genuine 
issues of material fact that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions and/or was 
constructive discharged; and (2) if so, whether there are genuine issues of material fact that but-
for Ms. Hatheway'S age and/or her protected activities engaged in, she would not have suffered 
the adverse employment actions and/or was constructively discharged. The District Court erred 
in its decision granting summary judgment on these two issues because there is direct evidence 
which creates genuine issues of material fact that both Ms. Hatheway did suffer adverse 
employment actions, was constructive discharged, and that but-for Ms. Hatheway's age, she 
would not have suffered those adverse employment actions and constructive discharge. 
1. There is direct evidence that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse 
employment actions and that age and/or engagement in protected 
activities was the but-for cause of her adverse employment actions 
suffered. 
The District Court wrongly found that Ms. Hatheway'S claims of age discrimination 
failed as a matter of law because Ms. Hatheway could not meet the prima facie element that she 
was (constructively) discharged or her employer took adverse employment actions against her 
based on a discrimination motive. However, Ms. Hatheway presented direct evidence that the 
University and its agents made ageist comments and established a policy of seeking young 
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employees who they paid more to, while mistreating a previously highly regarded but older 
employee. 
Direct evidence in the context of a discrimination case is defined as evidence of conduct 
or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly 
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that 
that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Enlow v. 
Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004). Stated another way, 
direct evidence is evidence, which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without 
inference or presumption. Goodwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Furthennore, 
[w]hen a plaintiff does not rely exclusively on the presumption but seeks 
to establish a prima facie case through the submission of actual evidence, 
very little such evidencc is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact 
regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive 
... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder. 
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009. 
Using the above rational in a Motion for Summary Judgment on a discrimination case, 
courts have held: 
when a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of disparate 
treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
intent, he will necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated reason 
for its employment decision." ... When (the] evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas 
presumption, a factual question will almost always exist with respect to 
any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. The existence of this question of 
material fact will ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment. 
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Schnidrig, Inc., 80 F.3d at 1410; Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. ColI. Dist, 934 F.2d 1104, 
1 I 11 (9th Cir.) (quoting Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009).8 Here, there was an abundance of direct 
evidence that shows that Ms. Hatheway did suffer multiple adverse employment actions as a 
direct result of discriminatory motive. 
(a) The evidence established that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse 
employment actions leading to constructive discharge. 
First, another employee who was younger, had less tenure with the University, and less 
"Hay Points" than Ms. Hatheway, and received a higher rate of pay than Ms. Hatheway. At the 
time of her hire, Ms. Allen was 47 years old and Ms. Hatheway was 62 years old; which is a 15 
year difference of age between the two.9 After raising that issue with Dr. Olsson and the Dean, 
and stating that she believed that it was based on her age, Ms. Hatheway was denied a remedy. 
Second, after complaining about that issue after President White's speech about older 
workers needing to retire, and Dr. Olsson's ageist comments, the University began a pattern of 
behavior conduct and comments that materially affected the compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of Ms. Hatheway's employment. This included, but is not limited to, isolating her, 
8 When an employee presents direct evidence to support his or her disparate treatment claim, the COUlt will not 
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis (which is discllssed below in section V.B.2), See Enlow v., 
389 F.3d at 812 (stating that when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment based on direct evidence in an ADEA 
claim, we do not apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
93 s,Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U,S. Ill, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), 
the Supreme Comt instructed that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct 
evidence of discrimination,"). 
9 The fact that Ms. Allen was over 40 years of age, i.e., she herself was in the protected class for age discrimination 
is not probative, Case law provides that the fact that an individual loses out to another individual in the same 
protected class is irrelevant, so long as the individual is being discriminated against based on their age. O'Connor v. 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp .. 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). 
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keeping her out of the loop of communications, changing her work area without her notice, 
failing to follow-up and having required meetings with Ms. Hatheway, and taking away several 
of her essential job duties and responsibilities. The University admits that they did not follow~up 
on some of the required meetings and that they rearranged her work area. They also admit that 
Ms. Hatheway had some of her essential job duties and responsibilities removed from her. 
"[S]ignificantly diminished material responsibilities" is an indication of a material adverse 
employment action. Waterman,146 Idaho at 672-673, citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
Third, after raising her issues with regards to her pay and stating that she believed the 
disparity was based on her age (and President White and Dr. Olsson's ageist comments), and 
receiving negative conduct and actions within the office, Ms. Hatheway received back to back 
poor annual evaluations, the first ever in her entire professional career. The evaluations were 
completely subjective and Ms. Hatheway has presented evidence, that when viewed in a light 
most favorably to her, shows they were untrue. This resulted in Ms. Hatheway being 
disqualified for an automatic pay raise and being on probation (according to the University's 
polices). The evaluation, coupled with the PDP was "a final verbal warning," Accordingly, this 
direct, undisputed evidence alone clearly establish an adverse employment action to survive 
summary judgment on that element of Ms. Hatheway'S claims. 
The facts and evidence discussed above further create a material issue of fact that 
Ms. Hatheway was constructively discharged. That is, a reasonable jury could clearly conclude 
that Ms. Hatheway'S working conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person in her 
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shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Those facts and evidence include, but not limited to: 
(1) being denied a pay raise due to a younger, less tenured, less hay points individual receiving a 
larger pay rate; (2) receiving back to back needs-to-improve evaluations based on false and 
erroneous allegations which resulted in being eligible for probation and being disqualified for her 
automatic pay raises after complaining about perceived age discrimination; (3) having 
Ms. Hatheway's supervisor and the University tell her and/or hearing comments such as "keep 
quiet and suck it up," "move on," "are you coming back" (suggesting she should retire), that they 
were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway," they had her under "continued surveillance," admitting 
that Dr. Olsson wanted a "young and energetic" employee, and being asked "why don't you get 
another job ... do you like your job ... how long are you going to stay?," (4) being placed in 
isolation. being removed from the loop of necessary communication. not being followed-up with 
required meetings, having her work space rearranged without her knowledge, and having 
essential job duties and responsibilities taken from Ms. Hatheway; and (5) having 
Ms. Hatheway's doctor place her off of work due to the bodily, mental and emotional symptoms, 
including physical manifestations such as the dizziness and rise in blood pressure, Ms. Hatheway 
was suffering from the stress and anxiety that was being caused by the University. 
Based on the above, it is plain that there were genuine issues of material fact created by 
the direct evidence on the issue of whether Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions 
and/or was constructive discharged; therefore the District Court's grant of summary judgment on 
that basis was erroneous and the Supreme Court should reverse the Opinion and Order. 
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(b) The facts and evidence provided by Ms. Hatheway further establish 
that these adverse employment actions lead to constructive discharge 
were based on discriminatory animus. 
Ms. Hatheway presented directed statements by persons involved in the decision-making 
process, President White and Dr. Olsson that directly reflect discriminatory attitude against age. 
This is sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that Ms. Hatheway's age and/or her reporting 
of age discrimination was the cause of her adverse employment actions. Yet, despite the 
standard that the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hatheway, that 
credibility determinations are not to be made on summary judgmeneO, and that all inferences are 
to be made for the non-moving party, the District Court abused its discretion and found that Ms. 
Hatheway had not provided direct evidence on the University's and Dr. Olsson's age biased 
motive and intent. This was in error. 
First, Defendants do not deny all of the ageist comments made in this case; however, they 
stated that Plaintiff could not survive summary judgment because said comments were "stray 
comments" and Ms. Hatheway could not establish a nexus for them to the adverse actions. 
Ultimately the court agreed with the University that the ageist comments were allegedly "stray 
comments. " 
While "stray remarks" by non-decisiolID1akers or by decision makers unrelated to the 
decision process are given less weight, courts do recognize the weight given is somewhat 
dependent on whether the comments are temporally remote from the date of decision. See, 
J 0 As stated above, it is not with in the court's province on summary judgment to assess the credibility of an affiant 
or deponent as credibility is left for the trier of fact at trial. Sohn, 125 Idaho at 171. 
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Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992). While 
comments can be made without suggesting age discrimination, "like any remarks, they must be 
viewed in context, along with the specific language used and the number of times the comments 
were made." Schug v. The Pyne-Davidson Co., No. 2001 WL 34312877, at *5 CD.Conn. 2001). 
As the Ninth Circuit Court stated in a recent age discrimination case that "[ d]etermining whether 
the comments were, in fact, innocuous or, in fact, a sign of bias belongs to the jury." Troy v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 24 Fed.Appx. 801,803 (9th Cir. 2001). 
As the facts provided above offer, especially when viewed in the light most favorably to 
Ms. Hatheway, there were several age andlor age discrimination retaliation related comments 
made in this case which were not stray comments, but instead is direct evidence of age biased 
intent and motive, all temporally related to her declining treatment, evaluations and pay. Some 
of those comments included, but are not necessarily limited to: (1) "we also have a 
responsibility, individually and collectively, to retire. And when we get to that point in life where 
we're not as productive, where it'll help the University and our program that we care so deeply 
about, recruit a young entry-level or mid-career person. It is time to get out of the way."; (2) 
"keep quiet and suck it up,"; (3) "move on,"; (4) "are you coming back" (suggesting 
Ms. Hatheway should retire); (5) that they were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway:" (6) they had 
Ms. Hatheway under "continued surveillance:" (7) Dr. Olsson wanted a "young and energetic" 
employee; and "no" he would not consider a qualified older worker (8) and being asked "why 
don't you get another j ob ... do you like your job ... how long are you going to stay?" 
36 
All of the above comments clearly give rise to the inference of anti-age bias and/or age 
discrimination retaliation, which created a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment. 
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Union Camp Co.!1'...;., 48 FJd 22, 28-29 (1 st Cir. 1995), citing Calhoun v. 
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (lst Cir.1986) (stating in pertinent part that repeated 
and/or coercive inquiries can clearly give rise to a reasonable inference of an anti-age bias (and 
lend support to a finding of constructive discharge), see Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 562-63 (three 
inquires over seven months coupled with demotion requiring employee to report to younger 
person employee had previously trained, and threat of onerous working conditions if no 
resignation). 
Additionally, the first of those comments were made by former University president 
Timothy P. White during his State of the University Address. The facts and evidence of this case 
show that the President's speech was made on or about May 1, 2006, right before the time that 
the adverse employment conducts started to occur against Ms. Hatheway. President White's 
comments were also made shortly before Dr. Olsson's similar "young" comments reflecting age 
discriminatory animus were made at the Faculty meeting. The comments made by President 
White during his State of the University Address concerning age were made in the open to all 
University employees, were made as the senior decision-maker of the University and were made 
regarding assignments, promotions and university policies. The remarks made by him were not 
merely general observations or loose comments, but rather were statements meant to have 
purpose and policy at the University, and to cause older University employees to retire. 
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This power and influence is evidenced by the treatment of Ms. Hatheway. The 
reasonable inference that can be drawn is that President White's comments and position on age 
and retirement were intended, and ultimately did shape and influence the intentions of the 
University's decision-makers attitude toward its older workers. That intention and attitude of the 
University decision-makers was for older retirement age University employees to retire and 
allow the University to hire "young, entry-level or mid-career persons" to replace them. That is 
exactly what occurred in this case. First, Dr. Olsson stated that he would only consider a 
"young" person for the MFA position. The individual hired for that position was thirty-six years 
old, below the protected classification for age. Then, after Dr. Olsson successfully forced 
Ms. Hatheway into retirement, he was able to hire a "young" replacement for her, Ms. Brittney 
Carmen. At the time of her hire, Ms. Carmen was thirty-two years old, again below the 
protected classification of age. 
Furthermore, when the fact section above is set out in sequential order, the direct 
evidence establishes a temporal relationship between the comments and the adverse employment 
action(s) Ms. Hatheway suffered, Temporal relationships create a sufficient nexus. The 
President's speech occurred right before Ms. Hatheway began to suffer the negative treatment 
and conduct. including, but not limited to, the isolation, lack of communication and removal of 
some of her essential job duties. Then, Dr. Olsson's comments about a "young and energetic" 
employee occurred right before her first poor evaluation. Lastly, the other age related comments 
occurred as Ms. Hatheway was being subjected to a hostile work environment after Ms. 
Hatheway reported her belief of Age Discrimination and in the form of two poor annual 
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evaluations, removal of some of her essential job duties, and being set-up for failure in her 
position by Dr. Olsson by isolating and keeping her out of the loop of communications. 
Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment was improper and should be reversed. 
2. In addition to the direct evidence, Ms. Hatheway'S age discrimination 
claim and constructive discharge claim must not be dismissed on 
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
analysis. 
Even assuming that the evidence of genuine issues of fact of age discrimination, hostile 
work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge in this case was not sufficiently 
"direct," the COUli should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the University under 
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test. At the summary judgment stage in age 
employment discrimination cases, where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, courts, 
including the Ninth Circuit (citing Gross) still use the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See, e.g., 
Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 607·08 (9th Cil'. 2012). Courts in the Ninth Circuit recognize 
that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for age discrimination claims under both 
the ADEA and the IHRA where an employee must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
disparate treatment. Enlow, 389 F.3d at 812. 
The McDonnell Douglas is simply "a tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment 
stage so that they may reach trial .. , [I]t is not normally appropriate to introduce the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework 10 the jury." Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 
(9th Cir.2002). The McDonnell Douglas test is if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, '[ t]he 
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some 
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions.' Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgn1t., Inc., 
615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Chuang, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2000)). 
"If defendant meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of material fact as to 
whether the defendant's proffered reasons for their terminations are mere pretext for unlawful 
discrimination." Id. 
A plaintiff can prove pretext (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is 'unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not 
believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the 
employer. Shelley, 666 F.3d at 609. See, also Morrow v. Bard Access Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 
2471525 (D. Or. 2011) (wherein a plaintiff who contended that age, not misconduct, was the 
reason for his termination, survived summary judgment when the plaintiff largely relied on his 
own affidavit, in which he describes statements made by several of defendant's managers that 
may be construed as demonstrating age bias; the court held that at a summary judgment 
proceeding, the veracity of plaintiffs testimony was not before the court, accepted the plaintiffs 
testimony as true for purposes of the pending motion, and found that a reasonable trier of fact 
could find that plaintiffs termination was an unlawful employment practice). 
Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to this case, Ms. Hatheway 
must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 
F.3d 454, 456 (9th Cir. 1995). As set forth above, taking Ms. Hatheway'S evidence as true, and 
giving the benefit of all inferences, there is ample evidence in the record to create a genuine issue 
of material fact on each element of the prima facie case of age discrimination. 
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The burden then shifts to the employer, the University of Idaho, to articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. It was the University's position on its 
motion for summary judgment, which ultimately the District Court agreed, that its basis for its 
adverse employment actions were that Ms. Hatheway was simpJy an unhappy employee who 
disliked her co-workers and the poor evaluations were justified. The University argued thereby, 
and the District Court wrongly agreed that Ms. Hatheway then could not establish her claims 
because of their proffered non-discriminatory reason. 
However, Ms. Hatheway provided sufficient evidence to rebut andlor at least create 
issues of material fact that the University's reasons for its adverse employment actions were not 
believable, inconsistent, and were in fact false (pretextual). Ms. Hatheway presented evidence 
that, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, shows that she was actually an exceptional 
employee, who was not disgruntled, and that the poor evaluations were not factually justified. 
The argument that Defendants' alleged non-discriminatory reason is in fact a pretext to 
discrimination is bolstered by the undisputed evidence that Ms. Hatheway was a highly regarded 
University employee who had been nominated for numerous University awards, always received 
excellent yearly evaluations and had an impeccable work history up to the point of the 
discrimination and retaliation occurred. 
In her last yearly evaluation given to Ms. Hatheway by Dr. Barber, it rated her as 
outstanding. In her last yearly evaluation give to Ms. Hatheway before the discrimination and 
retaliation began, Dr. Olsson rated Ms. Hatheway also as outstanding. Yet, after the ageist 
comments by Dr. White and Dr. Olsson were made, and Ms. Hatheway'S complaints thereof, 
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Ms. Hatheway then received in her very next annual evaluation an overall rate of below 
expectations, placing her on probation and denying her an automatic state pay raise. The timing 
of this is a significant circumstantial fact because the only two real matters that occurred between 
these evaluations were the Faculty meeting and Prcsident White's speech. It is implausible and 
inherently inconsistent to state on one hand that Ms. Hatheway was a bad employee who needed-
to-improve, and on the other receive nominations for the outstanding employee of the year. 
Accordingly, the circumstantial evidence of Ms. Hatheway's superior work history, the positive 
comments made by her peers, and the recognition for her outstanding work during the same time 
that she was receiving the adverse employment actions against her, tends to show that the 
Defendants' reason for the adverse employment action against Ms. Hatheway was really a 
pretext to discrimination. 
Even Defendants' proffered reason for its adverse employment actions against 
Ms. Hatheway, i.e. a personality conflict with Ms. Allen and being an unhappy employee which 
allegedly resulted in misconduct by Ms. Hatheway, creates a genuine issue of material fact still 
exists on that issue. Stated plainly, there are two competing inferences that can be drawn from 
the evidence, the University's and Ms. Hatheway'S. Ms. Hatheway's reasonable competing 
inference from the evidence is that it was Ms. Hatheway'S age andior her reporting of age 
discrimination was the basis for the negative reviews and the negative actionsiconduct she 
received fr0111 the University which forced her to retire. Consequently, two competing 
reasonable inferences create a question of fact that can only be decided by the trier of fact. 
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Moreover, if the facts and evidence establish that Ms. Hatheway was an unhappy 
employee, it was due to the fact that she was being subjected to discrimination and retaliation 
because in paxt the bases for her poor evaluations were false and/or lacked merit. The University 
cannot use Ms. Hatheway's proper reporting or discussions of her treatment as proof of her lack 
of "teamwork," and then use it as the basis for her poor treatment. And, that issue is a question 
of credibility which requires a subjective analysis, one that the District COUIt was not allowed to 
make, yet did regardless. As stated in the standard of review section above, in reviewing such 
credibility and subjective documents in a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, Ms. Hatheway, and the Court must 
not make credibility determinations. See, e.g., Stansbury v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Serv., 
Inc., 128 Idaho 682, 685-86 (1996) (wherein the Idaho Supreme COUIt in a discrimination case 
took all of a non-moving plaintiffs assertions to be true, and held, in light of a factual dispute, to 
vacate a district court's entry of summary judgment against the plaintiff). 
As a result of the above arguments, and based upon the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the 
District COtllt's grant of summary judgment was wrong and should be overturned. 
C. Issues of fact existed on Ms. Hatheway's hostile work environment claim to 
preclude summary judgment. 
To prevail at trial on her hostile work environment age discrimination claim, 
Ms. Hatheway must show: (1) she was subject to verbal or physical conduct of a [age 
discriminatory} nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; (3) that the conduct was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive 
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working environment; and that (4) the employer ratified, knew, or should have known about the 
conduct. Like hostile work environment claims brought under Title VII, employees who allege a 
hostile work environment under the ADEA must prove the existence of severe or pervasive and 
unwelcome verbal or physical harassment because of the employee's age. See 
Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1109 (superseded by statute on other grounds) (recognizing a 
claim for a hostile work environment based on age under the ADEA). 
The facts and evidence suppOlting the constructive discharge claim from the materials 
submitted at the motion for summary judgment also supports that the District Court should not 
have granted summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway'S hostile work environment claim. The facts 
and evidence brought forth by Ms. Hatheway, when considered true, and viewed in the light 
most favorably to her establish that there are genuine issues of material fact a reasonable jury 
could use to conclude that: (1) Ms. Hatheway was subjected to verbal or physical conduct 
because of her age; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome, as evidenced by her numerous 
complaints about it and ultimately being forced to retire; (3) that the conduct was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to aIter the conditions of the Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive 
working environment, which is also evidence by the fact that there was an abusive working 
environment that caused Ms. Hatheway to suffer bodily, mental and emotional harm, which 
necessitated medical treatment, and Jeft her no reasonable cboice but to quit; and that (4) the 
employer ratified, knew, or should have known about the conduct at issue but failed to take 
action or took insufficient action to prevent it, as evidenced by Ms. Hatheway'S early and often 
complaints to Dr. Olsson, the Dean, and to the IHRC of the age discriminatory conduct, which 
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continued up through the point of her retirement. Therefore, the University of Idaho's motion 
for summary judgment on this claim was also improperly granted. 
D. Issues of fact existed on Ms. Hatheway's retaliation claim to preclude 
summary judgment. 
To prevail at trial on her retaliation claim, Ms. Hatheway must show that she was 
discriminated against because she "opposed any practice made unlawful by this chapter [the 
IHRA] or because such individual has made a charge, testified, assisted, or patticipated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter." Patterson v. State, 
Dept. of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 318 (2011); I.C. § 67-5911. Case law provides that 
the prima facie elements Ms. Hatheway must show for a retaliation claim are a (1) protected 
activity, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) causation. Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 
F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003). 
"Protected activities include: (1) opposing an unlawful employment practice; and (2) 
participating in a statutorily authorized proceeding." E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & 
Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). It is not disputed that Ms. Hatheway engaged in 
protected activities by both opposing a (disputed) unlawful employment practice, and also 
participated in a statutorily authorized proceeding. 
Generally under retaliation claims, an "adverse employment action" is "any adverse 
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party 
or others from engaging in a protected activity." &!Lv. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th 
Cir. 2000). This definition includes actions "materially affect[ing] compensation, terms, 
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conditions, or privileges" of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); Kortan v. CaL Youth 
Auth., 2 17 FJd 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). The direct evidence in this case establishes that Ms. 
Hatheway both opposed an unlawful employment practice, but also participated in a statutorily 
authorized proceeding when she filed her Idaho Human Rights Complaint. Direct evidence 
establishes that ShOlily thereafter, Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions including 
poor evaluations, isolation, failure to receive increase in pay, and removal of her employment 
duties. 
Further, direct and circumstantial evidence shows that the reasons for the adverse 
employment actions were false, and the timing and nexus of those actions creates a question of 
fact on the issue of causation. Causation is generally held to be a question of fact that can only 
be determined by a trier of fact. See ~ Ennis v. Boundary County, 2010 WL 2813361 (D. 
Idaho July 15, 2010) (holding on a summary judgment motion on a retaliation claim that the 
"element of causation [is] purely a question of fact.) Thereby, thcre is, at the very least, material 
questions of fact surrounding the timing and motive/intent of those adverse actions which only 
took place after Ms. Hatheway reported her beliefs that she was suffering from age 
discrimination; this then must necessarily preclude summary judgment 
E. There are genuine issues of material fact which should have precluded 
summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim. 
The District Court improperly dismissed Ms. Hatheway'S negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim because it found the University did not engage in age discrimination, 
hostile work environment, or retaliation, and as result, found that there was no duty that was 
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breached. The District Court's determination on this issue was wrong because Ms. Hatheway 
clearly raises genuine issues of material facts on her age discrimination, hostile work 
environment, and retaliation claims. Thereby, according to the District Court's own logic and 
analysis in granting summary judgment, summary judgment on appeal must be reversed. 
Moreover, Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim arises out of 
the tortious conduct involved in the age discrimination, the hostile work environment, retaliation 
and constructive discharge by the wrongful handling of the allegations of her alleged misconduct 
and the failure by the University to act with care towards Ms. Hatheway. In wrongful discharge 
cases, claims of infliction of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case support such a 
claim in addition to the other claims. See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 783-
84, (2000); Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 211 (2002). 
Ms. Hatheway's claim of NIED is rooted in the false and pretextual documents and 
statements contained in her evaluations, along with the University's tortious conduct towards 
Ms. Hatheway by the harmful words and conduct/actions taken against her. Defendants have a 
common law duty of due care to not cause harm and damages to Ms. Hatheway. The University 
breached its duties to Ms. Hatheway by their wrongful tortious conduct, which caused physical 
manifestations of Ms. Hatheway's emotional distress. Therefore, summary judgment on 
Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim should not have been granted. 
47 
v. 
reasons, 
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890 P.2d 331 
126 Idaho 745 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Twin Falls, November 1994 Term. 
Blanca EstelaA VILA, individually and as 
parent and natural guardian of Selma 
Manriquez and Fernando Manriquez, 
children under 18 years of age, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
v. 
Dale Brent WAHLQUIST and the State of 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 
a governmental agency, Defendants-
Respondents. 
No. 21070. I Feb. 23, 1995. 
Motorist injured in collision with vehicle driven by state 
employee brought action against state under Tort Claims 
Act. After state moved for summary judgment based on 
failure to provide notice within 180 days as required by 
Act, motorist moved to compel discovery, and the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Cassia County, 1. 1., 
denied motorist's motion to compel pending resolution of 
state's motion and subsequently granted summary 
judgment. Motorist appealed, and the Supreme Court, 
J., held that: (1) claim was barred due to motorist's 
failure to give notice even though state insurance adjuster 
had notice that motorist intended to seek medical attention 
for injuries; (2) fact that motorist was illiterate in English 
did not affect applicability of notice requirement; and (3) 
trial court did not abuse discretion in suspending discovery 
pending resolution of potentially dispositive motion. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (7) 
On appeal from order of summary judgment, 
standard of review is same as standard used by 
district court in ruling on motion for summary 
judgment. 
In reviewing order of summary judgment, court 
liberally construes record in light most favorable 
to party opposing motion, drawing all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Claim by motorist injured in collision with state 
employee against state under Tort Claims Act 
was barred where motorist failed to provide 
notice to state within 180 days as required by 
Act, even though insurance adjuster for state was 
aware that motorist was considering seeking 
medical treatment within one week after accident 
and motorist was illiterate in English and could 
not read notice sent to her by state shortly after 
accident informing her of steps required to bring 
claim under Act. 
Notice of potential insurance claim does not 
constitute notice to state of claim against state 
and its employees for any act or omission of 
employee within course or scope of his 
employment as required by Tort Claims Act. 
890 P.2d 331 
Insurance company's awareness of accident or 
medical expenses does not relieve claimant of 
burden to file timely notice of tort claim with 
appropriate governmental entity in order to 
recover under Tort Claims Act. 
Control of discovery is within discretion of trial 
court. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
suspending discovery in action under Tort 
Claims Act pending resolution of potentially 
dispositive motion for summary judgment based 
on claimant's failure to provide notice to state of 
claim within 180 days as required by Act where 
claimant admittedly took no steps during 180 
days after accident to notify state of claim other 
than speaking to state insurance adjuster and 
information sought through discovery was 
immaterial to motion for summary judgment. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**332 *746 Raymundo Pena, Rupert, for appellant. 
Atty. Gen. and Hall, Farley, Oberrecht 
& Blanton, Boise, for respondents. 
argued. 
Opinion 
Justice. 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment and dismissing with prejudice the appellant's tort 
action against the State of Idaho and its employee arising 
out of an automobile accident. The district judge held that 
the appellant failed to serve a notice of tort claim on the 
State of Idaho within the 180 day time limit as required by 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The appellant also appeals from 
an order denying a motion to compel production of 
documents and granting the respondents' motion for a 
protective order. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 19, 1991, the appellant Blanca Estela Avila and 
her children, Selma Manriquez and Fernando Manriquez 
(collectively Avila) were involved in a traffic accident 
when a vehicle driven by respondent Dale Brent Wahlquist 
(Wahlquist) rear-ended Avila's vehicle. Wahlquist was an 
employee of respondent Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare (H & W), and was driving a state-owned vehicle 
while returning from state business at the time of the 
accident (Wahlquist and H & W collectively respondents). 
Within a week of the accident, Kris Michalk (Michalk), an 
insurance adjuster hired by the state's Bureau of Risk 
Management, visited Avila's home to take her statement 
and photographs of her automobile. According to Avila's 
affidavit: 
... in the course of the representative's 
investigation, the representative asked 
me questions regarding the occurrence of 
the traffic collision and informed me that 
the State would be handling the damages 
which had occurred to me .... [D]uring 
**333 *747 our conversation, I informed 
the representative that I had not been 
feeling well as a result of the accident 
and that I would be seeking medical 
treatment. 
Following this meeting, Michalk wrote to Avila, in a letter 
dated August 27, 1991, informing her that if she wished to 
make a claim against the state of Idaho, she needed to fill 
out and file a notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary 
of State's office. The letter also notified Avila that the 
notice had to be filed within 180 days of the accident. 
890 P.2d 331 
Michalk enclosed a notice of tort claim form with the 
letter. A vila claims she is illiterate in the English language 
and did not understand the adjuster's instructions regarding 
filing a written claim. 
Avila filed a tort claim notice with the Secretary of State's 
office on May 28, 1992, approximately nine months after 
the accident, and filed a complaint for damages in 
September 1992. In answering the complaint, respondents 
raised the affirmative defense that A vila failed to file a 
timely tort claim notice pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act, and later filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Thereafter, A vila filed a discovery request seeking, among 
other things, a copy of all investigative reports, 
memoranda, documents, and photographs executed by any 
employee of H & W regarding the adjustment of Avila's 
claim. Respondents objected to this request on the grounds 
that these items were protected from discovery pursuant to 
the attorney/client privilege, and by the work product 
doctrine, as these items belonged in the claim file of the 
Bureau of Risk Management. Avila filed a motion to 
compel production of the requested documents, and a 
notice of deposition by subpoena duces tecum of Michalk, 
requiring her to bring with her to the deposition the 
specified documents. Respondents filed a motion for 
protective order to prevent the deposition of Michalk. 
Following a hearing in June 1993, the district court denied 
Avila's motion to compel and provisionally granted 
respondents' motion for protective order pending 
resolution of respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
After hearing arguments on the motion for summary 
judgment, the district court issued its Opinion and Order on 
October 21, 1993, granting the motion. Avila appeals both 
the order denying the motion to compel, and the order 
granting summary judgment. 
II. 
ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw." 
III. 
180-DA Y NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act states that "[n]o claim or action 
shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its 
employee unless the claim has been presented and filed 
within the time limits prescribed by this act." 
The Act establishes a 180-day time limit to file a claim: 
All claims against the state arising under 
the provisions of this act and all claims 
against an employee of the state for any 
act or omission of the employee within 
the course or scope of his employment 
shall be presented to and filed with the 
secretary of state within one hundred 
eighty (180) days from the date the claim 
arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered, whichever is later. 
All such claims must "accurately describe the 
conduct and circumstances **334 *748 which brought 
about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, 
state the time and place the injury or damage occurred, 
state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall 
contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a 
statement of the actual residence of the claimant...." 
The accident occurred on August 19, 1991. The notice of 
tort claim was filed with the state on May 28, 1992, over 
nine months later. Accordingly, Avila's claim is barred 
unless she gave some other notice within the 180 day time 
period. A vila argues that the state knew ofthe existence of 
the accident and sent an adjuster to investigate the claim, 
and therefore, the state was on notice and was not 
prejudiced in its ability to investigate or process the claim. 
A vila argues that written or oral notice may be sufficient to 
satisfy the notice provisions of § as long as the 
State is not prejudiced by the manner of imparting notice. 
Citing 
[31 This Court recently rejected a similar argument in 
890 P.2d 331 
The holding in Sysco, that notice of a 
potential claim to a governmental 
entity's insurer constitutes substantial 
compliance with the ITCA notice 
requirements, was not necessary to the 
disposition of Pounds, and the reference 
in that opinion to the Sysco rationale was 
dicta. 
Friel at 31. Likewise, Avila's reliance on Huff is 
unavailing. The claimant in Huffwent to the governmental 
entity and presented written repair estimates, discussed the 
claim with the secretary treasurer of the governmental 
entity, and followed up with at least two telephone calls. 
The Huff court held that the governmental entity "was 
clearly apprised of the fact that a claim was being 
prosecuted against it, and the amount thereof." 
By contrast, Avila never 
notified the state that she was pursuing a tort claim and the 
amount thereof, within the 180 day period. Avila's alleged 
statements to the adjuster that she had not been feeling well 
as a result of the accident and would be seeking medical 
treatment were insufficient to "provide notice that she 
intended to go a step farther by bringing a tort claim." 
14j (5) Further, this Court has rejected the argument that 
notice of a potential insurance claim constitutes notice of a 
potential tort claim sufficient to satisfy 
The same analysis applies under 
An insurance company's awareness of an 
accident or medical expenses does not relieve a claimant of 
the burden to file a timely notice of tort claim with the 
appropriate governmental entity. 
and will start the running of the 120-day period.") The 
letter dated August 27, 1991 from the insurance adjuster 
advising A vila of the necessity of filing a notice of tort 
claim, even if Avila was unable to read it, was sufficient to 
put Avila on inquiry notice as to the contents of the letter. 
The district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of respondents for Avila's failure to file a timely 
notice of tort claim. 
**335 *749 IV. 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
A vila also contends that the district court erred in granting 
provisionally respondents' motion for a protective order 
and denying Avila's motion to compel, pending resolution 
of the motion for summary judgment. Avila sought access 
to the claim file of the Bureau of Risk Management to 
determine what the state knew and the extent it was put on 
notice. 
16117) Control of discovery is within the discretion of the 
trial court. 
no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to 
suspend discovery pending resolution of the potentially 
dispositive summary judgment motion. A vila admittedly 
took no affirmative steps during the 180 days after the 
accident to notify the state of her tort claim, other than 
speaking with Ms. Michalk when she investigated the 
accident. The information in the claim file would be 
immaterial to the motion to dismiss, because an insurance 
company's information about an accident or medical 
expenses does not relieve a claimant of the burden to file a 
timely notice of tort claim with the appropriate 
governmental entity. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's orders which granted summary 
judgment in favor of respondents, and provisionally 
granted respondents' motion for a protective order and 
denied Avila's motion to compel are affirmed. In view of 
our disposition of this case, we need not reach the other 
issues and arguments raised by the parties on appeal. Costs 
on appeal to respondents. 
890 P.2d 331 
C.J., and JJ., and 890 P.2d 331 
WOODLAND, J. Pro Tern., concur. 
Parallel Citations 
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119 Idaho 539 
Supreme Court of Idaho , 
Twin Falls Nov. 1990 Term. 
Ronald T. BONZ and Ruth I. Bonz, 
husband and wife; Elbert L. Haye and 
Margaret T. Haye, husband and wife; 
Stanley V. Haye, Sr. and Joyce Ann Haye, 
husband and wife; Larry Hughes and 
Leslie L. Hughes, husband and wife; 
Stanley V. Haye, Jr. and Patricia E. Haye, 
husband and wife; and Jack A. Gibson, all 
individually, Plainti£fs-Appellants, 
v. 
Jay D. SUDWEEKS, J. Dee May, Jon J. 
Shindurling, Mark Stubbs, and L. Jay 
Mitchell, individually and as partners of 
Sudweeks, May, Shindurling, Stubbs & 
Mitchell, a partnership and Sudweeks, 
May, Shindurling, Stubbs and Mitchell, a 
partnership, Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 18335. I March 29,1991. 
Suit was brought alleging professional malpractice. The 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County, 
W.H. 1., granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant attorneys on ground that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations, and the plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court, 1., held that 
existence of a cloud on title to real property which 
continued because of a failure to properly record a release 
oflis pendens was not sufficient damage for a professional 
malpractice action to accrue; rather, damage did not occur, 
and cause of action did not accrue, until investor learned of 
cloud on the property and thereafter refused to participate 
in a venture to develop the property. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes (2) 
There must be "some damage" before 
professional malpractice action accrues and 
limitation period begins to run. 
subd.4. 
7 
Existence of a cloud on title to real property 
which continued because of a failure to properly 
record a release of lis pendens was not sufficient 
damage for a professional malpractice action to 
accrue; rather, damage did not occur, and cause 
of action did not accrue, until investor learned of 
cloud on the property and thereafter refused to 
participate in a venture to develop the property. 
subd.4. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**876 *539 Jerome, for 
pI ainti ffs-appe Ilants. 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Boise, for 
defendants-respondents. argued. 
Opinion 
BOYLE, Justice. 
In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether the 
existence of a cloud on the title to real property which 
continued **877 *540 because of a failure to properly 
record a release of lis pendens is sufficient damage for a 
professional malpractice action to accrue. 
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' case on the basis that 
the action had accrued at the time the cloud on title was 
allowed to remain and the two-year statute oflimitations in 
had expired prior to plaintiffs filing their 
complaint. For reasons set forth herein, we reverse the 
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
808 P.2d 876 
The plaintiffs in this action were owners of real property 
located in Jerome County, Idaho, at the intersection of 
Interstate 84 and State Highway 93, and were former 
clients of the attorneys and law firm named as defendants. 
In early 1985, several real property transactions and 
exchanges involving land in Lincoln County and Jerome 
County, Idaho, occurred which resulted in litigation and, 
relative to the instant appeal, the filing and recording of a 
lis pendens on real property located in Jerome County. 
Defendants in this action were attorneys retained in that 
prior case to provide legal services to plaintiffs herein 
related to the real property transactions and resulting 
litigation. Negotiations between the parties in that prior 
action resulted in settlement of the controversy and the 
attorneys prepared settlement and dismissal documents, 
together with a release of lis pendens intended to be 
recorded in Jerome County. Following settlement of the 
controversy a paralegal at defendants' law office mailed 
the release of lis pendens to Lincoln County where it was 
recorded. Unfortunately, the original lis pendens sought to 
be released had been recorded in Jerome County and not in 
Lincoln County. As a result, the original lis pendens filed 
in Jerome County was not released and continued to be a 
cloud on the title to plaintiffs' property. 
In March, 1987, the cloud on the title of plaintiffs' Jerome 
County real property was discovered by a third-party 
investor who had intended to invest $300,000.00 in the 
development of that property. As a result of the unreleased 
lis pendens remaining on the county records, the 
third-party investor refused to participate or have any 
further involvement in the development of plaintiffs' 
Jerome County property. The third-party investor did not 
advise plaintiffs that the presence of the lis pendens was 
the reason for withdrawing his offer of financial support 
for development of the property. As a result, plaintiffs 
were unable to obtain financing for the project. 
In January, 1988, plaintiffs were not able to meet financial 
obligations on a note secured by the Jerome County 
property and a foreclosure action was commenced. In 
April, 1988, it was discovered by the parties to this action 
that the release of lis pendens had been recorded by the 
attorneys in the wrong county. On January 6, 1989, this 
action for damages alleging professional malpractice was 
filed. 
The following dates and events are crucial to the issues 
presented in this appeal: 
March 13, 1986 Release of Lis Pendens recorded in 
Lincoln County 
March, 1987 Third party investor learns of Lis 
Pendens on Jerome County records and withdraws 
offer of $300,000.00 financial investment III 
plaintiffs' property 
April, 1988 Plaintiffs discover Lis Pendens has not 
been released from Jerome County records 
January 6, 1989 Complaint in this action filed seeking 
damages for professional malpractice 
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of 
limitations in had expired prior to the 
complaint being filed on January 6, 1989, because 
plaintiffs had been damaged at the time of recording the 
release of lis pendens in the wrong county on March 13, 
1986. As a result of the cloud remaining on the title to the 
Jerome County property on March 13, 1986, the trial court 
held that plaintiffs could not freely transfer the property 
and their action had accrued at that time. 
**878 *541 For reasons set forth herein, we reverse the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment and remand the 
action for further proceedings. 
I. 
ST ANDARD FOR REVIEW-SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
"A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Standards applicable to summary judgment require the 
district court and Supreme Court upon review, to liberally 
construe facts in the existing record in favor of the 
nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences 
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. 
"[M]otions for summary judgment should be 
granted with caution." 
contains 
conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach 
different conclusions, a summary judgment must be 
808 P.2d 876 
II. 
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE-ACCRUAL OF 
ACTION 
This is an action based on professional malpractice. 
applicable statute of limitations contained in 
provides that an action to recover damages for 
professional malpractice must be commenced within two 
years. provides in pertinent part: 
4. An action to recover damages for 
professional malpractice, ... shall be 
deemed to have accrued as of the time 
of the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of, and the limitation 
period shall not be extended by reason 
of any continuing consequences or 
damages resulting therefrom or any 
continuing professional or commercial 
relationship between the injured party 
and the alleged wrongdoer, ... 
! 11 Although not stated in the statute, this Court has 
interpreted the law to require "some damage" before the 
action accrues and the limitation period begins to run. 
I As 
noted by a unanimous Court in Griggs v. Nash: 
Having resolved that is the applicable 
statute of limitations in this case, we must then 
determine when the action accrued. The statute provides 
that actions for professional malpractice accrue "as of 
the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained 
of." Ifwe were to apply the statute strictly, the claims .. . 
would clearly be barred. The alleged acts or omissions .. . 
occurred in May 1984. Since the third-party complaint 
was not filed until September of 1987, the statute would 
bar the claims. However, in 
this Court extended the date 
for the accrual of actions **879 *542 for professional 
malpractice where the negligence is continuing, until 
the date that damage occurred 
(Emphasis added.) 
The requirement of "some damage" as a necessary element 
to accrual of an action for statute of limitation purposes 
was also addressed in 
This Court has dealt with the question of professional 
malpractice in a number of recent cases. These cases 
point out that while points out that "the 
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the 
time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of 
... ," nevertheless until some damage occurs no cause of 
action accrues for professional malpractice, even 
though the "occurrence, act or omission complained of," 
which ultimately causes the damages, has occurred 
earlier. 
[21 The trial court held that the presence of the cloud on the 
title to the Jerome County property constituted sufficient 
damage for the plaintiffs' action to accrue and since the 
complaint for professional malpractice was filed on 
January 6, 1989, more than two years after March 13, 
1986, when the release was filed in the wrong county, the 
action was barred by the statute oflimitations. 
The legal issue presented in the instant appeal is somewhat 
similar to that presented in Griggs v. Nash, wherein we 
first had occasion to define what "damage" is for purposes 
of determining when the statute of limitations in 
begins to run. The precise issue presented here is 
whether the presence of the lis pendens as a cloud on the 
title in and of itself, without some related or actual damage 
to plaintiffs, is sufficient to cause the action to accrue. 
Under the particular facts of this case we hold that the 
cloud on the title is not damage sufficient to cause the 
action to accrue. 
Unlike Griggs and its predecessors the damage in this 
instant appeal is not as easily ascertainable and 
determined. In Griggs, the plaintiffs' damage was in the 
form of expenses actually incurred for attorney fees. In the 
early case 
an action for architect malpractice, the plaintiff 
suffered personal injury when she fell down an interior 
stairway in an apartment complex. In 
5 an action for medical 
malpractice alleging negligent diagnosis of rubella, the 
damage occurred at the time the infant was born with 
congenital defects. In 
an action for accounting malpractice, the 
action did not accrue until an IRS assessment caused 
damage to the taxpayers. In 
an action for accounting 
malpractice, the action did not accrue until damage 
occurred after bankruptcy proceedings when it first 
became apparent that the creditor plaintiff would not be 
808 P.2d 876 
an 
action for legal malpractice, the action accrued for statute 
oflimitation purposes when plaintifflost its opportunity to 
secure post-bankruptcy confirmation interest on a secured 
claim. 
All of the above-cited cases have a common thread. The 
damage, for statute of limitation purposes, occurred long 
after the negligent act. The most poignant example is in 
Stephens v. Stearns, where the personal injury occurred 
several years after the negligent design ofthe stairway. 
Applying the principles and rules of our case law to the 
record before us, we conclude **880 *543 that the 
proposed action against defendants accrued in March, 
1987. Our review of the record clearly demonstrates that 
the damage to plaintiffs did not occur when the release of 
lis pendens was mistakenly recorded in Lincoln County. 
Rather, the damage occurred in March, 1987, when the 
investor learned of the cloud on the Jerome County 
property and thereafter refused to participate in a venture 
to develop the property. It was at the time the investor 
refused to participate financially in the property 
development that plaintiffs were damaged, rather than at 
the time the release was inadvertently filed in the wrong 
county. 
The determination of what constitutes "damage" for 
purposes of accrual of an action must be decided on the 
circumstances presented in each individual case. In the 
instant case there is no dispute as to dates or events 
involved in the recording of the release of lis pendens or 
filing of plaintiffs' action. Based on our review of the 
record we hold that plaintiffs had suffered no damage, as 
Footnotes 
contemplated in and our case law, until the 
investor withdrew his financial support from the proposed 
development venture. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the rule established and adopted in Stephens v. 
Stearns, and refined in our other cases, we therefore hold 
that plaintiffs did not suffer damages, as contemplated in 
and their action did not accrue until 
withdrawal of the investor's financial support in March, 
1987. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations of 
does not bar plaintiffs' action for alleged 
professional malpractice because their complaint was filed 
within two years of the date the financing was withdrawn. 
We reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment 
and remand. Costs to appellants. No attorney fees awarded 
on appeal. 
BAKES, c.J., and BISTLINE, and 
JJ., concur. 
Parallel Citations 
808 P.2d 876 
The requirement of "some damage" before an action accrues has its origin in . melm,""S 
In Stephens this Court stated, "[ a]s a general rule the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some 
damage has occurred. W. Prosser, Handbook a/the Law a/Torts § 301 (4th ed. 1971)." (Emphasis added.) 
The recent cases referred to in Treasure Valley v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A, 
I (accountant malpractice); 
(physician medical malpractice); (architect 
malpractice). In all of these professional malpractice cases, the Court has required some damage to the plaintiff before the action 
accrues and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run. 
816 P.2d 1009 
120 Idaho 452 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
Alfred J. BOWEN and CherylA. Bowen, 
husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
David J. HETH, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 18326. I Aug. 2, 1991. I Petitionfor 
Review Denied Oct. 3,1991. 
Prospective vendors sought release of funds held in 
escrow. The First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County, 
Richard G. Magnuson, 1., granted partial summary 
judgment for vendors, and purchaser appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Winmill, J. pro tern., held that prospective 
vendors of property were entitled to return of funds 
escrowed to protect potential purchaser from sale to third 
party while he investigated property's development 
potential, when purchaser failed to make offer within 
requisite 90 days, notwithstanding vendors' alleged failure 
to provide purchaser with information necessary for his 
investigation, where agreement did not expressly condition 
return of funds upon vendors' cooperation. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (3) 
Prospective vendors of property were entitled to 
return of funds escrowed to protect potential 
purchaser from sale to third party while he 
investigated property's development potential, 
when purchaser failed to make offer within 
requisite 90 days, notwithstanding vendors' 
alleged failure to provide purchaser with 
information necessary for his investigation, 
where agreement did not expressly condition 
return of funds upon vendors' cooperation. 
Failure to issue interlocutory appeal certificate 
until after request for certification was made by 
appellant and his motion was heard by court was 
not abuse of discretion. 
Breach of contract plaintiffs who prevailed on 
interlocutory appeal taken by defendant were 
entitled to recover attorney fees even though 
defendant might ultimately be found to be 
prevailing party after trial on his counterclaim. 
20(3). 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**1009 *452 
defendant-appellant. 
Lukins & Annis, 
plaintiffs-respondents. 
Opinion 
WINMILL, Judge, Pro Tern. 
Coeur d'Alene, for 
Coeur d' Alene, for 
argued. 
This is an appeal from a certified, partial summary 
judgment ordering the release of funds held in escrow. For 
reasons explained below, we affirm. 
Alfred Bowen and Cheryl Bowen own real property 
located in Coeur d' Alene, adjacent to the Spokane River, 
and commonly known as the Harbor Center. In early 1987, 
David Heth made inquiries about purchasing the property, 
but determined that before making an offer he would 
require time to further investigate the property **1010 
*453 and its development potential. Concerned that the 
property might be sold to a third party after he had 
816 P.2d 1009 
expended considerable time and money in his 
investigation, Heth persuaded the Bowens to enter into an 
escrow agreement which would protect him from such an 
eventuality. 
The agreement required that Heth immediately commence 
an investigation of the property and that the Bowens 
cooperate with that investigation. The agreement also 
provided that the Bowens would, upon execution of the 
agreement, deposit $22,500 in an escrow account. The 
agreement detailed the disposition of the escrowed funds. 
In the event Heth failed to make an offer within ninety days 
or made an offer within that time frame which was later 
consummated, the escrow would be closed and the funds 
returned to the Bowens. On the other hand, if an offer was 
made by a third party during the same ninety-day period 
which resulted in a sale of the property, or Heth made a 
reasonable offer which was rejected by the Bowens, then 
the funds would be disbursed to Heth. The agreement also 
provided that any dispute between the parties as to whether 
Heth's offer was "reasonable" would be resolved by 
arbitration. 
Heth did not make an offer within ninety days. The 
Bowens then filed this action to obtain an order directing 
the escrow agent to disburse the funds to the Bowens. Heth 
filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Bowens failed to 
supply him with information necessary to value the 
property, and thereby breached the provision of the 
agreement which required that the Bowens cooperate with 
Heth in his investigation of the property. The counterclaim 
requested that judgment be entered against the Bowens for 
$22,500. 
The Bowens moved for partial summary judgment on their 
claim for the return of the funds. Following a hearing, the 
motion was granted and the escrow agent was directed to 
close the escrow and return the funds to the Bowens. Heth 
then filed an objection to the court's order, requesting a 
modification of the language used by the court or a 
certification of the order for immediate appeal pursuant to 
The court granted the latter request and a 
certification was attached to the partial 
summary judgment. This appeal followed. 
Heth raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the 
district court erred in granting partial summary judgment 
in the face of his contention that the Bowens had violated 
an express provision of the contract. Second, Heth argues 
that the district court erred in failing to initially attach a 
certificate to the order granting partial summary 
judgment. For the reasons stated below, we find no merit in 
either contention and affirm the decision of the district 
court. 
On review of an order granting summary judgment, our 
task is to determine whether there are genuine issues of 
material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
In this case, the facts crucial to the 
district court's decision were undisputed. The agreement 
provided that the funds would be returned to the Bowens if 
Heth failed to make an offer for the property within ninety 
days. It was undisputed that Heth failed to make such an 
offer. Thus, the court determined that, as a matter of law, 
the Bowens were entitled to a return of the funds. 
III Heth contends, however, that the Bowens were not 
entitled to the funds because they allegedly breached an 
express provision of the agreement by failing to provide 
him with information necessary for his investigation. 
Nothing in the express language of the agreement supports 
Heth's argument. While the agreement did require that the 
Bowens cooperate in the investigation, compliance with 
that requirement was not stated as a condition of the return 
of the funds. Rather, the agreement was clear and specific 
that on the ninety-first day after the agreement was 
executed, the funds would be returned to the Bowens if 
Heth had not made an offer on the property. The agreement 
imposed no other condition for the return of the **1011 
*454 funds. Absent fraud or overreaching, which has not 
been alleged here, the courts cannot modifY the express 
terms of an agreement upon which competent parties have 
agreed. Lupis v. Peoples Mortgage Co., supra; 
Heth argues that even if the agreement does not expressly 
so provide, it is a necessary implication of the agreement 
that the Bowens would not be entitled to a return of the 
funds if they failed to cooperate with Heth's investigation. 
Relying on our Supreme Court's decision in 
I Heth suggests that such a proviso can be 
read into the contract as part of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. While the Supreme Court in 
Davis recognized that a contract should be construed to 
include such implied provisions as are necessary to 
effectuate the intention of the parties, the Court also 
suggested that such terms may only be implied where the 
contract is silent on the issue in question. 
I Here, the agreement is explicit in stating 
that the funds must be returned to the Bowens if Heth 
failed to make an offer on the property within the 
agreed-upon time frame. No other conditions were 
imposed. The Court cannot accept Heth's invitation to read 
additional conditions into the agreement by implication, 
because to do so would contradict the parties' clearly 
816 P.2d 1009 
stated intent. 
In summary, we conclude that the parties' agreement did 
not expressly condition the return of the funds upon the 
Bowens' cooperation with Heth's investigation of the 
property. Nor can such a condition be implied as necessary 
to effectuate the intent of the parties. Heth is still able to 
pursue his counterclaim against the Bowens for breach of 
contract. However, he is not entitled to prevent the close of 
the escrow and the return of the funds while that claim is 
resolved in further court proceedings. 
121 Heth also contends that the district court erred in 
pennitting disbursement of the funds without issuing a 
certificate so as to provide Heth with a means to 
appeal or stay the court's order. However, decisions 
concerning certification are committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be 
reversed on appeal unless the court's decision amounts to 
an abuse of discretion. K()np}~l~(m 
Such orders are not to be entered routinely, 
and certification should be granted only upon a showing of 
hardship, injustice or other compelling reasons. 
Robertson v. Richard5, supra. Here a 
certificate was issued, but not until after a request for 
certification was made by Heth and Heth's motion was 
heard by the court. We cannot fault the district court for 
declining to issue a certificate until a request 
and an appropriate showing of necessity was made. 
Accordingly, we find no error by the district court on this 
issue. 
!31 The Bowens have prevailed on each ofthe issues raised 
by the appellant Heth in this appeal and they are entitled to 
costs. The Bowens have requested that they be awarded 
their attorney fees on appeal under The 
subject matter ofthis lawsuit falls under the definition of a 
"commercial transaction" as defined by 20(3) 
and as shown by the contract between the parties. This 
action was brought upon the contract to enforce one party's 
rights under the contract. Accordingly, the statute 
mandates that "the prevailing party shall be allowed a 
reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed 
and collected as costs." 120(3); 
We recognize that the appeal came to us upon a partial 
summary judgment, certified by the trial court to be final 
for the purposes of appeal. The issues of the defendant's 
counterclaim have yet to be decided and the Bowens may 
not ultimately be the **1012 *455 prevailing party in the 
case. Nevertheless, Heth chose to seek appellate review on 
limited issues before the case was fully decided. The 
Bowens were entitled to respond and their position has 
been fully upheld on the limited issues presented by the 
appeal. Accordingly, we hold they are entitled to an award 
offees for this appeal even though Heth may ultimately be 
found to be the prevailing party after trial on his 
counterclaim. 
In summary, we affirm the partial summary judgment 
ordering disbursement of the escrowed funds to the 
Bowens. Costs and fees to the respondents, as stated above. 
WALTERS, C.J., and SWANSTROM, 1., concur. 
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100 Idaho 808 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Donna BOWLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Marshal T. KEATING and Moscow Public 
School District No. 281, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 12524. I Sept. 11, 1979. I Rehearing 
Denied Feb. 12, 1980. 
Teacher sought relief on basis of contention that refusal to 
employ her as vice principal resulted from sex 
discrimination in violation of state statute. The Second 
Judicial District Court, Latah County, Roy E. Mosman, J., 
rendered judgment for defendants, and teacher appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Donaldson, C. J., held that: (1) fact 
that no woman had been hired for secondary 
administrative positions in school district did not make 
out prima facie case of sex discrimination under 
"disparate impact" theory; but (2) in such case in which 
teacher established, under "disparate treatment" theory, 
that refusal to employ her as vice principal for the 
asserted reasons that she lacked administrative ability and 
was unable to relate well with others was a prima facie 
case of sex discrimination, such prima facie case was not 
rebutted where defendants failed to present credible 
evidence suggesting that such reasons were in fact the real 
reasons; and (3) school district's rejection of eight male 
applicants was irrelevant to teacher's establishing of a 
prima facie discrimination claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bistline, J., concurred specially and filed opinion. 
Shepard, 1., dissented and filed opinion in which Bakes, 
J., concurred. 
West Headnotes (12) 
[I) Civil Rights 
... Evidence 
Though ultimate burden of persuasion on issue 
whether there has been discrimination in 
violation of state statute remains with 
c()!llp!~inatlt! the complainant m~~J'roye a 
Westta'ltlNexr 
[2) 
[3) 
[4) 
prima facie unlawful discrimination case 
without proving an employer's intent to 
discriminate and thereby shift, to the employer, 
the burden of producing evidence of a lawful 
explanation for employer's treatment of 
complainant. (Per Donaldson, C. J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring 
specially.) I.e. § 67-5909. 
Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
Either "disparate treatment" theory or "disparate 
impact" theory may be applied to a particular set 
of facts for purpose of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination in violation of state 
statute. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring 
specially.) I.e. § 67-5909. 
Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
To establish prima facie case of illegal 
discrimination under "disparate impact" theory, 
plaintiff need only prove that an employer's 
policies and practices which are neutral on their 
face and intent nevertheless discriminate in 
effect against a particular group; thereafter 
employer must shoulder burden to show a 
business necessity for use of the policies or 
practices challenged. (Per Donaldson, C. J., with 
one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909. 
Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
To establish prima facie case of discrimination 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
606 P.2d 458 
(5) 
under "disparate treatment" theory, complainant 
must show that he belongs to a protected class, 
that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants, and 
that despite his qualifications, he was rejected 
and that following his rejection, the position 
remained open and employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications; at such point, burden shifts to 
employer to articulate some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for complainant's 
rejection. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring 
specially.) I.C. § 67-5909. 
Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
Proof of significant statistical disparity may be 
used to create a prima facie case of 
discrimination in violation of state statute. (Per 
Donaldson, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring specially.) I.e. § 
67-5909. 
[6] Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
In proceeding in which teacher sought relief on 
basis of contention that refusal to employ her as 
vice principal resulted from sex discrimination 
in violation of state statute, fact that no woman 
had been hired for secondary administrative 
positions in school district did not make out a 
prima facie case of sex discrimination under 
"disparate impact" theory, in view of the small 
number of positions in the district and the small 
number of female applicants. (Per Donaldson, C. 
J., with on Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
VVestlavvNext 
[7] Civil Rights 
~Hiring 
Subjective hiring procedures are not per se 
violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 
1964. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring 
specially.) Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 
42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-2(a). 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
[8] Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
[9] 
If an employer utilizes subjective and 
unstructured standards in the hiring process, the 
employer, in addition to presenting legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment 
decision, must produce credible evidence to 
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the 
real reasons in order for employer to rebut a 
prima facie case of discrimination in violation of 
state statute; if employer does produce such 
credible evidence, burden of producing evidence 
shifts back to plaintiff to show that employer's 
reasons for rejecting plaintiff were in fact 
pretext. (Per Donaldson, C. 1., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring 
specially.) I.C. § 67-5909. 
Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
In action in which teacher established under 
"disparate treatment" theory, that refusal to 
employ her as vice principal for the asserted 
reasons that she lacked administrative ability 
and was unable to relate well with others was a 
prima facie case of sex discrimination in 
violation of state statute, such prima facie case 
was not rebutted where defendants failed to 
present credible evidence suggesting that such 
reasons were in fact the real reasons for 
rejecting teacher's application. (Per Donaldson, 
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one 
2 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
606 P.2d 458 
Justice concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909. 
(10) Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
In proceeding in which teacher sought relief on 
basis of contention that refusal to employ her as 
vice principal resulted from sex discrimination 
in violation of state statute, school district's 
rejection of eight male applicants was irrelevant 
with respect to teacher's establishing of a prima 
facie discrimination claim. (Per Donaldson, C. 
J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring specially.) LC. § 67-5909. 
(11) Civil Rights 
~Hiring 
Where there is a claim of job discrimination by 
member of a minority covered by statutory 
provisions pertaining to discrimination, minority 
member is not deprived of his or her cause of 
action even though a person not a part of that 
minority is also rejected from the same job. (Per 
Donaldson, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring specially.) LC. § 
67-5909. 
(12) Civil Rights 
~Evidence 
Plaintiff, who alleges that he had been 
discriminated against by employer, need only 
show that plaintiff belongs to protected class, 
that he applied and was qualified for job for 
which employer was seeking applicants, that 
plaintiff was rejected despite his qualifications 
and that, following rejection, position remained 
open and employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons with plaintiffs qualifications; once 
WestlawNext 
plaintiff has made such showing, he has satisfied 
his burden of proof without having to show an 
intent to discriminate, and burden then shifts to 
employer to prove by credible evidence that he 
rejected plaintiffs application for legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason. (Per Donaldson, C. J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring specially.) I.e. § 67-5909. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*810 **460 Allen V. Bowles, Moscow, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Cope R. Gale, Moscow, for defendants-respondents. 
Opinion 
DONALDSON, Chief Justice. 
Plaintiff-appellant, Donna Bowles (Bowles), brought a 
claim for relief in district court in which she alleged that 
the defendants-respondents, Marshal T. Keating, 
Superintendent, and the Moscow Public School District 
281 (school district), refused her employment for a vice 
principal position as a result of sex discrimination in 
violation of LC. s 67-5909. Following trial, the trial court 
found that the school district did not hire Bowles because 
of "her apparent lack of administrative ability and her 
failure to relate well to others," that Bowles was not the 
most qualified applicant for the job, and that the school 
district rejected all nine official applicants and instead 
hired a teacher from the Moscow Junior High School for 
the vice principal position. From these findings the court 
concluded that the school district's hiring process was not 
unreasonable, that the school district discriminated 
against all nine applicants but that such discrimination 
was not based on sex and that there were justifiable 
reasons for the school district to refuse to hire Bowles. 
Bowles then brought this appeal. We reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
The facts of this case are largely uncontested, and it is 
only the conclusions which flow from the facts which are 
in controversy. In the spring of 1973, there was an 
opening for the position of vice principal at Moscow High 
School. The school district gave notice of that opening to 
colleges in the Pacific Northwest, California and to the 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
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Idaho State Department of Employment. Nine applicants, 
including Mrs. Bowles, filed applications in response to 
that announcement. 
Bowles' educational qualifications for the pOSItion 
include a Bachelor's Degree in Business Education with a 
minor in English and a Master's Degree in School 
Administration. She also held an Idaho State Certificate 
for Administration. In terms of experience she had spent 
seven years as a teacher of business subjects, such as 
shorthand, typing and business law. She also had taught 
three years in a high school of 150 students in Pierce, 
Idaho, then in Benton City, Washington, in a school of 
500 to 700 students and after that in a high school of 
approximately 150 students in Deary, Idaho. For two 
years in the winters, Bowles had taught adult education 
classes in shorthand and typing. 
The evidence at trial disclosed that there were four 
administrative positions in Moscow's secondary school 
system in existence at the time Bowles filed her 
application for the vice principal position. At the time of 
trial no women held those positions. Bowles was the first 
woman to apply for one of the administrative positions; 
although, at the time of trial, one other woman had 
applied for a position. Defendant Keating did not 
recommend either Bowles or the subsequent applicant for 
a position. 
The evidence also indicated that defendant Keating and a 
John Swartz, then the principal at Moscow High School, 
screened the nine applications submitted and interviewed 
four to six of the nine applicants, including Mrs. Bowles. 
Those interviews were unstructured in nature. Neither 
interviewer formulated any standardized written questions 
for the interviews. Nor did either take any formal notes of 
the interviews. Defendant Keating testified that he and 
Swartz utilized no objective tests or standards to evaluate 
those interviewed. In the main, they evaluated the 
applicants' responses subjectively.l Upon completion of 
the interview process, Keating *811 **461 and Swartz 
decided not to hire any of the nine applicants and instead 
offered the position to a man who had never filed an 
official application for the position and did not hold an 
Idaho Administrator's Certificate.2 
As specifically relating to Bowles and the reasons for her 
rejection for the position, defendant Keating testified that 
in his opinion she lacked direct experience in the 
supervising of other teachers. He also expressed concern 
that because she had previously worked in smaller 
schools, she would be unfamiliar with computerized 
scheduling and grading. He also felt that the fact that 
Bowles' training was primarily in the business field might 
be a handicap in her supervising others in other academic 
areas. Finally, Keating, based on information from 
Westlav"Next 
previous employers, believed that Bowles had difficulty 
in relating to others in the area of human relation skills. 
Swartz testified that he formulated his impressions of 
Bowles primarily from the interview. It was his opinion 
that she was weak in the area of working with discipline 
problems, as well as in the area of supervision of the 
instruction of teachers. A former supervisor of Bowles 
testified that while she thought Bowles was a good 
teacher and despite the fact that she had seen Bowles 
operate in a supervisory capacity only occasionally, she 
did not think Bowles would make a good administrator. 
Based on the above evidence the trial court held for the 
defendant. On appeal, Bowles asserts that the trial court 
did not adhere to a correct order and allocation of proof at 
trial; that the evidence does not support the fmdings and 
conclusions of the trial court relating to the justifiable 
reasons for the rejection of her application: specifically, 
her lack of administrative ability and her inability to relate 
to others; and that the school district erroneously judged 
the applicants on the basis of subjective evaluations rather 
than using objective standards. 
We point out initially that this action does not involve an 
asserted violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a)). Neither does this action 
allege the violation of any of Bowles' constitutional rights 
under either the United States or Idaho Constitution. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 
L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). 
Idaho Code s 67-5909 provides: 
"Acts prohibited. It shall be a prohibited act to 
discriminate against a person because of, or on a basis 
of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in any of 
the following: 
(1) For an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to 
discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an 
individual with respect to compensation or the terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment .... " 
This provision clearly indicates the legislative intent to 
prohibit discrimination in employment practices in Idaho 
on the basis of sex. Idaho Trailer Coach Association v. 
Brown, 95 Idaho 910,523 P.2d 42 (1974). In this respect 
I.C. s 67-5909 is a parallel state statute to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this Court has not had 
occasion to determine the necessary quantum of proof and 
applicable standards for adjudication of claims of 
statutorily proscribed discrimination on the basis of sex. 
*812 **462 Many federal courts, on the other hand, have 
determined proof requirements and standards for 
adjUdication under Title VII. Further, the state courts 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
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which have had occasion to construe their discrimination 
statutes have done so on the basis of the quantum of proof 
and standards promulgated in the federal cases dealing 
with alleged Title VII sex discrimination violations. See 
Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 151 
N.J.Super. 15, 376 A.2d 535 (1977); General Electric 
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 
(1976); Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 
Wash.App. 48", 573 P.2d 389 (1978). Four states have 
expressly adopted the federal quantum of proof and 
standards in sex discrimination cases. See State Fair 
Employment Practices v. Hohe, 53 Ill.App.3d 724, 11 
Ill.Dec. 158, 368 N.E.2d 709 (1977); Wheelock College 
v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, 
371 Mass. 130, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976); Danz v. Jones, 
263 N. W.2d 395 (Minn. 1978); Scarborough v. Arnold, 
379 A.2d 790 (N.H. 1977). 
[I) Federal and state courts dealing with discrimination 
cases have recognized that "proof of unlawful 
discrimination rarely can be established by direct 
evidence and that an employer's seemingly arbitrary or 
pretextual explanation for a particular hiring judgment 
should not be permitted to justify conduct which is in fact 
unlawfully discriminatory." Wheelock College v. 
Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, supra 
355 N.E.2d at 314. Thus, while we acknowledge that the 
ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of 
discrimination remains with the complainant, Board of 
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d 
169 (1 st Cir. 1978), we accept the principle that a 
complainant may prove a prima facie unlawful 
discrimination case without proving an employer's intent 
to discriminate, thereby shifting the burden of producing 
evidence to the employer to give a lawful explanation for 
its treatment of the complainant. We therefore adhere to 
and are guided by the quantum of proof and standards 
promulgated in discrimination cases arising under Title 
VII. 
[2) Under a Title VII analysis, once a plaintiff has carried 
the burden of producing evidence as to certain facts, 
certain presumptions arise in that plaintiff's favor. 
Without proving an employer's intent to discriminate, a 
discrimination plaintiff may make a claim for relief under 
either the "disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or the "disparate impact" theory of 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849,28 
L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). See generally B. Schlei & P. 
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12 (1976). 
Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324,97 S.Ct. 1843,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In 
this case Bowles has attempted to utilize both theories. 
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(3) To establish a prima facie case of illegal 
discrimination under the "disparate impact" theory, a 
plaintiff need only prove that an employer's policies and 
practices which are neutral on their face and intent, 
nevertheless discriminate in effect against a particular 
group. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, supra; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra. 
Thereafter, an employer must shoulder the burden to 
show a business necessity for the use of the policies or 
practices challenged. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra. 
(4) To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under 
the "disparate treatment" theory, a plaintiff must show (1) 
that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants, (3) that despite her qualifications, she 
was rejected, and (4) that following her rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications.3 *813 **463 McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, supra; Peters v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 516 F.2d 
447 (5th Cir. 1975). At this point, the burden shifts to the 
employer "to articulate some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra 411 U.S. at 802, 93 
S.Ct. at 1824. 
(5) (6) In attempting to establish her "disparate impact" 
theory, Bowles relied upon employment statistics drawn 
from the Moscow School District. Proof of significant 
statistical disparity may be used to create a prima facie 
case of discrimination. See, e. g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor 
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 972,28 L.Ed.2d 237 (1971). See 
generally, B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment 
Discrimination Law 1147-96 (1976). Bowles asserts that 
since no woman has been hired for secondary 
administrative positions in the Moscow School District, 
such is a statistical imbalance within the group hired by 
the employer and is sufficient to create a prima facie case. 
We disagree. Such conclusion might appropriately be 
drawn if the statistical base relied on were larger, but here 
the small number of positions in the district (4), coupled 
with the small numbers of female applicants (2), 
precludes the inference that the lack of female 
administrators is attributable to discrimination, and not 
chance. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, supra; Mayor of Philadelphia v. 
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 
1323,39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 
514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally, Note, 
Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences 
Under Title VII, 59 Va.L.Rev. 463 (1973). We note a lack 
of evidence in the record indicating the percentage of 
qualified secondary administrators who are women. As to 
VVorks 
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assumptions which may be drawn in the absence of such 
evidence, See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, supra; Mayor of Philadelphia v. 
Educational Equality League, supra; Robinson v. City of 
Dallas, supra; Hester v. Southern Railway Co., 497 F.2d 
1374 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally, Note Title VII and 
Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 
Colum.L.Rev. 1614 (1973); Note, Employment 
Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title 
VII, 59 Va.L.Rev. 463 (1973). Here, we hold that Bowles 
did not make a prima facie case based upon the "disparate 
impact" theory. 
Bowles also asserts that she established a prima facie case 
of discrimination under the "disparate treatment" theory. 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra. We agree that 
Bowles did make out a prima facie case under those 
standards. This is not dispositive of the case, however. 
When a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the 
burden of producing evidence then shifts to the employer 
to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the applicant's rejection. As the United States Supreme 
Court recently stated in Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 
(1978): 
"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises 
an inference of discrimination only because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more 
likely than not based on the consideration of 
impermissible factors. 
"When the prima facie case is understood in light of the 
opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the 
burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of 
proving that he based his employment decision on a 
legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one 
such as race .... To dispel the adverse inference from a 
prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the 
employer need only 'articulate some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' 
" 
*814 **464 Hence in the instant case the burden of 
producing evidence which shifted to the school district 
was that of proving that the decision not to hire Bowles 
was based on legitimate nondiscriminatory 
considerations. It is the nature of the burden which shifts 
to the defendant in this case and the proof required once 
the burden does shift which causes us to reverse the 
decision of the district court and remand this case for a 
new trial. 
(7) In the abstract, shifting the burden of producing 
evidence to the employer may be no burden at all where, 
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as here, the employer utilizes subjective and unstructured 
standards to make an employment decision. The record 
before us clearly indicates that the school district based its 
decision not to hire Bowles on subjective and 
unstructured standards. Bowles asserts that such standards 
can be easily manipulated to disguise discrimination. We 
certainly do not dispute the validity of this assertion. But 
it is also true that decisions of hiring or promotion in 
upper level jobs may of necessity involve assessments of 
such abstractions and intangibles, as leadership, 
personality, ability to relate to others and supervisory 
ability, which are difficult, if not impossible, of realistic 
measurement by objective technique alone. See Rogers v. 
International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), 
Vacated and remanded on another issue, 423 U.S. 809, 96 
S.Ct. 19,46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), Opinion on remand, 526 
F.2d 722 (1975); Note, Title VII and Employment 
Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 Colum.L.Rev. 
1613 (1973). We note that subjective hiring procedures 
are not per se violative of Title VII. Rogers v. 
International Paper Co., supra; Hester v. Southern 
Railway Co., supra; see generally, B. Schlei & P. 
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 166-81 
(1976). 
[8] But we are of the opinion that where, as in this case, 
an employer utilizes subjective and unstructured standards 
in the hiring process, that employer, in addition to 
presenting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an 
employment decision, must produce credible evidence to 
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real 
reasons. See Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892, 
895-896 (8th Cir. 1976); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975); Peters v. Jefferson 
Chern. Co., supra; Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 
F.2d 651, 653-654 (8th Cir. 1975). If the employer does 
not produce such credible evidence, he has failed to rebut 
the plaintiffs prima facie case. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court stated it this way: 
"(I)fthe reason given by the employer is 
the real reason for its action and it is a 
nondiscriminatory one ... the employer 
has fulfilled its obligation of stating a 
reason and producing support for the 
stated reason, thus rebutting the prima 
facie case." 
Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission against 
Discrimination, supra, 355 N.E.2d at 315. If the employer 
does produce such credible evidence, then the burden of 
producing evidence shifts back to the plaintiff to show 
that the employer's reasons for rejecting the plaintiff were 
in fact pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra. 
6 
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[9) Our review of the record indicates that while the 
school district presented their reasons for rejecting 
Bowles' application lack of administrative ability and 
inability to relate well with others they failed to present 
credible evidence to suggest that those reasons were 
anything more than convenient reasons A 
The only evidence in the record with respect to Bowles' 
inability to relate well to others is the testimony of 
defendant Keating. He offered testimony that based on 
information which he had from other employers, he 
believed that "she might have difficulty in the area of 
human relation skills." While there is other testimony in 
the record concerning Bowles' qualifications *815 **465 
or lack of qualifications, there is no other testimony 
bearing specifically on her ability to relate well to other 
people. 
As it relates to Bowles' administrative abilities, the record 
indicates that she had a more significant administrative 
background than the person who was hired. The trial 
judge himself so stated at trial. In light of this, the finding 
of the fact that Bowles was not the most qualified 
applicant for the job becomes a meaningless fmding. 
[10) We tum now to a discussion of the trial court's 
conclusion of law that since all nine applicants (eight men 
and one woman) were discriminated against, Bowles 
could not seek relief based on a claim of sex 
discrimination. The problem is that this logic effectively 
forces the plaintiff to show initially, contrary to the 
holding of McDonnell Douglas and Fumco, that the 
employer intended to discriminate against her on the basis 
of sex. The trial judge erroneously considered such a 
threshold showing to be essential in order for Bowles to 
make out a claim for relief. At trial he stated: 
"(I)t seems to me that there must be 
something that shows discrimination 
directed toward your client because 
she's a female. And I don't fmd that in 
the record. There's no question she was 
discriminated against but it seems to me 
she was an outsider. And I don't think 
you've shown anything just because she 
was a woman." 
The fact of the matter is that because Bowles claims to 
have been discriminated against on the basis of sex, under 
I.C. s 67-5909, she has a claim for relief. The school 
district's rejection of the other eight applicants, all of 
whom were male, is irrelevant to her establishing a prima 
facie discrimination claim; although, it may be relevant to 
the school district's attempt to rebut Bowles' prima facie 
case. 
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[11) [12) Where there is a claim of job discrimination by 
a member of the minority covered by chapter 59 of the 
Idaho Code, that minority member is not deprived of his 
or her cause of action even though a person not a part of 
that minority is also rejected from the same job. Quite to 
the contrary, I.e. s 67-5909 opens the doors of this state's 
courts to a plaintiff who alleges that an employer 
discriminated against herlhim on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin with a minimum showing 
on his or her part. Under McDonnell Douglas, such a 
plaintiff need Only show that: (1) that person belongs to a 
protected class, (2) that person applied and was qualified 
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, 
(3) that despite that person's qualifications, shelhe was 
rejected, (4) and lastly, that following herlhis rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of herlhis qualifications. 
Once a discrimination plaintiff has made this showing, 
without any showing of an employer's intent to 
discriminate, shelhe has satisfied herlhis burden of proof. 
At that point the burden shifts to the defendant-employer 
to prove by credible evidence that it rejected the 
plaintiffs application for legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons. If the employer's reasons are legitimate 
nondiscriminatory ones and if they are the real reasons for 
the employer's actions, the employer has fulfilled its 
obligation of stating reasons and producing support for 
those reasons, thus rebutting a prima facie discrimination 
case. 
The proper focus in this case is on the defendants' ability 
to rebut Mrs. Bowles' prima facie discrimination case, not 
on Mrs. Bowles' ability to produce evidence of the school 
district's intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. If the 
defendants successfully rebut her case, the practical effect 
of such a rebuttal would be that there was no 
discrimination on the basis of sex as a matter of law. 
Conversely, if the defendants fail in their burden, the 
effect would be to conclude that they discriminated 
against the plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of I.e. 
s 67-5909 as a matter oflaw. 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion of the record 
and of the law to be applied, this action was tried with a 
certain amount of confusion, as to the standards to be 
used to guide the litigation, the burden required of the 
plaintiff to establish a prima *816 **466 facie case and 
the burden upon the defendants to rebut that case. Given 
the confusion at trial and the resulting absence of a record 
which would indicate whether the trial judge found for the 
defendants because Bowles could not prove the school 
district intended to discriminate against her on the basis of 
sex and whether the school district did in fact rebut 
Bowles' prima facie showing, a new trial is in order. 
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We have taken the time to set out the nature of the proof 
required and the standards to be utilized in determining 
the validity ofa discrimination claim under I.C. s 67-5909 
in this case because it represents one of the first 
significant state job discrimination cases to reach Idaho 
courts. We have no doubt that many will follow. We have 
no desire to deal with these future cases in an ad hoc 
manner. Nor will this Court be complacent with allowing 
litigants -in such cases to build a record for appeal in the 
same ad hoc manner. 
This case is reversed and remanded for a new trial in 
accordance with this opinion. We award costs pursuant to 
I.A.R. 40(a). 
McFADDEN, 1., concurs. 
BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring. 
I agree that we should utilize federal case law under Title 
VII to fashion the standards which, absent further 
governing legislation, will apply to actions brought in this 
state under I.C. s 67-5909. This serves to relieve our 
district courts of the burden of forging new law in this 
delicate area, and also appears to further the legislative 
intention as expressed in I.e. s 67-5901: 
"The general purposes of this act are: (1) 
To provide for execution with the state 
of the policies embodied in the federal 
Civil Rights Act of 1965 (sic) and to 
make uniform the laws of those states 
which enact this act. ... " 
I also agree that we must remand this case for a new trial, 
for I am unable to completely agree with the analysis 
contained in the dissenting opinion. That analysis fails to 
reduce the procedure followed here by the trial court to 
the category of "harmless error." As noted by the 
plurality, it is evident from the trial transcript and briefs 
that much confusion attended the trial not an unexpected 
turn of events, given the lack of guidelines for the trial 
court to follow. If Mrs. Bowles had no opportunity to 
establish that the defendant employer's articulated reasons 
for refusing to hire her were in fact pretextual, as appears 
to be the case, this alone presents sufficient reason to 
justify reversing for a second trial free of that infirmity. 
E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Moreover, there is 
reason to hold that the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficiently confusing to warrant 
reversal for clarification. A trial court's fmdings ought to 
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be such as to assist the appellate court in reaching a clear 
understanding of the basis for the decision. See Perry 
Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 531 P.2d 584 
(1975); Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 372 P.2d 414 
(1962). The judge who tried this cause has since returned 
to private practice. It is appropriate in reversing, 
therefore, to remand the cause for an entirely new trial. 
See Walter v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 94 Idaho 738, 497 
P.2d 1039 (1972). 
If the plurality advocates adopting a standard of proof to 
require the employer to prove his "real" reason to the 
exclusion of all other reasons, as the dissent maintains, 
however, I must disagree with that standard. The plurality 
states that the "employer, in addition to presenting 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment 
decision, must produce credible evidence to show that the 
reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons." This 
statement is followed by a reference to five cases. 
As the dissent points out, there are at least two ways to 
read that standard set forth by the plurality. The first way 
is to hold that the employer must do more than merely 
state a reason for his decision, where such reason has no 
support in the evidence. This apparently is the standard 
the dissent would adopt. A second possible *817 **467 
reading is to require that the employer prove his "real" 
reasons to the exclusion of all other possible reasons, 
including those of a discriminatory nature. After a close 
examination of the cases cited by the plurality, I cannot 
agree that this more stringent standard was utilized in 
those cases or that it should be adopted here. I also do not 
believe that this was the standard that the plurality 
intended to adopt. 
In the first case cited by the plurality, Garrett v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976), the court merely held 
that there was substantial evidence to support the judge's 
findings that plaintiff was discharged for the reasons 
stated by defendant and that those reasons were not 
pretext. That court stated that once a prima facie case is 
made out by the plaintiff, the "burden then shifts to 
defendant to show a valid reason for the action, and 
plaintiff is then afforded an opportunity to show that 
defendant's asserted reason is a mere pretext." Id. at 895. 
This statement that defendant must "show a valid reason" 
can in no way be read to require him to prove his "real" 
reason to the exclusion of all others. 
The court in Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 
348 (lOth Cir. 1975) , stated that "(d)efendant may, of 
course, rebut this prima facie showing by producing 
evidence of objective business reasons or necessity for its 
failure to promote the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in turn, are free 
to show that this was pretextual." The only other relevant 
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statement made by the court was "(a)s to the salaried 
positions and the use of the totem pole, it would appear 
that the defendant would have the burden of establishing 
the fundamental fairness of this approach since it is 
largely subjective." Id. Again, these two statements do not 
place on the employer the burden of proving the real 
reason to the exclusion of all others. 
In Peters v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th 
Cir. 1975), the court stated that" '(o)nce the plaintiff has 
made out his prima facie case we look to the defendant 
for an explanation since he is in a position to know 
whether he failed to hire a person for reasons which 
would not exonerate him.' " Id. at 450, quoting Hodgson 
v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 455 F.2d 
818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972). The court stated that defendant 
had established legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, 
that the plaintiff had not been transferred because she had 
a history of back problems and the job would have 
required heavy weight lifting. The court's statement that it 
would "look to the defendant for an explanation" does not 
amount to a shift in the burden of proof, as opposed to the 
burden of going forward. 
The defendant in Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 
F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975), failed to establish a "legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection," 
but it was not because the court required him to prove his 
real reason. Rather he failed to show that the reason 
advanced was at all credible. Defendant's only evidence 
consisted of self-serving statements that plaintiffs work 
was piling up and that other employees couldn't take care 
of it. Furthermore, it was shown that in the past defendant 
had used temporary help to fill in for absentees, but 
defendant refused to do so in this case. 
The confusion surrounding the burden of proof here was 
perhaps best illustrated in the final case cited in the 
plurality opinion, Wheelock College v. Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 355 
N.E.2d 309 (1976). That court stated that the employer's 
burden in articulating "some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason" requires the employer to 
produce not only evidence of the reason for its action but 
also underlying facts in support of that reason. However, 
that court further stated that the employee then has the 
burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the 
articulated reason was in fact the real reason for the 
employer's actions, or merely pretextual. Later in the 
opinion the court also stated that "an employer must not 
only give a lawful reason or reasons for its employment 
decision but also must produce credible evidence to show 
that the reason or *818 **468 reasons advanced were the 
real reasons." Id. at 138, 355 N.E.2d at 314. The citations 
after this statement showed that the court was only putting 
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the burden of going forward on the defendant, however, 
not the burden of proof. The only other statement made 
by the court on this issue was as follows: 
"(I)fthe employee has proved a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination and the employer gives an explanation 
for a hiring decision which has no reasonable support 
in the evidence or is wholly disbelieved (and hence is 
transparently pretextual), the employee should prevail. 
On the other hand, if the reason given by the employer 
is the real reason for its action and it is a 
nondiscriminatory one, even if the commission thinks 
the employer's action was arbitrary or unwise, the 
employer has fulfilled its obligation of stating a reason 
and producing support for the stated reason, thus 
rebutting the prima facie case." Id. at 138-39, 355 
N.E.2d at 315. 
As I read this case, the employer must produce evidence 
to show that his stated reasons are not transparently 
pretextual, I.e., he must set forth evidence which would 
reasonably justity the conclusion that the stated reasons 
were not merely convenient rationale. This is only a 
burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to rebut 
the prima facie case, for the ultimate burden of proof on 
the issue of discrimination remains with plaintiff. At no 
time does the burden of proof itself shift to the employer. 
There appear to be two reasons why some courts, 
apparently aloof from the fact that the Ultimate burden of 
proof remains at all times on the plaintiff, See King v. 
Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 
1975); Naraine v. Western Electric Co., 507 F.2d 590 (8th 
Cir. 1974), seemingly place the burden of proof on the 
employer at this second step. One reason is simply 
through a linguistic error and a misunderstanding of the 
distinction between going forward with the evidence and 
having the burden of proof. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. 
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 296-98, 58 L.Ed.2d 
216 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The second reason is 
a feeling that only the employer knows the real reasons 
for his decision, and, if it is a subjective decision, it is 
very difficult for plaintiff to prove that it was a 
discriminatory reason; thus the employer should have the 
burden of proving that his decision was nondiscriminatory 
once a prima facie case is made out. This assumes, 
however, as the plurality here states, that "the practical 
effect (of defendants rebutting plaintiff s prima facie 
case) ... would be that there was no discrimination on the 
basis of sex as a matter of law." I must disagree with this 
assumption that for all practical purposes the third step, 
where plaintiff can show pretext, is superfluous. There are 
ways that pretext can be shown. Plaintiff can show pretext 
by showing that the records relied on in support of the 
advanced reason "were fraudulent, inaccurate or 
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otherwise unreliable ... if they were intended or known 
to be so .... " Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. 
Supp. 468 (D.CoI.1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 524 F.2d 263 (lOth Cir. 1975). Plaintiff 
could also show sufficient pretext to take the issue to the 
trier of fact by showing that the reasons advanced had no 
bearing on plaintiffs ability to perform on the job or by 
showing that the person actually hired was even less 
qualified in those areas relied on by the employer. 
The plurality opinion acknowledges that the ultimate 
burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. It also states 
that a prima facie case shifts ''the burden Of producing 
evidence to the employer to give a Lawful explanation for 
its treatment of complainant" (emphasis added). A better 
reading of the plurality opinion leads to the conclusion 
that the standard adopted is one of producing enough 
evidence to show that the advanced reasons were not 
purely pretextual, for the plurality held that defendants 
had not met their burden because "(t) hey failed to present 
credible evidence to suggest that those reasons were 
anything more than convenient reasons." The plurality did 
not hold that defendants had not met their burden of 
proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real 
reasons, but only that they had in effect merely stated 
reasons *819 **469 without enough support in the 
evidence to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case. The 
statement that defendant "must produce credible evidence 
to show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real 
reasons," a statement taken from Wheelock College, 
supra, does not to my mind place the burden on defendant 
of proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real 
reasons. It merely requires him to produce enough 
evidence to justifY the conclusion that his reasons 
reasonably could have been the real reasons. That was the 
standard adopted by the court in Wheelock College, and I 
believe that is the standard which should be applied and 
that it is the standard which the plurality intended to 
adopt. 
Although subjectiveness will always remain a part of the 
hiring process for many types of jobs, "(a)bsolute 
discretion over employment decisions where subjective 
race prejudice may control (perhaps even without the 
executive's knowledge) is no longer consistent with our 
law." Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 
1976). Employers would be better off, both legally and 
probably job-wise, if they developed reasonably objective 
hiring procedures and records that they could then present 
to the court on being charged with job discrimination. 
Even if I am incorrect in this reading of the plurality 
opinion, moreover, it appears from reading both opinions 
that a majority of this Court would agree with me that the 
quantum and standard of proof is as follows: (1) plaintiff 
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carries the initial burden of making out a prima facie case 
from which it can be inferred, "if such actions remain 
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such 
actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act.' " Furno Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), 
quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 
L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); (2) defendant then must rebut that 
prima facie showing by producing enough evidence to 
show that his stated reasons are in fact credible, I.e., that 
his decision could reasonably have been based on the 
reasons set forth; and (3) plaintiff then can show that in 
fact the reasons stated are pretextuaL 
SHEPARD, Justice, dissenting. 
I would affirm. In my view, the trial court's findings of 
fact of no illegal discrimination are Not clearly erroneous 
under either state or federal standards. The federal 
framework for the adjudication of claims of sex 
discrimination is by no means settled. It is apparent that 
the majority is intent upon applying federal Title VII 
analysis to the case at bar and, in my opinion, parts of the 
analysis contained in the majority are either unclear or 
erroneous statements of federal law. 
To prove a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the plaintiff may proceed under either the 
"disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(l973), or the "disparate impact" theory of Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849,28 L.Ed.2d 
158 (1971). Claims of disparate treatment are 
distinguishable from claims of disparate impact: 
"The latter involve employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups 
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity ... 
. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not 
required under a disparate impact theory." Int'I Brd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97 
S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 
I am in accord with the majority's analysis of plaintiffs 
claim under the disparate impact theory. 
"Disparate treatment" is the most readily understood type 
of discrimination. 
"The employer simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, 
re!i~ion, sex,.()~ national()!i~.in. Proof of discrimill~t()ry 
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motive is critical, although it can in some situations be 
inferred from the mere fact of differences *820 **470 
in treatment." Int'l Brd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
supra, at 335 n. 15,97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15. 
Thus, contrary to the majority, it Is necessary for Donna 
Bowles to show that the defendants intended to 
discriminate against her on the basis of sex. See also 
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 
2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978), 
Rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 
L.Ed.2d 216 (1978); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 
442 F.Supp. 593 (E.D.Pa. 1977). In recognition of the 
difficulty of proving intent, however, the United States 
Supreme Court has established a method by which a 
plaintiff may generate an inference of discrimination upon 
the showing of certain facts. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, Supra. The four elements needed for a plaintiff to 
make out a prima facie case are as set forth in the majority 
opinion. Once the four McDonnell Douglas factors are 
met, an inference of discriminatory motive is raised. 
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School Dist. No. 213, 565 
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977). 
If the plaintiff carries the initial burden and establishes a 
prima facie case, the "burden then must shift to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, supra 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. 
See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, supra. The 
burden which shifts is not, as the majority suggests, the 
burden of persuasion but, rather, the burden of going 
forward with the evidence. The ultimate burden of 
persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the 
plaintiff, who must convince the court by a preponderance 
of the evidence that she has been the victim of 
discrimination. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College v. 
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sweeney v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 
1978); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.Pa. 
1977). If the employer articulates a reason for rejection 
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the trial 
enters a third phase not treated in the majority opinion. At 
this point, the plaintiff is to be "afforded a fair 
opportunity to show that petitioner's (the employer's) 
stated reason for respondent's (the employee's) rejection 
was in fact pretext." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
supra 411 U.S. at 804,93 S.Ct. at 1825. See also Furnco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, supra. 
The majority correctly concludes that Mrs. Bowles 
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment criteria. I agree 
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that the proper focus in this case is thus upon the 
defendant's ability to rebut this prima facie case. I do not 
agree, however, that the defendants failed to rebut the 
prima facie case. 
In reaching its conclusion that the defendants failed to 
rebut plaintiffs prima facie case, the majority appears to 
be adopting a new standard of proof to apply to such 
factual situations. Under federal pattern and practice, an 
employer need only "articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802, 93 
S.Ct. at 1824. The majority is now placing upon the Idaho 
employer who uses subjective hiring practices the 
additional burden of producing "credible evidence to 
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the Real 
reasons." (Emphasis added.) We are not told what "real" 
reasons are, and how one goes about distinguishing them 
from some other kind. There are at least two possible 
ways to read this new standard. The majority may wish to 
emphasis that the employer must do something more than 
merely "state" his reasons. Under Furnco and McDonnell 
Douglas "the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 
'Explains what he has done' or'Produc(es) evidence of 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.' " Bd. of Trustees 
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, supra. It has never 
been the law that the employer may rebut a prima facie 
case by merely stating a reason which has no support in 
the evidence. 
*821 **471 Another, and more logical, way to read the 
majority's new standard is as an imposition upon the 
employer to prove his "real" reason to the exclusion of all 
other reasons including those of a discriminatory nature. 
If this be the case, a defendant employer in Idaho will be 
saddled with a burden more onerous than he would bear 
in federal court. In Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College 
v. Sweeney, supra, the Court dealt with that very issue 
and reversed a Court of Appeals decision which required 
the defendant employer to prove an Absence of 
discriminatory motive because that party had greater 
access to such evidence. The Court noted that in Furnco 
and McDonnell Douglas it was stated that an employer 
may dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie case 
by simply articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection. The Court then 
declared that "there is a significant distinction between 
merely 'articulat(ing) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason,' and 'prov(ing) absence of discriminatory 
motive' .... (T)he former will suffice to meet the 
employee's prima facie case of discrimination." 99 S.Ct. 
at 295. The Court also noted that placing the burden of 
proving the absence of a discriminatory motive on the 
employer, 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
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"would make entirely superfluous the third step in the 
Furnco McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would 
place on the employer at the second stage the burden of 
showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, 
rather than requiring such proof from the employee as 
part of the third step." 99 S.Ct. at 295 n. 1. 
If this Court wishes, as it states, to follow federal law, 
then the proper question before us is simply whether the 
defendants articulated or established that there was a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Mrs. 
Bowles. There is no justification or basis in the case law 
for imposing upon the defendants the obligation to prove 
that this was the "real" reason to the exclusion of others. 
To impose that additional proof burden on defendants, the 
majority ostensibly uses the fact that the school district 
used subjective hiring procedures. It must be noted in this 
regard that the employer in McDonnell Douglas also used 
a subjective criterion for refusing to hire the plaintiff 
therein. Although the Court of Appeals had said that the 
subjective reason would carry little weight in rebutting 
charges of discrimination, the Supreme Court said that it 
would suffice to meet the prima facie case. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 
1817. At this point, then, the sole question is whether the 
defendants articulated or established a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Mrs. Bowles. 
The district court, based upon the evidence adduced at 
trial, expressly found that plaintiff was not hired "because 
of her apparent lack of administrative ability and her 
failure to relate well to others." He, therefore, concluded 
as a matter of law that "there were justifiable reasons for 
the defendant school district not to hire the plaintiff." This 
Court can overturn the judge's decision only by ruling 
that it was "clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). This same 
standard is applicable to judge-tried discrimination cases 
in federal court. E. g., Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 
F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 
F.2d416 (5th Cir. 1975). 
On appeal it is axiomatic that the record, the evidence, 
and the inferences arising therefrom are to be viewed 
most favorably to the respondent and in support of the 
findings of the trial court. Matter of Estate of Webber, 97 
Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). As to appellant's 
experience in administration, the testimony indicates that 
aside from formal education she had worked 
approximately seven years as a teacher of business 
subjects such as shorthand, typing, and business law in 
three different high schools. In two of them, she taught 
under the supervision of her husband, who was the high 
school principal. Two of those schools numbered 
approximately 150 students as contrasted with 
approximately 600 in Moscow high school. For two years 
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in the winter season she taught adult education classes in 
shorthand *822 **472 and typing under the supervision of 
one Andruiza. She had made application for a teaching 
position at Moscow high school and later for a position in 
administration at the University of Idaho and was not 
hired for either position. During 1973 and 1974, she made 
application for positions as Moscow junior high school 
vice-principal, Moscow high school vice-principal, and 
Moscow high school principal. She was not hired for any 
of these positions. Since 1973, she has worked as legal 
secretary for her husband. 
As stated in the majority opmlOn, appellant was 
interviewed by defendant Keating and Swartz, who was 
then the principal at Moscow high school. Both testified 
that they felt Bowles lacked direct experience in the 
supervision over the teachers; that her experience in 
smaller schools would handicap her in dealing 
administratively with computerized scheduling and 
grading in a large school such as Moscow; that she had 
little experience in working with discipline problems; and 
when they checked with former supervisors of Bowles, it 
was reported that she had difficulty in relating to others in 
the area of human relation skills. That testimony was 
supported by the testimony of one Andruiza, a former 
supervisor of Bowles. 
It is true, as asserted by the majority opinion, that 
subjective and unstructured standards were utilized in 
evaluating appellant's application. However, it is also true 
that decisions of hiring or promotion in upper level jobs 
may necessarily involve such abstractions and intangibles 
as leadership, personality, ability to relate to others, and 
supervisory ability, which are difficult, if not impossible, 
to realistically measure by objective techniques alone. See 
Rogers v. Int'I Paper Co., 5lO F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded on another issue, 423 U.S. 809,96 
S.Ct. 19, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), opinion on remand, 526 
F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975), Note, Title VII and Employment 
Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 Colum.L.Rev. 
1614 (1973). Subjective hiring procedures are not Per se 
violative of Title VII, Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., supra; 
Hester v. Southern Railroad Co., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
In my judgment, the record here supports the finding of 
the trial court "that the plaintiff was not hired by the 
defendant, Moscow School District, as the high school 
vice-principal because of her apparent lack of 
administrative ability and her failure to relate well to 
others." Thus, evidence Was adduced to show a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason. Thereafter, appellant had full 
opportunity to produce evidence to show that defendant's 
refusal to hire was, in fact, sexually premised. This she 
did not do. I would hold that since the trial court's ruling 
Works. 
Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
600 P.2d 458 
was not clearly erroneous, we are bound to accept it. 
LR.C.P. 52(a). 
In my judgment, the majority opinion ignores the record 
which clearly supports the ruling of the trial court and 
appears to be influenced by two additional factors. The 
first appears to be that the trial court did not expressly 
recognize that appellant had established a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination. If the trial court had dismissed 
plaintiff's case at the end of her case in chief or ended his 
analysis with the simple conclusion that she had not met 
her burden of establishing a prima facie case, I, too, 
would vote for a reversaL However, the purportedly 
erroneous statement of the trial judge contained in the 
majority opinion occurred at the conclusion of the entire 
trial, and since the trial court at that time had heard 
evidence of legitimate reasons for the refusal to hire, I 
would hold that he was correct in suggesting at that point 
the necessity of tendering evidence showing that the 
hiring decision was sexually premised. Appellant was not 
halted at the "threshold." Federal courts have held that 
any error in classifying plaintiffs proof as insufficient to 
create a prima facie case is harmless error. See, e. g., 
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 
1978); Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th 
Cir.1975). 
The second factor which I view as influencing the 
majority opinion is the trial court's conclusion "that all 
nine of the applicants for the job of high school 
vice-principal were discriminated against, but said *823 
**473 discrimination was not based on sex, and said 
discrimination was not illegal." That conclusion is 
probably substantiated in the record as a desire on behalf 
of the defendants-respondents to hire a current employee 
of the school district, or an "insider." The majority 
opinion Finds that appellant "had a more significant 
Footnotes 
administrative background than the person who was 
hired." I would disagree with that Finding of the majority. 
I would view the record otherwise and only note that the 
trial court made no such finding. The record sustains, and 
I would uphold, the finding of the trial court that the 
appellant was not the most qualified of the nine applicants 
for the job regardless of what her qualifications might be 
when compared to those of the "insider." The conclusion 
to be drawn from this is that a male who was the most 
qualified of the applicants, as well as Mrs. Bowles, appear 
to have been discriminated against in favor of an "insider" 
who also happened to be a male. While such may be 
offensive to our abstract notions of fair play, I would hold 
that the trial judge was correct in ruling that it was not an 
Illegal Form of discrimination. Discrimination is not 
unlawful unless the form of discrimination is 
constitutionally or statutorily forbidden. B. Schlei & P. 
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 15 (1976). A 
practice of "cronyism" or "insider" hiring may, in some 
instances, be facially neutral, but also have a 
discriminatory impact. See Local 53 ofInt'l Ass'n of Heat 
and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 
F.Supp. 756 (E.D.Va. 1978). However, I fmd no such 
evidence of discriminatory impact in the case at bar. 
I would affirm the decision of the lower court. 
BAKES, J., concurs. 
Parallel Citations 
606 P.2d 458 
1 At trial neither interviewer could specifically recall specific questions asked at the interviews. Swartz testified that all he could 
specifically remember about Bowles' interview was that she did not go into enough detail in response to his questions whatever 
they were. 
2 At trial, the trial judge commented to defendant Keating that it appeared to him that Keating had intended to hire the uncertified 
individual all along. The trial judge based this observation partially on the fact that Keating had signed a statement after reviewing 
the nine official applications to the effect that no certified person was available for the position even though Mrs. Bowles was 
certified. Keating denied any such intention. He then noted this individual's qualifications which in his, Keating's mind, better 
qualified him as an administrator than Mrs. Bowles: 
"He had successfully completed training as a jet flight pilot with the United States Air Force and I felt that that 
experience had given him a good deal of leadership training. A good deal of experience in supervision of others. 
Good deal of training in administrative responsibilities that would be very similar to a position in school 
administration. I personally felt that that was a strong plus factor in his background for the position we were 
considering for." 
3 While there has been some suggestion that the order, nature, and burden of proof prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, a racial discrimination case under Title VII, is inapplicable to sex discrimination cases, 
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Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979) 
606 P.2d 458 
the United States Supreme Court in Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Jurinko, 414 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 293, 38 L.Ed.2d 214 (1973), has 
indicated that the proof requirements in McDonnell Douglas are applicable to sex discrimination cases. See also Jacobs v. Martin 
Sweets Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977). 
4 Given our conclusion in this regard, we do not reach the question of whether Bowles presented evidence showing that the School 
District's reasons for rejecting her were mere pretext. 
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Employee who had suffered no adverse job consequences 
as result of alleged sexual harassment by supervisor 
brought suit against former employer under Title VII 
alleging that sexual harassment forced her constructive 
discharge. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, 1., 
entered summary judgment in favor of employer. The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed. 
Employer petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court, 
Justice held that: (1) employer is subject to 
vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment 
created by a supervisor with immediate or successively 
higher authority over employee; (2) in those cases in which 
employee has suffered no tangible job consequences as 
result of supervisor's actions, employer may raise an 
affirmative defense to liability or damages; and (3) 
affirmative defense requires employer to show that it 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior and that employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided or to avoid harm 
otherwise. 
Affirmed. 
Justice filed opinion concurring in judgment. 
Justice filed dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
joined. 
West Headnotes (13) 
Terms quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment are not controlling for purposes of 
determining employer liability for harassment by 
supervisor; however, terms are helpful in making 
rough demarcation between Title VII cases in 
which sexual harassment threats are carried out 
and where they are not or are absent altogether, 
and thus terms are relevant when there is 
threshold question whether employee can prove 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
When employee proves that tangible 
employment action resulted from refusal to 
submit to supervisor's sexual demands, he or she 
establishes that employment decision itself 
constitutes change in terms and conditions of 
employment that is actionable under Title VII; 
however, for any sexual harassment preceding 
employment decision to be actionable, conduct 
must be severe or pervasive. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 
Federal law, based on general common law 
principles of agency, governs employer's 
vicarious liability under Title VII for sexual 
harassment by supervisor, although common law 
principles may not be wholly transferable to Title 
VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
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Employer may be liable for both negligent and 
intentional torts committed by employee within 
scope of his or her employment. 
General rule is that sexual harassment by 
supervisor is not conduct within scope of 
employment for purposes of employer liability 
under agency principles. 
Although supervisor's sexual harassment is 
outside scope of employment because conduct 
was for personal motives, employer can be liable, 
nonetheless, where its own negligence is cause of 
harassment; employer is negligent with respect to 
sexual harassment if it knew or should have 
known about the conduct and failed to stop it. 
Apparent authority is relevant to principal's 
vicarious I iability where agent purports to 
exercise power which he or she does not have, as 
distinct from where agent threatens to misuse 
actual power. 
Under "aided in the agency relation" standard for 
vicarious liability, more than mere presence of 
employment relation that aids in commission of 
harassment is necessary to hold employer liable 
for supervisor's action; however, whatever exact 
contours of standard, vicarious liability may be 
found under standard when supervisor's 
discriminatory act results in tangible 
employment action against employee. 
Tangible employment action taken by supervisor 
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of 
employer. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et 
seq., 701(b), 
Employer is subject to vicarious liability to 
victimized employee for actionable hostile 
environment created by supervisor with 
immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over employee; when no tangible employment 
(1 
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action is taken, employer may raise affirmative 
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof 
by preponderance of the evidence. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., § 
Employer's affirmative defense to vicarious 
liability for supervisor's creation of hostile work 
environment comprises two necessary elements: 
(a) that employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
Employer has no affirmative defense to vicarious 
liability for supervisor's harassing conduct in 
violation of Title VII when supervisor's 
harassment culminates in tangible employment 
action, such as discharge, demotion, or 
undesirable reassignment. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 70 I et seq., 
Employer might be held vicariously liable under 
Title VII for supervisor's making unwelcome and 
threatening sexual advances to employee, even 
though conduct did not result in tangible job 
consequences for employee; however, employer 
could avoid liability by showing by 
preponderance of evidence that it exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior and employee 
unreasonably failed to use preventive or 
corrective measures provided by employer. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
**2259 *742 Syllabus* 
Respondent Kimberly Ellerth quit her job after 15 months 
as a salesperson in one of petitioner Burlington Industries' 
many divisions, allegedly because she had been subjected 
to constant sexual harassment by one of her supervisors, 
Ted Slowik. Slowik was a midlevel manager who had 
authority to hire and promote employees, subject to higher 
approval, but was not considered a policymaker. Against a 
background of repeated boorish and offensive remarks and 
gestures allegedly made by Slowik, Ellerth places 
particular emphasis on three incidents where Slowik's 
comments could be construed as threats to deny her 
tangible job benefits. Ellerth refused all of Slowik's 
advances, yet suffered no tangible retaliation and was, in 
fact, promoted once. Moreover, she never informed 
anyone in authority about Slowik's conduct, despite 
knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual 
harassment. In filing this lawsuit, Ellerth alleged 
Burlington engaged in sexual harassment and forced her 
constructive discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, The District 
Court granted Burlington summary judgment. The Seventh 
Circuit en banc reversed in a decision that produced eight 
separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling 
rationale. Among other things, those opinions focused on 
whether Ellerth's claim could be categorized as one of quid 
pro quo harassment, and on whether the standard for an 
employer's liability on such a claim should be vicarious 
liability or negligence. 
Held: Under Title VII, an employee who refuses the 
unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a 
supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job 
consequences, may recover against the employer without 
showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for 
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the supervisor's actions, but the employer may interpose 
an affirmative defense. Pp. 2264-2271. 
(a) The Court assumes an important premise yet to be 
established: A trier of fact could find in Slowik's remarks 
numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied 
some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not 
carried out. Cases based on carried-out threats are referred 
to often as "quid pro quo" cases, as distinct from 
bothersome attentions or sexual remarks sufficient to 
create a "hostile work environment." Those two terms do 
not appear in Title VII, which forbids only *743 
"discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his 
'" terms [or] conditions ... of employment, because of ... 
§ 2000e-2(a)(I). In 11I,PV"'UlV 
this Court distinguished between the two 
concepts, saying both are cognizable under Title VII, 
though a hostile environment claim requires harassment 
that is severe or pervasive. did not discuss the 
distinction for its bearing upon an employer's liability for 
discrimination, but held, with no further specifics, that 
agency principles controlled on this point. 
Nevertheless, in wake, 
Courts of Appeals held that, if the plaintiff established a 
quid pro quo claim, the employer was subject to vicarious 
liability. This rule encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state 
their claims in quid pro quo terms, which in tum **2260 
put expansive pressure on the definition. For example, the 
question presented here is phrased as whether Ellerth can 
state a quid pro quo claim, but the issue of real concern to 
the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability, 
rather than liability limited to its own negligence. This 
Court nonetheless believes the two terms are of limited 
utility. To the extent they illustrate the distinction between 
cases involving a carried-out threat and offensive conduct 
in general, they are relevant when there is a threshold 
question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination. 
Hence, Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, so 
it is a hostile work environment claim requiring a showing 
of severe or pervasive conduct. This Court accepts the 
District Court's finding that Ellerth made such a showing. 
When discrimination is thus proved, the factors discussed 
below, not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment, control on the issue of vicarious liability. Pp. 
2264-2265. 
(b) In deciding whether an employer has vicarious liability 
in a case such as this, the Court turns to agency law 
principles, for Title VII defines the term "employer" to 
include "agents." Given this express direction, 
the Court concludes a uniform and predictable standard 
must be established as a matter of federal law. The Court 
relies on the general common law of agency, rather than on 
the law of any particular State. 
The Restatement (Second) of 
Agency (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful beginning 
point, although common-law principles may not be wholly 
transferable to Title VII. See 
Pp. 2265-2266. 
(c) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his 
servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment. Restatement § 219(1). Although such torts 
generally may be either negligent or intentional, sexual 
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional 
conduct. An intentional tort is within the scope of 
employment when *744 actuated, at least in part, by a 
purpose to serve the employer. Id, §§ 228(l)(c), 230. 
Courts of Appeals have held, however, a supervisor acting 
out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual 
urges may be actuated by personal motives unrelated and 
even antithetical to the employer's objectives. Thus, the 
general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not 
conduct within the scope of employment. Pp. 2265-2267. 
(d) However, scope of employment is not the on ly basis for 
employer liability under agency principles. An employer is 
subject to liability for the torts of its employees acting 
outside the scope of their employment when, inter alia, the 
employer itself was negligent or reckless, Restatement § 
219(2)(b), or the employee purported to act or to speak on 
behalf of the employer and there was reliance upon 
apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the existence of the agency relation, id, § 219(2)( d). 
An employer is negligent, and therefore subject to liability 
under § 219(2)(b), if it knew or should have known about 
sexual harassment and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a 
minimum standard for Title VII liability; but Ellerth seeks 
to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious liability. 
Section 219(2)(d) makes an employer vicariously liable for 
sexual harassment by an employee who uses apparent 
authority (the apparent authority standard), or who was 
"aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation" (the aided in the agency relation 
standard). P. 2267. 
(e) As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where 
the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does 
not have, as distinct from threatening to misuse actual 
power. Compare Restatement § 6 with § 8. Because 
supervisory harassment cases involve misuse of actual 
power, not the false impression of its existence, apparent 
authority analysis is inappropriate. When a party seeks to 
impose vicarious liability based on an agent's misuse of 
delegated authority, the Restatement's aided in the agency 
relation rule provides the appropriate analysis. Pp. 
2267-2268. 
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(f) That rule requires the existence of something more than 
the employment relation itself because, in a sense, most 
workplace **2261 tortfeasors, whether supervisors or 
co-workers, are aided in accomplishing their tortious 
objective by the employment relation: Proximity and 
regular contact afford a captive pool of potential victims. 
Such an additional aid exists when a supervisor subjects a 
subordinate to a significant, tangible employment action, 
i.e., a significant change in employment status, such as 
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Every 
Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question 
has correctly found vicarious liability in that circumstance. 
This Court imports the significant, tangible employment 
action concept for resolution of the vicarious *745 liability 
issue considered here. An employer is therefore subject to 
vicarious liability for such actions. However, where, as 
here, there is no tangible employment action, it is not 
obvious the agency relationship aids in commission of the 
tort. Moreover, holds that agency principles 
constrain the imposition of employer liability for 
supervisor harassment. Limiting employer liability is also 
consistent with Title VII's purpose to the extent it would 
encourage the creation and use of antiharassment policies 
and grievance procedures. Thus, in order to accommodate 
the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused 
by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's 
equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by 
employers and saving action by objecting employees, the 
Court adopts, in this case and in 
following holding: An employer is subject to vicarious 
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee. When 
no tangible employment action is taken, a defending 
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence, see The defense 
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an 
employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a 
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the 
employment circumstances may appropriately be 
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of 
the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to 
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to 
avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable 
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally 
suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the second 
element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available, 
however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in 
a tangible employment action. Pp. 2268-2270. 
(g) Given the Court's explanation that the labels quid pro 
quo and hostile work environment are not controlling for 
employer-liability purposes, Ellerth should have an 
adequate opportunity on remand to prove she has a claim 
which would result in vicarious liability. Although she has 
not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at 
Slowik's hands, which would deprive Burlington of the 
affirmative defense, this is not dispositive. In light of the 
Court's decision, Burlington is still *746 subject to 
vicarious liability for Slowik's activity, but should have an 
opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense. P. 
2271. 
23 affirmed. 
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Opinion 
**2262 Justice 
Court. 
delivered the opinion of the 
We decide whether, under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, et 
*747 seq., an employee who refuses the unwelcome and 
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no 
adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the 
employer without showing the employer is negligent or 
otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions. 
I 
Summary judgment was granted for the employer, so we 
118 S.Ct. 2257,77 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (SNA) 1, 170 ALR. Fed. 677". 
must take the facts alleged by the employee to be true. 
(per curiam). The 
employer is Burlington Industries, the petitioner. The 
employee is Kimberly Ellerth, the respondent. From March 
1993 until May 1994, Ellerth worked as a salesperson in 
one of Burlington's divisions in Chicago, Illinois. During 
her employment, she alleges, she was subjected to constant 
sexual harassment by her supervisor, one Ted Slowik. 
In the hierarchy of Burlington's management structure, 
Slowik was a midlevel manager. Burlington has eight 
divisions, employing more than 22,000 people in some 50 
plants around the United States. Slowik was a vice 
president in one of five business units within one of the 
divisions. He had authority to make hiring and promotion 
decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, who 
signed the paperwork. See . I 
According to Slowik's supervisor, his 
position was "not considered an upper-level management 
position," and he was "not amongst the decision-making or 
policy-making hierarchy." Slowik was not Ellerth's 
immediate supervisor. Ellerth worked in a two-person 
office in Chicago, and she answered to her office 
colleague, who in turn answered to Slowik in New York. 
Against a background of repeated boorish and offensive 
remarks and gestures which Slowik allegedly made, 
Ellerth places particular emphasis on three alleged 
incidents where Slowik's comments could be construed as 
threats to deny her *748 tangible job benefits. In the 
summer of 1993, while on a business trip, Slowik invited 
Ellerth to the hotel lounge, an invitation Ellerth felt 
compelled to accept because Slowik was her boss. App. 
155. When Ellerth gave no encouragement to remarks 
Slowik made about her breasts, he told her to "loosen up" 
and warned, "you know, Kim, I could make your life very 
hard or very easy at Burlington." [d., at 156. 
In March 1994, when Ellerth was being considered for a 
promotion, Slowik expressed reservations during the 
promotion interview because she was not "loose enough." 
Id., at 159. The comment was followed by his reaching 
over and rubbing her knee. Ibid. Ellerth did receive the 
promotion; but when Slowik called to announce it, he told 
Ellerth, "you're gonna be out there with men who work in 
factories, and they certainly like women with pretty 
butts/legs." Id., at 159-160. 
In May 1994, Ellerth called Slowik, asking permission to 
insert a customer's logo into a fabric sample. Slowik 
responded, "I don't have time for you right now, Kim 
... -unless you want to tell me what you're wearing." [d., at 
78. Ellerth told Slowik she had to go and ended the call. 
Ibid. A day or two later, Ellerth called Slowik to ask 
permISSIOn again. This time he denied her request, but 
added something along the lines of, "are you wearing 
shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a 
who Ie heck of a lot easier." I d., at 79. 
A short time later, Ellerth's immediate supervisor 
cautioned her about returning telephone calls to customers 
in a prompt fashion. In response, 
Ellerth quit. She faxed a letter giving reasons unrelated to 
the alleged sexual harassment we have described. 
About three weeks later, however, she sent a letter 
explaining she quit because of Slowik's behavior. 
During her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform 
anyone in authority about Slowik's conduct, despite 
knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual 
harassment. *749 In fact, she chose not to inform her 
**2263 immediate supervisor (not Slowik) because" 'it 
would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents 
of sexual harassment.' " On one occasion, she told 
Slowik a comment he made was inappropriate. 
In October 1994, after receiving a right-to-sue letter from 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
Ellerth filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, alleging Burlington engaged 
in sexual harassment and forced her constructive 
discharge, in violation of Title VII. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to Burlington. The court found 
Slowik's behavior, as described by Ellerth, severe and 
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, but 
found Burlington neither knew nor should have known 
about the conduct. There was no triable issue offact on the 
latter point, and the court noted Ellerth had not used 
Burlington's internal complaint procedures. 
Although Ellerth's claim was framed as a hostile work 
environment complaint, the District Court observed there 
was a quid pro quo "component" to the hostile 
environment. Proceeding from the premise 
that an employer faces vicarious liability for quid pro quo 
harassment, the District Court thought it necessary to apply 
a negligence standard because the quid pro quo merely 
contributed to the hostile work environment. See 
The District Court also dismissed Ellerth's 
constructive discharge claim. 
The Court of Appeals en banc reversed in a decision which 
produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a 
controlling rationale. The judges were able to agree on the 
problem they confronted: Vicarious liability, not failure to 
comply with a duty of care, was the essence of Ellerth's 
case against Burlington on appeal. The judges seemed to 
agree Ellerth could recover if Slowik's unfulfilled threats 
to deny her tangible job benefits was sufficient to impose 
vicarious liability on Burlington . 
*750 
(per curiam ). With the exception of Judges Coffey and 
Easterbrook, the judges also agreed Ellerth's claim could 
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be categorized as one of quid pro quo harassment, even 
though she had received the promotion and had suffered no 
other tangible retaliation. 
The consensus disintegrated on the standard for an 
employer's liability for such a claim. Six judges, Judges 
Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, Evans, Rovner, and Diane P. 
Wood, agreed the proper standard was vicarious liability, 
and so Ellerth could recover even though Burlington was 
not negligent. They had different reasons for the 
conclusion. According to Judges Flaum, Cummings, 
Bauer, and Evans, whether a claim involves a quid pro quo 
determines whether vicarious liability applies; and they in 
tum defined quid pro quo to include a supervisor's threat to 
inflict a tangible job injury whether or not it was 
completed. Judges Wood and Rovner 
interpreted agency principles to impose vicarious liability 
on employers for most claims of supervisor sexual 
harassment, even absent a quid pro quo. 
Although Judge Easterbrook did not think Ellerth had 
stated a quid pro quo claim, he would have followed the 
law of the controlling State to determine the employer's 
liability, and by this standard, the employer would be liable 
here. In contrast, Judge Kanne said Ellerth had 
stated a quid pro quo claim, but negligence was the 
appropriate standard of liability when the qUid pro quo 
involved threats only. 
Chief Judge Posner, joined by Judge Manion, disagreed. 
He asserted Ellerth could not recover against Burlington 
despite having stated a quid pro quo claim. According to 
Chief Judge Posner, an employer is subject to vicarious 
liability for "act[s) that significantly alte[r) the terms or 
conditions of employment," or "company act[s)." 
In the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled quid pro 
quo is a *751 mere threat to do a company act rather than 
the act itself, and in these circumstances, an employer can 
be found liable for its negligence only. Chief Judge 
Posner also found Ellerth failed to create a triable issue of 
fact as to Burlington's negligence. 
Judge Coffey rejected all of the above approaches because 
he favored a uniform **2264 standard of negligence in 
almost all sexual harassment cases. 
The disagreement revealed in the careful opinions of the 
judges of the Court of Appeals reflects the fact that 
Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling 
agency law principles in a new and difficult area offederal 
law. We granted certiorari to assist in defining the relevant 
standards of employer liability. 
II 
III At the outset, we assume an important proposition yet 
to be established before a trier of fact. It is a premise 
assumed as well, in explicit or implicit terms, in the various 
opinions by the judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
premise is: A trier of fact could find in Slowik's remarks 
numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied 
some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not 
carried out or fulfilled. Cases based on threats which are 
carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as 
distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that 
are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 
environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough 
demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out 
and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but 
beyond this are of limited utility. 
Section 703(a) of Title VII forbids 
"an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or *752 privileges of employment, because 
of such individual's ... sex." 
See generally E. Scalia, The Strange 
Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Policy 307 (1998). 
In the terms served a specific and limited purpose. 
There we considered whether the conduct in question 
constituted discrimination in the terms or conditions of 
employment in violation of Title VII. We assumed, and 
with adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual 
favors from an employee in return for a job benefit, 
discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of 
employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an 
employer's sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or 
conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We 
distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile 
environment claims, see 
and said both were cognizable under Title VII, 
though the latter requires harassment that is severe or 
pervasive. The principal significance of the 
distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either 
explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or 
conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be 
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severe or pervasive. The distinction was not discussed for 
its bearing upon an employer's liability for an employee's 
discrimination. On this question held, with no 
further specifics, that agency principles controlled. 
Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of 
they acquired their own significance. The 
standard of employer responsibility turned on which type 
of harassment *753 occurred. If the plaintiff established a 
quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeals held, the 
employer was subject to vicarious liability. See 
The rule encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state 
their claims as quid pro quo claims, which in tum put 
expansive pressure on the definition. The equivalence of 
the quid pro quo label and vicarious liability is illustrated 
by this case. The question presented on certiorari is 
whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro quo 
harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is 
whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik's 
alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own 
negligence. The question presented for certiorari asks: 
"Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment 
may be stated under Title VII ... where the plaintiff 
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances 
of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects 
on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to 
those advances?" Pet. for Cert. i. 
121 We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To 
the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases 
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive 
conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a 
threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. When a plaintiff 
proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a 
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or 
she establishes that the *754 employment decision itself 
constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any 
sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to 
be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or 
pervasive. Because Ellerth's claim involves only 
unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile 
work environment claim which requires a showing of 
severe or pervasive conduct. See 
For purposes of this case, we accept 
the District Court's finding that the alleged conduct was 
severe or pervasive. See supra, at 2262-2263. The case 
before us involves numerous alleged threats, and we 
express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat 
is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or 
conditions of employment. 
When we assume discrimination can be proved, however, 
the factors we discuss below, and not the categories quid 
pro quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling 
on the issue of vicarious liability. That is the question we 
must resolve. 
III 
[31 We must decide, then, whether an employer has 
vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work 
environment by making explicit threats to alter a 
subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on 
sex, but does not fulfill the threat. We tum to principles of 
agency law, for the term "employer" is defined under Title 
VII to include "agents." see !VIPrUfW 
In express terms, 
Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII 
based on agency principles. Given such an explicit 
instruction, we conclude a uniform and predictable 
standard must be established as a matter offederallaw. We 
rely "on the general common law of agency, rather than on 
the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these 
*755 terms." 
The resulting federal rule, based on a 
body of case law developed over time, is statutory 
interpretation pursuant to congressional direction. This is 
not federal common law in "the strictest sense, i.e., a rule 
of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of 
a federal statute ... , but, rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a 
special federal rule of decision." 
7 
State-court decisions, applying state employment 
discrimination law, may be instructive in applying general 
agency principles, but, it is interesting to note, in many 
cases their determinations of employer liability under state 
law rely in large part on **2266 federal-court decisions 
under Title VII. E.g., 
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As acknowledged, the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency (1957) (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful 
beginning point for a discussion of general agency 
principles. Since our 
decision in federal courts have explored agency 
principles, and we find useful instruction in their decisions, 
noting that "common-law principles may not be 
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII." The 
EEOC has issued Guidelines governing sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII, but they provide little guidance on 
the issue of employer liability for supervisor harassment. 
See § (1997) (vicarious liability for 
supervisor harassment turns on "the particular employment 
relationship and the job functions performed by the 
individual"). 
A 
Section 219(1) of the Restatement sets out a central 
principle of agency law: 
*756 "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his 
servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment." 
141 An employer may be liable for both negligent and 
intentional torts committed by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment. Sexual harassment under 
Title VII presupposes intentional conduct. While early 
decisions absolved employers of liability for the 
intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes 
liability where the employee's "purpose, however 
misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master's 
business." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, 
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 70, p. 505 (5th 
ed.1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton on Torts). In 
applying scope of employment principles to intentional 
torts, however, it is accepted that "it is less likely that a 
willful tort will properly be held to be in the course of 
employment and that the liability of the master for such 
torts will naturally be more limited." F. Mechem, Outlines 
of the Law of Agency § 394, p. 266 (P. Mechem 4th ed. 
1952). The Restatement defines conduct, including an 
intentional tort, to be within the scope of employment 
when "actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
[employer]," even if it is forbidden by the employer. 
Restatement §§ 228(1)(c), 230. For example, when a 
salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious 
conduct is within the scope of employment because it 
benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it 
may violate the employer's policies. See Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505-506. 
As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting 
out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual 
urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the 
employer. See, e.g., I 
(supervisor acting in scope of 
employment where employer has a policy of discouraging 
women from seeking advancement **2267 and "sexual 
harassment was simply a way offurthering that policy"). 
The concept of scope of employment has not always been 
construed to require a motive to serve the employer. E.g., 
Federal courts have nonetheless found 
similar limitations on employer liability when applying the 
agency laws of the States under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, which makes the Federal Government liable for torts 
committed by employees within the scope of employment. 
see, e.g., 
(supervisor's unfair criticism of 
subordinate's work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual 
advances not within scope of employment); 
(BREYER, C.J.) (sexual harassment amounting to assault 
and battery "clearly outside the scope of employment"); 
see also 2 L. Jayson & R. Longstreth, Handling Federal 
Tort Claims § 9.07[4], p. 9-211 (1998). 
[51 The general rule is that sexual harassment by a 
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment. 
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Scope of employment does not define the only basis for 
employer liability under agency principles. In limited 
circumstances, agency principles impose liability on 
employers even where employees commit torts outside the 
scope of employment. The principles are set forth in the 
much-cited § 219(2) ofthe Restatement: 
"(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his 
servants acting outside the scope of their employment, 
unless: 
"(a) the master intended the conduct or the 
consequences, or 
"(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
"(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the 
master, or 
"(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of 
the principal and there was reliance upon apparent 
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by 
the existence of the agency relation." 
See also § 219, Comment e (Section 219(2) "enumerates 
the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of 
servants acting solely for their own purposes and hence not 
in the scope of employment"). 
Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the 
employer acts with tortious intent, and indirect liability, 
where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or 
her the employer's alter ego. None of the parties contend 
Slowik's rank imputes liability under this principle. There 
is no contention, furthermore, that a nondelegable duty is 
involved. See § 219(2)( c). So, for our purposes here, 
subsections (a) and (c) can be put aside. 
161 Subsections (b) and (d) are possible grounds for 
imposing employer liability on account of a supervisor's 
acts and must be considered. Under subsection (b), an 
employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the 
employer's own negligence. *759 § 2l9(2)(b). Thus, 
although a supervisor's sexual harassment is outside the 
scope of employment because the conduct was for personal 
motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its 
own negligence is a cause ofthe harassment. An employer 
is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or 
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. 
Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability 
under Title VII; but Ellerth seeks to invoke the more 
stringent standard of vicarious liability. 
Section 219(2)( d) concerns vicarious liability for 
intentional torts committed by an employee when the 
employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority 
standard), or when the employee "was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation" (the aided in the agency relation standard). Ibid. 
As other federal decisions have done in discussing 
vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, e.g., HPVI"1n 
we begin 
with § 219(2)( d). 
c 
171 As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where 
the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does 
not have, **2268 as distinct from where the agent threatens 
to misuse actual power. Compare Restatement § 6 
(defining "power") with § 8 (defining "apparent 
authority"). In the usual case, a supervisor's harassment 
involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression 
of its existence. Apparent authority analysis therefore is 
inappropriate in this context. If, in the unusual case, it is 
alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a 
supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim's mistaken 
conclusion must be a reasonable one. Restatement § 8, 
Comment c ("Apparent authority exists only to the extent it 
is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to 
believe that the agent is authorized"). When a party seeks 
to impose vicarious liability *760 based on an agent's 
misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement's aided in 
the agency relation rule, rather than the apparent authority 
rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis. 
D 
18) We tum to the aided in the agency relation standard. In 
a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in 
accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of 
the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may 
afford a captive pool of potential victims. See 
, Were this to 
satisfY the aided in the agency relation standard, an 
employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only 
for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker 
harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any 
court of appeals to have considered the issue. See, e.g., 
v. 
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discrimination); see also 29 (1997) 
("knows or should have known" standard of liability for 
cases of harassment between "fellow employees"). The 
aided in the agency relation standard, therefore, requires 
the existence of something more than the employment 
relation itself. 
At the outset, we can identifY a class of cases where, 
beyond question, more than the mere existence of the 
employment relation aids in commission of the 
harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action against the subordinate. Every Federal 
Court of Appeals to have considered the question has 
found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results 
in a tangible employment action. See, e.g., 
1 (" 'If the 
plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury 
from her supervisor's actions, the employer becomes 
strictly liable without any further showing .. .' "). *761 In 
we acknowledged this consensus. See 
("[T]he courts have 
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory 
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, 
whether or not the employer knew, or should have known, 
or approved of the supervisor's actions"). Although few 
courts have elaborated how agency principles support this 
rule, we think it reflects a correct application ofthe aided in 
the agency relation standard. 
In the context of this case, a tangible employment action 
would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a 
promotion. The concept of a tangible employment action 
appears in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals 
discussing claims involving race, age, and national origin 
discrimination, as well as sex discrimination. Without 
endorsing the specific results ofthose decisions, we think it 
prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment 
action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we 
consider here. A tangible employment action constitutes a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits. Compare 
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by 
a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a 
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a 
material loss of benefits, significantly **2269 diminished 
material responsibilities, or other indices that might be 
unique to a particular situation"), with 
(demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or 
prestige insufficient), and 
(reassignment to 
more inconvenient job insufficient). 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, 
there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted 
*762 absent the agency relation. A tangible employment 
action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a 
general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person 
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this 
sort of injury. A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as 
easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact 
with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his 
or her offensive conduct. See 
(MacKinnon, J., concurring). But one 
co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock 
another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another. 
Tangible employment actions fall within the special 
province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been 
empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to 
make economic decisions affecting other employees under 
his or her control. 
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the 
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to 
bear on subordinates. A tangible employment decision 
requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. 
The decision in most cases is documented in official 
company records, and may be subject to review by higher 
level supervisors. E.g., 
(noting that the supervisor did not 
fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did, but 
the employer was still liable because the committee 
functioned as the supervisor's "cat's-paw"). The 
supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of the 
enterprise and use its internal processes. See 
("From the perspective of the employee, the 
supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity"). 
[91 For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken 
by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of 
the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the aided in 
the agency relation standard, its requirements will always 
be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment 
action *763 against a subordinate. In that instance, it would 
be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an 
employer to escape liability, as itself appeared to 
acknowledge. See, supra, at 2268. 
Whether the agency relation aids in commission of 
supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a 
tangible employment action is less obvious. Application of 
the standard is made difficult by its malleable terminology, 
which can be read to either expand or limit liability in the 
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context of supervisor harassment. On the one hand, a 
supervisor's power and authority invests his or her 
harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, 
and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the 
agency relation. See I!!W?""W 
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]t is 
precisely because the supervisor is understood to be 
clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to 
impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates"). On 
the other hand, there are acts of harassment a supervisor 
might commit which might be the same acts a coemployee 
would commit, and there may be some circumstances 
where the supervisor's status makes little difference. 
It is this tension which, we think, has caused so much 
confusion among the Courts of Appeals which have sought 
to apply the aided in the agency relation standard to Title 
VII cases. The aided in the agency relation standard, 
however, is a developing feature of agency law, and we 
hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our 
understanding of the standard in an area where other 
important considerations must affect our judgment. 
**2270 In particular, we are bound by our holding in 
that agency principles constrain the imposition of 
vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment. See 
("Congress' decision to define 
'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer, 
surely evinces an intent to place some 
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under 
Title VII are to be held responsible"). Congress has not 
altered *764 rule even though it has made 
significant amendments to Title VII in the interim. See 
("[W]e must bear 
in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily 
in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free 
to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation"). 
Although suggested the limitation on employer 
liability stemmed from agency principles, the Court 
acknowledged other considerations might be relevant as 
well. See 
("common-law principles may not be transferable in all 
their particulars to Title VII"). For example, Title VIl is 
designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were 
employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort 
to create such procedures, it would effect Congress' 
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in 
the Title VII context, see 
the EEOC's policy of encouraging the development of 
grievance procedures. See (1997); 
EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 BNA 
FEP Manual 405:6699 (Mar. 19, 1990). To the extent 
limiting employer liability could encourage employees to 
report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or 
would also serve Title VII's deterrent 
we have observed, Title VII 
borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences 
and the considerations which animate that doctrine would 
also support the limitation of employer liability in certain 
circumstances. 
[l 0 I (11) 112) In order to accommodate the agency 
principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse 
of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally 
basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers 
and saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the 
following holding in this case and in 
also decided today. *765 An employer is subject to 
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an 
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor 
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence, see The defense 
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an 
employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a 
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the 
employment circumstances may appropriately be 
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of 
the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to 
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to 
avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable 
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally 
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second 
element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available, 
however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in 
a tangible employment action, such as discharge, 
demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 
**2271 IV 
Relying on existing case law which held out the promise of 
118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170 A.L.R. Fed. 677 ... 
vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims, see supra, at 
2264-2265, Ellerth focused all her attention in the Court of 
Appeals on proving her claim fit within that category. 
Given our explanation that the labels quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes 
of establishing employer liability, see supra, at 2265, 
Ellerth *766 should have an adequate opportunity to prove 
she has a claim for which Burlington is liable. 
1131 Although Ellerth has not alleged she suffered a 
tangible employment action at the hands of Slowik, which 
would deprive Burlington of the availability of the 
affirmative defense, this is not dispositive. In light of our 
decision, Burlington is still subject to vicarious liability for 
Slowik's activity, but Burlington should have an 
opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense to 
liability. See supra, at 2270. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, reversing the grant of summary judgment 
against Ellerth. On remand, the District Court will have the 
opportunity to decide whether it would be appropriate to 
allow Ellerth to amend her pleading or supplement her 
discovery. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court's ruling that "the labels quid pro quo 
and hostile work environment are not controlling for 
purposes of establishing employer liability." Ante, at 2271. 
I also subscribe to the Court's statement of the rule 
governing employer liability, ante, at 2270, which is 
substantively identical to the rule the Court adopts in 
Justice 
dissenting. 
with whom Justice joins, 
The Court today manufactures a rule that employers are 
vicariously liable if supervisors create a sexually hostile 
work environment, subject to an affirmative defense that 
the Court barely attempts to define. This rule applies even 
ifthe employer has a policy against sexual harassment, the 
employee knows about that policy, and the employee never 
*767 informs anyone in a position of authority about the 
supervisor's conduct. As a result, employer liability under 
Title VII is judged by different standards depending upon 
whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is 
aIleged. The standard of employer liability should be the 
same in both instances: An employer should be liable if, 
and only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was 
negligent in permitting the supervisor's conduct to occur. 
I 
Years before sexual harassment was recognized as 
"discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex," 
), the Courts of Appeals considered whether, 
and when, a racially hostile work environment could 
violate Title VII.! In the landmark case 
cert. denied, 
the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that the practice of racially segregating 
patients in a doctor's office could amount to discrimination 
in" 'the terms, conditions, or privileges' " of employment, 
thereby violating Title VII. (quoting 
»). The principal opinion in the case 
concluded that employment discrimination was not limited 
to the "isolated and distinguishable events" of "hiring, 
firing, and promoting." (opinion of 
Goldberg, J.). Rather, Title VII could also be violated by a 
work environment "heavily polluted with discrimination," 
because of the deleterious effects of such an **2272 
atmosphere on an employee's well-being. 
(actionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace 
is "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 
and insult" (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
In race discrimination cases, employer liability has turned 
118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170 A.L.R. Fed. 677 ... 
on whether the plaintiff has alleged an adverse 
employment consequence, such as firing or demotion, or a 
hostile work environment. If a supervisor takes an adverse 
employment action because of race, causing the employee 
a tangible job detriment, the employer is vicariously liable 
for resulting damages. See ante, at 2268. This is because 
such actions are company acts that can be performed only 
by the exercise of specific authority granted by the 
employer, and thus the supervisor acts as the employer. If, 
on the other hand, the employee alleges a racially hostile 
work environment, the employer is liable only for 
negligence: that is, only if the employer knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the 
harassment and failed to take remedial action. See, e.g., 
cert. denied, 
Liability has thus been imposed 
only if the employer is blameworthy in some way. See, 
e.g., 
This distinction applies with equal force in cases of sexual 
harassment.2 When a supervisor inflicts an adverse 
employment consequence upon an employee who has 
rebuffed his advances, the supervisor exercises the specific 
authority granted to him by his company. His acts, 
therefore, are the company's acts and are properly 
chargeable to it. See 
(Posner, C. 1., dissenting); ante, at 2269 ("Tangible 
employment actions fall within the special province of the 
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the 
company as a distinct class of agent to make economic 
decisions affecting other employees under his or her 
control"). 
If a supervisor creates a hostile work environment, 
however, he does not act for the employer. As the Court 
concedes, a supervisor's creation of a hostile work 
environment is neither within the scope of his 
employment, nor part of his apparent authority. See ante, at 
2265-2268. Indeed, a hostile work environment is 
antithetical to the interest of the employer. In such 
circumstances, an employer should be liable only if it has 
been negligent. That is, liability should attach **2273 only 
if the employer either knew, or in the exercise of *770 
reasonable care should have known, about the hostile work 
environment and failed to take remedial action.3 
Sexual harassment is simply not something that employers 
can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary 
measures-constant video and audio surveillance, for 
example-that would revolutionize the workplace in a 
manner incompatible with a free society. See 
5 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, such measures could 
not even detect incidents of harassment such as the 
comments Slowik allegedly made to respondent in a hotel 
bar. The most that employers can be charged with, 
therefore, is a duty to act reasonably under the 
circumstances. As one court recognized in addressing an 
early racial harassment claim: 
"It may not always be within an employer's power to 
guarantee an environment free from all bigotry .... [H]e 
can let it be known, however, that racial harassment will 
not be tolerated, and he can take all reasonable measures 
to enforce this policy .... But once an employer has in 
good faith taken those measures which are both feasible 
and reasonable under the circumstances to combat the 
offensive conduct we do not think he can be charged 
with discriminating on the basis of race." 
*771 Under a negligence standard, Burlington cannot be 
held liable for Slowik's conduct. Although respondent 
alleged a hostile work environment, she never contended 
that Burlington had been negligent in permitting the 
harassment to occur, and there is no question that 
Burlington acted reasonably under the circumstances. The 
company had a policy against sexual harassment, and 
respondent admitted that she was aware of the policy but 
nonetheless failed to tell anyone with authority over 
Slowik about his behavior. See ante, at 2262. Burlington 
therefore cannot be charged with knowledge of Slowik's 
alleged harassment or with a failure to exercise reasonable 
care in not knowing about it. 
II 
Rejecting a negligence standard, the Court instead imposes 
a rule of vicarious employer liability, subject to a vague 
affirmative defense, for the acts of supervisors who wield 
no delegated authority in creating a hostile work 
environment. This rule is a whole-cloth creation that draws 
no support from the legal principles on which the Court 
claims it is based. Compounding its error, the Court fails to 
explain how employers can rely upon the affirmative 
defense, thus ensuring a continuing reign of confusion in 
this important area of the law. 
Injustif)ring its holding, the Court refers to our comment in 
should look to "agency principles" for guidance in 
determining the scope of employer liability, 
The Court then interprets the term "agency 
principles" to mean the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
(1957). The Court finds two portions of the Restatement to 
118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170 A.L.R. Fed. 677 ... 
be relevant: § 219(2)(b), which provides that a master is 
liable for his servant's torts if the master is reckless or 
negligent, and § 219(2)( d), which states that a master is 
liable for his servant's torts when the servant is "aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation." The Court *772 appears to reason that a 
supervisor is "aided ... by... the agency relation" in 
creating a hostile work environment because the 
supervisor's **2274 "power and authority invests his or 
her harassing conduct with a particular threatening 
character." Ante, at 2269. 
Section 219(2)( d) of the Restatement provides no basis 
whatsoever for imposing vicarious liability for a 
supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment. 
Contrary to the Court's suggestions, the principle 
embodied in § 219(2)( d) has nothing to do with a servant's 
"power and authority," nor with whether his actions appear 
"threatening." Rather, as demonstrated by the 
Restatement's illustrations, liability under § 219(2)(d) 
depends upon the plaintiff's belief that the agent acted in 
the ordinary course of business or within the scope of his 
apparent authority A In this day and age, no sexually 
harassed employee can reasonably believe that a harassing 
supervisor is conducting the official business of the 
company or acting on its behalf. Indeed, the Court admits 
as much in demonstrating why sexual harassment is not 
committed within the scope of a supervisor's employment 
and is not part of his apparent authority. See ante, at 
2265-2268. 
Thus although the Court implies that it has found guidance 
in both precedent and statute-see ante, at 2265 ("The 
resulting federal rule, based on a body of case law 
developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to 
congressional direction")-its holding is a product of willful 
policymaking, pure and simple. The only agency principle 
that justifies imposing employer liability in this context is 
the principle *773 that a master will be liable for a 
servant's torts if the master was negligent or reckless in 
pennitting them to occur; and as noted, under a negligence 
standard, Burlington cannot be held liable. See supra, at 
2273. 
The Court's decision is also in considerable tension with 
our holding in that employers are not strictly liable 
for a supervisor's sexual harassment. See 
Although the Court recognizes an affirmative 
defense-based solely on its divination of Title VII's 
gestalt, see ante, at 2270-it provides shockingly little 
guidance about how employers can actually avoid 
vicarious liability. Instead, it issues only Delphic 
pronouncements and leaves the dirty work to the lower 
courts: 
"While proof that an employer had promulgated an 
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not 
necessary in every instance as a matter oflaw, the need 
for a stated policy suitable to the employment 
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any 
case when litigating the first element ofthe defense. And 
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid 
hann is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure 
to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally 
suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the 
second element of the defense." Ante, at 2270. 
What these statements mean for district courts ruling on 
motions for summary judgment-the critical question for 
employers now subject to the vicarious liability 
rule-remains a mystery. Moreover, employers will be 
liable notwithstanding the affinnative defense, even 
though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in 
question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid 
harm. See ibid. In practice, therefore, employer liability 
very well may be the rule. *774 But as the Court 
acknowledges, this is the one result that it is clear Congress 
did not intend. See ante, at 2269-2270; 
The Court's holding does guarantee one result: There will 
be more and more litigation to clarifY applicable legal rules 
in an area in which both practitioners and the courts have 
long been begging for guidance. It thus truly boggles the 
mind that the Court can claim that its holding will effect 
"Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather 
**2275 than litigation in the Title VII context." Ante, at 
2270. All in all, today's decision is an ironic result for a 
case that generated eight separate opinions in the Court of 
Appeals on a fundamental question, and in which we 
granted certiorari "to assist in defining the relevant 
standards of employer liability." Ante, at 2263-2264. 
* * * 
Popular misconceptions notwithstanding, sexual 
harassment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a form of 
employment discrimination. As such, it should be treated 
no differently (and certainly no better) than the other forms 
of harassment that are illegal under Title VII. I would 
restore parallel treatment of employer liability for racial 
and sexual harassment and hold an employer liable for a 
hostile work environment only if the employer is truly at 
fault. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
Parallel Citations 
118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170 A.L.R. Fed. 677 ... 
118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170 
A.L.R. Fed. 677, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,340, 141 
L.Ed.2d 633, 66 USLW 4634, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 
5029,98 Daily Journal DAR. 6991,98 CJ CAR. 3405, 
Footnotes 
11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 692 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion ofthe Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of 
the reader. See 
This sequence of events is not surprising, given that the primary goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eradicate race 
discrimination and that the statute's ban on sex discrimination was added as an eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill. 
See 
The Courts of Appeals relied on racial harassment cases when analyzing early claims of discrimination based upon a supervisor's 
sexual harassment. For example, when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a work environment 
poisoned by a supervisor's "sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions" could itself violate Title VII, its principal 
authority was Judge Goldberg's opinion in See 
); see also 
I agree with the Court that the doctrine of quid pro quo sexual harassment is irrelevant to the issue of an employer's vicarious 
liability. I do not, however, agree that the distinction between hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment is 
relevant "when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII." Ante, at 2265. A 
supervisor's threat to take adverse action against an employee who refuses his sexual demands, if never carried out, may create a 
hostile work environment, but that is all. Cases involving such threats, without more, should therefore be analyzed as hostile work 
environment cases only. If, on the other hand, the supervisor carries out his threat and causes the plaintiff a job detriment, the plaintiff 
may have a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. See E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 307, 309-314 (1998). 
See Restatement § 219, Comment e; § 261, Comment a (principal liable for an agent's fraud if "the agent's position facilitates the 
consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent 
appears to be acting in the ordinary course of business confided to him"); § 247, Illustrations (newspaper liable for a defamatory 
editorial published by editor for his own purposes). 
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the Cleveland Twist Drill Company, 
Defendants, Appellants. 
No. 85-1952. I Aug. 20, 1986. 
Employee brought action against former employer for 
alleged age discrimination in employment. The United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
Joseph L. Tauro, J., entered judgment on verdict for 
employee, and employer appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bownes, Circuit Judge, held that question whether 
employer's actions amounted to a constructive discharge in 
violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act was 
properly submitted to jury under evidence indicating that, 
in connection with employer's desire to reduce its work 
force, preferably by retiring older employees, employee 
was asked three times in seven months whether he wished 
to retire and, after indicating in negative, was demoted by 
employer, reprimanded for doing something he had done 
before without sanction, excluded from training sessions, 
and threatened with a drastic increase in working hours. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (6) 
A case for a constructive discharge under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act is not 
established unless trier of fact is satisfied that 
new working conditions would have been so 
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in 
employee's shoes would have felt compelled to 
resign. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 2 et seq., et seq. 
Allegations concerning hours worked by others 
after employee was terminated, even if 
eliminated, did not preclude submission of 
constructive discharge issue under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act given 
repeated inquiries about resignation, threat of 
onerous working hours if no resignation, and 
demotion of employee along with promotion of 
younger coemployees. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
et seq. 
Evidence that employee, who always received 
good work ratings and high pay raises until a new 
manager arrived, was demoted after he refused to 
retire, reprimanded for doing something he had 
done before without sanction, excluded from 
training sessions, and threatened with a drastic 
increase in working hours was sufficient to 
warrant submission of issue in constructive 
discharge case whether a reasonable person in 
employee's shoes would have felt that his 
services were no longer desired. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., et seq. 
Question whether employer's actions amounted 
to a constructive discharge in violation of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act was properly 
submitted to jury under evidence indicating that, 
in connection with employer's desire to reduce 
its work force, preferably by retiring older 
employees, employee was asked three times in 
seven months whether he wished to retire and, 
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after indicating in negative, was demoted by 
employer, reprimanded for doing something he 
had done before without sanction, excluded from 
training sessions, and threatened with a drastic 
increase in working hours. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
et seq. 
Denial of requested instruction to effect that 
constructive discharge case was to be considered 
and decided by jury as a case between persons of 
equal standing in community was not an abuse of 
discretion when trial court admonished jury twice 
to avoid bias or prejudice. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
et seq. 
Metaphorical-alliterative reference by employee 
in constructive discharge case to "corporate 
claws" was within normal bounds of creative 
advocacy and was not such as to warrant giving 
of employer's requested instruction on 
anticorporate bias. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
et seq. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*560 William P. Robinson, III with whom John A. 
Houlihan, Judith C. Savage, and Edwards & Angell, 
Providence, R.I., were on brief, for defendants, appellants. 
Orlando F. de Abreu with whom Kevin J. McAllister, 
Taunton, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellee. 
Before BOWNES, Circuit Judge, BROWN,* Senior 
Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge. 
Opinion 
BOWNES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellants, Acme Cleveland Corporation and its 
subsidiary The Cleveland Twist Drill Company, appeal 
from a judgment for their former employee, Robert 
Calhoun, under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, et 
Calhoun had contended that, after working for appellants 
and their predecessors for forty-two years, appellants 
entered into a course of action designed to force him into 
early retirement at age sixty-two. It was appellants' 
contention that they merely asked Calhoun whether he 
wished to take early retirement and that Calhoun 
voluntarily decided that he would retire. Since appellants 
did not actually fire Calhoun, a key legal and factual issue 
in the case was whether appellants' actions could be 
considered *561 to amount to a constructive discharge. 
Appellants contend that, as a matter of law, the facts 
alleged and proven by Calhoun did not amount to a 
constructive discharge and that the district court erred 
when it failed to grant appellants' motion for summary 
judgment, directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. Appellants 
also claim that they were denied a fair trial because the 
district court failed to give a requested "anticorporate bias" 
jury instruction requested by appellants. 
III We consider first the constructive discharge issue. The 
basic rules governing constructive discharge in this circuit 
were laid down in 
that the new working conditions would have been so 
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the 
employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." 
This is an "objective standard," 
denied, 
( I in which the focus is upon the "reasonable state of 
mind of the putative discriminatee." 
the determination, it must be kept in mind that 
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discharge .... An employee is protected from a calculated 
effort to pressure him [or her] into resignation through 
the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in 
excess of those faced by his [ or her] coworkers. He [or 
she] is not, however, guaranteed a working environment 
free from stress. 
. The question we must consider, 
then, is whether, given the factual allegations and evidence 
presented by Calhoun, there was no constructive discharge 
as a matter oflaw. This requires a recitation of the facts. 
Aside from three years in the Navy during World War IT, 
Calhoun worked continuously for The Cleveland Twist 
Drill Company or its predecessor from 1940 until his 
resignation in 1982. By 1964, he had worked his way up to 
the position of Manager of the Product Design and 
Application Department. In every year prior to 1982, 
Calhoun had received good reviews of his work and yearly 
raises in pay. 
By 1982, The Cleveland Twist Drill Company was having 
financial problems, particularly because it was not 
delivering orders on time and was not selling reliable 
merchandise. As a result, a new plant manager, Clifford 
Preuss, was hired in February of 1982. On February 17, 
1982, Preuss asked all employees eligible for early 
retirement, including Calhoun who was sixty-two at that 
time, whether they had any intention of taking early 
retirement so as to minimize layoffs of junior personnel. 
Calhoun told Preuss that he wished to continue working 
until he was sixty-five. 
On March 10, 1982, without warning or criticism of 
Calhoun's past performance, a younger man, Ronald 
Sabatos, was made Manager of the Product Design and 
Application Department. Although no cut in his pay was 
made, Calhoun was demoted to Supervisor of the 
Department. Thereafter, Calhoun was not invited to 
participate in a training seminar to which both his 
immediate superior and junior were invited. Next, Calhoun 
was told that it was "grounds for dismissal" for him to have 
brought a portable television into work on Patriot's Dayl, a 
day that was a holiday for all non supervisory personnel, 
and watched the start and finish of the Boston Marathon, 
although similar conduct had occurred in the past without 
comment. 
On May 20, 1982, Calhoun had a second meeting with 
Preuss concerning his retirement plans, as did all other 
employees eligible *562 for early retirement. Once again, 
Calhoun stated that he intended to keep on working. 
Calhoun had a third meeting with Preuss on August 30, 
1982, as did all other retirement-eligible employees. The 
details of this meeting are in dispute as are other relevant 
facts. 
Calhoun claims that Preuss told him at this meeting that the 
company was "ready to give him his severance pay and 
terminate him," albeit with full retirement benefits. The 
alternative offered by Preuss was that Calhoun would have 
to be prepared to work a twelve- to fourteen-hour day and 
Saturdays, as compared to the nine- and nine and 
one-half-hour day he had been working. Calhoun testified 
that no one at his level of management had worked such 
long hours. He also testified that in 1983, after his 
termination, he had a conversation with his former 
assistant who told Calhoun that he was not working any 
longer hours than Calhoun had worked. Preuss testified 
that Sabatos, the newly hired Product Design Manager, had 
been working twelve to fourteen hours a day. Preuss also 
testified that during this August conversation all he did was 
tell Calhoun about a "new" retirement package that the 
company had authorized allowing severance for early 
retirees. Company documents offered by Calhoun, 
however, indicated that the severance pay provision had 
been in effect since August of 1981, prior to Calhoun's 
first meeting with Preuss. Preuss testified that he was 
unaware of the policy prior to the August 1982 meeting. 
He also testified that he did not mention any specific 
number of hours that Calhoun would have to work, but said 
only that if Calhoun did not choose to retire he would be 
expected to work the same number of hours as those 
working under him and possibly some Saturdays. Both 
Preuss and Calhoun agreed that Calhoun asked Preuss at 
this meeting whether he could collect unemployment 
benefits while he was receiving severance pay. 
The day after the August 30 meeting, Calhoun told Preuss 
that he would take early retirement. After leaving The 
Cleveland Twist Drill Company, where he had been 
making $34,000 a year with generous benefits, Calhoun 
sought similar work, but was unable to find it. He worked 
as a construction worker for $6 to $8 an hour and his 
income dropped to around $18,000 a year. 
Summary Judgment 
In his affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, Calhoun alleged that Preuss had asked him 
about his retirement plans three times in seven months, that 
he had been demoted and a younger man promoted to his 
position, that he had been threatened with a twelve- to 
fourteen-hour work day and Saturday work if he did not 
resign, and that he had been informed that no employee 
had been forced to work these hours after his termination. 
Appellants claim first that the district court should have 
struck those paragraphs of Calhoun's affidavit in which he 
claimed that after his resignation other employees had not 
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worked the long hours he was threatened with because this 
information was not within Calhoun's personal 
knowledge. Without this assertion, appellants claim that 
the events alleged by Calhoun, even if shown to be true, 
were not sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the 
plaintiffs summary judgment burden of proving 
constructive discharge. 
Appellants rely on cases in which one of these factors 
standing alone was held an insufficient basis for a finding 
of constructive discharge: 
(loss of prestige 
because of particularly precipitious replacement by trainee 
insufficient); 
(pranks, tricks, heavy-handed humor, and 
being required to work two consecutive hitches not 
sufficient). 
121 Appellants' theory is that since each isolated incident 
cannot as a matter of law suffice for a constructive 
discharge, all of them together must also fail to do so. The 
fallacy in this "divide and conquer" approach *563 is that 
these events must be viewed as part of a single behavior 
pattern by appellants. Even were we to omit the allegations 
concerning the hours worked by others after Calhoun was 
terminated, the other events taken together compare 
favorably enough with fact patterns in successful age 
discrimination cases so as to make a grant of summary 
judgment improper. See 
(choice of transfer to lower 
paying job or resignation sufficient); 
(several inquiries about retirement plans 
along with humiliating demotion, even with same pay and 
benefits, sufficient). Tn this case, there were repeated 
inquiries about resignation, demotion of the plaintiff, 
promotion of a younger person and the threat of onerous 
working hours ifno resignation. We cannot say as a matter 
of law that these events viewed as a whole could not be 
sufficient to constitute constructive discharge. 
Directed Verdict 
131 When deciding whether to grant a directed verdict 
motion, the trial court must look at the facts in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and, if any set of facts 
could result in that party's victory, the court must deny the 
motion. "In doing so, we must recognize that it is for 
jurors, not judges, to weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility ofwitnesses." 
The facts 
viewed in the light most favorable to Calhoun are: 
I. Calhoun always received good work ratings and high 
pay raises until Preuss arrived; 
2. Cleveland Twist Drill wanted to reduce its work force, 
preferably by retiring older employees; 
3. Calhoun was asked three times in seven months whether 
he wished to retire, despite having made it clear the first 
time that he would not retire until he was sixty-five; 
4. In an effort to remove Calhoun after he refused to retire, 
he was demoted, reprimanded for doing something he had 
done before without sanction, excluded from training 
sessions, and threatened with a drastic increase in working 
hours; 
5. Calhoun was demoted from being in charge of the 
department he had run for fourteen years and was put under 
two people he had trained; 
6. No specific criticism of Calhoun's work was ever made; 
and 
7. After his termination, Calhoun was told by a former 
assistant who had taken over Calhoun's duties that he was 
not working any more hours than he ever had. 
This set of facts was clearly sufficient for a jury to find that 
a reasonable person in Calhoun's shoes would have felt 
that his services were no longer desired. 
Judgment N.O. V. 
We have stated that 
[t]he standard for granting judgment 
n.o.v. in this circuit is well settled. Such a 
motion should only be granted upon a 
determination that the evidence could 
lead reasonable [persons] ... to but one 
conclusion, a determination made 
without evaluating the credibility of 
witnesses or the weight of the evidence at 
trial. 
The testimony of Sabatos was to the effect that 
he had more formal engineering education than Calhoun, 
that he had some special expertise in a new product line 
being produced at the plant and that he generally worked a 
twelve- to fourteen-hour day. Cross-examination brought 
out that Sabatos' expertise was in a product that accounted 
41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1121, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,553 
for no more than 10-20% of the factory's output. 
Calhoun's expertise, on the other hand, related to the 
product that accounted for 80-90% of the factory's output. 
Sabatos also testified that Combis, the man who told 
Calhoun he was working the same *564 hours as before, 
had essentially taken over Calhoun's duties. Preuss' 
testimony focused upon the difficult financial position of 
the factory and his attempts to improve it. He testified that 
the company had less work than the staffing level could 
justifY and that his first move was to reduce the staff. He 
also testified that the plant was having problems producing 
a quality product on time and that he thought Sabatos was 
simply a better man for the job. Cross-examination brought 
out that manufacturing deadlines did not fall within 
Calhoun's department, but within the responsibility of the 
Production Department. Preuss also testified that he did 
not want Calhoun to leave, but was simply trying to find 
out if he had any retirement plans before laying off a more 
junior employee. 
141 While appellants' explanation of their action is 
credible, a reasonable jury could have found that the facts 
amounted to a constructive discharge. Appellants offered 
very little evidence to justifY Calhoun's demotion as the 
result of inadequate performance and the repeated 
retirement inquiries could be interpreted as harassment or 
at least a broad hint that Calhoun should retire, especially 
since he had expressed a clear intention not to retire at 
earlier meetings. Finally, the threat of an increased work 
day could be seen as a clear message that the company was 
prepared to make Calhoun's life more and more miserable 
as he continued to refuse to retire, especially when there 
was no evidence offered to show that Calhoun had to work 
long hours to get his job done. The district court did not err 
in denying appellants' motion for a judgment n.o.v. 
151 Appellants' final claim of error is the district court's 
failure to give an "anticorporate bias" jury instruction. 
Appellants submitted such an instruction2 to the court prior 
Footnotes 
Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
to the charge and properly objected to the court's failure to 
so instruct. Appellants argue that such an instruction was 
made necessary by the anticorporate language used by 
plaintiff's counsel during the closing: "they squeeze the 
corporate claws around his neck until he has no choice but 
to say, 'Well, I will retire,' " and "[s]lowly, Bob Calhoun 
could feel the claw of the company clutching at his neck." 
The district court instructed the jury that "[b lias, prejudice, 
preconceived notions have no place in a jury's 
deliberations" and "[y]ou are to perfonn your duty without 
any bias or prejudice as to either party." 
[6) "The purpose of jury instructions is to advise the jury 
on the proper legal standards to be applied in detennining 
issues of fact as to the case before them." 
Beyond 
that, the district court's choice of jury instructions is a 
matter of discretion. We see no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's decision not to give the requested 
instruction. The court admonished the jury twice to avoid 
bias or prejudice and we believe that was sufficient under 
the circumstances. Plaintiff's metaphorical-alliterative 
reference to "corporate claws" seems to us to be within the 
nonnal bounds of creative advocacy. It did not approach 
the appeal to bias found in 
where plaintiff's counsel 
emphasized that the corporation was foreign, it had 
substantial assets and the plaintiff would be a ward of the 
state if no award was made. 
Affirmed 
Parallel Citations 
41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1121, 41 EmpJ. Prac. Dec. 
P 36,553 
Patriot's Day is an indigenous Massaehusetts holiday; the Boston Marathon is traditionally run on Patriot's Day. 
The instruction requested by the appellants was as follows: 
You should not attach any significanee to the fact that Mr. Calhoun is an individual while Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist 
Drill are corporations. This case should be considered and decided by you as a case between persons of equal standing in the 
community. Corporations such as Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist Drill are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as 
a private individual such as Mr. Calhoun. You should not give any preference to Mr. Calhoun because he is an individual, nor 
does the mere fact that Mr. Calhoun is an individual make his testimony any more credible than the testimony presented by 
Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist Drill. All persons, including corporations, stand equal before the law and are to be treated 
as equals in a court of justice. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Ronald Y. CHUANG and Linda Chuang, 
PlaintYTs-Appellants, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DA VIS, 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES; and Fitz-Roy 
Curry, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 99-15036. I Argued and Submitted 
March 14, 2000. I Filed Aug. 30, 2000. 
Assistant professor of pharmacology and assistant research 
pharmacologist, both of Chinese origin, brought action 
against state university under Title VII alleging 
discrimination based on race and national origin. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California, David F. Levi, 1., entered summary judgment in 
favor of university. Assistant professor and assistant 
pharmacologist appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) assistant professor 
was not required to show that he filed formal application 
for full-time-equivalent (FTE) position to establish that 
denial of FTE was adverse employment action; (2) 
assistant professor's alleged lack of qualifications for 
certain human genetics program, if proven, did not 
preclude him from establishing he was qualified for FTE 
position; (3) alleged forcible relocation of laboratory, if 
proven, was adverse employment action; (4) assistant 
professor and assistant pharmacologist failed to establish 
prima facie claim challenging alleged failure of university 
officials to respond to grievances regarding 
misappropriation of research funds; (5) alleged statement 
by university official, and dean's alleged laughter in 
response, if proven, constituted direct evidence of race and 
national origin discrimination; (6) alleged statement by 
chair of pharmacology department during forcible 
relocation of laboratory, if proven, constituted direct 
evidence of discrimination; and (7) post-complaint hires 
were not relevant to claim challenging denial of FTE 
position. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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employer's motion for summary judgment; this is 
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be resolved through a searching inquiry, one that 
is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, 
upon a full record. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.c.A. 
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favorably. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether assistant professor's microbiology 
research and expertise fell within broad category 
of "human genetics" and thus qualified him for 
human genetics program, precluding summary 
judgment as to whether he was qualified for 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) position at state 
university, as required for prima facie Title VII 
case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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Civil Rights 
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Assistant professor's alleged lack of 
qualifications for certain human genetics 
program, if proven, did not preclude him from 
establishing he was qualified for 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) position, as required 
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simply FTE awarded pursuant to such program. 
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[10) Civil Rights 
;>~Particular Cases 
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occupied by assistant professor of pharmacology 
and assistant research pharmacologist at state 
university, if proven, was "adverse employment 
action" under Title VII, inasmuch as its alleged 
results included disruption of important, ongoing 
research projects, loss of experimental subjects, 
withholding of research grants, new facilities 
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change in working conditions. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
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~Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
The removal of or substantial interference with 
work facilities important to the performance of 
an employee's job constitutes a material change 
in the terms and conditions of employment and 
thus is an "adverse employment action" under 
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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Civil Rights 
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up their laboratory space for Caucasian faculty 
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Caucasian faculty member over a faculty 
member's objections. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et 
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assistant research pharmacologist, both of 
Chinese origin, failed to establish prima facie 
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state university officials to respond to grievances 
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action, and there was no evidence that non-Asian 
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formal responses in similar circumstances. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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Particular Cases 
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nondiscriminatory reason in Title VII action for 
denying assistant professor full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) position by stating that because he had 
full-time position, his position was not in 
jeopardy, and dean was prepared to pay for his 
base salary if need arose. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
Assistant professor of pharmacology and 
assistant research pharmacologist, both of 
Chinese origin, established more favorable 
treatment of similarly situated individuals 
outside their protected classes, as required for 
prima facie Title VII case of race and national 
origin discrimination against state university, by 
providing evidence that they were forced to give 
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forcibly relocating assistant professor's 
laboratory by stating that relocation was required 
to accommodate human genetics program. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
(16) Civil Rights 
v.cMotive or Intent; Pretext 
A Title VII plaintiff can prove pretext in two 
ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
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1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.CA § 
2000e et seq. 
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pretext in a Title VII action are not exclusive; a 
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Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
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Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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producing any evidence of discrimination 
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case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of 
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employment action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.c.A. 
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pretext stage. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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whether state university's proffered explanations 
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full-time-equivalent (FTE) position and forcibly 
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that laboratory space was needed for human 
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1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 
2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 
U.S.CA 
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At the summary judgment stage of a Title VII 
action, as well as at trial, any form of evidence of 
discriminatory treatment that is otherwise 
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relationship between the various claims involved. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA 
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withstand summary judgment in a Title VII 
action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
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A Title VII plaintiff is required to produce very 
little direct evidence of an employer's 
discriminatory intent to move past summary 
judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 
as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; 
(25) Civil Rights 
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"two Chinks" in the pharmacology department 
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discrimination in Title VII action brought by 
assistant professor of Chinese origin. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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for summary judgment in a Title VII action; to 
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2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
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discrimination based on national origin. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
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[29) Civil Rights 
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Alleged hiring of Asian professors to fill three of 
seven full-time-equivalent (FTE) state university 
positions was not relevant to Title VII claim by 
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complaint. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California; David F. Levi, District 
Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-97-00613-DFLIPAN. 
Before: POLITZ,IREINHARDT, HAWKINS, Circuit 
Judges. 
Opinion 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
Dr. Ronald Y. Chuang and Dr. Linda Chuang contend that 
officials at the University of California, Davis ("Davis") 
discriminated against them on the basis of their race 
(Asian) and national origin (Chinese), in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e et seq.2 The Chuangs allege that they suffered 
discrimination as a result of: (1) Davis's failure and refusal 
to provide Dr. Ronald Chuang with a promised tenure 
position; (2) Davis's forcible relocation of the Chuangs' 
laboratory during an ongoing research program sponsored 
by the National Institute of Health ("NIH"); and (3) 
Davis's failure to respond to Dr. Ronald Chuang'S 
complaints regarding the misappropriation of some of his 
research funds. *1120 The district court granted Davis 
summary judgment on all three claims. We reverse on the 
first two and remand for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND3 
Dr. Ronald Chuang is a microbiologist with a worldwide 
reputation in his area of expertise. He has conducted 
important research on the interaction between drug abuse 
and AIDS, including a seminal study on the effect of 
morphine on the simian immunodeficiency virus, an 
important model for AIDS research. He has published his 
findings in prestigious scientific journals. His research has 
been continuously supported by grants from the National 
Institute of Health (NIH). In 1996, when many of the 
events in this case transpired, his research program was 
being funded by an extraordinary $1.7 million grant from 
the NIH and other external sources. 
The School of Medicine at Davis is divided into two parts: 
Clinical and Basic Sciences. The Basic Sciences division 
consists of five departments: pharmacology, biological 
chemistry, physiology, cell biology and human anatomy, 
and medical microbiology. 
In 1982, the School of Medicine hired Dr. Chuang as an 
assistant professor of pharmacology and Dr. Linda 
Chuang, his wife, as an assistant research pharmacologist.4 
The Chuangs have long collaborated on various research 
programs. The Chuangs joined the pharmacology 
department at Davis because they had enjoyed their 
graduate school experience there and wanted to contribute 
to the university's educational mission. In choosing Davis, 
Dr. Chuang turned down an offer for a tenure-track 
position at the leading pharmacology department in the 
country, at Yale University. 
A. Denial of FTE Position 
When Dr. Chuang joined Davis, he was appointed as an 
assistant "in-residence" professor. Professors in residence 
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are responsible for funding most of their salaries and 
research through outside grants. By contrast, 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) professors-i.e., tenured 
faculty-have their salaries funded directly by Davis. 
When an FTE faculty member in a department retires or 
resigns, the FTE position is generally returned to the 
department to be reallocated to someone else. Dr. Chuang, 
the only full-time faculty member in the pharmacology 
department who is not Caucasian, is also the only one 
without an FTE. 
Shortly after Dr. Chuang joined the department, Dr. Larry 
Stark, then the department chairman, supported Dr. 
Chuang for a five-year NIH Research Career Development 
Award (RCDA), with the understanding that if the 
prestigious award were granted, Dr. Chuang would receive 
an FTE position upon its completion. Dr. Chuang received 
the award, completed it in 1989, but never received an 
FTE. 
In a letter dated April 26, 1988, Chairman Stark informed 
Dr. Chuang that School of Medicine Dean Hibbard 
Williams wanted to keep him on the faculty, but that no 
FTE was available at the time and Davis could not provide 
him one until a resignation or retirement occurred. In a 
memorandum dated April 1988, Chairman Stark told an 
assistant dean that "the School has committed itself to 
finding [Dr. Chuang] a permanent FTE position in the 
Department." The memorandum described Dr. Chuang's 
promotions within the department to the level of associate 
professor and concluded that in light of "recent court 
decisions ... these facts also argue strongly for planning an 
FTE position for Dr. Chuang." 
*1121 There have been five retirements 111 the 
pharmacology department since 1989. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Chuang has not received an FTE. 
The Executive Committee is a supervisory and 
policymaking body of the Davis School of Medicine. At a 
meeting of this committee in 1989, Professor Wallace 
Winters asked about a Chinese~American professor (not 
Dr. Chuang) whom the faculty of the pharmacology 
department had previously and unanimously asked the 
admiiiistratioh- to pursue as a candidate for department 
chairman. The administration had never contacted this 
candidate, and Dean Williams had not responded to the 
faculty's request. According to Professor Winters, Dr. 
Carroll Cross, sitting next to the dean, remarked that "two 
Chinks" in the department were more than enough; in 
response, Dean Williams laughed. 
In 1989 and 1990, Davis hired two Caucasian professors as 
FTEs in the pharmacology department. The second of 
these two professors, Dr. Michael Hanley, a male 
Caucasian with no active NIH grants, was hired as a 
"Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" appointment. The 
"Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" program was 
designed by the University of California to recruit minority 
and women faculty. It provided a special exemption by 
which a department could forgo the regular full candidate 
search for an open position.5 Through these hires, the 
already overwhelmingly white pharmacology department 
became more so. 
Several more FTEs became available to Dean Williams, 
but he never used them. Two and a haifFTE positions were 
available in the pharmacology department due to 
retirements. When Dean Gerald Lazarus took over in 1992, 
he gave three FTEs to the new Rowe Program (described 
infra ); four FTEs to the Basic Sciences division for 
recruitment purposes; and two FTEs to the Basic Sciences 
division for "compelling educational needs, retention or 
requirements of the Associate Dean for Research" 
(emphasis added). None of these FTEs went to Dr. 
Chuang, despite the earlier assurances he had received. 
After the Chuangs filed their complaint in district court in 
1997, the Basic Sciences division filled a number of FTE 
positions. Three were given to Asian professors, but not to 
Dr. Chuang. 
B. Forcible Relocation 
When the Chuangs joined the faculty in 1982, they were 
assigned laboratory space in Tupper Hall for their 
exclusive use. Dr. Gary Henderson, a Caucasian faculty 
member, refused to remove equipment and materials that 
he was storing there. In spite of the requests of the Chuangs 
and the department chairman, Dr. Henderson did not 
remove the equipment and materials until approximately 
seven years later. He was not forcibly relocated. 
In 1990, when the department made its "diversity" -based 
hire of Dr. Hanley, Dean Williams asked the Chuangs to 
give Dr. Hanley two laboratory rooms that they were using 
for ongoing research. At the time, most of the other faculty 
members were using their laboratory space for storage 
purposes; Dr. Chuang was the only faculty member in the 
pharmacology department conducting active research. 
Although Dean Williams assured the Chuangs that this 
arrangement would be temporary, lasting approximately 
13-18 months, the rooms were never returned. The 
Chuangs had to borrow laboratories from other faculty 
members to continue their research. They relocated their 
equipment and research in borrowed spaces five times. 
Upon becoming dean of the School of Medicine, Dr. 
Lazarus decided to launch the "Rowe Program," a program 
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in human genetics. The program required 5000 square feet 
of space. Davis officials initially designated space in 
Briggs Hall for *1122 this program. They contend, 
however, that Dr. Michael Seldin, the professor who was to 
be hired as the Rowe Chair, conditioned his acceptance on 
receiving the space adjacent to the department of 
biological sciences on the fourth floor of Tupper Hall-the 
space occupied by the pharmacology department. In his 
deposition, Dr. Seldin denied that he had demanded this 
space. 
In open meetings in December 1995, Associate Dean Fitz-
Roy Curry assured the Basic Sciences division faculty that 
no faculty member with an active research program would 
be affected by the allocation of space for the Rowe 
Program. Then, on January 29, 1996, Dr. Mannfred 
Hollinger, the new chairman of the pharmacology 
department, informed the Chuangs that the department 
would be moved from the fourth floor to the basement of 
Tupper Hall. If the Chuangs refused to move out, Hollinger 
said, the administration would change the locks on their 
doors. Dr. Tom Jue, a faculty member in the biological 
chemistry department who had borrowed laboratory space 
in the pharmacology department, was also told to relocate. 
Like the Chuangs, Dr. Jue was Chinese-American and had 
an active research program funded by the NIH. Most of the 
other pharmacology laboratory rooms on the fourth floor 
were not in use; they were reserved for "future 
pharmacologists" or new faculty members not yet 
identified.6 The administration did not require Dr. 
Hanley-the Caucasian faculty member who was using the 
two rooms from the Chuangs' laboratory, who had no 
active NIH research grants, and who had since switched to 
a different department-to relocate. No Caucasian faculty 
member with active research was required to relocate. 
The Chuangs protested the relocation of their laboratory 
space, but to no avail. 7 Chairman Hollinger responded to 
their protests in a hostile manner. He told the Chuangs that 
if they did not comply, "worse things" than the 
discontinuation of their research would happen to them; 
that "when all the shooting is done, there will surely be a 
casualty"; and that the administration would "physically 
throw [them] out of the laboratory by force" if necessary. 
On April 18, 1996, the move of their laboratory began. 
Members of the dean's office, led by Dr. Ted Wandzilak, 
began packing and moving the Chuangs' laboratory 
without their consent, mishandling and damaging 
expensive equipment and hazardous materials. Dr. 
Wandzilak admitted to the Chuangs that the administration 
was acting wrongly, but said that if they challenged the 
eviction on legal grounds, it would take a long time for the 
matter to be resolved. On May 6, 1996, Dr. Hollinger 
observed the relocation process and told the Chuangs, 
"You should pray to your Buddha for help." 
The Chuangs' equipment and materials were crammed into 
the basement laboratory room that they had been 
assigned-still occupied by other faculty-with the 
overflow put in another room. The locks to their 
fourth-floor laboratory were changed. In declarations 
submitted below, several Davis faculty members stated in 
the strongest of terms that the forcible relocation of a 
researcher's laboratory was unheard of. Several Caucasian 
faculty members *1123 had, in 1996 and earlier, protested 
the relocation of their laboratory space, but Davis had 
never evicted them or removed their equipment. 
Furthermore, an expert on NIH research grants stated that 
the forcible relocation ofthe Chuangs' laboratory violated 
not only Davis's commitment to Dr. Chuang, but also its 
commitment to the federal agency itself. 
Davis's relocation of the Chuangs' laboratory had a 
calamitous effect on their research programs. The 
Chuangs' overall research space was significantly reduced. 
The basement of Tupper Hall was not designed for 
molecular biology, Dr. Chuang'S main field of research. 
The Chuangs' laboratory rooms and offices are now 
located on different floors (the fourth floor and the 
basement), a fact which not only complicates the 
scientists' work, but also compromises experimental 
designs due to the safety rules and regulations of the Center 
for Disease Control and the university itself. The Chuangs 
lack access to a cold room and other critical facilities. As a 
result of the relocation, a technician, graduate student, and 
undergraduate student quit Dr. Chuang'S research 
program, and he has found it difficult to hire qualified 
replacements. Scheduled experiments were delayed. A 
colony of monkeys, to be used in a research project, grew 
too much in the interim and had to be replaced. The NIH 
withheld research grants on a particular project for eight 
months, and the Chuangs could not obtain supplemental 
grants, which would otherwise have been available to 
them, because they no longer had sufficient laboratory 
space. Another $75,000 grant was lost entirely. 
C. Investigation of Misappropriated Funds 
In June 1994 about $8,000 was misappropriated from Dr. 
Chuang's NIH research account and diverted to the 
accounts of the pharmacology department and its 
chairman. Dr. Chuang made repeated attempts to have the 
matter investigated by Davis's internal audit office, and 
complained in writing to various administration officials in 
1995 and 1996. The associate director of the internal audit 
office investigated Dr. Chuang's complaints, provided a 
written report to the provost, and told Dr. Chuang that the 
provost would contact him with the findings. The provost 
did not do so, however, and Dr. Chuang never received any 
formal response from Davis. In a declaration submitted 
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below, the associate director of the internal audit office 
asserted that disciplinary actions were taken in response to 
Dr. Chuang'S complaint, but that Dr. Chuang could not be 
informed of these actions "because of privacy concerns." 
The internal audit office was itself unable to respond 
formally to Dr. Chuang'S complaint "because of 
workload." 
D. Proceedings Below 
On July 12, 1996, the Chuangs filed a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 
1997 they received a notice of right to sue and filed a Title 
VII lawsuit, alleging inter alia discrimination on the basis 
of race and national origin, in federal district court. Davis 
filed a motion for summary judgment; the district court 
granted it; and the Chuangs filed this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Framework 
[I) [2) [3) The parties agree that the applicable legal 
framework for considering the summary judgment motion 
in the instant case is that established by McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas. a plaintiff 
alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must first 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.ld. at 802, 93 
S.ct. 1817. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) he 
belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the 
position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment 
action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his 
protected class were treated more favorably. ld. The 
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
*1124 reason for the challenged action. lei. If the employer 
does so, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason 
is pretextual "either directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer 
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of 
Community Afjclirs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 
S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 
[4) As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment 
discrimination action need produce very little evidence in 
order to overcome an employer's motion for summary 
judgment. This is because "the ultimate question is one that 
can only be resolved through a searching inquiry~one that 
is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full 
record." Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 
1410 (9th Cir.1996) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Here, contrary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56, the district court did not evaluate the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Chuangs, but instead resolved 
material facts that were disputed and disregarded other 
important evidence. As we will explain, the record 
supports a finding of illegal discrimination by Davis on 
two of the Chuangs' claims and warrants a resolution by 
trial on those claims. 
B. Prima Facie Case 
[5) Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, "[t]he 
requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima 
facie case for Title VII ... on summary judgment is minimal 
and does not even need to rise to the level of a 
preponderance of the evidence." Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co .• 
26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (citation omitted); accord 
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson. Inc .. 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th 
Cir.1998). 
1. Denial of FTE Position 
[6) Dr. Chuang contends that he was unfairly denied a 
promised FTE position because of his race and/or national 
origin. Davis argues that Dr. Chuang failed to establish a 
prima facie case because: (1) he did not apply for the FTEs 
that became available; and (2) he was not qualified to 
receive them.8 Davis does not challenge the other elements 
of the prima facie case. 
[7) With regard to Davis's first objection, the university 
contends that because Dr. Chuang did not apply for the 
FTEs, the failure to grant him such status did not constitute 
an adverse employment action. The record shows, 
however, that Dr. Chuang made several written requests 
for an FTE. Both the department chairman and the dean 
promised him that he would receive an FTE once one 
became available. Other faculty members have received 
FTEs without submitting formal applications. One 
individual, for example, received an FTE without ever 
applying for one, partly as an incentive for recruiting her 
husband, Dr. Seldin, to the school. Furthermore, Dr. 
Chuang had completed a prestigious RCDA grant in 1989. 
After a different professor at Davis, Dr. Margaret Meyer, 
had completed an RCDA grant, the university had 
considered itself compelled under its terms to award her an 
FTE.9 Dr. *1125 Chuang's grant contained the same terms, 
but Davis did not award an FTE to him. Each of these 
points supports a finding that any failure by Dr. Chuang to 
file a formal application as and when individual FTEs 
became available was irrelevant, and that the filing of such 
formal applications was not necessary in order for him to 
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establish that he was the subject of an adverse employment 
action. 
[8) [9) As for Dr. Chuang's qualifications, the district court 
concluded that Dr. Chuang had failed to establish that he 
was qualified for the Rowe Program, the School of 
Medicine's new program in human genetics. This analysis 
is deficient in several respects. First, there is at least a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. 
Chuang's microbiology research and expertise fell within 
the broad category of "human genetics" and thus qualified 
him on that basis. Second, at least one individual without 
experience in human genetics, Dr. Seldin's wife, received a 
Rowe Program FTE. Third, and most important, Dr. 
Chuang challenges Davis's failure to award him a 
pharmacology department FTE, not simply an FTE 
awarded pursuant to the Rowe Program. Davis could, for 
instance, have given to Dr. Chuang directly one of the three 
FTEs that it instead assigned to the Rowe Program in 1992. 
Or it could have given him one of the other FTEs that 
became available, such as the FTEs that went to Caucasian 
individuals in the pharmacology department in 1989 and 
1990. The chairman and dean had promised him an FTE at 
least since 1988, and five FTEs became available in the 
pharmacology department between then and 1996. On the 
basis of the record at summary judgment, Dr. Chuang was 
qualified for at least some, and possibly all, of these FTEs. 
In view of the above, we conclude that Dr. Chuang 
succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination with regard to his failure to receive an FTE. 
2. Forcible Relocation 
The Chuangs also established a prima facie case with 
respect to the forcible relocation of their laboratory space. 
Here, consistent with the district court's decision, Davis 
contests the third and fourth elements of the McDonnell 
Douglas test. It argues that the forced relocation did not 
amount to an adverse employment action, and that the 
Chuangs did not show that they were treated differently 
than other employees. 
[10) [11) Viewing the evidence favorably to the Chuangs, 
the relocation of their laboratory space unquestionably 
qualifies as an adverse employment action. Title VII 
provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment." 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Supreme 
Court has held that "this not only covers 'terms' and 
'conditions' in the narrow sense, but 'evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment '" in employment.' " Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offihore Serl's., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 
S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (quoting Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 
2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Cf Ray v. Henderson, 217 
F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that for purposes 
of a Title VII retaliation claim, "an action is cognizable as 
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to 
deter employees from engaging in protected activity"). 
Here, the forcible relocation of the Chuangs' laboratory 
disrupted important, ongoing research projects. Due to the 
delay, experimental subjects were lost and research grants 
were withheld. The Chuangs lost other grants entirely. 
Both scientists rely on grants for their salary. During the 
move, fragile, expensive equipment was damaged and 
misplaced. The Chuangs were moved to a location with 
qualities-e.g., split-level assignment, reduced space, lack 
of cold storage-totally inadequate for their ongoing 
research. Members of Dr. *1126 Chuang'S research team 
quit because of the change in working conditions. Several 
Davis professors declared that the involuntary move of Dr. 
Chuang'S laboratory was unprecedented and certain to 
hinder his research. It also violated the university'S 
commitments to the NIH. The forcible relocation involved 
far more than, as the district court characterized it, "a host 
of annoyances." The removal of or substantial interference 
with work facilities important to the performance of the job 
constitutes a material change in the terms and conditions of 
a person's employment. Assuming the truth of the 
allegations, the move of the Chuangs' laboratory more 
than qualified as an adverse employment action. 
[12) The Chuangs also satisfy the fourth element of the 
McDonnell Douglas test, the more favorable treatment of 
similarly situated individuals outside their protected 
classes, in at least two different ways. They were forced to 
give up their laboratory space for a Caucasian faculty 
member of junior rank, Dr. Seldin. Furthermore, Davis has 
never relocated the laboratory space of any Caucasian 
faculty member over the faculty member's objections.fo 
In view of the above, a prima facie case exists as to the 
forcible relocation also. 
3. Investigation of Misappropriated Funds 
[13) The Chuangs did not, however, establish a prima facie 
case on their claim challenging the failure of Davis 
officials to respond to his grievances regarding the 
misappropriation of his research funds. The lack of a 
response does not amount to an adverse employment 
action. The record shows that Davis officials investigated 
Dr. Chuang's complaint and took unspecified disciplinary 
actions. While the university's failure to inform Dr. 
Chuang of its findings or resulting disciplinary actions was 
certainly irritating and perhaps unjustified, it did not 
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materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of the Chuangs' employment. Nor did the 
Chuangs present evidence showing that non-Asian or 
non-Chinese complainants have received formal responses 
in similar circumstances. I I We therefore affirm the district 
court's award of summary judgment on this claim. 
C. Davis's Nondiscriminatory Reasons and Pretext 
Analysis 
[14) (15) Because the Chuangs established a prima facie 
case for the first two claims, the burden of production 
shifts to Davis to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for 
each adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor 
Center, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Davis contends 
that it did not give Dr. Chuang an FTE because he had a 
full-time position, his position was not in jeopardy, and the 
dean was prepared to pay for his base salary if the need 
arose. It also maintains that the forcible relocation of the 
Chuangs' laboratory was required to accommodate the 
Rowe Program. 
By offering these explanations, Davis has articulated 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 
McDonnell Douglas requires the Chuangs in tum to raise a 
genuine factual question whether, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to them, Davis's reasons are 
pretextual. 
*1127 [16) [17) We have stated that a plaintiff can prove 
pretext in two ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is "unworthy of 
credence" because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise 
not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful 
discrimination more likely motivated the employer. 
Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22. These two approaches are 
not exclusive; a combination of the two kinds of evidence 
may in some cases serve to establish pretext so as to make 
summary judgment improper. In this case, while the 
indirect evidence and direct evidence are independently 
sufficient to allow the Chuangs to proceed to trial, it is the 
cumulative evidence to which a court ultimately looks. 
1. Indirect Evidence 
[18] [19) It is not quite accurate to say that at this point the 
burden of production shifts back to the Chuangs. As the 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, a disparate treatment 
plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing 
any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his 
prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the truth of the employer's 
proffered reasons. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, --, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (holding that if factfinder rejects 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons as 
unbelievable, it may infer "the ultimate fact of intentional 
discrimination" without additional proof of 
discrimination); see also St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 
U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. While the plaintiff always 
retains the burden of persuasion, Reeves, 530 U.S. at --, 
120 S.Ct. at 2106, he does not necessarily have to 
introduce "additional, independent evidence of 
discrimination" at the pretext stage, id. at 2109. Accord 
Schnidrig, 80 F .3d at 1410--11; Washington, 10 F.3d at 
1433; Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College 
Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991); Lowe v. City of 
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008-09 (9th Cir.1985), 
amended by 784 F.2d 1407 (1986). 
[20) Here, we conclude that, with respect to Dr. Chuang'S 
FTE claim, the evidence constituting his prima facie case is 
sufficiently strong to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the truth of Davis's proffered nondiscriminatory 
reasons. Dr. Chuang's qualifications as a microbiologist 
and academic are extraordinary: he has developed a 
reputation as a leading AIDS researcher, published in 
prestigious journals, and received large amounts of 
funding from the NIH. Yet he is the only full-time faculty 
member in his department at Davis who has not received 
an FTE. It also happens that he is the only non-Caucasian. 
He was promised an FTE, but whenever one became 
available, it was assigned to someone else. Given this 
evidence, a factfinder could well decide to disbelieve 
Davis's explanation that (aside from his purported lack of 
qualifications) it did not offer an FTE to Dr. Chuang 
because his position was never in jeopardy (a fact due, of 
course, to the high level of funding he had obtained). 12 
[21) [22) Similarly, we hold that the Chuangs made a 
sufficiently strong showing in their prima facie case to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Davis's 
proffered explanation for the forcible relocation of their 
laboratory is pretextual. Davis contends that Dr. Seldin, the 
presumptive Rowe Chair, demanded the precise space 
occupied by the Chuangs on the fourth floor of Tupper 
Hall, the space adjacent to t~at occupied by the department 
of biological chemistry. Dr. Seldin, however, denied this 
contention in his deposition. This is the sort of evidence 
that could lead a factfinder to disbelieve Davis. The refusal 
of Dr. Henderson to remove equipment from the Chuangs' 
*1128 laboratory, the failure of Dean Williams to return to 
them the two rooms assigned to Dr. Hanley in 1990, and 
the extraordinarily hostile manner in which the School of 
Medicine evicted the Chuangs are additional facts which 
contribute to establishing a jury issue as to the falsity of 
Davis's explanation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
120 S.Ct. at 2110-11. In addition, the circumstances 
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surrounding Davis's failure to give Dr. Chuang the 
promised FTE may properly be considered in determining 
whether Davis's explanation regarding the forcible 
relocation is pretextual. The Reeves principle that the same 
evidence may be used at various stages of a court's 
analysis applies equally to the use of such evidence with 
respect to various claims of discrimination. At the 
summary judgment stage, as well as at trial, any form of 
evidence of discriminatory treatment that is otherwise 
admissible may be used to support any allegation of 
discrimination, whether or not there is a direct relationship 
between the various claims involved. 
2. Direct Evidence 
[23J [24] The Chuangs also presented direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive with respect to both of the claims on 
which we reverse the grant of summary judgment. In its 
order, the district court held that direct evidence of pretext 
had to be specific and substantial. This was error. "With 
direct evidence, a triable issue as to the actual motivation 
of the employer is created even if the evidence is not 
substantial." Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 546 (9th 
Cir.1998) (citing Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-21); see also 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at --,120 S.Ct. at 2111 (criticizing 
lower court for failing to draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of plaintiff when analyzing direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus). The plaintiff is required to 
produce "very little" direct evidence of the employer's 
discriminatory intent to move past summary judgment. 
Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Lindahl v. Air France, 
930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.199l)); see also Lowe, 775 
F.2d at 1009. 
[25) The Chuangs easily clear this threshold. Two items of 
direct evidence in this case are particularly significant. 
First, a member of the Executive Committee, a 
decisionmaking body for the School of Medicine, Dr. 
Cross, reportedly stated in a meeting in 1989, just as Dr. 
Chuang was completing his prestigious five-year NIH 
Research Career Development Award, that "two Chinks" 
in the pharmacology department were "more than 
enough."]3 We need not dwell on the offensiveness of the 
term used. It is "an egregious and bigoted insult, one that 
constitutes strong evidence of discriminatory animus on 
the basis of national origin." Cf Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149 
(discussing allegation that employer referred to another 
employee as "dumb Mexican"). Dr. Cross's remark 
establishes discriminatory intent even though it was uttered 
during consideration of a different Asian-American's 
potential employment. ld. ("[I]f such remarks were indeed 
made, they could be proof of discrimination against 
[plaintiff] despite their reference to another agent and their 
utterance after the hiring decision."). Moreover, it 
implicates not only the speaker. For purposes of summary 
judgment, Dean Williams's laughing response to this 
remark establishes adequate evidence of discriminatory 
intent on his part also. Cf McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
804, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (observing that an employer's 
"reaction" to plaintiffs "legitimate civil rights activities" 
might be relevant to showing of pretext), cited in Lowe, 
775 F.2d at 1009; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at --, 120 
S.Ct. at 2111 (rejecting claim that, as a matter of law, 
discriminatory remarks must be made "in the direct 
context" of an adverse employment decision). 
*1129 [26) [27) The second item of direct evidence is the 
statement of Dr. Hollinger, the chairman of the 
pharmacology department, during the forcible relocation 
of the Chuangs' laboratory. Having already told the 
Chuangs that they would be physically thrown out of their 
laboratory and that "worse things" would happen if they 
continued their protests, Chairman Hollinger told them on 
May 6, 1996, during the eviction process, that they "should 
pray to [their] Buddha for help." The district court opined 
that this statement was "apparently intended as a humorous 
comment on his and Dr. Chuang's joint plight in the 
laboratory relocation controversy in which Dr. Hollinger 
was Dr. Chuang's ally in opposing the move." In drawing 
this inference in Davis's favor, the district court erred. 
First, the comment was not humorous. Second, Dr. 
Hollinger did not share the Chuangs' plight; the record 
supports a finding that as department chairman, he was 
instrumental in creating it. (It also indicates that 
department chairmen play a significant role in hiring 
faculty and awarding FTEs.) It is not the province of a 
court to spin such evidence in an employer's favor when 
evaluating its motion for summary judgment. To the 
contrary, all inferences must be drawn in favor of the 
non-moving party. Like the "two Chinks" incident, the 
admonition of a high-ranking official to an Asian-
American employee to "pray to your Buddha" during the 
time of an adverse employment action is sufficient 
evidence of discriminatory motive for purposes of 
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. 
3. Cumulative Evidence 
In view of the conclusions we have reached with respect to 
both the indirect evidence and the direct evidence, there 
can be no doubt that on the basis of the cumulative 
evidence, the Chuangs have, for purposes of summary 
judgment, established pretext on Davis's part. 
D. Post-Complaint Hires 
Lastly, with respect to Dr. Chuang's claim for denial of an 
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FTE position, the district court held that he failed to show 
"differential treatment regarding the denial of an FTE 
position." Specifically, according to the district judge, Dr. 
Chuang did not refute Davis's evidence that "of the seven 
FTEs awarded in the Basic Sciences division of the School 
of Medicine since 1996, three have gone to Asian 
professors." Davis cites this fact in its brief, but wisely 
refrains from relying on it as a basis for affirming the 
district court's decision. 
[28) As an initial matter, the record does not reveal the 
national origin of these new hires. An employer's 
favorable treatment of"Asian" employees does not answer 
a claim of discrimination based on national origin. See Lam 
v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n. 16 (9th 
Cir.1994) ("[I]t is significant that Lam and the Asian male 
candidate were of different national origins-Lam being 
Vietnamese-French, the male candidate, Chinese. Lam 
alleged not only race discrimination but also national 
origin discrimination, thereby raising this distinction as 
relevant under Title VII."). 
[29) More important, the three Asian professors were 
hired, according to the Chuangs, long after the Chuangs 
filed their complaints with the EEOC and their lawsuit in 
federal court. If accurate, this timing would eliminate any 
probative value the evidence might otherwise have. "Given 
the obvious incentive in such circumstances for an 
employer to take corrective action in an attempt to shield 
itself from liability, it is clear that nondiscriminatory 
employer actions occurring subsequent to the filing of a 
discrimination complaint will rarely even be relevant as 
circumstantial evidence in favor of the employer." Lam, 40 
F.3d at 1561 n. 17 (citing Gonzales v. Police Dep 't, City of 
San Jose, 901 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.1990)). In 
Gonzalez this court reviewed rulings calling into doubt the 
relevance of an employer's post-complaint promotion of 
minority employees in cases seeking prospective relief 
Footnotes 
against discriminatory employment practices. 901 F.2d at 
762. It then found the *1130 irrelevance of such evidence 
"even more apparent" in disparate treatment cases like this 
one addressing "whether discrimination occurred prior to 
the commencement of a Title VII action." Id. "Curative 
measures simply do not tend to prove that a prior violation 
did not occur." Id. 
Davis's subsequent hiring practices are therefore irrelevant 
to the question whether Dr. Chuang was subjected to 
discrimination from 1982 to 1997. On remand, the district 
court should exclude at trial evidence of Davis's 
post-complaint hiring of Asian-American professors, 
unless the university can prove that it made its hiring 
decisions before it became aware that the Chuangs 
intended to pursue their complaints. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on Dr. Ronald Chuang's 
challenge to the denial of his promised FTE position and 
the Chuangs' challenge to the forcible relocation of their 
laboratory in 1996. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED. 
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86 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1551, 79 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
P 40.228, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7295,2000 Daily Journal 
DAR. 9673 
The Honorable Henry A. Politz, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
2 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Dr. Fitz-Roy Curry as a defendant below. 
3 Because the plaintiffs appeal from an order graHting Davis summary judgment, we set forth the relevant facts in the light most 
favorable to them. Some of these facts arc disputed by Davis. 
4 The allegations and claims in this case relate primarily to Dr. Ronald Chuang. For purposes of clarity, we herein refer to him as "Dr. 
Chuang" and his wife as "Dr. Linda Chuang." 
5 Davis argues, not particularly persuasively in light of the materials in the record, that the "Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" 
program was intended to recruit faculty from outside the university, not qualified minority and women faculty. 
6 Even at the time the parties submitted briefs on summary judgment below, there was still enough empty laboratory space on the 
fourth floor of Tupper Hall for both the Rowe Program and the Chuangs' research needs. 
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7 The Chuangs made numerous formal and informal complaints with the administration. Their reasons for not wanting to relocate 
were: (1) the relocation would significantly damage their ongoing research; (2) due to strongly held cultural beliefs, they could not 
work in the proximity of the morgue, which is located on the basement floor; and (3) the basement is unsafe for Dr. Linda Chuang 
who often has to work in the laboratory late at night. With respect to the second reason, Associate Dean Curry advised the Chuangs to 
enter the basement from an entrance away from the morgue, cover their eyes with their hands as they walked past the morgue to their 
laboratory, and "pretend" that the morgue was not there. 
8 The district court also held that Dr. Chuang failed to show "differential treatment regarding the denial of an FTE position" because 
"of the seven FTEs awarded in the Basic Sciences division of the School of Medicine since 1996, three have gone to Asian 
professors." This point is not relevant to the prima facie requirement. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that an 
employer treated similarly situated individuals outside the plaintiff's protective class more favorably, not that the employer treated all 
other members within the class less favorably. We address the relevance of these post-complaint hires to the overall disparate 
treatment inquiry in Section D, infra. 
9 Davis incorrectly argues that the declaration relating this evidence "lacks foundation, is conclusory, and is hearsay." The statements 
set forth in Professor Jerold Theis's declaration are based on his personal knowledge of faculty meetings and other events that 
occurred during his twenty-eight years at the Davis School of Medicine. It is proper evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e). 
10 The Chuangs also argue that no Caucasian faculty member with an ongoing active NIH research program was asked to move during 
the 1996 relocation. Davis, however, asserts that Dr. Larry Stark also had active ongoing research and was asked to relocate his 
laboratory space from Tupper Hall. (He did not oppose relocation.) In response, the Chuangs contend that at the time Dr. Stark was 
not conducting research at Tupper Hall, but at a different laboratory, and that his research involved only a small amount of grant 
money, not NIH funds. These disputed facts also require resolution by the facttinder at trial. 
11 While Dean Lazarus testified in his deposition that complaints of this nature are meticulously investigated, he did not state whether 
formal responses are always provided. 
12 We do not suggest that this is the only indirect evidence that supports this aspect of Dr. Chuang's claim. For example, there is also 
evidence regarding misuse of the "Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" program to give a Caucasian scientist, but not Dr. Chuang, 
an FTE position in the otherwise all-white phannacology department. 
13 The fact that this incident was related in the declaration of a faculty member other than Ronald or Linda Chuang strengthens its value 
as direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149 n. 5; Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1411. 
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DESERT PALACE, INC., dba Caesars 
Palace Hotel & Casino, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 99-15645. I Argued and Submitted March 
21,2002. I FiledAug. 2, 2002. 
Former employee sued former employer for gender 
discrimination under Title VII. The United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada, David W. Hagen, J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of former 
employee. Former employer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, William W. Schwarzer, Senior District Judge, 
268 F .3d 882, vacated judgment. On en banc rehearing, the 
Court of Appeals, McKeown, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
Title VII imposes no special or heightened evidentiary 
burden on a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case; (2) District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in giving mixed-motive 
instruction: (3) issue whether discrimination was 
motivating factor in terminating employee was for jury; (4) 
issue whether employer would have decided to terminate 
employee even if employee's gender had played no role in 
termination decision was for jury; and (5) District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding arbitration 
decisions. 
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. 
Gould, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion in which 
Kozinski, Fernandez, and Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges, 
joined. 
West Headnotes (47) 
[I) Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Title VII imposes no special or heightened 
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a 
mixed-motive case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[2) 
[3J 
[4) 
Civil Rights 
·,;;",Employment Practices 
Civil Rights 
·ifxADiscrimination by Reason of Race, Color, 
Ethnicity, or National Origin, in General 
Civil Rights 
·.,,·?Sex Discrimination in General 
An employee makes out a Title VII violation by 
showing discrimination because of race, sex, or 
another protected factor. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-2(a)(l). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
. Motive or Intent; Pretext 
An "unlawful employment practice" prohibited 
by Title VII encompasses any situation in which 
a protected characteristic was a motivating factor 
in an employment action, even ifthere were other 
motives. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). 
Civil Rights 
" Defenses in General 
In a mixed-motive Title VII case, if the employee 
succeeds in proving only that a protected 
characteristic was one of several factors 
motivating the employment action, an employer 
cannot avoid liability altogether, but instead may 
assert an affirmative defense to bar certain types 
of relief by showing the absence of "but for" 
causation. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(m), 
706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
21 Cases that cite this headnote 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 49 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (2002) 
89 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 673, 83 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,122 ... 
[5) 
[6) 
[7) 
Civil Rights 
4:",cPresumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Amendments to Title VII providing that an 
unlawful employment practice is established 
when a protected characteristic is a motivating 
factor in an employment action, and providing an 
affirmative defense relative to such situation, did 
nothing to change the plaintiffs ultimate burden 
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(m), 
706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
Civil Rights 
.,~,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Civil Rights 
,Sex Discrimination 
Title VII does not impose a special evidentiary 
rule on or hurdle for victims of mixed-motive 
discrimination to prove their case; the inquiry is 
simply that of any civil case, that is, whether the 
plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for a rational 
factfinder to conclude by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the employer violated the statute, 
that is, that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§§ 703(a, m), 706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a, m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Non-circumstantial evidence is not the magical 
threshold for Title VII liability. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
[8) 
[9) 
Civil Rights 
'~/;~Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
The plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a 
violation through a preponderance of evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, that a protected 
characteristic played a motivating factor in the 
employer's decision. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
Evidence 
,/':Circumstantial Evidence 
In proving a case, circumstantial evidence is 
weighed on the same scale and laid before the 
jury in the same manner as direct evidence; in 
other words, circumstantial evidence is not 
inherently less probative than direct evidence. 
[10) Courts 
Supreme Court Decisions 
It is generally undesirable, where holdings of the 
Supreme Court are not at issue, to dissect the 
sentences of the United States Reports as though 
they were the United States Code. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
[11) Civil Rights 
Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment claims under Title VII 
require the plaintiff to prove that the employer 
acted with conscious intent to discriminate. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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11 Cases that cite this headnote 
[12] Civil Rights 
;~=Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
A Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie 
case by showing: (1) that he belongs to a racial 
minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and (4) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[13) Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
The legal proof structure of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case and burden-shifting 
paradigm is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the 
summary judgment stage so that they may reach 
trial. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[14) Civil Rights 
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
A Title VII plaintiff may make out a prima facie 
case, which may be a weak showing, that entitles 
her to a transitory presumption of discrimination; 
the burden of production only shifts briefly to the 
employer to explain why it took the challenged 
action, if not based on the protected 
characteristic. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[15) Civil Rights 
(>~~Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Once an employer rebuts the presumption of 
discrimination created by a prima facie Title VII 
case, the burden of production shifts back to the 
plaintiff to introduce evidence from which the 
factfinder could conclude that the employer's 
proffered reason was pretextual. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
[16) Civil Rights 
,,>Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
In a Title VII case, the burden of persuasion 
always remains with the employee to prove the 
ultimate Title VII violation, that is, unlawful 
discrimination. Civil Rights Actofl964, § 701 et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[17) Civil Rights 
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Nothing compels the parties to a Title VII action 
to invoke the McDonnell Douglas presumption; 
evidence in a Title VII action can be in the form 
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, or 
other sufficient evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, of discriminatory intent. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.CA § 2000e et seq. 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
[18) Civil Rights 
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
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Although the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting scheme may be used in a Title 
VII action where a single motive is at issue, this 
proof scheme is not the exclusive means of proof 
in such a case; it also might be invoked in cases in 
which the defendant asserts a "same decision" 
defense to certain remedies, a circumstance in 
which mixed motives are at issue. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[19) Civil Rights 
',,oQ·Instructions 
Regardless of the method chosen to arrive at trial, 
it is not normally appropriate to introduce the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
to the jury. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[20) Civil Rights 
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Civil Rights 
.Questions of Law or Fact 
The presumption of discrimination created by a 
prima facie Title VII case retains vitality at trial 
in one limited circumstance, that is, where there 
is no rebuttal by the employer, but the plaintiff's 
prima facie case is in factual dispute; the jury 
then determines whether the prima facie case is 
established, and, if it is, the jury must find 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[21J Civil Rights 
Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Once at the trial stage of a Title VII action, the 
plaintiff is required to put forward evidence of 
discrimination "because of' a protected 
characteristic. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
[22) Civil Rights 
·,>"",Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Civil Rights 
"d""Pleading 
A Title VII case need not be characterized or 
labeled as a "pretext" or "mixed-motives" case at 
the outset, inasmuch as the shape will often 
emerge after discovery or even at trial; similarly, 
the complaint itself need not contain more than 
the allegation that the adverse employment action 
was taken because of a protected characteristic. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[23) Civil Rights 
F Instructions 
After hearing both parties' evidence at a trial of a 
Title VII claim, the district court must decide 
what legal conclusions the evidence could 
reasonably support and instruct the jury 
accordingly, and this determination is distinct 
from the question of whether to invoke the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption; the choice of 
jury instructions depends simply on a 
determination of whether the evidence supports a 
finding that just one, or more than one, factor 
actually motivated the challenged decision. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[24) Civil Rights 
Instructions 
If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII 
action, the trial court determines that the only 
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that 
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the 
challenged employment action or that 
discrimination played no role at all in the 
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employer's decisionmaking, then the jury should 
be instructed to determine whether the 
challenged action was taken "because of' the 
prohibited reason. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703(a), as amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[25] Civil Rights 
~""Motive or Intent; Pretext 
If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII 
action, the trial court determines that the only 
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that 
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the 
challenged employment action or that 
discrimination played no role at all in the 
employer's decisionmaking, and the jury 
determines that the employer acted because of 
discriminatory intent, the employee prevails and 
may receive the full remedies available under 
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a). 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[26J Civil Rights 
Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Civil Rights 
.·Defenses in General 
If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII 
action, the trial court determines that the only 
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that 
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the 
challenged employment action or that 
discrimination played no role at all in the 
employer's decisionmaking, and the jury 
determines that the employer did not act because 
of discriminatory intent, the employer prevails; 
in such cases the employer does not benefit from 
the "same decision" defense, which, if 
successful, significantly limits the employee's 
remedies. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a). 
[27] Civil Rights 
·~Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Civil Rights 
',P" Instructions 
In Title VII cases in which the evidence could 
support a finding that discrimination is one of 
two or more reasons for the challenged decision, 
at least one of which may be legitimate, the jury 
should be instructed to determine first whether 
the discriminatory reason was a motivating factor 
in the challenged action; if the jury's answer to 
this question is in the affirmative, then the 
employer has violated Title VII. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
[28) Civil Rights 
,/e,Relief 
Civil Rights 
,·Monetary Relief; Restitution 
Civil Rights 
Proceedings, Grounds, and Objections in 
General 
If the jury finds in a Title VII mixed-motives case 
that the employer has proved the "same decision" 
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the employer will escape the 
imposition of damages and any order of 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and the like, 
and is liable solely for attorney fees, declaratory 
relief, and an order prohibiting future 
discriminatory actions. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§ 706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.CA § 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
[29) Civil Rights 
Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Although the employer may be entitled to the 
"same decision" affirmative defense instruction 
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in some Title VII cases, and in other cases it may 
not, the employee's ultimate burden of proof in 
all cases remains the same: to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
challenged employment decision was "because 
of' discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[30) Civil Rights 
>,,·Motive or Intent; Pretext 
"Single-motive" and "mixed-motive" cases are 
not fundamentally different categories of cases, 
and both require the employee to prove 
discrimination; they simply reflect the type of 
evidence offered. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 
et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[31) Federal Courts 
Nature or Subject-Matter ofIssues or 
Questions 
Federal Courts 
Conduct of Trial in General 
The Court of Appeals generally reviews the 
formulation of jury instructions for abuse of 
discretion, but whether an instruction misstates 
the law is a legal issue reviewed de novo. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[32) Federal Courts 
Allowance of Remedy and Matters of 
Procedure in General 
Determination whether evidence could be 
characterized as establishing multiple motives, 
thus warranting affirmative defense on part of 
employer in Title VII action, was evaluation of 
evidence, warranting review for abuse of 
discretion. 
[33) Federal Courts 
\;;?~ Instructions 
Employer waived objection to form of jury 
instruction in Title VII action in conceding at trial 
that it was "a reasonable statement of the mixed 
motive instruction." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et 
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 51, 28 V.S.C.A. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[34) Civil Rights 
\~\) Instructions 
District court did not abuse its discretion in 
giving mixed-motive instruction in Title VII 
action; although employee did not dispute many 
of events that took place, and although employee 
did not wholly discount that such events may 
have been part of basis for her discipline and 
termination, the wide array of discriminatory 
treatment was sufficient to support conclusion 
that sex was also motivating factor in 
decision-making process. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[35) Federal Courts 
,Trial De Novo 
Court of Appeals would review de novo 
appellant's challenge to district court's denial of 
its motion for judgment as matter of law. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[36) Federal Courts 
Verdicts in General 
Federal Courts 
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"#,,,Rendering Final Judgment on Reversal 
The Court of Appeals can overturn a jury's 
verdict and grant a motion for judgment as a 
matter oflaw only if there is no legally sufficient 
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party 
on that issue. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(a), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[37) Federal Courts 
",Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals may not 
substitute its view of the evidence for that of the 
jury. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28 
U.S.c.A. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[38) Federal Courts 
Judgment N. O. v 
Federal Courts 
Weight or Preponderance of Evidence in 
General 
Federal Courts 
Credibility of Witnesses in General 
In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals neither 
makes credibility determinations nor weighs the 
evidence, and it must draw all inferences in favor 
of the nonmovant. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
[39) Federal Courts 
,. Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals is required 
to disregard all evidence favorable to the moving 
party that the jury is not required to believe; this 
high hurdle recognizes that credibility, 
inferences, and factfinding are the province ofthe 
jury, not the Court. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
[40] Civil Rights 
'f'Questions of Law or Fact 
Issue whether intentional discrimination on basis 
of sex was motivating factor in subjecting 
employee to termination and other adverse 
actions was for jury in Title VII action; linking 
differential treatment to employee's sex was not 
difficult given that she was the only woman in 
her unit, employee was terminated for physical 
altercation with male coemployee who netted 
only suspension, and employee was told she did 
not deserve overtime because she did not have 
family to support. Civil Rights Act ofl964, § 701 
et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
[41J Civil Rights 
[42) 
Hostile Environment; Severity, 
Pervasiveness, and Frequency 
Civil Rights 
Hostile Environment; Severity, 
Pervasiveness, and Frequency 
For purposes of Title VII, the prevalence ofrace 
or sex-based slurs does not excuse them. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Sex Discrimination 
When abuse directed at women centers on the 
fact that they are females, a jury may infer 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
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[43) Civil Rights 
;'=Questions of Law or Fact 
Issue whether employer would have decided to 
terminate employee even if employee's gender 
had played no role in termination decision was 
for jury in Title VII action; although employee's 
infractions may have played role in termination, 
documentation of her infractions and discipline 
stemmed in part from sex discrimination. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
[44) Civil Rights 
"",Admissibility of Evidence; Statistical 
Evidence 
District court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding from Title VII action arbitration 
decisions relating to incident that triggered 
termination; discrimination was not covered by 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and thus 
was not issue in arbitration. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
[45) Federal Courts 
, Instructions 
Employer's failure to object to punitive damages 
instruction during trial of Title VII action did not 
preclude Court of Appeals from reviewing such 
instruction to ascertain whether it complied with 
Kolstad v. American Dental Association, which 
provided employers with good faith defense to 
punitive damages. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[46) Federal Courts 
·is""Instructions 
The Court of Appeals has discretion to review a 
jury instruction despite a failure to object where a 
solid wall of Circuit authority would have 
rendered an objection futile. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[47) Civil Rights 
•. , •• Exemplary or Punitive Damages 
Jury's finding that employer engaged in 
egregious conduct did not obviate need, in course 
of whether deciding whether employer was liable 
for punitive damages under Title VII, to 
determine whether employer acted in good faith, 
inasmuch as egregious misconduct could not be 
equated with lack of good faith. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 
2000e et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada; David Warner Hagen, District Judge, 
Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00009 DWHI RJJ. 
Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, REINHARDT, 
KOZINSKI, FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, 
SILVERMAN, GRABER, McKEOWN, FISHER, 
GOULD, and P AEZ, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
OPINION 
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McKEOWN, Circuit Judge 
[1) We agreed to hear this case en banc! primarily to 
examine the legal standard for proof of a violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. In this classic instance of what 
has been termed a "mixed-motive" case, the employer, 
Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino ("Caesars"), terminated 
Catharina Costa, the only woman in her bargaining unit, 
citing disciplinary problems. Costa argued, and the jury 
agreed, that sex was "a motivating factor" in her 
termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Because Caesars 
failed to establish that she would have been terminated 
without consideration of her sex, the jury awarded back 
pay and compensatory damages. Finally, the jury found 
that the discrimination was "egregious" and warranted 
punitive damages. Caesars argues that Costa should have 
been held to a special, higher standard of "direct 
evidence," a threshold it claims she did not meet. We 
disagree. Title VII imposes no special or heightened 
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a so-called 
"mixed-motive" case. Consequently, we affirm the 
liability finding as well as the judgment for back pay and 
compensatory damages. In light of intervening Supreme 
Court authority, we remand with respect to punitive 
damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,119 
S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). 
BACKGROUND 
Catharina Costa is a trailblazer. She has worked most of 
her life in a male-dominated environment, driving trucks 
and operating heavy equipment. At Caesars, a well known 
casino in Las Vegas, she worked in a warehouse and, along 
with members of her bargaining unit, Teamsters Local 995, 
operated the forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and 
beverage orders. Costa was the only woman in this job. 
Costa's work was characterized as "excellent" and "good." 
As her supervisor explained: "We knew when she was out 
there the job would get done." Nonetheless, she 
experienced a number of problems with management and 
her co-workers. At first, she responded by simply focusing 
on doing her job well. Slowly, Costa began to notice that 
she was being singled out because she was a woman. Her 
concerns not only fell on deaf ears-"my word meant 
nothing"-but resulted in her being treated as an "outcast." 
In a series of escalating events that included informal 
rebukes, denial of privileges *845 accorded her male 
co-workers, suspension, and finally discharge, Costa's 
efforts to resolve problems were thwarted along the way. 
The situation deteriorated so significantly that she finally 
complained to the human resources department, which 
declined to intervene. 
There were "so many" incidents, it was difficult for her to 
recount them all. Nonetheless, her testimony at trial on this 
point was detailed and extensive. For example, when men 
came in late, they were often given overtime to make up 
the lost time; when Costa came in late-in one case, one 
minute late-she was issued a written reprimand, known as a 
record of counseling. When men missed work for medical 
reasons, they were given overtime to make up the lost time; 
when Costa missed work for medical reasons, she was 
disciplined. On one occasion, a warehouse supervisor 
actually suspended her because she had missed work while 
undergoing surgery to remove a tumor; only the 
intervention of the director of human resources voided this 
action. 
In another episode, corroborated at trial by a fellow 
employee who was an eyewitness, a number of workers 
were in the office eating soup on a cold day. A supervisor 
walked in, looked directly at Costa, and said, "Don't you 
have work to do?" He did not reprimand any of her 
colleagues-all men. Another supervisor began to follow 
her around the warehouse. Although several other 
Teamsters complained about this supervisor's scrutiny, 
three witnesses, in addition to Costa, testified that she was 
singled out for particularly intense "stalking." 
Costa presented extensive evidence that she received 
harsher discipline than the men. For instance, she was 
frequently warned and even suspended for allegedly 
hazardous use of equipment and for use of profanity, yet 
other Teamsters engaged in this conduct with impunity. In 
at least one instance, such a charge against Costa was 
found to have been fabricated and the suspension voided. 
Supervisors began to "stack" her disciplinary record. In 
one case, a supervisor issued multiple warnings on a single 
day, including docking her for an absence that dated back 
over eight months and for absences that occurred when 
Costa was under a doctor's care. Another warehouse 
manager steered a co-worker who had a dispute with Costa 
to security instead of handling the matter himself because 
the manager wanted to bring "this problem with Costa to a 
'head.' " -
Costa was also treated differently than her male colleagues 
in the assignment of overtime. For example, in an analysis 
of 95.5 hours of overtime assigned to eight Teamsters, 
Costa received only two hours. Failure to assign overtime 
was not for Costa's lack of willingness to work additional 
hours. Costa was listed as "refusing" overtime when she 
was on vacation. When she was offered overtime, it was at 
the last minute, making it impractical for her to accept. The 
situation became more blatant when Costa asked her 
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supervisors point blank about the differential treatment of 
another Teamster who was favored with overtime 
assignments. The response: He "has a family to support." 
Costa also presented evidence that she was penalized for 
her failure to conform to sexual stereotypes. Although her 
fellow Teamsters frequently lost their tempers, swore at 
fellow employees, and sometimes had physical 
altercations, it was Costa, identified in one report as "the 
lady Teamster," who was called a "bitch," and told "[y]ou 
got more balls than the guys." Even at trial, and despite 
testimony that she "got along with most people" and had 
"few arguments," Caesars' managers continued to 
characterize her as "strong *846 willed," "opinionated," 
and "confrontational," leading counsel to call her "bossy" 
in closing argument. Supervisor Karen Hallett, who later 
signed Costa's termination order, expressly declared her 
intent to "get rid of that bitch," referring to Costa. 
Supervisors frequently used or tolerated verbal slurs that 
were sex-based or tinged with sexual overtones. Most 
memorably, one co-worker called her a "fucking cunt." 
When she wrote a letter to management expressing her 
concern with this epithet, which stood out from the 
ordinary rough-and-tumble banter, she received a 
three-day suspension in response. Although the other 
employee admitted using the epithet, Costa was faulted for 
"engaging in verbal confrontation with co-worker in the 
warehouse resulting in use of profane and vulgar language 
by other employee." 
These events culminated in Caesars' termination of Costa. 
The purported basis for termination was a physical 
altercation in the warehouse elevator with another 
Teamster, Herb Gerber. This incident began, as Gerber 
admitted, when he went looking for Costa, upset about a 
report that he believed she had made about his 
unauthorized lunch breaks. Gerber trapped Costa in an 
elevator and shoved her against the wall, bruising her arm. 
Costa gave a detailed account of the altercation. Right 
away she told supervisor Hallett. Reassured that Hallett 
would investigate, Costa returned to work, only to have 
Gerber seek her out and "come at" her a second time. 
Costa's account was also corroborated by her immediate 
reports to union officials, by photographs of the bruises, 
and by a witness who had seen Gerber blocking the 
elevator door. In contrast, Gerber did not immediately 
report the incident, had no physical corroboration, and 
provided few details. He first denied that the altercation 
was physical, but then changed his story to state that Costa 
had, in fact, hit him. 
Nonetheless, Caesars did not believe Costa. Caesars 
reasoned that the facts were in dispute, so it disciplined 
both employees-Gerber with a five-day suspension and 
Costa with termination. 
Both Costa and Gerber grieved their respective disciplines 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which did 
not cover sex discrimination. The arbitrator upheld both 
actions. After receiving an EEOC right to sue letter, Costa 
filed this suit. The trial court dismissed her claim of sexual 
harassment on summary judgment, but allowed the other 
disparate treatment claim to proceed. 
At trial, Caesars maintained that Costa was terminated 
because of her disciplinary history and her altercation with 
Gerber. Costa did not suggest that she was a model 
employee, but rather that her sex was a motivating factor in 
her termination. After hearing Costa's testimony, Judge 
Hagen, the trial judge, admonished counsel: "This is a case 
that should have settled." He denied Caesars' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law at the close of Costa's case, 
which was renewed at the close of the evidence. The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Costa for $64,377.74 back 
pay, $200,000 compensatory damages, and $100,000 
punitive damages. When Judge Hagen denied defense 
motions for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding 
the verdict, and for a new trial, he elaborated as follows: 
"At trial, the evidence showed a pattern of disparate 
treatment favoring male co-workers over plaintiff in the 
application of disciplinary standards, allowance of 
overtime, and in her termination. From this evidence 
reasonable minds could infer that plaintiffs gender played 
a motivating part in Caesars's conduct towards plaintiff 
.... " He did, however, *847 grant remittitur, and Costa 
agreed to reduce compensatory damages to $100,000. 
DISCUSSION 
Title VII itself provides the benchmark for resolving the 
primary question in this case. Although the road from Title 
VII to resolution of Costa's case rests ultimately on a 
straightforward examination of the statute, it is helpful to 
examine the statute's structure and the history of the 1991 
amendments to the statute. After analyzing the import of 
the passing reference to "direct evidence" in Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 
268 (1989), and the framework for Title VII cases, we 
address the evidence in Costa's case, including the claim 
that evidence of an arbitration award was erroneously 
excluded, and the propriety of giving a "mixed-motive" 
jury instruction. We conclude by examining the punitive 
damages award in light of Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 
2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494. 
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I. TITLE VII STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of' a protected 
characteristic, such as race or sex. Such discrimination is 
deemed "an unlawful employment practice": 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.] 
42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(a). 
The 1991 Act added § 2000e-2(m), which provides that 
"an unlawful employment practice is established" when a 
protected characteristic is "a motivating factor" in an 
employment action: 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment 
practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice. 
Civil Rights Act of 1965, Title VII, § 701,42 U.s.c. § 
2000e-2(m) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)). 
The 1991 Act also provided an affirmative defense that 
limits the remedies if an employer demonstrates that it 
would have nonetheless made the "same decision": 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation 
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent 
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible 
motivating factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except 
as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs 
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the 
pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; 
and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring 
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or 
payment, described in subparagraph (A). 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
[2) We think this text is crystal clear: an employee makes 
out a Title VII violation by showing discrimination 
"because of' race, sex, or another protected factor. Such 
discrimination is characterized by the statute as "an 
unlawful employment practice." 
*848 [3) [4) More specifically, "an unlawful employment 
practice" encompasses any situation in which a protected 
characteristic was "a motivating factor" in an employment 
action, even if there were other motives. In such a 
case-sometimes labeled with the "mixed-motive" 
moniker-if the employee succeeds in proving only that a 
protected characteristic was one of several factors 
motivating the employment action, an employer cannot 
avoid liability altogether, but instead may assert an 
affirmative defense to bar certain types of relief by 
showing the absence of "but for" causation. 
(5) [6) [4) The amendments to the statute have done 
nothing to change the plaintiff s long-standing burden: 
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of 
Cmty, Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 
1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); accord Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Nor can we discover anything in this 
statute that warrants imposing a special evidentiary rule on 
or hurdle for victims of discrimination to prove their case. 
The burden of showing something by a "preponderance 
of the evidence," the most common standard in the civil 
law, "simply requires the trier of fact 'to believe that the 
existence of a fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence before [it] may find in favor of the party 
who has the burden to persuade the [jury] of the fact's 
existence.' ,. 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 
Pension Trust jor S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 
2264,124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358,371-72,90 S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 
(Harlan, .1., concurring) (citation omitted)). The inquiry is 
simply that of any civil case: whether the plaintiff s 
evidence is sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer 
violated the statute-that "race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice." 
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A.PRICE WATERHOUSE 
Although Title VII imposes no special burden of proof on 
discrimination plaintiffs, some courts have fashioned a 
heightened burden based not on the statute but on the case 
that prompted its amendment, Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 
(1989). We tum to that case. There, the Supreme Court 
confronted a problem not previously encountered in the 
statute's twenty-five year history: causation. The issue 
presented was whether there should be liability where an 
adverse employment decision was the result of mixed 
motives. More specifically, the trial court found that the 
failure to select Ann Hopkins for partner at an accounting 
firm was motivated both by legitimate concerns about her 
interpersonal skills and by "an impermissibly cabined view 
of the proper behavior of women." Id. at 236-37, 109 S.Ct. 
1775. 
All nine justices essentially agreed that liability was 
inappropriate where the employer would have made the 
same decision absent sex discrimination-in other words, 
the illegitimate factor was not a "but for" cause-but they 
divided over the nuances of the burden of proof. Four 
justices agreed that "when a plaintiff in a Title VII case 
proves that her gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding 
of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if 
it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id. at 
258, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). These justices 
*849 made clear that when "an employer considers both 
gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a 
decision, that decision was 'because of' sex." Id. at 241, 
109 S.Ct. 1775. But, the employer could escape liability 
through the "same decision" affirmative defense. The 
dissent criticized the plurality for "its shift to the defendant 
of the burden of proof," id. at 281, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(Kennedy, 1., dissenting), and argued that the plaintiff 
should have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that discrimination was the "but for" cause of the 
challenged action. In response, the plurality emphasized 
that it offered the defendant an affirmative defense to 
liability only after the plaintiff established that 
discriminatory animus played a role in the challenged 
employment action: 
[S]ince we hold that the plaintiff retains 
the burden of persuasion on the issue 
whether gender played a part in the 
employment decision, the situation 
before us is not ... one of "shifting 
burdens" .... Instead, the employer's 
burden is most appropriately deemed an 
affirmative defense: the plaintiff must 
persuade the factfinder on one point, and 
then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, 
must persuade it on another. 
Id. at 246,109 S.Ct. 1775. Regardless of nomenclature, the 
plurality agreed that if the employer showed a lack of "but 
for" causation, then that showing precluded liability. 
Justice 0 'Cormor and Justice White each wrote separately, 
concurring in the judgment only. Justice White relied on 
MI. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), 
a First Amendment case holding that a showing that 
constitutionally protected conduct had been a "motivating 
factor" in an employment decision was sufficient to shift 
the burden to the state to prove the absence of causation. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258-59, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). He found it 
unnecessary to parse the semantic distinction whether "the 
Mt. Healthy approach is 'but-for' causation in another 
guise or creates an affirmative defense." Id. at 259, 109 
S.Ct. 1775. Justice O'Cormor traced the burdenshifting 
approach back to venerable tort cases such as Summers v. 
Tice, 33 Ca1.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Ca1.l948). Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263-64, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(O'Connor, 1., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice O'Connor had further gatekeeping concerns about 
when what she considered to be a special "burden shift" 
might be invoked, thus permitting the plaintiff to make less 
than the full showing necessary for a statutory violation: 
I believe there are significant differences 
between shifting the burden of 
persuasion to the employer in a case 
resting purely on statistical proof as in 
the disparate impact setting and shifting 
the burden of persuasion in a case like 
this one, where an employee has 
demonstrated by direct evidence that an 
illegitimate factor played a substantial 
role in a particular employment decision. 
Id. at 275, 109 S.Ct. 1775. It was in this context that she 
discussed a need for "direct evidence" to show that the 
employer's "decisional process has been substantially 
infected by discrimination" before the special burden shift 
would be triggered. Id. at 269-70,109 S.Ct. 1775. Because 
it was arguably the "narrowest ground" for the decision, 
Justice O'Connor's one-justice concurring opinion was 
considered by some to be the controlling analysis. 
Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st 
Cir.1999); but see Thomas v. Nat'l Football League 
Players Ass 'n, 131 F.3d 198,203 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("Justice 
*850 O'Connor's concurrence was one of six votes 
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supporting the Court's judgment ... , so that it is far from 
clear that [it] should be taken as establishing binding 
precedent."), as vacated in part on reh 'g, 1998 WL 
1988451 (D.C.Cir. Feb.25, 1998); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir.1992) (" '[D]irect 
evidence' was not a requirement imposed by the majority 
in Price Waterhouse."). 
B. 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS TO 
TITLE VII 
Congress quickly responded to Price Waterhouse and a 
handful of other Supreme Court employment 
discrimination decisions with the introduction of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990, which targeted "the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections 
that were dramatically limited by those decisions." H.R. 
Conf Rep. No. 101-856, at 1 (1990). Although the 1990 
legislation ultimately floundered, an amended version, 
with much of the text intact, became the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which expressly overruled the basic premise that an 
employer could avoid all liability under Title VII by 
establishing the absence of "but for" causation. 
Now, under Title VII, the use of a prohibited characteristic 
(race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) as simply "a 
motivating factor" in an employment action is unlawful. 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Congress did, however, add one 
safety valve: an employer can escape damages and orders 
of reinstatement, hiring, promotion and the like-but not 
attorney's fees or declaratory or injunctive relief-by 
proving the absence of "but for" causation as an 
affirmative defense. Id. § 2000e-2(m). To the extent that 
there was confusion after Price Waterhouse-semantic or 
otherwise-with respect to burden shifting, the amendment 
clarified (I) that a Title VII violation is established through 
proof that a protected characteristic was "a motivating 
factor" in the employment action and (2) that the 
employer's "same decision" evidence serves as an 
affirmative defense with respect to the scope of remedies, 
not as a defense to liability. 
The legislative history evinces a cl;~>intent to overrule 
Price Waterhouse. In a subsection titled "The Need to 
Overturn Price Waterhouse," the report accompanying the 
1991 Civil Rights Act reflects congressional concern that 
the "inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision 
(was] to permit prohibited employment discrimination to 
escape sanction under Title VII." H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), 
at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584. 
The report elaborates: 
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, it precluded all invidious 
consideration of a person's race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin in 
employment. The effectiveness of Title 
VII's ban on discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin has been severely undercut by the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 
Id. at 45. We do not disagree with those courts that have 
noted that the legislative history does not address Justice 
O'Connor's "direct evidence" comment. See, e.g., Watson 
v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207,218-19 
(3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1147, 121 S.Ct.l086, 
148 L.Ed.2d 961 (2001).2 What the history does show 
beyond doubt, however, is that the premise for Justice 
O'Connor's comment is wholly abrogated: No longer may 
*851 "employers' discriminatory conduct escapeE ] 
liability," H.R. Rep. 40(1) at 47, simply by showing other 
sufficient causes. Consequently, there is no longer a basis 
for any special "evidentiary scheme" or heightened 
standard of proof to determine "but for" causation. 
C. "DIRECT EVIDENCE" 
Following Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, much has been made of Justice O'Connor's passing 
reference to "direct evidence." Indeed, the reference has 
spawned a virtual cottage industry of litigation over the 
effect and meaning of the phrase. It is unnecessary, 
however, to get mired in the debate over whether Justice 
O'Connor's opinion was controlling or not because the 
resolution to this conundrum lies in the 1991 amendments. 
Justice O'Connor's reference must be interpreted in light 
of the Court's understanding at the time of Price 
Waterhouse, namely, that "but for" causation was factored 
into proof of a Title VII violation, either as an affirmative 
defense (plurality) or as part of the plaintiffs proof 
(dissent). Justice O'Connor wrote separately in part to 
"express [her] views as to when and how the strong 
medicine of requiring the employer to bear the burden of 
persuasion on the issue of causation should be 
administered." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262, 109 
S.Ct. 1775. Her reference to "direct evidence" was 
intertwined with her concern about a scheme that shifted 
the burden on the question ofliability from the employee to 
employer, albeit through an affirmative defense. The 1991 
Act eliminated any confusion about burden-shifting and 
the proof necessary for a Title VII violation, so it is not 
surprising that courts have had trouble converting Justice 
O'Connor's reference into a legal standard under the new 
statutory provision. 
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The resulting jurisprudence has been a quagmire that 
defies characterization despite the valiant efforts of various 
courts and commentators. Within circuits, and often within 
opinions, different approaches are conflated, mixing 
burden of persuasion with evidentiary standards, confusing 
burden of ultimate persuasion with the burden to establish 
an affirmative defense, and declining to acknowledge the 
role of circumstantial evidence. We see no need to get 
bogged down in this debate. Rather, based on the language 
of the statute-which requires proof of only "a motivating 
factor" and does not set out any special proof burdens-we 
conclude that Congress did not impose a special or 
heightened evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in a Title 
VII case in which discriminatory animus may have 
constituted one of two or more reasons for the employer's 
challenged actions. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m). 
This approach is consistent with recent Supreme Court 
cases underscoring that no special pleading or proof 
hurdles may be imposed on Title VII plaintiffs. For 
example, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506, 
122 S.Ct. 992, 997-99, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Court 
struck down judicially imposed heightened pleading 
standards. Just two years earlier, in Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, it declined to require independent 
evidence of discrimination in addition to prima facie 
evidence and sufficient evidence to rebut pretext. Instead, 
the Court emphasized that the jury determines the ultimate 
question of liability. Id. Sticking to the statutory wording, 
in Oncale v. Sundowner OffShore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 
75, 80-81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (l998), the 
Court rejected various circuits' special requirements for 
same-sex sexual harassment cases. Finally, in Burlington 
Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53, 118 S.Ct. 
2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), the Court quashed 
distinctions between "quid *852 pro quo" and "hostile 
environment" liability structures in harassment cases. 
Here, too, we believe that we are well advised to follow the 
statute instead of engaging in judicial invention. 
To understand why we should stick to the statute rather 
than divine a new standard of proof, it is instructive to look 
at the state of circuit law in this area. Judge Selya has made 
an attempt to categorize the circuits' appro,!ches in a 
framework that provides a useful overview. Fernandes. 
199 F.3d at 582. He first discusses the "classic" position, 
an approach that takes the definition of "direct evidence" 
from the dictionary: " 'evidence, which if believed, proves 
existence of fact in issue without inference or 
presumption.' " Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc .. 833 F.2d 1525, 
1529 n. 6 (II th Cir.1987) (quoting Black '50' Law Dictionary 
413 (5th ed.1979» (emphasis in Rollins ). Judge Selya 
notes that "only the Fifth and Tenth Circuits cling 
consistently to this view, [but] other tribunals have 
embraced it periodically." Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 
Next IS the "animus plus" posltlOn, which basically 
requires that the plaintiff prove a particularly strong 
case-more than ordinarily would be required for an 
inference of discrimination to be permissible. Our review 
indicates that a majority of courts that impose a "direct 
evidence" requirement adhere to this view, either explicitly 
or implicitly. See, e.g., Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204 (defining 
direct evidence as "a relationship between proof and 
incidents"); Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580 (explaining the 
function of direct evidence as restricting the mixed-motive 
analysis "to those infrequent cases in which a plaintiff can 
demonstrate [discrimination] with a high degree of 
assurance"); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1143 (4th 
Cir.1995) (holding that the determination "hinges on the 
strength of the evidence"); Bass v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 
256 F.3d 1095,1105 (lIth Cir.2001) (requiring, under the 
rhetoric of banning circumstantial evidence, "only the 
most blatant remarks") (citation omitted). Judge Selya 
places the Fourth, D.C., Ninth,3 and Third circuits in this 
camp, not without hesitation, and indicates that other 
circuits indicate "occasional approval" of this approach. 
Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 
Finally, there is the "animus" poslt1on, which simply 
requires evidence that bears on the alleged discriminatory 
animus or, put even more simply, evidence of 
discrimination. Judge Selya places the Second Circuit, the 
Eighth Circuit "intermittently," and other stray cases, in 
this camp. Id. 
Other courts and commentators have had even more 
difficulty articulating an order to the chaos. See, e.g., 
Thomas, 131 F.3d at 205 (citing Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits as taking "direct evidence" to mean 
non-inferential); Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking 
the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach 
in Analyzing Mixed Motives Discrimination Claims, 86 
Coruell L.Rev. 899,908-15 (2001); Robert Belton, Mixed 
Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law 
Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 Mercer 
L.Rev. 651, 663 (2000) ("The line between McDonnell 
Douglas and Price Waterhouse is very murky."). 
Indeed, within circuits, cases sometimes take different 
approaches. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 
1294 (lith Cir.1999) (recognizing intra-circuit *853 
splits). For example, the First Circuit first embraced the 
animus plus approach in Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580, but 
recently implied in Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson 
Hospital, 282 F .3d 60, 64 (1 st Cir.2002), that it took the 
classic approach. The Eleventh Circuit first allowed "broad 
statements" of discriminatory attitude, Burrell v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Ga. Military ColI., 125 F.3d 1390, 1394 n. 7 
(11 th Cir.1997), but later concluded that only statements 
related to the decisionmaking process were sufficient to 
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overcome the special "direct evidence" hurdle, Bass, 256 
FJd at 1105. 
In a carefully considered decision issued shortly after the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Second Circuit held that 
direct evidence simply meant evidence sufficient to permit 
the trier of fact to conclude that an illegitimate 
characteristic was a motivating factor in the challenged 
decision under Title VII. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1185. 
However, a few months later, a different panel held that 
discrimination victims face the special hurdle of presenting 
"evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in 
the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly 
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude." Ostrowski 
v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.1992). 
Although Ostrowski squarely rejected a definition of 
"direct evidence" as non-circumstantial evidence, id. at 
181, some cases quote it as though it supported the 
noncircumstantial requirement. See, e.g., Cronquist v. City 
of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir.2001). 
Ostrowski was an age discrimination case, but has been 
widely applied in the Title VII context, apparently without 
analysis of the difference in the statutes. See, e.g., Lightfoot 
v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir.1997). 
In the Tenth Circuit, the court initially declined to impose a 
heightened "direct evidence" requirement, only to be 
ignored by a panel ruling six months later. Compare 
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 553 (lOth 
Cir.1999) ("A mixed motive instruction is ... appropriate in 
any case where the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to 
find both forbidden and permissible motives." (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)) with Shorter v. ICG 
Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.1999) 
(imposing a "direct evidence" requirement as classically 
defined, and excluding "statements of personal opinion, 
even when reflecting a personal bias"). 
[7) We believe that the best way out of this morass is a 
return to the language of the statute, which imposes no 
special requirement and does not reference "direct 
evidence." To the extent that courts are using "direct 
evidence" as a veiled excuse to substitute their own 
judgment for that of the jury, we reject that approach. In so 
doing, we follow the Second Circuit's Tyler case, 958 F.2d 
at 1184-85, the Eleventh Circuit's Wright case, 187 F .3d at 
1301-02, the Tenth Circuit's approach in Medlock, 164 
F.3d at 553, and the Eighth Circuit in Schleiniger v. Des 
Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d 1100,1101 (8th Cir.1991). 
We also agree with other courts to the extent that they hold 
that non circumstantial evidence is not the magical 
threshold for Title VII liability. See, e.g., Thomas, 131 F.3d 
at 203 ( collecting cases). 
[8) [9) [10] Put simply, the plaintiff in any Title VII case 
may establish a violation through a preponderance of 
evidence (whether direct or circumstantial)4 that a *854 
protected characteristic played "a motivating factor." Like 
the Supreme Court, "we think it generally undesirable, 
where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the 
sentences of the United States Reports as though they were 
the United States Code." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1993). The "direct evidence" quagmire results from just 
such a misdirected inquiry, and we decline to be drawn in. 
D. THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROVING A TITLE 
VII VIOLATION 
In addition to the confusion over "direct evidence," there 
has been considerable misunderstanding regarding the 
relationship among the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting analysis (sometimes referred to as 
"pretext" analysis), which primarily applies to summary 
judgment proceedings, and the terms single-motive and 
mixed-motive, which primarily refer to the theory or 
theories by which the defendant opposes the plaintiffs 
claim of discrimination. The short answer is that all of 
these concepts coexist without conflict. 
Caesars' argument in favor of a higher evidentiary burden 
is emblematic of the confusion. Caesars maintains that 
without special proof, "any plaintiff who is able to 
establish a prima facie showing in a pretext case would 
qualify for a mixed-motive instruction, conflating the two 
categories of cases." This argument mistakenly juxtaposes 
the pretrial McDonnell Douglas legal framework and the 
"mixed-motive" characterization. 
[11] To place McDonnell Douglas in perspective, it must 
be remembered that the current form of Title VII is the 
result of twenty-seven years of dynamic exchange between 
the Supreme Court and Congress, working toward a 
framework that provides a remedy for barriers of 
discrimination and inequality in the workplace. Early in 
the statute's history, the Supreme Court distinguished 
disparate impact claims under Title VII § 703(a)(2) from 
disparate treatment claims under § 703(a)(l). Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703 (a). 
Disparate treatment claims require the plaintiff to prove 
that the employer acted with conscious intent to 
discriminate. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 805-06,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) 
(distinguishing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
91 S.Ct. 849,28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971)). 
[12J [13] McDonnell Douglas was the first in a series of 
cases dealing with the difficulties of proving intent to 
discriminate in a disparate treatment context. The Supreme 
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Court detailed circumstances sufficient to support an 
inference of discrimination, the now-eponymous 
McDonnell Douglas "prima facie case and burden-shifting 
paradigm."5 The Court recently reaffirmed that "the 
precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary 
depending on the context and were 'never intended to be 
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.' " Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. 
at 995 *855 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). This 
legal proof structure is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the 
summary judgment stage so that they may reach trial. 
As the Supreme Court elaborated a few years after 
McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case "eliminates the 
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. 
Therefore, "we presume these acts, if otherwise 
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation and 
intemal quotation marks omitted). Burdine clarified, 
however, that the plaintiff need not rely on this 
presumption: "She may succeed ... either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. 
Throughout these cases and those that followed, the court 
reaffirmed the canons of proof: the plaintiff retains the 
"ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been 
the victim of intentional discrimination," id. at 256, 101 
S.Ct. 1089; the question comes down to whether she has 
made her case. See also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 
2742; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097. 
[l4J [15) [16) The plaintiff may make out a prima facie 
case-which may, admittedly, be a weak showing-that 
entitles her to a commensurately small benefit, a transitory 
presumption of discrimination: the burden of production 
only shifts briefly to the employer to explain why it took 
the challenged action, if not based on the protected 
characteristic. In practice, employers quickly rebut the 
presumption and it "drops from the case." Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 256 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Deborah C. 
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment after 
Hicks. 93 Mich. L.Rev. 2229,2302-04 (1995). The burden 
of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to introduce 
evidence from which the factfinder could conclude that the 
employer's proffered reason was pretextual. The burden of 
persuasion always remains with the employee to prove the 
ultimate Title VII violation-unlawful discrimination. 
[17J [18) It is important to emphasize, however, that 
nothing compels the parties to invoke the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption. United States Postal Servo Bd. v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478,75 L.Ed.2d 403 
(1983). Evidence can be in the form of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case, or other sufficient 
evidence-direct or circumstantial-of discriminatory intent. 
Id. at 714 & n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478. Thus, although 
McDonnell Douglas may be used where a single motive is 
at issue, this proof scheme is not the exclusive means of 
proof in such a case. Indeed, it also might be invoked in 
cases in which the defendant asserts a "same decision" 
defense to certain remedies, a circumstance in which 
mixed motives are at issue. 
[19) [20) Regardless ofthe method chosen to arrive at trial, 
it is not normally appropriate to introduce the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework to the jury.6 At that 
stage, the framework "unnecessarily evaders] the ultimate 
question *856 of discrimination vel non." Aikens. 460 U.S. 
at 714,103 S.Ct. 1478. 
[21) [22) [23) Once at the trial stage, the plaintiff is 
required to put forward evidence of discrimination 
"because of' a protected characteristic.7 After hearing both 
parties' evidence, the district court must decide what legal 
conclusions the evidence could reasonably support and 
instruct the jury accordingly. This determination is distinct 
from the question of whether to invoke the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption, which occurs at a separate, earlier 
stage of proceedings, involves summary judgment rather 
than jury instructions, and is unrelated to the number of 
possible motives for the challenged action. Instead, the 
choice of jury instructions depends simply on a 
determination of whether the evidence supports a finding 
that just one-or more than one-factor actually motivated 
the challenged decision. Justice White, in his concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse, succinctly described how the 
type of evidence presented affects the question facing the 
JUry: 
In [single-motive] cases, "the issue is whether either 
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' 
motives behind the decision." In mixed-motive cases, 
however, there is no one "true" motive behind the 
decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple 
factors, at least one of which is legitimate. 
Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation 
omitted).8 Following the 1991 amendments, 
characterizing the evidence as mixed-motive instead of 
single-motive results only in the availability of a 
different defense, a difference which derives directly 
from the statutory text, not from judicially created proof 
structures. 
As a practical matter, the question of how many motives 
the evidence reasonably supports affects the jury 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 64 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (2002) 
89 Fair EmpI,Prac.Cas. (BNA) 673,83 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,122 ... 
instructions as follows: 
[24) (25) [26) If, based on the evidence, the trial court 
determines that the only reasonable conclusion a jury could 
reach is that discriminatory animus is the sale cause for the 
challenged employment action or that discrimination 
played no role at all in the employer's decisionmaking, 
then the jury should be instructed to determine whether the 
challenged action was taken "because of' the prohibited 
reason. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. 
at 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (emphasizing "because of' 
standard). If the jury determines that the employer acted 
because of discriminatory intent, the employee prevails 
and may receive the full remedies available under Title 
VII; if not, the employer prevails. In such cases the 
employer does not benefit from the "same decision" 
defense, which, if successful, significantly limits the 
employee's remedies. 
[27) [28) In contrast, in cases in which the evidence could 
support a finding that discrimination is one of two or more 
reasons for the challenged decision, at least one of which 
may be legitimate, the jury should be instructed to 
determine first whether the discriminatory reason was "a 
*857 motivating factor" in the challenged action. If the 
jury's answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the 
employer has violated Title VII. However, if the jury then 
finds that the employer has proved the "same decision" 
affirmative defense by a preponderance ofthe evidence, 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the employer will escape the 
imposition of damages and any order of reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, and the like, and is liable solely for 
attoruey's fees, declaratory relief, and an order prohibiting 
future discriminatory actions. 
[29) Regardless of what kind of instructions are given, we 
emphasize that there are not two fundamentally different 
types of Title VII cases. In some cases, the employer may 
be entitled to the "same decision" affirmative defense 
instruction. In others, it may not. The employee's ultimate 
burden of proof in all cases remains the same: to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged 
employment decision was "because of' discrimination. 
Finally, we tum to the question of where the concept of 
pretext fits in this framework. Although cases in which the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is applied are sometimes 
referred to as "pretext cases," and we have no wish to 
change a quarter century of usage, it should be noted that 
questions of pretext may arise in any Title VII case, 
regardless of whether it is analyzed under McDannel! 
Douglas. Cases in which the dispute is only over whether 
or not the employer possessed the discriminatory motive 
alleged need not involve pretext, although they often do. 
For example, if the plaintiff chooses not to invoke the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer need not 
proffer any explanation for the challenged action, but may 
simply require the plaintiff to prove her case of 
discrimination. Nor is the concept of pretext alien to cases 
in which an employer asserts a "same decision" or "but 
for" defense. For example, one of the employer's 
purportedly legitimate reasons may be pretextual. On the 
other hand, another may not. As Justice O'Connor recently 
explained in writing for the Court: "Proof that the 
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply 
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of 
intentional discrimination .... " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147,120 
S.Ct.2097. 
[30) To summarize: McDonnell Douglas and 
"mixed-motive" are not two opposing types of cases. 
Rather, they are separate inquiries that occur at separate 
stages of the litigation. Nor are "single-motive" and 
"mixed-motive" cases fundamentally different categories 
of cases. Both require the employee to prove 
discrimination; they simply reflect the type of evidence 
offered. Where the employer asserts that, even if the 
factfinder determines that a discriminatory motive exists, 
the employer would in any event have taken the adverse 
employment action for other reasons, it may take 
advantage of the "same decision" affirmative defense. The 
remedies will differ if the employer prevails on that 
defense. With this framework in mind, we tum to the 
evidence in Costa's case. 
II. MIXED MOTIVE INSTRUCTION AND 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Although Caesars invokes the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis, that framework is not instructive at this stage of 
the case. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 7l3-14, 103 S.Ct. 1478. 
Rather, we are asked to review the district court's decision 
to give a mixed-motive instruction and the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the jury's verdict, as challenged in 
a motion for judgment as a matter oflaw made at the close 
of the evidence. 
*858 A. THE MIXED MOTIVE JURY 
INSTRUCTION 
[31) [32) We must first determine the applicable standard 
of review. The standards are well known and often stated: 
we generally review the formulation of instructions for 
abuse of discretion, but whether an instruction misstates 
the law is a legal issue reviewed de novo. See, e.g., 
Voohries-Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707,713 
(9th Cir.200 I). At issue here is whether the evidence can 
be characterized as establishing multiple motives, and thus 
i © 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 65 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (2002) 
89Fai':~EmpT.prac~CaS:~ (BNA) 673:~83~Empr Prac:'Dec~P~:;f{<1'22::: '"_".~ ... '.'_"~~_.m~mm_ ••• ~·· ......................~.~..~~-••••• ~.<, .. ~ 
warranting the affirmative defense. Because this 
evaluation is, at bottom, an evaluation of the evidence, an 
abuse of discretion standard is appropriate. 
[33) The district court submitted both claims-the 
tennination and the conditions of employment-to the jury. 
It first instructed the jury that: 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. Costa suffered adverse work conditions, and 
2. Costa's gender was a motivating factor in any such 
work conditions imposed upon her. Gender refers to 
the quality of being male or female. 
If you find that each of these things has been proved 
against a defendant, your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. On the other hand, if 
any of these things has not been proved against a 
defendant, your verdict should be for the defendant. 
The jury was next given the following mixed-motive 
instruction, which is central to this appeal: 
You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment 
of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiffs sex and 
also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the 
plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's 
treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your 
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct 
was also motivated by a lawful reason. 
However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of 
the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful 
reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled 
to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless 
the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly 
even if the plaintiffs gender had played no role in the 
employment decision. 
Caesars first intimates that the wording of the mixed 
motive instruction was invalid because it inappropriately 
implied a judicial determination that sex was in fact a 
motivation for the challenged treatment. Caesars, however. 
waived any objection to the form of the instruction by 
conceding at trial that it was "a reasonable statement of the 
mixed motive instruction." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; Shaw v. City 
of Sacramento, 250 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.2001) (as 
amended). 
[34) As for Caesars' main contention, we are not persuaded 
that the district court erred in giving a mixed-motive 
instruction. In many respects, Costa's case presents a 
typical Title VII case in which a plaintiff alleges that she 
was discharged or disciplined for a discriminatory reason 
and the employer counters that the reason for its action was 
entirely different. The evidence did not require the jury to 
believe that discrimination was the only motive, nor that 
Caesars' stated reasons were all bogus or pretextual. For 
example, there was evidence that Hallett, Stewart, and 
other decisionmakers were legitimately concerned about 
Costa's behavior and altercations with co-workers, but 
there was likewise significant evidence that they *859 
would not have taken such drastic disciplinary measures 
against a man. Similarly, the jury could reasonably have 
concluded that the overtime assignment system was in a 
state of disarray that allowed favoritism and that one 
element of that favoritism was preferential treatment for 
male workers. The fact is that Caesars may have had 
legitimate reasons to terminate Costa. Indeed, unlike in 
many Title VII cases, Costa does not dispute many of the 
events that took place. Nor does she wholly discount that 
these events may have been part of the basis for her 
discipline and termination. Nonetheless, the wide array of 
discriminatory treatment is sufficient to support a 
conclusion that sex was also a motivating factor in the 
decision-making process. Thus, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction. 
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
(35) [36) [37) [38) [39) We review de novo Caesars' 
challenge to the district court's denial of its Rule 50(b) 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. 
Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1226 
(9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1055, 122 S.Ct. 645, 
151 L.Ed.2d 563 (2001). At the outset, we note that the 
standard that Caesars must meet is very high. We can 
overturn the jury's verdict and grant such a motion only if" 
'there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to 
find for that party on that issue.' " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149, 
120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a». Because we 
"may not substitute [our 1 view of the evidence for that of 
the jury," Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227, we neither make 
credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence and we 
must draw all inferences in favor of Costa, Reeves, 530 
U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986». The Supreme Court cautions us to "disregard 
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is 
not required to believe." Jd. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. This 
high hurdle recognizes that credibility, inferences, and 
factfinding are the province of the jury, not this court. 
1. LIABILITY DETERMINATION 
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[40] Applying the analysis outlined above, we begin, not 
surprisingly, with the text of the statute, asking whether a 
reasonable jury could conclude that sex was "a motivating 
factor" in the challenged actions. The discriminatory 
treatment ran the gamut from disparate discipline and 
"stacking" Costa's personnel file to stalking her, singling 
her out for different treatment in the workplace, and 
discriminating against her in the assigmnent of overtime. 
In the final analysis, the jury heard testimony from Costa 
and fifteen other witnesses. Testimony included the 
chronology of escalating discipline and targeting of Costa, 
co-workers who identified discrimination because of sex, 
and multiple examples of disparate treatment purposefully 
directed at Costa because of her sex. Lending credence to 
the claim that sex was a motivating factor in her treatment, 
Costa also offered evidence of sexual stereotyping and 
sexual epithets. Viewing the evidence from her perspective 
and drawing all inferences in her favor, we cannot 
conclude that "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis for a reasonable jury," Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135, 149, 
120 S. Ct. 2097, to find that intentional discrimination on 
the basis of sex was "a motivating factor" in subjecting 
Costa to a number of adverse employment actions, and 
culminating in her termination. 
Costa presents overwhelming evidence that she was more 
harshly treated than her male coworkers. Because she was 
the only woman in an otherwise all-male unit, linking the 
differential treatment to her *860 sex was not a difficult 
leap. The jury could easily infer that sex was one of the 
reasons Costa was singled out for negative treatment. 
Indeed, the evidence is sufficiently strong that for many of 
the incidents the jury might have concluded that sex was 
the only reason for the adverse action. "Proof of 
discriminatory motive ... can in some situations be inferred 
from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Int'l Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97 
S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Mindful of the 
Supreme Court's admonishment to "draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of' the prevailing party, Reeves, 530 
U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, we conclude that the jury 
was entitled to view the differential treatment here as 
evidence of discrimination. 
In a case quite similar to this one, Sischo-Nownejad v. 
Merced Community College District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1112 
(9th Cir.1991), we held that a plaintiff had made a showing 
sufficient to create a factual issue. The plaintiff there, the 
only woman holding a full-time faculty appointment in the 
art department of a community college, alleged that she 
was denied a choice as to which courses to teach and that 
she was deprived of supplies, whereas male co-workers 
were not. The college was also nonresponsive to 
reasonable requests for leave and disciplined her for petty 
offenses. Id. at 1107-08. Similarly, Costa presented 
evidence that she was denied overtime and medical leave 
where male co-workers were not. Her work was supervised 
more intensely than that of male colleagues. She was 
reprimanded for minor infractions while men, sitting right 
next to her and engaging in the same conduct, were not. 
Thus, this is a case where "the employer's conduct carries 
with it an inference of unlawful intention so compelling 
that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's 
protestations of innocent purpose." Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. 
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,311-12,85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 
(1965) nW]here many have broken a shop rule, but only 
union leaders have been discharged, the Board need not 
listen too long to the plea that shop discipline was simply 
being enforced."). 
The most prominent example of this differential treatment 
was Caesars' decision to terminate Costa for an incident 
that netted her male co-worker only a five-day suspension. 
Costa's claim that she was shoved against an elevator wall 
and sustained bruises from the altercation is not one to be 
taken lightly. The excuse that the management could not 
figure out whom to believe-Costa or Gerber-is 
questionable given the strong corroboration of Costa's 
story and the inconsistencies in Gerber's account. The 
explanation offered by Caesars was lacking in several 
respects, and the jury was certainly not required to believe 
it. The jury was entitled instead to infer that Costa was 
fired, while Gerber was only suspended, because Costa 
was a woman. This is precisely the circumstance in which 
we credit the inference in Costa's favor. 
Finally, the jury could easily have believed that Costa's 
record was itself largely a result of discrimination because 
of repeated incidents of unfair discipline that accumulated 
over time. For example, her supervisor's decision to 
backfill the records with prior alleged misconduct supports 
such a conclusion. See Pogue v. United States Dep't of 
Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir.1991). In Pogue, we 
held that the Department of Labor acted, at least in part, 
with impermissible retaliatory motives, because the 
employee's "prior work performance and defiant attitude 
cited by the Secretary could reasonably be attributed to the 
Navy's admitted retaliation." Id. Moreover, "Pogue 
presented evidence, *861 relied on by the AU, that the 
disciplinary actions taken against her were substantially 
disproportionate to discipline imposed by the Navy in the 
past." Id. 
Caesars presents us with alternate rationales for the 
termination, and asks us to hold as a matter of law that 
Costa's conduct was the only element motivating its 
decision. We decline this invitation. Perhaps the disparities 
in how Costa was treated were in part because supervisor 
Hallett disliked her as a person and not as a woman. 
Perhaps they were in part because Costa had a history of 
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"not getting along" with her co-workers, although there 
was contrary testimony. What the jury implicitly 
concluded, however, was that the disparities were also in 
part because she was a woman. In so finding, the jury did 
not necessarily reject all of Caesars' legitimate complaints 
about Costa. But even if it credited certain of these 
explanations, in following the jury instructions, it 
reasonably found that sex was "a motivating factor" in the 
termination. The evidence of differential treatment was so 
persuasive and longstanding that the judgment may be 
upheld on this ground alone. "[I)t is primarily the province 
of the jury to determine what inferences can be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence. So long as the evidence can 
reasonably support an inference of discrimination, the 
court should not upset the jury's decision." Norton v. 
Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.1998). 
We turn next to Costa's evidence that she was chastised for 
failing to conform to the role stereotypically assigned to 
women. The jury heard remarks that could reasonably be 
viewed to "stem[ ] from an impermissibly cabined view of 
the proper behavior of women." Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 236-37, 109 S.Ct. 1775. She was told that she did 
not deserve overtime because she did not have a family to 
support. In her view, the implication was that she was not a 
man with a family to support. The jury could interpret this 
as a comment directed to her as a woman, indicating that 
the discriminatory action, a failure to assign overtime, was 
based on her not being a male breadwinner. The Seventh 
Circuit held similar facts to be evidence of sex 
stereotyping. See Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 
355, 362 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that jury could believe 
employer held sexual stereotypes when female paramedic 
applicant was the only one asked about family 
responsibilities). 
She was also disciplined in circumstances that the jury 
could reasonably infer amounted to telling her to "walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely." Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 109 S.Ct. 1775. For example, 
Costa was told "[y]ou got more balls than the guys." And 
yet, arguably when she acted tough like the guys, she 
received harsher discipline rather than an "atta boy" 
reinforcement. At trial, Caesars' consistent objection to 
Costa as an employee was that she was "strong-willed" and 
"opinionated," a view that the jury could have reasonably 
interpreted as gender stereotyping. As was clear from her 
testimony, Costa sought no special treatment, only equal 
treatment. 
[41) Finally, reinforcing the inference that her gender 
motivated the adverse view of her character, Costa 
presented evidence of sexual language and epithets 
directed to her. Specifically, Costa presented evidence that 
Hallett, the very supervisor who signed her discharge, had 
declared an intention on several occasions to "get rid of 
that bitch." Whether this term is part of the everyday 
give-and-take of a warehouse environment or is inherently 
offensive is not for us to say. Instead, we simply conclude 
that the jury could interpret it here to be one piece of 
evidence *862 among many, a derogatory term indicating 
sex-based hostility.9 In addition, managers encouraged 
sex-based epithets directed at Costa by disciplining her for 
failing to tolerate the slurs silently. Admittedly, Costa 
worked in a rough and tumble and often vulgar 
environment. But the prevalence of race or sex-based slurs 
does not excuse them. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 
F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1018, 
122 S.Ct. 1609,152 L.Ed.2d 623 (2002). 
[42) As we explained in Steiner v. Showboat Operating 
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1994), when abuse 
directed at women "center[ s] on the fact that they[ are) 
females," a jury may infer discrimination. In Steiner, a 
hostile environment case, a supervisor "was indeed 
abusive to men, but ... his abuse of women was different. It 
relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit references to 
women's bodies and sexual conduct." Id. at 1463 (citing 
Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 114 S.Ct. 367, 
126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). Similarly here, the evidence 
supports the inference that the abuse directed toward Costa 
was different in nature and degree. 
In the context of this case, we need not decide whether this 
sexual language is dispositive of discrimination. Rather, 
this language was simply one more factor for the jury to 
consider in the face of repeated differential treatment by 
Hallett and others at Caesars. Viewing the evidence in 
Costa's favor, the jury could have easily inferred that the 
use of highly charged and offensive sexual language was 
simply another means of singling Costa out because she 
was a woman. 
Finally, we detour briefly to address the suggestion that 
Hallett was somehow incapable of discriminating against 
Costa because Hallett was herself a woman. This argument 
was resoundingly rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court 
in Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81,118 S.Ct. 998. In a society 
where historically discriminatory attitudes about women 
are "firmly rooted in our national consciousness," 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684,93 S.Ct. 1764, 
36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (plurality opinion), we cannot 
discount that the jury perceived Hallett, a former Army 
officer now placed in a supervisory position in a virtually 
male-only world, as demonstrating hostility toward Costa 
as a woman as a means of showing that she was "one of the 
boys." See also JE.B. v. Alabama ex ref TB., 511 U.S. 
127, 136-37, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) 
("[O)ur nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination .... ") (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 
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684, 93 S.Ct. 1764). Life was not necessarily easy for 
Hallett, but that was no excuse for visiting harsh discipline 
on Costa. 
2. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE-"SAME DECISION" 
(43) Once the jury found liability on the part of Caesars, it 
was asked to decide whether the "defendant proved by a 
preponderance *863 of the evidence that the defendant 
would have made the same decisions if the plaintiff s 
gender had played no role in the employment decision." 
The jury checked the "NO" box. This question on the 
special verdict form reflects the "same decision" 
affirmative defense provided in 42 
U.S.C.2000e-5(g)(2)(B); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas 
Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759-60 (9th Cir.1996). 
Caesars, not Costa, has the burden on this question, and we 
must still filter the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Costa. Under this lens, much of the evidence of differential 
treatment removes this question from the realm of the 
hypothetical and shows what, in fact, Caesars did do when 
men violated its policies. Costa's infractions may have 
played a role in her termination. But the evidence also 
underscores how the documentation of her infractions and 
discipline stemmed in part from sex discrimination. Based 
on the extensive testimony, the jury simply did not believe 
that Caesars would have made the same decision "but for" 
Costa's sex. There was a substantial basis for the jury to 
conclude that Caesars did not meet its burden in 
demonstrating that it would have made the same decision 
absent consideration of sex. 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF ARBITRATION 
DECISIONS 
(44) Caesars argues that the trial court's exclusion of 
arbitration decisions, relating to the incident that ultimately 
triggered Costa's termination, was an abuse of discretion 
so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted. The incident 
that led to Costa's termination was the altercation with 
Gerber in the elevator. In an arbitration brought pursuant to 
their collective bargaining agreement, both Costa and 
Gerber challenged the discipline imposed, to no avail. At 
the discrimination trial, having successfully argued that 
hearsay rules blocked Costa's attempt to introduce 
transcripts of the arbitration hearing, Caesars later sought 
to introduce the arbitrator's decisions. Costa responded by 
raising a hearsay objection and arguing that admission of 
the decisions would be irrelevant because the central issue 
of the trial-sex discrimination-was not addressed in the 
arbitration. 
Costa is correct that discrimination was not covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement and was not at issue in the 
arbitration. Thus, the present case can be distinguished 
from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38, 
94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), in which the 
Supreme Court established an employee's right to pursue 
both Title VII judicial remedies and arbitration "under the 
nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining 
agreement." Because we review for abuse of discretion the 
narrow evidentiary issue before us, we need not address the 
scope of Gardner-Denver or broader issues with respect to 
the preclusive effects of arbitration on subsequent 
discrimination claims. See, e.g., Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct. 
1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Other courts have held that 
district courts have discretion to exclude arbitration awards 
in similar circumstances. See, e.g. Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 
40 F.3d 239,246 (7th Cir.1994); McAlester v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249,1259 (10th Cir.1988); Perry v. 
Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 284-85 (7th Cir.1986). Under these 
circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to exclude the arbitration decisions. See 
United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213,1217 
(9th Cir.200l) (standard of review). 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The jury awarded $100,000 in pumtlve damages, in 
addition to the $200,000 in *864 compensatory damages 
(later remitted to $100,000) and $64,377.74 in backpay. 
Caesars argues that the jury instruction on punitive 
damages, though a proper statement of Ninth Circuit law at 
the time of trial, was in fact in error under the Supreme 
Court's later ruling in Kolstad v. American Dental 
Association, 527 U.S. 526,119 S.Ct. 2118,144 L.Ed.2d 
494 (1999). We agree and accordingly remand for 
consideration of punitive damages. 
We have explained that Kolstad provided the employer 
with a new "good faith" defense, enabling it to escape 
punitive damages if it can show that the challenged actions 
were not taken by senior managers and were contrary to the 
employer's good faith implementation of an effective 
antidiscrimination policy. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 810-11; 
Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 
212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th Cir.2000). Kolstad also suggests 
that" 'the court should review the type of authority that 'the 
employer has given to the employee, the amount of 
discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it 
is accomplished.' " 527 U.S. at 543, 119 S.Ct. 2118 
(quoting 1 L. Schlueter & K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 
4.4(B)(2)(a), p. 181 (3d ed.1995». Understandably, in 
view of the then-current Ninth Circuit authority, the 
instructions here contained no such considerations, nor 
were these issues considered by the district court.l 0 
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[45] [46] Initially, we must detennine whether Caesars 
waived the objection to the fonn of the instruction by 
failing to raise it at trial. We have discretion to review an 
instruction despite such a failure to object where a" 'solid 
wall of Circuit authority' would have rendered an 
objection futile." Knapp v. Ernst & Wh inn ey, 90 F.3d 
1431, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Robinson v. 
Heilman, 563 F.2d l304, l307 (9th Cir.1977) (per 
curiam)). Consistent with our prior cases in this 
transitional period, we believe that review is appropriate to 
detennine whether the jury instructions comported with the 
Supreme Court's command in Kolstad. See Winarto v. 
Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 
1291 (9th Cir.2001); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 809-10; 
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 514. 
[47] Both parties seek to avoid a remand on the punitive 
damages issue. Costa argues that the jury's finding of 
egregious conduct obviates the need to detennine good 
faith; Caesars argues that punitive damages are unavailable 
as a matter of law. Neither argument prevails. The jury 
found the conduct "egregious" or reflective *865 of 
"complete indifference to the safety and rights of others." 
Kolstad held that "egregious" misconduct was probative 
but not necessary for an award of punitive damages. 527 
U.S. at 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Instead, the question was the 
employer's "malice" or "reckless indifference" to the 
employee's federally protected rights. Id. at 535-36, 119 
S.Ct. 2118. The jury's findings, which were 
well-supported, establish this requisite scienter and the 
additional, probative factor of egregious misconduct. 
However, we cannot equate "egregious" misconduct with a 
lack of "good faith" as a matter oflaw. Nor can we say that 
punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law. We 
therefore remand for a retrial on the issue of punitive 
damages in light of Kolstad. 
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in 
part. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal. 
GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI, 
FERNANDEZ, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges, join, 
dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent because the majority does not follow 
the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 
(1989), in Title VII mixed motives cases. The majority's 
analysis is not persuasive and should be corrected because 
it disregards the holding of Hopkins that is reflected in 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. 
In Hopkins, the plurality, comprised of four Justices, 
concluded that an employee should be able to recover 
under Title VII if gender was "a factor in the employment 
decision at the moment it was made," id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 
1775, unless the employer, using objective evidence, could 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have made the same decision absent the discriminatory 
motive.Id. at 244-45,252,109 S.Ct. 1775. 
Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in 
the judgment. Justice White thought that the impennissible 
motive must have been a "substantial factor" in the 
employer's decision and that the employer need not use 
"objective evidence" to make its same-decision showing. 
!d. at 259,261, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Justice White would pennit 
a mixed motive test in which the burden is shifted to the 
employer, but he would be liberal on the evidence an 
employer could offer. His view of when such a test should 
be available, however, is broader than Justice O'Connor's. 
Justice O'Connor would allow a plaintiff to use a mixed 
motive test only in narrow circumstances. In concurrence, 
Justice O'Connor held that she would require a Title VII 
plaintiff in a mixed motive case to produce "direct 
evidence" showing that "decisionmakers placed 
substantial negative reliance on [the] illegitimate 
criterion," id. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775. 
I do not point to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion 
merely to admire its common sense, though that is 
admirable. Rather, we must heed the direct evidence rule 
of Hopkins as controlling, and we may not diminish it, in 
the majority's terms, as a "passing reference." Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hopkins, which in 
considered language required the use of direct evidence to 
prove a mixed motive case, must be viewed as the holding 
of the Court, under the rule of Marks v. United States, 430 
U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) 
("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds *866 .... ") (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Because Justice O'Connor would permit the use of the 
mixed motives test only when direct evidence is present, 
Justice O'Connor "concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds," see Marks 430 U.S. at 193,97 S'Ct' 
990, and her concurrence is to be considered the holding of 
Hopkins under the rule described in Marks. The view that 
Justice O'Connor's opinion is the holding in Hopkins is 
supported by Congress' actions in amending Title VII in 
1991, by the holdings of other circuits on the issue, and by 
sound policy. 
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The 1991 amendments to Title VII did not modifY the 
Supreme Court's prior holding on the need for direct 
evidence. Subsection (m) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which 
incorporates the premise of Hopkins that discrimination 
can be shown in a mixed motive case so long as it is one 
factor, was enacted two years after Hopkins: 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter [42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e et seq.], 
an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the 
practice. 
42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(m). Though Congress responded to 
other aspects of the Court's holding in Hopkins, 
specifically the holding that an employer could completely 
avoid liability if it could show that it would have made the 
same decision absent the discriminatory motive, see 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 
1142 (4th Cir.1995), Congress, in amending Title VII, did 
not respond at all to Justice O'Connor's direct evidence 
requirement, which had already been adopted by several 
circuit courts. Instead, the statutory amendments are silent 
as to that subject, neither praising nor condemning, neither 
adopting nor rejecting, and clearly not modifying Justice 
O'Connor's test, which is properly viewed as the holding 
of Hopkins. This silence indicates that Congress left 
undisturbed Justice O'Connor's holding and the prior 
circuit decisions that adhered to it. As we remain bound by 
the Supreme Court's precedent, we must follow the direct 
evidence rule as explained in Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence. 
By vitiating Justice O'Connor's direct evidence 
requirement, the majority's holding puts our circuit in 
conflict with almost all others. See Jackson v. Harvard 
Univ., 900 F.2d 464,467 (1st Cir.1990); Ostrowski v. Atl. 
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171,182 (2d Cir.1992); Starceski 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d lO89, 1096 (3d 
Cir.1995); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th 
Cir.1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 
858, 861 (5th Cir.1993); Wilson v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510,514 (6th Cir.1991); Plain. EJ 
Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir.1997); 
Schleiniger v. Des Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d llO0, 
1101 (8th Cir.1991); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 
(lOth Cir.1993); E.E.O.c. v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 
F.2d 920, 923 (11 th Cir.1990). As suggested in the 
decision of the three-judge panel in Costa, and as reflected 
in the cases cited above, these circuits have correctly 
viewed Justice O'Connor's OpllllOn in Hopkins as the 
holding of the Court and have followed it on that basis. See 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 886-88 (9th 
Cir.2001), vacated by 274 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir.2001). I 
agree with the other circuits and with the reasoning of the 
prior opinion of the three-judge panel in Costa, which I 
adopt because it is faithful to precedent.! We *867 should 
not rush to join a decision that turns its back on our 
colleagues' wisdom and engages our circuit in a fanciful 
frolic of its own. 
Finally, apart from our duty to abide by precedent, policy 
concerns favor adhering to Justice O'Connor's view of 
mixed motives analysis. Mixed motives analysis is a 
departure from the well-established McDonnell Douglas 
framework. Whereas McDonnell Douglas requires the 
plaintiff to make a pretext showing once an employer puts 
forth evidence oflegitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 
the challenged employment practice, mixed motive 
analysis allows a plaintiff to prevail even when she cannot 
prove pretext. 
To keep the mixed motive framework from overriding in 
all cases the McDonnell Douglas rule and the pretext 
requirement, which it clearly was not meant to do, mixed 
motive analysis properly is available only in a special 
subset of cases. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence 
requirement meets this need: It requires the plaintiff to 
produce highly probative, direct evidence, before she may 
utilize the more lenient, mixed motives test. As a practical 
matter, without this or some similar constraint on when a 
plaintiff may invoke the mixed motives test, any plaintiff 
would opt for the Hopkins framework to avoid having to 
show pretext. The Supreme Court's seminal opinion in 
McDonnell Douglas would be effectively overruled by an 
incorrect interpretation of Hopkins that jettisons the direct 
evidence requirement, an effect that could not have been 
intended in Hopkins and an effect that will create 
uncertainty in our settled law. 
Taken with the idea that plaintiff, an unsatisfactory 
employee, is a "trailblazer," the majority departs from the 
path of precedent and blazes its own trail beyond the 
frontiers of settled law into regions of error. I respectfully 
dissent. -
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Synopsis 
Background: Former county fire and rescue employee 
brought whistIeblower action upon her discharge 
following discovery of her notes detailing 
minute-by-minute activities of two co-workers. The 
District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai County, 
John T. Mitchell, J., entered summary judgment in favor of 
fire and rescue. The Court of Appeals, 2007 WL 1501383, 
affirmed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that: 
[1] as a matter of first impression, McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial in cases 
involving claims raised under state whistIeblower act; 
[2] fact question as to whether fire and rescue's stated 
reason for termination was pretextual precluded summary 
judgment; 
[3] fact question as to whether employee's notes 
constituted a "communication" protected by whistle blower 
statute precluded summary judgment, even though notes 
were never presented to employee's supervisors; 
[4] fact question as to whether employee acted in "good 
faith" precluded summary judgment, even though 
employee sought to gain personally from reporting waste, 
and her notes referred to coworkers by disparaging 
nicknames; and 
[5] fact question as to whether employee was participating 
in an "investigation" precluded summary judgment, even 
though employee's note-taking was not part of an official 
inquiry. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes (21) 
[I} Appeal and Error 
. Scope ofInquiry in General 
[2] 
[3] 
[4} 
While Supreme Court gives serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of 
Appeals when considering a case on review from 
that court, Supreme Court reviews the district 
court's decision directly. 
Appeal and Error 
",,4,Cases Triable in Appellate Court 
Supreme Court reviews an appeal from an order 
of summary judgment de novo, and Supreme 
Court's standard of review is the same as the 
standard used by the trial court in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
,Presumptions and burden of proof 
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
disputed facts are construed in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the record are drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
Presumptions and burden of proof 
Judgment 
. Showing to be made on opposing affidavit 
Adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations 
in the pleadings to survive motion for summary 
judgment, but must set forth by affidavit specific 
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 74 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008) 
224 P .3d 458, 28 
[5) Officers and Public Employees 
;y",Presumptions and burden of proof 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis 
applicable to employment discrimination claims 
is applicable at trial in cases involving claims 
raised under state whistleblower act; however, 
burden-shifting framework does not apply at 
summary judgment stage. West's LC.A. § 6-2101 
et seq. 
(6) Courts 
(7) 
.o;~'" Validity and construction of Constitutions and 
statutes of other states 
When confronted with matters of first impression 
involving state statutes, Supreme Court may 
glean insight from the interpretations of sister 
states concerning similar or identical statutes; 
while the construction of a statute by another 
state may be persuasive, it is not conclusive and 
the Court may refuse to adopt the foreign 
construction. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Officers and Public Employees 
.:·.Presumptions and burden of proof 
When the McDonnell Douglas analysis is applied 
to cases involving retaliatory discharge under a 
whistleblower statute, the test is as follows: (I) 
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
retaliatory conduct for an action protected by the 
relevant whistleblower statute; (2) once the 
plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the 
defendant is obligated to produce evidence 
which, if taken as true, would permit the 
conclusion that there was a non-retaliatory reason 
for the adverse action; and (3) if the defendant 
articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for 
discharge, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
reason the defendant offers is a pretext for 
retaliatory conduct. West's LC.A. § 6-2101 et 
seq. 
(8) 
(9) 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
~F"'Public officers and employees, cases involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
county fire and rescue's stated reason for 
terminating employee was pretextual precluded 
summary judgment in favor of fire and rescue in 
employee's action alleging violation of 
whistleblower statute. West's I.C.A. § 6-2101 et 
seq. 
Officers and Public Employees 
'v·DPresumptions and burden of proof 
Although there must be something more than 
pure speculation or conjecture, circumstantial 
evidence may provide an inference of causation 
in action under whistleblower act; proximity in 
time between the protected activity and the 
adverse employment action is particularly 
significant. West's LC.A. § 6-2101 etseq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[10) Appeal and Error 
.Scope and theory of case 
Appellate court reviewing grant of summary 
judgment may affirm the trial court on a theory 
not relied upon below. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
(11) Appeal and Error 
rReview Dependent on Whether Questions Are 
of Law or of Fact 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
over which Supreme Court exercises free review. 
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[12] Statutes 
~~'~Literal and grammatical interpretation 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an 
examination ofthe statute's literal words. 
[13] Statutes 
,~Existence of ambiguity 
Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as 
written, without engaging III statutory 
construction. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[14) Statutes 
Existence of ambiguity 
Only where statutory language is ambiguous will 
courts look to rules of construction for guidance 
and consider the reasonableness of proposed 
interpretations. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[15) Statutes 
Meaning of Language 
Unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, 
ordinary words will be given their ordinary 
meaning when construing a statute. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[16) Statutes 
Intention of Legislature 
Statutes 
%w",Policy and purpose of act 
Statutes 
'pStatute as a Whole, and Intrinsic Aids to 
Construction 
Statutes 
,w=Giving effect to entire statute 
In construing a statute, Supreme Court will not 
deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, 
but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose 
and intent of the legislature, based on the whole 
act and every word therein, lending substance 
and meaning to the provisions. 
[17] Judgment 
.,.c,Public officers and employees, cases involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
employee's keeping of notes, detailing the 
allegedly wasteful activities of her coworkers, 
constituted a "report," and thus a 
"communication" protected by whistleblower 
statute precluded summary judgment in favor of 
county fire and rescue in employee's action 
alleging violation of whistleblower statute. 
West's LC.A. §§ 6-2103(2), 6-2104(1)(a). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[18) Judgment 
. Public officers and employees, cases involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
employee of county fire and rescue acted in 
"good faith" in recording the allegedly wasteful 
activities of her coworkers precluded summary 
judgment in favor of fire and rescue in 
employee's action alleging violation of 
whistleblower statute, even though employee 
sought to gain personally from reporting waste, 
and her notes referred to coworkers by 
disparaging nicknames. West's LC.A. § 
6-2104(1 )(b). 
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[19] Officers and Public Employees 
,~Grounds for removal 
Although it may fall into the overall 
consideration of whether public employee acted 
in good faith, the fact that employee was hoping 
to gain personally from reporting coworkers' 
impropriety would not foreclose a finding that 
her actions were protected by state whistleblower 
act. West's LC.A. § 6-2104(1)(b). 
[20] Judgment 
ip,Public officers and employees, cases involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
employee of county fire and rescue was 
participating in an "investigation" when 
recording the allegedly wasteful activities of her 
coworkers precluded summary judgment in favor 
of fire and rescue in employee's action alleging 
violation of whistleblower statute. West's LC.A. 
§ 6-2104(2). 
[21] Officers and Public Employees 
"Grounds for removal 
An "investigation," within meaning of state 
whistleblower statute, is not limited to an official 
inquiry, but encompasses actions involving close 
examination or observation. West's LC.A. § 
6-2104(2). 
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for appellant. 
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Opinion 
HORTON, Justice. 
*393 Appellant Mary C. Curlee (Curlee), a former 
employee of Respondent Kootenai County Fire and Rescue 
(KCFR), was discharged on October 13, 2004, after her 
notes detailing the minute-by-minute activities of two of 
her coworkers, Jackie Sharp (Sharp) and Lisa Wheeler 
(Wheeler), to whom she assigned the fictitious names 
"Muffy" and "Buffy," were discovered by Sharp on 
Curlee's desk. Curlee filed suit against KCFR, alleging 
that she was fired in violation of the Idaho Protection of 
Public Employees Act as her notes documented the waste 
of public funds, property, or manpower. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of KCFR and Curlee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment. This Court granted 
review sua sponte. We vacate the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 1999, Curlee held several office positions 
within the KCFR system. In 2002, Curlee was transferred 
into the administrative offices of KCFR. When Curlee 
arrived, Wheeler and Sharp were already working there as 
a bookkeeper and an administrative assistant, respectively. 
Initially, Curlee performed data entry duties; she was later 
assigned to the front-desk receptionist position. While in 
her data entry position, Curlee became displeased with 
what she considered to be an inordinate amount of time 
Wheeler and Sharp spent on personal conversations during 
the workday. Curlee perceived the actions as wasteful and 
complained to the Fire Chief, Ronald Sampert. When she 
complained to Chief Sampert about Wheeler and Sharp's 
behavior, Curlee also suggested that she be moved from 
the receptionist position to a more important position and 
that the office could be run by two, not three, employees. 
After being reassigned to the receptionist position, Curlee 
was in direct daily contact with Wheeler and Sharp. 
Growing more frustrated with the actions of her 
coworkers, Curlee eventually voiced her concerns to two 
fire commissioners, two lieutenants, and the deputy chief. 
Each of these individuals listened to her complaints. The 
deputy chief and one of the lieutenants informed Curlee 
they would discuss her concerns with Chief Sampert. 
Curlee claims that both of the lieutenants told her she 
should document the behavior of her coworkers that she 
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believed to be wasteful. 
Over the course of the next several months, Curlee 
maintained a detailed, handwritten, minute-by-minute log 
of the activities engaged in by her two coworkers which 
Curlee deemed to be wasteful. During this time period, 
Curlee again expressed her frustration to Chief Sampert. In 
response, he expressed a desire to ease the tension in the 
office and to have all of his employees work together. One 
of the fire commissioners told Curlee that he and another 
commissioner *394 **461 were "working on" Curlee's 
concerns. Curlee did not discuss or disclose the contents of 
her log during these conversations or at any other time to 
any employee ofKCFR. 
Approximately seven months after Curlee began keeping 
her log, Sharp inadvertently discovered the log when she 
was attending the front desk during Curlee's lunch break. 
Sharp showed the log to Wheeler. Both women noticed 
that, within the log, Curlee had frequently referred to them 
as "Muffy" and "Buffy" rather than by their names. 
Wheeler and Sharp made photocopies of the log and 
submitted them to Chief Sampert. Both women were angry 
that Curlee had been recording their office activities and 
felt that being referred to as "Muffy" and "Buffy" was 
derogatory and insulting. Chief Sampert agreed to speak 
with Curlee about the log. 
Chief Sampert, accompanied by the deputy chief, spoke 
with Curlee about the log. When asked what she meant to 
accomplish by keeping the log, Curlee responded that 
everyone in the office wasted too much time and she 
wanted to show how much. Curlee also informed Chief 
Sampert that she could document anything she wanted to. 
Chief Sampert informed Curlee that her coworkers were 
upset and insulted by the derogatory names she had used 
and that all offices had wasted time. ChiefSampert advised 
Curlee that she was not trying to get along with the others 
and that her behavior was exacerbating office tension. He 
indicated that he was trying to build a team, and her actions 
were detrimental to the team. Curlee advised Chief 
Sampert that she and the two coworkers would never be a 
team. Chief Sampert gave Curlee the remainder of the day 
off as paid leave and asked her to go home and develop a 
solution to ease the worKplace tension. 
Curlee returned to work the next day. Chief Sampert asked 
her if she had thought about the problem and what they 
might do about it. Curlee responded that she did not know 
what to do, that she would not apologize, and that she had 
done nothing wrong. When Chief Sam pert discussed the 
importance of not creating dissension in the office and 
working together, Curlee responded that it was her 
coworkers who found the log and gave it to him. Curlee 
reiterated that she would not apologize and would never be 
able to have a good working relationship with her two 
coworkers. Her employment was then terminated. 
Curlee filed suit against KCFR, alleging that she was 
wrongfully terminated in violation of the Idaho Protection 
of Public Employees Act for documenting a waste of 
public funds and manpower. KCFR answered Curlee's 
complaint, denied the allegations, and moved for summary 
judgment. KCFR moved to strike an affidavit submitted by 
Curlee from Suzanne Johnson, a former KCFR employee 
who had worked with Sharp prior to Curlee's transfer into 
the administrative office. The district court granted the 
motion to strike and granted KCFR's motion for summary 
judgment. Curlee filed a motion to reconsider, which the 
district court denied. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] [2] [3] [4] "While this Court gives serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when 
considering a case on review from that court, this Court 
reviews the district court's decision directly." Hauschulz v. 
State, 144 Idaho 834, 837, 172 P.3d 1109, 1112 (2007) 
(citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 
798, 802 (2007)). This Court reviews an appeal from an 
order of summary judgment de novo, and this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the 
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 
Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006). When ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment, disputed facts are 
construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Lockheed 
Martin, 142 Idaho at 793, 134 P.3d at 644. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Jd. "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the 
adverse *395 **462 party may not rest upon mere 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for triaL" 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 
1227 (1994). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Curlee claims that she was discharged in violation of the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, I.c. § 6-2101 et 
seq. (the Act), which is commonly referred to as a 
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"whistleblower act." The Act "seeks to 'protect the 
integrity of government by providing a legal cause of 
action for public employees who experience adverse action 
from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation.' " Mallonee v. State, 
139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004) (quoting I.C. 
§ 6-210 1). On appeal, Curlee asserts three points of error: 
first, she asserts it was error to grant summary judgment to 
KCFR; second, she asserts it was error to strike Suzanne 
Johnson's affidavit; and third, she asserts it was error to 
deny her motion to reconsider, alter, or amend. On appeal, 
KCFR raises the issue of whether the district court's grant 
of summary judgment can be affirmed under a different 
legal theory, namely that Curlee's actions were not 
protected by the Act. We consider these issues below. 
A. The district court erred by granting summary 
judgment to KCFR. 
The primary issue in this case is whether the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of KCFR. 
Curlee's principal argument is that the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of KCFR was improper 
because the district court did not evaluate the evidence in 
accordance with proper standards for deciding summary 
judgment motions. Specifically, Curlee argues that the 
district court usurped the function of the jury by making 
findings of fact and drawing inferences from the evidence 
in favor of KCFR, rather than determining whether she 
demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
The district court ruled on KCFR's motion for summary 
judgment from the bench, holding that Curlee had failed to 
demonstrate a causal connection between her keeping of 
the log and her tennination. The district court noted that, 
although Curlee had presented evidence that she may have 
been terminated for a reason protected by the Act (her 
keeping of the log), KCFR presented evidence of a 
legitimate reason for her discharge (her refusal to follow 
Chief Sampert's order to take measures to resolve the 
tension she had created with her coworkers by using the 
names Muffy and Buffy in her log). The district court 
stated that, once KCFR presented a legitimate reason for 
her termination, the burden shifted back to Curlee to "poke 
holes" in KCFR's rationale for her termination. The 
district court held that Curlee had not carried her burden of 
producing evidence that showed a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether she was discharged for any 
reason other than her refusal to work productively with her 
coworkers. 
[5] Although the district court did not specifically identify 
the basis for its ruling, it appears that the burden-shifting 
standard that it applied is derived from McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a U.S. Supreme Court case involving 
employment discrimination, and its progeny.! A summary 
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is as 
follows: (1) once a plaintiff produces evidence that she 
suffered from an adverse discriminatory employment 
decision; then (2) the burden shifts to the employer to 
produce evidence that the employment decision was based 
on a legitimate reason; and then (3) the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason the employer proffers is in fact 
a pretext. Id. The McDonnell Douglas analysis has been 
applied widely by federal and state courts (including this 
Court) faced with employment discrimination *396 **463 
cases. See e.g. Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812-14, 
606 P.2d 458, 462-64 (1979); Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 
Idaho 33, 36, 644 P.2d 355, 358 (1982). However, this 
Court has yet to extend the McDonnell Douglas analysis to 
apply to cases of retaliatory discharge under Idaho's 
whistleblower act. 
[6] Some sister states and federal courts have applied the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis in cases involving unlawful 
discharge for actions protected under whistleblower 
statutes similar to Idaho's. See e.g. LaFond v. General 
Physics Servo Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir.1995) 
(addressing the application of the McDonnell Douglas 
three-part test to the Connecticut whistleblower statute); 
Stevens V. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 831 F.Supp. 737, 741 
(E.D.Mo.1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas standards 
in the absence of state case law identifying the elements of 
a whistleblower claim under Missouri law); Rosen V. 
Transx Ltd., 816 F.Supp. 1364, 1369-70 (D.Minn.1993) 
(analyzing Minnesota's whistleblower statute under the 
l\1cDonnell Douglas test). When confronted with matters 
of first impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may 
glean insight from the interpretations of sister states 
concerning similar or identical statutes. See e.g. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints V. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 418,849 P.2d 83, 91 
(1993); Ada County Assessor V. Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 431, 849 P.2d 98, 104 (1993). 
However, whiJe the construction of a statute by another 
state may be persuasive, it is not conclusive and we may 
refuse to adopt the foreign construction. Mochel V. 
Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 480,5 P.2d 549,553 (1930). We 
find the decisions of our sister states to be well-reasoned 
and conclude that the McDonnell Douglas analysis should 
be applied to actions arising under Idaho's whistleblower 
act. 
[7] When the McDonnell Douglas analysis is applied to 
cases involving retaliatory discharge under a 
whistleblower statute, the test is as follows: (1) the plaintiff 
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must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct for 
an action protected by the relevant whistleblower statute; 
(2) once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the 
defendant is obligated to produce evidence which, if taken 
as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a 
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) if the 
defendant articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason 
for discharge, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason 
the defendant offers is a pretext for retaliatory conduct. 
LaFond, 50 F.3d at 173. 
While other courts have found the McDonnell Douglas 
framework useful in approaching cases under state 
whistleblower statutes, those courts have also noted that 
the "burden-shifting rule of McDonnell Douglas, however, 
has little or no application at the summary judgment stage. 
The rule explicitly governs the burden of persuasion at 
trial." Heng v. Rotech Med. Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389, 401 
(ND.2004) (construing North Dakota's whistleblower 
statute); see also LaFond, 50 F.3d at 174. We find this 
foreign jurisprudence well-reasoned. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court erroneously held Curlee to a 
higher burden of proof than is permissible at summary 
judgment by requiring her to "poke holes" in KCFR's 
proffered rationale for discharging her and to demonstrate 
that the grounds advanced as justification for her 
termination were a pretext for retaliatory conduct. While 
this burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial, it was 
error for the district court to apply it at the summary 
judgment stage. 
[8] The role of the trial court at the summary judgment 
stage is limited to discerning whether there are any genuine 
issues of material fact to be tried. LaFond 50 F.3d at 174. It 
does not extend to deciding them. Id. Therefore, in order to 
survive summary judgment, Curlee only had the burden of 
presenting evidence from which a rational inference of 
retaliatory discharge under the whistleblower act could be 
drawn. Id. If Curlee presented a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge, the district court was not free to 
accept as true the employer's testimony that she was fired 
for some other legitimate reason. Id. We conclude that the 
district court erred by accepting KCFR's justification for 
discharging Curlee and requiring *397 **464 her to show 
that the justification was, in fact, a pretext. 
[9] We find that Curlee presented a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge. The close relation in time between 
the discovery of her documentation of her coworkers' 
waste and her termination supports the reasonable 
inference that Curlee was discharged for that 
documentation. "Although there must be something more 
than pure speculation or conjecture, circumstantial 
evidence may provide an inference of causation. Proximity 
in time between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action is 'particularly significant.' " Heng, 
688 N.W.2d at 399 (internal citation omitted). We 
recognize that a jury may well decide that KCFR did not 
discharge Curlee in retaliation for her documentation of 
waste. However, that determination properly belongs to the 
jury at trial and not the judge at the summary judgment 
stage. For that reason, we vacate the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of KCFR. 
B. Genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether 
Curlee was fired for conduct protected under the 
whistleblower statute. 
[10] On appeal, KCFR advances the alternative argument 
that summary judgment was appropriate because Curlee 
failed to establish that her conduct fell under the protection 
of the Act. This issue was not addressed by the district 
court. However, the appellate court may affirm the trial 
court on a theory not relied upon below. McCuskey v. 
Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 663, 851 P.2d 953, 959 
(1993) (citing Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459,680 
P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984)). Thus, we consider the issue 
herein. 
Under Idaho's whistleblower act, a prima facie case for 
retaliatory discharge requires Curlee to show: (1) she was 
an "employee" that engaged or intended to engage in 
protected activity; (2) her "employer" took adverse action 
against her, and (3) the existence of a causal connection 
between the protected activity and the employer's adverse 
action. I.C. §§ 6-2104 & 6-2105(4); see also Dahlberg v. 
Lutheran Social Services of North Dakota, 625 N.W.2d 
241, 253 (N.D.200 1) (identifying the elements of a prima 
facie case under North Dakota's whistleblower statute); 
Calvi! v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 122 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th 
Cir.1997) (articulating the elements of a prima facie case 
under Minnesota's whistleblower statute). There is no 
question that, as defined by the Act, Curlee is an 
"employee," KCFR is an "employer," and that discharge 
constitutes "adverse action." I.e. § 6-2103. As we 
concluded in Part III(A) , supra, Curlee has met her 
summary judgment burden of demonstrating that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her discharge 
was causally related to her maintaining the log of her 
coworkers' conduct. The only remaining question is 
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Curlee's conduct in maintaining the log was 
"protected activity." 
KCFR argues that Curlee's actions are not protected 
activities under I.e. § 6-2104 because (I) she did not 
communicate in good faith the existence of any waste of 
public funds, property or manpower, which is protected 
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activity under I.e. § 6-2104(1)(a); and (2) she did not 
participate or give infonnation in an investigation, hearing, 
court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other fonn 
of administrative review, which is protected activity under 
I.C. § 6-2104(2). We disagree. 
An employee's cause of action under the whistleblower act 
isdefinedinI.C. § 6-2105(4): 
To prevail in an action brought under the 
authority of this section, the employee 
shall establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the employee has suffered 
an adverse action because the employee, 
or a person acting on his behalf engaged 
or intended to engage in an activity 
protected under section 6-2104, Idaho 
Code. 
KCFR's position is based primarily on its interpretation of 
specific words in the whistleblower act, which provides: 
(1)(a) An employer may not take adverse action against 
an employee because the employee, or a person 
authorized to act on behalf of the employee, 
communicates in good faith the existence of any waste 
of *398 **465 public funds, property or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or 
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state or the United States. Such 
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner 
which gives the employer reasonable opportunity to 
correct the waste or violation. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (1 )(a) of this section, an 
employee communicates in good faith if there is a 
reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good 
faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably 
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or 
frivolous. 
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an 
employee because an employee participates or gives 
infonnation in an investigation, hearing, court 
proceeding, legislative or otherlnquiry, or other fonn of 
administrative review. 
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an 
employee because the employee has objected to or 
refused to carry out a directive that the employee 
reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation 
adopted under the authority of the laws of this state, 
political subdivision of this state or the United States. 
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies 
that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to 
document the existence of any waste of public funds, 
property or manpower, or a violation, or suspected 
violation of any laws, rules or regulations. 
I.e. § 6-2104 (emphasis added). 
[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Our standard of review for 
statutory interpretation is well established: 
The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Hart, 135 
Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850,852 (2001). 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an 
examination of the statute's literal words. 
State v. Burn igh t, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the 
language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 
(1999). Only where the language is 
ambiguous will this Court look to rules 
of construction for guidance and consider 
the reasonableness of proposed 
interpretations. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 
226,231,31 P.3d 248,253 (2001). 
Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of 
Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006). 
"Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, 
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when 
construing a statute." Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 123 Idaho at 415,849 
P .2d at 88 (citing Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 
427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990)). In construing a 
statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of 
the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole 
act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning 
to the provisions. George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 
1387-88 (1990). 
1. "Communication" of waste 
[17] KCFR argues that Curlee's actions fall outside the 
protection of the Act because they were not a 
"communication." Idaho Code § 6-2104(1 )(a) specifically 
provides: 
An employer may not take adverse action 
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against an employee because the 
employee ... communicates in good faith 
the existence of any waste of public 
funds, property or manpower.... Such 
communication shall be made at a time 
and in a manner which gives the 
employer reasonable opportunity to 
correct the waste or violation. 
(emphasis added). The statute defines "communicate" as 
"a verbal or written report." I.e. § 6-2103(2). The statute 
does not, however, define "report." The dictionary 
definition of "report" is to "give an account of." Delgado v. 
Jim Wells County, 82 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Ct.App.2002) 
(quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (1990) to construe the ordinary meaning of 
"report" under Texas's whistleblower statute). 
**466 *399 KCFR argues that, while the documentation 
was written, there was no evidence that Curlee prepared 
the documentation as a written report or ever intended to 
submit it to her supervisors. KCFR posits that Curlee failed 
to establish that she was keeping these notes as part of a 
report or that she ever intended to pass them along to a 
supervisor. KCFR points out that it was her coworkers that 
inadvertently discovered the notes that Curlee kept in 
secret and that when Curlee was questioned about them by 
Chief Sampert she merely stated that she could keep them 
if she wanted to. Therefore, KCFR asserts that her notes 
were not a communication protected by the whistleblower 
act. Weare not persuaded by this argument. 
It was not necessary that Curlee actually have presented 
the notes to her employer in order to constitute a report. 
Idaho's whistleblower act only requires that the employee 
"intended to engage in an action protected under the act." 
I.e. § 6-2105(4) (emphasis added). Curlee presented 
evidence that her supervisors instructed her to document 
the waste. By way of affidavit, she testified she "began 
documenting the things in the office to support the fact that 
there was waste of manpower and mismanagement in the 
office" and that her "notes were part of the communication 
of such wastefulness of manpower and public funds in the 
office." A reasonable inference may be drawn that she 
intended to deliver the report to her supervisors at some 
future time, but that action was preempted by the 
inadvertent discovery of her notes by Sharp. Indeed, it 
appears that the district judge drew this inference, as he 
stated that "it seems to me from my reading of what is 
admissible the Plaintiff was assembling information that 
she felt reported waste .... " We conclude that KCFR is not 
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this ground. 
[18) KCFR argues in the alternative that Curlee's actions 
are not protected under the Act because the notes were not 
kept in "good faith." The statute defines good faith as 
follows: "an employee communicates in good faith if there 
is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good 
faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably 
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or 
frivolous." I.e. § 6-2104(1)(b) (emphasis added). KCFR 
argues that that the reports were malicious because the 
attribution of the names "Mufry" and "Bufry" to Wheeler 
and Sharp was disparaging. 
The statute does not define malice. The dictionary defines 
malicious as: "harboring ill will or enmity ... proceeding 
from hatred or ill will ... playfully or archly mischievous ... 
[c ] lever, cunning ... having or done with, wicked or 
mischievous intentions or motives '" [i]ll-disposed, 
spiteful, resentful, bitter, rancorous, sinister, 
unpropitious." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1367 (1966). It is 
clear from the record that Curlee disliked Wheeler and 
Sharp and resented working with them. Other courts have 
held that animosity between the discharged employee and 
the subjects of their reports compromises any finding that 
the employee's complaints were made in "good faith" as 
defined by whistleblower law. Cipriani v. Lycoming 
County Housing Auth., 177 F.Supp.2d 303, 331 
(M.D.Pa.2001) (discussing the requirement of good faith 
under Pennsylvania'S whistleblower statute). 
KCFR points to Baird v. Cutler, 883 F.Supp. 591 (D.Utah 
1995), a case under the Utah whistleblower act, where it 
was stated: "Discipline for failure to abide by reasonable 
established procedures, or for rudeness or incivility, even 
when it occurs in connection with 'whistleblowing,' does 
not constitute a violation of the 'Whistleblower Act.' " Id. 
at 606. KCFR argues that even if Curlee's log was a 
communication that reported waste, her actions 
nonetheless fell outside of the protection of the statute 
because they were not made in good faith, and that her 
incivility was the true reason for her discharge. 
[19) From the factual averments contained in the 
affidavits, it could be inferred that when Curlee initially 
approached Chief Sampert about the wastefulness of 
Wheeler and Sharp she had ulterior motives of personal 
gain and promotion. Some courts have required that "we 
must not look only at the contents of the report, but also at 
the reporter's purpose in making the report." Dahlberg, 
*400 **467 625 N.W.2d at 254. For instance, the 
whistIeblower statutes of some states require that, as an 
element of good faith, the employee not take the actions for 
personal gain or consideration. See e.g. Cipriani, 177 
F.Supp.2d at 331; Albright v. City of Philadelphia, 399 
F.Supp.2d 575, 595-96 (E.D.Pa.2005). However, the Idaho 
whistleblower act does not contain similar language. 
Therefore, although it may fall into the overall 
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consideration of whether she acted in good faith or not, the 
fact that Curlee was hoping to gain personally from 
reporting the waste of Wheeler and Sharp does not 
foreclose a finding that her actions were protected by the 
Idaho whistleblower act. 
Curlee claims that she used the names Muffy and Buffy 
because Wheeler and Sharp reminded her of characters 
from a movie. Whether an employee has made a report in 
good faith is a question of fact, and summary judgment is 
appropriate only if, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Curlee, reasonable minds could only 
conclude that her use of the names Muffy and Buffy was 
indeed malicious. We conclude that the question whether 
Curlee's usage of the names Muffy and Buffy shows that 
the report was malicious is an issue offact to be decided by 
a jury and not by this Court on appeal. 
2. Participation in an "investigation" 
(20) [21] Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) provides: "An employer 
may not take adverse action against an employee because 
an employee participates or gives information in an 
investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or 
other inquiry, or other form of administrative review." 
(emphasis added). Curlee argues that she was participating 
in an investigation of the wasteful activities of her 
coworkers. In support of this claim, she asserts that two 
lieutenants told her to document waste after she informed 
them of Wheeler's and Sharp's conduct. KCFR asserts that 
"[pJarticipation or giving information in an investigation, 
hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry or 
other form of administrative review requires more than 
simply documenting alleged wasteful activities by 
co-workers" and that Curlee "did not show the trial court 
that she was participating or giving information in any 
investigation or other form of administrative review." 
The word "investigate" is not defined in the statute. 
Therefore, we must give it its plain meaning. An ordinary 
dictionary defines "investigate" as follows: "to track ... to 
observe or study by close examination and systematic 
inquiry ... to make a systematic examination; esp : to 
conduct an official inquiry." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 616 (lOth ed.1993) 
(emphasis added). The legal dictionary of first resort 
Footnotes 
defines the word as follows: "to follow up step by step by 
patient inquiry or observation ... to examine and inquire 
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful 
inqUlsltton; examination .... " BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed.1979). Although the word 
"investigation" may be narrowly defined as an official 
inquiry, we conclude that the plain meaning of the word is 
broader and encompasses actions involving close 
examination or observation. In view of the evidence that 
Curlee's note-taking was the product of her superiors' 
direction to "document" her allegations of waste, we 
conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether she intended to give information in an 
investigation. 
C. The remaining issues need not be addressed by this 
Court on appeal. 
Curlee asserts that the district court erred by striking 
Suzanne Johnson's affidavit and by denying her motion to 
reconsider, alter, or amend. Because we have concluded 
that the district court erred by granting KCFR's motion for 
summary judgment, it is not necessary to address whether 
the district court erred by striking Johnson's affidavit and 
denying Curlee's motion to reconsider, alter, or amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We vacate the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of KCFR. The case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Costs are awarded to Curlee. 
*401 **468 Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices 
BURDICK, 1. JONES and W. JONES concur. 
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1 Although the district court did not mention McDonnell Douglas specifically, KCFR argues in its supplemental brief that "Under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifted to Curlee to demonstrate that KCFR's alleged reason for the adverse employment 
decision was a pretext for another motive which was in violation of the statute. This Curlee has failed to do." 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
LUCE, FORWARD, HAMILTON, & 
SCRIPPS, Defendant-Appellant. 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Nos. 00-57222, 01-55321. I Argued and 
Submitted April 1, 2002. I Filed Sept. 3, 
2002. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
sued employer under Title VII and other statutes, alleging 
that employer retaliated against employee by requiring him 
to sign arbitration agreement as condition of employment. 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, Florence Marie Cooper, J., 122 F.Supp.2d 
1080, enjoined employer from requiring arbitration as 
condition of employment and from enforcing existing 
arbitration agreements. Employer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Trott, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) an employer 
may require employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a 
condition of employment, abrogating Circuit City Stores v. 
Banyasz, Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., Ferguson v. 
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc.; (2) applicant's refusal to 
sign compulsory arbitration agreement was not opposition 
to unlawful employment practice, so as to be protected 
conduct for purposes of retaliation claim; and (3) 
applicant's refusal to sign compulsory arbitration 
agreement was not participation in statutorily authorized 
proceeding, so as to be protected conduct for purposes of 
retaliation claim. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Pre gerson, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes (9) 
[1) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Validity 
[2) 
[3) 
[4J 
An employer may require employees to arbitrate 
Title VII claims as a condition of employment; 
abrogating Circuit City Stores v. Banyasz, No. 
C-01-3106 WHO; Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
2001 WL 1105046; Ferguson v. Countrywide 
Credit Indus., Inc., No. 
CVOO-13096AHM(CTX). Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
,0c,Unconscionability 
Not all agreements requiring arbitration of Title 
VII claims as a condition of employment will be 
enforced; they must still comply with the 
principles of traditional contract law, including 
the doctrine of unconscionability. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e 
et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Validity 
Employer could require appropriate compulsory 
arbitration of Title VII claims of its applicants 
and employees as condition of employment, and 
could enforce those arbitration agreements 
against current employees, as long as agreements 
complied with traditional principles of contract 
law. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
Labor and Employment 
Wages and Hours 
To establish retaliation under Title VII, ADA, 
ADEA, or EPA, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) was required to prove that: 
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[5] 
(1) applicant engaged in protected activity; (2) 
applicant suffered adverse employment decision; 
and (3) there was causal link between applicant's 
activity and adverse employment decision. Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
623(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
12203(a). 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
:·>Activities Protected 
Labor and Employment 
·">,,Protected Activities 
Protected activities, for purposes of a retaliation 
action under Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, or the 
EPA, include: (1) opposing an unlawful 
employment practice, and (2) participating in a 
statutorily authorized proceeding. Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(d); Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-3(a); Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203(a). 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[6] Civil Rights 
Activities Protected 
Applicant's refusal to sign agreement requiring 
him, as condition of employment, to arbitrate 
Title VII claims, was not opposition to unlawful 
employment practice, so as to be protected 
conduct for purposes of retaliation claim, 
inasmuch as voluminous legal precedent was to 
the contrary, and employee could not have 
reasonably interpreted text of any relevant 
federal statute to forbid compulsory arbitration. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-3(a). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
Civil Rights 
::=Activities Protected 
It is not necessary that the policy opposed by an 
employee be demonstrably unlawful for the 
opposition to be protected conduct for purposes 
of a Title VII retaliation claim; if the employee's 
refusal to accede to an employer's policy is based 
on a reasonable belief that the policy is unlawful, 
the employee's conduct is a protected manner of 
opposition. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704( a), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
• .. ··Activities Protected 
Applicant's refusal to sign agreement requiring 
him, as condition of employment, to arbitrate 
Title VII claims, was not participation in 
statutorily authorized proceeding, so as to be 
protected conduct for purposes of retaliation 
claim; although Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) argued that employee 
reserved right to bring action in judicial forum, 
no federal law guaranteed him ability to vindicate 
that right in federal forum. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
Civil Rights 
Activities Protected 
Labor and Employment 
Protected Activities 
The protections against retaliation found in Title 
VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the EPA extend to 
an applicant or an employee who informs his 
employer of his intention to participate in a 
statutory proceeding, even if he has not yet done 
so. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3), 
29 U.S.C.A. § 21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
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623(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 
US,C.A. § 2000e-3(a); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
12203(a). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*996 Charles A. Bird, Kelly Capen Douglas, Luce, 
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, San Diego, CA, for the 
defendant -appellant -appellee. 
Robert F. Walker, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
LLP, Los Angeles, CA, defendant-appellant-appellee. 
Dori K. Bernstein, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Washington, DC, for the 
plaintiff-appellee-appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California; Florence Marie Cooper, 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-01322-FMC. 
Before PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and 
FITZGERALD, District Judge. * 
Opinion 
OPINION 
TROTT, Circuit Judge. 
The law firm Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP 
("Luce Forward") refused to hire Donald Scott Lagatree 
("Lagatree") as a full-time legal secretary because he 
would not sign an agreement to *997 arbitrate claims 
arising from his employment. On behalf of Lagatree, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 
sued Luce Forward for retaliation in violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USc. § 2000e-3, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 
U.s.c. § 12203(b), the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 ("ADEN'), 29 USc. § 623(d), and the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 USc. § 21S(a)(3). The 
EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree and a 
permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from 
requiring that employees sign arbitration agreements as a 
condition of employment. 
The district court refused to award make-whole relief and 
rejected EEOC's request for an injunction based on the 
ADA, the ADEA, or the EPA. Relying on Duffield v. 
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998), 
however, the district court enjoined Luce Forward from 
requiring applicants to arbitrate Title VII claims and from 
enforcing existing agreements to arbitrate those claims. 
We have jurisdiction over Luce Forward's timely appeal 
pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1291. In Circuit City Stores v. 
Adams, S32 US. lOS, 121 S.Ct. l302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 
(2001), the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Duffield. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court and hold that 
employers may require employees to sign agreements to 
arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of their 
employment. We vacate the district court's permanent 
injunction against Luce Forward, which relied exclusively 
on Duffield for the contrary proposition. We additionally 
reject the EEOC's retaliation theory. Lagatree did not 
engage in a protected activity when he refused to sign the 
Luce Forward arbitration agreement, and consequently, 
Luce Forward did not retaliate by refusing to hire him. 
BACKGROUND 
Lagatree applied for a position as a full-time legal 
secretary with Luce Forward in September 1997. 
Impressed with Lagatree's credentials and experience, 
Luce Forward extended to him a conditional offer of 
employment. On his first day of work, Luce Forward 
presented Lagatree with its standard offer letter, which set 
forth the terms and conditions of employment. The letter 
specified Lagatree's salary and benefits. His employment 
was at-will; "either [he] or the firm [could] terminate [his] 
employment at any time, with or without cause." The offer 
letter also included an arbitration provision requiring 
Lagatree to submit all "claims arising from or related to his 
employment" to binding arbitration. In its entirety, the 
Luce Forward arbitration agreement provided: 
In the event of any dispute or claim 
between you and the firm (including 
employees, partners, agents, successors 
and assigns), including but not limited to 
claims arising from or related to your 
employment or the termination of your 
employment, we jointly agree to submit 
all such disputes or claims to confidential 
binding arbitration, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Any arbitration must be 
initiated within 180 days after the dispute 
or claim first arose, and will be heard 
before a retired State or Federal judge in 
the county containing the firm office in 
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which you were last employed. The law 
of the State in which you last worked will 
apply. 
Lagatree objected to the arbitration provision. He told 
Deborah Sweeney ("Sweeney"), a Luce Forward personnel 
employee, that he "couldn't sign ... the arbitration 
agreement" because "it was unfair." In his deposition, 
Lagatree clarified that he would not sign an arbitration 
agreement under an at-will employment situation because 
he believed he needed to *998 keep in place his "civil 
liberties, including the right to a jury trial and redress of 
grievances through the government process." Sweeney 
then went to discuss the matter with Raymond W. Berry 
("Berry"), the director of human resources at Luce 
Forward. 
Lagatree worked for Luce Forward for two days without a 
contract while Luce Forward considered his vigorous 
objection to the arbitration provision. After those two days, 
Lagatree met with Berry and Sweeney. Lagatree asked 
whether Luce Forward "could strike" the arbitration 
provision from the offer letter. Berry responded that the 
arbitration agreement was a non-negotiable condition of 
employment at Luce Forward, and "if [Lagatree] didn't 
agree to ... signing that clause, then he would not be an 
employee of the firm." When Lagatree expressed his belief 
that "he didn't feel that it was right," Berry again "told him 
that[signing the arbitration provision] was the only way 
that he could stay-or become an employee of the firm." 
Initially, Lagatree agreed to sign the arbitration provision, 
but a short time later Lagatree refused to do so, and 
consequently, Luce Forward withdrew its job offer. It is 
undisputed that Luce Forward refused to hire Lagatree 
only because he would not sign the arbitration provision. 
In February 1998, Lagatree sued Luce Forward in Los 
Angeles Superior Court accusing Luce Forward of 
wrongfully terminating his employment. Lagatree sought 
lost wages, damages for emotional distress, and punitive 
damages. The Superior Court granted Luce Forward's 
motion to dismiss, holding that Luce Forward did not 
unlawfully discharge Lagatree when he refused to sign a 
predispute arbitration agreement as a condition of 
employment. A California Court of Appeal affirmed, and 
the California Supreme Court denied review. Lagatree v. 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 74 Cal.AppAth 1105, 
88 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 (1999), review denied 2000 Cal. 
LEXIS 262, at *1 (Ca1.2000). 
While his state court suit was pending, Lagatree filed a 
complaint with the EEOC, alleging that he was wrongfully 
terminated for refusing to sign the Luce Forward 
arbitration provision. The EEOC sued Luce Forward on 
behalf of Lagatree and in the public interest, arguing that 
(1) Duffield forbade Luce Forward from requiring Lagatree 
to sign an arbitration agreement, and (2) by refusing to hire 
Lagatree, Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated against him 
for asserting his constitutional right to a jury trial. The 
EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree, including 
"rightful place employment," back wages and benefits, and 
compensatory and punitive damages. The EEOC sought 
also a permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from 
engaging in unlawful retaliation and ordering Luce 
Forward to "desist from utilizing mandatory arbitration 
agreements." 
The district court denied any award of damages on behalf 
of Lagatree. Considering itself bound by Duffield, 
however, the district court felt it was "required to issue an 
injunction prohibiting [Luce Forward] from requiring its 
employees to agree to arbitrate their Title VII claims as a 
condition of employment and from attempting to enforce 
any such previously executed agreements." The district 
court did not issue an injunction forbidding compulsory 
arbitration of ADA, ADEA or EPA claims. Nor did the 
district court expressly rule on the EEOC's retaliation 
theory. Luce Forward timely appealed the district court's 
injunction. The EEOC cross-appealed, seeking to enjoin 
Luce Forward from engaging in an "unlawful retaliatory 
practice by denying employment to any applicant ... who 
refuses to waive his right to participate *999 in statutorily 
protected [ ] proceedings." 
ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary 
judgment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th 
Cir.2000) (en bane). 
DISCUSSION 
I DUFFIELD 
An employer may not discriminate against "an employee 
or applicant for employment because of su~h individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 USc. § 
2000e-2(a)(l) (Title VII), "disability," 42 U.S.c. § 
12112(a)(ADA), or "age." 42 USc. § 623(a)(l) (ADEA). 
The EPA makes it unlawful to pay lower wages on the 
basis of an employee's sex. 29 USc. § 206(d)(I). 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the Act") strengthened 
Title VII by making it easier to bring and to prove lawsuits 
and by expanding the available judicial remedies so that 
plaintiffs could receive full compensation for injuries 
resulting from discrimination. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 
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30 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. 
The Act also included a "polite bow to the popularity of 
alternative dispute resolution," as governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Pryner v. 
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir.1997). 
Specifically, § 118 of the Act provided that "[ w ] here 
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of 
alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... 
arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under 
this chapter." Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 118 
reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 118"); Cj 
42 U.S.c. § 12212 ("Where appropriate and to the extent 
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute 
resolution, including ... arbitration is encouraged to resolve 
disputes arising under this chapter."). 
Congress passed § 118 against the backdrop of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, III S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 
(1991). In that case, the Court held that an employer could 
compel arbitration of an employee's ADEA claim pursuant 
to an arbitration provision required as a condition of his 
employment. The Court recognized that arbitration did not 
hinder the discrimination plaintiff's ability to vindicate her 
rights: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral 
forum, rather than a judicial forum." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 
26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 
S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)). I By this language, the 
Court judicially sanctioned the liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration. 
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer and 
Congress's seemingly perspicuous language that § 118 
encourages arbitration, we determined in Duffield that 
*1000 Congress intended to exempt Title VII claims from 
compulsory arbitration. 144 F.3d at 1185. In Duffield, 
Robertson Stephens required Tonya Duffield, "like every 
other individual who wishes to work in the United States as 
a broker-dealer in the securities industry, to agree to 
arbitrate all disputes arising from her employment." ld. 
Duffield signed her employment contract without 
objection and began working as a broker-dealer for 
Robertson Stephens. Id. at 1186. 
Duffield subsequently sued Robertson Stephens for sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title 
VII and California's Fair Employment & Housing Act 
("FEHA"). Robertson Stephens sought to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the compulsory arbitration 
provision in Duffield's employment contract, while 
Duffield sought a declaration that the compulsory 
arbitration provision was unenforceable. The district court 
rejected Duffield's arguments and granted Robertson 
Stephen's motion to compel. 
On appeal, we reversed the district court's order 
compelling arbitration. The opening paragraph of our 
opinion succinctly presented the issue for review: 
"[W]hether employers may require as a mandatory 
condition of employment ... that all employees waive their 
right to bring Title VII and other statutory and 
non-statutory claims in court and instead agree in advance 
to submit all employment-related disputes to binding 
arbitration." Id. at 1185. We believed that the answer to 
this question was potentially dispositive of whether 
Robertson Stephens could enforce the compulsory 
arbitration agreement signed by Duffield. As we 
approached the case: (1) if Robertson Stephens could not 
require Duffield to sign an arbitration agreement as a 
condition of her employment, it surely could not enforce 
the agreement against her; whereas (2) if Robertson 
Stephens could require Duffield to sign an arbitration 
agreement as a condition of her employment, that 
agreement might be enforceable subject to the constraints 
of traditional contract law. See, e.g., First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 
1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (".l;lpply[ ing] ordinary 
statelaw principles that govern the formation of contracts" 
determining the validity of an agreement to arbitrate); 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 
784-85 (9th Cir.2002) (refusing compulsory arbitration of 
Title VII claims where arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.2002) (allowing arbitration); 
Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th 
Cir.2002) (allowing compulsory arbitration of FEHA 
claims where agreement was not unconscionable); 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th 
Cir.1994) (refusing compulsory arbitration where plaintiff 
did not knowingly agree to arbitrate). 
At the outset of Duffield, we observed that reading § 118 to 
allow compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims was "at 
odds with" Congress's directive that Title VII be read 
broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 144 F.3d at 
1192. We thought it "at least a mild paradox" that the Act, 
which expanded remedies for victims of discrimination, 
encouraged the use of a process whereby employers 
condition employment on their prospective employees' 
surrendering of their rights to a judicial forum. Id. at 
1192-93 (quoting Plyner, 109 F.3d at 363). These 
observations established the opinion's foundation. 
Building on this foundation, the Court undertook an 
exercise in statutory interpretation, commencing with an 
examination of § 118' s plain language. The Duffield Court 
determined that, in context, Congress's pronouncement in 
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§ 118 that "arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes 
*1001 arising under [Title VII]" was ambiguous "at a 
minimum." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. To clarifY this 
ambiguity, the Court turned to § 118 's legislative history. 
After picking and choosing snippets of legislative history 
consistent with its desired result, which the dissent sets 
forth "at some length," the Court concluded that § 118 
codified the law as it was understood before Gilmer-that 
employers could not compel prospective employees to 
forego their right to litigate Title VII claims in a judicial 
forum as a condition of employment. Id. at 1199. 
Accordingly, the Duffield Court held that "under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, employers may not [through 
compulsory arbitration agreements] compel individuals to 
waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum." Id. at 1185. 
As Robertson Stephens could not require Duffield to sign 
an arbitration agreement as a condition of her employment, 
the Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement that 
she signed. Id. at 1199 ("In view of the fact that the 
context, language, and legislative history of the 1991 Act 
together make out a conclusive case, that Congress 
intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII 
claims, we think it inescapable that [Duffield's arbitration 
agreement] is unenforceable as applied to such claims."). 
Those seeking to distinguish Duffield assert that it 
addressed only whether an employer may enforce 
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims against its 
employees. See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 
1307, 1315 (lIth Cir.2002) ("[Duffield] ... stand[s] for the 
proposition that compulsory arbitration agreements are 
'unenforceable' or are 'inconsistent' with Title VI!."); 
Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. EEOC, 245 F.3d 
831, 835 (D.C.Cir.200 I) ("Duffield ruled only that such 
agreements are 'unenforceable' with respect to Title VII 
claims."). We respectfully disagree with these narrow 
assessments. The Duffield Court decided whether an 
employer could require compulsory arbitration as a 
condition of employment-a question it believed dispositive 
of the entire case. The latter portions of Duffield which 
concluded that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable simply express the inevitable consequence 
of holding that employers may not require arbitration of 
Title VII claims as a condition of employment. See, e.g., id. 
at 1199. ("The contract before us [ ] requires compulsory 
arbitration ... and it is contracts of that nature we are 
compelled to hold unenforceable .... "). 
While Duffield properly considered whether an employer 
could require that an employee sign a compulsory 
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, 
arguably its outcome was at odds with existing Circuit 
authority. In Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 
F .2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.1992), we held that Congress did 
not intend to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims. The 
Mago Court extended Gilmer to Title VII claims, finding 
probative the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII. 
!d. Mago, however, did not interpret (or even mention) § 
118, even though Mago was decided months after its 
passage. 
Later in Lai, we observed: "Gilmer ... made it clear that the 
ADEA does not bar agreements to arbitrate federal age 
discrimination in employment claims. Our Circuit has 
extended Gilmer to employment discrimination claims 
brought under Title VII." Lai, 42 F.3d at 1303 (citing 
Mago) (emphasis added); see also id. ("The issue before 
us, however, is not whether employees may ever agree to 
arbitrate statutory employment claims; they can."). Lai 
discussed § 118, and contrary to Duffield, concluded that 
Congress intended to allow arbitration of Title VII claims 
"where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use 
these methods." *1002 42 F.3d at 1304-05 (citing 
H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1) (1991), reprinted in 1991 
u.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (statement of Sen. Dole». 
Although Duffield cited both Mago and Lai, it did not 
address these decisions' express statements that Gilmer 
and § 118 authorized compulsory arbitration of Title VII 
claims. 
Since our Duffield decision in 1998, our Sister Circuits as 
well as the Supreme Courts of Cali fomi a and Nevada have 
unanimously repudiated its holding. See, e.g., Desiderio v. 
Nat 'I Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198,206 (2d 
Cir.1999) (referring to Duffield's reasoning as "the poet's 
lament"); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,7 (lst Cir.1999); Koveleskie v. SBC 
Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361,365 (7th Cir.1999) ("We 
respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit on this issue 
.... "); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d 
Cir.1998); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 
832, 837 (8th Cir.1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 
105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C.Cir.1997); Austin v. 
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 
(4th Cir.1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 39 F .3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.1994); Bender v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (lIth 
Cir.1992); A~rord, 939 F.2d at 230; Willis v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir.1991); see also 
'Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24 
Ca1.4th 83,99 Ca1.Rptr.2d 745,6 P.3d 669,675-76 (2000) 
("Aside from the fact Duffield is a minority of one, we find 
its reasoning unpersuasive."); Kindred v. Second Judicial 
Dist., 116 Nev. 405, 996 P.2d 903, 906 (2000). Duffield, 
like Bikini Atoll, now sits ignominiously alone awaiting 
remediation. 
That remediation can occur, however, only if a decision of 
the Supreme Court permits us to question Duffield. See 
United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992) 
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("As a general rule, one three-judge panel of this court 
cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel. 
An exception to this rule arises when an intervening 
Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent 
of the Ninth Circuit .... ") (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). In Circuit City, the Supreme Court so directly 
undermined the reasoning behind Duffield, that we 
conclude it has lost its status as valid precedent. 
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court reviewed our decision 
in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th 
Cir.1998) (per curiam), in which we held that the FAA was 
not applicable to any contract of employment. The 
Supreme Court disagreed with Craft's conclusion, 
clarifying that the FAA covered all employment contracts 
except those of transportation workers. Circuit City, 532 
U.S. at 119, 121 S.Ct. l302. In the process, the Court 
described the "real benefits to the enforcement of 
arbitration provisions," including lower costs and easy 
choice-of-law resolution, and it rejected "the supposition 
that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow 
disappear when transferred to the employment context." 
Id. at 122-23, 121 S.Ct. l302. Most importantly, the Court 
believed it had "been quite specific in holding that 
arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA 
without contravening the policies of congressional 
enactments giving employees specific protection against 
discrimination prohibited by federal law ... ; by agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum." 
Id. 
Although Circuit City did not repudiate Duffield by name, 
the Supreme Court's language and reasoning decimated 
Duffield's conclusion that Congress intended *1003 to 
preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. In 
particular, Circuit City's unambiguous proclamation that 
"arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA 
without contravening the policies of congressional 
enactments giving employees specific protection against 
discrimination prohibited by federal law" cannot be 
reconciled with Duffield's holding that Congress intended 
Title VII, one such "congressional enactment," to preclude 
compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims.2 Circuit 
City, 532 U.S. at 122-23,121 S.Ct. l302. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court's emphatic reminder that the 
right to a judicial forum is not a substantive right 
contradicts Duffield's fundamental supposition that the Act 
guaranteed a nonwaivable, substantive right to a jury trial.3 
Compare Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23,121 S.Ct. 1302 
("[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial forum.") with Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185 ("[U]nder 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may not [through 
compulsory arbitration agreements] compel individuals to 
waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum. ") (emphasis 
added). In effect, Circuit City recognized that an aggrieved 
employee does not lose anything by resolving his 
grievances in an arbitral forum, where he may demand the 
"specific protection" against discrimination afforded by 
federal law, including Title VII. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 
123, 121 S.Ct. 1302. 
[1) [2) Instead of trying to salvage Duffield by creatively 
reconciling these inconsistencies as "different" yet 
"compatible holdings," we reach the inevitable conclusion 
that Duffield no longer remains good law.4 We regard 
Duffield as within the *1004 category of "fruitful error."5 
In Duffield's stead, we hold that an employer may require 
employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of 
employment. Our decision is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's language and reasoning in Circuit City. It also 
unifies Ninth Circuit case law and brings us in line with our 
Sister Circuits and the Supreme Courts of California and 
Nevada. We note also that it is consistent with Congress's 
pronouncement in ~ 118 that "arbitration is encouraged to 
resolve disputes arising under [Title VII]."6 Of course, not 
all compulsory arbitration agreements will be enforced; 
they must still comply with the principles of traditional 
contract law, including the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Our decision today should not impact the EEOC's mission 
at all. As the Supreme Court recently explained in EEOC v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 
L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), a compulsory arbitration agreement 
between an employer and an employee does not prevent 
the employee from filing a complaint with the EEOC. Nor 
does such an agreement bind the EEOC to an arbitral 
forum because the EEOC is not a party to that agreement. 
Id. Thus, even if an employee must arbitrate her Title VII 
claims pursuant to a compulsory arbitration agreement, the 
EEOC, in its ombudsman's role, remains free to seek 
appropriate victim-specific relief in any suitable forum. Id. 
at 769. 
[3) Without further ado, we vacate the district court's 
Duffield-based permanent injunction. Compelled by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City, we conclude that 
Duffield no longer remains good law. Luce Forward may 
require appropriate compulsory arbitration of its applicants 
and employees as a condition of employment. In addition, 
Luce Forward may enforce those arbitration agreements 
against current employees, as long as the arbitration 
agreements comply with traditional principles of contract 
law. 
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II RETALIATION 
Although the EEOC asserts that Circuit City did not 
implicitly overrule Duffield and that Duffield remains the 
law of the Circuit, the EEOC, nevertheless, does not place 
all its eggs in Duffield's basket. In fact, the EEOC 
primarily argues that Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated 
against Lagatree by not hiring him after he refused to sign 
Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement. 
[4] [5] The federal laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination make it unlawful for an employer to 
retaliate against an applicant or employee because she has 
engaged in a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 
(Title VII);? *100542 U.S.c. § l2203(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c. 
§ 623(d) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 2lS(a)(3)(EPA). To 
establish retaliation, the EEOC, on Lagatree's behalf, must 
prove that: (1) Lagatree engaged in a protected activity; (2) 
Lagatree suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) 
there was a causal link between Lagatree' s activity and the 
adverse employment decision. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 
118 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir.1997). Protected activities 
include: (1) opposing an unlawful employment practice; 
and (2) participating in a statutorily authorized proceeding. 
Silverv. KCA, Inc., S86F.2d 138, 141 (9thCir.1978). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Lagatree suffered an 
adverse employment decision when Luce Forward 
refrained from hiring him because he refused to sign Luce 
Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement. Luce 
Forward contests only whether Lagatree engaged in a 
protected activity when he refused to sign the arbitration 
agreement. See Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 
1406, 1411 (9th Cir.1987) (finding adverse employment 
action and causal link were undisputed and only question 
was whether employee engaged in protected opposition 
conduct); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 
1008,1011-12 (9th Cir.1983) (same). 
A. Opposing an Unlawful Employment Practice 
[6) [7] Lagatree's refusal to sign Luce Forward's 
compulsory arbitration agreement was not protected 
opposition conduct. Title VII's statutory "opposition 
clause" prohibits an employer from retaliating against an 
applicant or employee "because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice." See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); see also 29 U.S.c. § 
623(d) (ADEA); 42 U.s.C. § 12203(a)(ADA). It is not 
necessary that the policy opposed be demonstrably 
unlawfu1. Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013. If the 
employee's refusal to accede to an employer's policy is 
based on a reasonable beliefthat the policy is unlawful, the 
employee's conduct is a protected manner of opposition. 
See, e.g., Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer 
Prods., 212 F.3d 493, S06 (9th Cir.2000) ("Title VII allows 
employees to freely report actions that they reasonably 
believe are discriminatory, even if those actions are in fact 
lawfu1."). 
In September 1997, however, when Lagatree refused to 
sign Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement as 
a condition of his employment, he could not have 
reasonably believed that Luce Forward's arbitration policy 
was an unlawful employment practice. Indeed, on May 13, 
1991, six years before Lagatree' s stint at Luce Forward, 
the Supreme Court in Gilmer expressly permitted requiring 
compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a condition of 
employment. In addition, Congress amended Title VII with 
§ 118 to provide explicitly that "arbitration is encouraged 
to resolve disputes ansmg under [Title VII]." 
Subsequently, in 1994, Lai extended the rationale of 
Gilmer to employment discrimination claims brought 
under Title VII. 42 F.3d at 1303. Finally, by 1997, at least 
five of our Sister Circuits had interpreted § 118 to permit 
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. Until Duffield 
was decided May, 13, 1998-nearly a year after Lagatree's 
refusal of Luce Forward's employment offer-no Court of 
Appeals had concluded that § 118 forbade compulsory 
arbitration of Title VII claims. Cf Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1312 
(holding refusal *1006 to sign a compulsory arbitration 
agreement in 1999 was not protected opposition conduct 
because reliance on Duffield was not objectively 
reasonable). In the face of voluminous contrary legal 
precedent, Lagatree could not have reasonably believed 
Luce Forward was engaged in unlawful activity when it 
required arbitration as a condition of employment. 
In addition, Lagatree could not have reasonably interpreted 
the text of any relevant federal statute to forbid compulsory 
arbitration. The EEOC argues that Lagatree's refusal to 
waive his procedural right to file or litigate a civil suit was 
protected opposition conduct because the ADA makes it 
"unlawful to coerce ... or interfere with any individual in 
the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or 
protected by this chapter." 42 U.s.C. § l2203(b) (emphasis 
added). The EEOC's argument, however, assumes 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent that the right to a 
judicial forum is a substantive right guaranteed by the 
ADA. 
By 1997, the Supreme Court had held repeatedly that "[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather than a 
judicial forum." Gilmer, SOO U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 
(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, lOS S.Ct. 3346). By 
this language, the Supreme Court distinguished between 
the substantive rights guaranteed by the statute and the 
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right to a judicial forum. 
Moreover, glaringly absent from the EEOC's argument is 
any express statutory indication that arbitration of ADA 
claims (or any other employment discrimination claims) is 
disfavored. Section 12203 does not mention arbitration at 
all, and another section of the ADA, 42 U.S.c. § 12212, 
like § 118 of Title VII, provides that "arbitration is 
encouraged to resolve disputes." 
Lagatree could not have reasonably interpreted the ADA's 
pronouncement that "arbitration is encouraged" to mean 
that "compulsory arbitration as a condition of employment 
is forbidden." The EEOC fails to identify a single case 
from any Circuit that would have supported Lagatree' s 
refusal to sign Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration 
agreement. Because Lagatree could not have reasonably 
believed that Luce Forward's policy of requiring 
arbitration was an unlawful employment practice, his 
opposition to that policy was not protected opposition 
conduct. Thus, as a matter oflaw Luce Forward's refusal to 
hire Lagatree for not signing a compulsory arbitration 
agreement was not illegal retaliation. 
B. Participating in a Statutorily Authorized Proceeding 
[8] By refusing to sign Luce Forward's compulsory 
arbitration agreement, Lagatree was not participating in a 
statutorily authorized proceeding. Title VII, the ADA, and 
the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate or retaliate against an employee or an 
applicant for employment because that person "has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
a ... proceeding." 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); 42 
US.c. § 12203(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c. § 623(d) (ADEA). 
The EPA similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate or retaliate against any employee because 
such employee has "instituted or caused to be instituted a 
proceeding under or related the [the EPA], or has testified 
or is about to testify in any such proceeding." 29 U.S.c. § 
215(a)(3). A covered "proceeding" undoubtedly includes 
instituting "a civil action ... in a court of competent 
jurisdiction." 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), (3) (Title VII); 
42 U.s.c. § 12117(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c. § 626(c)(l) 
(ADEA); 29 U.S.c. § 216(b)(EPA). An *1007 individual 
who files a civil action has "participated in any manner" in 
a covered proceeding; thus an employer may not retaliate 
against that individual. 
[9] The statutory protections against retaliation also extend 
to an applicant or an employee who informs his employer 
of his intention to participate in a statutory proceeding, 
even if he has not yet done so. See Gifford v. Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (9th 
Cir.1982) (holding employee states a retaliation claim after 
being fired for writing a letter threatening an EEOC 
charge). In Gifford, we saw no "legal distinction .. . 
between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected .. . 
and threatening to file a charge." Id. at 1156 n. 3. 
Here, the EEOC argues that Luce Forward cannot refuse to 
hire Lagatree because, although he did not file or threaten a 
civil action, he reserved his right to bring a civil action in a 
judicial forum. EEOC completes its argument as follows: 
[Luce Forward]'s practice of refusing to 
employ any individual who will not sign 
the compulsory waiver ... is effectively a 
preemptive strike against future 
participation conduct afforded absolute 
protection under each of the federal 
anti-retaliation provisions. Rather than 
wait for an employee to file or litigate a 
suit under a federal rights law, or to 
announce his intention to do so-at which 
point the employee unquestionably 
would be statutorily protected from any 
retaliatory adverse treatment, Luce 
Forward preemptively denies 
employment to any individual who will 
not waive his right to engage in such 
protected participation activity. 
Critical to the EEOC's position is the notion that 
Lagatree's right to a judicial forum is "afforded absolute 
protection under each of the federal anti-retaliation 
provisions." That notion, and thus the EEOC's entire 
position, lacks merit. 
Although Lagatree undoubtedly retained the right to be 
free from discrimination, a right he could not prospectively 
waive, see, e.g., 29 U.S.c. § 626(f)(c), no federal law 
guaranteed him the ability to vindicate that right in a 
judicial forum. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gilmer 
condoned compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a 
condition of employment. Reaffirming Gilmer, in Circuit 
City, the Supreme Court extolled the advantages of 
arbitrating employment discrimination claims and rejected 
the "supposition that the advantages of the arbitration 
process somehow disappear when transferred to the 
employment context." 532 U.S. at 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302. 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
right to a judicial forum was not a substantive right: "By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial forum." Id. 
Waiving the right to a judicial forum is unlike signing a 
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"yellow dog contract," by which an employer forbids an 
employee from joining a union. An employee's right to 
join a union is a substantive right guaranteed by the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151. No statute, 
however, forbids the compulsory waiver of a judicial 
forum, and thus demanding its waiver is not illegal. While 
Congress might have forbidden arbitration of employment 
discrimination claims, instead, it "encouraged" their 
arbitration. 
Along with his experience and credentials, the privilege of 
a judicial forum was a valuable asset Lagatree brought to 
the negotiating table. During negotiations, Luce Forward 
offered Lagatree a base salary of $3,600/month plus 
substantial benefits in return for his services and his 
agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes. 
Lagatree objected to Luce *1008 Forward's demand of 
arbitration and counteroffered, asking that Luce Forward 
waive its compulsory arbitration requirement. Luce 
Forward refused to waive compulsory arbitration, and 
Lagatree initially decided to accept Luce Forward's terms 
of employment. When Lagatree ultimately refused to agree 
to Luce Forward's terms of employment, he simply made a 
rational economic decision that Luce Forward was asking 
too much and offering too little in return. But Luce 
Forward incurred no liability as a result of these failed 
negotiations; it only lost the potential services of a 
qualified applicant. Indeed, dickering over freely waivable 
rights is not a protected activity, and the failure to agree to 
the terms of an employment contract is not retaliation. 
CONCLUSION 
Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield, and therefore, 
we vacate the district court's permanent injunction, which 
relied on Duffield. We hold that Luce Forward could 
require Lagatree to arbitrate potential Title VII claims as a 
condition of his employment. When Lagatree refused to 
sign the arbitration agreement, Luce Forward's refusal to 
hire him was not unlawful retaliation because Lagatree's 
right to a judicial forum is not afTorded absolute protection 
under any federal statute. 
VACATED; REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
FOR JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 
LUCE FORWARD. 
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. The maJonty concludes that in 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 
1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), the Supreme Court 
"implicitly overruled" Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & 
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998). Maj. op. at 996-97. For 
the following reasons, I would find that Duffield remains 
good law. 
I. 
The issue in Duffield was whether employers may require 
their employees, as a mandatory condition of employment, 
to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. See Duffield, 
144 F.3d at 1185. Based on an analysis of Congress' intent 
when it amended Title VII through the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), we held 
that employers may not require employees, as a mandatory 
condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title 
VII claims. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90. 
The issue in Circuit City was whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.c. § 1 et seq., excludes 
from its coverage not only employment arbitration 
agreements by transportation workers, but also 
employment arbitration agreements by non-transportation 
workers. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109,121 S.Ct. 1302. 
Without mentioning Duffield, Title VII, or the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, the Supreme Court held that the FAA 
excludes from its coverage employment arbitration 
agreement by transportation workers, but not employment 
arbitration agreements by non-transportation workers. See 
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 1302. 
Duffield and Circuit City are cases of the proverbial apples 
and oranges: different law, different issues, and different, 
yet compatible holdings. Most importantly, when the 
Supreme Court concluded in Circuit City that the FAA 
covers employment arbitration agreements by 
non-transportation workers, it did not also implicitly 
conclude, contra Duffield, that employers may require 
their employees, as a mandatory condition of employment, 
to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. Whether the 
FAA covers employment arbitration *1009 agreements by 
non-transportation workers-the issue in Circuit City-is one 
question. Whether an employer may require an employee, 
as a mandatory condition of employment, to agree to 
arbitratefitture Title VII claims-the issue in Duffield-is an 
entirely different question. In answering "yes" to the first 
question, Circuit City did not also implicitly answer "yes" 
to the second question. "Arbitration under the [FAA] is a 
matter of consent, not coercion .... " Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Ed. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). It is entirely 
consistent to hold-as the Supreme Court did in Circuit 
City-that non-transportation workers who consent in 
advance to arbitration can later be held to that agreement 
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under the FAA, and to also hold-as we did in Duffield-that 
employers may not compel their employees to enter 
arbitration agreements under Title VII. Accordingly, 
Duffield remains good law after Circuit City, and the 
District Court's injunction modeled on Duffield should be 
affirmed. 
II. 
The majority advances two arguments in support of its 
conclusion that Circuit City "implicitly overruled" 
DujJield. Both arguments are unconvincing. 
A. 
First, the maJonty relies on dicta in Circuit City that 
"arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA 
without contravening the policies of congressional 
enactments giving employees specific protection against 
discrimination prohibited by federal law." Maj. op. at 1002 
(quoting Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302) 
(emphasis added). I The majority claims that this 
"unambiguous proclamation ... cannot be reconciled with 
Duffield's holding that Congress intended Title VII to 
preclude compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims." 
Maj. op. at 1003 (citing Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123,121 
S.Ct. 1302) (footnote omitted, emphasis added). In reality, 
there is no contradiction whatsoever between the Circuit 
City dicta and the Duffield holding. 
In perceiving a contradiction between the Circuit Citv 
dicta and the Duffield holding, the majority ignores ~a 
crucial word in the Duffield holding: "compulsory." In 
Duffield, we referred to arbitration agreements as 
compulsory "when individuals must sign an agreement 
waiving their rights to litigate future claims in a judicial 
forum in order to obtain employment with, or continue to 
work for, the employer." See 144 F.3d at 1187.2 The 
Supreme Court said in Circuit City only that, generally, 
employees who have *1010 agreed to arbitrate future 
claims under federal anti-discrimination law can be held to 
such arbitration agreements without violating the policies 
of federal anti-discrimination law. The Supreme Court did 
not also say in Circuit City-contra Duffield-that employees 
can be required, as a mandatory condition of employment, 
to agree to arbitrate future claims under federal 
anti-discrimination law without violating the policies of 
federal anti-discrimination law. Nor is the second 
statement implied in the first. Perhaps more importantly, 
the Circuit City dicta that enforcement of arbitration 
agreements can be compatible with the policies of federal 
anti-discrimination law does not contradict the Duffield 
holding that in the case of Title VII, enforcement of 
compulsory arbitration agreements is always incompatible 
with the text and legislative history of the § 118 of Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. 
We reached our holding in Duffield after closely following 
instructions set forth by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 
1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) in the context of another 
federal anti-discrimination law, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEN'). In Gilmer, the Supreme 
Court first reiterated that" '[h]aving made the bargain to 
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress 
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.' " 500 
U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 
105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985» (alteration in 
original). The Supreme Court then placed the burden on 
the plaintiff, who sought to avoid arbitration of his ADEA 
claim as per agreement, "to show that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims." 
Id. The Supreme Court observed that "[i]f such an 
intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the 
ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' 
between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying 
purposes." Id. The Supreme Court examined the ADEA in 
this regard and held that the plaintiff "ha[ d] not met his 
burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, 
intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act." 
Id. at 35, III S.Ct. 1647.3 
In Duffield, we recited these instructions word for word: 
"Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should 
be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an 
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for 
the statutory rights at issue." Mitsubishi, ... 473 U.S. [at] 
628, 105 S.Ct. 3346 .... The burden, therefore, is on 
Duffield to demonstrate that "Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of a judicial *1011 forum for [Title 
VII] claims" in the manner mandated by the [securities 
registration application]. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III 
S.Ct. 1647 .... "If such an intention exists, it will be 
discoverable in the text of [the act at issue], its 
legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between 
arbitration and the [act's] underlying purposes." Id. at 
26, III S.Ct. 1647 .... 
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. We moreover closely followed 
these instructions in Duffield when we found that 
"Congress' intent to preclude the compulsory arbitration of 
Title VII claims is conclusively demonstrated in the text 
and!or legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991...." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90 (emphasis added); 
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compare with Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647. 
Section lIS of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides: 
"Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, 
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, 
including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes 
arising under [Title VII]." Pub. L. No.1 02-166, § lIS, 105 
Stat 1071 (1991), reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 19S1 
(emphasis added). Regarding the text of § lIS, we 
observed that especially in light of the limiting phrases 
"[ w ]here appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by 
law," "it would seem entirely disingenuous to fasten onto 
... one word," i.e., encouraged, "and conclude that 
Congress was boundlessly in favor of all forms of 
arbitration." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. Indeed, given that 
encouragement implies voluntariness and requirement 
implies involuntariness, Congress' instruction in § 118 that 
"arbitration ... is encouraged" if anything seems to 
contradict the majority's conclusion that arbitration may be 
required as a condition of employment under Title VII. We 
concluded that "the text of [§ lIS] is, at a minimum, 
ambiguous," and we therefore turned to the legislative 
history of that section. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. Because 
our detailed discussion in Duffield of § l1S's legislative 
history unequivocally supports our holding in that case, 
and because the majority in the present case does not 
address any part of that discussion, I reproduce that 
discussion below at some length: 
Congress in fact specifically rejected a proposal that 
would have allowed employers to enforce "compulsory 
arbitration" agreements. It did so in the most emphatic 
terms, explaining that: 
H.R. 1 includes a provision encouraging the use of 
alternative means of dispute resolution to supplement, 
rather than supplant, the rights and remedies provided 
by Title VII. The Republican substitute, however, 
encourages the use of such mechanisms "in place of 
judicial resolution." Thus. under the latter proposal 
employers could refuse to hire workers unless they 
signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file 
Title VII complaints .... American workers should not 
be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil 
rights. 
H.R. Rep. No. 40(I) at 104 (emphasis added). This 
rejection of the "Republican" proposal provides ... 
"strong evidence" of Congress' intent ... to preclude 
compulsory arbitration of civil rights claims and to 
"encourage" only voluntary agreements-agreements that 
do not require potential employees to waive their right to 
litigate in a judicial forum as a mandatory condition of 
employment.... The [House] Committee [on Education 
and Labor], s view of § 118 was reiterated by key 
congressmen in the floor debates, who repeatedly stated 
that § lIS encouraged arbitration only "where parties 
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use those methods." 
137 Congo Rec. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) 
(statement of Sen. Dole); see *1012 also 137 Congo Rec. 
H954S (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
Hyde) (explaining that § lIS encourages arbitration 
where "the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect" to 
submit to such procedures). The most informed and 
important statements were made by Representative 
Edwards, the Chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor. Representative Edwards 
unequivocally explained during the debate immediately 
prior to the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1991]'s passage ... : 
["]This section contemplates the use of voluntary 
arbitration ... , not coercive attempts to force employees 
in advance to forego statutory rights .... ["] [137 Congo 
Rec. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
Edwards)] (emphasis added). Finally, President Bush 
echoed Congress' understanding of the arbitration 
section in signing the Act, stating that "section lIS 
encourages voluntary agreements between employers 
and employees to rely on alternative mechanisms such 
as mediation and arbitration." Statement of the President 
of the United States, Signing Ceremony, Pub. L. No. 
102-166 (Nov. 21, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (emphasis added). 
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196-97 (footnote omitted). 
Notwithstanding the majority's unsupported statement that 
the Duffield court "pick[ ed] and cho [se] snippets of 
legislative history consistent with its desired result," maj. 
op. at 1001, there can be little doubt in the correctness of 
the conclusion by the Duffield court that arbitration 
agreements required by employers from their employees 
as a condition of employment are not "voluntary 
arbitration agreements between employers and employees" 
as envisioned by Congress for Title VII. Duffield's holding 
that enforcement of compulsory arbitration agreements 
violates the text and legislative history of § lIS of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 is compatible with Circuit City dicta 
that enforcement of consensual arbitration agreements 
does not violate the policies of federal anti-discrimination 
law. 
B. 
Second, the majority claims that "the Supreme Court's 
emphatic reminder [in Circuit City] that the right to a 
judicial forum is not a substantive right contradicts 
Duffield's fundamental supposition that the Act guaranteed 
a nonwaivable, substantive right to a jury trial." Maj. op. at 
1003. The majority attempts to support this claim by 
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comparing the Supreme Court's statement in Circuit City 
that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute," 
532 U.S. at 123,121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. 
at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 
at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346)), with our holding in Duffield that 
"under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may not 
[through compulsory arbitration agreements] compel 
individuals to waive their Title VII right to a judicial 
forum," 144 F.3d at 1185. See maj. op. at 1000. Nowhere 
in Duffield, however, did we suggest that this "right to a 
judicial forum" is a substantive right, as the majority 
claims. Indeed, our statement in Duffield that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 "increased substantially the procedural 
rights and remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs," 144 
FJd at 1189 (emphasis added), suggests, to the contrary, 
that we perceived the right to a jury trial as a procedural 
right. Duffield, then, "was not premised ... on the arbitral 
forum causing a loss of substantive rights." Melton v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 0 1-93-KI, 200 I WL 1105046, 
*3 (D.Or. Aug. 9, 2001). Instead, "Duffield found 'the 
context, language and [legislative] history ... make out a 
conclusive case ... that Congress intended to preclude 
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.' " Id. (quoting 
*1013 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199). Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court's statement that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate 
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute," Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 
123, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III 
S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 
105 S.Ct. 3346)), does not contradict our conclusion that 
"Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of 
Title VII claims," Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199. 
Most damaging to the majority's argument is that already 
in Duffield, we considered the very language which the 
Supreme Court later quoted in Circuit City-and which the 
majority now concludes "contradicts" our holding in 
Duffield-and concluded that this language was compatible 
with our holding there. We first wrote: "We recognize that, 
as the Supreme Court has stated, agreements to arbitrate 
must generally be treated not as 'forego[ing] the 
substantive rights afforded by [a] statute,' but rather as 
_ merely changing the forum in which they are protected. 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 ... (quoting 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346 .... )" Duffield, 
144 F.3d at 1199. We then explained: 
Yet even assuming that the general 
federal policy in favor of arbitration 
would ordinarily apply to the compulsory 
arbitration of civil rights claims, we are 
not free to apply that policy here. Where 
Congress has manifested its intent, with 
regard to arbitration questions and 
otherwise, the Supreme Court has made 
it abundantly clear that the judiciary is 
not free to "legislate" its own contrary 
preferences. 
!d. (citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,406-07, 
118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998)). 
According to the majority, Circuit City contradicted 
Duffield by merely re-quoting language from Gilmer and 
Mitsubishi; language which we already considered in 
Duffield and found compatible with our holding there. The 
majority reads too much into Circuit City. Circuit City 
added nothing to the interpretation of the 
Gilmer!Mitsubishi language. In particular, Circuit City did 
not contradict the interpretation of that language in 
Duffield. In the end, the majority does no more than 
register its own disagreement with this court's earlier 
interpretation of the Gilmer! Mitsubishi language in 
Duffield. But as the majority acknowledges, such 
disagreement by one panel of this court with a prior panel 
of this court is not a proper ground for reconsidering the 
decision of the prior panel. See maj. op. at 1002 (citing 
United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992)).4 
*1014 III. 
Less than four years ago, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Duffield. See Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens 
& Co., 525 U.S. 982, 119 S.Ct. 445, 142 L.Ed.2d 399 
(1998). Last year, the same Supreme Court decided a 
different issue in Circuit City without as much as 
mentioning Duffield. In the present case, the majority, after 
brushing aside Duffield's careful statutory interpretation as 
an "exercise," maj. op. at 1000, and reading into Circuit 
City what isn't there, somehow reaches "the inevitable 
conclusion" that Duffield has been "implicitly overruled" 
and "no longer remains good law," maj. op. at 1003, 1008. 
The majority recognizes that it is error for one panel of our 
court to "remed[y]" the decision of another panel of our 
court, unless "a decision of the Supreme Court requires 
th[e] panel" to do so. Maj. op. at 1002.5 Indeed, we 
observed in Gay that "one three-judge panel of this court 
cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior 
panel," except "when 'an intervening Supreme Court 
decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth 
Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.' " 967 F .2d at 
327 (quoting United States v. Lancellotti, 761 F.2d 1363, 
1366 (9th Cir.1985)). Because no intervening decision by 
the Supreme Court has undermined Duffield's holding, it is 
error for the majority to reconsider that holding. 
Perhaps most disturbing is that the majority does not 
consider the consequences of its holding today. By 
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allowing employers to require their employees, as a 
mandatory condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate 
future Title VII claims, the majority allows employers to 
force their employees to chose between their jobs and their 
right to bring future Title VII claims in court. That choice, 
of course, is no choice at all.6 There may be "real benefits 
to the enforcement of arbitration provisions." Maj. op. at 
1002 (quoting Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23, 121 S.Ct. 
1302).7 *1015 That does not justifY allowing employers to 
shove arbitration provisions down the throats of individual 
employees as a non-negotiable precondition of 
employment. 
Footnotes 
I dissent. 
Parallel Citations 
89 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1134, 83 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
P 41,168, 13 AD. Cases 792, 24 NDLR P 206, 02 Cal. 
Daily Op. Servo 8033,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,089, 
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,055 
* The Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation. 
1 In the wake of Gilmer, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alford V. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
which had held that an employee was not required to arbitrate her Title VII sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims despite 
having signed a compulsory arbitration agreement. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.1990), vacated by 500 U.S. 930, III S.Ct. 2050, 114 
L.Ed.2d 456 (1991) ("The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the ... Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of 
Gilmer .... "). The Fifth Circuit reversed itself, holding that Title VIJ claims may be arbitrated pursuant to a eompulsory agreement. 
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc .. 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.1991). 
2 1lle dissent claims we ignore the import of the word "compulsory" which it equates with "coercive" employer conduct. We do no 
such thing. However, instead of categorically prohibiting all so-called "compulsory" arbitration agreements, as the dissent would do, 
we police truly "coercive" employer conduct through the application of traditional contract law principles, including 
unconscionability, which specifically examines the question of coercion. See e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psych care Servo Inc., 
24 Cal.4th 83, 113-22,99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (2000). 
3 The dissent citcs Melton V. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 0 1-93-KI, 200 I WL 1105046, at *3 (D.Or. Aug. 9, 2001), for the proposition 
that Duffield "was not premised ... on the arbitral forum causing a loss of substantive rights," but amazingly neglects to consider or 
explain Duffield's own language to the contrary. See, e.g., Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185. 
4 It seems our remedial efforts arrived not a moment too soon. Our own Court has begun to hack away at Duffield's viability. See 
Circuit City Stores V. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2(02) ("Duffield's continued validity is questionable."). Our Sister 
Circuits have also begun to undermine Duffield. Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1315 ("Further, the viability of Duffield has been recognized to 
be in considerable doubt in light of the later decided Circuit City."); Borg-Warner, 245 F.3d at 835 ("We cannot say whether the 
Ninth Circuit will continue to adhere to DufJield in the face of the Supreme Court's Circuit City decision."). More noteworthy, 
perhaps, our district courts are adrift, wondering whether Duffield remains valid precedent. Four district court opinions have held that 
Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield. Farac V. Permanente Med. Grollp, 186 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1045 (N.D.CaI.2002) ("Circuit 
City implicitly overruled Duffield."); Eftekhari V. Peregrine Fin. & Sec., Inc., No. C 00-3594 JL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16087, at 
*25,2001 WL 1180640 (N.D.Cal. September 24,20(1); Olivares V. Hispanic Broad. Corp., No. CV 00-00354-ER, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5760, at *1-2, 2001 WL 477171 (C.O. Cal. April 26, 2(01); Scott V. Burns Int'! Sec. Servs., Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1133,1137 
(O.Hawai'i 2(01) ("The Supreme Court's contrary statement in Circuit City that arbitration agreements do not contravene the 
policies of congressional enactments of the protections of federal law ... implicitly overrules ... Duffield. "). However, three district 
court opinions have expressed the contrary view that Duffield remains valid precedent. Circuit City Stores v. Banyasz, No. C-O 1-3106 
WHO, 2001 U.S. Oist. LEXIS 16953, at *6-8, 200 I WL 1218406 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 11,20(1); Melton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *6-9, 
2001 WL 1105046 (D.Or. Aug. 9,20(1); Fergllson V. Countrywide Credit indus., inc., No. CVOO-13096AHM(CTX), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS, 200 I WL 867103 (C.O.Cal. Apr. 23, 200 I) afrd on other grounds 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2(02) (Pregerson J.). 
5 To quote the recently-departed polymath, Stephen 1. Gould, ''[a]s the great Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto wrote: 'Give me a 
fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own cOlTections. You can keep your sterile truth for yourself.' " Stephen 1. 
Gould, The Panda's Thumb, 244 (1980). 
6 "We do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear." Circllit City, 532 U.S. at 119, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting 
RatzlaJ V. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)). 
7 All the federal anti-discrimination statutes contain similar provisions forbidding retaliation. By way of representative example, Title 
VII, 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-3, provides: 
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter. 
The above quoted passage from Circuit City is dicta because it refers only to federal anti-discrimination law and Circuit City involves 
exclusively state anti-discrimination law. See 532 U.S. at 110, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302. Needless to say, such dicta cannot overrule-not 
even explicitly and much less "implicitly"-a holding, like the one in Duffield. This fact by itself invalidates the majority's first 
argument in support of its conclusion that Circuit City "implicitly overruled" Duffield. But even if this were not enough, there are-as 
shown below-additional reasons to reject the majority's first argument. 
2 In Duffield, we thus did not use the term "compulsory arbitration" as it is traditionally defined. See Black's Law Dictionary 100 (7tb 
ed. 1999) (defining "compulsory arbitration" as "[a]rbitration required by law or forced by law on the parties"). "Compulsory 
arbitration," both as we used that term in Duffield and as it is traditionally defined, must furthermore be distinguished from 
"mandatory arbitration." See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361,362 (7th Cir.1999) (employing the term 
"mandatory arbitration" to reflect "the contractual situation where if one party to a dispute requests arbitration, the other party is 
obliged to arbitrate"). 
3 It is misleading to state, as the majority does, that the Supreme Court held in Gilmer that "an employer could compel arbitration of an 
employee's ADEA claim pursuant to an arbitration provision required as a condition of his employment." Maj. op. at 999. The 
Supreme Court indeed stated the question presented as "whether a claim under the [ADEA] can be subjected to compulsory 
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, III S.Ct. 1647. But 
the Supreme Court did not use the term "compulsory" in the sense given to that tenn in Duffield, i.e., requiring an employee to sign an 
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Rather, the Supreme Court used the 
term "compulsory" in the sense of "mandatory," i.e., contractually required. See id. And while the arbitration provision at issue in 
Gilmer was indeed required as a condition of employment, this was not made an issue by the Supreme Court, which held more 
generally that the plaintiff "ha[ d] not met his burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude 
arbitration of claims under that Act." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, II I S.Ct. 1647. Thus, there is no conflict between Gilmer and Duffield. 
4 For the same reasons, the Supreme Court's subsequent statement in EEOC v. Waffle HOllse, inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754,765 n. 
10, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), that "[the Supreme Court has] held that federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration 
agreements that are enforceable pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum" does not make 
"Duffield's continuing validity ... questionable" or "cast doubt as to whether Congress precluded compulsory arbitration of Title VII 
claims," contrary to what a panel of this court recently suggested in Circuit City Stores, inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.2002). 
See id. at 1107 (stating that "[u]ltimately," the Najd court did not have to "decide whether Duffield remains good law because Najd 
did not sue under Title VII"), see also id. at 1110 (Paez, 1., concurring) (criticizing the Najd majority's "assault on the validity of 
Duffield" as "entirely unnecessary" and "merely gratuitous"), In support of its statement that federal statutory claims may be the 
subject of enforceable arbitration agreements because such agreements determine only the choice of forum, the Waffle House 
Court-like the Circuit City Court-merely re-quoted the same passage from Gilmer and Mitsubishi which we already considered in 
Duffield and found compatible with our holding there. See WajJle HOllse, 122 S.Ct. at 765 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 754 (quoting Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsllbishi, 473 U.S. at 628,105 S.Ct. 3346)). 
5 It is, therefore, irrelevant whether "[ s ]ince our Duffield decision in 1998, our Sister Circuits as well as the Supreme Courts of 
California and Nevada have unanimously repudiated its holding." Maj. op. at 1001-02. Moreover, six of the ten cases from other 
circuits cited in support of this statement were decided before Duffield. In none of these six cases was the question at issue in Duffield 
and in the present case-whether employers may require employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title 
VII claims-a question that was explicitly decided contra Duffield. 
6 More than three-quarters of a century ago, Andrew Furuseth, then president of the International Seaman's Union of America, said in 
opposition to the FAA as originally proposed: "Will such contracts be signed') Esau agreed, because he was hungry .... With the 
growing hunger in modern society, there will be but few that will be able to resist." Proceedings of the 26th Annual Convention of the 
international Seaman's Union of America 203-204 (1923). This still holds true today, if employers are allowed to require their 
employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate their future Title VII claims. It was for this reason that in 1991, 
Congress rejected a "Republican substitute" for § 118 which would have allowed such compulsory arbitration agreements. Congress 
explained that "American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil rights." H.R. Rep. No. 40(1) at 
104 (emphasis added). 
7 There are also well-known "potential disadvantages" from the employees' point of view, such as "waiver of a right to a jury trial, 
limited discovery, and limited judicial review." Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 
745,6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000) (noting also that "[v]arious studies show that arbitration is advantageous to the employers ... because it 
reduces the size of the award that an employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a 'repeat player' in the arbitration 
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system"). See also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (l1th Cir.1998) (noting that "[a]rbitration 
ordinarily brings hardship for litigants along with potential efficiency" because "[a]rbitrallitigants often lack discovery, evidentiary 
rules, a jury, and any meaningful right to further review"); Katherine Eddy, Note, To Every Remedy a Wrong: The Confounding oj 
Civil Liberties Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 52 Hastings L.J. 771, 776-77 (2001) (noting that 
"[a]nother major disadvantage [of arbitration] to employee-plaintiffs is the lack of diversity among the arbitrators from which the 
employee may choose" because, for example, "[o]fthe 50,000 arbitrators on the American Arbitration Association panels, only 6% 
are women"). 
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389F.3d 802 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
David ENLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
SALEM-KEIZER YELLOW CAB CO., INC., 
an Oregon corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 02-35881. I Argued and Submitted Nov. 
4,2003. I Filed June 10,2004. I Amended 
Nov. 2, 2004. 
Synopsis 
Background: Former employee brought action against 
former employer alleging discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon, Donald C. 
Ashmanskas, United States Magistrate Judge, 2001 WL 
34041899, denied employee's motion for partial summary 
judgment and granted employer's motion for summary 
judgment. Employee appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Alarcon, Circuit Judge, 
held that: 
[I] district court erroneously applied McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting analysis, and 
[2] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
termination of employee was temporary or permanent. 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
Ferguson, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
Opinion, 371 F.3d 645, superseded on denial of rehearing. 
West Headnotes (8) 
[I] Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
District court erroneously applied McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting analysis in ruling on 
employer's summary judgment motion in ADEA 
action by requiring former employee to produce 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
evidence that employer had a discriminatory 
motive for terminating his employment as a taxi 
driver, where employee presented direct 
evidence that employer permanently terminated 
his employment because he was over 70; 
evidence that employee was 73 years old and that 
employer's new auto insurance policy did not 
cover drivers over the age of 70 supported 
inference that employer had adopted practice of 
intentionally discriminating against drivers over 
70 years of age. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
14 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
..... Disparate Treatment 
Civil Rights 
/,Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment is demonstrated when the 
employer simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion or other protected characteristics. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
. •. Disparate Treatment 
Liability in a disparate treatment claim under the 
ADEA depends on whether the protected trait of 
age actually motivated the employer's decision. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
4 Cases that cite thIS headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
.... Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
When an employee alleges disparate treatment 
based on direct evidence in an ADEA claim, the 
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[5) 
Court of Appeals does not apply the 
burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas in determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
24 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
''''''$Age Discrimination 
Direct evidence of discrimination in the context 
of an ADEA claim is defined as evidence of 
conduct or statements by persons involved in the 
decision-making process that may be viewed as 
directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory 
attitude sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer 
that attitude was more likely than not a 
motivating factor in the employer's decision. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
38 Cases that cite this headnote 
[6) Civil Rights 
[7) 
,Age Discrimination 
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting formula 
applies under the ADEA where an employee 
must rely on circumstantial evidence that he or 
she was at least 40 years old, met the requisite 
qualifications for the job, and was discharged 
while younger employees were retained; it 
creates a presumption that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated against the employee. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
". Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Under McDonnell Douglas, if an employee 
presents prima facie circumstantial evidence of 
(8) 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer 
to produce evidence that the plaintiff was 
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; this 
burden-shifting scheme is designed to assure that 
the plaintiff has his day in court despite the 
unavailability of direct evidence. 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
'c)",Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether employer permanently terminated 73 
year old employee from his taxi driver position, 
or whether employee was temporarily discharged 
to avoid termination of employer's business 
license while it negotiated with it insurer to waive 
age exclusion provisions in its auto policy, 
precluding summary judgment in employee's 
ADEA action against employer. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*804 John S. Razor, The Law Office of John S. Razor, 
Salem, OR, for the plaintiff-appellant. 
Robert J. Custis, Kent Custis LLP, Portland, OR, for the 
defendant -appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon; Donald C. Ashmanskas, Magistrate 
Judge, Presiding.* D.C. No. CV-00-OI331-AS. 
Before: ALARCON, FERGUSON, and RAWLINSON, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
Opinion by Judge ALARCON; Partial Concurrence and 
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Partial Dissent by Judge FERGUSON. 
ORDER 
The court's opinion, filed June 10,2004, [371 F.3d 645] is 
amended as follows: 
The second paragraph on slip op. 7621 [371 F.3d at 647] 
that reads: 
is deleted. 
We affirm the denial of his motion 
because we conclude that Yellow Cab 
presented sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether it terminated Mr. Enlow's 
employment temporarily without 
discriminatory intent. We reverse the 
order granting Yellow Cab's motion for 
summary judgment, however, because 
the district erred in concluding that Mr. 
Enlow failed to present prima facie 
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with a 
discriminatory motive or intent. 
The following paragraph shall be inserted on page 7621 
[371 F.3d at 647] and substituted for the deleted text. 
We affirm the denial of his motion 
because we conclude that Yellow Cab 
presented sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether, as asserted in its response to 
Enlow's motion for partial summary 
judgment, it terminated Mr. Enlow's 
employment temporarily based on a bona 
fide occupational qualification 
("BFOQ") or because of reasonable 
factors other than age ("RFOA"). We 
reverse the order granting Yellow Cab's 
motion for summary judgment, however, 
because the district erred in concluding 
that Mr. Enlow failed to present prima 
*805 facie evidence that Yellow Cab 
acted with a discriminatory motive or 
intent. 
On the sixth line of slip op. 7623 [371 F.3d at 648], delete 
"seventy-two" and substitute "seventy-three" for the 
deleted text. 
On slip op. 7623 [371 F.3d at 648], the second sentence of 
the second paragraph reads: 
is deleted. 
We discuss below the conflicting 
evidence presented by the parties 
regarding whether the termination ofMr. 
Enlow's employment was intended to be 
temporary or permanent, and whether 
Yellow Cab acted pursuant to a facially 
discriminatory employment practice to 
discharge employees over seventy years 
old. 
The following sentence shall be inserted on slip op. 7623 
[371 F.3d at 648] and substituted for the deleted text: 
We discuss below the conflicting 
evidence presented by the parties 
regarding whether Mr. Enlow's 
employment was permanently 
terminated solely to save costs, or 
whether Yellow Cab intended to 
interrupt his employment temporarily in 
order to avoid losing its business license. 
In the fifth line of the last paragraph on slip op. 7623 [371 
F.3d at 648] delete "seventy-two years old" and substitute 
"seventy-three years old" for the deleted text. 
In the first paragraph under Part One on slip op. 7624 [371 
F.3d at 649] insert the words "in order to survive a motion 
for summary judgment" at the end of the second sentence. 
In the first line of the paragraph beginning on line 8 on slip 
op. 7627 [371 F.3d at 650] insert "In his opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment," before the words "Mr. 
Enlow". 
On line 1 0 of slip op. 7627 [371 F .3d at 650] delete 
"seventy-two years old" and substitute "seventy-three 
years old" for the deleted text. 
On line 11 of slip op. 7627 [371 F.3d at 650] insert the 
following sentences after the word "seventy." 
In an affidavit filed in support of his motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Enlow declared that "[a]t no 
time did the defendant offer me an unconditional offer 
of re-employment." He further, stated that "[m]y 
understanding at the time of my termination was that I 
was terminated and would no longer be working for the 
Defendant. " 
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On lines 15 and 16 of slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651] delete 
the words "by an age discriminatory employment practice" 
and substitute "because he was over the age of seventy" for 
the deleted text. 
Beginning with line 16 of slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651] 
delete: 
Mr. Enlow relied on the direct evidence 
that his employment was terminated 
because the Star Insurance policy did not 
cover employees who were older than 
seventy years of age. This evidence was 
sufficient to support an inference that by 
terminating his employment after 
purchasing the Star Insurance policy, 
Yellow Cab adopted a practice of 
intentionally discriminating against 
employees over seventy years of age. 
Beginning with line 28 on slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651] 
delete: 
At trial, Mr. Enlow will bear the burden of persuading 
the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Yellow Cab's motive in terminating Mr. Enlow's 
employment was discriminatory. See Reeves, 530 U.S. 
at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (" 'The ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains 
at all times with the *806 plaintiff.' ") (quoting Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). 
Beginning with line 15 on slip op. 7629 [371 F.3d at 
651-52] delete the following text to line 16 on slip op. 7630 
[371 F.3d at 652]. 
Accordingly, Mr. Enlow's reliance on UAWv. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 
L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) is misplaced. In Johnson Controls, 
the employer was aware of the discriminatory provision 
when it adopted an employment practice barring all 
women, except those whose infertility was medically 
documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead 
exposure exceeding governmental standards. Id. at 
198-99, III S.Ct. 1196. Yellow Cab's temporary 
discharge of Mr. Enlow was in reaction to an 
unanticipated exigent circumstance that threatened the 
suspension of its license to conduct business. 
Likewise, City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 
657(1978) is readily distinguishable. In Manhart, the 
Department of Water and Power knowingly and 
intentionally administered a retirement, disability and 
death-benefit program that required its female 
employees to make larger contributions to the pension 
fund that its male employees. Id. at 704, 98 S.Ct. 1370. 
The decision to adopt an employment practice that 
treated men differently from women was carefully 
calculated, "[b ]ased on a study of mortality tables and 
[the Department's] own experience." Id. at 705,98 S.Ct. 
1370. Mr. Enlow has presented no evidence that 
establishes that Yellow Cab had any knowledge of the 
discriminatory provisions in the Star Insurance policy 
when it purchased the policy. Nor has Mr. Enlow 
presented any evidence that Yellow Cab deliberately 
adopted an employment practice or program in order to 
discriminate against persons over forty in violation of 
the ADEA. Thus, Mr. Enlow failed to establish, as 
required by the Supreme Court's more recent Hazen 
decision, that Yellow Cab "relied upon a formal, facially 
discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment" of 
older employees when it purchased the Star Insurance 
policy. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701 
(emphasis added) (explaining that Manhart presented a 
case of disparate treatment because the employer 
"relied" on a "formal" policy requiring discrimination). 
Mr. Enlow has not demonstrated that his age "actually 
motivated [his] employer's decision" to purchase a new 
insurance policy. Id. 
On line 21 and 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] delete: 
"of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for temporarily terminating Mr. 
Enlow's employment." 
On line 21 and 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] 
substitute the following for the deleted text: 
"that Mr. Enlow's employment was not 
permanently terminated." 
On line 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] insert after 
"Mr. Haley" the following text: 
", Yellow Cab's personnel manager," 
One line 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] delete the 
word "alleged" and substitute the word "declared" for the 
deleted word. 
On line 5 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 652] delete "Mr. 
Anderson alleged". Insert "Mr. Gary Anderson, Yellow 
Cab's Secretary! Treasurer, declared" and substitute for the 
deleted text. 
On line 20 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653] insert after the 
word "behalf.", "Mr. Anderson declared:". 
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On line 25 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653], delete "of his 
termination from YeHow *807 Cab" and substitute "of the 
termination of his employment with YeHow Cab" for the 
deleted text. 
On line 31 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653], delete 
"alleged" and substitute "declared". 
The paragraph on slip op. 7632 [371 F.3d at 653] that 
reads: 
is deleted. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to 
YeHow Cab, this evidence shows that it 
did not have an explicit faciaHy 
discriminatory employment practice to 
terminate the employment of taxi cab 
drivers who were more than seventy 
years old. Instead, the evidence shows 
that Mr. Enlow was temporarily 
discharged to avoid termination of 
YeHow Cab's business license while it 
negotiated with Star Insurance to waive 
the age exclusion provisions in its policy. 
As a demonstration of its intent to protect 
Mr. Enlow's employment rights, Yellow 
Cab successfuHy obtained temporary 
employment for him with another cab 
company. Yellow Cab also obtained Star 
Insurance's tentative agreement to waive 
the age-based exclusion of coverage if 
Mr. Enlow would submit to a physical 
examination. Mr. Enlow rejected Star 
Insurance's wiHingness to consider 
waiving its age exclusion provisions ifhe 
could pass a physical examination. He 
also declined YeHow Cab's offer to 
reemploy him. The evidence offered by 
Yellow Cab presents a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether the 
termination of employment was 
temporary or permanent and whether 
Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory 
animus against employees over forty 
years_ of age. Accordingly, the district 
court did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
The following paragraph shall be inserted on slip op. 7632 
[371 F.3d at 653] for the deleted text: 
Viewed in the light most favorable to YeHow Cab, this 
evidence shows that it did not permanently terminate 
Mr. Enlow's employment because he was more than 
seventy years old. Instead, YeHow Cab's evidence 
shows that Mr. Enlow was temporarily discharged to 
avoid termination of YeHow Cab's business license 
while it negotiated with Star Insurance to waive the age 
exclusion provisions in its policy. As a demonstration of 
its intent to protect Mr. Enlow's employment rights, 
YeHow Cab successfuHy obtained temporary 
employment for him with another cab company. YeHow 
Cab also obtained Star Insurance's tentative agreement 
to waive the age-based exclusion of coverage if Mr. 
Enlow would submit to a physical examination. Mr. 
Enlow rejected Star Insurance's wiHingness to consider 
waiving its age exclusion provisions if he could pass a 
physical examination. He also declined YeHow Cab's 
offer to reemploy him. The evidence offered by YeHow 
Cab presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether it can demonstrate at trial that its employment 
decision "falls within one of the exceptions to the 
ADEA's prohibitions." EEOC v. Santa Barbara, 666 
F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). The 
ADEA provides that "[i]t shaH not be unlawful for an 
employer ... to take any action otherwise prohibited 
under '" this section where age is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of the based on reasonable factors 
other than age .... " 29 U.S.c. § 623(0(1). "The validity 
of a BFOQ turns upon factual findings, preferably ones 
by a jury." EEOC v. Boeing Company, 843 F.2d 1213, 
1216 (9th Cir.1988). 
*808 Whether a BFOQ or RFOA defense will sustain a 
judgment in favor of Yellow Cab will depend on the 
resolution of disputed factual issues which can only be 
resolved by a trier of fact regarding the employment 
action Yellow Cab actually took, such as, whether Mr. 
Enlow's discharge was temporary or permanent, was 
subject to a medical test, did he refuse an offer of 
reinstatement, was he laid off solely for the time 
necessary for Yellow Cab to obtain insurance coverage 
for him, and whether it was prohibitively expensive to 
insure drivers over seventy. We cannot decide on the 
sharply disputed facts in this record which version of the 
facts will be persuasive to a jury, and which party should 
prevail on appeal as a matter oflaw. Thus, we express no 
view at this interlocutory stage of these proceedings 
regarding the principles of law that will be applicable 
after the jury has made its findings and we have a 
complete record of the relevant facts. The district court 
did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
Delete the paragraphs beginning after "Conclusion" on slip 
op. 7632 [371 F.3d at 653] and slip op. 7633 [371 F.3d at 
654] that read: 
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We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct 
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's 
decision to tenninate his employment was motivated by 
discriminatory animus. For that reason, the district court 
erred in granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that Mr. Enlow failed to present 
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory 
animus. 
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that its temporary discharge of 
Mr. Enlow was without discriminatory intent, and was 
solely to avoid losing its business license based on the 
fact that all of its employees were not covered by 
automobile liability insurance. Mr. Enlow failed to 
present any evidence that Yellow Cab acted pursuant to 
an explicit facially discriminatory company practice to 
fire taxi cab drivers who were over seventy years of age. 
Thus, the district court did not err in denying Mr. 
Enlow's partial motion for summary judgment. Because 
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we 
reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct the district 
court to grant his motion for summary judgment. 
The following two paragraphs shall be inserted on slip op. 
7632 [371 F.3d at 653] and slip op. 7633 [371 F.3dat654] 
and substituted for the deleted material. 
We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct 
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's 
decision to terminate his employment was based on the 
fact that he was more than seventy years of age. For that 
reason, the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. 
Enlow failed to present any evidence that Yellow Cab 
acted with discriminatory animus. 
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact 
regarding whether Mr. Enlow was permanently 
discharged because of his age, or whether it has a viable 
BFOQ or a RFOA affinnative defense based on its 
evidence that a temporary discharge was necessary to 
avoid losing its business license because all of its 
employees were not covered by automobile liability 
insurance. The district court did not err in denying Mr. 
Enlow's partial motion for summary judgment. Because 
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we 
reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct *809 the 
district court to grant his motion for summary judgment. 
With these amendments, Judge Alarcon and Judge 
Rawlinson have voted to deny the petition for rehearing. 
Judge Ferguson has voted to grant the petition for 
rehearing. Judge Rawlinson has voted to deny the petition 
for rehearing en banco Judge Alarcon recommended that 
the petition for rehearing en banc be denied. Judge 
Ferguson recommended that the petition for rehearing en 
banc be granted. 
The full court has been advised ofthe petition for rehearing 
en banco No judge has requested a vote on whether to 
rehear the matter en banco Fed. R.App. P. 35. 
The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en 
banc are DENIED. 
OPINION 
ALARCON, Circuit Judge. 
David Enlow appeals from the order denying his motion 
for partial summary judgment regarding his Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim, and 
the order granting Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co.'s 
("Yellow Cab") cross-motion for summary judgment. Mr. 
Enlow contends that he was entitled to summary judgment 
because he presented direct evidence that Yellow Cab 
pennanently discharged him solely because of his age. 
We affinn the denial of his motion because we conclude 
that Yellow Cab presented sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether, as 
asserted in its response to Enlow's motion for partial 
summary judgment, it tenninated Mr. Enlow's 
employment temporarily based on a bona fide 
occupational qualification ("BFOQ") or because of 
reasonable factors other than age ("RFOA"). We reverse 
the order granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary 
judgment, however, because the district erred in 
concluding that Mr. Enlow failed to present prima facie 
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with a discriminatory 
motive or intent. 
We analyze the legal questions raised in this appeal 
separately. In Part One, we explain why we conclude that 
the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's motion for 
summary judgment. In Part Two, we consider whether 
Yellow Cab presented sufficient evidence in response to 
Mr. Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact requiring that the parties 
have their day in court to determine which party should 
prevail. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
Sometime prior to June 24, 1999, a representative from the 
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Bell Anderson insurance agency in Tacoma, Washington 
contacted Yellow Cab to see if it would be interested in a 
new insurance product that could save Yellow Cab a 
significant amount of money on its annual insurance 
premiums. After considering the quoted premium, Yellow 
Cab decided to accept the new policy. It is undisputed that 
Yellow Cab purchased the insurance policy from 
Meado wbrook Insurance Group because the cost of its new 
product, Star Insurance, was more than $10,000 less than 
the amount Yellow Cab had paid previously to the 
Reliance Insurance Co. ("Reliance Insurance"). At the time 
Yellow Cab accepted the Star Insurance offer, it had no 
knowledge that the policy excluded coverage of employees 
younger than twenty-three or older than seventy years of 
age. 
In order to obtain a business license to operate a "[v ]ehicle 
for hire," the City of Salem, Oregon requires that a taxi cab 
company carry automobile liability insurance that covers 
each person employed as a "[t]axicab driver." Salem 
Revised Code, Title 3, Ch. 34.002(1), 0), 34.01O(d). 
Yellow *810 Cab's liability coverage under the Star 
Insurance policy was scheduled to take effect on June 25, 
1999, the same date that its Reliance Insurance policy was 
due to expire. Yellow Cab paid $l3,200 to Star Insurance, 
representing a 20% down payment on the new policy, and 
was scheduled to begin making monthly payments on that 
policy on July 1,1999. 
The City of Salem required Yellow Cab to inform it of the 
insurance it planned to use no later than June 25, 1999. 
Yellow Cab faced suspension of its business license on that 
date if it could not provide proof of insurance for each taxi 
cab driver in its employ.l 
At 4:00 p.m. on June 24, 1999, a Star Insurance agent 
called Gary Anderson, Yellow Cab's Secretary/Treasurer, 
to inform him that its new policy did not cover employees 
younger than twenty-three or older than seventy years of 
age, and that Mr. Enlow was not eligible for insurance 
under the new policy because he was seventy-three years 
old. Prior to June 24, Yellow Cab had not received a copy 
of the Star Insurance policy, nor had it reviewed the Star 
Insurance policy's underwriting guidelines or restrictions. 
After learning of the age limitation in the Star Insurance 
policy, Yellow Cab's personnel manager, Richard Haley, 
called Mr. Enlow into his office and discharged him. We 
discuss below the conflicting evidence presented by the 
parties regarding whether the termination of Mr. Enlow's 
employment was intended to be temporary or permanent, 
and whether Yellow Cab acted pursuant to a facially 
discriminatory employment practice to discharge 
employees over seventy years old. 
Mr. Enlow filed a complaint in the district court on 
September 21, 2000 in which he alleged that Yellow Cab 
had violated the ADEA and Oregon Revised Statutes § 
659.030(1)(a) (renumbered 659A.030(2)(a) in 2001), 
Oregon's parallel age discrimination statute. He prayed for 
front and back pay. 
On May 18, 2001, Mr. Enlow filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on this ADEA claim in which he 
argued that he had established "a prima facie case" of age 
discrimination under the ADEA by presenting evidence 
that he was seventy-three years old, had performed his job 
to his employer's satisfaction, and was discharged when 
his employer obtained less expensive automobile liability 
insurance that did not cover drivers over the age of 
seventy, while younger employees were retained. He 
maintained that he was entitled to prevail in the action 
because his age was the "but for" cause of his termination. 
Yellow Cab filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 
June 1, 2001 in which it argued that it was entitled to 
summary judgment because Mr. Enlow had not produced 
any evidence that Yellow Cab intended to discriminate 
against him based on his age. It stated: "For David Enlow 
to prevail, he must not only satisfy the prima facie 
requirements of an ADEA claim, but must produce 
evidence that Yellow Cab 'intended' to discriminate 
against him because of his age." Yellow Cab maintained 
that because Mr. Enlow failed to allege or produce 
evidence of discriminatory motive, he could not prevail 
under a *811 disparate treatment theory of liability. 
Yellow Cab asserted that Mr. Enlow failed to present any 
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory 
animus, or that its proffered reasons for terminating his 
employment were merely a pretext for impermissible 
discrimination. 
The district court denied Mr. Enlow's partial motion for 
summary judgment and granted Yellow Cab's motion for 
summary judgment on November 26, 2001. The district 
court held that Mr. Enlow "failed to provide evidence of a 
discriminatory motive [on] the part of the Defendant in the 
decision to terminate Plaintiff." Mr. Enlow filed a timely 
notice of appeal of the order granting Yellow Cab's 
cross-motion for summary judgment, and the order 
denying his motion for partial summary judgment.2 
Pat:t One 
[I] Mr. Enlow contends that the district court erred in 
granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary judgment. He 
maintains that he was not required to produce evidence that 
the proof relied upon by Yellow Cab to justify the 
termination of his employment was a pretext for 
impermissible discrimination in order to survive a motion 
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for summary judgment. He argues that the familiar 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis should not 
apply to this case because he presented direct evidence that 
Yellow Cab terminated his employment because of his 
age. 
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de 
novo. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 849(9th 
Cir.2000). We may affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment on any basis that is supported 
in the record. San Jose Christian Coli. v. City of Morgan 
Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.2004). 
Under the ADEA, employers may not "fail or refuse to hire 
or ... discharge any individual [who is at least forty years 
old] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
age." 29 U.s.c. § 623(a)(1). In Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 
(1993), the Supreme Court identified two theories of 
employment discrimination: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact. Id. at 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (citing Int'l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 
n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). In this 
appeal, Mr. Enlow relies solely on the disparate treatment 
theory of liability. 
[2] [3] Disparate treatment is demonstrated when" '[t]he 
employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion [or other 
protected characteristics].' " Id. (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97 
S.Ct. 1843). More recently, the Court instructed that" 
'liability [in a disparate treatment claim] depends on 
whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually 
motivated the employer's decision.' " Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Hazen, 
507 U.S. at 610,113 S.Ct. 1701). The Court held that "the 
plaintiffs age must have' actually played a role in [the 
employer's decision-making] process and had a 
determinative influence on the outcome.' " Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 
1701). 
*812 [4] [5] When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment 
based on direct evidence in an ADEA claim, we do not 
apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) in determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 
S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), the Supreme Court 
instructed that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable 
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of 
discrimination." Id. at 121,105 S.Ct. 613; see also AARPv. 
Farmers Group, Inc., 943 F.2d 996, 1000 n. 7 (9th 
Cir.l991) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, however, when there 
is direct evidence of discrimination, such as when a 
provision[ of a pension plan] is discriminatory on its face, 
the prima facie case analysis is inapplicable") Direct 
evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is defined as " 
'evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in 
the decision-making process that may be viewed as 
directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ... 
sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude 
was more likely than not a motivating factor in the 
employer's decision.' " Walton v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir.1999) (alteration in 
original, emphasis added) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zip Feed 
Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir.l993)). 
[6] [7] The McDonnell Douglas formula applies under the 
ADEA where an employee must rely on circumstantial 
evidence that he or she was at least forty years old, met the 
requisite qualifications for the job, and was discharged 
while younger employees were retained. Reeves, 530 U.S. 
at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. It "creates a presumption that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." 
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under 
McDonnell Douglas, if an employee presents prima facie 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the burden 
shifts to the employer to " 'produc[ e] evidence that the 
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.' " Reeves, 530 U.S. 
at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089). This 
burden-shifting scheme is designed to assure that the " 
'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of 
direct evidence.' " Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121, 
105 S.Ct. 613 (alteration in original) (quoting Loeb v. 
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (lst Cir.1979». 
In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. 
Enlow presented direct evidence that Yellow Cab 
permanently terminated his employment because he was 
seventy-three years old and the new insurance policy did 
not cover employees over the age of seventy. In an 
affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, Mr. Enlow declared that "[a]t no time did the 
defendant offer me an unconditional offer of 
re-employment." He further, stated that "[m]y 
understanding at the time of my termination was that I was 
terminated and would no longer be working for the 
Defendant." Thus, Mr. Enlow carried his "initial burden of 
offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an 
employment decision was based on a discriminatory 
criterion illegal under the Act." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 
358, 97 S.Ct. 1843. 
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[W]hen a plaintiff has established a 
prima facie inference of disparate 
treatment through direct or 
circumstantial evidence, he will 
necessarily have raised a genuine issue 
of material fact with respect to the 
legitimacy or bona fides of the 
employer's articulated reason for its 
employment decision.... When [the] 
evidence, *813 direct or circumstantial, 
consists of more than the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption, a factual question 
will almost always exist with respect to 
any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. 
The existence of this question of material 
fact will ordinarily preclude the granting 
of summary judgment. 
Schnidrig V. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 141O(9th 
Cir.1996) (alterations in original, first emphasis added, 
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Sischo-Nownejad V. Merced Cmty. Coil. Dist., 934 F.2d 
1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991)). 
Yellow Cab presented evidence in opposItion to Mr. 
Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment that the sole 
reason it temporarily terminated Mr. Enlow's employment 
was to prevent the City of Salem from closing its business 
doors because it lacked proof that each of its drivers was 
insured. In reviewing the district court's decision to grant 
Yellow Cab's motion for summary judgment, we must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Enlow. 
Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th 
Cir.2000). 
The district court granted Yellow Cab's motion for 
summary judgment because it concluded that Mr. Enlow 
failed to produce evidence that Yellow Cab had a 
discriminatory motive for terminating Mr. Enlow's 
employment. In reaching this conclusion, the district court 
erroneously applied the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting analysis. Mr. Enlow presented direct 
evidence that would support an inference that his 
employment was terminated because he was over the age 
of seventy. By granting summary judgment in favor of 
Yellow Cab, the district court denied Mr. Enlow his day in 
court" 'with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of 
[Yellow Cab's] articulated reason for its employment 
decision.' " Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 111 I (quoting 
Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th 
Cir.1985) ). 
Part Two 
Mr. Enlow also seeks reversal of the order denying his 
motion for partial summary judgment in his ADEA claim. 
He maintains that he is entitled to summary jUdgment 
without a trial because he has presented direct evidence 
that his employment was terminated because employees 
who are more than seventy years old are not covered under 
the Star Insurance policy. He requests that we instruct the 
district court to enter judgment in his favor. 
It is undisputed that Yellow Cab did not purchase the Star 
Insurance policy in order to discriminate against 
employees younger than twenty-three and older than 
seventy years of age. In his supplemental brief to this court, 
Mr. Enlow concedes that Yellow Cab was not aware of the 
Star Insurance policy's discriminatory provision when it 
purchased it. 
In reviewing the denial ofMr. Enlow's motion for partial 
summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Yellow Cab. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1287. 
In response to Mr. Enlow's motion, Yellow Cab offered 
evidence that Mr. Enlow's employment was not 
permanently terminated. Mr. Haley, Yellow Cab's 
personnel manager, declared in his affidavit that "the only 
reason why Mr. Enlow was terminated was because the 
company made a switch in auto insurance carriers and the 
new carrier did not insure drivers under twenty-three years 
of age or over the age of seventy. The saving in annual 
premium expense was the only reason why Yellow Cab 
switched insurance." He also alleged that "[a]t no time did 
Yellow Cab search for an insurance carrier who did not 
insure older workers in order to terminate Mr. Enlow's 
position with the company." Mr. Haley further stated that: 
*814 Mr. Enlow was ... a commissioned 
employee. He was paid a percentage of 
the fares he took in. All of his taxes and 
expenses were paid out of his share of the 
gross fares. Terminating Mr. Enlow did 
not have any direct economic benefit in 
that Yellow Cab did not experience a 
savings in unpaid salaries or benefits. 
Indeed, terminating a driver actually 
made Yellow Cab one more driver short. 
Mr. Gary Anderson, Yellow Cab's Secretary/Treasurer, 
declared that Yellow Cab adopted the new Star Insurance 
policy without knowledge that it did not insure drivers over 
the age of seventy or under the age of twenty-three. He 
stated that Yellow Cab did not learn of the age limitation 
until 4:00 p.m., on the day before it was required to provide 
proof of insurance to the City of Salem or face the loss of 
its business license. Mr. Anderson declared that the 
possibility of renewing its old insurance policy "was no 
longer available" at the time Yellow Cab learned of the 
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new policy's age limitation. 
Yellow Cab also produced evidence that Mr. Haley had 
indicated to Mr. Enlow that the termination of his 
employment was only "temporary until coverage could be 
resolved or obtained." Immediately following Mr. Enlow's 
termination, Mr. Anderson made several phone calls on 
Mr. Enlow's behalf. Mr. Anderson declared: "I personally 
called Cherry City cab company in order to find Mr. Enlow 
work while we sorted out the insurance coverage 
problem." Mr. Anderson was successful in securing a job 
interview for Mr. Enlow with the Blue Jay Cab Company. 
Mr. Enlow was hired to begin work with the Blue Jay Cab 
Company within a week of the termination of his 
employment with Yellow Cab. 
Finally, Yellow Cab introduced evidence that after it 
discharged Mr. Enlow, Mr. Anderson spoke with 
representatives at Star Insurance to see if they would waive 
the age restriction in their policy so that Mr. Enlow could 
be reemployed. Mr. Anderson declared: "I was able to talk 
the insurance carrier into considering Mr. Enlow for 
insurance ifhe would be willing to consider submitting to a 
medical check-up." Yellow Cab then presented Mr. Enlow 
with the option of taking a physical examination with the 
hope that Star Insurance would agree to insure Mr. Enlow 
on the basis of a clean bill of health. Mr. Anderson stated in 
his affidavit that "Mr. Enlow indicated that he would not 
agree to a physical and declined the offer to return to 
Yellow Cab." This evidence directly conflicts with Mr. 
Enlow's allegation that he was permanently terminated 
from his employment solely because of his age. 
(8) Viewed in the light most favorable to Yellow Cab, this 
evidence shows that it did not permanently terminate Mr. 
Enlow's employment because he was more than seventy 
years old. Instead, Yellow Cab's evidence shows that Mr. 
Enlow was temporarily discharged to avoid termination of 
Yellow Cab's business license while it negotiated with Star 
Insurance to waive the age exclusion provisions in its 
policy. As a demonstration of its intent to protect Mr. 
Enlow's employment rights, Yellow Cab successfully 
obtained temporary employment for him with another cab 
company. Yellow Cab also obtained Star Insurance's 
tentative agreement to waive the age-based exclusion of 
coverage if Mr. Enlow would submit to a physical 
examination. Mr. Enlow rejected Star Insurance's 
willingness to consider waiving its age exclusion 
provisions ifhe could pass a physical examination. He also 
declined Yellow Cab's offer to reemploy him. The 
evidence offered by Yellow Cab presents a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding whether it can demonstrate at 
trial that its *815 employment decision "falls within one of 
the exceptions to the ADEA's prohibitions." EEOC v. 
Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.1982) (citations 
omitted). The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall not be 
unlawful for an employer ... to take any action otherwise 
prohibited under ... this section where age is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of the particular business, or where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than 
age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). "The validity of a BFOQ 
turns upon factual findings, preferably ones by a jury." 
EEOC V. Boeing Company, 843 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th 
Cir.1988). 
Whether a BFOQ or RFOA defense will sustain a 
judgment in favor of Yellow Cab will depend on the 
resolution of disputed factual issues which can only be 
resolved by a trier of fact regarding the employment action 
Yellow Cab actually took, such as, whether Mr. Enlow's 
discharge was temporary or permanent, was subject to a 
medical test, did he refuse an offer of reinstatement, was he 
laid off solely for the time necessary for Yellow Cab to 
obtain insurance coverage for him, and whether it was 
prohibitively expensive to insure drivers over seventy. We 
carmot decide on the sharply disputed facts in this record 
which version of the facts will be persuasive to a jury, and 
which party should prevail on appeal as a matter of law. 
Thus, we express no view at this interlocutory stage of 
these proceedings regarding the principles of law that will 
be applicable after the jury has made its findings and we 
have a complete record of the relevant facts. The district 
court did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct 
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's 
decision to terminate his employment was based on the 
fact that he was more than seventy years of age. For that 
reason, the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. 
Enlow failed to present any evidence that Yellow Cab 
acted with discriminatory animus. 
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding 
whether Mr. Enlow was permanently discharged because 
of his age, or whether it has a viable BFOQ or a RFOA 
affirmative defense based on its evidence that a temporary 
discharge was necessary to avoid losing its business 
license because all of its employees were not covered by 
automobile liability insurance. The district court did not err 
in denying Mr. Enlow's partial motion for summary 
judgment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact 
in dispute, we reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct 
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the district court to grant his motion for summary 
judgment. 
We VACATE the order granting Yellow Cab's motion for 
summary judgment and AFFIRM the order denying Mr. 
Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Each side shall bear its own costs. 
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge, concurring ill part and 
dissenting in part. 
I concur in the majority's decision to vacate the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant Salem-Keizer 
Yellow Cab. But I dissent from the majority's denial of 
summary judgment to plaintiff David Enlow. The majority 
have bought Yellow Cab's implosive position that when it 
purchased a new insurance policy that reduced its premium 
payments by more than $10,000 per year, it did not know 
the terms or conditions of the new policy or *816 why it 
was so much less expensive than its old policy. The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not 
protect an employer whose deliberate indifference toward 
its business policies leads it to terminate employees in 
violation of the ADEA. 
Additionally, the majority have bought another implosive 
belief that the ADEA does not apply when an employee 
covered under the ADEA is discharged only temporarily 
for economic reasons. Temporary termination is not a 
defense under the ADEA; it qualifies under neither the 
bona-fide-occupational-qualification ("BFOQ") exception 
nor the reasonable-factor-other than-age ("RFOA") 
exception to the ADEA. Whether the termination was 
temporary or permanent will have an effect on the amount 
of damages eventually awarded but is not a factor in 
determining liability. 
The uncontested facts establish a violation of the ADEA. 
Mr. Enlow, a 72-year-old cabdriver, was discharged from 
Yellow Cab because the company's new insurance policy 
did not cover drivers over 70. The majority remands this 
case to district court to determine whether Yellow Cab 
terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily on the basis- of an 
ADEA exception. Yet it makes no difference regarding 
liability for discrimination whether the termination was 
permanent or temporary. The only question to be resolved 
is whether, as a matter oflaw, the ADEA is violated where 
an employer terminates a 72-year-old employee because 
the company's chosen insurance policy does not cover 
drivers over 70. 
The answer to that question is without question. Where an 
employer intentionally uses age as a criterion for an 
employment decision, it is not a defense that the employer 
sought only to save costs. Nor can the employer escape 
liability by claiming that exigent circumstances excused its 
actions. The ADEA prohibited age discrimination while 
carefully enumerating several exceptions to the rule. See 
29 U.S.c. § 623(f). None of these exceptions applies here. 
The majority's implicit creation of a new exception for age 
discrimination taken to reduce insurance costs dilutes the 
protections that Congress sought to provide for older 
workers. 
I. 
Yellow Cab contends that Mr. Enlow did not establish the 
discriminatory intent required for an ADEA disparate 
treatment claim, as described by Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 
(1993). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an 
employer does not violate the ADEA by terminating an 
older employee in order to prevent his pension benefits 
from vesting, even if pension status is correlated with age. 
Id. at 611-12, 113 S.Ct. 1701. The Court reasoned that age 
and pension status are "analytically distinct" and noted that 
a younger employee who has worked for a particular 
employer his entire career might be closer to qualifying for 
pension benefits than an older employee newly hired. ld. at 
611,113 S.Ct. 1701. 
Yellow Cab claims that here, too, it discharged Mr. Enlow 
based on a classification-insurability-that is analytically 
distinct from age. Unlike the situation in Hazen, however, 
there is not merely a correlation between age and 
qualification for insurance coverage, but absolute 
identification: Mr. Enlow did not qualify for Yellow Cab's 
new insurance policy because he was over 70, and as a 
result, the company fired him. The cab company 
acknowledged that but for Mr. Enlow's age, he would not 
have been discharged. Thus, Mr. Enlow meets Hazen's 
requirement that an employee show that age "actually *817 
played a role in [the employer's decision-making] process 
and had a determinative influence on the outcome." 507 
U.S. at 610,113 S.Ct. 1701. 
Yellow Cab's attempt to separate out insurability from age 
is unavailing. In City ol Los Angeles Dep't. ol Water & 
Power v. Manhart, the Supreme Court rejected the 
employer's argument that a plan requiring women to make 
larger monthly contributions to a pension plan than men 
was "based on the factor oflongevity rather than sex." 435 
U.S. 702, 712, 98 S.Ct. 1370,55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). The 
Court stated: "It is plain ... that any individual's life 
expectancy is based on a number of factors, of which sex is 
only one .... [O]ne cannot say that an actuarial distinction 
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based entirely on sex is based on any other factor other 
than sex. Sex is exactly what it is based on." Id. at 712-13, 
98 S.Ct. 1370(intemal citations omitted). Here, too, an 
individual's insurance risk is based on numerous factors, 
but Mr. Enlow's inability to qualify for insurance coverage 
was based solely on age. The cab company cannot splice 
out insurability from age where, as in Manhart, the 
proffered basis for its employment practice coincides 
absolutely with a protected trait. 
Nor can Yellow Cab escape liability by shifting blame to 
the insurance carrier that established the coverage limits. 
The Supreme Court held more than twenty years ago that 
an employer violated Title VII where the retirement plans 
offered to its employees provided lower monthly benefits 
to women, even though the discriminatory conditions were 
supplied by private insurers. Ariz. Governing Comm. for 
Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compo Plans V. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983). 
The employer "cannot disclaim responsibility for the 
discriminatory features of the insurers' options" and 
violates Title VII "regardless of whether third parties are 
also involved in the discrimination." Id. at 1089, 103 S.Ct. 
3492. Here, too, Yellow Cab is no less responsible for 
violating the ADEA because it did so in response to an 
insurance policy that it selected from a third party. 
Furthermore, even assuming that the company was not 
motivated by stigmatizing stereotypes of older workers, 
Yellow Cab has violated the ADEA. Hazen explains that 
"[ilt is the very essence of age discrimination for an older 
employee to be fired because the employer believes that 
productivity and competence decline with old age." 507 
U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701. Congress enacted the ADEA 
in order to address the concem that "older workers were 
being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate 
and stigmatizing stereotypes." Id. Hazen further stated that 
where an employer's decision is "wholly motivated by 
factors other than age," the problem presented by such 
stereotyping "disappears." Id. at 611, 113 S.Ct. 
170 I (emphasis added). 
This interpretation of the ADEA's rationale, however, does 
not shield Yellow Cab. The majority believes that to 
establish disparate treatment, Mr. Enlow must still 
persuade a trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Yellow Cab's motive in terminating him was 
intentionally discriminatory. But precedent is clear that in 
a case of facial discrimination, the explicit use of a 
protected trait as a criterion for the employer's action 
establishes discriminatory intent, regardless of the 
employer's subjective motivations. "Whether an 
employment practice involves disparate treatment through 
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the 
employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of 
the discrimination." *818 Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 
L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (finding an employer's 
fetal-protection policy to be sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII where it excluded women of child-bearing 
capacity from jobs exposing them to lead). There, the 
Supreme Court noted that "the absence of a malevolent 
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy 
into a neutral policy .... " Id. See also Frank v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir.2000) 
(reaffirming that "where a claim of discriminatory 
treatment is based upon a policy which on its face applies 
less favorably to one gender ... a plaintiff need not 
otherwise establish the presence of discriminatory intent"). 
This Court has applied the principle, first established in 
Title VII cases, that an employer's subjective motivations 
are not controlling in a case of facial discrimination to 
claims under the ADEA. In EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., for 
example, we stated that where a severance policy denied a 
benefit to workers 55 and older, no showing of the 
employer's ill will toward older people was required.l 724 
F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1984), overruled on other 
grounds in Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 
U.S. 158, 109 S.Ct. 2854, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 (1989), 
superseded by revision to 29 U.S.c. §§ 621,623. 
Indeed, there is good reason to find discriminatory intent 
where an employer's decision or policy discriminates on 
its face: where differential treatment based on a protected 
trait is open and explicit, older workers are stigmatized on 
account of their age regardless of the employer's 
subjective motivations. Moreover, although there is no 
evidence that Yellow Cab itself espoused stereotypes of 
older workers, by dismissing Mr. Enlow because of an 
insurance policy that did not cover drivers over 70, Yellow 
Cab ratified the insurance company's categorical judgment 
that drivers over 70 were not competent. 
Whatever the rights of the insurance business to set 
coverage limits as it deems appropriate, Yellow Cab's 
termination of an older employee based on the new 
policy's age exclusion implicated the stigmatizing 
stereotypes to which Hazen refers. Mr. Enlow's dismissal 
falls squarely within the range of -discriminatory 
employment actions that the ADEA sought to prevent. 
II. 
Although Mr. Enlow's dismissal constitutes facial 
discrimination under the ADEA, the majority believes that 
Yellow Cab's decision to terminate Mr. Enlow potentially 
falls within an established ADEA exception. In particular, 
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the majority suggests that Yellow Cab qualifies for a 
BFOQ or a RFOA exception to the ADEA, both of which 
insulate a defendant from liability for discrimination. The 
majority, however, misconstrues both ADEA exceptions: 
discharging an employee, even if only temporarily, to save 
costs never justifies age-based discrimination under any 
exception. 
A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ',) 
Exception 
As a preliminary matter, the affinnative BFOQ defense set 
forth in § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA is inapplicable in this case 
because Yellow Cab failed to raise it in its motion *819 for 
summary judgment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
described the BFOQ defense as an affirmative defense, 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206, III S.Ct. 1196, 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,112, 
105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), which the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires to be specifically 
pleaded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Failure to plead an affinnative 
defense therefore results in a waiver of that defense. See 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 235 (7th 
Cir.1991). Since Yellow Cab did not specifically plead the 
BFOQ defense in its motion for summary judgment, 
Yellow Cab effectively waived this defense. 
More importantly, even if Yellow Cab were permitted to 
raise the BFOQ defense in district court, the defense would 
nonetheless fail as a matter of law. The majority believes 
that to establish a BFOQ defense, Yellow Cab need only 
prove that it tenninated Mr. Enlow temporarily and not in 
bad faith. The majority repeatedly states that according to 
Yellow Cab, the tennination of Mr. Enlow was to be 
temporary. The opinion does not explain, however, why 
this would make a difference. The ADEA prohibits age 
discrimination "with respect to ... compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment ... ". 29 U.s.c. § 
623(a)(1). It does not only prohibit "pennanent" 
termination. Thus, although this fact is contested, it is not a 
material fact requiring us to remand the case. 
The Supreme Court has established that the BFOQ defense 
is a'narrow exception to the ADEA that only applies in 
special situations. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 
201, III S.Ct. 1196; Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 
472 U.S. 400, 412,105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,334,97 S.Ct. 2720, 
53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). In particular, the BFOQ defense 
applies only in situations where an employer who 
discriminates on the basis of age demonstrates that "age is 
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular 
business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Thus, one of the elements 
that a defendant invoking the BFOQ defense must satisfy 
is that its age-based discrimination relates to a "particular 
business," which the Supreme Court defined in Thurston 
as the particular job from which the protected individual is 
excluded. 469 U.S. at 122, 105 S.Ct. 613. 
In Thurston, more specifically, the Supreme Court held 
that Trans World Airlines' ("TWA's") discriminatory 
transfer policy was not pennissible under § 4(f)(1) because 
age is not a BFOQ for the "particular" position of flight 
engineer. Id. The transfer policy explicitly allowed 
airplane captains displaced for reasons other than age to 
"bump" less senior flight engineers. Id. Those captains 
disqualified from their position after reaching the age of 
60, however, were denied the transfer privilege altogether 
because of their age. Id. The Court detennined that a 
BFOQ defense was meritless because age is not a BFOQ 
for the position of flight engineer. Id. at 123, 105 S.Ct. 613. 
TW A had actually employed at least 148 flight engineers 
who were over 60 years old, thereby defeating the 
contention that captains over 60 years old were too old or 
incapable of perfonning as flight engineers. Id. n. 18. 
Here, too, Yellow Cab's discriminatory insurance policy is 
not pennissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ 
for the particular position of cab driver. Yellow Cab's own 
pleadings acknowledge that Mr. Enlow, a nineteen-year 
employee of the company, maintained a solid job 
perfonnance. In addition, Yellow Cab's supplemental brief 
to this Court reiterated that the cab company did not 
consider Mr. *820 Enlow to be an unsafe driver. 
Accordingly, Mr. Enlow's age did not affect his ability to 
carry out his duties for Yellow Cab; he was neither 
incapable of perfonning his job, see Johnson Controls, 499 
U.S.at20I, III S.Ct.1l96(explainingthatanage-based 
BFOQ defense must relate to the employee's occupation, 
including his ability to do the job) (emphasis added), nor a 
potential safety risk, see Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419, 105 
S.Ct. 2743 (finding that an age-based BFOQ purportedly 
justified by safety interests must be "reasonably necessary" 
to the overriding interest in public safety). Thus, Mr. 
Enlow's dismissal, despite his continued ability, violated 
the "particular business" requirement of the BFOQ 
defense. 
Furthermore, we have refused to consider economic costs 
as a basis for a BFOQ defense. The majority opinion 
recites at length Yellow Cab's claim that it laid off Mr. 
Enlow solely for the time necessary for Yellow Cab both to 
avoid tennination of its business license and to negotiate 
with Star Insurance to waive the age exclusion provisions 
in its policy. In EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 
1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1983), however, we stated that 
"[ e ]conomic considerations ... [could notJ be the basis for a 
BFOQ-precisely those considerations were among the 
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targets of the ACt."2 As a result, it is irrelevant whether 
Yellow Cab terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily or because 
it failed to exercise rational business judgment in 
purchasing an insurance policy the terms and conditions of 
which it did not know. 
In an effort to save costs, Yellow Cab ultimately adopted a 
new insurance policy that did not cover drivers over 70, 
and, consequently, discriminated against Mr. Enlow. Even 
though Yellow Cab's previous insurance policy covered 
drivers over 70, Yellow Cab nonetheless chose a new 
policy that effectively saved the company $10,000 in 
annual insurance premiums. But Yellow Cab made this 
business decision at Mr. Enlow's discriminatory expense. 
An employer's deliberate indifference toward a new 
discriminatory policy it chooses to adopt is therefore no 
excuse for age discrimination. 
B. Reasonable Factors Other than Age ("RFOA '') 
Exception 
Although Yellow Cab invoked, and both parties addressed, 
the affirmative RFOA defense in their motions for 
summary judgment, the defense fails as a matter of law as 
well. Yellow Cab asserted below that its employment 
decision fell within the ADEA exception for actions taken 
"where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors 
other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Here, however, 
Yellow Cab differentiated Mr. Enlow from other drivers 
precisely and only because of his age-making the defense 
inapplicable. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 
F.3d 1529, 1541 (2d Cir.1996) ("By its terms, the statute 
supplies an exception for 'age-neutral' decisions based on 
other factors such as health or even education that might be 
correlated with age ... not an exception for policies that 
explicitly but reasonably discriminate based on age."). 
Moreover, *821 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC") regulations interpreting the ADEA 
state that the "reasonable factors other than age" defense is 
unavailable where an "employment practice uses age as a 
limiting criterion .... " 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c). 
Footnotes 
The EEOC regulations also provide that a "differentiation 
based on the average cost of employing older [workers] ... " 
does not qualify under this exception. 29 C.F.R. § 
1625.7(f). Citing that regulation, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected a cost-savings defense in a case with almost 
identical facts as the case before us. In Tullis V. Lear Sch., 
Inc., 874 F.2d 1489 (1Ith Cir.1989), a private school fired 
a 66-year-old bus driver because its insurance carrier only 
covered drivers 65 or younger. The Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that the school's decision to dismiss the driver was based 
on his age, id. at 1490-91, and that the increased insurance 
cost for the school did not exempt it from complying with 
the ADEA. Id. at 1490. 
III. 
Mr. Enlow's claim of age discrimination should be granted 
on summary judgment. There are no material facts for a 
trier of fact to determine. As a matter of law, the 
termination of an employee because he is older than the 
age limitation of his employer's insurance policy violates 
the ADEA, even if the employer chose that policy to save 
money. Had Yellow Cab terminated a female employee 
because its insurance policy did not cover women, or 
discharged an Asian employee because its insurance 
excluded Asians, we would surely have repudiated those 
actions. As certainly, Yellow Cab's decision to terminate a 
72-year-old cabdriver because its new insurance excluded 
drivers over 70 deserves our censure. Anti-discrimination 
law would mean nothing if an employer could justify a 
facially discriminatory action by invoking the bottom line 
of its profit and loss statement. 
Parallel Citations 
104 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 301, 04 Cal. Daily Op. 
Servo 9817, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,447 
* Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Fed.R.Civ.P., the parties con,;ented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all 
proceedings in this case. 
Salem Revised Code, Title 3, Ch. 30.124 requires as follows: 
Whenever any ... policy of insurance is required in connection with any license required by this title, the maintenance thereof in 
full force and effect shall be a condition of the validity of any license issued under this chapter. Upon receiving information that 
such ... insurance is, for any reason, no longer in full force and effect, the director shall summarily suspend such license. 
2 On this appeal, Mr. Enlow has abandoned his state age discrimination claim. See Big Bear Lodging Ass 'n v. Snow Summit, inc., 182 
F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) ('"Issues appealed but not briefed are deemed abandoned."). 
1 Borden's held that a policy that denied severance pay only to employees who were eligible for retirement constituted disparate 
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treatment. 724 F.2d at 1393. While that holding may not survive Hazen, the Borden's analysis of the intent required in facial 
discrimination cases is still apt. Moreover, in a case decided after Hazen, the Third Circuit found a separate inquiry into an 
employer's subjective motivations unnecessary in a case of facial age discrimination. See DiBiase V. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 
F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir.1995). 
2 Other circuits agree that economic considerations, unlike job-related safety concerns, are not a basis for the BFOQ defense. See 
Leftwich V. Harris-Stowe State Coli., 702 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1983) (stating that "economic savings derived from discharging 
older employees cannot serve as legitimate justification under the ADEA for an employment selection criterion"); Smallwood v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir.1981) (holding that the economic burdens involved in hiring older pilots was not 
grounds for a BFOQ exception that justified United Airlines' age-based discrimination policy against hiring older pilots). 
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Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
WM. FREMMING NIELSEN, Senior District Judge. 
*1 Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10). A hearing on the 
Motion was held July 13,2010. Plaintiffs were represented 
by Larry Purviance; Defendants were represented by Peter 
Erbland. The Court has reviewed the file and written 
pleadings and heard oral argument from counsel. For the 
reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Jeffrey Ennis contends that Defendant Greg 
Sprungl terminated Ennis because he ran against Sprung I 
in the 2008 election for Boundary County Sheriff. 
Defendants contend that Ennis was terminated because he 
lacked POST certification as a peace officer, which Idaho 
law requires. 
Ennis was employed as a detention deputy for the 
Boundary County Sheriffs Office from March 3, 1997 
through March 19,2009. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 9). Sprungl was 
the Sheriff of Boundary County at the time of Ennis' hiring 
and termination. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 5). However, Sprungllost 
his re-election and position as Sheriff to Greg Voyles in 
2000. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 4). Sprungl was not Sheriff between 
January 2001 and November 2004, after which he was 
re-elected. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 5). One of a sheriffs duties is 
to oversee the training and certification of all detention 
officers. (Sprungl Aff. ~ 7). 
Under Idaho law, any county detention officers employed 
before July 1, 1997 must be trained and certified through 
the Peace Officer's Standards and Training ("POST") 
Academy by July 1, 1999. (Idaho Code § 19-5117(2)). 
Additionally, a sheriff does not have the power to retain a 
deputy if the deputy has not become POST certified within 
one year of his employment. (Fegert Aff., Exh. A). Ennis 
was not POST certified as a peace officer during the course 
of his employment. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 18). 
Sprungl alleges that he advised Ennis about POST 
certification when Ennis was initially hired. (Sprungl Aff., 
'110). Ennis alleges that he did not receive notice about his 
lack of POST certification until January 2005. (Ennis Aff., 
~ 4). Ennis announced his intention to run against Sprungl 
for county Sheriff sometime in either June or early July 
2008. (Ennis Aff. ~ 4). Ennis ran against Sprungl, but 
Sprungl was again re-elected and re-took title as Sheriff. 
(Sprungl Affidavit, ~ 6). After his announcement, Ennis 
contends that Sprungl took immediate action to terminate 
him. (Ennis Aff., ~ 4). 
On June 20, 2008, Sprungl notified Ennis in writing that he 
must complete certain requirements to obtain proper 
certification. (Sprungl Aff, ~ 13, Exh. A). Ennis attempted 
to complete the applications for both POST training and 
certification, as well as a certification waiver during this 
time. (Sprungl Aff. '116, Exh. C). For the next six months, 
correspondence between Sprungl, Ennis and the POST 
Academy indicates disagreements as to whether Ennis 
completed his application for certification. (Sprungl Afr, 
'1'117-23, Exhs. D-G). 
*2 Ennis withdrew his application for new POST 
certification in January 2009. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 22; Ennis 
Aff., '1 8). Sprungl submitted Ennis' application to the 
POST Academy anyway. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 24, Exh. H). The 
POST Academy later notified Sprungl that Ennis did not 
meet minimum health and administrative standards 
(Sprungl Aff., ,: 24, Exh. H), therefore Ennis was not 
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eligible for certification. (Id.). Sprung I placed Ennis on 
suspension then terminated him on March 19, 2009. 
(Sprungl Aff., ~ 29, ~ 32, Exh. J). Sprungl cited lack of 
POST certification as the reason for termination. (Sprungl 
Aff., ~ 32, Exh. L). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Summary Judgment Standard of Law 
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is 
to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... " 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3l7, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored 
procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by 
which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be 
isolated and prevented from going to trial with the 
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat 
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue 
of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242,247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, id. at 255, and the Court must not 
make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the 
nonmovant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie 
v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.1999). On the 
other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable 
inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. 
Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.1988). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux 
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, lO76 (9th Cir.200l) (en banc). To 
carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any 
affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition 
excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence 
to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. 
Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F .3d 528, 532 (9th 
Cir.2000). 
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce 
evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. 
Id. at 256-57. The non-moving party must go beyond the 
pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on 
file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Ce/otex, 
477 U.S. at 324. The Court is "not required to comb 
through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for 
summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified 
Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d lO26, lO29 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting 
Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 
1418 (9thCir.1988». Instead, the "party opposing 
summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to 
specific triable facts." Southern California Gas Co. v. City 
of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,889 (9th Cir.2003). Statements 
in a brief, unsupported by the record, cannot be used to 
create an issue of fact. Barnes v. Independent Auto. 
Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995). 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
*3 Defendants move for summary judgment in this case, 
and dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety. In his 
Complaint, Plaintiff raises First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants under 
42 U.s.C. § 1983. Defendants' Motion addresses the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and raises various 
other challenges to Defendants' liability. Plaintiff s 
Response addresses only his First Amendment claim. 
A. Plaintiff's First Amendment claim 
In alleging violations of his constitutional rights, Ennis 
invokes 42 U.s.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, 
the plaintiff must (1) establish the deprivation of a right 
secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law and (2) 
establish that the deprivation was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law. Amer. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50,119 S.Ct. 977,143 L.Ed.2d 
130 (1999). Ennis claims that the Defendants deprived him 
of his First Amendment right to free speech by terminating 
him after he announced his intention to run for public 
office. 
To evaluate a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, 
the Court must conduct a five-step inquiry. Eng v. Cooley, 
552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.2009). First, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of showing: (1) whether the plaintiff 
spoke on a matter of public concern, (2) whether the 
plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee and 
(3) whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 
action. Id. If the plaintiff satisfied the first three steps, the 
burden shifts to the government to show (4) whether the 
state had an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently from other members of the general 
public and (5) whether the state would have taken the 
adverse employment action regardless of the protected 
speech. Id. 
Using the test outlined in Eng is appropriate for two 
reasons. First, in a § 1983 action that involves both 
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political patronage and retaliation under the First 
Amendment, conducting a retaliation analysis goes to the 
heart of the case. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828,829 
(9th Cir.1989). In Thomas, plaintiff was a lieutenant 
officer who ran against his supervisor, Sheriff Carpenter, 
in a public election. After Thomas lost the election, he 
alleged that Carpenter retaliated against him by banning 
Thomas from department meetings and the like. ld. The 
court found an inquiry into First Amendment retaliation 
and not political patronage-which involves a completely 
different analysis-was proper. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[i]n the forty 
years since Pickering, First Amendment law has evolved 
dramatically, if sometimes inconsistently." Eng, 552 F.3d 
at 1070. The Ninth Circuit created this test after 
"unraveling Pickering's tangled history" and thus the test 
is appropriate to use for First Amendment retaliation cases. 
1d.1 
(1) Public concern and private citizel1 
*4 First, the parties do not dispute that running for public 
office is a public concern. Conduct must be related to 
issues of political, social or other concerns to the 
community sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment. 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 
75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Ennis announced his intention to 
run, then ran, as a candidate in the 2008 election for sheriff 
of Boundary Countya public concern. Second, the parties 
do not dispute that Ennis acted as a private citizen when he 
ran for sheriff in 2008. A public employee acts like a 
private citizen when he performs acts outside of his daily 
professional responsibilities. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). 
Running for public office was not part of Ennis' 
professional responsibilities as a detention deputy. 
Therefore, Ennis' speech is entitled to First Amendment 
protection. ld. 
(2) Substantial or motivating factor 
Third, Ennis must show that running for sheriff against 
Sprungl was a substantial or motivating factor in the state's 
action to terminate him. This is an element of causation 
and "purely a question of fact." Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d at 
1071. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has listed three ways 
in which a plaintiff can raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. Keyser v. ,Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 
FJd 741, 744 (9th Cir.2001). First, a plaintiff may 
introduce evidence regarding proximity in time between 
the protected action and the retaliatory employment 
decision, from which a jury could infer retaliation. ld. 
Second, a plaintiff may introduce evidence that his 
employer expressed opposition to his speech. !d. Finally, 
the plaintiff may introduce evidence that his employer's 
proferred explanations for the adverse employment actions 
were false and pre-textual. ld. Defendants do not dispute 
that they had knowledge of Ennis' speech. 
Ennis showed that despite his lack of POST certification 
for almost eleven years, Sprungl did not take formal action 
to demand certification until after Ennis ran against 
Sprungl in the 2008 election. About eight months passed 
between Ennis' announcement running against Sprungl 
and Ennis' termination. Depending on the circumstances, 
an eleven month gap can support an inference of First 
Amendment retaliation. Allen v. lranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 
1078 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit cautions that 
mechanical application of a specified time period is 
unrealistically simplistic, however this only applies when a 
court states that a time period is too lengthy to support an 
inference of retaliation. Anthoine v. North Central 
Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 751 (9th Cir.20l0) 
(citing Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978-979 
(9th Cir.2003». Given Sprungl's inability to enforce the 
certification policy for ten years prior, an eight month and 
two week period could reasonably lead a jury to infer 
retaliation from protected speech. 
Ennis alleges that Sprung I sabotaged Ennis' attempts to 
apply for a POST certification waivers throughout his 
employment. However, the plaintiff must show evidence 
that his termination was "designed to retaliate against and 
chill political expression." Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 
1028 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 
F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1986». To support a retaliation 
claim, the record must demonstrate a constitutional 
violation.ld. The alleged sabotage does not relate to Ennis' 
First Amendment claim because his waiver attempt 
occurred three years before running against Sprungl. It is 
beyond the scope of his cause of action and is not evidence 
of retaliation. Additionally, while Defendants assert that 
Ennis had the burden of submitting his own application, 
the point is moot under Butler.2 
*5 At hearing, Plaintiff focused largely on whether 
Defendants adequately assisted his pursuit of a waiver of 
POST certification requirements. However, Plaintiff made 
no mention of the waiver argument in briefing to the Court, 
except for references in Ennis' Affidavit. Additionally, 
Sprungl was not Sheriff for several years of Ennis' 
employment in Boundary County. This casts doubt on 
Ennis' allegations. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate bad faith on the part of Defendants 111 
failing to submit Plaintiff's waiver packet. 
Regardless, Ennis has fulfilled his burden of proof under 
Eng. He meets the first two steps of the Eng test and has 
raised a genuine issue of material fact on the third step. The 
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burden thus shifts to Defendants to prove the fourth and 
fifth prongs of the Eng test. 
(3) Adverse employment action regardless of protected 
speech 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment if they can 
demonstrate that they would have terminated Ennis 
regardless of his protected conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. 
Again, Defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux, 
263 F.3d at 1076. While courts will normally look into the 
fourth prong of the Eng test, Defendants did not address it. 
However, Defendants have shown that Ennis would have 
been terminated absent his running in an election against 
Sprungl. 
The fifth prong asks whether the Defendants can show 
Ennis' protected speech was not a but-for cause of the 
adverse employment action. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. Even if 
the protected conduct was a substantial factor in deciding 
to terminate, the Constitution "is sufficiently vindicated if 
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if 
he had not engaged in the conduct." Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. 
Bd. o[Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-286, 97 S.Ct. 568, 
50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). This principle is especially true if 
the consequences of allowing the terminated employee to 
continue employment are significant. Id. at 286. 
However, the Defendants must show that it would have 
terminated Ennis, not that it could have. Settlegoode v. 
Portland Public Schools, 371 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir.2004) 
(see also Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194 (9th 
Cir.1989». Again, this inquiry is "purely a question of 
fact." Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir.2009). 
At the same time, district courts have broad discretion to 
determine an official's intent with regards to alleged ~ 
1983 violations at the summary judgment stage. 
Crawford-EI v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,600-601, 118 S.Ct. 
1584,140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). 
Under ~ 19-5117 (2), all detention deputies must be POST 
trained and POST certified to have the authority to act as 
peace officers. Defendants have shown that Ennis was 
required by law to be POST certified. Ennis was not 
qualified for certification because he failed to meet 
minimum health and application requirements. Because 
Ennis never attained certification, he had no authority to be 
a peace officer in Boundary County. The Parties agree that 
Ennis has received no POST certification. 
*6 Defendants assert two additional facts to show a lack of 
but-for causation. 
First, the parties agree that Ennis had notice of the 
certification requirement at least three years before he 
exercised his protected speech. Second, allowing Ennis to 
continue his employment as an uncertified officer would 
involve significant consequences. Employing an 
uncertified officer would subject Ennis, Sprungl and 
Boundary County to "grave consequences[,]" such as civil 
and criminal penalties. (Fegert Af£ Exh. A). 
Defendants have not justified why it took ten years to 
terminate Ennis under § 19-5117(2) when they had 
statutory authority to do so. However, no reasonable juror 
could find that Ennis was entitled to a job that he held 
unlawfully. Even if Ennis can show triable facts of 
improper motive, his termination placed him in no worse 
position than ifhe had not run for sheriff's office. 
In his response, Ennis cites generally to Allen v. !rano as 
"indistinguishable" from the facts at hand. When 
responding to a motion for summary judgment, the 
non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 324. Ennis expects his First Amendment retaliation 
claim to be vindicated without analysis. However, he has 
not shown how Allen raises a genuine issue of fact. 
A salient difference between this cause of action and Allen 
is that Allen was legally entitled to his job, unlike Ennis. 
283 F.3d at 1079. Based on this brief analysis, and lack 
direction from Ennis, the case is not sufficient to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact as to Ennis' claim. 
Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on Ennis' First Amendment claim. 
B. Defendants' immunity claims 
(1) Qualified immunity: Sheriff Sprungl 
"Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials 
'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.' " San Jose Charter of Hells Angels 
Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 
(9th Cir.2005) (quoting Harlow 4'. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 
However, a state official may be held personally liable in a 
~ 1983 action ifhe knew or should have known that he was 
violating plaintiff's constitutional rights. Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818. 
A qualified immunity analysis consists of two prongs. 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 
232, III S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991». First, 
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whether taken in a light most favorable to the party 
asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the 
defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right. ld. 
Second, whether that right was clearly established. ld. The 
relevant, dispositive inquiry into the second prong is 
whether it would be clear to a reasonable defendant that his 
conduct was unlawful in the particular situation he 
confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 
*7 Courts may use their sound discretion to decide which 
of the two prongs should be addressed first. Pearson v. 
Callahan, U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 
565 (2009). Finally, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that his rights were clearly established at the time 
of the alleged First Amendment violation. Moran v. State 
o.fWashington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.1998). 
Defendants contend that Sheriff Sprung 1 is entitled to 
qualified immunity on Ennis' First Amendment claim. 
Ennis did not respond to the qualified immunity claims in 
Defendants' motion. Offering no evidence that specifically 
rebuts facts submitted by a defendant is not sufficient to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Kardoh v. u.s., 
572 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir.2009) (see Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(e)(2». Also, when viewing the facts in a light most 
favorable to Ennis, no First Amendment violation can be 
found. Thus, Ennis has failed to meet the first prong of 
Saucier. Even if the Court finds a potential constitutional 
violation, Defendants allege that it would not be clear to a 
reasonable official that terminating Ennis was unlawful. 
Defendants have shown that Sprungl was compelled to 
terminate Ennis because Ennis failed to become POST 
certified. 
While the timing of the termination is suspect, given ~ 
19-5117 (2), a reasonable officer would consider the act 
lawful. In fact, it would have been unlawful not to 
terminate Ennis. Additionally, Ennis has not met his 
burden of responding to Defendants' claims under the 
second prong of Saucier. Thus, the Court will grant 
Defendants' motion as to Sprungl's qualified immunity 
claim. 
(2) Eleventh Amendment immunity: Defendants 
Dinning, Smith, Kirby, and Stevens 
Defendants assert that Dan Dinning, Ron Smith, Walt 
Kirby, and Richard Stevens are immune trom Ennis' 
claims under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh 
Amendment bars suits in federal court "by private parties 
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from 
public funds." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663,94 
S.Ct. 1347,39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). State officials acting in 
their official capacity cannot be sued under ~ 1983. Hafer 
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 
(1991). As a result, these suits "should be treated as suits 
against the state." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 
105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Finally, liability 
under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal 
participation by each defendant. Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 
858, 862 (9th Cir.1979). 
Under the Eleventh Amendment, Dinning, Smith, Kirby, 
and Stevens are immune from suit for actions performed in 
their official capacities. Further, Ennis raises no allegations 
against these individuals in their personal capacities; the 
Complaint only asserts specific allegations against Sheriff 
Sprungl. The Court finds that Defendants Dinning, Smith, 
Kirby, and Stevens are immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
C. Municipal liability 
A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 when 
execution of its policy or custom inflicts a constitutional 
injury. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th 
Cir.2009) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 
(1978). A municipality cannot be held liable on a 
respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Ennis 
has not shown how a policy or custom of Boundary County 
compelled Sprungl to terminate Ennis for exercising his 
First Amendment rights. On the contrary, state law gave 
Sprungl the authority to terminate Ennis because he lacked 
POST certification. Thus, the court will grant Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment with respect to Boundary 
County. 
D. Plaintiff's Due Process Claims 
*8 Ennis makes general allegations in his Complaint that 
Defendants violated his due process rights. Defendants 
adequately countered his claim, to which the Plaintiff did 
not respond. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution bars states from depriving any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw. Nordyke v. 
King, 563 F.3d 439, 449 (9th Cir.2009); U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, ~ 1. A procedural due process claim has two 
distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally 
protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of 
adequate procedural protections." Hufford v. },JcEnaney, 
249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.200 1). "A protected property 
interest is present where an individual has a reason-able 
expectation of entitlement deriving from existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such 
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as state law." Stiesberg v. California, 80 F.3d 353, 356 (9th 
Cir.1996). 
The Court assumes Ennis contends that he was illegally 
terminated from his job as a detention officer. However, 
his j ob was not a protected property interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is not reasonable for Ennis to 
expect entitlement to his job because Idaho law expressly 
conditions peace officer employment on meeting POST 
certification. Ennis has not provided any evidence too 
show he actually obtained certification. Therefore, he did 
not lose a protected property interest and his due process 
claim fails. 
In addition to Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, 
Ennis asserts that the Defendants violated his Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights. Complaints must allege more 
than unadorned accusations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. ----, 
----, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing 
Bel! Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007». A complaint fails 
when it offers "labels and conclusions" or " 'naked 
assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Resting on allegations 
without factual support makes summary judgment proper. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. 
Here, Ennis asserted blanket allegations regarding his 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and did not enhance 
them with any facts. Although the Defendants did not 
address these claims, the Court finds it appropriate to 
dismiss them here, for failure to state claims on which 
relief can be granted. 
E. Department of Labor's decision not preclusive 
In his Response, Ennis showed how the Idaho Department 
of Labor found Ennis' discharge was not motivated by 
misconduct on his part. (Ennis Aff., '13, Exh. A; See Idaho 
Code § 72-1366( e». Defendants understand Ennis to assert 
that they are collaterally estopped from moving for 
summary judgment. In their Reply, Defendants assert that 
the Idaho Department of Labor findings are not preclusive 
in law nor in application. (Dkt. No. 17). 
Footnotes 
A state agency's determination of an issue is preclusive if it 
acts "in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of 
fact properly before it which the parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to litigate." Astoria Federal Savings 
and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 
2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) (quoting United States v. 
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 
1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966». The purpose of collateral 
estoppel is to enforce repose among litigants. University of 
Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798,106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 
L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). However, the issue to be precluded 
must be identical in substance to the issue subsequently 
raised. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108. Ennis has not shown how 
the Department of Labor resolved the facts in dispute in his 
First Amendment retaliation claim. Particularly, it is 
unclear how a finding of "no misconduct" resolves the 
issue of being terminated regardless of protected speech. 
Additionally, Defendants have shown that the 
determination of no misconduct does not defeat their 
motion for summary judgment. 
*9 Idaho Code § 72-1366(e) defines the term "discharged 
for misconduct" as "willful, intentional disregard of the 
employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the 
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his 
employees." Puckett v. Idaho Dep't of Corrections, 107 
Idaho 1022, 1023, 695 P.2d 407 (1985). Because the 
Department of Labor indicated that Ennis was terminated 
because he lacked POST certification yet found no 
misconduct, it seems both issues are not mutually 
exclusive. It was not Boundary County Sheriffs Office's 
'rule,' 'standard of behavior,' or 'interest' that compelled 
Ennis' termination, but rather state law. Thus, Ennis has 
not overcome his burden to show that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, particularly under the fifth prong of 
Eng. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED. 
The Clerk of Court is directed to file this Order, provide 
copies to counsel and CLOSE this file. 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) was a landmark Supreme COUli case that 
established the law for First Amendment retaliation cases for § 1983 actions. 
2 In sUPPOJi, Defendants seem to claim that IOAP A II. 11.01.072 obligated Ennis, not Sprungl, to submit his application. However, 
the law does not mention anything about a duty specific to a person in Ennis' shoes. 
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Fourth Circuit. 
Christine EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
TECHNOLOGIES APPLICATIONS & 
SERVICE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 95-1697. I Argued Jan. 3 1, 1996. I 
Decided April 5, 1996. 
Female employee brought action against her employer for 
sex and age discrimination. The United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, Alexander Williams, 
Jr., J., granted summary judgment for employer, and 
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) employee failed to satisfY her 
burden of proving that her employer refused to promote 
her because of her gender; (2) summary judgment could be 
granted without discovery; (3) district court did not abuse 
its discretion in striking portion of opposing party's 
affidavit before deciding summary judgment motion; and 
(4) employee's age discrimination, sexual harassment and 
pay and benefit discrimination claims did not relate back to 
her timely filed administrative complaint alleging only 
failure to promote. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (22) 
Court of Appeals reviews district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo, applying same legal 
standards as district court and viewing facts and 
inferences drawn from facts in light most 
favorable to nonmoving party. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter oflaw. 
While courts must take special care when 
considering motion for summary judgment in 
discrimination case because motive is often 
critical issue, summary judgment disposition 
remains appropriate if plaintiff cannot prevail as 
matter oflaw. 
Female employee failed to satisfy her burden of 
proving that her employer refused to promote her 
because of her gender, though she alleged 
differential treatment in pay, benefits and 
seniority, where she did not provide supporting 
proof for allegations, and alleged statement by 
her supervisor, who hired her initially, that he 
would not allow her to become supervisor was 
not discriminatory on its face. 
Under three-step framework for proving 
employment discrimination, without direct 
evidence of discrimination, under McDonnell 
Douglas, plaintiff-employee must first prove 
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prima facie case of discrimination by 
preponderance of evidence; defendant-employer 
would then have opportunity to present 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
employment action; if employer does so, 
presumption of unlawful discrimination created 
by prima facie case "drops out of the picture" and 
burden shifts back to employee to show that 
given reason was just pretext for discrimination. 
Plaintiff employee claiming discrimination 
always bears ultimate burden of proving that 
employer intentionally discriminated against her. 
Female employee failed to satisfY her obligation 
to prove that her employer intentionally 
discriminated against her by failing to promote 
her, though she was qualified for promotion, 
where management did not consider her ready for 
supervisory position, and consolidated 
supervisory position was assigned to person they 
considered best qualified to assume those tasks 
based on his computer and prior supervisory 
experience; employee's bald assertions 
concerning her own qualifications and 
shortcomings of her co-workers failed to 
disprove employer's explanation or show 
discrimination. 
9 
In failure to promote case, plaintiff must establish 
that she was better qualified candidate for 
position sought as proof that company's 
explanation is pretextual and that she was victim 
of intentional discrimination. 
As general rule, summary judgment IS 
appropriate only after adequate time for 
discovery. 
Summary judgment must be refused where 
opposing party has not had opportunity to 
discover essential information. 
2 
Summary judgment was properly granted 
without discovery, though opposing party's 
memorandum referred to her lack of discovery, 
where she did not file any discovery requests, 
move for continuance to conduct discovery, or 
file affidavit. 
Nonmoving party cannot complain that summary 
judgment was granted without discovery unless 
that party attempted to oppose motion on grounds 
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that more time was needed for discovery or 
moved for continuance to permit discovery 
before district court ruled. 
Summary judgment may be denied or 
continuance ordered if nonmovant shows 
through affidavits that it could not properly 
oppose motion for summary judgment without 
chance to conduct discovery. 
Party may not simply assert in its brief that 
discovery was necessary and thereby overturn 
summary judgment when it failed to comply with 
requirement that it set out reasons for need for 
discovery in affidavit. 
While courts generally are concerned about 
granting summary judgment when opposing 
party has not had fair opportunity to discover 
essential information, they reasonably expect 
notification and explanation when more time for 
discovery is needed. 
District court did not abuse its discretion in 
striking portion of opposing party's affidavit 
before deciding summary judgment motion, 
where those portions consisted of party's own 
self-serving opInIOns without objective 
corroboration, and other statements that were 
found to be hearsay, irrelevant or conclusory. 
Generally, affidavit filed in opposition to motion 
for summary judgment must present evidence in 
substantially same form as if affiant were 
testifying in court. 
Affidavits submitted on summary judgment must 
contain admissible evidence and be based on 
personal knowledge. 
Female employee's age discrimination, sexual 
harassment and pay and benefit discrimination 
claims did not relate back to her timely filed 
administrative complaint, and were thus time 
barred, where only allegation made in her 
original administrative charge was that employer 
failed to promote her because of her sex. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e)(l), § 
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Discrimination charges filed outside time frame 
for administrative charges of discrimination are 
barred, but discriminatory allegation may still be 
relevant background evidence for valid claims. 
Allegations contained in administrative charge of 
discrimination generally operate to limit scope of 
any subsequent judicial complaint. 
Only discrimination claims stated in initial 
charge, reasonably related to original complaint, 
and developed by reasonable investigation of 
original complaint may be maintained in 
subsequent Title VII lawsuit. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 
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OPINION 
Circuit Judge: 
Appellant Christine Evans appeals a district court order 
granting summary judgment to her employer in a Title VII 
discrimination case. She argues that the district court erred 
by failing to apply the appropriate legal standards in 
analyzing the motion for summary judgment, by striking 
much of her affidavit and by barring several of her 
discrimination claims as not proceeding from or relating to 
her original charge of failure to promote because of sex 
discrimination. We find her challenges meritless. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Evans was a temporary worker assigned to the Norden 
Service Company, Inc., when Technologies Applications 
and Services Company, Inc. ("T AS"), purchased it in April 
1991 Two months later, Gary Houseman, TAS's Director 
of Quality Assurance, recommended that T AS hire Evans 
full-time as an Inspector/Quality Control Analyst in his 
department.2 Upon assuming the position in June 1991, 
Evans was assigned to inspect T AS computer hardware 
products, such as consoles for naval ship combat centers at 
various stages of production. As early as December 1991, 
Evans informed company officials that she was interested 
in obtaining a supervisory position. 
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Overall, Evans received good evaluations at T AS. 
Houseman described her as an excellent employee in a 
September 1992 performance review, but also indicated 
that her attitude and "moodiness" would affect her 
promotability. In addition, Evans and another quality 
control inspector, Winston Samuel, both received 
reprimands in February 1993 for squabbling on the job. 
Several personnel changes took place at T AS, some of 
which were related to financial difficulties at the company. 
In February 1992, the Quality Control Supervisor ("QCS") 
resigned. T AS officials selected James Thompson, a 
supervisor and long-time Field Service Engineer, to 
assume the QCS duties and work in a dual capacity as 
QCS/Field Engineer. Neither Evans nor Samuel was given 
an opportunity to apply for the supervisory position. A year 
later, Thompson resigned as QCS. T AS officers never 
advertised the QCS job as open, but instead eliminated the 
position and assigned its duties to Ronald Lewis, a man 
already performing software engineering functions. Again, 
neither Evans nor Samuel had a chance to apply for the 
reconfigured position. 
On April 21, 1993, Evans filed a discrimination charge 
with the Montgomery County, Maryland, Human 
Relations Commission ("HRC"). In the charge, Evans 
alleged that T AS denied her a promotion because of her 
gender. She asserted that Houseman's February 1993 
decision to eliminate the QCS position and merge its duties 
into the software engineering position held by Lewis 
constituted sex discrimination. On April 4, 1994, Evans 
amended her charge to allege that the February 1993 
decision amounted to age discrimination as well. 
The following month, Evans filed suit in the Circuit Court 
of Montgomery County, Maryland, claiming that T AS had 
discriminated against her because of her sex and age in 
violation oflocallaws and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, *958 Evans made 
numerous allegations: that another employee harassed her 
in 1990; that she was "ripe" but not selected for promotion 
in 1991 that she received different pay, benefits, and 
seniority than younger males; that T AS failed to promote 
her in 1993 because of her age and her gender; and that 
T AS failed to take adequate affirmative steps to correct its 
unlawful practices. 
After removal to the United States District Court, T AS 
moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that all 
of Evans's claims-except for the sex discrimination 
allegation-should be dismissed because they were never 
raised in a timely administrative charge. T AS also 
maintained that Evans failed to make out a primafacie case 
to support her claim of sex-based failure to promote and 
ultimately failed to establish that she was the victim of sex 
discrimination. In support of its position, T AS submitted 
an affidavit from Evans's immediate supervisor, 
Houseman, and other exhibits. 
Evans opposed TAS's motion and submitted her own 
affidavit attesting to her qualifications for the QCS 
position. Although the memorandum of law in support of 
her motion indicated that she had not had the opportunity 
to conduct discovery, Evans had never requested discovery 
nor sought a continuance to enable her to gather 
information to refute T AS's motion. 
The district judge issued a memorandum and order in 
February 1995, granting TAS's motion for summary 
judgment. The judge examined Evans's affidavit and 
struck portions of it as "not based on personal knowledge," 
"containing hearsay statements," or "irrelevant, 
conclusory, or both." He dismissed Evans's claims of 
sexual harassment, failure to promote in 1991, and 
discrimination in pay and benefits as outside the scope of 
Evans's administrative charge and not "reasonably 
proceeding from a sex discrimination claim based on 
failure to promote." The judge also dismissed Evans's age 
discrimination claim as untimely, finding that the 
allegation was belated and unrelated to her original 
administrative charge of sex discrimination. He noted that 
"Evans never mentioned her age or indicated in any 
manner that age was a factor" in the original charge. 
Finally, the district judge found that Evans had not 
established a prima facie case offailure to promote in 1993 
because of sex discrimination nor provided any evidence 
that T AS's articulated reasons for assigning the QCS 
duties elsewhere were pretextual or "unworthy of 
credence." Determining that no issue of material fact 
existed for a jury to resolve, the district judge granted 
summary judgment to T AS. Evans filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
II. CLAIM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BY FAILURE 
TO PROMOTE 
Evans rests on two grounds her contention that the district 
court erred in granting T AS's motion for summary 
judgment on her claim that she was denied promotion 
because of her sex: that the court failed to apply the 
appropriate legal standards and that she had not received 
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. We consider 
each in tum. 
A. Summary Judgment Analysis 
III 12)131 We review the district court's grant of summary 
& ~t>'nI"r:t> 
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judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the 
district court and viewing the facts and inferences drawn 
from the facts in the light most favorable to Evans, the 
nonmoving party. 
Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to ajudgment 
as a matter oflaw." see also 
special care when considering a motion for summary 
judgment in a discrimination case because motive is often 
the critical issue, summary judgment disposition remains 
appropriate if the plaintiff *959 cannot prevail as a matter 
of law. 
cert. denied, 
If, after 
reviewing the record as a whole, however, we find that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for Evans, then a 
genuine factual dispute exists and summary judgment is 
improper. 
141 Evans's charge that TAS refused to promote her 
because of her gender is a claim of disparate treatment. To 
meet her burden on summary judgment, Evans might have 
offered direct or circumstantial evidence, or proceeded 
under the proof scheme set forth in 
Our analysis reveals 
that Evans failed to meet her various burdens under either 
approach. In reaching the same conclusion, the district 
court set forth the appropriate governing standards then 
analyzed the evidence before it, primarily using the 
burden-shifting scheme established by McDonnell 
Douglas and its progeny. 
To satisfy ordinary principles of proof, Evans must provide 
direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate or 
circumstantial evidence of sufficiently probative force to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
reveals little, if any, direct or indirect evidence of 
discriminatory motive. Evans alleges differential treatment 
in pay, benefits and seniority but fails to provide 
supporting proof. She also alleges, without offering 
corroborating evidence, that she was discriminated against 
in previous promotion decisions. Evans offers an alleged 
comment by Houseman that he would not allow her to 
become a supervisor. However, the statement is not 
discriminatory on its face, as it could have been made in 
reference to any male or female employee seeking 
promotion. Nor is it placed in any context that makes it so. 
In addition, because Houseman is the same person who 
hired Evans, there is a "powerful inference" that the failure 
to promote her was not motivated by discriminatory 
animus. ); 
see also 8. Evans also submitted 
her own affidavit, mostly made up of conclusory 
statements about her qualifications and the deficiencies of 
her colleagues. However, Evans's "own naked opinion, 
without more, is not enough to establish aprimafacie case 
of [ ]discrimination." For 
Evans to prevail, then, it must be by using the proof 
scheme established in McDonnell Douglas. 
[51 161 171 Under that three-step framework, the 
plaintiff-employee must first prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If she 
succeeds, the defendant-employer has an opportunity to 
present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
employment action. If the employer does so, the 
presumption of unlawful discrimination created by the 
primafacie case "drops out of the picture" and the burden 
shifts back to the employee to show that the given reason 
was just a pretext for discrimination. 
plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving that 
the employer intentionally discriminated against her. 
the record before us, Evans has failed to satisfy her 
obligation. 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, 
Evans must prove a set of facts enabling the court to 
conclude that it is more likely than not that TAS's failure to 
promote her was motivated by discrimination. 
She must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) 
her employer had an open position for which she applied or 
sought to apply; (3) she was qualified for the position; and 
(4) she was rejected for the position under circumstances 
*960 rise to an inference of unlawful 
While the evidence creates a close call as to Evans's 
qualification for the QCS position, we must remember that 
"the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous." rlllr(J,'np 
Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we find 
that Evans has satisfied the "relatively easy test" of 
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showing that she, a qualified applicant, "was rejected 
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination." 
(internal quotations and citations omitted), 
cert. denied, 2 
Our inquiry is not over, however, for T AS has articulated 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for choosing a man 
to fill the QCS position instead of Evans. The company 
offered substantial evidence that management considered 
Evans not yet ready for a supervisory position, including 
the September 1992 performance review indicating that 
while she was good at her job, Evans had problems with 
"moodiness," Evans's February 1993 reprimands, and 
Houseman's statements that Evans lacked the education 
and training needed for the QCS position. In addition, T AS 
provided proofthat company officials decided for financial 
reasons to eliminate the QCS position by merging it into 
another position, and then did so by assigning the QCS 
duties to Lewis, the person they considered best qualified 
to assume the QCS tasks. Unlike Evans and Samuel, Lewis 
was well-versed in computer hardware and software and 
possessed prior supervisory experience. He also had 
seniority in the company, having joined it in 1982. 
181 Job performance and relative employee qualifications 
are widely recognized as valid, non-discriminatory bases 
for any adverse employment decision. See K1!'"/HPJP 
Because "the employer has discretion to choose 
among equally qualified candidates provided the decision 
is not based upon unlawful criteria," 
(citing 
Evans must present proof that 
the company's explanation is pretextual and that she was 
the victim of intentional discrimination. 
In a failure to promote 
case, the plaintiff must establish that she was the better 
qualified candidate for the position sought. 
I 
Evans's evidence falls far short ofthat needed to overcome 
summary judgment. She has failed to show that she was 
more qualified for the promotion than the man selected or 
that, as between her sex and TAS's explanation, her sex 
was the more likely reason for her failure to be promoted. 
While a Title VII plaintiff may present direct or indirect 
evidence to support her claim of discrimination, 
unsupported speculation is insufficient. 
Evans's 
unsubstantiated allegations and bald assertions concerning 
her own qualifications and the shortcomings of her 
co-workers fail to disprove TAS's explanation or show 
discrimination. See (plaintiff's 
own opinions and conc1usory allegations do not have 
sufficient "probative force to reflect a genuine issue of 
material fact"); 
evidence shows that Evans was treated like the only other 
similarly situated individual at TAS-Samuel also held the 
position of inspector and was denied the opportunity to 
apply for the QCS opening-and that her supervisor thought 
she did not merit a promotion. The demonstrated facts 
remain therefore that TAS management found Lewis to be 
the most qualified employee and shifted to him the QCS 
responsibilities. Evans simply has failed to demonstrate 
that she was more qualified than that employee and thus 
more deserving of the duties. "It is the perception of the 
decision maker *961 which is relevant," not the 
self-assessment of the plaintiff. 
Based on our review of the record, then, we find that Evans 
has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. 
B. Summary Judgment Without Discovery 
110) Ill) As a general rule, summary judgment is 
appropriate only after "adequate time for discovery." 
17, 
denied, 
"[S]ummary judgment must be refused where the 
nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover 
information that is essential to his opposition." 
Evans first 
argues not only that the principle is a hard and fast rule, but 
also that her lack of discovery placed extra burdens on 
T AS to prove that there was no issue for trial. However, 
she has provided no legal support for her contentions. 
1121 1131 114J We have held that the nonmoving party 
cannot complain that summary judgment was granted 
without discovery unless that party had made an attempt to 
oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was 
needed for discovery or moved for a continuance to permit 
discovery before the district court ruled. See 
a court to deny summary judgment or to 
continuance if the nonmovant shows through affidavits 
that it could not properly oppose a motion for summary 
judgment without a chance to conduct discovery. We, like 
other reviewing courts, place great weight on the 
affidavit, believing that "[a] party may not simply 
assert in its briefthat discovery was necessary and thereby 
i"~mrin'" & "",,""Ii'" 
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overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with 
the requirement of to set out reasons for the 
need for discovery in an affidavit." /\lom""" 
(citing 
(if plaintiffs arguing summary 
judgment was premature because they had inadequate time 
for discovery were "genuinely concerned," then they 
should have sought relief under The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly explained that "[a] 
reference to and to the need for additional 
discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment is not an adequate substitute 
for a affidavit ... and the failure to file an 
affidavit under is itself sufficient grounds to 
that the opportunity for discovery was 
The record shows that Evans never filed any discovery 
requests, moved for a continuance so she could conduct 
discovery, or filed an affidavit as required by In 
short, Evans never informed the district court that she 
needed time to develop the factual record so that she could 
properly oppose T AS's motion. Evans concedes that she 
did not file an affidavit in accordance with but 
argues that she made her discovery concerns known in her 
memorandum in opposition to TAS's summary judgment 
motion by noting her lack of discovery in two passages.4 
While Evans's memorandum refers to her lack of 
discovery, the effort is insufficient to compel denial of 
T AS's summary judgment motion. 
(15) While courts generally are concerned about granting 
summary judgment when the opposing party has not had a 
fair opportunity to discover essential information, they 
reasonably expect notification and explanation when more 
time for discovery is needed. In light of Evans's failure to 
take any affirmative steps regarding discovery, we *962 do 
not find the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
T AS improper. 
III. EVANS'S AFFIDAVIT 
1161 Evans next charges that the district court improperly 
struck much of the affidavit she submitted in support of her 
opposition to TAS's motion for summary judgment. We 
review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion, 
1 
cert. denied, 
and the factual determinations underlying the 
evidentiary ruling for clear error, 
1171 1181 Generally, an affidavit filed in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment must present evidence in 
substantially the same form as ifthe affiant were testifying 
in court. specifically 
requires that affidavits submitted on summary judgment 
contain admissible evidence and be based on personal 
knowledge. See also 
(evidence submitted in opposition to 
summary judgment motion must be admissible and based 
on personal knowledge). Thus, summary judgment 
affidavits cannot be conclusory, f{/,lwfvH,lah 
or based upon hearsay, 
Because the district court followed such principles when it 
struck many portions of Evans's affidavit, it acted 
properly. The district judge did not strike the entire 
affidavit and did not grant all ofTAS's requests to strike, 
but instead struck and disregarded only those portions it 
deemed inadmissible or improper in accordance with 
Furthermore, the district judge carefully specified 
which parts of the affidavit would be stricken and why. 
Several of the portions struck consisted of Evans's own 
unsupported assertions of her qualifications and the 
abilities of her colleagues.s Because, again, we generally 
consider self-serving opinIOns without objective 
corroboration not significantly probative, the decision to 
strike and disregard as irrelevant Evans's assertions was 
not improper. The district court's determination that 
portions of the affidavit contained statements that were not 
based on personal knowledge does not appear to be clearly 
erroneous.6 Finally, the court correctly found other 
statements to be hearsay, irrelevant, or conclusory, and 
properly struck those sections pursuant to 
IV. CLAIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, PAY AND 
BENEFITS DISCRIMINA TION AND AGE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Finally, Evans challenges the district court's dismissal 
of her other claims as time-barred and outside the scope of 
the original charge filed with the Montgomery County 
HRC. She maintains that those claims should have been 
permitted as amended to or relating back to her original 
charge. 
(20) /211 122) Title VII and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 
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provide a maximum of 300 days from the occurrence of an 
alleged discriminatory event for a claimant to file a timely 
charge with the EEOC, if she first instituted proceedings 
with a state or local agency, ); 
26(d)(2), while Montgomery County law allows 
one year, Mont. Co., Md., Code § 27-7. Charges filed 
outside that time frame are barred, but a discriminatory 
allegation may still constitute relevant background 
evidence for valid claims. 
The allegations contained in the administrative 
charge of discrimination generally operate to limit the 
*963 scope of any subsequent judicial complaint. 
Only those discrimination claims stated in the 
initial charge, those reasonably related to the original 
complaint, and those developed by reasonable 
investigation of the original complaint may be maintained 
in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit. 
see also 
(affirming lower court's determination of 
untimeliness because charge of illegal layoff does not 
encompass allegations of illegal failure to rehire), cert. 
denied, 
(finding job transfer and salary claims 
not contained in EEOC charge barred). 
The only allegation that Evans made in her original 
administrative charge was that T AS failed to promote her 
in February 1993 because of her sex. Evans never filed a 
charge with the EEOC or the Montgomery County HRC 
alleging sexual harassment or discrimination in pay and 
benefits. Furthermore, the harassment claim alleges 
conduct that occurred in 1990-well beyond the scope of the 
applicable laws. See ); Mont. Co., 
Md., Code § 27-7. The district court properly determined 
therefore that Evans's additional claims were time-barred. 
Evans also contends, however, that she brought those 
additional allegations in order to show illegal motive and a 
pattern of discrimination because "all ofthe discriminatory 
events and incidents surrounding Evans's employment are 
closely interrelated with T AS's discrimination and 
unwillingness to promote her." Even so, the district court 
ruled properly, recognizing that while the later allegations 
cannot stand as separate charges of discrimination for 
which T AS may be liable, they might be admissible as 
evidence at trial to support her properly asserted sex 
discrimination claim. See 
Again, Evans's original charge alleged only sex 
discrimination. It never mentioned age or alleged that age 
was a factor in T AS's alleged discriminatory denial of 
promotion. Evans added the age discrimination accusation 
after the charge had been pending for nearly a year, and 
more than a full year after the alleged discriminatory 
activity took place. Thus, on its face, the age 
discrimination claim is time-barred, having been filed well 
after both the ADEA and the county time limit had expired. 
See Mont. Co., Md., Code § 27-7. Evans 
maintains, however, that the age discrimination claim 
arose from the same facts and circumstances as her sex 
discrimination charge and thus relates back to the original 
filing date. EEOC regulations provide that when an 
amendment is filed outside the applicable limitations 
period, it may be considered timely if it involves claims 
"related to or growing out of' the original charge. 
However, age discrimination does not 
necessarily flow from sex discrimination and vice versa. 
See, e.g., 
(untimely amendment alleging 
discrimination does not relate back to original sex 
discrimination charge since not flowing from it); 
(untimely amended claim of sex 
discrimination does not relate back to the original charge 
of age discrimination because the allegations could not be 
inferred from it). Moreover, Title VII and ADEA claims 
arise from completely distinct statutory schemes. See 
(denying amendment adding age discrimination 
allegation to charge of discrimination based on national 
origin). Other courts have observed that permitting a late 
amendment to an original discrimination charge adding an 
entirely new theory of recovery "would eviscerate the 
administrative charge filing requirement altogether" by 
depriving the employer of adequate notice and resulting in 
a failure to investigate by the responsible agency. 
Such was the outcome here: Evans 
filed her lawsuit only one month after she filed her 
amendment, depriving the HRC of time to investigate the 
age discrimination allegation and T AS of notice of the 
claim. 
*964 For these reasons, we find that the district court 
properly dismissed Evans's claims of sexual harassment, 
pay and benefit discrimination, and age discrimination as 
time-barred or outside the scope of her administrative 
charge. Because we conclude that the district court 
properly granted summary judgment to TAS, its order is 
AFFIRMED. 
Parallel Citations 
72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1222,68 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
P 44,010,34 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1033 
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Footnotes 
T AS is a government contractor that builds and supplies high technology equipment for the United States Government. 
Both Houseman and Evans were 42 years old at the time. 
Evans's complaint alleges promotion discrimination in 1991, but the relevant QCS position was vacated and filled by Thompson in 
1992. 
Evans's memorandum in opposition states that T AS's assertions that she could not prove the McDonnell Douglas elements are 
without merit and inappropriate for argument "at this early stage in the litigation-especially when plaintiff has not yet been afforded 
the opportunity to conduct discovery," and that "[e]ven without the aid of discovery," she could make a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination. 
In those sections, Evans details her own qualifications, disparages the qualifications and work experiences of two of her colleagues, 
and discusses the qualifications of her supervisor. 
The district court detennined that Evans, a low-level employee, would not have had infonnation about TAS's financial affairs or the 
criteria for a position that was never posted, and consequently struck her statements about those matters. 
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When there are two permissible views of 
evidence, district court's choice of one view 
cannot be clearly erroneous. 
In Title VII discrimination case, district court's 
resolution of ultimate issue whether employer's 
reason for denying promotion to employee was 
pretext is finding of fact subject to clearly 
erroneous standard. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, to 
7 
Female attorney failed to show that law firm's 
failure to admit her as partner violated Title VII, 
as record did not show that firm applied its 
partnership admission standards unequally to 
male and female associates, nor that diminished 
ability in area of legal analysis was improper 
reason for denying admission; district court's 
belief that firm's high standard of analytical 
ability was unwise did not make firm's standard a 
pretext for discrimination, district court's 
comparison of plaintiff with successful male 
candidates in categories other than legal analytic 
ability did not lend support to its ultimate finding 
of pretext, and district court ignored evidence 
firm produced to compare plaintiff's 
shortcomings with strengths of successful male 
candidates in category of legal analytic ability. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, 7; 
Pretext in Title VII action is not established by 
virtue of fact that employee has received some 
favorable comments in some categories or has, in 
past, received some good evaluations. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 7. 
Title VII plaintiff does not establish pretext by 
pointing to cntlclsms of members of 
nonprotected class, or commendation of plaintiff, 
in categories defendant says it did not rely upon 
in denying promotion to member of protected 
class, although such comments may raise doubts 
about fairness of employer's decision. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 
In Title VII discrimination case, evidence 
establishing incredibility of employer's reason 
must show that standard or criterion employer 
relied on was obviously weak or implausible. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, to 
In Title VII discrimination case, court should not 
ignore evidence which sheds light on whether 
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employer treated similarly situated males and 
females alike. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, to 
7. 
Even if female attorney received "small" cases at 
beginning of her tenure at law firm, no violation 
of Title VII was shown, as there was no evidence 
that such assignments were result of sex 
discrimination; her evaluations indicated that it 
may have been her academic credentials that 
contributed to her receipt of less complex 
assignments. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, to 
Statistical evidence of employer's pattern and 
practice with respect to minority employment 
may be relevant to showing of pretext in Title VII 
case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, to 
Female attorney's raw numerical comparisons of 
small number of women admitted to partnership 
throughout law firm's history were not probative 
offirm's alleged discriminatory motive in failing 
to admit her to partnership; her comparisons were 
not accompanied by any analysis of either 
qualified applicant pool or flow of qualified 
candidates over relevant time period. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 7. 
District court's findings that female attorney was 
evaluated negatively for being too involved with 
women's issues, specifically her concern about 
law firm's treatment of paralegals, and that male 
partner was not criticized for encouraging 
discussion of "women's issue" of part-time 
employment, were of marginal value in 
supporting finding that firm's failure to admit 
female attorney to partnership was for pretextual 
reason in violation of Title VII; partner testified 
that he was not criticizing plaintiff for raising 
paralegal issue, but for her misperception that it 
was "women's issue." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 
Record did not support district court's finding, in 
Title VII action against law firm by female 
attorney who was not admitted to partnership, 
that male associate's sexual harassment offemale 
employees at firm was not mentioned in its 
consideration of that male associate for 
partnership; chairman of associates committee 
met with male associate concerning those 
incidents and placed memorandum in his 
personnel file, and incident occurred after 
associates committee decided it was unlikely to 
recommend him for partnership in any event. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, to 
60 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000 ... 
District court's finding in Title VII 
discrimination case that female attorney who was 
not made partner was evaluated negatively for 
being "very demanding," while several male 
associates who were made partners were 
evaluated negatively for lacking sufficient 
assertiveness in their demeanor, did not support 
court's conclusion that female attorney was 
treated differently because of her gender; 
criticisms of her assertiveness related to way in 
which she handled administrative manners such 
as office and secretarial space, while criticism of 
male associates for lacking assertiveness was 
related to their handling of legal matters. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 7. 
Law firm partner's alleged statement to female 
attorney during selection process that she did not 
fit firm's mold since she was a woman did not 
support district court's conclusion that firm's 
subsequent failure to admit female attorney to 
partnership violated Title VII; other evidence of 
sex discrimination was lacking, partner made that 
comment five years before partnership decision, 
and partner himself left firm before partnership 
decision was made, although he had consistently 
supported female attorney's candidacy. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 
Law firm partner's six alleged crude and 
unprofessional statements to female attorney 
over period of five years were insufficient to 
sustain district court's finding that law firm's 
reason for denying female attorney admission to 
partnership, i.e., her legal analytical ability, was 
just pretext to cover up sex discrimination; other 
evidence of sex discrimination was lacking and, 
although partner was at one time decision maker 
and eventually supported female attorney's 
admission to partnership, he took no part in final 
votes or evaluations concerning her because he 
had by that time left firm. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 
to 
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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen (Wolf) appeals from 
a judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting relief in favor of 
Nancy O'Mara Ezold (Ezold) on her claim that Wolf 
intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her 
sex in violation ofTitIe VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(TitIe VII), to 
when it decided not to admit her to the 
firm's partnership effective February 1, 1989. At trial Wolf 
contended that it denied Ezold admission to the partnership 
because her skills in the category of legal analysis did not 
meet the firm's standards. The district court disagreed and 
found that this articulated reason was a pretext contrived to 
mask sex discrimination. Wolf argues on appeal that the 
district court improperly analyzed the evidence before it 
and that the evidence, properly analyzed, does not support 
the district court's ultimate finding of pretext. 
This case raises important issues that cut across the 
spectrum of discrimination law. It is also the first in which 
allegations of discrimination arising from a law firm 
partnership admission decision require appellate review 
after trial. Accordingly, we have given it our closest 
attention and, after an exhaustive examination ofthe record 
and analysis of the applicable law, have concluded that the 
district court made two related errors whose combined 
effect require us to reverse the judgment in favor of Ezold. 
The district court first impermissibly *513 substituted its 
own subjective judgment for that of Wolf in determining 
that Ezold met the firm's partnership standards. Then, with 
its view improperly influenced by its own judgment of 
what Wolf should have done, it failed to see that the 
evidence could not support a finding that Wolfs decision 
to deny Ezold admission to the partnership was based upon 
a sexually discriminatory motive rather than the firm's 
assessment of her legal qualifications. Accordingly, we 
hold not only that the district court analyzed the evidence 
improperly and that its resulting finding of pretext is 
clearly erroneous, but also that the evidence, properly 
analyzed, is insufficient to support that finding and 
therefore its ultimate conclusion of discrimination cannot 
stand. We will therefore reverse and remand for entry of 
judgment in favor of Wolf. This disposition makes it 
unnecessary to address the issues raised in Wolfs appeal 
concerning the remedy the district court awarded to Ezold 
or those in Ezold's cross-appeal concerning her claim of 
constructive discharge. 
I. 
Ezold sued Wolf under Title VII alIeging that Wolf 
intentionalIy discriminated against her because of her sex 
when it decided not to admit her to the firm's partnership. 
She further alIeged that she was constructively discharged 
by reason of the adverse partnership decision. The court 
bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. After a 
lengthy bench trial the district court rendered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 29, 1990. 
(Ezold 1). It entered judgment 
in favor of Ezold on her claim for intentional 
discrimination and against her on her claim for 
constructive discharge. 
The district court held that the nondiscriminatory reason 
articulated by Wolf for its rejection of Ezold's 
candidacy-that her legal analytical ability failed to meet the 
firm's partnership standard-was a pretext. It stated: 
Ms. Ezold has established that the 
defendant's purported reasons for its 
conduct are pretextual. The defendant 
promoted to partnership men having 
evaluations substantiaIly the same or 
inferior to the plaintiffs, and indeed 
promoted male associates who the 
defendant claimed had precisely the lack 
of analytical or writing ability upon 
which Wolf, Block purportedly based its 
decision concerning the plaintiff .... Such 
differential treatment establishes that the 
defendant's reasons were a pretext for 
discrimination. 
ld. at 1191-92 (Conclusion of Law (COL) 11). The district 
court also held that four instances of conduct by Wolf 
supported its finding of pretext: (J) Ezold was evaluated 
negatively for being too involved with women's issues in 
the firm; (2) a male associate's sexual harassment of 
female employees at the firm was seen as "insignificant" 
and not mentioned to the Associates Committee prior to 
the partnership decision; (3) Ezold was evaluated 
negatively for being very demanding, while male 
associates were evaluated negatively for lacking 
assertiveness; and (4) Ezold "was the target of several 
comments demonstrating [Wolfs] differential treatment of 
her because she is a woman." ld. at 1192 (COL 12). 
In holding that Ezold had failed to establish that she was 
constructively discharged, the district court stated: 
A reasonable person in Ms. Ezold's 
position would not have deemed her 
working conditions to be so intolerable 
as to feel compelIed to resign. 
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Id. (COL 16). This holding became relevant to the issue of 
damages. By way of relief, Ezold sought backpay as well 
as instatement in the firm as a partner, and if such 
instatement was impractical, front pay. Wolf argued to the 
district court that its holding that Ezold was not 
constructively discharged limited her relief to back pay 
covering the period from her unlawful denial of admission 
to the partnership, effective February 1, 1989, until the date 
of her voluntary resignation from the firm on June 7, 1989. 
On March 15, 1991, the district court decided that its 
holding against Ezold on her constructive discharge *514 
claim did not preclude her from obtaining relief for the 
period following her voluntary resignation. See 
The parties then briefed the issue of whether Ezold 
properly mitigated her damages as required by section 
706(g)(l) of Title VII, On 
July 23, 1991, the district court issued its final 
memorandum and order. It ruled that Ezold had properly 
mitigated her damages and that her rejection of Wolf's 
offer to admit her as a partner as of February 1, 1990 if she 
accepted responsibility for its domestic relations practice 
did not toll Wolf's liability for back pay. The court then 
awarded Ezold back pay in the amount of$131,784.00 for 
the period from her resignation on June 7, 1989 to January 
31,1991. The parties agreed that if the court's November 
27, 1990 and March 15, 1991 orders were affirmed on 
appeal, Ezold would be instated as a partner.2 The court 
incorporated this agreement into its orders. The district 
court also awarded Ezold attorney's fees and costs. Wolf 
timely appealed from the district court's orders. Ezold filed 
a protective cross-appeal from the district court's denial of 
her constructive discharge claim. 
II. 
Ezold was hired by Wolf as an associate on a partnership 
track in July 1983. She had graduated in the top third of her 
class from the Villanova University School of Law in 1980 
and then worked at two small law firms in Philadelphia. 
Before entering law school, Ezold had accumulated 
thirteen years of administrative and legislative experience, 
first as an assistant to Senator Edmund Muskie, then as 
contract administrator for the Model Cities Program in 
Philadelphia, and finally as Administrator of the Office of 
a Special Prosecutor of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Justice. 
Ezold was hired at Wolf by Seymour Kurland, then 
chairman of the litigation department. The district court 
found that Kurland told Ezold during an interview that it 
Ezold was assigned to the firm's litigation department. 
From 1983-87, Kurland was responsible for the 
assignment of work to associates in the department. He 
often delegated this responsibility to partner Steven 
Arbittier. As Ezold acknowledged, many partners 
bypassed the formal assignment procedure and directly 
assigned matters to associates. The district court found that 
Arbittier assigned Ezold to actions that were "small" by 
Wolf standards. 
Ezold's performance was reviewed regularly throughout 
her tenure pursuant to Wolf's evaluation process, which 
operates as follows: The Associates Committee, consisting 
often partners representing each ofthe firm's departments, 
first reviews the performance of all the firm's associates 
and makes recommendations to the firm's five-member 
Executive Committee as to which associates should be 
admitted to the partnership. The Executive Committee then 
revIews the partnership recommendations of the 
Associates Committee and makes its own 
recommendations to the full partnership. The firm's voting 
partners consider only those persons whom the Executive 
Committee recommends for admission to the partnership. 
Senior associates within two years of partnership 
consideration are evaluated annually; non-senior 
associates are evaluated semi-annually. The firm's partners 
are asked to submit written evaluations on *515 
standardized forms.3 The partner is asked the degree of 
contact he has had with the associate during the evaluation 
period. Partners were instructed that the evaluations were 
to be completed regardless of the extent of the evaluating 
partner's contact or familiarity with the associate's work. 
Ten criteria of legal performance are listed on the forms in 
the following order: legal analysis, legal writing and 
drafting, research skills, formal speech, informal speech, 
judgment, creatIvIty, negotIatmg and advocacy, 
promptness and efficiency. Ten personal characteristics are 
also listed: reliability, taking and managing responsibility, 
flexibility, growth potential, attitude, client relationship, 
client servicing and development, ability under pressure, 
ability to work independently, and dedication. As stated by 
Ian Strogatz,4 Chairman of the Associates Committee: 
"The normal standards for partnership include as factors 
for consideration all of the ones ... that are contained [on] 
our evaluation forms." Joint Appendix (App.) at 1170. 
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Despite format changes, legal analysis was always listed as 
the first criterion to be evaluated. This criterion was 
defined on the evaluation forms used in 1987 and 1988 as 
the "ability to analyze legal issues; grasp problems; collect, 
organize and understand complex factual issues." Id at 
3728. Partners provide grades as well as written comments 
on these criteria. The evaluation forms describe the grades 
as follows: 
-DISTINGUISHED: Outstanding, exceptional; 
consistently demonstrates extraordinary adeptness and 
quality; star. 
-GOOD: Displays particular merit on a consistent basis; 
effective work product and performance; able; talented. 
-ACCEPT ABLE: Satisfactory; adequate; displays 
neither particular merit nor any serious defects or 
omissions; dependable. 
-MARGINAL: Inconsistent work product and 
performance; sometimes below the level of what you 
expect from Associates who are acceptable at this level. 
-UNACCEPTABLE: Fails to meet minimum standard 
of quality expected by you of an associate at this level; 
frequently below level of what you expect. 
Id at 3464 (emphasis in original). 
The form asks the evaluating partner to describe any 
particular strengths or weaknesses of an associate. Partners 
are also asked to indicate their views on the admission of 
each senior associate to the partnership. The evaluation 
lists five possible responses: "with enthusiasm," "with 
favor," "with mixed emotions," "with negative feelings" or 
"no opinion." Partners are also asked to respond "yes" or 
"no" to the following question: "I would feel comfortable 
turning over to this Associate to handle on hislher own a 
significant matter for one of my clients." Id at 3467. Given 
the number of reviewing partners, the evaluations often 
contain a wide range of divergent views. 
These evaluations are then compiled and summarized by 
the firm's administrative staff and organized in books for 
review by the Associates Committee. 
Each member of the Associates 
Committee is asked to make an initial assessment of the 
evaluations pertaining to one of the associates or 
candidates for partnership. That committee member 
prepares a form entitled "Committee Member's Associate 
Evaluation Summary" summarizing his or her personal 
view of each associate's evaluations. This form is 
colloquially referred to as the "bottom line" memo. As 
found by the district court, the bottom line memo "is 
intended to be [the Associates Committee member's] own 
personal view of what he has gleaned from the evaluations 
submitted at the time by the partners who submitted 
evaluation forms, plus anything in addition that [the 
Associates Committee member} has *516 gleaned from 
any interviews that he has conducted with respect to those 
evaluations." (emphasis in original). 
The bottom line memo also contains a "grid" reflecting the 
Associates Committee member's summary of the 
evaluated associate's grades in legal and personal skills. 
The bottom line memo also assesses a senior associate's 
prospects for regular partnership (Category VI) under the 
following ratings: "more likely than not," "unclear," "less 
likely than not" or "unlikely." In 1987 and 1988, similar 
rankings were used to determine the associate's potential 
for special partnership (Category VII). The Category VII 
partnership then in existence conferred a non-equity 
"partnership" status upon associates who fell below the 
normal standard for admission as equity partners but 
whose work nevertheless was making a valuable 
contribution to the firm. See 
Each member of the Associates Committee receives copies 
of the bottom line memo for all associates before meeting 
formally to discuss evaluations. The bottom line memo 
serves as a starting point for the Associates Committee's 
discussion of each candidate. The Committee members 
using both the bottom line memo and the administrativ~ 
summaries of the grades and comments, engage in a 
process of weighing and comparing each associate's legal 
skills and personal characteristics. The Committee also 
conducts interviews of those partners who failed to submit 
written evaluations of an associate during an evaluation 
period, submitted an evaluation that requires clarification 
or asked for an opportunity to supplement the written 
evaluation in an interview.5 Strogatz testified that the 
Committee has no formal voting procedure. 
It ultimately reaches its own consensus as to 
each senior associate's partnership potential and as to each 
associate's performance. It also formulates a performance 
review that will be given to each associate and senior 
associate by a member of the Committee. 
The firm's partners evaluated Ezold twice a year as an 
associate and once a year as a senior associate from 
October 1983 until the Associates Committee determined 
that it would not recommend her for partnership in 
September 1988. The district court found that "[i]n the 
period up to and including 1988, Ms. Ezold received 
strongly positive evaluations from almost all of the 
partners for whom she had done any substantial work." Id 
at 1182 (FOF 60).6 In making this finding the district court 
relied on the evaluations of Wolf partners Seymour 
Kurland, Robert Boote, Steve Goodman, Barry Schwartz, 
Alan Davis and Raymond Bradley. Ezold's overall score in 
60 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000 ... 
legal skills in the 1988 bottom line memorandum before 
the Associates Committee was a "G" for good. It was noted 
that "overall" that year she received "stronger grades in 
intellectual skills than last time." Id. at 1183 (FOF 71). 
Evaluations in Ezold's file not mentioned by the district 
court show that concerns over Ezold's legal analytical 
ability arose early during her tenure at the firm. In an 
evaluation covering the period from November 1984 
through April 1985, Arbittier wrote: 
I have discussed legal issues with Nancy 
in connection with [two cases]. I found 
her analysis to be rather superficial and 
unfocused. I am beginning to doubt that 
she has sufficient legal analytical ability 
to make it with the firm .... She makes a 
good impression with people, has 
common sense, and can handle routine 
matters well. However these traits will 
take you just so far in our firm. I think 
that due to the nature of our practice 
Nancy's future here is limited. 
App. at 3392. That same year Schwartz wrote: 
*517 I have worked a great deal with 
Nancy since my last evaluation .... Both 
cases are complex, multifaceted matters 
that have presented novel issues to us. 
While her enthusiasm never wanes and 
she keeps plugging away-I'm often left 
with a product that demonstrates 
uncertainty in the analysis of a problem. 
After extensive discussions with me, the 
analysis becomes a little more focused, 
although sometimes I get the sense that 
Nancy feels adrift and is just marching as 
best she can to my analytical tune .... In 
my view her energy, enthusiasm and 
fearlessness make her a valuable asset to 
us. While she may not be as bright as 
some of our best associates, her talents 
will continue to serve us well. 
Id. at 3392. Also in 1985, partner Donald Joseph rated 
Ezold's legal analytical ability as marginal and wrote "[i]ts 
[sic] too early to tell but I have been disappointed on her 
grasp of the problem, let alone performance." Id. 
During her next evaluation period from April through 
November 1985, Ezold received similar negative 
evaluations. Arbittier, Robert Fiebach and Joseph rated her 
legal analytical abilities as marginal. Arbittier wrote: 
She took a long time getting [a summary 
judgment brief] done and I found it to be 
stilted and unimaginative. One of the 
main issues-dealing with the issue of 
notice-she missed completely and did not 
grasp our position .... Also, in considering 
whether to file a defensive motion ... she 
failed to cite me to a clause in the 
agreement that was highly relevant 
leaving me with the impression that the 
motion could not succeed. I think Nancy 
tries hard and can handle relatively 
straight-forward matters with a degree of 
maturity and judgment, but when she 
gets into more complicated areas she 
lacks real analytical skill and just does 
what she is told in a mechanical way. She 
is not up to our minimal Wolf, Block 
standards. 
Id. at 3376. Boote made the following report on his 
performance review with Ezold after this evaluation 
period: 
Nancy appeared to accept the judgment, 
albeit a little grudgingly, that her 
analytical, research and writing ability 
was not up to our standards and that she 
should focus on the types of matters that 
she can handle effectively .... We made it 
very clear to Nancy that if she pursues 
general civil litigation work she is not on 
track toward partnership and that her 
only realistic chance for partnership in 
our opinion is to develop a good 
reputation for herself in one of the 
specialized areas of practice. 
Id. at 3375. 
In the evaluation period covering November 1985 to April 
1986, Boote wrote the following to the Associates 
Committee: 
Nancy continues to get mixed reviews. 
Her pluses are that she is mature, 
courageous, pretty good on her feet and 
has the capacity to inspire confidence in 
clients. Her minuses are that there is 
doubt about her analytic and writing 
ability.... In considering Nancy's 
prospects for the long range, I think we 
should bear in mind that we have made 
mistakes in the past in letting people go 
to other firms who really could have 
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filled a valuable niche here. Whether 
Nancy is such a person, of course, 
remains to be seen. 
Id. at 3365. 
A summary of Ezold's performance review from October 
1986 prepared by Schwartz stated: 
Nancy was advised that several of the 
lawyers feel she has made very positive 
progress as a lawyer, Sy [Kurland] being 
one of them. However, he told her that 
other lawyers had strong negative 
sentiments about her capabilities and 
they feel she has a number of 
shortcomings in the way of complicated 
analysis of legal problems and in being 
able to handle the big complicated 
corporate litigation, and therefore, does 
not meet the standard for partnership at 
Wolf, Block .... Both Sy and I urged 
Nancy to seriously consider looking for 
employment elsewhere as she may not be 
able to tum the tide. 
Id. at 3364. 
Although several partners saw improvement in Ezold's 
work, negative comments *518 about her analytical ability 
continued up until, and through, her 1988 senior associate 
evaluation, the year she was considered for partnership. A 
summary of her evaluations for 1987 and 1988, focusing 
on the grades and comments she received in the category of 
legal analysis, follows:? 
*519 During the 1987 evaluation period, two partners 
viewed Ezold's eventual admission to the partnership 
"with enthusiasm," sixteen "with favor," eight "with mixed 
emotions" and seven with "negative feelings." Id. at 3346. 
The Associates Committee formed a consensus that 
Ezold's analytical ability fell below the firm's standards. It 
predicted her partnership chances as "unclear" and if she 
was made a partner it would most likely be a Category VII 
partner because there was substantial doubt as to her legal 
ability. Id. at 3349. At trial Ezold acknowledged that 
during her evaluation meeting for this period she was told 
that "there were partners who criticized [her] writing 
ability and questioned [her] ability to handle complex 
litigation, perhaps criticized or questioned [her] ability in 
the area oflegal analysis." Id. at 666. 
1988 Evaluations 
Partner Grade 
Name (Legal 
C 
0 
m 
m 
e 
n 
t 
Analysis) s 
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Rosenblum 
Temin 
Davis 
Arbittier 
Fiebach 
Goldberger 
Joseph 
Poul 
Simon 
A "On a very complicated matter primarily involving financial analysis, I 
am not sure whether or not [Ezold] grasped analysis fully. (I am not 
sure that others working on project did either. ... )." Recommended 
partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3488-91. 
A Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with mixed emotions." Id. 
at 3508-11. 
A "She will never be a legal scholar-but we have plenty of support in that 
area." Recommended partnership with "enthusiasm." Id. at 3512-15. 
A "Barely adequate legal skills"; "Her abilities are limited. She makes a 
good impression but she lacks real legal analytical ability." 
Recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3520-23. 
M "Nancy has certain strengths .... If directed, she will do a good 
job-except that she has limitations with respect to complex legal 
issues. However, when left on her own she does not do what has to be 
done until [the] case is in crisis and she does a poor job in keeping [the] 
client informed." Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." 
Id. at 3544-47. 
Would feel comfortable turning over a significant matter for one of his 
clients "if not too complex." "Nancy reputedly can handle many of our 
matters on her own. If so and reliable others bear these rumors out, 
partnership may be in the cards." Recommended partnership with 
"mixed emotions." Id. at 3552-55. 
"[H]er abilities to grasp legal issues from the little I observed was 
insufficient to trust her in major litigation on her own." Recommended 
partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3560-63. 
G Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 3580-83. 
"Probably ancient history-but I do recall my perception that she does 
60 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000 ... 
Fala 
Roberts 
Garber 
Berriman 
Kaplinsky 
McConomy 
not write well and lacks intellectual sophistication." Recommended 
partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3596-99. 
G "Nancy handled a moderate sized lawsuit for a client of mine. Job was 
done well and responsibly. Result was good." Id. at 3656. 
G Slight contact; recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 
3688-91. 
"Experience with her years ago was unsatisfactory." No opinion on 
partnership recommendation. Id. at 3756-59. 
G Slight contact; recommended partnership "with enthusiasm." Id. at 
3776-79. 
A "She has done a very nice job on the Home Unity shareholder 
litigation .... I am probably not as complimentary as Alan [Davis] might 
be. I was never convinced that she had a complete grasp of the 
accounting issues in the case." Recommended partnership "with 
favor." Id. at 3452-55. 
G "Only worked on one matter for me. She is doing a super job." 
Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 3464-67. 
*520 In 1988, ninety-one partners submitted evaluations of 
Ezold. Thirty-two, a little more than one-third, made 
recommendations with varying degrees of confidence, for 
Ezold's admission to partnership. Seven of those partners 
recommended that Ezold be made a partner "with 
enthusiasm," fourteen "with favor," six with "mixed 
emotions," four with "negative feelings," and one with 
"mixed emotions/negative feelings." Id at 3318. Three of 
the four partners who voted for partnership with negative 
feelings were members of Ezold's department. After 
reviewing Ezold's evaluations and conducting interviews, 
the Associates Committee voted 9-1 not to recommend 
Ezold for Category VI partnership. 
In a discussion initiated by Davis, the Associates 
Committee also debated modifYing the partnership 
standard as a matter of general policy or specially in 
Ezold's case because of her other positive attributes. Davis 
believed: 
although [Ezold] was not up to par on her 
legal analytical ability, ... deficiencies in 
a particular area, even though it was a 
traditional area where we required a 
certain superior level, could be 
overlooked or relaxed to where there 
were sufficiently compensating skills in 
other areas, because I felt as chairman 
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that in staffing a case, I could put 
together the right skills, and we had 
enough business where we could fit 
everybody in usefully and productively. 
Id. at 1665, 1686. He thought the firm "just ought to come 
off [its] standards and be a little more creative in melding 
different abilities that different people might bring." Id. at 
1685. The other Committee members ultimately rejected 
this suggestion. 
The Associates Committee told Ezold that she would not 
be recommended for admission as a "Group VI" regular 
partner effective February 1, 1989 because "too many 
partners did not believe she had sufficient legal analytical 
ability to handle complex legal issues." I 
It did vote, however, to 
recommend her for the status of "Group VlI" special 
partner that the firm had heretofore made available to 
associates who are valuable but fall below the firm's high 
standards for full partnership. The continuing existence 
of that category was, however, then under review by the 
finn's Executive Committee. It was in fact later 
eliminated. 
Out of a total of eight candidates in Ezold's class, five male 
associates and one female associate were recommended for 
regular partnership. One male associate, Associate X, was 
not recommended for either regular or special partnership. 
The Executive Committee decided to review the 
Associates Committee's negative recommendation of 
Ezold and also to conduct an independent review of the 
negative *521 recommendation of Associate X. William 
Rosoff, former chairman of the Executive Committee, 
conducted the inquiry. Rosoffreviewed Ezold's evaluation 
documents and interviewed four litigation department 
partners: Schwartz, Boote, Arbittier and Fiebach. Rosoff 
had learned of the policy disagreement among some of the 
firm's partners as to whether the partnership standard 
should be relaxed in light of Ezold's other attributes. He 
reported to the Executive Committee that it should not 
recommend Ezold's admission unless it was prepared to 
reduce the finn's partnership standards. The 5-member 
Executive Committee voted unanimously not to 
recommend Ezold's admission as a regular partner. 
On November 16, 1988 Executive Committee Chairman 
Charles Kopp met with Ezold and informed her of the 
decision. He also told her that two domestic relations 
partners had informed the Committee several days earlier 
that they were leaving the firm and that this immediate 
vacuum presented an opportunity for her. Id. at 1189 (FOF 
137). He promised that if she agreed to work in this 
department, she would be made a regular partner in one 
year. Other associates passed over for partnership in the 
past had sometimes agreed to specialize in a certain area 
where the need arose and had later made partner. Although 
Kopp had little contact with Ezold, he believed that Ezold 
could handle the work because of the positive evaluations 
of her skills with clients and in the courtroom and because 
the practice area did not require the same complex analysis 
as the firm's commercial litigation practice. See id. at 1189 
(FOF 137-38).14 Ezold declined the offer. Kopp told Ezold 
that the firm nevertheless wanted her to stay and she could 
stay on as a litigation associate as long as she wanted. Id. at 
1189 (FOF 139). 
Ezold also met with Rosoff concerning the domestic 
relations offer. The district court found that Rosoff "told 
her that although he could not assure her of a partnership in 
the future if she declined the domestic relations partnership 
offer, she would be considered for partnership in the 
future." He also told her that she 
would receive a substantial pay raise the following July 
when semi-annual raises are given to associates, but she 
would not receive the pay raise being given to the other 
members of her class who were recommended for 
partnership. 
Ezold remained at the firm, none of her cases were taken 
away from her, and Davis, then chair of the Litigation 
Department and one of Ezold's supporters, continued to 
assign her new cases. On January 25, 1989, one day after 
the firm's partners voted on the admission of new partners, 
Ezold began looking for other employment. She ultimately 
signed a one-year contract as president of an 
environmental consulting firm, a former client of Wolf, 
and also took an "of counsel" position with a suburban law 
firm. Ezold resigned from the firm on June 7,1989. 
III. 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
and 
(West 1981). We have jurisdiction over the 
*522 final orders of the district court pursuant to 
IV. 
Ezold claims Wolf intentionally discriminated against her 
because of her sex. Intentional discrimination in 
employment cases fall within one of two categories: 
"pretext" cases and "mixed-motives" cases. See 
60 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000 ... 
pretext cases, the familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
analysis applies. In a mixed motives case the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine analysis does not apply, and the plaintiff 
has the burden of showing by evidence tied to a 
discriminatory animus that an illegitimate factor had a 
"motivating" or "substantial" role in the employment 
decision. This theory has been 
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 
(West Supp.1992). Jfthe plaintiff makes such 
a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence "that it would have reached 
the same [employment] decision ... even in the absence of' 
the impermissible factor. 
There is some uncertainty in the law 
about the sort of evidence a plaintiff must show to shift the 
burden to an employer in a mixed motives case, see 
cert. denied, 
but we need not address that issue here as Ezold 
proceeded only under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
framework. See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 46-47 
("Your Honor ... [ intended to say that this case followed 
standard McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.... This is a 
pretext case."). This is not a mixed-motive case. The issue 
in this case is "whether illegal or legal motives, but not 
both, were the 'true' motives behind the [partnership] 
II I Therefore, before considering Wolf's contentions, we 
think it wise to revisit the alternating burdens of proof in a 
Title VII discrimination case under the now familiar 
Ezold relied on this particular method of 
circumstantial proof of discrimination at trial. The plaintiff 
must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence a 
prima facie case of discrimination. t<m0/j,,?O 
( 
The plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing 
that she is a member of a protected class; that she was 
qualified for and rejected for the position; and that 
non-members of the protected class were treated more 
favorably. (citing 
see 
After the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 
genuine issue of fact, the presumption of discrimination 
drops from the case. 
plaintiff, since she retains the ultimate 
persuasion, must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant's proffered reasons were a 
pretext for discrimination. *523 
12) The parties do not dispute the district court's 
conclusion of law that Ezold demonstrated a prima facie 
case, in particular that she was "qualified" for admission to 
the partnership. While "more than a denial of promotion as 
a result of a dispute over qualifications" must be shown to 
prove pretext, see 
such a dispute will satisfY the plaintiff's 
prima facie hurdle of establishing qualification as long as 
the plaintiff demonstrates that "[s]he was sufficiently 
qualified to be among those persons from whom a 
selection, to some extent discretionary, would be made." 
I (quoting 
In Title VII cases involving a dispute over 
"subjective" qualifications, we have recognized that the 
qualification issue should often be resolved in the second 
and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
analysis, to avoid putting too onerous a burden on the 
plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case, but we have 
refused to adopt a blanket rule. 
Because the prima facie case is 
it is rarely the focus of the ultimate 
cert. denied, 
We agree with 
the district court's conclusion that favorable evaluations 
from partners with whom Ezold worked, and a score of 
"0" on her 1988 bottom line memo, demonstrate that she 
was qualified for partnership consideration. See 
The defendant may rebut the presumption of 
discrimination arising out of the plaintiff's prima facie case 
by producing evidence that there was a "legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason" why the plaintiff was rejected. 
The Supreme 
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Court in Burdine said: 
[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, 
through the introduction of admissible 
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection. The explanation provided must 
be legally sufficient to justify a judgment 
for the defendant. I f the defendant carries 
this burden of production, the 
presumption raised by the prima facie 
case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry 
proceeds to a new level of specificity. 
Placing this burden of production on the 
defendant thus serves simultaneously to 
meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by 
presenting a legitimate reason for the 
action and to frame the factual issue with 
sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will 
have a full and fair opportunity to 
demonstrate pretext.. .. 
131 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant's articulated reasons are pretextual. 
This burden merges into the plaintiff's 
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been 
the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. The plaintiff 
must demonstrate "by competent evidence that the 
presumptively valid reason [ ] for [the alleged unlawful 
employment action] [was] III fact a coverup for a ... 
discriminatory decision." 
Explicit evidence of 
discrimination-i.e., the "smoking gun"-is not required. See 
A plaintiff can 
establish pretext in one of two ways: "either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of 
credence." 
141 In proving that the employer's motive was more likely 
than not the product of a discriminatory reason instead of 
the articulated legitimate reason, sufficiently strong 
evidence of an employer's past treatment of the plaintiff 
may suffice. See *524 
decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the 
evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to 
prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent." 
Wolf's articulated nondiscriminatory reason for denying 
Ezold's admission to the partnership was that she did not 
possess sufficient legal analytical skills to handle the 
responsibilities of partner in the firm's complex litigation 
practice. Ezold attempted to prove that Wolf's proffered 
explanation was "unworthy of credence" by showing she 
was at least equal to, if not more qualified than, similarly 
situated males promoted to partnership. She also 
contended that her past treatment at the firm showed 
Wolf's decision was based on a discriminatory motive 
rather than the legitimate reason of deficiency in legal 
analytical ability that the firm had articulated. 
v. 
From this overview of the law, we tum to the specifics of 
the district court's analysis, its findings and the parties' 
contentions concerning them. The district court compared 
Ezold to eight successful male partnership candidates, 
Associates A-H. It found: 
The test that was put to the plaintiff by 
the Associates Committee that she have 
outstanding academic credentials and 
that before she could be admitted to the 
most junior of partnerships, she must 
demonstrate that she had the analytical 
ability to handle the most complex 
litigation was not the test required of 
male associates. 
The district court 
then concluded: 
Ms. Ezold has established that the 
defendant's purported reasons for its 
conduct are pretextual. The defendant 
promoted to partnership men having 
evaluations substantially the same or 
inferior to the plaintiff's, and indeed 
promoted male associates who the 
defendant claimed had precisely the lack 
of analytical or writing ability upon 
which Wolf, Block purportedly based its 
decision concerning the plaintiff. The 
defendant is not entitled to apply its 
standards in a more "severe" fashion to 
female associates.... Such differential 
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treatment establishes that the defendant's 
reasons were a pretext for discrimination. 
Id. at 1191-92 (COL II ) (citations omitted). 
Wolf says this finding of pretext is wrong. Analyzing its 
contentions, we perceive two reasons why this is so. First, 
the district court's finding that Ezold was required to have 
outstanding academic credentials before she could be 
admitted to partnership is without factual support in the 
record. The only evidence in the record that Wolf 
considered Ezold's academic record is limited to the 
original decision to hire Ezold and to assignments given to 
Ezold early in her employment with Wolf, issues we 
consider in Part IX, infra. Second, in its analysis, the 
district court did not focus on Wolfs articulated reason for 
denying Ezold partnership-lack of analytic ability to 
handle complex litigation. Instead, the district court first 
substituted its own general standard for the qualities Wolf 
believed were essential to law firm partnership. Then, 
applying its own incorrect standard of comparison, the 
district court did not realize that a comparison of Ezold's 
legal analytic ability with that of the successful *525 males 
could not support a finding of pretext. Overall, Ezold's 
evaluations in that category were not as good as that of 
even the least capable male associate who was offered a 
partnership position. 
VI. 
Wolf contends that in all aspects of its analysis the district 
court improperly substituted its own subjective 
judgment-not only concerning what the firm's partnership 
standard should be-but also concerning whether Ezold met 
this standard. Specifically, it alleges that the district court 
ignored the negative evaluations concerning Ezold's legal 
analytical ability that are in the record; looked beyond the 
criterion of legal analysis, Wolf's articulated 
nondiscriminatory reason, in comparing Ezold to male 
associates admitted to the partnership; failed to make 
findings concerning male associates denied admission to 
the partnership based on their deficient legal analytical 
ability; and excluded from evidence the evaluation files of 
female associates admitted to the partnership who received 
criticisms similar to male associates admitted to the 
partnership in areas other than legal analysis. Initially, 
Wolf argues our review of these issues is plenary. 
Wolf relies on 
proposition that we exercise plenary review over the 
district court's determinations on these questions. Ezold 
responds that Wolf is trying to obtain plenary review by 
couching a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as 
legal error in the selection of the appropriate standards for 
determining discrimination. In Logue the defendant 
asserted on appeal that the district court incorrectly applied 
the legal standard for sex discrimination by failing to 
address and make findings of fact on all of the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons it offered in support of its 
termination of the plaintiff's employment. /d. at 153. We 
held that by failing to address all of the defendant's 
proffered reasons the district court erred as a matter oflaw, 
misapplied the legal standard governing sex discrimination 
and deprived the defendant of the full trial process 
contemplated by Burdine. 
151 This case is distinguishable from Logue. Here, the 
district court did consider Wolf's articulated 
nondiscriminatory reason and did make findings upon it. 
Wolf contends the district court's findings are incomplete 
and that those it did make do not support its ultimate 
finding of pretext. Plenary review is appropriate in order to 
determine the extent to which essential findings are 
missing. The district court's refusal to credit or make 
findings concerning all of Wolf's proffered evidence, 
however, does not subject its express findings to plenary 
review. Those findings cannot be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous. A finding becomes clearly erroneous 
"when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
When there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
district court's choice of one view cannot be clearly 
erroneous. 
The district court's resolution of the ultimate issue 
whether Wolf's reason for denying Ezold's admission to 
the partnership was a pretext is a finding of fact subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard set forth in 
See id. at 573, 
We may reverse the district 
court on this finding of fact only if the evidence is 
insufficient to permit a rational factfinder to infer that 
Wolf's assertion that Ezold was wanting in legal analytic 
ability was a mask for unlawful sex discrimination. 
Wolfs disagreement with the method of analysis the 
district court employed leads naturally to its challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district 
court's finding of pretext and its ultimate conclusion of 
unlawful discrimination. *526 Thus, Wolf contended at 
oral argument before this Court: "[t]here is no proof, in this 
case, of a gender-driven result." Transcript at 59. In 
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
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we must determine based on our own "comprehensive 
review of the entire record" whether Ezold has satisfied her 
ultimate burden of proving intentional sex discrimination. 
In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Ezold. See 
(citing 
cert. denied, 
We again defer to the district court's 
factual findings, including once more its ultimate finding, 
and we cannot reverse any of them unless they are clearly 
erroneous. 
VII. 
171 Wolfs articulated reason for refusing to offer Ezold a 
partnership was its belief, based on a subtle and subjective 
consensus among the partners, that she did not possess 
sufficient legal analytic ability to handle complex 
litigation. Wolf never contended that Ezold was not a good 
courtroom lawyer, dedicated to her practice, and good with 
clients. Instead, many partners felt, because of the level of 
her legal analytical ability, that she could not handle 
partnership responsibilities in the firm's complex litigation 
practice. Absent evidence to show that legal analytic 
ability was not a necessary precondition for partnership at 
Wolf, the district court's opinion about Ezold's 
comparative strengths in the other categories on the 
evaluation form is immaterial. 
A. 
The record does not show that anyone was taken into the 
partnership without serious consideration of their strength 
in the category of legal analytic ability. The evaluations 
specifically asked each partner whether he or she would 
feel comfortable turning over to the partnership candidate 
"to handle on his/her own a significant matter for one of 
my clients." See App. at 3423. Several of the partners' 
responses to this question on Ezold's evaluations show 
clear concern about the depth of her legal analytical 
capabilities. See, e.g., App. at 3348 ("I would not want her 
in charge of a large legally complex case, the traditional 
measure of a Wolf, Block partner."). This same question, 
reflecting a requirement that an applicant exhibit analytical 
abilities sufficient to meet Wolfs perception of the firm's 
standard, was considered throughout the firm's evaluations 
of the male associates with whom Ezold was competing. 
See, e.g., App. at 4257 ("I just am concerned if he could 
'first chair' a case."); App. at 4823 ("He [Associate H] can 
handle the most complex litigation we have."); App. at 
4532 ("Based on [Associate C's] ability to analyze a legal 
problem 1 could feel comfortable in turning over my best 
client to him for a significant matter."); App. at 5044 
("[There are] questions about his intellectual strength, his 
ability to manage complex transactions and his level of 
attention to detail"); App. at 4696 ("[H]e just doesn't have 
the high level of intelligence we need to handle complex 
legal questions."). Ezold herself acknowledged at trial that 
because of the nature of Wolf's litigation practice, its 
litigators devote much more time to legal analysis than 
in-court trial work. 
Davis, a member of the Associates Committee who 
favored partnership for Ezold, testified that he recognized 
her shortcomings in the area oflegal analytic ability. Thus, 
he advocated a relaxation of the partnership standard to 
accommodate her because he believed that her other skills 
"outweighed whatever deficiencies she had in the legal 
ability area." App. at 1684. The Associates Committee and 
the Executive Committee ultimately refused to relax the 
firm's standards. Such a refusal to relax *527 standards, 
however, is not evidence of discrimination. 
Wolf reserves for itself the power to decide, by consensus, 
whether an associate possesses sufficient analytical ability 
to handle complex matters independently after becoming a 
partner. It is Wolf's prerogative to utilize such a standard. 
fu ~an 
age discrimination case, we stated that "[b Jarring 
discrimination, a company has the right to make business 
judgments on employee status, particularly when the 
decision involves SUbjective factors deemed essential to 
certain positions." We stated again that "[a] 
plaintiff has the burden of casting doubt on an employer's 
articulated reasons for an employment decision. Without 
some evidence to cast this doubt, this Court will not 
interfere in an otherwise valid management decision." 
(citing 
(a court will not second guess 
business decisions made by employers, in the absence of 
some evidence of impermissible motives)); see 
("While an employer's judgment or course of action may 
seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question 
is simply whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal 
discrimination. "). 
The partnership evaluation process at Wolf, though 
formalized, is based on judgment, like most decisions in 
human institutions. A consensus as to that judgment is the 
end result of Wolf's formal process. In that process, the 
Associates Committee has the role of collecting and 
weighing hundreds of evaluations by partners with diverse 
views before reaching its consensus as to a particular 
associate's abilities. The consensus the Associates 
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Committee reaches is then passed on to the Executive 
Committee. After its review and, at least in Ezold's case, 
additional independent investigation, the Executive 
Committee submits its final recommendation to the 
partners for a vote. 
The differing evaluations the partners first submit to the 
Associates Committee are often based on hearsay or 
reputation. No precise theorem or specific objective 
criterion is employed. Cj (not 
"unwarranted invasion" of college's tenure process for 
district court "to determine that [professor] was held to 
higher standards in objective terms, i.e. number of 
publications") (emphasis added). We have cautioned 
courts on several occasions to avoid unnecessary intrusion 
into sUbjective promotion decisions in the analogous 
context of academic tenure. While such decisions are not 
insulated fromjudicial review for unlawful discrimination, 
it is clear that courts must be vigilant not 
to intrude into that determination, and 
should not substitute their judgment for 
that of the college with respect to the 
qualifications of faculty members for 
promotion and tenure. Determinations 
about such matters as teaching ability, 
research scholarship, and professional 
stature are subjective, and unless they 
can be shown to have been used as the 
mechanism to obscure discrimination, 
they must be left for evaluation by the 
professionals .... 
B. 
In Ezold's case, the district court correctly recognized the 
legal premise that should have governed its result: Title 
VII prohibits only "discrimination." Therefore, 
"consideration of the practices of the [firm] toward the 
plaintiff must be evaluated in light of its practices toward 
the allegedly more favored group, in this case males." 
The district court, however, failed to apply this legal 
premise to the evidence before it. It disagreed not only with 
Wolf's assessment of Ezold's ability to meet Wolf's 
standards, but also with Wolf's *528 partnership standards 
themselves. For example, it found: 
In the magnitude of its complexity, a case 
may have a senior partner, a younger 
partner, and an associate(s) assigned to a 
case. Accordingly, requiring the plaintiff 
to have the ability to handle on her own 
any complex litigation within the firm 
before she was eligible to be a partner 
was a pretext. 
The district court 
disagreed with Wolf's decision not to overlook Ezold's 
deficiency in legal analysis because of her other skills and 
attributes, but the court is not a member of Wolf's 
Associates Committee or Executive Committee. Its belief 
that Wolf's high standard of analytical ability was unwise 
in light of the staffing of senior partners on complex cases 
does not make Wolf's standard a pretext for 
discrimination. 
181 The evaluations that the district court did rely upon in 
making its finding of pretext praised Ezold for skills other 
than legal analysis, such as client relations and ability in 
court, that Wolf never disputed she possessed. Where an 
employer produces evidence that the plaintiff was not 
promoted because of its view that the plaintiff lacked a 
particular qualification the employer deemed essential to 
the position sought, a district court should focus on the 
qualification the employer found lacking in determining 
whether non-members of the protected class were treated 
more favorably. Without such a limitation, district courts 
would be routinely called upon to act as members of an 
employer's promotion board or committee. It would 
subjectively consider and weigh all the factors the 
employer uses in reaching a decision on promotion and 
then make its own decision without the intimate 
knowledge of the history of the employer and its standards 
that the firm's decisionmakers use in judging the degree to 
which a candidate exhibits a particular qualification that 
the employer has decided is of significance or primary 
importance in its promotion process. Pretext is not 
established by virtue of the fact that an employee has 
received some favorable comments in some categories or 
has, in the past, received some good evaluations. See, e.g., 
("An employer rating an employee as 
competent discredits the employer's stated reason for 
discharging the employee, however, only when the 
employer's stated reason is the employee's general 
incompetence.") (emphasis added). It was not for the 
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district court to determine that Ezold's skills in areas other 
than legal analysis made her sufficiently qualified for 
admission to the partnership. 
The district court's method of comparing Ezold to 
"similarly situated" male associates admitted to the 
partnership points up this initial flaw in its analysis. It 
engaged in a "pick and choose" selection of various 
comments concerning the male associates' personalities, 
work habits, and other criteria besides legal analysis, 
conducted its own subjective weighing process and then 
found that "[ m ]ale associates who received evaluations no 
better than [Ezold] and sometimes less favorable than [her] 
were made partners." 
In doing so, the district court made no reference to the 
many favorable evaluations of the analytical ability of 
these male associates. 
ajJ'd in relevant part, 
rev'd on other grounds, 
(plurality), is 
instructive. There the dispute centered in part on whether 
Price Waterhouse's concern about the plaintiff's 
interpersonal skills was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason to deny her partnership, or whether it was unworthy 
of credence. The district court held that "[i]t is clear that 
the complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills 
were not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination." 
Contemporaneous evaluations 
"conducted well before the plaintiff was proposed for 
partnership" reflected numerous criticisms of her 
interpersonal skills, *529 and "[ e ]ven partners who 
strongly supported her partnership candidacy 
acknowledged these deficiencies." ld. The plaintiff in 
Hopkins had contended that men with problems in 
interpersonal skills were invariably admitted to the 
partnership. The district court disagreed, stating: 
[T]he plaintiff has identified two male 
candidates who were criticized for their 
interpersonal skills because they were 
perceived as being aggressive, 
overbearing, abrasive or crude, but were 
recommended by the Policy Board and 
elected partner. Price Waterhouse points 
out that in both cases the Policy Board 
expressed substantial reservations about 
the candidates' interpersonal skills but 
ultimately made a "business decision" to 
admit the candidates because they had 
skills which the firm had a specific, 
special need [for] and the firm feared that 
their talents might be lost if they were put 
on hold .... In addition, these candidates 
received fewer evaluations from partners 
recommending that they be denied 
partnership and the negative comments 
on these candidates were less intense 
than those directed at the plaintiff. 
ld. at 1115.18 
The district court's comparison of Ezold with the 
successful male candidates in categories other than legal 
analytic ability does not lend support to its ultimate finding 
of pretext. The district court could not overturn Wolf's 
judgment that Ezold did not meet its standards for legal 
analytic ability without finding that Wolf's conclusions as 
to Ezold's legal analytic ability were pretextual. That 
finding, in order to stand, has to be based on evidence 
showing either that Wolf's asserted reason for denying 
Ezold a partnership position was not credible-either 
through comparison of her ability in that category, as Wolf 
perceived it, with the successful male associates, or by 
evidence showing that Wolf's decision not to admit Ezold 
to the partnership was more likely motivated by a 
discriminatory reason than by her shortcomings in legal 
analytic ability. 
c. 
Were the factors Wolf considered in deciding which 
associates should be admitted to the partnership objective, 
as opposed to subjective, the conflicts in various partners' 
views about Ezold's legal analytical ability that this record 
shows might amount to no more than a conflict in the 
evidence that the district court as factfinder had full power 
to resolve. The principles governing valid comparisons 
between members of a protected minority and those 
fortunate enough to be part of a favored majority reveal an 
obvious difficulty plaintiffs must face in an unlawful 
discrimination case involving promotions that are 
dependent on an employer's balanced evaluation of 
various subjective criteria. This difficulty is the lack of an 
objective qualification or factor that a plaintiff can use as a 
yardstick to compare herself with similarly situated 
employees. In Bennun, the reason Rutgers assigned for 
denying Bennun's promotion to the position of tenured 
professor was the "poor quality and insufficient quantity of 
his research." Because Bennun's 
research product could be measured against the judgment 
of his academic peers and, by that judgment, objectively 
compared with the research of a successful candidate for 
professor, Bennun was able to show the reason the 
University advanced for denying him the rank of professor 
was incredible. He did so by proving that he had published 
a higher number of articles than the similarly situated 
non-hispanic member ofthe faculty who had been granted 
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professorial rank and that his articles had received more 
favorable reviews from internationally known scholars. fd. 
By objectively comparing Bennun's published research 
with that of the favored candidate, the district court 
rationally found that Bennun was held to higher standards 
than a non-Hispanic. This Court held that this *530 finding 
was not clearly erroneous and thus laid a proper foundation 
for the district court's circumstantial inference that 
Rutgers' articulated reason for denying Bennun promotion 
was a pretext. fd. at 179-80. 
Similarly, in Kunda, the district court held that 
Muhlenberg's asserted reason for not promoting Kunda, 
lack of a master's degree, "was pretextual in view of its 
promotion of male members of the department who did not 
have masters' degrees." We affirmed, 
stating: 
Muhlenberg's attempt to explain and 
distinguish each of the three situations 
[in which male members without 
master's degrees were promoted] raised a 
factual issue which the trier of fact 
decided against it. We cannot say that the 
record is barren of any evidence to 
support the trial court's findings, and 
therefore will affirm its ultimate 
conclusion that plaintiff was 
discriminated against on the basis of sex 
in the denial of a promotion. 
fd. at 545. 
The record shows a 9-1 consensus among the members of 
the Associates Committee that Ezold's admission to the 
partnership was "unlikely" because of their overall 
assessment of her legal analytical ability. It was followed 
by the unanimous negative vote of the Executive 
Committee and the entire partnership. The positive 
evaluations of some partners concerning Ezold's skills in 
areas other than legal analysis do not show the reason Wolf 
advanced for denying partnership to Ezold was incredible 
and so a pretext for discrimination. 
Ezold, unlike the plaintiffs in Bennun and Kunda, is not 
able to point to an objectively quantifiable factor by which 
Wolf compared her qualifications against those of the male 
associates considered for partnership. Wolfs articulated 
reason, lack of legal analytic ability to handle complex 
litigation, like all its other criteria, involves subjective 
assessment of an associate's manifested behavior and 
performance. 
D. 
Here, the district court not only based its finding of pretext 
on invalid comparisons, but it also ignored evidence Wolf 
produced to compare Ezold's shortcomings with the 
strengths of the successful male candidates in the category 
of legal analytic ability. 
Thus, Wolf also argues the district court ignored 
significant evidence by focusing only on the positive 
evaluations in Ezold's files and turning a blind eye to the 
many negative criticisms concerning her analytic ability. 
Compare with supra at 
516-20. Wolfs attack in this respect is even more serious 
in its consequence than its attack on the court's use of 
comparisons between Ezold and the successful male 
candidates in categories other than legal analytic ability. 
The court's improper comparison of Ezold and the 
successful males in categories other than legal analytic 
ability would merely require a remand for appropriate 
comparison. If, however, Ezold is unable to show that she 
compared favorably in the category oflegal analytic ability 
with at least one ofthe successful male candidates, she will 
have failed to show that Wolf did not pass her over for the 
legitimate reason it asserted. If she fails in that respect, she 
loses the benefit of the inference of unlawful 
discrimination that arises when the employer's legitimate 
articulated reason is shown not to be the real reason for the 
employer's discriminatory action. Absent that inference, 
Ezold cannot prevail on her McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
theory unless she has produced direct evidence 
independently sufficient to show discriminatory animus, 
an issue we consider in Part IX, infra. See 
Compare W!LULmntc! 
I. ("The broad, 
overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and 
consumer, is efficient *531 and trustworthy workmanship 
assured through fair and ... neutral employment and 
personnel decisions.") with HUV/f,,"o 
("Title VII, however, does not demand that 
an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or 
women.") (citing § kV'JV';-kl 
We are not unmindful of the difficult task a plaintifffaces 
in proving discrimination in the application of subjective 
factors. It arises from an inherent tension between the goal 
of all discrimination law and our society's commitment to 
free decisionmaking by the private sector in economic 
affairs. 
The fact that Wolfs articulated reason for rejecting Ezold, 
lack of legal analytical ability, involves subjective and not 
objective factors subject to easy measurement does not, 
therefore, insulate the partnership decision from all review. 
When an employer relies on its subjective evaluation of the 
plaintiffs qualifications as the reason for denying 
promotion, the plaintiff can prove the articulated reason is 
unworthy of credence by presenting persuasive 
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comparative evidence that non-members of the protected 
class were evaluated more favorably, i.e., their deficiencies 
in the same qualification category as the plaintiffs were 
overlooked for no apparent reason when they were 
promoted to partner.20 
make this showing. 
*532 The district court's failure to consider the negative 
evaluations of Ezold's legal analytic ability because the 
partners making them had little contact with Ezold cannot 
be excused in the face of the credence the district court 
gave to positive comments about Ezold's ability from 
those who likewise had little or no contact with her. While 
a factfinder can accept some evidence and reject other 
evidence on the basis of credibility, it should not base its 
credibility determination on a conflicting double standard. 
Moreover, the district court never made a finding that the 
critical evaluations were themselves incredible or a pretext 
for discrimination. There is no evidence that Wolfs 
practice of giving weight to negative votes and comments 
of partners who had little contact and perhaps knew 
nothing about an associate beyond the associate's general 
reputation was not applied equally to female and male 
associates. Cf ("Regardless 
of its wisdom, the firm's practice of giving 'no' votes [by 
partners who had only limited contact with the candidate] 
great weight treated male and female candidates in the 
same way."). Ezold's preliminary contention that the 
district court did not have to consider these negative 
comments lacks merit. We turn therefore to an 
examination of the evidence comparing Ezold and the 
successful male candidates in the category oflegal analytic 
ability. 
A sampling of comments from the negative evaluations of 
Ezold's legal analytic ability reveals the extent to which 
the district court's refusal to consider them flawed its 
analysis. For example, Fiebach was one of those with 
negative comments about Ezold's legal analytic ability. He 
consistently rated Ezold's analytical skills as "marginal" 
long before a 1988 disagreement in the Carpenter matter.22 
See App. at 3190-91, 3025. Fiebach had experienced 
"substantial" contact with Ezold during her final two years 
as an associate. He recommended Ezold for partnership, 
with professed "negative feelings." See App. at 3544-47. 
Fiebach was not alone in his negative comments about 
Ezold's legal analytic ability. Arbittier also strongly and 
consistently criticized Ezold in the category of legal 
analysis.23 Arbittier had opposed hiring Ezold in the first 
instance because he did not think she had the academic 
credentials to make it at the firm. See App. at 3414 ("[p ]oor 
academic record-well below our standards"). In a 1984 
evaluation Arbittier wrote "she is doing much better than I 
thought she would .... "24 App. at 3397. Ezold later did work 
for Arbittier, and his contemporaneous evaluations 
indicate he was not impressed by her performance. See id. 
at 1488-89, 3380 (her brief was "stilted and 
unimaginative"; "she failed to cite me to a clause in the 
agreement that was highly relevant"; "she missed [the 
main issue] completely"). He ultimately recommended 
Ezold's admission to the partnership "with mixed 
emotions." 
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Even Ezold's strongest supporters acknowledged the 
shortcomings in her legal analytical ability. See, e.g., App. 
at 3894 (Boote) ("I would not want her in charge of a large 
legally complex case, the traditional measure of a Wolf, 
Block partner."); id. at 3878 (Kurland) ("Nancy is an 
exceptionally good courtroom lawyer ... except there *533 
seems to be serious question as to whether she has the legal 
ability to take on large matters and handle them on her 
own."); id. at 3512 (Schwartz) ("Nancy is adequate in 
[legal analysis], but is not a legal scholar."); id. at 3956 
(Davis) ("She remains a little weak in her initial analysis of 
complex legal issues."). These contemporaneous criticisms 
support Wolfs contention that the final consensus among 
its partners that Ezold did not, in the perception of the firm, 
possess the legal analytical capacity requisite to becoming 
a partner, and not her sex, was the reason for denying her a 
partnership position. 
VIII. 
The district court's error in failing to consider the many 
negative evaluations of Ezold's legal analytic ability, like 
its error in comparing Ezold's strengths in other categories 
with the successful male candidates, is not dispositive of 
Wolfs argument that Ezold failed to produce evidence 
sufficient to show she was manifestly as good as the least 
capable of the favored males. The failure to consider these 
negative comments would not be fatal to Ezold's case if 
there were evidence in the record that could rationally 
support a finding of unequal treatment by Wolfin applying 
its articulated reason for the screening of candidates for 
partnership. Thus, it remains necessary for us to examine 
the record in that respect. 
We note at once that it shows the evaluation process at 
Wolf is demanding. Cf 
("[ 0 ]pinions 
managers and supervisors are evaluated, and the same can 
be said for many jobs that involve ... complex and subtle 
tasks like the provision of professional services .... "); 
( 
"Where a broad spectrum of views is sought ... a file 
composed of irreconcilable evaluations is not unusual.... 
[T]enure files typically contain positive as well as negative 
evaluations, often in extravagant terms, sufficient to 
support either a grant or denial of tenure."). The firm may 
have been wrong in its perception ofEzold's legal analytic 
ability and, if so, its decision to pass over Ezold would be 
unfair, but that is not for us to judge. Absent a showing that 
Wolfs articulated reason oflack of ability in legal analysis 
was used as a tool to discriminate on the basis of sex, Ezold 
cannot prevail. See 
(Powell, J., 
concurring) ("The qualities of mind, capacity to reason 
logically ... and the like are unrelated to race or sex."). 
A. 
Always having in mind that the issue before us is whether 
the firm passed over Ezold because she is a woman, we 
begin our specific comparative analysis with male 
Associate A. 
Associate A worked in Wolf's litigation department. He 
was recommended for partnership by the Associates 
Committee in the fall of 1988. He is closest to Ezold in the 
category of legal analysis, and, like her, received some 
negative evaluations over the years.25 In its findings 
concerning A's evaluations, however, the district court 
failed to point out that no partner actually rated A lower 
than Ezold in the criterion of legal analysis. No partner had 
expressed serious problems with A's analytical ability as 
of 1988, the year he was up for partnership, as in Ezold's 
case. In fact, no partner gave A a grade below 
acceptable/marginal in the category of legal analysis 
during his final evaluation period. 
Associate A received at least one and sometimes several 
marks of "distinguished" in this category during each 
evaluation period from April 1984 through 1988. Gregory 
Magarity, Ezold's most ardent advocate, rated A as 
"distinguished" in legal analysis in 1987 and 1988, higher 
than the grade of "good" he gave Ezold in those years. He 
wrote: 
*534 [Associate A] did a magnificent job 
in the preparation and trial of [a case] in 
Indianapolis, Indiana. His written 
product was excellent; his support and 
legal analysis were likewise excellent.. .. 
You can assign [Associate A] to any of 
my cases. 
App. at 5127. Barry Schwartz, David Doret, Donald 
Joseph and Donald Bean also consistently rated A as 
distinguished. Boote, a supporter of Ezold, also rated A 
higher than Ezold in this category. The record is replete 
with positive comments from many partners about 
Associate A that the district court did not refer to. In 1987 
and 1988, not one partner ever gave Ezold an unqualified 
rating of "distinguished" in the category of legal 
analysis.26 
Although Fiebach rated A as just "acceptable" in legal 
analysis in 1988 (App. at 6385), the district court 
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incorrectly compared his single rating to Ezold's "bottom 
line" rating of "good" which was prepared not by Fiebach, 
but by Associates Committee member Arthur Block based 
on Block's own shorthand summary of a large number of 
individual evaluations of Ezold's analytic ability.27 See 
That same year 
Fiebach gave Ezold a rating of "marginal," lower than the 
acceptable rating he gave A in that criterion. 
Strogatz had also made a critical evaluation of A in 1987, 
the year prior to his admission to the partnership, but 
Strogatz viewed A's admission to the partnership "with 
favor" in 1988. He wrote that "[A] is over the line," App. at 
4354, and graded him as "good/acceptable" in the category 
oflegal skills. Strogatz did not grade Ezold in this category 
in 1987 or 1988 because of no contact with her other than 
administratively. He did state, however, that "[m]y 
impression from others is that her legal skills are at best 
average and more probably marginal." App. at 3975. 
Finally, in 1988, eight partners viewed A's admission to 
the partnership "with enthusiasm," one "with 
enthusiasm/favor," thirty-two "with favor," six "with 
mixed emotions," one "with negative feelings" and the rest 
had no opinion. Davis was the only partner in the firm to 
vote for A's admission to the partnership with a negative 
view. He gave A the same grade as Ezold, however, in the 
category of legal analysis. In 1988, seven partners viewed 
Ezold's admission "with enthusiasm," fourteen "with 
favor," six "with mixed emotions," four "with negative 
feelings" and one "with mixed emotions/negative 
feelings." A's analytical skills, while criticized by various 
partners, were never as consistently questioned as Ezold's. 
The criticisms of A, found among the comments of the 
partners evaluating Ezold and A, do not support a finding 
that Wolfs legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
refusing a partnership position to Ezold was incredible. In 
a comparison of subjective factors such as legal ability, it 
must be obvious or manifest that the subjective standard 
was unequally applied before a court can find pretext. See 
supra at 525-26; Unequal 
application of the criterion of legal ability is not manifest 
between Ezold and Associate A on this record.2S It does 
not contain evidence *535 sufficient to show that Ezold 
was held up to a higher standard than Associate A because 
she was a woman. 
Ezold's ability in legal analysis suffers even more in the 
partners' eyes when compared with the individual 
evaluations of the other successful male candidates. All of 
the other males that Wolf accepted for partnership in 1988 
received many scores of distinguished in the category of 
legal analysis, and none of them ever received a grade of 
marginal in this category during his final evaluation period 
prior to admission to the partnership. We summarize them 
as follows.29 
The Associates Committee recommended Male Associate 
B, an associate in the litigation department, for partnership 
in July 1989. The critical comments upon which the district 
court relied with respect to Associate B have nothing to do 
with B's legal analytical skills but focus instead upon his 
work habits. B's legal analysis, on the other hand, was 
often rated as distinguished. See, e.g., App. at 4724 (Poul) 
("[H]e does a remarkable job. I expect him to take over the 
client some day."); id at 4249-51, 4268, 4280. In his last 
evaluation as a senior associate, six partners rated B as 
"distinguished" in legal analysis, and not one partner rated 
him below "acceptable" in this category. Davis and 
Magarity, Ezold's strongest supporters, graded B higher 
than Ezold in the category of legal analysis, recognizing 
his ability as "distinguished." Davis wrote on B's final 
evaluation that "he has produced elegantly written legal 
work." App. at 428l. Several partners, even those 
criticizing B' s work habits, characterized him as "very 
bright." Not one partner viewed B's admission to the 
partnership with negative feelings. 
Associate C, an associate in the real estate department, was 
recommended by the Associates Committee in 1987 and 
became a partner in February 1988. With respect to 
Associate C, the district court made one finding: 
94.... In the 1987 Associates Committee bottom line 
memo, he received an overall grade of"G," the same as 
that which Ms. Ezold had received. The summary of 
evaluations used by the Associates Committee noted 
that Henry Miller, a partner in the Real Estate 
Department, had changed Associate C's legal analysis 
score to ["acceptable"] and suggested that an "adequate 
[score] may well be sufficient in his mind for regular 
partnership. " 
Contrary to this single limited finding by the district court, 
C's legal analysis was uniformly rated as "good" or 
"distinguished." The district court ignored the consensus in 
C's department that he had a high level of legal analytical 
ability. See App. at 4542; id at 4532 (Weintraub) ("Based 
on his ability to analyze a legal problem, I could feel 
comfortable in turning over my best client to him for a 
significant matter.") In citing Miller's grade of 
"acceptable" in 1987, the district court fails to point out 
Miller's comments that any problems with B were based 
on earlier work and that he had improved from that time. 
Twelve partners viewed C's admission "with enthusiasm," 
twenty-six "with favor," eight "with mixed emotions" and 
one "with negative feelings." 
Associate D, an associate in the corporate department, was 
recommended for partner by the Associates Committee in 
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1988. In addition to other comments unrelated to D's legal 
analytical ability, the district court relied on the fact that in 
1988 three partners said D needed help with his writing 
skills. The district 
court failed to note that the partners who said D needed 
help with writing did so on the basis that English is not D's 
native language, as he was born and raised in a foreign 
country. One of the partners criticizing D's writing ability 
also wrote: "I'd want a close look at his drafting skills-and 
perhaps we should make a special effort to cultivate 
them-in *536 view of the language issue." App. at 4460. 
Very few partners ever questioned D's legal analytical 
ability and he received several marks of "distinguished" 
during his evaluations from 1986-88. The following 
comments from D's file are typical: "Can handle very 
confusing complex structural and strategic issues .... Is a 
superb strategist on corporate acquisition matters." Id. at 
4503; "[D] is unusually smart and has an instinctive grasp 
of business. I believe he is a star." Id. at 4481. Eight 
partners voted for his admission "with enthusiasm," 
twenty-seven "with favor," twelve "with mixed emotions," 
one "with favor/mixed emotions" and one "with negative 
feelings." 
Associate E, an associate in the estates department, was 
admitted to the partnership in 1987. The district court made 
one finding concerning Associate E: 
10 I. Mr. Strogatz stated that Associate E was not a star 
and that an associate did not need to be a star to be a 
partner. He also wrote that he thought of Associate E "as 
a guy just to do work." 
Strogatz made this comment 
based on "no contact" with E. See id. Strogatz wrote: 
"Although not a star, [E] meets our standards." App. at 
4438. The district court points to no criticism of E's legal 
analysis because there is none in the record and, in fact, E's 
ability was often rated as distinguished. See, e.g., App. at 
4417 (Olyn) ( "His analytic abilities are exceptional."); id. 
at 4414 (Kamens) ( "[E] exhibits a willingness to 
understand certain legal problems and analyzes them quite 
well."). The district court's reliance on Strogatz's 
evaluation in finding pretext further demonstrates the 
inconsistency with which it compared evaluations in this 
case, relying only on positive evaluations by partners 
Ezold had done "substantial" work for, while relying on 
negative evaluations of male associates based on no 
contact. 
The following findings of the district court concerning 
Associate F, an associate in the corporate department, 
related to his legal analytical ability: 
103. The grid on Associate F's bottom line memo in 
1988, the year before his consideration for partnership, 
reflected a composite grade of "0-" for legal analysis. 
107. The prior year Donald Joseph, a partner in the 
Litigation Department, had rated Associate F's legal 
skills as acceptable, noting "a shoddiness in clear 
thinking or maybe lack offull experience." 
108. At the same time, Michael Temin, a partner in the 
Corporate Department, recommended that Associate F 
receive help in his writing and drafting skills. 
110. In 1986, William Rosoff evaluated Associate F: 
[H]e is sometimes too fast or flip or not 
attentive enough. In one matter, he failed 
to collect on a letter of credit on the 
grounds that he supposed Al Braslow 
would handle that part of the matter, 
when it was an inappropriate assumption 
to make especially without talking to Al. 
In another matter, the time for answering 
a complaint expired. While he might 
have thought someone else was seeing to 
it, he should have double checked. 
In fact, Joseph's full comment about "a shoddiness in clear 
thinking" stated: 
Acceptable-I have used ... [acceptable] in 
the old [Wolf, Block] terms; a good 
lawyer, practical and valuable. I can't 
describe precisely my hesitancy-perhaps 
a shoddiness in clear thinking or maybe 
lack of full experience .... 
App. at 4606. In F's final evaluation period, Joseph 
recommended F's admission "with favor." Id. at 4611. 
While Temin wrote that F needed help with writing skills 
in 1988, he gave him a grade of "good" in legal and 
professional skills. With respect to Rosoffs 1986 
criticism, the district court omitted the following statement 
by Rosoff in the same evaluation: "[F] seems to be fine 
substantively .... I don't cite these as experiences which 
mean he cannot make the grade here, but he does *537 
have to make a more careful and expansive view of his role 
and responsibilities." Id. at 4602. Associate F's legal 
analytical ability was never called into question. In 
addition, F received a "distinguished," numerous "goods," 
and no "marginals" on his final review. Five partners 
viewed his admission to the partnership "with 
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enthusiasm," twenty-two "with favor," four "with mixed 
emotions" and three "with negative feelings." While the 
number of negative votes is close to the four Ezold 
received, the record shows that F had greater overall 
support from the partners in his department than Ezold did 
in hers.3o 
The district court cited the following comments regarding 
the legal analytical ability of Associate G, an associate in 
the corporate department admitted to the partnership In 
February 1988: 
112. In the bottom line memorandum on Associate G for 
1987, the year before he became partner in the Corporate 
Department, his grid reflected no composite score 
higher than "G," In four of the legal skills, including 
legal research and promptness, Associate G was rated 
only "acceptable." 
113, In his 1987 evaluation Associate G was rated 
"acceptable" in legal analysis by Alan Molod, a partner 
in the Corporate Department. Mr. Molod added that 
Associate G was "Not a Star" and was "Sloppy at times 
and [showed] occasional lapses in judgment." 
The district court did not credit or consider the many 
favorable evaluations of G, such as, "[G] is one of the 
brightest lawyers in our firm." App. at 4676. While Molod 
rated G as only acceptable in legal analysis in 1987, this 
score should be viewed against the many "good" and 
"distinguished" grades he received in this category. 
Molod's full comments stated: "Good solid lawyer. Not a 
star. Very hard worker. Sloppy at times and occasional 
lapses in judgment." ld. at 4677. Despite rating G as only 
"acceptable" in legal analysis in 1987, Molod 
recommended G's admission to the partnership "with 
favor." Overall, thirteen partners viewed G's admission to 
the partnership "with enthusiasm," thirty "with favor," six 
"with mixed emotions" and two "with negative feelings." 
The district court relied on one partner's criticisms of 
Associate H in concluding that Wolf applied its standards 
in a more severe fashion to Ezold. It found: 
116. Mr. Arbittier wrote in his 1987 evaluation of 
Associate H: 
[Associate H] has really let me down in his handling 
of a case for General Electric Pension Trust. He 
missed the crux of the case in the beginning and 
dragged his feet terribly in getting it back on track .... 
[Associate H] works very hard, but hard work alone is 
not enough. I have my doubts that he will ever be 
anything but a helper who does what he is told 
adequately but with no spark. 
Mr. Arbittier wrote that Associate H was trying "to 
change my view of him and I am giving him a second 
chance. He [has] brains. Maybe he can change." Mr. 
Arbittier also called Associate H "phlegmatic, diffident, 
nonassertive and unimaginative," and in 1988 wrote that 
he was "[not] real strong in legal analysis or in focusing 
on the key issues (dividing the wheat from the chaft)." 
117. In 1989, Mr. Arbittier concluded that Associate H 
was a "nice guy" who had made improvement; he 
supported Associate H for partnership. Mr. Arbittier 
explained Associate H's "redemption"; Associate H told 
Mr. Arbittier how he had been overworked. 
While the district court credited Arbittier's criticism of H, 
it chose to ignore Arbittier's continuing criticism of Ezold 
on the same grounds between 1984 and 1988. See supra at 
516-17, 518-19. The district court also ignored the fact that 
in H's final two evaluations, Arbittier viewed his 
admission to the partnership with favor and wrote the 
following comments: "[s]ignificant *538 improvement"; 
"A good lawyer. ... In the past I had some problems with 
[H]. He seems to have overcome them .... " App. at 4845, 
4858. This change in viewpoint was based on H's handling 
of a specific case for Arbittier. Goldberger specifically 
wrote in his evaluation of H that Arbittier's critical 
evaluation was "aberrational... [H] is a talented, 
hard-working lawyer who deserves to make it." ld. at 4828. 
Moreover, the district court failed to acknowledge H's 
grades of "distinguished" in legal analysis throughout his 
tenure at the firm. Twelve partners viewed his admission to 
the partnership "with enthusiasm," seventeen "with favor," 
one "with mixed emotions" and zero "with negative 
feelings." 
Finally, we note that three of the four partners who 
expressed "negative feelings" towards Ezold's candidacy 
were members of her own department, while none of the 
eight male associates was viewed with "negative feelings" 
by more than one member of their department. 
The district court's finding that Wolf applied its 
partnership standards in a more "severe" fashion to female 
associates is clearly erroneous. The comparative evidence 
of more favorable treatment for male employees contained 
in this record does not support that finding. See 
(holding pretext "clearly erroneous 
because [plaintiff] failed to make any showing of disparate 
treatment and because [defendant] proved that male 
attorneys were treated the same as she in the disputed 
areas,"). Our review of the entire evaluation files of the 
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eight male associates discloses that, unlike Ezold, whose 
staunchest supporters persistently expressed doubts about 
her ability to meet the firm's criterion of legal analysis, 
Associates A to H faced no comparable degree of criticism 
about their legal analytical skills. The snippets of 
comments critical of these male associates culled from 
dozens of evaluation forms do not show that Wolfs 
articulated reason for declining to recommend Ezold for 
partnership was "obviously weak or implausible" or that 
the standards were "manifestly unequally applied." 
(citations omitted). 
B. 
Despite Wolf's request, the district court failed to make 
findings concerning other male associates who, like Ezold, 
were passed over for partnership. The evidence concerning 
their evaluations adds support to our conclusion that the 
district court's finding that Wolf's asserted legitimate 
reason for denying Ezold a partnership position was a 
sham cannot be supported on a theory of discriminatory 
application. 
II J I Male Associates 1 and 2, who were comparable to 
Ezold in the category of legal analysis, were also rejected 
for regular partnership. Again, we recognize that the 
district court, as factfinder, "can accept some parts of a 
party's evidence and reject others." fV'.mnln 
But when the evidence sheds light on whether the 
employer treated similarly situated males and females 
alike, it should not be ignored. See 
(comparison of whether male attorneys treated same as 
discharged female attorney in disputed categories). 
Male Associates I and 2 were highly rated by a number of 
partners, but, as with Ezold, the Associates Committee 
determined their ability in legal analysis fell below the 
firm's standards. The Associates Committee expressed its 
views on Male Associates 1 and 2 in a letter to the 
Executive Committee stating that, although they were 
"valuable associates," they nevertheless fell below the 
firm's "historically accepted standards for admission to the 
partnership." App. at 2586. The partners' comments about 
Male Associates 1 and 2 were very similar to those 
criticizing Ezold. This is illustrated by the following 
sampling of comments about Male Associate I: "[He] has 
good talents although he is not as capable in legal analysis 
as others," id at 4632 (Brantz); "[His] best skills are in 
client relations and desire to please, rather than legal 
analysis or intellectual genius," id at 4630 (Schneider); 
"[H]e has great difficulty analyzing and drafting complex 
business transactions," *539 id at 4642 (Wiener); "[There 
are] questions about his intellectual strength, his ability to 
manage complex transactions and his level of attention to 
detail," id at 5044 (Baer). The partners' comments with 
regard to Male Associate 2 are also similar to those the 
partners made about Ezold: "[H]e lacks the minimum level 
of analytic ability which is required to succeed at WB," id 
at 4696 (Chanin); "[His legal analysis is] just fair. Came up 
with little in the way of new ideas .... Seemed to miss key 
points at times," id at 4695 (Arbittier); "[Legal analysis is] 
[n]ot penetrating or focused. I do not feel comfortable 
relying on his legal judgment," id at 4697 (Arbittier); 
"[H]e just doesn't have the high level of intelligence we 
need to handle complex legal questions," id at 4696 
(Arbittier); "[He] is an enigma to me. His writing ability is 
substandard, and I have no confidence in his analytic skill. 
On the other hand, my client [] likes him very much," id at 
4725 (Brantz). 
If the district court had employed the appropriate 
comparative analysis by focusing on whether Wolf's 
articulated reason of legal analysis was a pretext, it should 
have reached a different result. Our review of the whole 
record leaves us with a "definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed" by the district court in its 
comparative analysis. 
The record does not show that Wolf 
applied its partnership admission standards unequally to 
male and female associates, nor that diminished ability in 
the area of legal analysis was an improper reason for 
denying admission.3 We sympathize with Ezold's 
situation and the long hours and efforts she put toward her 
partnership goal. On the record before us, however, we 
cannot affirm the district court's finding that Wolf's 
asserted reason for denying Ezold's admission to the 
partnership was unworthy of credence based on her theory 
that its standard of legal analytic ability was applied to her 
in an unlawfully discriminatory manner. 
Because the evaluation files contain insufficient evidence 
to show that Ezold was evaluated more severely than the 
male associates, Ezold has not shown that Wolf's proffered 
reason for failing to promote her was "unworthy of 
credence." We therefore hold that the district court's 
ultimate finding of pretext cannot be sustained on this 
basis. 
IX. 
We must, however, still consider certain additional 
evidence which Ezold says directly establishes that Wolf's 
articulated reason was a pretext by showing that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated its decision 
not to admit her to the partnership. 
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As stated at the outset of our pretext analysis, sufficiently 
strong evidence of an employer's past treatment of a 
plaintiff may prove pretext. See 
An employer's general policy and practice 
with regard to minority employment may also establish 
pretext. 
The district court held that four instances of 
conduct "supported" the finding of pretext that it otherwise 
based on its comparison of Ezold with Associates A-H. 
The four instances of conduct by Wolf that the district 
court held supported its finding of pretext were: (1) Ezold 
was evaluated negatively for being too involved with 
women's issues in the firm; (2) a male associate's sexual 
harassment of female employees at the firm was seen as 
"insignificant"; (3) Ezold was evaluated negatively for 
being very demanding while male associates were 
evaluated negatively for lacking assertiveness; *540 and 
(4) Ezold "was the target of several comments 
demonstrating [Wolf's] differential treatment of her 
because she is a woman." 
They are discussed in Part IX C. infra. In 
addition, it made findings of fact concerning Wolf's 
assignment process that Ezold claims support its finding of 
pretext. We discuss that contention in Part IX A. Ezold's 
contention that the ratio of male to female partners at Wolf 
shows a pattern of illegal discrimination is the subject of 
Part IX B. Finally, Ezold points to other evidence in the 
record, upon which the district court made no findings, as 
evidence that shows Wolf's asserted reason for passing her 
over was pretextual. She contends that this evidence, 
considered as a whole, would entitle the district court to 
find that Wolf "more likely" denied her admission to the 
partnership because of her sex than because of Wolf's 
asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason. See 
That evidence 
is the subject of discussion in Part IX D. 
In order to succeed on this theory, Ezold must show that it 
is more likely that the firm denied her a partnership 
position because of her sex than because of its perceptions 
of her legal analytic ability. With this causal requirement in 
mind, we will analyze each of the incidents or practices at 
Wolfwhich Ezold alleges shows directly that Wolf passed 
her over because she is a woman rather than because of any 
deficiency Wolf might have perceived in her legal ability. 
A. 
(12) Ezold contends illegal discriminatory treatment based 
on sex deprived her of equal opportunities to work on 
significant cases or with a wide variety of partners and that 
this unequal treatment IS evidence of gender 
discrimination. From 1983 to 1987, Kurland was 
responsible for the assignment of work to associates in the 
litigation department. He often delegated this 
responsibility to Arbittier. Though Ezold acknowledges 
that many partners bypassed the formal assignment 
procedure and directly assigned matters to associates, the 
district court found that Arbittier assigned Ezold to actions 
that were "small" by 
Ezold complained to Kurland and 
others about the quality of her assignments and that she had 
opportunities to work only with a limited number of 
partners. 
This Court has recognized that when an employer 
discriminatorily denies training and support, the employer 
may not then disfavor the plaintiff because her 
performance is affected by the lack of opportun ity. 
Even if we assume that Ezold 
received "small" cases at the beginning of her tenure at 
Wolf, however, there is no evidence this was the result of 
sex discrimination. Her evaluations indicate, rather, that it 
may have been her academic credentials that contributed to 
her receipt of less complex assignments. For example, 
Davis stated that "[t]he Home Unity case was the first 
really fair test for Nancy. I believe that her background 
relegated her to ... matters (where she got virtually no 
testing by Wolf, Block standards) and small matters." App. 
at 3514. It is undisputed that Arbittier opposed hiring 
Ezold because of her academic history and lack of law 
review experience. In one of Ezold's early evaluations, 
Kurland wrote: "She has not, in my view, been getting 
sufficiently difficult matters to handle because she is not 
the Harvard Law Review type .... We must make an effort 
to give her more difficult matters to handle." Id. at 3400. 
He also stated: "I envisioned ... her when I hired her as a 
'good, stand-up, effective courtroom lawyer.'" Id. at 3348. 
In urging the Executive Committee to reconsider Ezold's 
candidacy Magarity wrote: 
*541 [The] perception [that she is not 
able to handle complex cases] appears to 
be a product of how Sy Kurland viewed 
Nancy's role when she was initially 
hired. For the first few years Sy would 
only assign Nancy to non-complex 
matters, yet, at evaluation time, Sy, and 
some other partners, would qualifY their 
evaluations by saying that Nancy does 
not work on complex matters. Nancy was 
literally trapped in a Catch 22. The 
Chairman of the Litigation Department 
would not assign her to complex cases, 
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yet she received negative evaluations for 
not working on complex matters. 
Jd. at 5576-77.33 
While it would be unfortunate if these academic and 
intellectual biases were perpetuated after the decision was 
made to hire Ezold, academic or intellectual bias is not 
evidence of sex discrimination. The district court made no 
finding that Ezold was given small assignments because of 
her sex. In fact, its findings contradict unlawful 
discrimination in that respect. It found: 
She worked for partners in the Litigation 
Department on criminal matters, 
insurance cases, general commercial 
litigation and other areas, and also did 
work for some partners in other 
departments. She handled matters at all 
stages of litigation, and was called upon 
by partners to go to court on an 
emergency basis. 
At trial Ezold 
characterized many of the cases she worked on as 
"complex" by either her standards or Wolf standards. In 
advocating Ezold for partner, Magarity stated that "from 
1986 through the present, Nancy has worked on numerous 
significant complex cases." App. at 5577. 
The district court found that when Ezold suggested to 
Schwartz in her early years at Wolf that an unfairness in 
case assignments may have occurred because she was a 
woman, Schwartz replied: "Nancy, don't say that around 
here. They don't want to hear it. Just do your job and do 
well." App. at 
657. This statement, made years before the 1988 decision 
to deny Ezold partnership, does not show that Wolf's 
evaluation of her legal ability was pretextual. Ezold's 
testimony that she "didn't know of any other reason" than 
gender for Wolf's treatment of her in the assignment 
process adds little. 
Ezold also points to a preliminary injunction matter early 
in her career that was reassigned to a man after she had 
been the sole volunteer. The district court found that 
Arbittier reassigned the injunction to a man "without 
explanation." See Arbittier, 
however, testified that he realized the case needed a more 
senior associate and so reassigned it. This too occurred 
early in Ezold's employment at Wolf and there is nothing 
in the record to show that it had any connection with 
Ezold's failure to attain partnership. The district court's 
finding does not support a conclusion that Wolf's reason 
for denying Ezold admission to the partnership is 
pretextual. 
The district court also found that when Ezold first got to 
the firm in 1983, she and a male associate not on 
partnership track were assigned to sort out a large group of 
minor cases previously handled by an associate who had 
left the firm. This finding fails to support the district 
court's ultimate finding of pretext. The assignment was 
made on an as-needed basis to fill the void created when 
the associate working on the matters had left. Additionally, 
the district court failed to recognize that Arbittier gave 
Ezold full authority to reassign the matters to other male 
associates and administer the whole affair. The small 
bankruptcy matters to which the district court refers were 
later reassigned by Kurland at Ezold's request. Kurland 
testified that he did this "both to free Nancy up a little and 
to give some demonstration that we [were] making an 
effort to change the nature of her assignments." App. at 
3375. 
*542 Concerns about associates being exposed only to 
"small" matters were not unique to Ezold. In fact, 
numerous partners expressed similar concerns about 
exposure to partners and assignment to complex cases with 
respect to male Associates A and B. See App. at 4920 
("The Department should try to give A some assignments 
as second man on a large case .... If we fail to do this, [A] 
will continue to slip along operating independently on 
cases and we will have to confront, too late, the question of 
whether or not he meets partnership standards."); id at 
4324 ("[A] has not been tested on large matters because of 
early perceptions that he was cavalier."); id at 4928 (B 
must get broader exposure); id at 4926 ("somehow [B] 
must get broader exposure-even his Dep't. Chairman 
knows nothing about him."). Ezold's assignment to a 
disproportionate number of small matters may have 
reflected academic or intellectual bias. Beyond her own 
perceptions, however, Ezold offered no evidence showing 
that she was treated differently from male associates in 
getting assignments or exposure. The findings of the 
district court concerning Wolf's assignment process are in 
fact gender-neutral and do not support its ultimate finding 
of pretext. 
With respect to the district court's finding that the firm 
prevented Ezold from gaining wide exposure to partners, 
the record shows that sixty-five partners expressed "no 
opinion" on the admission of Associate B, a litigator, 
which was more than the fifty-nine "no opinion" votes 
Ezold received. Fifty-nine partners also expressed "no 
opinion" on the admission of Associate H. 
The district court's finding that Ezold did not work for 
more than five hundred hours in any year on anyone 
matter, while "virtually all the male associates in the 
department" worked for six hundred hours on a single 
matter, is belied by the record. 
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The record shows that Ezold billed 701.2 hours 
on a major litigation matter in 1985 and that a majority of 
male associates in the litigation department did not bill six 
hundred hours or more on any single matter. 
Finally, the district court found that by allowing partners to 
bypass the formal assignment system, Kurland and 
Arbittier "prevented the plaintiff from securing improved 
assignments ... [and] impaired her opportunity to be fairly 
evaluated for partnership." I 
The fact that Wolfs formal assignment 
process was often bypassed does not support the district 
court's finding ofpretext.34 Title VII requires employers to 
avoid certain prohibited types of invidious discrimination, 
including sex discrimination. It does not require employers 
to treat all employees fairly, closely monitor their progress 
and insure them every opportunity for advancement. 
"[O]ur task is not to assess the overall fairness of [Wolf's] 
actions." 55 5. It is a sad fact oflife 
in the working world that employees of ability are 
sometimes overlooked for promotion. Large law firms are 
not immune from unfairness in this imperfect world. The 
law limits its protection against that unfairness to cases of 
invidious illegal discrimination. This record contains no 
evidence that Wolf's assignment process was tainted by a 
discriminatory motive. 
B. 
Ezold also tries to reinforce her claim of pretext by 
pointing to the small number of women admitted to the 
partnership throughout the firm's history. The record 
shows that in 1989, only five of Wolf's 107 partners were 
women and there was only one woman among the 
twenty-eight partners in the litigation department in which 
Ezold had sought partnership. The district court made no 
finding based upon these numbers.35 
1141 Statistical evidence of an employer's pattern and 
practice with respect to minority employment may be 
relevant to a showing of pretext. See 
*543 Ezold's raw 
numerical comparisons, however, are not accompanied by 
any analysis of either the qualified applicant pool or the 
flow of qualified candidates over a relevant time period. 
The district court in Hopkins recognized the weakness of 
this type of evidence: 
[Plaintiff's] proof lacked sufficient data 
on the number of qualified women 
available for partnership and failed to 
take into account that the present pool of 
partners have been selected over a long 
span of years during which the pool of 
available qualified women has changed. 
Women have only recently entered the 
accounting and related fields in large 
numbers and there is evidence that many 
potential women partners were hired 
away from Price Waterhouse by clients 
and rival accounting firms. 
(in disparate impact case, proper 
comparison is between racial composition of at-issue jobs 
and racial composition of qualified population in relevant 
job market). 
Because no conclusion can be drawn from Ezold's raw 
numbers on underrepresentation, they are not probative of 
Wolf's alleged discriminatory motive. See 
(statistics showing small percentage of 
minority faculty members inadequate absent some other 
indication of relevance); 
("Because the considerations affecting promotion 
decisions may differ greatly from one department to 
another, statistical evidence of a general 
underrepresentation of women in the position of full 
professor adds little to a disparate treatment claim"). We, 
like the district court, do not consider them material to 
Ezold's Title VII claim. 
c. 
Finally, the district court held that the four specific 
instances of conduct mentioned supra at 540 evidenced a 
discriminatory animus and supported its finding of pretext. 
See It did not hold 
that these instances of conduct provided an independent or 
alternative basis for its finding, but viewed them only as 
support therefor. 
I. 
(lSI The first instance of conduct on which the district 
court relied was that Ezold "was evaluated negatively for 
being too involved with women's issues ... specifically her 
concern about the [firm's] treatment of paralegals," while 
Fiebach was not reproached for raising the "women's 
issue" of part-time employment. Jd. Ezold's perception 
was that the firm mistreated its paralegals by overworking 
and underpaying them and that treatment would not have 
occurred but for the fact that they were predominantly 
women. The court's finding on this matter refers to a 1986 
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evaluation submitted by Schwartz, one of Ezold's 
partnership supporters, in which he wrote: "Judgment is 
better, although it still can be clouded by over-sensitivity to 
what she misperceives as 'womens' [sic] issues." App. at 
3366. Schwartz testified, however, that he was not 
criticizing Ezold for raising the issue of the firm's 
treatment of paralegals, but for her misperception that this 
was a "women's issue." Ed at 1585-86. Moreover, the fact 
that Fiebach, a male partner, was not criticized for 
encouraging discussion of part-time employment is not 
probative of whether the partnership decision concerning 
Ezold was gender-based. This evidence is of marginal 
value in supporting the district court's finding of pretext. 
2. 
1161 The second instance of conduct on which the district 
court relied was "the fact that a male associate['s] sexual 
harassment of female employees at the Firm was seen as 
insignificant and not worthy of mention to the Associates 
Committee in its consideration of that male associate for 
partnership." 
While it is undisputed that the male associate, Associate X, 
engaged in some form of harassment offemale employees, 
the district court's finding about Wolfs attitude towards it 
is unsupported by the *544 evidence and thus clearly 
erroneous. The record shows that Strogatz, then Chairman 
of the Associates Committee, met with Associate X 
concerning these incidents, and that a memorandum was 
placed in his personnel file. There was testimony that the 
incident was reported to the associate's department 
chairman and to the Associates Committee. The record 
also indicates that the incident occurred after the 
Associates Committee decided it was unlikely to 
recommend Associate X for partnership in any event. 
There is no evidence Wolf viewed the incident as 
"insignificant." This incident is not evidence that the firm 
harbored a discriminatory animus against either women 
generally or Ezold specifically. It lends no support to the 
district court's finding of pretext. 
3. 
! The district court found that Ezold was "evaluated 
negatively for being 'very demanding,' while several male 
associates who were made partners were evaluated 
negatively for lacking sufficient assertiveness in their 
demeanors." 
(emphasis in original). The criticisms of Ezold's 
assertiveness related to the way in which she handled 
administrative matters such as office and secretarial space, 
and not legal matters. See App. at 2206-11 ("Very difficult 
to deal with on administrative matters. Very demanding."); 
see also id. at 3365, 3389. In particular, David Hofstein's 
evaluation of Ezold in 1984 stated: 
My one negative experience did not 
involve legal work. When my group 
moved to the south end of the 21st floor, 
Nancy had a fit because she had to move. 
As 1. Strogatz and our [Office Manager] 
know, Nancy's behavior was 
inappropriate and I think affected 
everyone's perception of her. Dealing 
with administrative matters 
professionally is almost as important as 
dealing with legal matters competently, 
and at least in that instance, Nancy blew 
it. 
App. at 3393. 
The district court refers to criticisms of male associates for 
lacking assertiveness, but in connection with their handling 
of legal matters. The district court was comparing apples 
and oranges. The record shows that male associates were 
also criticized for their improper handling of 
administrative problems. See App. at 3388 ("He has had a 
series of run ins with administration .... "); id. at 5099 
(associate not admitted to partnership criticized for "lack 
of tact, being arrogant or undiplomatic or unconciliatory"); 
id. at 4778 ("[h]e is quarrelsome"). The district court also 
quotes an evaluation of Ezold as a "prima donna" on 
administrative matters, but leaves out the full context ofthe 
statement which compares her to a male associate: 
"Reminds me of[a male associate]-very demanding, prima 
donna-ish, not a team player." Ed. at 3209.36 
The district court's finding that this evidence supports its 
conclusion that Ezold was treated differently because of 
her gender is clearly erroneous. An "unfortunate and 
destructive contlict of personalities does not establish 
sexual discrimination." 
Further, by the time of Ezold's final evaluation 
in 1988, there was no mention of her attitude on 
administrative matters. Rosoff testified that III 
independently reviewing the Associate Committee's 
decision not to recommend Ezold for partnership, he 
disregarded the criticisms of her handling of administrative 
matters from earlier years as "ancient history." App. at 
2410. There is again no evidence that this incident *545 
played any role in Wolf's decision to deny Ezold's 
admission to the partnership. 
4. 
60 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 1000 ... 
1181 Finally, the district court found that Ezold was the 
target of several comments demonstrating the firm's 
differential treatment of women. The district court found 
the fo llowing: 
During the selection process ... Mr. 
Kurland told Ms. Ezold that it would not 
be easy for her at Wolf, Block because 
she did not fit the Wolf, Block mold 
since she was a woman, had not attended 
an Ivy League law school, and had not 
been on law review. Mr. Kurland and 
Ms. Ezold stated that at one of the 
meetings with Ms. Ezold, only Ms. Ezold 
and he were present. 
See Ezold did not 
raise this reference at a subsequent lunch with associate 
Liebenberg, a woman, and Schwartz, nor did she express 
concern over Wolf's treatment of women. Although 
Kurland denied making the statement, the district court 
resolved this credibility issue in Ezold's favor and we will 
not disturb it. 
Wolf argues that this comment made in 1983 before Ezold 
accepted the job is not probative on whether its partnership 
decision five years later was gender-based. In ?/hOy",,~1/ 
the plaintiff alleged 
racial discrimination in the denial of tenure and we 
considered the probative value of evidence of a 
discriminatory attitude on the part of a key decisionmaker. 
There, the president of the university exercised a 
significant influence on the decisionmakers and had made 
the final tenure decision. He had also made two statements 
reflecting racial bias.ld. We held, although the "statements 
standing alone, occurring as they did over five years before 
the final denial of tenure, could not suffice to uphold a 
finding [of discrimination], they do add support, in 
combination with the other evidence, to the ultimate 
conclusion." Id.; see 
(alleged 
derogatory comments made to plaintiff by dean before she 
began teaching "were made well before the plaintiff's 
tenure review process began and are manifestly too remote 
from the tenure decision-making process to have any 
relevance in this action"), ajJ'd, 
cert. denied, 
Here, however, as we have painstakingly pointed 
out, other evidence of sex discrimination is lacking. In any 
event, Kurland made this comment before Ezold began her 
employment at Wolf, five years before the partnership 
decision. The comment's temporal distance from the 
decision Ezold says was discriminatory convinces us it is 
too remote and isolated to show independently that 
unlawful discrimination, rather than Wolf's asserted 
reason, more likely caused the firm to deny Ezold the 
partnership she sought in 1988. 
Kurland himself had left the firm in January 1988, before 
Ezold's 1988 evaluation and before the Associates 
Committee and the Executive Committee denied her 
admission to the partnership. Thus, he did not take part in 
the final decision to deny Ezold's admission to the 
partnership, although he had consistently supported her 
candidacy despite his recognition of other partners' 
perceptions about her legal analytical ability. See 
("I think she has proven her 
case."). Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely 
given great weight, particularly if they were made 
temporally remote from the date of decision. See Hflnl/iVlc 
(O'Connor, J., 
cert. denied, 
We 
decline to depart from this principle in the present case. 
D. 
[191 In her brief on appeal, Ezold points to several other 
alleged sexist comments by Kurland to which she testified 
at trial but upon which the district court made no findings. 
Thus, the remaining issue on sufficiency is whether all of 
the sexist comments *546 Ezold attributes to Kurland 
taken together, are enough to establish pretext. Ezold 
testified that at the close of a litigation department dinner, 
Kurland singled her out for interrogation on the issue of 
sex discrimination at the firm. Kurland testified that he 
addressed the topic to the entire group because he was Vice 
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association and 
everyone was discussing the issue at the time. Ezold also 
testified and Kurland did not deny that Kurland would give 
her instructions in the hallway to "smile" and crudely ask 
whether she had any romantic encounters the night before. 
She also testified that at a litigation associates' breakfast 
Kurland recounted a judge's comments about a murder 
case involving the rape of a corpse. Kurland testified: 
I looked around at the young people and 
at the time I was in the middle of a 
murder trial and I thought, my God, my 
young people here, have such a narrow 
fragmented aspect of what law is today, 
interrogatories and depositions in 
Federal Court, dealing in money matters 
and they don't really have a 
comprehension of what happens in law, 
that we have a whole state court system 
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and criminal system, that they do not 
even come in contact with and I thought 
it would be beneficial for them to 
broaden their horizon to give them some 
exposure to hear firsthand from me what 
it was like to be involved in an actual 
murder trial ... [and that] the judge was 
telling me about other cases he had ... and 
he told me about this one case and I 
talked about a case that a man had killed 
a woman and had sex with her 
afterwards. 
App. at 1756-57. 
Ezold additionally testified that Kurland told her not to 
refer a talented female attorney to the firm for employment 
because he did not want the problems caused by another 
female attorney working in the litigation department. 
Kurland did not recall Ezold talking to him about hiring 
anyone but denied making the statement about women 
associates. Finally, Ezold points to an alleged statement by 
Kurland cautioning female attorneys with children from 
traveling on business. Kurland denied making this 
statement and in fact often assigned Liebenberg, a female 
partner who had small children, to cases requiring 
extensive travel. 
Although the district court made no findings that these 
statements were actually made or whose version of the 
facts it believed, we must consider them on the sufficiency 
issue in the light most favorable to Ezold. In doing so, we 
recognize that proof of a discriminatory atmosphere may 
be relevant in proving pretext since such evidence "does 
tend to add 'color' to the employer's decisionmaking 
processes and to the influences behind the actions taken 
with respect to the individual plaintiff." 
We must 
therefore decide whether these six alleged comments by 
Kurland over a period offive years are sufficient to sustain 
the district court's finding that Wolf's reason for denying 
Ezold admission to the partnership-her legal analytical 
ability-was just a pretext to cover up sex discrimination. 
In Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., we considered 
the relevance in an age discrimination case of a statement 
made by a corporate vice-president after the plaintiff's 
termination. The vice-president stated: "[This company] 
was a seniority driven company with old management and 
that's going to change, 'I'm going to change that.' " 
We said: 
When a major company executive 
speaks, "everybody listens" in the 
corporate hierarchy, and when an 
executive's comments prove to be 
disadvantageous to a company's 
subsequent litigation posture, it can not 
compartmentalize this executive as if he 
had nothing more to do with company 
policy than the janitor or watchman. 
ld. This case is superficially similar to Lockhart in that 
Kurland, as the chairman of the litigation department, was 
a company executive until he left the firm in 1987. It is 
distinguishable, however, in several material respects. The 
other evidence supporting the verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs in Lockhart, unlike the evidence in the *547 
present case, was substantia1.37 In addition, though 
Kurland was at one time a decisionmaker and eventually 
supported Ezold's admission to the partnership, he took no 
part in the final votes or evaluations concerning Ezold 
because he had by that time left the firm. 
Though Kurland's comments, if made, were crude and 
unprofessional, we do not believe they are sufficient in and 
of themselves to sustain the district court's judgment in 
favor ofEzold. They may reflect unfavorably on Kurland's 
personality or his views, but they are not sufficient to show 
that there was such a pervasive hostility toward women at 
Wolf sufficient to show that Ezold's partnership decision 
was more likely the result of discriminatory bias than 
Wolf's perception38 of Ezold's legal ability. Ezold has 
made no claim that Kurland's comments created a hostile 
If we were to hold that several stray remarks 
by a nondecisionmaker over a period of five years, while 
inappropriate, were sufficient to prove that Wolf's 
associate evaluation and partnership admission process 
were so infected with discriminatory bias that such bias 
more likely motivated Wolf's promotion decision than its 
articulated legitimate reason, we would spill across the 
limits of Title VII. See nnnKIlV1' 
(Title VII strikes a balance between protecting 
employees from unlawful discrimination and preserving 
for employers their remaining freedom of choice.). 
x. 
We have reviewed the evidence carefully and hold that it is 
insufficient to show pretext. Despite Ezold's disagreement 
with the firm's evaluations of her abilities, and her 
perception that she was treated unfairly, there is no 
evidence of sex discrimination here. The district court's 
finding that Wolf's legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
was incredible because Ezold was evaluated more severely 
than male associates because of her gender, as well as its 
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finding that Wolf's requirement that she possess analytical 
skills sufficient to handle complex litigation was a pretext 
for discrimination, are clearly erroneous and find no 
support in the evidence. Finally, this record also lacks 
sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus to sustain a 
finding that Wolf more likely had a discriminatory *548 
motive in denying Ezold's admission to the partnership. 
XI. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the district 
court in favor ofEzold and remand for entry of judgment in 
favor of Wolf. 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Feb. 3, 1993 
PRESENT: Chief Judge, 
Footnotes 
The petition for rehearing filed by Nancy O'Mara Ezold in 
the above captioned matter having been submitted to the 
judges who participated in the decision of this court and to 
all the other available circuit judges ofthe circuit in regular 
active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision 
having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit 
judges of the circuit in regular active service not having 
voted for rehearing by the court in bane, the petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Parallel Citations 
60 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair 
EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 
41,921,61 USLW 2398 
involved an accounting firm's denial of 
partnership to a female accountant. That case did proceed to trial but thc appellate decisions provide guidance only on the parties' 
burdens of proof in a mixed motives casco This case was not tried on that theory. 
The district court's order also stated that if its prior orders were affirmed on appeal, it would thereafter determine back pay for the 
period from February I, 1991 to the date of Ezold 's instatement as a partner. 
There was little change beyond format in the evaluation forms used throughout Ezold's tenure. We will describe the evaluation forms 
in effect in 1987 and 1988, the years Ezold was a senior associate being evaluated for admission to the partnership. 
At all relevant times, Strogatz served as chairman ofthe Associates Committee. 
The evaluation form asks the reviewing partner whether he or she would like to "supplement and/or explain [the] written evaluation 
in an oral interview with a member of the Associates Committee." See, e.g., App. at 3889,6467. 
The district court quoted Ezold's evaluations in FOF 61-71. 
7 Because the reason Wolf articulated for denying Ezold partnership was lack oflegal analytic ability, this summary includes neither 
positive evaluations in other categories upon which the district court made findings nor evaluations in which there was neither grade 
nor comment in the category of legal analysis. Many of Ezold's evaluations in other categories were highly complimentary and 
compared quite favorably to the partners' evaluations of male candidates for partnership in the same categories. The district court's 
use of these other favorable evaluations in the comparative analysis in support of its ultimate finding of pretext is discussed in Part 
VII of this opinion, infra. 
1987 Evaluations 
Partner 
Name 
Grade 
(Legal 
c 
o 
Analysis) m 
m 
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Promislo 
Kurland 
Alderman 
Boote 
Flaherty 
Joseph 
Schwartz 
Dubrow 
Roberts 
Spitzer 
e 
n 
ts 
M "I had minimal contact with Nancy, but 1 thought she did not generate ideas ... or pull the facts 
together well and exercise the best lawyerly judgement. She seemed somewhat over her head, but I 
don't think she should have been." Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 
3854-57. 
"[T]here seems to be serious question as to whether she has the legal ability to take on large matters 
and handle them on her own. We have been over this many times and there is nothing 1 can add to 
what I've already said about Nancy. What I envisioned about her when I hired her as a "good, 
stand-up effective courtroom lawyer" remains to be true and 1 think she has proven her case. 
Apparently she has not proved to the satisfaction ofthe firm the other qualities considered necessary 
to rise to the top of the firm." Recommended partnership "with mixed emotions." Id. at 3878-81.' 
A Slight contact. Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3886-89. 
A "Nancy has avoided demonstrating ability in th[e] area [oflegal analysis] because I believe she lacks 
it. On the other hand, in Nancy's case, other qualities redeem her .... I would not want her in charge 
ofa large legally complex case, the traditional measure ofa Wolf Block partner." Recommended 
partnership "with favor." Id. at 3894-97.' 
A Slight contact. Recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3918-21. 
"I have been singularly unimpressed with the level of her ability .... She may be fine to keep for 
certain smaller matters, but I don't see her skills as being those for our sophisticated practice." Id. at 
3930-33. Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3933. 
G "She is excellent in court and loves to be in that arena .... She remains a little weak in her initial 
analysis of complex legal issues." Id. at 3954-56.'" 
A "[I]n my one experience we lost a client, but I think Nancy performed satisfactorily." No opinion as 
to partnership admission. Id. at 3990-93. 
G Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 4052-55. 
G "Little contact, most favorable impression." Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 
4060-63. 
8 FN8. The district court omitted from its findings this portion of Kurland's evaluation concerning Ezold's legal analytical ability. 
9 FN9. The district court omitted this portion of Boote's evaluation from its finding. 
10 FNIO. The district court omitted this comment on legal analysis from its finding. 
Roberta Liebenberg, a female litigation partner, voted against Ezold's admission. The only Associates Committee member voting in 
favor of Ezold was her former neighbor, Ronald Weiner. 
"Special partners," in contrast to regular partners, do not have the right to vote, do not have any equity in the partnership and may be 
removed by the Executive Committee. In addition, the benefits provided are inferior to those of regular partners. 
1 I 
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It is not clear from the record whether such an inquiry is a matter of course in connection with negative partnership recommendations. 
Ezold testified that Kopp told her that she could learn the area of the law in a week. Ezold contended that the offer of a position in 
domestic relations, a position with allegedly less esteem in the firm, is also evidence of discrimination. The district court found this 
department was formerly headed by a male, and is currently headed by two male senior partners. 
We believe this abrogates the inference of discrimination Ezold would have us draw. 
After the Associates Committee determined that it would not be recommending Ezold for partnership, it was decided not to give her 
the September 1988 raise given to those in her class who were promoted. Ezold's salary as a senior associate was $73,000.00. The 
lowest level regular partner earns between $125,000.00 and $140,000.00 a year. 
This statement in Patterson is in conformity with the law that pre-existed Patterson and is not affected by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. See (section !OI of Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturns 
portion of Patterson holding that proscription of racial discrimination in making of contract under applies only to 
refusals to hire and promotions rising to level of opportunity for "new and distinct relation" between employer and employee) 
(quoting I 
Though the record indicates that perceived legal analytic ability is a necessary condition for partnership at Wolf, it, in and of itself, is 
not a necessary and sufficient condition. Otherwise, thc remaining categories on the evaluation form would be superfluous. 
We recognize that the conclusions in the statement we quote from Hopkins were made by the factfinder. Nevertheless, we think the 
quoted language, correctly setting forth the basis on which comparison must be made, reflects the legal standard that the district court 
was required to apply to the evidence before it in Ezold's case. 
Among the factors other than legal analytic ability that Wolf considered are "creativity," "negotiating and advocacy," "attitude," 
"ability under pressure" and "dedication." See supra at 515 (listing criteria of legal performance and personal characteristics 
appearing on evaluation form). 
As discussed infra, the plaintiff can also prove that despite the employer's articulated reason, a discriminatory reason "more likely" 
motivated the employer's decision. I 
The defendant is not required to prove that those promoted are "better qualified" than the plaintiff See 
Ezold argues the district court appropriately declined to consider Fiebach's objections because they were gender-based. Ezold refers 
to an Apri I 1988 disagreement over case strategy in the Carpenter case. The district court made a general finding that Ezold 
was criticized for being "very demanding" and was expected by some members of the Firm to be nonassertive and acquiescent 
to the predominantly male partnership. Her failure to accept this role was a factor which resulted in her not being promoted to 
partner. 
This general finding does not permit the court to ignore Fiebach's assessment. It does, 
however, illustrate again that the court did not consider the whole record relating to Wolfs articulated reason for denying Ezold a 
partnership position. 
The record shows that Arbittier was a tough critic of many associates. male and female, when he felt they did not measure up to 
Wolfs standards on analytic ability. 
The most damning motive that these comments reveal is lack of confidence based on academic credentials. This is a far cry from sex 
discrimination. 
The district court's findings recited these comments. See FOF 76-86. 
Ezold did receive one "distinguished/good" from Stephen Goodman, who had substantial contact with her, in May 1987. In addition, 
she received a "distinguished" in legal analysis in 1983 and 1984 from Bean and in 1985 from Magarity. Wolf contended that one of 
the factors taken into account by the Associates Committee was whether a partner had a reputation as an especially hard or easy 
grader. There is strong evidence supporting Wolfs contention that Magarity was an "easy grader". The record is full of glowing 
memos that he wrote on behalf of male associates, including Associates A and B. See App. at 5126, 5128. 
The 1988 bottom line memos on Ezold and A were both prepared by Block. His summary of both of their legal analysis grades was 
"good." 
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The record also shows that A had stronger support from the partners within the litigation department than Ezold did. In 1988, ofthe 
twenty-eight partners in the litigation department, thirteen partners viewed A's admission "with favor" and three "with enthusiasm"; 
only two partners had mixed emotions and only one viewed his admission negatively. Ezold, on the other hand, had much less 
support from the litigation department partners. Only five partners viewed Ezold's admission "with favor" and only three "with 
enthusiasm"; four partners had mixed emotions and three viewed her admission negatively. 
The district court's findings concerning the evaluations of the other associates with whom it compared Ezold are found in FOF 
87-118. 
Ofthe twenty-eight partners in the corporate department, nine partners viewed F's admission "with favor," two "with enthusiasm," 
and one negatively. 
Wolf contends additionally that the district court erred in its post-trial decision to exclude from evidence the evaluation files ofthree 
successful female partnership candidates. 
Assuming, without deciding, that these files were relevant, we note the district court did not exclude them on grounds of relevancy. 
Rather, when they were offered on redirect, it ruled they were "beyond the scope" that could have been anticipated on direct 
examination and were not proper redirect. In any event, in view of our disposition we need not resolve this issue. 
The district court's complete findings concerning Wolfs assignment process as it related to Ezold are found in FOF 21-40. 
Magarity also testified that he saw nothing in Ezold's evaluations indicating any bias against her because of her gender. 
Ezold did not complain when she benefitted from the informal assignment process. 
The district court failed to do so despite Ezold's proposed finding on the issue. 
The district court made no finding concerning another incident involving Ezold. In that respect, the record indicates that Ezold was 
chastised for her handling of a request to reassign a case. Kurland had told Ezold that she should not handle any more small cases so 
she could free herself up for more substantial matters. He said that if she was assigned small cases she should come to him about 
reassignment. When Arbittier sent her the file in a simple bankruptcy case she sent it back with a note asking that it be reassigned. 
The record indicates that Ezold was criticized for just sending the file back with a note instead of talking to someone first. There is, 
however, no mention of this incident in any of Ezold's evaluations. 
In Lockhart, there was sufficient indirect evidence to support the jury's verdict that age was the determinative factor in Lockhart's 
discharge. This evidence included: (I) Lockhart had received satisfactory performance evaluations and merit salary increases in each 
year over his twenty-two year career with the company; (2) he had never received a reprimand or demotion; (3) the alleged reason for 
his discharge was discrepancies found in an audit of his office, however, he was never given an opportunity to explain these 
discrepancies prior to his tennination; (4) his immediate supervisor testified that he was a good and dependable worker and that the 
standard company policy was to proceed through a series of reprimands before an employee would be dismissed; (5) the second 
person responsible for his termination also testified that Lockhart was never insubordinate and never deliberately violated company 
policy; and (6) there was evidence that the company had decided to undertake a major restructuring which resulted in the 
consolidation of several locations and the filling of new management positions by mueh younger and inexperienced individuals. 
It bears repeating in this final stage of diseussion that Wolfs impression of Ezold's legal analytic ability, informed but at the same 
time subjeetive, is the focal point in this case and that Wolfis entitled to fonn its own subjeetive judgment on that faetor. Wolfis also 
entitled to be wrong in its judgment so long as it does not base its ineorrect decision on unlawful sex discrimination or stereotype. 
For hostile environment to be actionable under Meritor, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the 
plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working environment." (quotation omitted); see also 
("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings 
in an employee" would not sufficiently affect conditions of employment to violate Title VII), cert. denied, 
(evidence of casual atmosphere and 
loose conversation that sometimes had sexual connotations or implications insufficient to prove hostile working environment). 
Hon. Collins 1. Seitz, Senior Circuit Judge ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, was limited to voting for panel 
rehearing. 
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Flavel v. Svedala Industries, Inc., 868 F.Supp. 1422 (1994) 
868 F.Supp. 1422 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Wisconsin. 
Malcolm D. FLA VEL, individually and on 
behalf of all other persons similarly 
situated, Group Representative Plaintiff 
and 
Robert F. Cnare, James R. Conradt, Major 
Coxhill, Robert K. Elbel, Malcolm D. Flavel 
(deceased), Russell H. Graff, Robert L. 
Isferding, Robert E. Jones, Chalasani C. 
Rayan (deceased), Richard Spoonamore 
and Ronald J. Weiss, Individual Plaintiffs, 
and 
The United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Intervenor 
PlaintiIfrepresenting the 11 named 
plaintiIfs above, plus Robert W. Belling, 
Conrad Heinemann, William D. Meager, 
Byron K. Smay, and Robert Van Dyke, as 
additional plaintiIfs represented by the 
United States, 
v. 
SVEDALA INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, 
and Svedala Incorporated, Defendants. 
No. 92-C-1095. I Nov. 10, 1994. 
Tenninated employees brought individual and class claims 
against employer under Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA). On employer's motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court, Warren, 1., held 
that: (1) employees established prima facie case of 
discrimination; (2) employees established that employer's 
proffered reasons for termination were pretextual; (3) 
plaintiffs would be allowed to call each named plaintiff in 
establishing their prima facie case; and (4) plaintiffs would 
not be allowed to adjust analytical framework of Teamsters 
by requiring defendants to present all defense evidence 
relevant to liability during prima facie stage of trial. 
Motion denied. 
West Headnotes (55) 
[1) Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
[2) 
[3) 
[4) 
Standard that, where record taken as a whole 
could not lead rational trier of fact to find for 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine need for 
trial and summary judgment is proper, is applied 
with extra rigor in employment discrimination 
cases, where intent and credibility are crucial 
issues. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.c.A. 
Federal Civil Procedure 
. 'Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Plaintiff's presentation of more than a scintilla of 
evidence supporting existence of illegitimate 
motive is enough to preclude summary judgment 
on ADEA claim. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Burden of Proof 
On motion for summary judgment, neither party 
may rest on mere allegations or denials in 
pleadings or upon conclusory statements in 
affidavits, and both parties must produce proper 
documentary evidence to support their 
contentions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Presumptions 
In deciding summary judgment motion, court 
need not draw every inference from the record, 
but only reasonable references. Fed.Rules 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 169 
Flavel v. Svedala Industries, Inc., 868 F.Supp. 1422 (1994) 
70 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1088 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
[5) Civil Rights 
[6) 
(7) 
,j/*Age Discrimination 
Civil Rights 
"~'''Age Discrimination 
In age discrimination cases where disparate 
treatment of single employee is at issue, plaintiff 
may prove age discrimination in one of two 
different ways; she may either produce direct or 
circumstantial evidence that age was determining 
factor in her discharge, or, as is more common, 
she may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting 
method of proof for Title VII cases originally set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas, and later adapted to 
age discrimination under ADEA. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e 
et seq.; Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
Direct evidence of discrimination includes any 
acknowledgement by defendant that 
discriminatory intent was behind its treatment of 
plaintiff; circumstantial evidence, in tum, may 
involve, inter alia, proof of suspicious timing, 
ambiguous statements and behavior, 
inappropriate remarks, and comparative evidence 
of systematically more favorable treatment 
toward similarly situated employees not sharing 
the protected characteristic. 
Civil Rights 
Prima Facie Case 
Under burden shifting approach of McDonnell 
Douglas, plaintiff must initially establish prima 
[8] 
[9) 
[10) 
facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) 
she was member of protected class; (2) she was 
doing the job well enough to meet employer's 
legitimate expectation; (3) she was discharged or 
demoted; and (4) employer sought replacement 
for her. 
Civil Rights 
"",",Age Discrimination 
If plaintiff succeeds in establishing prima facie 
case of age discrimination, this creates rebuttable 
presumption of discrimination, and burden of 
production shifts to employer to articulate 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
employee's discharge; if employer is successful, 
presumption dissolves, and burden shifts back to 
employee to show that employer's proffered 
reasons are pretext for age discrimination. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
Civil Rights 
!Age Discrimination 
If age discrimination plaintiff successfully shows 
that employer has offered pretext, that is, a phony 
reason, for firing employee, then trier of fact is 
pennitted, although not compelled to infer, that 
real reason was age. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
In attempting to show that employer's proffered 
reasons are pretext for discrimination, plaintiff 
might be well advised to present evidence of 
discrimination in addition to that required to 
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demonstrate pretext, because ultimate burden of 
persuading trier of fact that defendant 
intentionally discriminated against plaintiff 
remains at all times with plaintiff, and because 
fact finder is not required to find in plaintiff s 
favor simply because she establishes prima facie 
case and shows that employer's proffered reasons 
are false. 
(11) Federal Civil Procedure 
"",Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
In employment discrimination action, for 
summary judgment purposes, nonmoving 
plaintiff must only produce evidence from which 
rational fact finder could infer that employer lied 
about its proffered reasons for dismissal. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.c.A. 
(12) Civil Rights 
,Disparate Treatment 
In ADEA representative action brought by either 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) or individual plaintiff alleging pattern or 
practice of disparate treatment, analytical 
framework which applies is analogous to 
framework in individual age discrimination 
claim. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[13) Civil Rights 
"Pattern or Practice" Claims 
Plaintiffs who raise pattern or practice class 
claim have as their initial burden the task of 
demonstrating that unlawful discrimination has 
been regular policy of employer, i.e., that 
discrimination was company's standard 
(14) 
operating procedure, that is, the regular rather 
than the unusual practice. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,~>sAge Discrimination 
Civil Rights 
'v"Age Discrimination 
Plaintiffs who raise pattern or practice class 
claim meet their burden of demonstrating that 
unlawful discrimination has been regular policy 
of employer by either producing direct or 
circumstantial evidence that their employer 
effectuated pattern of discriminatory age-based 
decision making, or utilizing burden-shifting 
method of proof similar to that articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[15] Civil Rights 
"Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Federal Civil Procedure 
• Damages 
Under burden-shifting approach, pattern or 
practice discrimination actions are generally 
bifurcated at trial into two parts, which are 
liability, or prima facie phase, where plaintiffs 
must prove discriminatory policy by 
preponderance of evidence, and remedial phase, 
where scope of relief awardable to each 
individual plaintiff is litigated. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
(16) Federal Civil Procedure 
Damages 
Under burden-shifting approach applicable to 
pattern or practice discrimination actions, 
efficiency is best enhanced if same jury makes 
liability and remedial factual findings, as: (1) 
plaintiffs need not reintroduce in remedial phase 
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anecdotal evidence already presented during 
liability phase; (2) defendants need not 
reintroduce in remedial phase defenses already 
presented in liability phase; and (3) conflicting 
discrimination findings as to plaintiffs whose 
cases are litigated in liability phase are avoided. 
[17] Civil Rights 
~:","Pattern or Practice" Claims 
Formal written policy is not required to establish 
pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination on 
part of employer; informal or unstructured 
method of decision making may be sufficient to 
invoke this doctrine. 
[18] Civil Rights 
,Prima Facie Case 
In prima facie phase of employment 
discrimination trial, plaintiffs need not offer 
evidence that each person for whom they will 
ultimately seek relief was victim of employer's 
discriminatory policy; their burden is to establish 
prima facie case that such policy existed. 
[19] Civil Rights 
Prima Facie Case 
In establishing prima facie case of pattern and 
practice discrimination, plaintiffs should produce 
statistical evidence demonstrating substantial 
disparities in application of employment actions 
as to protected and unprotected group, buttressed 
by anecdotal evidence of general policies or 
specific instances of discrimination. 
[20] Civil Rights 
,;n,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Absence of statistical evidence must not 
invariably prove fatal in every pattern or practice 
employment discrimination case; where overall 
number of employees is small, anecdotal 
evidence may suffice. 
[21] Civil Rights 
,\",Prima Facie Case 
In some pattern or practice employment 
discrimination cases, plaintiff's statistical 
evidence alone might constitute prima facie case. 
[22] Civil Rights 
,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence IS 
automatically entitled to reverence to the 
exclusion of the other in pattern or practice 
employment discrimination case; however, when 
one type of evidence is missing altogether, the 
other must be correspondingly stronger for 
plaintiffs to meet their burden. 
[23] Civil Rights 
Prima Facie Case 
Where plaintiff class in pattern or practice 
employment discrimination case is prohibitively 
large for each plaintiff to provide individual 
testimony of alleged discriminatory conduct, 
plaintiffs regularly present anecdotal testimony 
from subset of plaintiffs in seeking to establish 
their prima facie case; in order to establish prima 
facie case, anecdotal evidence must suggest 
broad-based discrimination, and providing mere 
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isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts by 
employer is insufficient. 
(24) Civil Rights 
"~':,Prima Facie Case 
During liability, or prima facie, stage of pattern 
or practice employment discrimination action, 
defendants may counter plaintiffs' proof through 
cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal 
evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in 
attempt to show that plaintiffs' proof is either 
inaccurate or insignificant. 
[25J Civil Rights 
... Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
To counter plaintiffs proof during prima facie 
stage of pattern or practice age discrimination 
action, employer might show, as an example, that 
claimed discriminatory pattern is product of 
hiring which occurred prior to ADEA rather than 
unlawful post-Act discrimination, or that during 
period employer is alleged to have pursued 
discriminatory policy it made too many 
employment decisions to justify inference that it 
had engaged III regular practice of 
discrimination. Age Discrimination III 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
126) Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
In employment discrimination action, strength of 
rebuttal evidence that defendants must produce to 
prevent plaintiffs from carrying burden of 
persuasion as to disparity in treatment among 
employee groups depends, as in any case, on 
strength of plaintiffs' proof. 
(27) Civil Rights 
'i'"Prima Facie Case 
In rebutting employee's prima facie case of 
pattern or practice employment discrimination, 
employer's defense must be designed to meet 
prima facie case of employee; although court 
does not mean to suggest that there are any 
particular limits of type of evidence employer 
may use, at liability stage the focus often will not 
be on individual hiring decisions, but on pattern 
of discriminatory decision making. 
(28) Civil Rights 
129) 
Prima Facie Case 
At prima facie stage of pattern or practice 
employment discrimination action, while 
defendants may attempt to establish 
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse 
employment decision against testifying plaintiff, 
they need not do so depending on their 
assessment of strength of plaintiffs' evidence; 
focus is on presence or absence of company-wide 
discriminatory policy, and not on individual 
employment decisions. 
Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
In rebutting plaintiffs prima facie case in pattern 
or practice employment discrimination action, 
defendant may, as an example, simply question 
accuracy of testifying plaintiffs recollection, or 
attempt to show absence of any age-based 
references toward that employee. 
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[30] Civil Rights 
,:;y,,,"Pattern or Practice" Claims 
In pattern or practice employment discrimination 
action, it is only during the second, or remedial, 
phase of trial that defendants must establish that 
individual plaintiffs were not, in fact, victims of 
discriminatory practice in order to escape 
liability. 
[31] Civil Rights 
;r,Age Discrimination 
Throughout prima facie stage of pattern or 
practice age discrimination action, plaintiffs bear 
burden of persuasion as to establishing prima 
facie case. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[32] Civil Rights 
"Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
At close of liability phase of pattern or practice 
age discrimination trial, jury is asked through 
appropriate instructions whether or not plaintiffs 
have met their burden of establishing by 
preponderance of evidence that defendants 
engaged in pattern or practice of age 
discrimination during relevant time frame; if jury 
responds negatively, then trial of plaintiffs , claim 
is completed and plaintiffs are left to pursue 
individual discrimination claims, presumably 
before different fact finder, but if, on the other 
hand, jury responds affirmatively, court may 
award prospective relief to plaintiffs. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[33] Civil Rights 
~~~Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
In pattern or practice employment discrimination 
action, effect of jury's determination that 
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of 
establishing that defendants engaged in pattern or 
practice of discrimination is to leave plaintiffs 
with burden of proving, without assistance from 
pattern and practice evidence, that each 
actionable termination suffered by plaintiffs was 
product of intentional discrimination on part of 
defendant; plaintiffs, in other words, can neither 
bolster their individual claims for relief with 
proof that defendants engaged in systemwide 
practice of racial discrimination, nor can they 
shift burden of proof to defendants. 
[34] Federal Civil Procedure 
Damages 
Where jury determines that plaintiffs have met 
their burden of establishing that defendants 
engaged in pattern or practice of age 
discrimination, in order to determine scope of 
individual relief to which plaintiffs might be 
entitled, court must move to second, or remedial, 
phase of trial. 
[35] Civil Rights 
.. Age Discrimination 
If plaintiffs prevail in liability, or prima facie, 
phase of pattern or practice employment 
discrimination trial, then proceedings move into 
the second, or remedial phase, where proof of 
pattern or practice supports inference that any 
particular employment decision, during period in 
which discriminatory policy was enforced, was 
made in pursuit of that policy; under such 
circumstances, it IS presumed that each 
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discrimination at hands of defendant. 
[36) Civil Rights 
~····Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
During remedial phase of pattern or practice 
employment discrimination action, presumption 
of discrimination shifts to defendants the burden 
of demonstrating that individual plaintiffs were 
not victims of the discriminatory practice; this 
includes not only burden of production, but also 
burden of persuading trier of fact that it is more 
likely than not that employer did not unlawfully 
discriminate against individual. 
(37) Civil Rights 
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Teamsters approach to pattern or practice 
employment discrimination action differs from 
traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis in that, 
under Teamsters approach, burden of persuasion 
can shift from plaintiffs to defendants. 
[38) Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
During remedial phase of pattern or practice age 
discrimination action, to rebut presumption of 
discrimination as to each plaintiff, defendants 
must establish by preponderance of evidence that 
age discrimination was not determining factor or 
but-for element in their employment decisions. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
~ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. ~ 621 et seq. 
[39) Civil Rights 
\r~Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
To rebut presumption of discrimination during 
remedial phase of pattern or practice 
discrimination action, defendants may present 
evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs' proof is 
either inaccurate or insignificant, or that 
nondiscriminatory explanation exists for 
presumed discrimination termination of each 
plaintiff. 
[40) Civil Rights 
,(;AcMeasure and Amount 
Amount of damages awardable to each plaintiff 
is litigated during remedial phase of pattern or 
practice employment discrimination trial. 
[41) Civil Rights 
,"Pattern or Practice" Claims 
During remedial stage of pattern or practice 
employment discrimination action, plaintiffs 
may counter defendants' proof through 
cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal 
evidence in attempt to show that defendants' 
nondiscriminatory justifications for employment 
decisions are merely pretext for discrimination. 
[42] Civil Rights 
Motive or Intent; Pretext 
As general rule, employment discrimination 
plaintiff may establish that defendants' 
nondiscriminatory justification for their 
employment decision is pre textual directly with 
evidence that defendants were more likely than 
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not motivated by discriminatory 
indirectly by evidence that 
explanation is not credible. 
[43) Civil Rights 
reason, or 
defendants' 
,,""",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Unlike McDonnell Douglas format applied to 
individual employment discrimination claims, 
Teamsters model applicable to pattern or practice 
claims imposes no burden on plaintiffs to 
produce evidence that defendants' proffered 
nondiscriminatory reason for employment 
decisions is pretextual, and burden of persuading 
fact finder that age discrimination was not 
determining factor in each of defendants' 
employment decisions remains with defendant. 
[44} Civil Rights 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Strength of rebuttal evidence that plaintiffs must 
produce to prevent defendants from carrying 
their burden of persuasion during remedial phase 
of pattern or practice employment discrimination 
trial will depend, as in any case, on strength of 
defendants' proof. 
[45J Civil Rights 
Instructions 
At end of remedial phase of pattern or practice 
age discrimination trial, jury is asked through 
appropriate instructions whether defendants 
willfully violated ADEA, and whether 
defendants have proven by preponderance of 
evidence that each individual plaintiff was not 
victim of age discrimination; they are also asked 
to assess damages for each named plaintiff. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[46) Civil Rights 
'·'J>Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Civil Rights 
',/AAdmissibility of Evidence; Statistical 
Evidence 
Where individual and class claims of 
employment discrimination are brought 
contemporaneously, court should consider 
evidence relating to individual claims in their 
assessment of class claim, and vice versa, since 
evidence relevant to one is also relevant to the 
other; class claim, however, is to be considered 
first, since if class claim has merit, named and 
unnamed individual class members are entitled to 
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters. 
[47J Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
Terminated employees established prima facie 
case of pattern or practice age discrimination; 
manager who was asked to calculate average age 
of salaried employees at facility expressed 
concern that such request was part of overall 
program to get rid of older workers, general 
manager commented when receiving list of 
employees who were age 60 and older that there 
were many long service employees and there was 
need for new blood in organization, general 
manager stated that problem with facility was 
that "we have too many old people in their jobs 
too long," and general manager stated that 
average age of sales force of 55-56 years old was 
too high and that younger and more aggressive 
sales force was needed. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
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[48] Civil Rights 
F,~Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Terminated employees met their burden of 
demonstrating that employer's explanations for 
their termination was merely pretext for age 
discrimination; employee who was terminated 
allegedly because he did not have in place 
adequate safety programs had history of 
satisfactory performance, employee who was 
terminated allegedly because his responsibilities 
were transferred and funding for his research was 
eliminated was passed over for several open 
positions by employer, and employee who was 
terminated allegedly because he resisted 
implementation of Total Quality Management 
(TQM) principles merely expressed doubts about 
applicability of certain specific management 
strategies to his small department. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
149J Civil Rights 
Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Terminated employee met his burden of 
establishing that employer's proffered reason for 
his termination was pretext for age 
discrimination; although employer maintained 
that employee was dismissed after his 
responsibilities were transferred in response to 
customer complaints and after further 
consolidation of operation obviated need for 
on-site manager at employee's facility, employee 
was not notified as to concerns over his 
performance, employee received merit pay 
increase, employee had not recently received 
performance appraisals, and- termination letter 
did not mention performance problems as cause 
for termination. Age Discrimination III 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[50] Civil Rights 
'rc0Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Terminated employees met their burden of 
establishing that employer's explanations for 
their "retirements" were pretext for age 
discrimination; although employer maintained 
that employees voluntarily retired, evidence 
indicated that employees were constructively 
discharged after employer imposed inflated sales 
quota on first employee during recessionary year 
and unduly criticized his performance, created 
new job description for district sales managers 
which included "trumped up" physical 
requirements for second employee who had 
medical condition, and subjected third employee 
to verbal harassment and adverse treatment. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[51] Labor and Employment 
Constructive Discharge 
Demonstrating constructive discharge requires 
showing that reasonable employee would have 
felt compelled to resign under circumstances of 
case. 
[52J Labor and Employment 
Constructive Discharge 
Constructive discharge involves more than mere 
Illconvenience or alteration of job 
responsibilities; it is instead established by 
indicating demotion evidenced by decrease in 
wage or salary, less distinguished title, material 
loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 
responsibilities, or other indices that might be 
unique to a particular situation. 
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[53) Civil Rights 
,,,,,,,Admissibility of Evidence; Statistical 
Evidence 
In pattern or practice age discrimination action, 
district court would allow plaintiffs to call each 
named plaintiff as witness in establishing prima 
facie case, given relatively small size of plaintiff 
class, plaintiffs' need to present more than 
isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts to meet 
their prima facie case, and general reluctance to 
limit degree of evidence deemed necessary by 
plaintiffs to meet their evidentiary burden. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
[54) Civil Rights 
'.""Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Plaintiffs in pattern or practice employment 
discrimination action who intended to have each 
named plaintiff testify in presenting their prima 
facie case would not be allowed to adjust 
analytical framework of Teamsters by requiring 
defendants to present all defense evidence 
relevant to liability, including nondiscriminatory 
reasons for each plaintiffs termination during 
prima facie stage of trial; such adjustment could 
prejudice defendants by lengthening trial and 
lead to complication of special verdict form used 
by jury. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
[55) Federal Civil Procedure 
Time for Consideration of Motion 
In employment discrimination action in which 
plaintiffs brought pattern and practice claim as 
group, and brought individual discrimination 
claims as well, employer's motion for summary 
judgment as to individual discrimination claims, 
which it brought contemporaneously with motion 
for summary judgment as to pattern or practice 
claims, was premature; finding of pattern or 
practice discrimination would obviate need to 
separately pursue individual discrimination 
claims, and, should jury determine that employer 
did not engage in pattern or practice of 
discrimination, employees could pursue 
individual discrimination claims in subsequent 
proceedings which would require court 
resolution under McDonnell Douglas format 
rather than Teamsters format utilized in pattern 
or practice case. 
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Opinion 
DECISION AND ORDER 
WARREN, District Judge. 
Before the Court are the defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment as to (1) the Age Discrimination Claim of 
Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke, (2) the Age Discrimination 
Claims of Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and 
Richard Spoonamore, and (3) those Plaintiffs Alleging 
Constructive Discharge-Byron Smay, William Meagher, 
Robert Isferding, Robert Jones, Major Coxhill, and James 
Conradt. For the following reasons, these motions are 
denied. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel, and 
Richard Spoonamore: 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 178 
Flavel v. Svedala Industries, Inc., 868 F.Supp. 1422 (1994) 
The Appleton operation of defendant Svedala Industries, 
Inc. ("SI") was responsible for the design, engineering, 
manufacturing and marketing of crushing equipment and 
screens. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 1.) Crushing 
equipment takes large mined rocks, some up to eight feet in 
diameter, and crushes them into small pieces; screens are 
then used to segregate rock particles by size. (Jd.) 
In April of 1989, William Farnsworth, who had been 
General Manager of the Appleton facility for many years, 
retired. (Jd. at ~ 2.) Mr. Farnsworth was replaced on 
November 15,1989 by William Guernsey, who had been 
General Manager of Consolidated Diesel, a *1429 joint 
venture between Cummins Engine Company and J.1. Case. 
(Jd. at ~ 3.) 
1. Ronald Weiss: 
When Mr. Guernsey interviewed for the general manager 
position with officers of Svedala Industri A.B. ("SlAB"), 
SI's Swedish parent corporation, various shortcomings of 
the Appleton management team were discussed, including 
the performance of plaintiff Ronald Weiss, Appleton'S 
Manager of Manufacturing. (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 46-47.) Mr. Weiss had started with 
SI's predecessor, Allis-Chalmers, in 1972, and was 
employed as the Manager of Manufacturing at Appleton 
since 1981. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~I 8.) Each 
written performance review prepared by Mr. Farnsworth 
for the five years before Mr. Guernsey was hired rated Mr. 
Weiss at the second from the top of six rating levels; none 
mentioned any "improvement needs," and all listed "upper 
management" or "general management" as Mr. Weiss' 
"long range career objectives." (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 2.) Mr. Weiss received favorable annual 
performance appraisals every year until 1990; it is disputed 
whether Mr. Farnsworth ever expressed dissatisfaction to 
anyone about his performance. (Jd. at ~~ 4-6.) Mr. 
Farnsworth nominated Mr. Weiss to attend the personnel 
development center to be conducted by SlAB at Nordic 
Hills Training Center; Mr. Weiss and all other Appleton 
nominees over forty (40) years of age were rejected, and 
only the youngest, Pat Quinn-then age thirty-eight 
(38)-was invited to attend. (Jd. at ~l~ 39-40.) Mr. 
Farnsworth also recommended Mr. Weiss, along with Jim 
Gregor or Hugh Foy, as his replacement. (Jd. aqI38.) The 
1989 performance review for Mr. Quinn describes him as a 
"solid young manager with very high potential," and the 
1989 performance review for Mr. Gregor, Appleton's 
Manager of Sales, lists the "need to develop young 
generation of salesmen & mgt. candidates" as his 
improvement needs; the progress review for Mr. Weiss 
dated February 8, 1990 dropped him from a near-top 
ranking to the bottom. (Id. at ~ 50.) 
According to the defendants, Mr. Guernsey, upon arriving 
at Appleton, concluded that costs relating to quality 
control, purchasing, and inventory were too high, and that 
plant safety was a problem. (Def.Proposed Findings of 
Fact ~~ 10-13; 15, 17). Mr. Guernsey believed that Mr. 
Weiss did not have in place an adequate safety 
improvement program, and held him responsible for cost 
problems. (Jd. at ~~ 14, 16-20.) Under Mr. Weiss' 
management, the Appleton facility had in place a 
management safety council, a safety brigade, safety tours, 
weekly safety programs, safety posters, periodic safety 
contests, safety awards, and a full-time nurse. (Pl.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 21.) The plaintiffs also 
reference Mr. Guernsey's November 8, 1991 deposition 
testimony, where he stated that the Appleton facility "had a 
safety record that was average in the industry," and the fact 
that the manufacturing operation at Appleton under Mr. 
Weiss' supervision had been rated as outstanding during 
the last audit of the program in 1987-88. (Jd. at ~~ 12,14.) 
Appleton stalIs1tcs on safety under Mr. Weiss' 
management were within OSHA requirements. (Jd. at ~ 
22.) 
The defendants indicate that Mr. Guernsey "is a proponent 
of the managerial philosophy known as Total Quality 
Management ("TQM")," which espouses teamwork, 
accountability, and quantifiable performance goals and 
objectives. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~I~ 4-5). The 
plaintiffs indicate that, in connection with the sale of the 
mineral systems division of Allis-Chalmers, John Platner, 
SI's North American President, eliminated the total quality 
assurance department at Appleton as a cost-savings 
measure, reassigning TQM to the engineering department, 
and that Mr. Weiss preserved as much of the TQM 
program in manufacturing as he could. (Pl.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings ofFact~~ 15-16.) According to the 
plaintiffs, Mr. Guernsey never discussed TQM or the 
safety program at Appleton with Mr. Weiss. (Jd. at ~~ 17-
20.) 
During the period preceding Mr. Guernsey's arrival at 
Appleton, Mr. Weiss was working on the largest cost 
reduction plan that had ever been approved during the 
eighteen years he had been with the company; he had also 
received prior approval before *1430 traveling to China in 
October of 1989 regarding a sourcing castings project. (Jd. 
at ~1'128-32.) Inventory levels at Appleton were not set by 
the manager of manufacturing operations; instead, a formal 
master scheduling meeting was held each month involving 
the general manager and his entire staff, with the former 
granting final approval for the monthly master schedule, 
including inventory levels. (Jd. at ~~ 33-35.) The 
manufacturing operations at Appleton under Mr. Weiss 
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produced inventory and other products in accordance with 
the approved master schedule. (Jd. at ~ 36.) 
In December of 1989, one month after he had replaced Mr. 
Farnsworth, Mr. Guernsey decided to remove Mr. Weiss as 
Manager of Manufacturing. (DefProposed Findings of 
Fact ~~ 21, 25.) Mr. Guernsey replaced Mr. Weiss with 
Gerald Dircks, a forty-nine (49) year old former colleague 
at Consolidated Diesel familiar with TQM principles. (Jd. 
at ~~ 22-24, 28-29.) Mr. Dircks was interviewed in 
December, and his hiring was approved by Mr. Planter and 
Swedish parent manager Jan Knuttson before Christmas. 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 41.) Mr. 
Guernsey announced Mr. Weiss' impending termination to 
Mr. Gregor and other SI managers; according to Mr. 
Gregor, Mr. Guernsey stated that "there could be some 
legal implications involved in this so none of you is to 
discuss any of this with anybody." (Jd. at ~ 42.) According 
to Mr. Weiss, Mr. Guernsey stated to him in a January of 
1990 conversation that "the problem with Appleton is that 
we have too many old people in their jobs too long." (Jd. at 
~ 54.) While he had initially considered placing Mr. Weiss 
in another position, Mr. Guernsey terminated his 
employment on February 12, 1990. (DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 26-28.) Mr. Weiss was fifty-four (54) 
years old when terminated. (Jd. at ~ 28.) His final rate card, 
signed by Mr. Guernsey, has the "retire" box marked as the 
reason for "separation from force," rather than "term." or 
"layoff" (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 7.) 
On November 2, 1990, Mr. Weiss filed an age 
discrimination charge with the Wisconsin Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations ("DILHR"). (Jd. at ~ 
8.) On November 16, 1990, SI, through its General 
Counsel John Fons, responded to Mr. Weiss' charge, 
stating that: 
"After his start with Boliden Allis, Inc., 
Mr. Guernsey reviewed the past and 
current performance of each manager 
and, based on Mr. Weiss's performance 
and willingness to be a team player, 
determined that Mr. Weiss would not be 
able to meet his expectations. Rather than 
insult Mr. Weiss by demoting him, Mr. 
Guernsey offered Mr. Weiss a severance 
package which included salary 
continuation to age 55, enabling Mr. 
Weiss to then qualify for retiree health 
benefits." 
(Jd. at ~ 9.) On January 9, 1991, DILHR made a probable 
cause finding in favor ofMr. Weiss. (Jd. at ~ 10.) 
2. Malcolm Flavel: 
Before SI acquired the Appleton unit out of the Allis-
Chalmers bankruptcy on January 1, 1988, plaintiff 
Malcolm Flavel participated in the international marketing 
of Appleton products, working extensively in the Far East, 
and was involved in comminution research, the study of 
how rocks and minerals break up. (Def.Proposed Findings 
of F act ~~ 30-31.) Shortly before the acquisition, Mr. 
Platner had rated Mr. Flavel first among the fifteen (15) 
key employees at Appleton, stating that he "[ did not] think 
there is any way [SI] could replace his knowledge." 
(Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 63-64.) Mr. 
Flavel had received significant awards for his work and 
held mining equipment patents. (Jd. at ~ 65.) On October 
17, 1990, Mr. Guernsey terminated Mr. Flavel; Mr. Flavel 
was fifty-four (54) years of age. (Jd. at ~ 40; Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 61.) Mr. Quinn, Mr. 
Flavel's supervisor at the time of his termination, noted 
that he "worked hard, was very dedicated and had no 
performance problems." (Jd. at ~ 82.) On September 30, 
1992, in response to an administrative charge brought by 
Mr. Flavel, the EEOC issued a finding of discrimination 
against SI. (Jd. at ~ 57.) 
The parties disagree as to the circumstances surrounding 
Mr. Flavel's dismissal. *1431 According to the defendants, 
Minco International A.B. ("Minco") was created as the 
international sales arm for SlAB, representing its products 
in areas where the latter had no sales or marketing 
companies. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 33.) They 
claim that Minco took over Mr. Flavel' s responsibilities 
for marketing Appleton products in the Far East and the 
Pacific Rim. (Jd. at ~ 34.) They also indicate that, in late 
1989 and early 1990, funding for comminution research at 
Appleton was eliminated. (Jd. at '1 35.) Pursuant to these 
changes, Minco purportedly agreed to split Mr. Flavel's 
time and expenses with Appleton. (Jd. at ~~ 36-37.) 
According to the defendants, Mr. Flavel introduced Peter 
Kohle, president of Minco, and Lars Strom, another Minco 
employee, to various Pacific Rim contacts; in the fall of 
1990, however, Minco discontinued funding for Mr. 
Flavel's position. (Jd. at ~l'; 38-39.) The defendants 
indicate that, since Mr. Flavel's termination, no one from 
Appleton has been employed primarily to travel to Asia to 
sell Appleton products or to engage in comminution 
research and development. (Jd. at ~ 41.) 
According to the plaintiffs, when SI initially responded 
through then Human Resources Manager Paul Stelter to 
the administrative charge that Mr. Flavel filed with the 
EEOC, no mention was made of international sales or 
Minco; instead, SI stated: 
"Specifically, Mr. Flavel was employed 
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by the Allis-Chalmers Corporation (A-
C) as a Consultant, Comminution 
Systems. His was a "one of a kind" 
research oriented position which, simply 
put, studied how rocks fractured. In 1988 
certain assets of A-C were purchased, 
including the Appleton operation which 
produces rock crushing equipment and 
remains part of an international 
corporation. Since that time, the basic 
research and development of our rock 
crushing machinery has been done in 
Sweden. Over the last several years it 
became apparent that we had no work for 
Mr. Flavel, within his area of expertise." 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 56,67.) The 
plaintiffs indicate that Mr. Flavel's immediate supervisor 
when he was terminated was Mr. Quinn, who told Mr. 
Weiss in late 1989 that Ted Thomas, then age thirty-three 
(33), would be given additional responsibility in the 
comminution area. (Jd. at ~~ 66, 70.) 
Mr. Quinn also purportedly admitted that the departure of 
another comminution consultant, Hugh Rimmer, in May of 
1990 had created an open position for an application 
engineer at the company. (Jd. at ~~ 58-59.) According to 
the plaintiffs, Mr. Quinn admitted that Mr. Flavel was fully 
qualified to perform such duties; however, instead of 
offering him the position, SI first offered the job to Joe 
Pirozzoli, who was younger than Mr. Flavel, and then hired 
David Urbanek, age twenty-eight (28), on April 1, 1991. 
(ld. at ~~ 60-62.) The plaintiffs also indicate that, since Mr. 
Flavel's termination, Mr. Thomas has traveled to China in 
connection with sales at the Anshan mining project, on 
which Mr. Flavel had previously been working, and to 
other countries. (Jd. at ~ 69.) 
Finally, the plaintiffs note that during 1990, when Minco 
had supposedly rejected Mr. Flavel as a participant in its 
international sales efforts, it was advertising for an open 
sales position for Latin America; the job requirements 
stated that applicants be "between 30 and 40, with a 
background in business and engineering, preferably with a 
degree from a college or institute of technology." (Jd. at '1'1 
71-72.) Mr. Flavel's international sales experience 
included Latin America; however. Minco hired Ed Pronk 
then age thirty-three (33). (Jd. at ~'173-75.) In making thi~ 
decision, the plaintiffs claim that Mr. Stelter and Mr. 
Quinn were influenced by a fax received from Minco 
which stated that the ideal candidate's age would be in the 
30's; in a June 20, 1990 letter from Mr. Stelter to Mr. 
Guernsey recommending a termination arrangement for 
Mr. Flavel, Mr. Stelter noted in the first paragraph that 
"Mal was born May 8, 1936 and is 54 years old." (Jd. at': 
79.) 
3. Richard Spoonamore: 
Plaintiff Richard Spoonamore, whose date of birth is May 
11, 1935, was hired by Allis-Chalmers, S1's predecessor, 
in July of 1979 as a field service representative. 
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 42; P1.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 84.) Mr. *1432 
Spoonamore was based in Tucson, Arizona, and travelled 
both internationally and domestically approximately sixty 
(60) percent of the time. (Jd. at ~ 85.) Mr. Spoonamore 
continued in this capacity when SI purchased the Appleton 
business on January 1, 1988, reporting to James Gregor, 
national sales manager for the Appleton facility. (Jd. at ~ 
86.) Mr. Spoonamore had technical, sales, and managerial 
experience with other firms involved in the mining and 
construction industries, had a bachelor of science degree in 
mechanical engineering, and had received a certificate in 
quality control courses from the American Society of 
Quality Control. (Jd. at ~ 92.) 
In late March or early April of 1990, at the 
recommendation of Mr. Gregor, Mr. Spoonamore was 
promoted to manager of the field service department at 
Appleton; he relocated to Appleton while his family 
remained in Arizona, and continued to report to Mr. 
Gregor. (Jd. at ~~ 87-88, 93; Def.Proposed Findings of 
Fact '143.) While unhappy with Sl's first-year salary offer 
of$43,200, Mr. Spoonamore agreed to accept the position, 
noting his desire to have his salary reviewed within one 
year. (PI. Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 90-
91.) 
One of Mr. Spoonamore's duties as manager of field 
service was to coordinate the activities of the field service 
representatives. (Jd. at '1'1 94-95.) According to plaintiffs, 
however, his ability to perform this task was "seriously 
undermined" by Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn, and Mr. 
Dircks, who "routinely" contacted field service 
representatives directly, ordered them to perform field 
service work without notifying Mr. Spoonamore, and 
"verbally abused [Mr. Spoonamore 1 in a very severe 
fashion in front of others." (Jd. at ~'195-97.) The plaintiffs 
also indicate that Mr. Spoonamore's attempts to hire a 
Wan·anty Administrator and to obtain a computer system 
for his department to improve performance were "denied 
without any explanation"; his request for a training room 
was also delayed. (Jd. at 'I~ 98-104.) Mr. Spoonamore also 
recommended that additional field service representatives 
be hired to cover increasing workloads; he was told, 
however, that he could not hire any additional persons 
because they "weren't in the budget." (Id. at ~ 105.) 
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The plaintiffs indicate that, within several months after 
coming to Appleton, Mr. Spoonamore, through Mr. Gregor 
and other employees, discovered that Mr. Guernsey was 
upset with Mr. Gregor for promoting him because he was 
"too old," "younger people [ ] could take his job," and "he 
had this young, professional-type guy waiting in the wings 
who could just step right in and hit the road running." (Jd. 
at ~ 107-109.) Later in 1990, Mr. Gregor told Mr. 
Spoonamore that, despite his satisfaction with Mr. 
Spoonamore's performance, Mr. Guernsey had told him 
that Joe Quinn and William Meagher, two salesmen for the 
Appleton business, were also "too old," that he had 
"lumped [them] all together," and that Mr. Gregor had to 
"get rid of you guys." (Jd. at ~~ 110-113.) In August of 
1990, Appleton parts manager Gary Wichtel purportedly 
told Mr. Spoonamore that Mr. Guernsey was not happy 
with him and other field representatives because of their 
age, and that he was glad that the people in the parts 
department were young. (Jd. at ~~ 114-115.) 
In 1990, Appleton employees, including managers, were 
scheduled to attend classes in TQM principles taught at 
Fox Valley Institute, located three miles from SI's 
Appleton facility. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 44.) 
According to the defendants, Mr. Spoonamore was critical 
of TQM philosophy, calling it "hogwash," as well as the 
TQM consultant retained to teach the Fox Valley classes, 
and his attendance at the classes was "sporadic." (Jd. at ~~ 
45-47.) The plaintiffs, however, indicate that Mr. 
Spoonamore merely expressed doubts about the 
applicability of certain specific management strategies to 
his small department, that he is conversant with TQM 
principles and believes they can be effective in assisting 
businesses like Appleton, and that Mr. Guernsey never 
discussed TQM principles with Mr. Spoonamore. 
(P1.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~l 173, 175-
177.) Moreover, they claim that his "sporadic" attendance 
only resulted from instructions by Mr. Guernsey and Mr. 
Stelter that business service, including answering *1433 
phones, should take priority over course attendance. (Jd. at 
~ 178.) 
In late December of 1990 or early January of 1991, Mr. 
Spoonal1!ore purportedly recommended to Mr. Gregor that 
each of the field service representatives in his department 
receive substantial raises in their annual salaries; at that 
time, two were under age forty (40), Steve Cadieux and 
Ron Monfils, and two were over age forty (40), Scott Hiller 
and Al Peterson. (Jd. at ~ 119.) Mr. Guernsey endorsed Mr. 
Spoonamore's recommendation for the two younger 
employees, approving substantial raises, but overruled his 
recommendation as to the two older employees, approving 
only token raises. (Jd.) Mr. Peterson had begun 
employment with SI five years after Mr. Monfils and three 
years after Mr. Cadieux; in 1990, Mr. Hiller received a 
substantially higher salary than the others, and in 1991 Mr. 
Peterson received a substantial raise. (DefReply to 
P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 119.) 
Mr. Spoonamore expected to receive a pay increase 
effective April 1, 1991; when he received his April 15, 
1991 paycheck, however, he realized that Mr. Guernsey 
had not approved a raise in salary. (DefProposed Findings 
of Fact ~ 48; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 
120, 125.) Mr. Guernsey had never conducted a 
performance review of Mr. Spoonamore, articulated to Mr. 
Spoonamore concerns about his performance, or provided 
written notice of alleged performance deficiencies. (Id. at ~ 
126.) The defendants attribute the raise denial to Mr. 
Spoonamore's "resistance to Guernsey's TQM 
management philosophy, as well as other problems 
Guernsey perceived with his performance." (Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 48.) On April 16, 1991, Mr. 
Spoonamore hand-delivered to Mr. Gregor a letter of 
resignation from his management position; in his letter and 
in a conversation with Mr. Gregor, he noted that he hoped 
to return to Tucson to "serve [the company] well in the 
Field Service Representative function," that he would 
assist his managerial successor during transition, and that 
he was upset over being denied a raise despite his 
satisfactory performance. (P1.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 121-123.) Mr. Gregor and his 
immediate supervisor, Joe Valitchka, had a conversation 
regarding Mr. Spoonamore's desired raise; in late April or 
early May of 1991, Mr. Spoonamore also spoke with Mr. 
Valitchka, telling him that he would have to return to 
Arizona ifhis salary in Appleton were not adjusted. (Jd. at 
~~ 124, 127; DefProposed Findings of Fact 'l~ 50--51.) 
On Memorial Day weekend of 1991, Mr. Spoonamore 
packed up his personal belongings and moved from 
Appleton to Tucson; it is not clear whether he had 
previously notified Mr. Gregor of his intention to do so. 
(Jd. at ~~ 52-53; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings ofF act 
~~l 130--131; DefReply to P1.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 130.) The following Tuesday, Mr. 
Gregor called Mr. Spoonamore in Tucson, and Mr. 
Spoonamore agreed to return to Appleton, at SI's expense, 
to assist in the transfer of his former job as manager of field 
service; it is not clear whether Mr. Spoonamore was 
offered a position as a field representative. (DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 54-57; P1.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 132-135.) During the next week in 
Appleton, at the request ofMr. Valitchka, Mr. Spoonamore 
compiled information relating to the costs to be incurred in 
"starting up" unused equipment sold by SI several years 
earlier to a Mexican customer; some time earlier, he had 
estimated the total start-up cost at $50,000, or twice that 
originally anticipated by Sl. (Jd. at ~~ 136-144; 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 58-68.) Mr. Guernsey 
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and Mr. Spoonamore had met in January or February of 
1991 about this estimate; while the defendants claim that 
Mr. Guernsey limited Mr. Spoonamore to spending 
$40,000 on such costs, (ld. at ~~ 67-68), the plaintiffs 
indicate that Mr. Spoonamore was informed by Mr. Gregor 
that Mr. Guernsey authorized completion of the start-up, 
without use of Appleton employees, even if expenses 
approached $70,000. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings 
of Fact ~'1 145-148.) The start-up of the equipment in 
Mexico was completed by Memorial Day of 1991 at a cost 
of over $67,000. (ld. at ~ 153-154.) 
Before completion ofthe start-up project, Mr. Spoonamore 
sent a letter to the Mexican *1434 customer advising them 
of the updated cost figures, acknowledging the contract 
terms calling for $25,260 in start-up charges, and 
indicating that he would advise them if "costs exceed[ ed] 
the contract figure so [they] will know of any back charges, 
to expect from the office." (ld. at ~~ 151-152.) In early 
June of 1991, after Mr. Spoonamore had returned to 
Appleton, Mr. Guernsey was informed of the total actual 
cost expended on the project, approximately $67,000; the 
defendants indicate that Mr. Guernsey was "extremely 
upset at Spoonamore's disobeying his directive on the 
costs relating to the" project. (DefProposed Findings of 
Fact ~ 71.) Mr. Gregor, however, testified that he 
"emphatically" believes that Mr. Spoonamore did not "go 
beyond his authority" in connection with the project. 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 149.) SI 
sought cost recovery from the equipment purchaser; 
ultimately, the parties reached a $60,000 settlement. (ld. at 
'r~ 154-155.) 
On Friday of that week, Mr. Spoonamore's employment 
was terminated in a meeting with Mr. Valitchka and Mr. 
Stelter. (ld. at ,r'1157-159; DefProposed Findings of Fact 
'172.) At this meeting, either Mr. Valitchka or Mr. Stelter 
stated that Mr. Spoonamore's "resignation was being 
accepted"; Mr. Spoonamore insists that he never 
voluntarily resigned. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings 
ofFact ~~ 159-160, 162-163; Def Reply to PI.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ,r 160.) According to the 
plaintiffs, at the request of Mr. Valitchka and Mr. Stelter, 
Mr. Spoonamore granted permission for his briefcase and 
rented vehicle to be searched before leaving. (PI.Resp. to 
Del.Proposed Findings of Fact ,r 161.) According to the 
plaintiffs, Mr. Spoonamore was never told that he was 
being terminated because of his purported resistance to 
TQM principles espoused by Mr. Guernsey. (ld. at'1174.) 
Mr. Spoonamore tiled an unemployment compensation 
claim in Arizona; on February 19,1992, an Appeals Board 
of the Arizona Department of Economic Security found 
that Mr. Spoonamore "did not express an intention to quit 
working entirely for the company," and that, when SI told 
him on May 28, 1991 that "he would be paid field service 
pay at his old rate, [it] had accepted [his] resignation from 
the position of manager of field service and had accepted 
[his] request to be hired as a field service representative." 
(ld. at ~~ 163-164.) This finding was affirmed on April 20, 
1992 by the Arizona Appeals Board. (ld. at ~ 165.) On July 
24, 1991, Mr. Spoonamore filed an age discrimination 
charge with the EEOC, specifically referencing purported 
ageist statements made by Mr. Guernsey. (ld. at ~ 182.) In 
October of 1992, the EEOC issued a Letter of Violation 
against SI, concluding that they "exercised a preference for 
younger employees and that preference had its origins with 
Swedish corporate affiliates," that Mr. Guernsey had 
"expressed and exercised a preference regarding the 
retention and promotion of younger staff," and that there 
was "substantial evidence" of a "campaign of harassment 
of older employees at the Appleton facility." (ld. at ~ 184.) 
B. PLAINTIFF ROBERT VAN DYKE: 
The Standard Steel Corporation of Los Angeles, California 
was acquired by Allis-Chalmers in the early 1970's and 
renamed Stansteel. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact '1'1 7-
8.) On January 1, 1988, as part of its acquisition of the 
Milwaukee unit of Allis-Chalmers, SI acquired the 
Stansteel operation. (ld. at ~~ 1-9.) Plaintiff Robert Van 
Dyke joined Standard Steel in 1966 and performed duties 
relating to export sales and licensing programs. (ld. at ~ 
10.) At that time, Standard Steel employed approximately 
400-500 employees. (ld. at ~ 11.) Due to declining 
business, that number decreased to approximately 300-400 
by 1977. (ld. at ~ 12.) In 1977, Mr. Van Dyke, by then the 
sales administration manager for Stansteel, was terminated 
as part of a reduction in force caused by the closing of 
Stansteel's manufacturing facility; approximately forty 
(40) people were retained to perform non-manufacturing 
tasks. (ld. at ~~ 13-14.) Mr. Van Dyke was rehired by 
Stansteel in 1979, and became the on-site manager in 1984; 
at that time, Stansteel employed approximately thirty (30) 
people. (ld. at ~~ 1, 15-17.) As manager, Mr. Van Dyke 
was responsible for overseeing the entire business group 
including engineering, parts sales, quality assurance, 
*1435 sales, contract administration and field service. (ld. 
at~18.) -
The Vice-President and General Manager of SI's 
Milwaukee facility is Dr. Ki Joung. (Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact '1 7.) Mr. Van Dyke 
reported directly to Dr. Joung from January I to November 
30, 1988, when he began reporting to Bobby Faulkner, 
manager ofthe product and processes area ofthe "Minerals 
Systems Company" at the Milwaukee facility. (ld. at ~ 8.) 
In November of 1988, a further reduction of the Stansteel 
work force took place; the parties dispute whether it 
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resulted from declining sales and whether Mr. Faulkner 
participated in termination decisions. (Id. at ~~ 21-22, 26; 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 19.) Several employees 
were discharged and responsibility for purchasing, quality 
assurance, field service, invoicing, accounting, 
engineering, parts sales, and contract administration were 
transferred to Milwaukee. (Jd. at ~ 20; Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 9.) According to the 
plaintiffs, Mr. Faulkner assumed responsibility for one of 
Mr. Van Dyke's normal managerial duties: resolving 
holdbacks on certain equipment contracts. (Jd. at ~ 10.) The 
defendants, however, contend that Mr. Faulkner so acted 
only after receiving customer complaints and determining 
that Stansteel's outstanding holdbacks were 
inappropriately high. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 
23-24; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of 
Fact ~ 10.) The plaintiffs indicate that Mr. Van Dyke was 
not consulted in any way prior to making these changes; 
according to the defendants, however, Dr. Joung and Mr. 
Faulkner advised Mr. Van Dyke about these and other 
concerns throughout 1989. (DefProposed Findings of Fact 
~ 25; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 24.) 
After the November of 1988 reduction-in-force, six 
employees remained at Stansteel-Mr. Van Dyke, Ed 
Simonian, Edward (Craig) Turner, Mary Ham, Bernice 
Wingerson, and Santiago (Jim) Rodriguez. (DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 22.) Stansteel also retained three former 
employees, Marcus Rouchaud, Roy Heacock, and Warren 
Vetter, as consultants. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings 
ofFact ~ 27.) 
According to the defendants, the Stansteel operation 
"continued to show disappointing results during 1989." 
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 26.) Nevertheless, in 
August of 1989, Mr. Faulkner authorized a 7.1 % merit pay 
increase for Mr. Van Dyke, which was approved in writing 
by Dr. Joung. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 
13.) The defendants claim that, at the end of 1989, Mr. 
Faulkner and Dr. Joung decided to further consolidate the 
Stansteel operation with the Milwaukee unit, determining 
that an on-site manager was not needed at Stansteel 
because Mr. Faulkner could supervise the operation from 
Milwaukee. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 27-28.) 
They indicate that this, plus Mr. Faulkner's concerns about 
Mr. Van Dyke's performance, resulted in a decision to 
terminate Mr. Van Dyke; they claim that his age was never 
discussed. (Jd. at';~ 29-31.) While the plaintiffs indicate 
that neither Dr. Joung nor Mr. Faulkner had ever 
questioned Mr. Van Dyke's performance in any way, the 
defendants claim that Mr. Faulkner discussed with Mr. 
Van Dyke his concerns regarding customer complaints and 
performance. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact 
~~ 14, 23, 28; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 28.) 
Mr. Van Dyke did not receive any performance appraisals 
as manager of Stansteel after approximately 1984. 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 29.) 
However, in a confidential memo to Mr. Planter pertaining 
to incentive compensation for Dr. Joung's first reports, Dr. 
Joung placed Mr. Van Dyke ahead ofMr. Faulkner in his 
list of incentive compensation candidates. (Jd. at ~ 17.) 
On January 9, 1990, Mr. Faulkner travelled to Stansteel to 
terminate Mr. Van Dyke; according to the plaintiffs, he 
made no mention of any performance problems, instead 
handing Mr. Van Dyke a termination letter citing 
restructuring as the cause for elimination of his position. 
(Jd. at ~~ 15-16, 32-33, 36.) Mr. Van Dyke's age was not 
discussed during the termination meeting. (DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~135.) Mr. Van Dyke was sixty-one (61) 
when he was terminated. (Jd. at ~ 37.) The parties agree 
*1436 that it was Dr. Joung's decision to discharge Mr. 
Van Dyke. (Id. at ~ 31; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 31.) After Mr. Van Dyke 
was terminated, four employees remained at 
Stansteel-Mr. Simonian, age fifty-five (55); Mr. Turner, 
age fifty-three (53); Ms. Hamm, age fifty-two (52); and 
Mr. Wingerson, age fifty-three (53). (Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 38.) Mr. Van Dyke 
believes that Stansteel should have terminated Mr. Turner 
in its restructuring, as specific performance deficiencies 
had been identified regarding Mr. Turner and Mr. Faulkner 
had been advised by Mr. Van Dyke that he was unhappy 
with his performance; the defendants, however, stress that 
Mr. Van Dyke did not "take any action" against Mr. Turner 
"even though he was his manager for several years." (Jd. at 
~~ 37-38; DefProposed Findings ofFact ~~139-40.) As of 
January of 1990, Mr. Faulkner was aware of co-workers' 
complaints about Mr. Turner; as part of the February 1991 
reduction-in-force at the Milwaukee facility, Mr. Turner 
was placed on probation and told that he had to focus on his 
job duties in order to maintain his employment. (Pl.Resp. 
to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 41-42.) 
In a set of notes pertaining to the business objectives of the 
Mineral Systems Company which predated Mr. Van 
Dyke's termination, Dr. Joung expressed concern that the 
engineering and sales personnel at Stansteel were too old. 
(Jd. aqjI8.) In a report to the Swedish parent corporation 
of SI in October of 1989, Dr. Joung noted that "[t]he 
average age of BA/Milwaukee employees is quite high ... 
[t]herefore, we initiated a program in 1989, in which the 
positions vacated by either retirement or departure were 
filled with younger people as much as possible." (ld. at ~ 
19.) According to the plaintiffs, Dr. Joung called Mr. Van 
Dyke from time to time to discuss the age of his staff, 
which Dr. Joung said was "up in age," and suggested that 
Mr. Van Dyke hire younger people to replace Stansteel 
personnel. (Jd. at ~I 20.) Mr. Van Dyke also contends that 
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Stansteel had a reasonable backlog of business when he 
was terminated, and good prospects for future business; the 
defendants dispute this claim. (Id. at ~ 25; Def.Reply to 
Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 25.) Mr. Van 
Dyke believes that he had more experience with 
Stansteel's products than Mr. Turner, and that a manager 
was still needed on site at the Stansteel operation when he 
was terminated. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of 
Fact ~ 45.) 
Mr. Van Dyke never filed an age discrimination charge 
with the EEOC. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 42.) He 
did not become involved in this action until he was 
contacted by the EEOC in late 1993. (Id. at ~ 43.) 
C. PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING CONSTRUCTIVE 
DISCHARGE: 
Six plaintiffs allege that they were constructively 
discharged; Byron Smay, William Meagher, Robert 
lsferding, Robert Jones, James Conradt, and Major 
Coxhill. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 1.) Each was 
employed at the Appleton unit, which was responsible for 
the design, engineering, manufacturing, and marketing of 
crushing equipment and screens. (Id. at ~~ 2,3.) 
In their voluminous submissions, the plaintiffs present the 
following facts as evidence demonstrating a pattern or 
practice of age discrimination by the defendants. Thomas 
Older, the president of SlAB, and other Swedish managers 
have been corporate directors of the defendants since SlAB 
purchased Allis-Chalmers' assets in early 1988. (Pl.Resp. 
to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 3.) The interlocking 
management relationship between SlAB and the Appleton 
and Milwaukee units involve direct, frequent and 
substantive communication between senior Swedish 
management and senior American management. (Id. at 'i~ 
4, 7.) Business consolidations, staff reorganizations and 
realignments, business plans and other significant business 
issues confronting the American subsidiaries are submitted 
to SlAB for consideration and approval by senior Swedish 
management. (Id. at " 7.) After the January 1, 1988 
acquisition of the solids processing business of Allis-
Chalmers, Swedish senior management put in place an 
annual budget review process, conducted in Sweden, to 
which each of the general managers for the *1437 United 
States facilities was "summoned to attend." (Id. at"5.) On 
a regular basis, and at least annually, Mr. Guernsey and Dr. 
Joung submitted detailed business plans or reports for 
consideration and approval by SlAB. (Id. at ~ 6.) Mr. 
Older, Jan Knuttson, and other senior Swedish managers 
traveled on a regular basis to the United States to discuss 
business planning issues with American management. (Id. 
at '1'16-7.) The Appleton unit submitted detailed financial 
reports, called "C-Reports," to SlAB on a monthly basis. 
(Id. at ~ 6.) 
The parties dispute whether the SlAB's involvement in the 
management of the Appleton and Milwaukee units 
extended to employment policies and decisions, and 
whether SlAB has been involved in key management and 
employment policy decisions at the American subsidiaries. 
(Id. at ~~ 8-9, 12; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 8-9, 12.) When Mr. Guernsey was 
being interviewed in Sweden by Mr. Older and Mr. 
Knuttson for the general manager position at Appleton, he 
discussed specific personnel in Appleton, including Mr. 
Weiss. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 11.) 
Mr. Planter was also directly involved in employment 
decisions and in the formulation of employment policies at 
the American subsidiaries; the parties dispute whether he 
was aware of and approved of the termination and/or 
demotion "of numerous senior and mid-level managers 
both at the Appleton and Milwaukee Units." (Id. at ~ 13.) 
As to the Milwaukee terminations which occurred on 
February 13, 1991, it was Mr. Planter who first met with 
Wayne Clark from Clark and Kevin to seek personnel 
consulting services in connection with the terminations; 
Mr. Clark's handwritten notes reflect that the topic of age 
was discussed in this meeting. (Id. at ~ 14.) 
According to the plaintiffs, both Dr. Joung and Mr. 
Soriano, another senior manager at the Milwaukee unit, 
after returning from a conference for senior managers ofSI 
in Sweden, reported that Swedish management was 
concerned about the high average age of the workforce at 
the Milwaukee facility, and wanted action taken to bring in 
younger workers; Swedish management purportedly stated 
that the Milwaukee unit had an "age problem." (Id. at ~~ 
15-16.) Mr. Soriano also allegedly stated that, while SlAB 
management believed that Milwaukee had a problem with 
older workers, it found the "age problem" at Appleton to 
be even worse. (Id. at ~ 17.) The written business plan 
submitted to SlAB by Dr. Joung on October 1, 1988 noted 
the "high average age" of SI's employees as a "principle 
weakness." (Id. at ~ 18.) In his annual business plan for 
1990--91, which was also submitted to senior management 
at SlAB, Dr. Joung reported that the average age of 
employees at the Milwaukee unit was still high and that a 
program had been initiated to fill positions with younger 
people, which had decreased the average age of 
employees. (Id. at ~~ 19-20.) On November 3, 1989, in a 
written response to questions raised by Mr. Older during 
the budget review process, Dr. Joung noted that the $7,000 
annual salary differential between American and Canadian 
employees was due to "age, experience, and project and 
process related expertise and experience." (Id. at "21.) Mr. 
Older acknowledges that he and Dr. Joung discussed the 
"high average age" problem. (Id. at ~~ 22-23.) 
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Plaintiff James Conradt had worked in the human 
resources area of the Appleton unit for approximately 
eighteen (18) years and had been the manager of human 
resources for four years prior to the end of his employment 
in May of 1990; he observed employment policies and 
practices at Sl in 1989 which, in his opinion, indicated that 
Sl and senior management at the Appleton facility were 
implementing a policy of age discrimination against older 
workers. (Id. at ~~ 24-26.) Bruce Merten was the manager 
of human resources for the Milwaukee unit and the 
manager for human resources at the corporate level for SI 
in the United States at the time of their acquisition by 
SlAB. (ld. at ~~ 27-29.) On several occasions in or about 
the spring and summer of 1989, Mr. Conradt and Mr. 
Merten discussed Sl's employment practices and their 
mutual concern that, based on a "youth cult" being 
imposed by SlAB management, SI management favored 
younger employees and discriminated against older 
workers. (Id. at ~~ 30-33.) Mr. Conradt claims that he was 
told by Mr. *1438 Merten that Sl had a policy which 
favored younger workers and discriminated against older 
employees. (ld. at ~ 33.) 
When Mr. Farnsworth retired as general manager at 
Appleton in April of 1989, senior management at SlAB 
and the American subsidiaries sought a replacement; Mr. 
Merten indicated "off the record" to Mr. Conradt that a 
particular applicant had been rejected because he was "too 
old." (ld. at ~~ 35-36.) Mr. Gregor, age forty-five (45) and 
the general sales manager for the Appleton unit in 1989, 
was recommended for the position by Mr. Knuttson. (Jd. at 
~~ 37-39.) Mr. Gregor traveled to Sweden in early March 
of 1989 to interview with senior executives of SlAB, 
including the manager for corporate human resources, who 
told him that SI was "looking for a guy in his late 30's." 
(ld. at 'l~ 40-41.) 1 Mr. Gregor was also interviewed by Mr. 
Older, who, inter alia, emphasized the many 
accomplishments he had achieved at a young age and 
commented about the young ages of other senior 
executives at SlAB. (Jd. at ~'I 44-45.) In Mr. Gregor's 
opinion, he was not given the promotion because he was 
viewed as too old. (Jd. at ~ 46.) 
Neither Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy, ages fifty-four (54) and 
forty-eight (48), respectively, both of whom had been 
recommended as replacements by Mr. Farnsworth, were 
promoted to general manager. (ld. at ~'147-48.) SI retained 
a professional executive search firm, Erwin & Associates, 
in conjunction with its search for a new general manager at 
Appleton; Mr. Planter and Mr. Knuttson met with Ron 
Erwin, informing him that (1) the Appleton business had 
been populated by "people who had been in the business 30 
years or more, and the message was we need to get new 
and different thinking and leadership that in looking 
toward the future that isn't just a prologue to the past," and 
(2) in conducting the general manager search, the 
managers of the Swedish parent company wanted to avoid 
"calcified" candidates, which Mr. Erwin considered to 
mean people who were "resistant to change" or who lacked 
"adaptability." (Jd. at ~~ 49-53.) Mr. Erwin formally 
recommended ten candidates to Mr. Planter for the 
position, and his written reports noted each candidate's 
age: 51,49,44,49,42,39,39,45,42, and 37. (Id. at ~ 55.) 
The last candidate, Mr. Guernsey, was hired for the 
position; while SlAB management received copies of each 
candidate's resume, the parties dispute whether senior 
SlAB managers made the final hiring decision. (ld. at ~~ 
56-60; Def.Reply to PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of 
Fact ~ 58.) 
Shortly after Mr. Guernsey began employment in early 
November of 1989, he met with SlAB management to 
discuss business objectives, planning, personnel issues and 
related matters. (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 
~~ 62-63.) Mr. Guernsey was in regular and direct 
communication with senior SlAB executives and 
submitted regular and detailed reports to SlAB regarding 
the Appleton facility; he also consulted with and reviewed 
personnel decisions with Mr. Planter. (Id. at ~~ 64-65.) 
Mr. Conradt claims that, within the first five months ofMr. 
Guernsey's tenure, he observed events exhibiting 
discriminatory policies on the part of SI and the Appleton 
unit. (Jd. at ~ 66.) In or about the summer of 1989, Mr. 
Gregor told Mr. Conradt that he had been denied the 
general manager's position because he was too old and 
because SlAB management wanted a younger person. (Id. 
at ~ 67.) In or about the fall of 1989, Mr. Conradt was 
asked by Mr. Merten to calculate the average age of 
salaried employees at the Appleton facility; Mr. Conradt 
was concerned that this request was part of an overall 
program to get rid of older workers. (Id. at ~ 68.) As he had 
done in prior years, Mr. Conradt compiled a list of 
employees sixty (60) years of age or older, which he 
submitted to Mr. Guernsey in December of 1989. (Jd. at ~ 
69-71.) After receiving the list, Mr. Guernsey purportedly 
told Mr. Conradt that "[w]e've got an awful lot of long 
service employees. We need to get some young-ah, new 
blood into the organization." (Id. at ~ 73.) In January of 
1990, Mr. Guernsey *1439 purportedly stated to Mr. Weiss 
that "rt]he problem with Appleton is that we have too many 
old people in their jobs too long." (Jd. at ~ 74.) Mr. Conradt 
reported Mr. Guernsey's statements to Mr. Merten, who 
responded that Mr. Guernsey's view regarding older 
employees was standard procedure for SI. (Id. at ~ 77.) 
In December of 1989, SI held a management assessment 
conference at the Nordic Hills Conference Center near 
Chicago, Illinois. (Jd. at '1 78.) In preparation for the 
conference, SlAB management instructed managers of the 
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manufacturing facilities to select candidates for the 
conference and to provide Swedish management with 
biographical information, including age. (Id. at ~ 79.) Mr. 
Farnsworth submitted the names of four candidates, 
including Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy, and their biographical 
information; only the youngest candidate, Mr. Quinn, who 
was in his thirties, was selected to attend by Swedish 
management. (Id. at ~~ 80--81,83.) The only information 
submitted to Swedish management was the nominees' job 
location, name, present title and age; all those selected to 
attend were in their thirties and forties, and all candidates 
in their fifties were rejected. (Id. at'182.) 
In or about February of 1990, Mr. Conradt became aware 
that SI intended to terminate Mr. Weiss. (Id. at ~ 85.) Mr. 
Conradt felt that Mr. Weiss had been an excellent 
performer and had not been subject to any negative 
performance reviews justifying termination. (Id. at ~ 88.) 
When Mr. Conradt objected to Mr. Guernsey that Mr. 
Weiss' termination would be a mistake, Mr. Guernsey 
purportedly told him that he had "two choices, [ ] do as I 
tell you or there is the door." (Id. at ~ 91.) According to Mr. 
Conradt, he feared that age discrimination would be 
directed at him for raising such objections, and he felt that 
he had no choice but to resign. (Id. at ~~ 92-93.) 
On or about February 8, 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted his 
first performance review of Mr. Gregor, establishing 
written performance objectives including the development 
of a "young generation of salesmen and manager 
candidates." (Id. at ~'1 94, 96--99.) During their meeting, 
Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that (1) he had calculated 
the average age of the sales force at Appleton to be 55-56 
years old, (2) the average age was too high in his opinion, 
(3) they needed to hire a younger and more aggressive 
sales force, (4) the sales staff was "old and stale," and (5) 
he was not comfortable working with such an "old" group 
of employees. (Id. at '1100.) The parties dispute whether 
Mr. Platner played any role in establishing any 
performance objectives. (Id. at ~'i 95-96; Def.Reply to 
Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 95-96.) Mr. 
Guernsey purportedly repeated these sentiments to Mr. 
Gregor in the months following this meeting, informing 
Mr. Gregor that, ifhe could not get rid of those people, Mr. 
Guernsey would instruct Mr. Stelter to do so. (PI.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings ofFact '1'1104-106.) On a number 
of occasions, Mr. Guernsey ordered Mr. Gregor to 
terminate Mr. Meagher, a salesman in the Florida region 
who was in his sixties and who Mr. Guernsey referred to as 
the "old incompetent in Florida"; he wanted to replace Mr. 
Meagher with some "young blood." (Id. at ~ 107.) 
In or about July of 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted a 
mid-year performance review of Mr. Gregor, reminding 
him of his performance objective to develop a younger 
generation of salesmen and management candidates. (Id. at 
~~ 113-114.) Mr. Gregor objected, telling Mr. Guernsey 
that, in his opinion, the older salesmen were doing a good 
job. (Id. at ~ 127.) During that review, Mr. Guernsey 
criticized Mr. Gregor's decision to promote Mr. 
Spoonamore, noting that he had a better candidate who was 
a "very young, professional guy." (Id. at ~~ 115-116.) 
Approximately eleven (11) months later, Mr. Spoonamore 
was terminated. (Id. at ~ 151.) As previously discussed, 
Mr. Guernsey and Mr. Gregor dispute the reasons for Mr. 
Spoonamore's termination. (Id. at ~~ 152-153.) Mr. 
Gregor felt that Mr. Guernsey was "fixated" on age as an 
employment criterion. (Id. at ~ 117.) 
Shortly after starting as sales and marketing manager for 
the Appleton facility in April of 1991, Mr. Valitchka 
indicated to Mr. Gregor that Sl's program was to reduce 
the average age of its sales force by bringing in *1440 
younger employees. (Id. at ~~ 120-123.) That same month, 
a meeting was held in the engineering conference room 
with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Gregor and several 
other employees. After Mr. Gregor noticed some old 
pictures of equipment on the wall and stated to Mr. Quinn 
that "you've got some real antiques there," Mr. Guernsey 
responded "Oh, I thought you were referring to Pat 
rQuinn's] people." (Id. at ~ 124.) 
After Mr. Quinn, age 39, replaced Mr. Coxhill, age 60, as 
manager of engineering, Mr. Gregor and other managers 
observed him verbally abuse, intimidate, unfairly criticize, 
yell obscenities, and humiliate older workers, including 
Mr. Flavel, Mr. lsferding, Mr. Jones, and others. (Id. at ~~ 
132-133.) Several employees, some at senior management 
positions, complained about the age discrimination and the 
harassment of older workers that was occurring at Svedala. 
(Id. at ~ 134.) Mr. Foy, the controller of the Appleton 
facility, learned of Mr. Quinn's behavior and, after 
discussing it with Mr. Gregor, reported it to Mr. Guernsey. 
(Id. at ~~ 135-136.) Mr. Gregor also complained to Mr. 
Fons, general counsel for SI, and Mr. Stelter about age 
discrimination and harassment directed towards him and SI 
salesmen, including harassment and abuse being carried 
out by senior management at Appleton, including Mr. 
Guernsey and Mr. Valitchka. (Id. at ~~ 137-138.) After 
voicing his complaints, Mr. Gregor perceived that 
discrimination and harassment against him and others 
intensified. (Id. at '1140.) 
Mr. Gregor filed a charge of age discrimination with the 
EEOC in late June of 1991. (Id. at '1 142.) Several days 
thereafter, he was fired by Mr. Guernsey, who purportedly 
admitted that he had been terminated for, among other 
things, filing a discrimination charge. (Id.) After Mr. 
Gregor was fired, Mr. Valitchka and Mr. Stelter revised the 
job description for the regional sales representatives, 
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adding new requirements that the sales representatives be 
physically able to climb into mines and quarries and 
engage in other similar kinds of physically demanding 
activities, and that the regional sales manager be in 
excellent physical condition. (Id. at ~ 143.) In or about the 
summer or early fall of 1991, the revised job description 
for salesmen was sent by Mr. Stelter, at Mr. Valitchka's 
instruction, to the physicians for the three oldest sales 
managers: Mr. Meagher, who underwent quintuple-bypass 
heart surgery; Mr. Pape, who had leukemia, and Mr. Smay, 
who had told Mr. Valitchka that he could not travel 
because he was having surgery; the revised job description 
was not sent to the doctors of the younger salesmen. (Id. at 
~'1144-145, 147; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 144-145, 147.) The physicians were 
asked to submit a report confirming that these employees 
could meet the physical requirements set forth in the new 
job description. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact 
at ~ 144.) The revised job requirements were not included 
in advertisements for new salesmen. (Id. at ~ 146.) Mr. 
Gregor viewed these new physical requirements as part of 
SI's program to rid itself of older employees. (Id. at ~~ 
148-149.) 
In or around May of 1990, in response to instructions by 
Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Coxhill, then the Manager of 
Engineering at Appleton, compiled an organizational chart 
for the engineering department at Appleton which included 
each employee's name, years of service, date of birth, as 
well as the average age. (Id. at ~~ 160, 162.) At Mr. 
Guernsey's instruction, Mr. Coxhill presented this 
information to Swedish management at the international 
conference of Svedala engineers and technicians in Brazil 
later that month. (Id. at ~~ 161, 163.) Mr. Coxhill was later 
terminated and replaced by Mr. Quinn. (Jd. at ~ 165.) 
Within two (2) years after Mr. Guernsey became general 
manager of the Appleton unit, at least eleven (11) 
employees age fifty (50) or older were no longer 
employed: Mr. Weiss, age 54; Mr. Flavel, age 54; Mr. 
Spoonamore, age 56; Mr. Gregor, age 47; Jim Danielson, 
age 51; John Bandholtz, age 52; Mr. Jones, age 60; Mr. 
Isferding, age 64; Mr. Meagher, age 65; Mr. Smay, age 59; 
Mr. Conradt, age 53; and Mr. Coxhill, age 60. (Id. at ~ 
166.) SI considered the age of candidates for v~rious 
employment positions in the company, including those for 
sales, engineering, human resources, legal, and other jobs. 
(Id. at~ 167.) 
*1441 Bruce Merten was the human resources manager for 
SI when the United States facilities were purchased by 
SlAB from Allis-Chalmers; he was involuntarily 
terminated at age fifty (50), and replaced by William 
Lenhart, age forty-four (44), on June 30, 1992. (Id. at 'l~ 
168-169, 172.) The resume submitted by Lenhart to SI and 
SlAB did not include his date of birth; before he was 
interviewed in Sweden, and after he was asked by the 
acting human resources manager about his qualifications 
and experience, Mr. Lenhart was asked whether he was 
married, whether he had any children, and what his date of 
birth was-he was also told that, "in Sweden they have no 
laws against asking folks for their date of birth." (Id. at ~ 
170-17l.) When Mr. Platner selected Mr. F ons as the new 
general counsel for SI, he utilized Mr. Fons' college 
graduation date to compute his age, which did not appear 
on his resume; Mr. Platner acknowledges that he would ask 
the age of any applicant for a senior management position. 
(Jd. at ~ 173.) Mr. Older similarly acknowledges 
requesting age information for employees hired by SlAB 
in Sweden, and SlAB management routinely lists 
applicants with their ages when hiring new personnel. (Id. 
at ~ 174-176.) At the Milwaukee unit, applications for 
employment from older individuals were rejected with 
handwritten notations on resumes such as "No! 56 yrs old", 
"No! 53 year", and "MUST BE 65 year old!". (Id. at ~~ 
177, 19l.) Several ofSI's personnel forms made reference 
to age, including its Salary Review Worksheet, Salaried 
Employee Listings, and Salaried Employee Rate Card. (Id. 
at~179.) 
On February 13, 1991, the Milwaukee facility carried out a 
reduction in force ("RIF") which resulted in the 
termination of twenty (20) employees; eighteen of the 
twenty were over age forty (40), and one of the two under 
age forty (40) and the youngest of the other eighteen were 
subsequently rehired by SI. (Jd. at ~~ 180-181.) Prior to the 
Milwaukee unit RIF, senior management from the unit 
met, together with certain consultants, to identify the 
specific employees who would be terminated; notes 
prepared by the consultants had a listing titled "Issues: 
Age." (Jd. at ~ 182.) A series of large flip charts were 
generated during the RIF planning meetings in Milwaukee 
containing notes of the discussions from the meetings, 
including notes about the persons under consideration for 
termination. (Jd. at ~ 183.) After the RIF planning meetings 
were concluded, the flip charts and notes were collected by 
Fred Cummings, the acting human resources manager for 
SI. (Jd. at ~ 184.) On July 29, 1992, in response to an 
EEOC request for information concerning age 
discrimination charges from two of those terminated in the 
February of 1991 RIF in Milwaukee, Mr. Lenhart wrote to 
SI's general counsel as follows: "I have the notes from 
Fred Cummings involvement, 2 inches worth. We need to 
sift through those and decide what to retain." (Jd. at ~ 185.) 
The flip charts have been destroyed, lost, or are otherwise 
missing. (Id. at ~ 186.) Handwritten notes from two 
persons in attendance at the RIF meetings in Milwaukee 
include the age and/or date of birth for each person 
considered for termination; most of the terminated 
employees were fifty years of age or older. (Id. at ~ 187.) 
After some of the terminated employees planned an age 
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discrimination class action, SI prepared written 
performance "evaluations" for several of them explaining 
the reasons for their departure; Robert Jermyn, MPSI sales 
manager, was asked to prepare one such report, even 
though he had not participated in the RIF planning 
meeting. (Id. at~~ 189-190.) 
After they were involuntarily terminated, six of the 
plaintiffs and several other SI employees filed 
administrative charges of age discrimination, including 
Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, Mr. Gregor, Mr. Jones, Robert 
Cnare, Robert Elbel, and Mr. Spoonamore; DILHR and 
two separate offices of the EEOC found probable cause to 
conclude that SI engaged in a practice of age 
discrimination against its older employees. (Id. at ~ 197.) 
1. Byron Smay: 
Plaintiff Byron Smay was a district sales manager 
stationed in St. Louis, Missouri. (Def.Proposed Findings of 
Fact ~ 4; Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 
198-200.) His territory included Arkansas, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri *1442 and part of 
Kentucky. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 5.) Mr. 
Gregor was Mr. Smay's direct supervisor until his 
temlination and replacement by Mr. Valitchka in July of 
1991. (Jd. at ~~ 15-16.) In February of 1990, after Mr. 
Guernsey had been general manager of the Appleton unit 
for four months, he told Mr. Gregor that he "had calculated 
the average age of our sales force, that it was too high, that 
he was accustomed to working with much younger people, 
and that [Mr. Gregor] needed to get younger, aggressive 
people in [the] sales force." (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 201.) Mr. Guernsey emphasized this 
point in Mr. Gregor's February of 1990 performance 
evaluation, writing that he should develop a "young 
generation of salesmen and manager candidates." (Jd. at " 
202.) Mr. Gregor believed that the district sales managers 
reporting to him were knowledgeable, experienced, and 
doing a good job; however, he felt "tremendous pressure" 
from Mr. Guernsey to get "young and aggressive type 
salespeople," and believed that Mr. Guernsey was "fixated 
completely on the subject of age." (Jd. at ~~ 203-204.) 
Prior to replacing Mr. Gregor in April of 1991, Mr. 
Valitchka was interviewed by an executive search firm 
retained by SI, which told him that the age of SI's sales 
force, and its older group of sales representatives, posed a 
challenge. (Jd. at ~ 205.) In April of 1991, following a 
meeting with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor 
that the sales force was too old, and that the "average age 
of those people needed to be driven down and we needed to 
get young salespeople there, period, and that was the 
strategy." (Jd.) 
Mr. Smay disagreed with Mr. Valitchka's vision of the role 
of a district sales manager, and, along with the other 
district sales managers, disliked him and had little regard 
for his abilities. (Def.Proposed Findings off act ~~ 18-19.) 
According to the plaintiffs, SI imposed an inflated sales 
quota on Mr. Smay for 1991, a year when the industry was 
in a recession. (Pl.Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact 
~~ 218-219.) In October of 1991, either Mr. Valitchka or 
Mr. Guernsey requested that Mr. Smay come to Appleton 
to discuss his poor sales performance for new equipment; 
through September of 1991, he had only achieved 15% of 
his target goal for new equipment sales. (Jd.; Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 21-22.) Mr. Smay met with Mr. 
Valitchka, Mr. Stelter, and Mr. Guernsey, and was 
criticized for failing to meet his sales quota; no comments 
were made about his age, and he was not threatened with 
termination. (Jd. at ,,~ 23-25; Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 218-219.) Mr. Valitchka sent Mr. 
Smaya memorandum in November of 1991 advising him 
that his performance was "unacceptable and cannot be 
tolerated"; in an internal memorandum generated months 
earlier, Mr. Smay was described as "extremely thorough, 
dedicated, and competent ... one of our best people." (Id. at 
~ 220.) According to Mr. Smay, this criticism left him 
"very hurt and ... rhe] knew rhe] was gone." (Jd. at ~ 221.) 
In the summer of 1991, Mr. Smay underwent surgery at 
Barnes Hospital in the St. Louis area. (Jd. at ~ 229; 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact "6.) He did not advise his 
superiors in Appleton or any other Appleton unit employee 
about his surgery or any resulting limitations on his work 
activities. (Jd. at '1 7.) When Mr. Valitchka subsequently 
learned that Mr. Smay had experienced medical problems, 
he asked for the name of Mr. Smay's doctor so SI could 
ensure that he was assigned to a position appropriate for his 
medical condition. (Jd. at ~ 8.) Mr. Smay provided his 
doctor's name, and Mr. Stelter sent to his doctor a job 
description for his position of district sales manager, 
asking him to relate Mr. Smay's condition and prognosis to 
such position. (Jd. at ~~ 9, 11-12.) According to the 
plaintiffs, the physical attributes listed in the "new" job 
description were not included in the version issued th_e 
previous year, and were intended to assure that the doctors 
of older employees would declare them to be unfit. 
(Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 227-229.) 
These attributes included excellent physical health, the 
ability to travel 80 to 90 percent of the week, a usual work 
week of ten and often 12 hours per day, regular weekend 
work, and the ability to climb onto structures and mines; 
according to the plaintiffs, these attributes were not *1443 
included in the job descriptions of other sales managers 
who did similar work or in advertisements for these jobs. 
(Jd.) SI sent similar letters to the doctors of district sales 
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managers Bernie Pape and William Meagher, who were 
suffering from cancer and heart disease, respectfully. 
(Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 13.) Mr. Smay's position 
was not altered after the letter was sent to his doctor. (ld. at 
~ l3.) 
In late 1991, Greg Joseph was hired to fill the sales 
manager position formerly held by Mr. Gregor, and Mr. 
Smay began reporting to Mr. Joseph. (Id. at ~~ 27-28.) In 
March of 1992, Mr. Joseph met with Mr. Smay to give him 
his performance review and territory assignment. (ld. at ~ 
29.) Mr. Smay told Mr. Joseph that he disagreed with the 
review in light of his performance in prior years; age was 
not discussed and Mr. Joseph did not indicate that Mr. 
Smay would be terminated. (ld. at ~~ 30-31.) Mr. Joseph 
also advised Mr. Smay that his territory was being 
reconfigured to include Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and part of 
Kentucky. (Id. at ~ 32.) Mr. Smay had first suspected that a 
territorial reconfiguration was likely when, a few weeks 
before the review meeting, a customer in Indianapolis 
showed him an advertisement by SI seeking to fill a 
newly-created sales position to be stationed in Southern 
Ohio; although he did not cover Ohio, he suspected that the 
addition of a new salesman would result in a territorial 
reassignment. (ld. at ~~ 33-34; PI.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 223.) Mr. Smay was upset about the 
territorial reassignment because he lost his prime states, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, and gained four southern 
states generally understood to have "zero potential"; 
however, he did not call the salesman who previously 
covered his reconfigured territory to confirm this fact. (ld. 
at ~~ 223-224; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 35-36.) 
Mr. Smay believed that SI was trying to get rid of him. 
(PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact '1225.) 
In early May of 1992, Mr. Smay advised Mr. Joseph that he 
was retiring after twenty-six years of employment with SI 
and its predecessor, Allis-Chalmers. (Id. at ~ 37; PI.Resp. 
to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 200.) He was replaced 
by Richard Robinson, age thirty-seven (37). (ld. at ~ 230.) 
Nobody from SI asked him to retire and he did not tell Mr. 
Joseph of his age discrimination concerns. (DefProposed 
Findin~s of Fact ~ 38.) In a subsequent conversation with 
Mr. Stelter, Mr. Smay indicated that he wanted to look 
after some personal investments. (ld. at ~ 39.) Mr. Smay 
does not recall telling Mr. Stelter that he was coerced to 
leave. (Jd. at ~ 40.) At the time his employment ended, 
nobody was criticizing him for his 1992 sales performance. 
(Jd. at ~ 41.) Mr. Smay was fifty-nine (59) when he retired. 
(ld. at ~ 42.) On May 11, 1992, Mr. Joseph sent a letter to 
Mr. Smay asking him to "reconsider and continue [his] 
employment with Allis Mineral Systems"; he did not 
respond. (Jd. at ~~ 43-44.) With Mr. Smay's assistance, SI 
closed its St. Louis sales office. (ld. at ~ 45.) 
On June 15, 1994, Mr. Smay began work with Lippman-
Milwaukee Company-a competitor of SI; his boss at 
Lippman is Mr. Gregor. (Id. at ~~ 46-47.) He had 
discussed the possibility of working for Lippman prior to 
leaving SI. (ld. at ~ 48.) Although he was aware of age 
discrimination claims being alleged by Mr. Flavel and 
others when he retired, Mr. Smay did not contact the 
EEOC or any state agency about his age discrimination 
concerns. (Jd. at ~ 49-50.) Mr. Smay did not initially 
pursue legal action after leaving SI because he was 
"concerned about getting on with [his] life ... trying to 
move forward at basically 60 years old is not the easiest 
thing in the world to do." (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 231.) In November of 1993, the EEOC 
contacted Mr. Smay about becoming involved in this 
action; Mr. Smay agreed. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 
~~ 51-52.) 
2. William Meagher: 
Plaintiff William Meagher was a district sales manager at 
Appleton; his office was in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and 
his territory included Florida, Georgia and Alabama. (Jd. at 
~~ 53-54.) In 1987, prior to SI's acquisition of the 
Appleton unit, he had been asked to list his expected 
retirement date on a form and return it to the Manager of 
Employee *1444 and Community Relations, Jim Conradt. 
(ld. at ~ 55.) Mr. Meagher indicated that he intended to 
retire at age sixty-two (62). (Id. at ~ 56.) 
Mr. Gregor was the national sales manager directly 
supervising Mr. Meagher until April of 1991, when he was 
replaced by Mr. Valitchka; Mr. Joseph replaced Mr. 
Valitchka in December of 1991. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 200.) In February of 1990, after Mr. 
Guernsey had been general manager of the Appleton unit 
for four months, he told Mr. Gregor that he "had calculated 
the average age of our sales force, that it was too high, that 
he was accustomed to working with much younger people, 
and that [Mr. Gregor] needed to get younger, aggressive 
people in rthe] sales force." (Jd. at '1 201.) Mr. Guernsey 
emphasized this point in Mr. Gregor's February of 1990 
performance evaluation, writing that he should develop a 
"young generation of salesmen and manager candidates." 
(ld. at ~ 202.) Mr. Gregor believed that the district sales 
managers reporting to him were knowledgeable, 
experienced, and doing a good job; however, he felt 
"tremendous pressure" from Mr. Guernsey to get "young 
and aggressive type salespeople," and believed that Mr. 
Guernsey was "fixated completely on the subject of age." 
(ld. at ~~ 203-204.) Mr. Meagher was asked about his 
retirement plans in 1990 by Mr. Gregor, who indicated that 
he needed to know whether he should budget for a 
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replacement; Mr. Meagher indicated that he was planning 
on retiring in March of 1992, on his sixty-fifth (65) 
birthday. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 57-59; 
PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 217.) 
Although the industry in which SI sold equipment was in a 
recession, Mr. Guernsey imposed a $1 million sales goal 
for Mr. Meagher's territory, despite a contrary assessment 
that, due to the poor economy, an attainable goal was 
$250,000. (ld. at ~ 212.) Mr. Gregor told Mr. Guernsey 
that, if Mr. Meagher was going to "increase sales even 
remotely in the direction of the stretch goals," he would 
need support in the form of products and designs. (ld. at ~ 
213.) Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that Mr. Meagher was 
an "old incompetent," and told Mr. Gregor to fire that "old 
son-of-a-bitch in Florida" and to replace him with "young 
blood"; when Mr. Gregor protested, Mr. Guernsey said 
he'd get Mr. Stelter "to figure out a way to do rit]." (ld. at 
~~ 207-208,213.) Mr. Meagher, unable to meet his sales 
goal, was informed in October of 1991 that his sales were 
"obviously unacceptable and below standard," and that 
"we are taking steps to replace you as soon as possible." 
(ld. at " 214.) Mr. Gregor advised Mr. Meagher that Mr. 
Guernsey thought he should be fired because of poor sales 
performance; no mention was made of age. (DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ';"60-61.) Mr. Gregor told Mr. Meagher 
not to worry because he was not going to fire him. (ld. at', 
62.) According to Mr. Meagher, however, his knowledge 
that Mr. Guernsey had prejudged him as incompetent and 
wanted him fired "helped make rhis] decision to retire." 
(PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~'1209-210.) 
Prior to replacing Mr. Gregor in April of 1991, Mr. 
Valitchka was interviewed by an executive search firm 
retained by SI, which told him that the age of SI's sales 
force, and its older group of sales representatives, posed a 
challenge. (ld. at ~ 205.) In April of 1991, following a 
meeting with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor 
that the sales force was too old, and that the "average age 
of those people needed to be driven down and we needed to 
get young salespeople there, period, and that was the 
strategy." (ld.) 
On May 13, 1991, while traveling in Alabama on business, 
Mr. Meagher suffered a heart attack and underwent 
quintuple-bypass surgery. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 
'i 63.) Mr. Meagher was unable to work for several months, 
during which time he received disability payments. (ld. at ~ 
64.) On July 1, 1991, he returned to work on a part-time 
basis; he was paid on an hourly basis until he resumed 
full-time status at his fonner salary. (ld. at ~'166-67.) For 
several months after he returned to work, Mr. Meagher was 
limited in his ability to perfonn his job, including the 
ability to travel. (ld. at " 68.) After returning to work in 
July of 1991, Mr. Valitchka asked Mr. Meagher to provide 
a list of his doctors so that SI could *1445 ensure that he 
was assigned to a position that was appropriate for his 
medical condition. (ld. at ~ 69.) Mr. Meagher provided 
such names, and Mr. Stelter sent letters to his doctors 
asking for his current status and prognosis for purposes of 
job placement. (ld. at ~~ 70-71.) According to the 
plaintiffs, the physical attributes listed in his "new" job 
description were not included in the version issued the 
previous year, and were intended to assure that the doctors 
of older employees would declare them to be unfit. 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 227-229.) 
These attributes included excellent physical health, the 
ability to travel 80 to 90 percent of the week, a usual work 
week of ten and often 12 hours per day, regular weekend 
work, and the ability to climb onto structures and mines; 
according to the plaintiffs, these attributes were not 
included in the job descriptions of other sales managers 
who did similar work or in advertisements for these jobs. 
(ld.) Mr. Meagher's position was not altered after this 
correspondence. (Def.Proposed Finding of Fact ~ 72.) 
After his heart attack and surgery, Mr. Meagher reiterated 
his desire to retire upon his sixty-fifth (65) birthday. (ld. at 
~ 73.) He specifically encouraged a colleague in his 
mid-fifties to pursue his job, and he advised another 
colleague to apply for the position, stating that SI was a 
good company for which to work. (ld. at ~~ 76-78.) While 
disappointed that he was not consulted about the process, 
Mr. Meagher believed it was reasonable for SI to advertise 
for his replacement, although he believed that SI exhibited 
poor judgment by not hiring his replacement at least six 
months before his retirement so he could properly train the 
new salesman. (ld. at ~~ 74-75.) In January of 1992, Mr. 
Meagher closed down the Tarpon Springs office and 
arranged for all the files to be shipped to Atlanta, Georgia, 
where his replacement, Mike Scheible, age twenty-eight 
(28), was to be located. (ld. at " 79; Pl.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 230.) Mr. Scheible spent 
several days with Mr. Meagher for training purposes, 
including attending an industry trade show in New Orleans 
in February of 1992. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~'I 
80-82.) 
Mr. Meagher retired in March of 1992, on or about his 
sixty-fifth (65) birthday. (ld. at ~ 84.) SI subsequently flew 
him and his wife to Appleton for a retirement party. (ld. at 
~ 85.) According to Mr. Meagher, he retired because he felt 
"that they wanted to force me out." (PI.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 217.) Mr. Meagher did 
not file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC 
because of his limited income after leaving employment, 
and became involved in this action after being contacted by 
the EEOC in October of 1993. (ld. at '1231; Def.Proposed 
Findings ofFact ~~ 86-87.) 
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3. Robert Isferding: 
Plaintiff Robert Isferding was born on October 12,1927, 
and joined Allis-Chalmers on September 15, 1973 as a 
Senior Application Engineer in Appleton. (Def.Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 88; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings 
of Fact ~~ 292-293.) In 1977, Mr. Isferding transferred to a 
field sales position in Charleston, West Virginia; in 1985, 
he returned to Appleton as a Senior Project and 
Application Engineer. (ld. at ~~ 294-295.) Mr. Isferding 
specialized in the sizing and application of screens. (ld. at ~ 
296.) Mr. Isferding reported to Mr. Quinn from September 
of 1985 until July of 1991, and his performance was 
reviewed yearly. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 89-
90.) His performance was always satisfactory. (Pl. Resp. to 
Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 297.) Mr. Quinn would 
only allow Mr. Isferding to read the front page of his 
review, and Mr. Isferding never saw any of Mr. Quinn's 
comments discussed with him the specific items set forth 
in the progress review. (ld. at ~ 321.) In each progress 
review by Mr. Quinn from 1985 through 1989, Mr. Quinn 
identified "finishing his career in his present position" as 
Mr. Isferding's long-term career objective; from 1980 to 
1983, however, Mr. Farnsworth always included 
advancing into management in his long-term career 
objective. (ld.) Mr. Isferding testified that his goal had 
always been to obtain a management position with the 
company. (ld.) On December 22,1989, Mr. Guernsey sent 
a memo to all of his managers asking that they identify the 
projected retirement dates of certain listed individuals; Mr. 
Quinn, when asked to identify the retirement dates of Mr. 
*1446 Isferding, Mr. Jones, and Don Hagen, responded 
that "all my people underlined in red plan on going till 65!" 
(ld. at '1298.) 
Shortly after Mr. Guernsey was hired as general manager 
at Appleton, Mr. Isferding claims that he began to 
experience harassment from Mr. Quinn, including kicking 
objects, screaming, cussing, abusive language, pounding 
his desk, and throwing books. (ld. at'l 300.) Mr. Quinn 
would use foul language, including "God damn" and 
"fucking," and Mr. Isferding would sometimes back away 
from Mr. Quinn for fear of being struck. (ld.) This conduct 
continued on an average of "at least once a month until 
July of 1991." (ld.) Mr. Isferding observed Mr. Quinn 
engage in abusive conduct toward Mr. Jones and Mr. 
Hagen; while he also observed abusive behavior towards 
the younger engineers, it was "not as bad as it was with us 
older engineers." (ld. at ~~ 301-302.) Mr. Isferding 
specifically recalls an incident where he and Mr. Jones 
were in Mr. Quinn'S office working on a contract; after 
asking Mr. Quinn some questions, Mr. Quinn started 
"throwing a tantrum, swearing and cussing. He kicked the 
file cabinet, kicked the door, and just humiliated us in 
public, because the door was open and the whole office 
could hear what was going on." (ld. at ~ 303.) After Mr. 
Quinn "went off into a rage" when being questioned by 
Mr. Isferding about a project, Ron Him, a purchaser, 
approached Mr. Isferding and said that he "ought to go 
down and knock that son of a bitch on his ass." (ld. at ~ 
304.) Mr. Isferding did not tell anyone else about these 
incidents, and did not report them to Mr. Guernsey. 
(Def.Proposed Findings ofFact~ 95.) None ofMr. Quinn's 
outbursts ever included comments regarding Mr. 
Isferding's age. (ld. at ~ 98.) When Mr. Quinn would swear 
and rage at Mr. Isferding, it would cause Mr. Isferding to 
"shrink down in his chair." (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 305.) After several such instances, Mr. 
Isferding began avoiding Mr. Quinn. (ld. at ~ 306.) Other 
employees witnessed such behavior, and SI management 
was aware of Mr. Quinn's conduct toward Mr. Isferding 
and other older employees. (ld. at ~~ 307-310.) 
During their January 31, 1991 meeting regarding 
performance, Mr. Isferding informed Mr. Quinn that he 
intended to retire after putting twenty (20) years in with the 
company; Mr. Quinn did not ask him to retire or indicate 
that he would be fired or that his job was in jeopardy, and 
told him that his performance was fine. (ld. at ~ 323; 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 91-93.) In the spring of 
1991, Mr. Isferding commented to Mr. Gregor that Mr. 
Quinn's behavior was occurring frequently and was 
wearing on him; he was losing sleep and behavioral 
changes were noticed by his wife. (Pl.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact 'l~ 311,319.) Mr. Gregor 
told Mr. Quinn that "the way he was treating these people 
was completely inappropriate"; Mr. Quinn wanted to know 
which employees were complaining about him, and 
indicated that he had no intention of changing his style. (ld. 
at ~ 312.) Mr. Foy was also aware of, and spoke with Mr. 
Guernsey regarding, Mr. Quinn's abusive behavior. (ld. at 
~ 313.) Mr. Platner acknowledged that he knew that Mr. 
Quinn was an "abusive" manager. (ld. at ~ 315.) During his 
performance review, Mr. Quinn was told that he could be 
"blunt" and "direct," and that he "should aim to be more 
tactful." (ld. at'1316.) 
Mr. Isferding observed that young engineers would sit in 
Mr. Quinn's office to discuss matters for several hours at a 
time, while Mr. Quinn never had time to answer his 
questions. (ld. at '1 317; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 
99.) Mr. Isferding and Mr. Jones were excluded from 
distributor meetings in 1990 and 1991; the younger 
Application Engineers, however, were invited. (P1.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 318.) Mr. Isferding had 
participated in such meetings prior to 1991. (ld.) He never 
inquired as to why he was not invited. (Def Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 100.) Mr. Isferding spoke with Mr. 
Jones and Mr. Hagen about the treatment they were 
receiving from Mr. Quinn; they concluded that Mr. Quinn 
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"just didn't want to get involved with the older people." 
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 320.) Mr. 
Isferding was also offended that he was not individually 
invited to a company picnic in the fall of 1990. 
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 101.) 
*1447 In July of 1991, the Application Department was 
reorganized; Mr. Quinn was promoted to Manager of 
Engineering, taking with him three young engineers, and 
Mr. Hagen and Mr. Isferding, the two oldest engineers, 
were transferred to the parts department as customer 
service representatives, reporting to Gary Wichtel. (Id. at ~ 
324; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 102.) The parties 
dispute whether this constituted a demotion. (Jd. at ~~ 102-
104; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 324-
325.) Mr. Hagen and Mr. Isferding were given 
responsibility for taking parts orders, a function handled 
prior to reorganization by clerical people in the parts 
department; they were no longer involved in the sizing of 
equipment, a duty transferred to the engineers in Mr. 
Quinn's department and done primarily by computers. (Jd. 
at ~ 325-326; DefProposed Findings ofFact ~ 106.) Prior 
to the reorganization, Mr. Isferding had manually 
performed the sizing of screens; the plaintiffs claim that 
afterwards, even though he no longer had this duty, he was 
nonetheless required to train the younger engineers on how 
to perform this function. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 327.) Mr. Isferding's salary did not 
change as a result of the reorganization, and he no longer 
had contact with Mr. Quinn. (DefProposed Findings of 
Fact 'I~ 103, 108-109.) Unlike Mr. Quinn, Mr. Wichtel 
never screamed at Isferding or other employees. (Id. at ~~ 
110-111.) 
Mr. Isferding claims that after the reorganization, he could 
see no future with the company, his job had become 
unbearable because of the harassment and the demotion of 
himself and other older employees, and he believed he 
would be fired. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact 
" 330.) After three weeks in the Parts Department, Mr. 
Isferding gave Mr. Wichtel verbal notice that he would be 
leaving the company in October of 1991. (Id. at ~ 331; 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 112.) Mr. Isferding and 
his wife had planned to stay in Wisconsin for at least two 
more years while she finished her schooling. (PI.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact " 332.) He did not advise 
anyone in management that he was being forced out; 
according to him, he "was kind of humiliated and [ ] felt 
bad, [and] didn't want to have to tell them that after [his] 
years of service that they would do something like this to 
[him]." (Id. at ~ 333; DefProposed Findings of Fact " 116.) 
Before leaving, Mr. Isferding trained another employee to 
perfonn his duties; the defendants indicate that his position 
was not refilled, while the plaintiffs claim that he was 
replaced by Randall Fischer, age thirty-five (35). (Jd. at ~ 
113; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 337.) An 
in-house retirement party was held for him on his last day 
and he received several gifts. (Id. at ~ 336; DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 114.) Mr. Isferding was sixty-four (64) 
years of age when he left employment with SL (Jd. at ~ 
115.) The company did not give him an exit interview 
before he left. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 
335.) 
When Mr. Isferding left SI, Mr. Wichtel recommended to 
Mr. Guernsey that SI's Nitro facility in West Virginia use 
him for consulting work; Mr. Isferding had previously 
worked for Nitro, was very interested in working there 
again, and did not want to jeopardize that opportunity. (Id. 
at ~ 334.) After building a house on land they owned, he 
and his wife moved to West Virginia in January of 1992. 
(Id. at ~ 338.) Mr. Isferding has sought employment since 
leaving SI. (Id. at ~ 339.) 
In the late summer or early fall of 1992, Mr. Isferding 
received two phone calls from Rita Bums of the EEOC; he 
did not tell her that he believed that he had been forced out 
of the company, that he had been a victim of age 
discrimination, or that Mr. Quinn's conduct and abusive 
language were age-related or affected his decision to leave 
SI. (Id. at" 340; Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 'I~ 117-
121.) According to Mr. Isferding, he kept these beliefs to 
himself out of embarrassment and to save face. (PI.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 340.) After he spoke with 
the EEOC, he discussed the matter with his wife and 
"began to put the pieces together and view more clearly all 
that had happened." (Id. at ~ 341; DefProposed Findings 
of Fact ~ 122.) 
*14484. Robert Jones: 
Plaintiff Robert Jones was born on August 20, 1930, and 
joined Allis-Chalmers of Canada in 1955. (P1.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 232-233.) Except for a 
four-month period in 1965, Mr. Jones worked 
continuously for Allis-Chalmers and its successors from 
1955 until May 31, 1991. (ld. at "234.) In 1975, Mr. Jones 
transferred from Canada to Appleton because he was 
looking for '"more responsibilities," "more challenges," 
and he wanted to "improve his position"; he accepted the 
position of Senior Project Application Engineer. (Id. at ~ 
235; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 124.) Mr. Jones 
specialized in primary gyratory crushers, which cost 
several million dollars each. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ,j 236.) 
From 1985 until he left SI, Mr. Jones was supervised by 
Mr. Quinn. (ld. at ~ 237; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 
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125.) During his 1987 performance review, Mr. Jones 
claims that Mr. Quinn told him that he thought Mr. Jones 
was only putting in time until retirement; Mr. Jones, 
insulted, told Mr. Quinn that that was not true. (PI.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 238.) 
According to the plaintiffs, after Mr. Guernsey became 
general manager of Appleton in November of 1989, Mr. 
Quinn's behavior toward Mr. Jones became very abusive; 
Mr. Jones was subjected to outbursts from Mr. Quinn at the 
rate of approximately twice a month. (Id. at ~ 239; 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 128-129.) Mr. Quinn 
would yell, scream, belittle, and swear at Mr. Jones in front 
of others; he pounded his desk, and kicked filing cabinets; 
and he would fly into a rage over a minor incident or when 
Mr. Jones asked for clarification. (Pl.Resp. to 
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 240-24l.) On one such 
occasion, Mr. Quinn purportedly "flew into a rage" over 
questions of freight charges; in another incident, Mr. 
Quinn yelled at Mr. Jones at the coffee machine after Mr. 
Jones prepared a chronological list of events occurring on a 
project with SI's sister company in Australia. (Id. at ~ 242.) 
On another occasion, Mr. Quinn demonstrably rebuked 
Mr. Jones for adopting a different method than suggested 
in doing a feed analysis; in another incident, Mr. Quinn 
"went into a rage" when Mr. Jones asked the manager of 
Svedala in Canada to assist him in allocating freight costs 
in returning a primary crusher. (Id.) 
Other employees witnessed this behavior toward Mr. 
Jones; for example, Mr. Spoonamore overheard Mr. Quinn 
yell at Mr. Jones "You dumb son-of-a-bitch, what are you 
doing there" and kick a cabinet, and Mr. Foy and Mr. 
Gregor observed Mr. Quinn act abusive toward Mr. Jones, 
Mr. Isferding, Mr. Flavel, Mr. Hagen, and other older 
employees. (Id. at ~~ 258, 260-263, 266.) When Mr. 
Gregor told Mr. Quinn that he was acting inappropriately, 
Mr. Quinn was surprised, wanted to know which 
employees were complaining about him, and indicated that 
he did not intend on changing his approach. (Id. at '1265.) 
Mr. Jones also observed Mr. Quinn exhibit similar 
behavior toward other older employees, including Mr. 
Hagen and Mr. Isferding, but not toward younger 
engineers; he believed the severity of these outbursts to be 
unwarranted and unprofessional. (Id. at '1'1 249, 270; 
DefProposed Findings of F act ~~ 130-131.) While the 
defendants claim that Mr. Jones did not report Mr. Quinn's 
conduct to anyone at SI, the plaintiffs argue that Mr. Jones 
spoke to Mr. Foy about it, and that SI management, 
including Mr. Guernsey and Mr. Platner, had knowledge of 
Mr. Quinn's abusive behavior toward Mr. Jones. (Id. at '1 
132; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 259, 
266-268.) During his performance review, Mr. Quinn was 
told that he could be "blunt" and "direct," and that he 
"should aim to be more tactful." (Id. at ~ 269.) 
Mr. Quinn testified that Mr. Jones' performance was 
satisfactory. (Id. at ~ 243.) Mr. Jones found performance 
reviews by Mr. Quinn to be very uncomfortable and 
intimidating, with Mr. Quinn raising his voice and making 
negative remarks. (Id. at ~ 248.) Mr. Jones did not discuss 
his performance evaluations with Mr. Quinn. (Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 133.) During his 1989 
performance review, Mr. Quinn asked Mr. Jones whether 
he had any plans to retire. (Id. at ~ 126; PI. Resp. to Def 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 244.) Mr. Jones told Mr. 
*1449 Quinn that he would stay as long as possible, and 
that he would give one year's notice ifhe intended to retire. 
(Id.; Def. Proposed Findings ofFact ~ 127.) Mr. Jones did 
not tell Mr. Quinn his career goals; nevertheless, Mr. 
Quinn wrote on Mr. Jones' 1989 performance review that 
his "long-range career objective" was to "finish [his] 
career at Boliden-Allis." (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 245.) Even though Mr. Jones never gave 
Mr. Quinn a specific retirement date, Mr. Quinn wrote to 
Mr. Guernsey in response to the latter's December 22, 
1989 request for the projected retirement date for Mr. 
Jones, Mr. Isferding and Mr. Hagen that "all my people 
underlined in red plan on going till 65!" (Id. at ~ 246.) In 
Mr. Jones' performance review for the calendar year 1990, 
which was given to him during a meeting in January of 
1991, Mr. Quinn wrote down as his long-term career 
objective: "organize and publish gyratory crusher 
information for future generations"; Mr. Jones had not 
given any indication that he intended to retire or otherwise 
leave the company. (Id. at ~ 247.) 
Mr. Jones and the other older engineers also felt that the 
younger engineers received favorable treatment and more 
individualized attention from Mr. Quinn. (Id. at ~~ 250, 
256.) For example, when an application conference 
regarding hydro cones was held in Sweden, SI sent the two 
youngest project engineers from the Application 
Department, even though one had been in the department 
for only one month. (Id. at ~ 252.) In addition, while Mr. 
Jones and Mr. Isferding had in the past participated in SI's 
annual two-day meeting in Appleton for its distributors, 
they were not invited to the meetings during their last two 
years, even though the younger engineers were, in fact, 
invited. (Id. at ~ 253.) Mr. Quinn also refused to allow Mr. 
Jones to take an extra day of vacation, instead docking him 
a day of pay, when Mr. Jones was one day late in returning 
from a vacation because of a snow storm in Appleton; that 
same day, SI closed its office and sent all of its employees 
home with pay because of the weather. (Id. at ~ 251.) When 
Mr. Jones mentioned to Mr. Hagen that Mr. Quinn was 
pretty hard on him, Mr. Hagen responded: "Oh, I'm the 
same, I have the same problem, I just think he has 
something against older people"; Mr. Isferding shared this 
conclusion. (Id. at'1255-256.) 
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Mr. Jones believed that the treatment he was receiving 
from Mr. Quinn was part of a company-wide policy 
implemented when Mr. Guernsey was hired to force out 
older employees. (ld. at ~ 271.) Mr. Jones found Mr. 
Quinn's treatment distressing, and believes that it affected 
his health and disposition. (ld. at ~ 272.) In early to 
mid-February of 1991, Mr. Jones asked Mr. Quinn if they 
could talk; after Mr. Quinn responded that "you've got 30 
seconds," Mr. Jones stated that he was leaving. (ld. at ~ 
273; Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 134-135.) At about 
noon that day, Mr. Quinn asked Mr. Jones if he would 
mind if Mr. Quinn announced his retirement to the rest of 
the staff at the three o'clock department meeting; Mr. 
Jones reluctantly agreed. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 274.) At that meeting, Mr. Quinn 
announced that Mr. Jones was leaving and invited Mr. 
Jones to state the reasons; Mr. Jones, reluctant to recite Mr. 
Quinn's abusive treatment, indicated that he wished to 
pursue other interests, was interested in working as a 
consultant for SI, and intended to eventually move to 
Colorado to be closer to his daughters. (ld.; Def Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 136-137.) Mr. Jones had no further 
discussions with Mr. Quinn or Mr. Stelter regarding his 
reasons for leaving; after the meeting, Alice Cordes, the 
department secretary, told Mr. Jones that he did not have to 
let Mr. Quinn "push him out." (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed 
Findings ofFact ~~ 275-276.) 
After Mr. Jones' retirement announcement, Mr. Quinn's 
abusive behavior towards him allegedly stopped. (ld. at ~ 
277.) Against his wishes, Ms. Cordes organized a 
retirement party for him; Mr. Jones (unsuccessfully) 
instructed her not to invite Mr. Quinn, and forty (40) to 
fifty (50) Appleton employees attended. (Id. at" 279; Def 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 139.) Mr. Jones did not tell 
anyone before he left that he felt he had been forced out 
because of harassment and age discrimination; he claims 
that he did not want to jeopardize any opportunity *1450 to 
do consulting work for SI. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 278.) 
Mr. Jones retired on May 31, 1991, at age sixty (60). (Def 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 138, 140.) While he was not 
individually replaced, his duties were spread among 
several employees, including Carol Cihak, Mr. Isferding, 
Mr. Hagen, Randy Fischer, and Sherry McGlin. (Jd. at ~ 
141; PI. Resp. to Def Proposed Findings of Fact " 281.) 
After Mr. Jones left SI, Mr. Gregor purportedly told him 
that "no matter what you did, you didn't have a chance, 
[Quinn] was out to get you." (ld. at ~ 280.) Mr. Jones 
subsequently sold his house in Appleton and moved to 
Colorado where his son and two daughters live. (Def 
Proposed Findings of Fact "142.) Mr. Jones talked with a 
number of individuals and companies regarding consulting 
work; he did some consulting work after his departure 
from Appleton for Allis-Chalmers Canada and Iron Ore 
Company of Canada. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed Findings 
of Fact ~~ 288-289.) He is currently employed as a 
downhill ski instructor in Frisco, Colorado. (ld. at ~ 290; 
Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 143.) He cross-country 
skis approximately eight (8) hours a week and participates 
in ski races during the winter, and bikes approximately ten 
(10) hours a week during the summer. (Id. at ~ 144; PI. 
Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 291.) 
Mr. Jones filed a charge of age discrimination with the 
EEOC on December 2,1991, approximately seven months 
after he left SI, alleging that Mr. Quinn's harassment 
forced him to leave. (ld. at ~ 282; Def Proposed Findings 
of Fact ~ 145.) Upon learning of Mr. Jones' charge, Mr. 
Stelter contacted Mr. Jones to discuss reemployment, 
offering him his job back at his prior salary. (ld. at ~ 146; 
PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 283.) 
According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Jones received no 
assurances from Mr. Stelter that Mr. Quinn's behavior had 
changed, or that anyone had talked to Mr. Quinn about his 
abusive behavior; instead, Mr. Jones was told "you'll have 
to work this out with Pat Quinn, he doesn't hold a grudge 
against you." (Id. at ~ 284.) The defendants, however, 
indicate that Mr. Stelter offered to set up a meeting with 
Mr. Quinn to discuss the prior problems, offered Mr. Jones 
the opportunity to work full or part time, and advised Mr. 
Jones that he would report to Mr. Thomas rather than Mr. 
Quinn if he agreed to return. (Def Proposed Findings of 
Fact '1~ 147-149.) According to the defendants, Mr. Jones 
did not accept reinstatement because he and his wife were 
eager to move to Colorado. (ld. at "150.) The plaintiffs, 
however, claim that, while Mr. Jones was eager to return to 
SI, he was uncomfortable having to continue working with 
Mr. Quinn, and feared that the offer was simply being 
made so that he would drop his EEOC charges. (PI. Resp. 
to Def Proposed Findings ofFact "'1285-286.) 
5. Major Coxhill: 
Plaintiff Major Coxhill began his career with Allis-
Chalmers in 1964; although he left the company briefly to 
work for another business, he worked there cumulatively 
for twenty-four (24) years and worked in the Engineering 
Department of the Appleton unit since 1972. (PI. Resp. to 
Def Proposed Findings of Fact "342.) Mr. Coxhill became 
Manager of Engineering for the Appleton unit, and a first 
report to the general manager, in 1986; he remained in this 
position when Mr. Guernsey replaced Mr. Farnsworth as 
general manager in November of 1989. (Id. at ~~ 343,346; 
Def Proposed Findings ofFact,1151.) 
Prior to 1989, Mr. Coxhill received very positive 
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performance reviews from Mr. Farnsworth. (PI. Resp. to 
Def. Proposed Findings ofF act ~ 345.) In late 1989 or early 
1990, Mr. Guernsey informed Mr. Quinn that he would 
replace Mr. Coxhill as Manager of Engineering; Mr. 
Guernsey had been in his position for only several months, 
had conducted no formal performance review of Mr. 
Coxhill, and had not indicated in any way that Mr. 
Coxhill's performance was not acceptable. (Id. at ~~ 347-
348.) In February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey reviewed Mr. 
Coxhill's performance for 1989, giving him a very 
favorable performance rating and assuring him that, 
although some management changes might be made, his 
job was not in jeopardy. (ld. at ~ 349.) Mr. Guernsey did 
not inform Mr. Coxhill that he had already told Mr. Quinn 
that Mr. Quinn would be *1451 replacing Mr. Coxhill as 
Manager of Engineering. (ld. at ~ 350.) 
In approximately May of 1990, Mr. Guernsey asked Mr. 
Coxhill to prepare information for SlAB management 
regarding the individual and average ages of each of the 
employees in the Engineering Department. (ld. at ~ 351.) 
In response to this request, Mr. Coxhill prepared an 
organizational chart which showed the name, birth date, 
and years of service of each employee in the Engineering 
Department as well as the average age of all employees in 
the department; the chart was presented by Mr. Coxhill to 
Swedish management of SlAB at an international product 
meeting held in Brazil that month. (ld. at ~ 352.) The chart 
revealed that Mr. CoxhilI, at age sixty (60), was the oldest 
member of the department. (ld. at ~~ 352-353.) In 
approximately November of 1990, Mr. Guernsey, along 
with members of management at Appleton, attended a 
conference in Sweden regarding product development; 
while Mr. Coxhill would normally have attended such a 
meeting, he was told by Mr. Guernsey not to attend. (!d. at 
~ 354.) At the conference, Mr. Guernsey told SlAB 
management that he wanted to "give Major a rest" and that 
Mr. Coxhill would be removed from his position as 
Manager of Engineering. (ld. at ~ 355.) 
In February of 1991, Mr. Coxhill received a review of his 
performance in 1990; Mr. Guernsey rated him a 2-plus, 
but told Mr. Coxhill that he rated all of his managers 
stringently and that Mr. Coxhill should _not worry about it, 
and did not tell Mr. Coxhill that his performance was 
unacceptable or that he was in jeopardy of losing his 
position. (ld. at ~'I 356-357, 359.) Mr. Coxhill believed 
that this rating was unfair and unjustified, and expressed 
his objections. (Id. at ~ 358.) 
On April 1, 1991, Mr. Guernsey summoned Mr. Coxhill to 
his office, and informed him that, as part of a departmental 
reorganization, he was being removed from his position as 
Manager of Engineering, and replaced by Mr. Quinn. (ld. 
at ~ 361; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 152, 156.) 
According to Mr. Coxhill, Mr. Guernsey then asked him 
whether he had considered retirement, and told him that 
Mr. Stelter was "standing by" to discuss with him that 
option; Mr. Guernsey then instructed Mr. Coxhill to take 
the rest of the day off from work to consider his options. 
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 362; Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 164.) Mr. Guernsey also 
purportedly told Mr. Coxhill that he was going to prepare 
an announcement regarding the job change, and asked Mr. 
Coxhill whether he would like to "fluff it up." (PI. Resp. to 
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 363.) According to Mr. 
Coxhill, he had no interest in retiring and was not told that 
he would be reassigned to another position or given any 
other job at Appleton. (ld. at~~364-365, 367.) Mr. Coxhill 
was not told that he was being terminated. (Def. Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 166.) Mr. Coxhill met with Mr. Stelter 
as instructed, told him he did not wish to retire, and took 
the remainder of the day off. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed 
Findings of Fact '1'1 366-368.) Mr. Coxhill claims that he 
was given no other alternative from Mr. Guernsey other 
than retirement, and believed that he would be fired if he 
did not retire. (ld. at ~~ 369-370.) At no time prior to this 
meeting had Mr. Coxhill been informed by Mr. Guernsey 
or any other senior manager of SI that his performance was 
unsatisfactory or that his position was in jeopardy. (Id. at ~ 
372.) 
The next day, Mr. CoxhiIl called Mr. Platner; while the 
plaintiffs indicate that he informed Mr. Platner that he was 
very angry and considering legal action, the defendants 
claim that he did not indicate to Mr. Platner that he 
believed he had been discriminated against on the basis of 
age. (ld. at ~~ 373-374; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
157.) Mr. CoxhiII then left Appleton for a short vacation. 
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 375.) On 
April 3, 199 I, Mr. Guernsey issued a company-wide 
memorandum announcing various changes in the 
organizational structure of the Appleton unit, including 
Mr. Coxhill's replacement as Manager of Engineering by 
Mr. Quinn. (lei. at ~ 376.) When Mr. Coxhill returned, Mr. 
Guernsey advised him that the company had a new 
assignment for him as Chief Engineer of Product Quality; 
although Mr. Coxhill considered this to be a "concocted" 
position *1452 and a demotion, and believed that it 
prevented him from competing for other positions in the 
company including Business Manager (a position he 
admits ideally required skills he did not possess), his salary 
did not change and he retained the same benefits and bonus 
plan. (lei. at ~'1377-379. 382-383; Def. Proposed Findings 
of Fact ~~ 153-155; Def. Reply to PI. Resp. to Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact '1 382.) As Manager of 
Engineering, Mr. Coxhill had supervisory responsibility 
over thirty (30) engineers, and was a first report to the 
general manager; as Chief Engineer of Product Quality, 
Mr. Coxhill had no supervisory responsibility over any 
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engineers, was no longer a first report to the general 
manager, and no longer participated in senior management 
staff meetings. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of 
Fact ~~ 380-383.) 
According to Mr. Coxhill, this series of events left him 
devastated and humiliated, and mistrustful of SI 
management. (fd. at ~ 384.) In addition, he claims that he 
observed a pattern of discrimination against himself and 
other older employees at Appleton, and believed that he 
would be fired. (fd. at ~~ 385-386.) Mr. Coxhill informed 
others in the company, including Mr. Danielson, Mr. 
Brock, and Mr. Bandholz, that he believed that he was 
being discriminated against on the basis of age and that his 
demotion was the result of age discrimination. (fd. at ~ 
387.) While on a business trip in France in July of 1991, 
Mr. CoxhiIl was told by Arvid Svensson, one of the 
managers of engineering for SlAB in Sweden, that he was 
sorry to have heard that Mr. Coxhill lost his position and 
that he had been aware of the change since November of 
1990, when he and other SlAB managers had been told by 
Mr. Guernsey that he was going to "give Major a rest" by 
replacing him with Mr. Quinn. (fd. at ~~ 388-391; Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 165.) According to Mr. 
Coxhill, this reinforced his view that Mr. Guernsey wanted 
him to retire all along, and that he was being discriminated 
against on the basis of his age. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~~ 391-392.) 
After Mr. Spoonamore was fired in June of 1991, Mr. 
Coxhill was asked to take on additional responsibilities as 
Field Service Manager. (fd. at ~ 393; Def. Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 158.) Mr. Valitchka indicated to Mr. 
Coxhill several times that someone with his skills was 
needed in the position. (fd. at'l 159.) According to Mr. 
Coxhill, this position would have further removed him 
from engineering activities, would not have allowed him to 
utilize his experience and expertise as an engineer, and 
would have taken him further away from the management 
track of the company; therefore, he denied the request. (PI. 
Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1393.) In October 
of 1991, Mr. Coxhill met with Mr. Guernsey and was again 
asked to consider the position ofField Service Manager; he 
viewed this as another demotion, but nevertheless accepted 
the job. (fd. at ~ 394-395, 404--406; Def. Proposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 160.) The parties dispute whether Mr. 
Coxhill remained in his previous position as Chief 
Engineer of Product Quality. (ld. at ~ 160; PI. Resp. to Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 396-397.) Mr. Coxhill was 
told that he would be reporting directly to Mr. Valitchka. 
(ld. at ~ 399.) 
On January 1, 1992, SI again reorganized its Appleton unit, 
and Mr. Coxhill began reporting to Mr. Quinn. (ld. at 'I~ 
400-401; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 161.) Mr. 
Quinn had a reputation at SI for abusive behavior, and had 
previously been abusive towards Mr. Coxhi1l; Mr. Coxhill 
did not want to work with or report to Mr. Quinn because 
he considered Mr. Quinn'S conduct to be unprofessional, 
even though he recalls only one incident where Mr. Quinn 
used abusive language towards him. (fd. at ~ 163; PI. Resp. 
to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 402--403.) According 
to Mr. Coxhill, his role and responsibility at SI continued 
to diminish, and any efforts on his part to become involved 
in engineering or management would be futile. (fd. at ~ 
408.) 
During 1990 and 1991, Mr. Coxhill witnessed the 
termination or departure of senior managers or employees 
who had been his colleagues and had been employed by SI 
or its predecessors for many years, including Mr. Weiss, 
Mr. Flavel, Mr. Gregor, Mr. Conradt, Mr. Bandholz, and 
Mr. Danielson. (fd. at ~ 407.) Mr. Coxhill concluded that 
SI was *1453 engaged in age discrimination and that such 
discrimination had been and was being directed against 
him, and that he may be fired in the future. (fd. at ~ 410.) In 
May of 1992, Mr. Coxhill advised Mr. Quinn that he was 
retiring from SI. (fd.; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
167-168.) Mr. Coxhill did not tell anyone that he was 
voluntarily retiring, and only indicated that he was leaving 
SI. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 411, 
413.) Mr. Coxhill was sixty-one (61) when he retired, and 
had worked at SI and its predecessors for almost twenty 
(20) years. (Id. at '1412; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
169.) Soon after he had spoken with Mr. Quinn, Mr. Stelter 
approached Mr. Coxhill and indicated that his departure 
would leave a big gap in the organization and that he could 
still change his mind about leaving. (fd. at ~ 170.) In 
August of 1992, a retirement party was held for Mr. 
Coxhili. (fd. at '1171; PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings 
of Fact ~ 412.) 
During his employment at SI, Mr. Coxhill complained 
about the employment actions that were being taken, 
objected to what he perceived to be age discrimination, and 
objected to his job changes. (ld. at ~ 414.) He did not, 
however, tell anyone that he was being forced to retire. 
(Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1172.) Since leaving SI, 
Mr. Coxhill has been actively seeking other employment. 
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings ofFact ~ 415.) He did 
not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (De£ 
Proposed Findings of Fact '1174.) 
6. James Conradt: 
Plaintiff James Conradt was born on February 19, 1937. 
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1 416.) He 
started with Allis-Chalmers in Appleton in 1958 as an 
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employee in the accounting department; he transferred to 
human resources, where he was employed from 1972 to 
1990. (ld. at ~ 417.) In 1986, he was promoted to Manager 
of Human Resources for the Appleton unit, a senior 
management position with "first report" responsibility to 
the general manager; he remained in this position when 
Mr. Guernsey arrived in November of 1989. (ld. at ~ 418; 
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 175-176.) In this 
position, Mr. Conradt participated in senior staff 
management meetings and was responsible for formulating 
and implementing human resources and employment 
policies and practices for the Appleton unit. (PI. Resp. to 
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 419.) He also negotiated 
union contracts and maintained compliance with state and 
federal laws and regulations. (ld.) 
After the Appleton and Milwaukee facilities were acquired 
by SlAB from Allis-Chalmers, Mr. Conradt began to 
observe things which indicated to him that SlAB had 
employment practices that discriminated against older 
workers and favored younger workers. (Id. at ~ 420--421.) 
Mr. Conradt reviewed the annual statement of Trelleborg 
AB, the predecessor of SlAB, and observed that the 
document contained the ages of directors and senior 
managers; he also observed that many of the managers 
were in their early or mid thirties. (ld. at ~ 422.) He 
received information about SlAB's employment policies 
and practices in 1989 and 1990 from Bruce Merten, who 
was then the human resources manager for the Milwaukee 
unit and SI. (ld. at ~ 423.) Mr. Merten and Mr. Conradt 
communicated regularly about human resources issues, 
policies and practices; they discussed Swedish 
management's emphasis on the age of its employees, and 
the favoring of younger employees over older ones. (Id. at 
~ 424.) According to Mr. Conradt, Mr. Merten told him 
directly that Swedish management had a policy favoring 
younger workers. (ld. at ~ 425.) Mr. Gregor told Mr. 
Conradt that, during his interview in Sweden for the 
general manager position at Appleton, he was told that 
SlAB wanted to hire someone young, preferably in his 
thirties. (ld. at ~ 426.) Mr. Merten also purportedly told 
him that another candidate for that position had been 
rejected because he was too old. (ld. at ~ 427.) Mr. 
Guernsey, age thirty-seven (37), was eventually hired; the 
three candidates recommended by Mr. Farnsworth, Mr. 
Gregor, age forty-five (45), Mr. Weiss, age fifty-four (54), 
and Mr. Foy, age forty-eight (48), were not selected. (ld. at 
~ 428.) 
Mr. Guernsey implemented several practices and 
procedures that were different from *1454 those utilized 
by Mr. Farnsworth; Mr. Conradt was not comfortable with 
Mr. Guernsey's style and believed him to be a poor 
communicator, as he did not consult Mr. Conradt or 
involve him in certain decisions to the extent he desired. 
(Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 177-178, 181.) In the 
fall of 1989, Mr. Merten instructed Mr. Conradt to 
calculate the average age of the salaried employees at the 
Appleton unit; Mr. Conradt had never before been asked to 
conduct this type of calculation, and was concerned that 
the information may be used inappropriately. (PI. Resp. to 
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 429.) In late 1989, Mr. 
Conradt became aware, as a result of discussions with Mr. 
Merten, that SI was going to conduct a management 
conference at a conference center near Chicago. (ld. at ~ 
430.) According to Mr. Conradt, he was told that this 
conference was only for the "young" and up and coming 
managers, and he was aware that the age of SI employees 
had been a factor in the process of selecting attendees; the 
only person selected to attend from Appleton was Mr. 
Quinn, a young manager in his thirties. (ld. at ~~ 430--431.) 
Mr. Guernsey asked Mr. Conradt to investigate the 
possibility of having certain Appleton employees attend 
MBA classes at a college near Appleton. (ld. at ~ 432.) 
Later, Mr. Guernsey indicated that the only two people he 
was considering for the program were Mr. Quinn and Mark 
Geyer, both in their thirties. (ld. at ~~ 432--433.) In 
December of 1989, Mr. Conradt prepared a list of 
employees who were sixty (60) or older, identified as 
employees who were potentially going to retire; Mr. 
Conradt had gathered such information in previous years. 
(ld. at ~ 434.) According to Mr. Conradt, Mr. Guernsey 
used the list to ask senior managers to specifically find out 
when those individuals planned to retire; he believed that 
this use departed substantially from the use to which this 
information had been put in the past by Mr. Farnsworth, 
and that it was used to pressure older employees to leave 
the company. (ld. at ~~ 435--436.) On December 15, 1989, 
after Mr. Conradt had provided Mr. Guernsey with 
information regarding employees' names and ages, Mr. 
Guernsey told him that "we've got an awful lot of long 
service employees. We need to get some young-ah, new 
blood into the organization." (ld. at ~, 437.) Mr. Conradt 
made a handwritten note of the conversation to record 
verbatim Mr. Guernsey's statement, and believed that Mr. 
Guernsey intended to get rid of long-term employees, 
including himself. (Jd. at ~ 438, 448.) 
In February of 1990, after being involved in several 
meetings, Mr. Conradt was informed by Mr. Guernsey that 
SI was going to terminate Mr. Weiss. (ld. at ~ 439; Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~1182.) Mr. Guernsey indicated 
to Mr. Conradt, and then to Mr. Weiss, that Mr. Weiss was 
being terminated because "he doesn't fit in." (Jd. at ~1183.) 
Mr. Conradt was aware that Mr. Weiss had not received 
any negative performance reviews and that his 
performance had not been formally reviewed by Mr. 
Guernsey. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
440.) Mr. Conradt believed this action to be the 
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implementation of a program to get rid of older, longer 
term employees. (Jd. at ~ 441.) In a meeting with Mr. 
Guernsey, Mr. Conradt stated that the termination of Mr. 
Weiss was a terrible mistake, was discriminatory, and was 
wrong. (Jd. at ~ 442; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
186.) Mr. Guernsey purportedly responded "I've decided 
to terminate him and you have two choices, you do as I tell 
you or there is the door." (Jd. at ~ 187; PI. Resp. to Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 443.) Mr. Guernsey did not 
indicate to Mr. Conradt that older employees did not fit in, 
or that Mr. Weiss was (or was not) terminated because of 
his age. (Jd. at ~ 444; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 
184-185.) Prior to the day Mr. Weiss was terminated, Mr. 
Conradt attended a meeting with Mr. Guernsey and an 
out-placement consultant who was retained by SI to 
provide employment counseling for Mr. Weiss after the 
termination; during this meeting, Mr. Guernsey stated that 
the company was concerned that the termination of Mr. 
Weiss would result in some type of legal action or age 
discrimination claim, and the outplacement consultant 
promised to strongly advise Mr. Weiss against filing a 
lawsuit. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
445.) 
*1455 Mr. Conradt was concerned in early 1990 that he 
would be terminated as a result of his age. (!d. at ~~ 449, 
453.) In December of 1989, Mr. Conradt was given 
incorrect information pertaining to a benefits presentation 
for employees at SI plants in Pennsylvania and Kansas; as 
a result, he told several hundred employees at the facilities 
the wrong information about their benefits. (Jd. at'1 451.) 
Mr. Guernsey reprimanded him, telling him it was his 
responsibility to know that the information was wrong 
even though it was provided by Mr. Merten. (Jd.) In 
February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey criticized Mr. Conradt for 
negotiating union contracts previously approved by Mr. 
Famsworth. (Jd. at '1 450.) According to Mr. Conradt, his 
job responsibilities were being downgraded and reduced as 
of early 1990. (Id. at ~ 452; Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 
'1l79.) While the defendants claim that Mr. Conradt only 
told Mr. Guernsey about this belief, the plaintiffs indicate 
that he complained to Mr. Merten. (Jd. at ~ 180; PI.Resp. to 
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 455.) Mr. Guernsey 
expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Conradt's performance 
and was actively seeking a replacement for him. (Jd. at ~ 
454.) According to Mr. Conradt, he was also concerned 
about being forced to participate in "illegal and immoral" 
employment discrimination policies involving Mr. Weiss 
and other older employees, and feared personal liability for 
carrying out such policies despite his objections. (Jd. at ~'1 
455-459.) 
Mr. Conradt decided to leave SI shortly after Mr. Weiss 
was terminated; at the end of March of 1990, he gave 
notice of his intention to leave the company. 
(Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 188, 190.) Mr. Conradt 
did not tell co-workers that he was voluntarily leaving his 
employment with SI. (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings 
of Fact ~ 460.) Mr. Conradt felt he had no choice but to 
leave SI, even though he enjoyed his work and wanted to 
continue his employment; however, he acknowledges that 
he was not fired. (Jd. at ~~ 459, 461; DefProposed 
Findings of Fact ~ 191.) When Mr. Guernsey asked him 
why he was retiring, Mr. Conradt did not tell him that he 
was the victim of age discrimination. (Jd. at ~ 192.) Mr. 
Conradt was fifty-three (53) years of age when he left his 
employment at SI; he was replaced by Mr. Stelter, age 
thirty-nine (39). (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of 
Fact ~~ 462-463.) Mr. Conradt was given a retirement 
party which was attended by about seventy-five (75) 
people. (Def.Proposed Findings of F act ~ 193.) At the time 
he made the decision to leave SI, Mr. Conradt anticipated 
receiving an inheritance under his father's will; he did not 
know the amount, which totalled approximately $300,000. 
(Jd. at ~ 189; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
464.) 
Mr. Conradt did not file a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 195.) While the 
defendants claim that he never informed any government 
agency that SI was engaging in discriminatory practices, 
the plaintiffs indicate that he did so on December 5, 1991. 
(Id. at ~ 194; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 
466.) Mr. Conradt indicates that he did not leave his 
employment with SI to engage in church work or 
missionary work. (Jd. at ~ 465.) Since leaving SI, he has 
sought employment as a human resources specialist; when 
no such employment ensued, he started his own 
woodworking business. (Jd.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
[IJ [2J Rule 56(c) deems summary judgment appropriate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A 
genuine issue of fact exists only where a reasonable jury 
could make a finding in favor of the non-moving party. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Santiago v. 
Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir.1990). An issue of fact 
must also be material, as "only disputes over facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law will properly preclude the entry of summary 
judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. 
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See also Clifton v. Schafer, *1456 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th 
Cir.1992); Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir.1989). 
The presence of a genuine issue of material fact is to be 
determined by the substantive law controlling that case or 
issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 25l3-14; 
Santiago, 894 F.2d at 221. Where the record taken as a 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
non-moving party, there is no genuine need for trial and 
summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co .. 
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 
l348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). This standard is 
"applied with extra rigor in employment discrimination 
cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues." 
McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 
368,370-71 (7th Cir.1992). A plaintiffs presentation of 
more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the existence 
of an illegitimate motive is enough to preclude summary 
judgment on an ADEA claim. Visser v. Packer Eng 'g 
Assoc., 909 F.2d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir.1990). 
(3) (4) The moving party has the initial burden of 
demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323,106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Local 
1545, 876 F.2d at 1292. Once this burden is met, the 
non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and 
designate specific facts to support or defend each element 
of the cause of action, showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-
53; Local 1545, 876 F.2d at 1293. Neither party may rest 
on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Koclanakis v. 
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 673, 675 (7th 
Cir.1990), or upon conclusory statements in affidavits, 
Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568,1572 (7th 
Cir.1989); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold 
Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007,1011 (7th Cir.1985), 
and both parties must produce proper documentary 
evidence to support their contentions. Whetstine v. Gates 
Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990); Local 1545, 
876 F.2d at 1293. In deciding a summary judgment motion, 
the Court must view the record in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences 
shall be drawn in that party's favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 
at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; Santiago, 894 F.2d at 221. A 
court need not draw every inference from the record, only 
reasonable inferences. Local 1545, 876 F.2d at 1292-93; 
Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 
(7th Cir.1989). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS: 
1. Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard 
Spoonamore: 
The defendants argue that, to prevail on their ADEA claim, 
each plaintiff must show that SI would not have fired him 
"but for" the motive to discriminate on the basis of age. 
According to the defendants, "[t]he undisputed facts in this 
case demonstrate that age had nothing to do with any of 
these three involuntary terminations." They contend that 
Mr. Weiss, age fifty-four (54), was terminated in early 
1990 because Mr. Guernsey found his performance, 
including his purported inability to embrace TQM 
principles, to be unacceptable; he was replaced by Mr. 
Dircks, a forty-nine (49) year old former colleague of Mr. 
Guernsey's at Consolidated Diesel. The defendants also 
indicate that, although Mr. Guernsey was not entirely 
satisfied with Mr. Flavel' s performance, he was terminated 
in late 1990 because the decision was made to eliminate his 
position by assigning international marketing functions to 
Minco International AB ("Minco"), SlAB's foreign 
subsidiary, and to eliminate funding for comminution 
research in Appleton. Finally, they argue that Mr. 
Spoonamore "quit his managerial position after not getting 
a raise due to his resistance to the new management [TQM] 
philosophy," and was later terminated in spring of 1991 for 
failure to follow orders regarding cost assessment in a 
start-up project in Mexico. These reasons, the defendants 
contend, preclude Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and Mr. 
Spoonamore from meeting the "but for" test. 
*1457 The plaintiffs respond that the defendants 
inappropriately limit their discussion to the McDonnell 
Douglas analytical framework applicable to individual 
discrimination claims involving indirect proof, ignoring 
the direct evidence indicating a "pattern or practice" of 
discrimination in this matter. According to the plaintiffs, 
contrary to the McDonnell Douglas approach, "[ e ]vidence 
supporting a pattern or practice claim shifts both the 
burdens of production and persuasion to the employer." 
They further argue that direct evidence of age 
discrimination against Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and Mr. 
Spoonamore renders the "mixed motives" analysis, rather 
than McDonnell Douglas framework, applicable to their 
individual discrimination claims; under this app_roach, a 
grant of summary judgment is normally not appropriate. 
Finally, the plaintifTs claim that Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and 
Mr. Spoonamore nevertheless have established a prima 
facie case under McDonnell Douglas and have raised 
significant issues of material fact with respect to the true 
reasons for the terminations. According to the plaintiffs, 
Mr. Weiss was terminated despite a long history of solid 
performance due to a companywide policy of age 
discrimination emanating from SlAB through Mr. Platner 
and Mr. Guernsey; they claim that SI's explanation for his 
termination has changed several times since the filing of 
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this lawsuit. They also claim that SI has been changing its 
explanation for Mr. Flavel's termination, and that another 
younger application engineer was hired after Mr. Flavel 
was fired. Finally, they argue that Mr. Guernsey referred to 
Mr. Spoonamore as being "too damn old" and suggested 
that he be replaced with a younger person, and that the 
reasons given by SI for his termination are pretextual. 
2. Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke: 
The defendants claim that Mr. Van Dyke cannot establish a 
prima facie case of age discrimination because no 
employee outside the protected class was treated more 
favorably than him. They indicate that, when Mr. Van 
Dyke became the on-site manager of SI's Stansteel 
operation in Los Angeles, he was responsible for 
overseeing the entire business group including 
engineering, parts sales, quality assurance, sales, contract 
administration and field service; in November of 1988, 
most of these functions were transferred to the Milwaukee 
facility, with Mr. Van Dyke reporting to Mr. Faulkner, age 
fifty-two (52). According to the defendants, Mr. Faulkner 
became concerned about several customer complaints 
relating to Mr. Van Dyke and Stansteel, and considered the 
amount of Stansteel's outstanding holdbacks to be too 
high. The defendants claim that, "[a]fter the Stansteel 
operation continued to show disappointing results during 
1989," further consolidation occurred; Dr. Joung decided 
that an on-site manager was no longer needed at Stansteel, 
and Mr. Van Dyke was terminated in January of 1990. 
Four employees remained at Stansteel, each over the age of 
fifty (50). Furthermore, the defendants claim that, even if 
Mr. Van Dyke can establish a prima facie case, he cannot 
prove that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination. 
The plaintiffs again respond that the defendants are 
ignoring the fact that, in a pattern or practice 
discrimination involving direct evidence, the three-part 
McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable, and the 
defendants, rather than the plaintiffs, bear the burden of 
establishing that Mr. Van Dyke was fired for a legitimate 
purpose after the plaintiffs establish their prima facie case. 
The plaintiffs further argue that there is abundant direct 
evidence that Mr. Van Dyke's performance was 
exemplary, that SI was engaged in an effort to reduce the 
average age of its workforce, and that S I' s alleged reasons 
for firing Mr. Van Dyke were, in fact, pre textual. For 
example, Dr. Joung purportedly acknowledged in his 
1990-91 business plan that he had made progress in 
meeting the company's goal of filling positions "with 
younger people as much as possible," and wrote notes 
asking whether Stansteel's employees were "too old." The 
plaintiffs further claim that SI's explanations for Mr. Van 
Dyke's termination have changed since filing of this 
lawsuit. Finally, the plaintiffs indicate that, under Kralman 
v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 23 F.3d 150 (7th 
Cir.1994), "the Seventh Circuit held that a prima facie case 
of age discrimination can be *1458 established where an 
employer has replaced one over--40 worker with another." 
3. Plaintiffs alleging constructive discharge: 
The defendants claim that the undisputed facts reveal that 
Mr. Smay, Mr. Meagher, Mr. Isferding, Mr. Jones, Mr. 
Conradt, and Mr. Coxhill were neither the victims of age 
discrimination nor constructively discharged. They assert 
that Mr. Smay, a district sales manager at Appleton, retired 
in May of 1992 after clashing with Mr. Valitchka, being 
criticized for low sales volume, and having his sales 
territory reassigned; he purportedly made no statement 
about being the victim of age discrimination. Mr. Meagher, 
also a district sales manager at Appleton, retired after being 
told that Mr. Guernsey viewed his sales performance as 
poor and after telling Mr. Gregor that he had planned on 
retiring in March of 1992 on his sixty-fifth (65) birthday. 
Mr. Isferding, a senior application and project engineer at 
Appleton, retired in October of 1991 after being verbally 
abused by Mr. Quinn on at least two occasions and being 
transferred to the parts department; again, he purportedly 
made no statement about being the victim of age 
discrimination. Robert Jones, also a senior project and 
application engineer, retired in May of 1991 after being 
verbally abused by Mr. Quinn with some regularity and 
notifying management that he wished to pursue other 
interests and to work as a consultant at a later time; after 
filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, he 
reportedly declined an offer of reinstatement. Mr. Coxhill 
was the Manager of Engineering at Appleton when Mr. 
Guernsey was hired; he retired in July of 1992 after being 
transferred to the position of Chief Engineer of Product 
Quality and being verbally abused by Mr. Quinn on at least 
one occasion. He purportedly made no statement about 
being the victim of age discrimination. Finally, Mr. 
Conradt, the Manager of Employee and Community 
Relations at Appleton, retired in March of 1990 after 
disagreeing with Mr. Guernsey over management style, 
performance reviews, and the termination of Mr. Weiss; 
again, he purportedly made no statement about being the 
victim of age discrimination. Based on these facts, the 
defendants claim that none of the six plaintiffs can prove 
constructive discharge by demonstrating that he (I) 
suffered a materially adverse employment action, (2) 
incurred a work environment that was so intolerable that a 
reasonable person would feel compelled to quit, and (3) 
sought redress while still employed. 
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The plaintiffs respond that each of these plaintiffs were 
targets of SI's pattern of age discrimination, which was 
implemented in this country shortly after SlAB's 
acquisition of Allis-Chalmers in 1989 through Mr. 
Guernsey. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Guernsey and 
other senior managers were hired based on age-based 
criteria, and Mr. Guernsey told several of his managers that 
younger employees were needed and implemented a 
scheme to rid SI of older employees. The plaintiffs claim 
that Mr. Meagher and Mr. Smay only retired, despite years 
of exemplary performance, after hearing of Mr. 
Guernsey's contempt for older employees (including 
specific references to Mr. Meagher), having grossly 
inflated and clearly unattainable sales goals thrust upon 
them, and being subjected to demeaning performance 
reviews and trumped-up job descriptions. They also assert 
that, in conformity with Mr. Guernsey's expressed 
sentiments regarding older employees, Mr. Quinn targeted 
Mr. Jones and Mr. Isferding, despite their respective 
histories of satisfactory performance, through verbal 
abuse, physical intimidation, public humiliation, and 
adverse treatment which lasted until each announced his 
retirement. The plaintiffs further argue that Mr. Guernsey, 
when removing Mr. Coxhill from the position of Manager 
of Engineering, made very clear his intention that Mr. 
Coxhill retire despite his years of solid performance, and 
only reassigned him to the "concocted" position of chief 
engineer, with little authority, to "warehouse" him after he 
voiced his shock and disapproval; in that position, he was 
placed under the authority of Mr. Quinn, whose abusive 
style was well-known. Finally, they indicate that Mr. 
Conradt resigned only after (I) witnessing SI's plan of age 
discrimination, (2) "repeatedly observing Guernsey 
implement Svedala's plan of age discrimination, over his 
objection" in the termination of Mr. Weiss, (3) being 
threatened *1459 with termination "if he failed to support 
plainly age-based actions taken by Guernsey," and (4) 
having his own job responsibilities downgraded and being 
subjected to unfair criticism by Mr. Guernsey. 
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: 
1. Individual Discrimination Claims: 
[5J [6J Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEN'), it is "unlawful for an employer '" to discharge [ 
] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
age." 29 U.S.c. ~ 623(a)(1). In discrimination cases where 
the disparate treatment of a single employee is at issue, see, 
e.g., Kirk v. Federal Property Management Corp., 22 F.3d 
135,138 (7th Cir.1994) (race discrimination case under 
Title VII), "[a] plaintiff may prove age discrimination in 
one of two different ways"; she may either produce direct 
or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining 
factor in her discharge, or, "as is more common, she may 
utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for 
Title VII cases originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 
668 (1973), and later adapted to age discrimination claims 
under the ADEA." Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 
13 F.3d 1120,1122 (7th Cir.1993) (citing McCoy v. WGN 
Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th 
Cir.1992). Direct evidence of discrimination, of course, 
includes any acknowledgement by the defendant that 
discriminatory intent was behind its treatment of the 
plaintiff; circumstantial evidence, in tum, may involve, 
inter alia, proof of suspicious timing, ambiguous 
statements and behavior, inappropriate remarks, and 
"comparative evidence of systematically more favorable 
treatment toward similarly situated employees not sharing 
the protected characteristic." Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 
25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.1994) (gender discrimination 
case under Title VII). Accord Troupe v. The May Dep't 
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994) (gender 
discrimination case under Title VII). 
[7J [8J [9J [10] [l1J Under the burden shifting approach of 
McDonnell Douglas, 
"the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie 
case, the plaintiff must show: (1) she was a member of 
the protected class (age 40 or over), (2) she was doing 
the job well enough to meet her employer's legitimate 
expectations, (3) she was discharged or demoted, and (4) 
the employer sought a replacement for her. Sarsha v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th 
Cir.1993). 
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie 
case, this creates a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to 
the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. 
If the employer is successful, the presumption dissolves, 
and the burden shifts back to the employee to show that 
the employer's proffered reasons are a pretext for age 
discrimination. Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass 'n, 
874 F .2d 419, 426-27 (7th Cir.1989)." 
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122. If the plainti ff successfully 
shows that the employer has offered "a pretext-a phony 
reason-for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact 
is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real 
reason was age." Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, Inc., 924 
F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citing Shager v. 
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Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.l990». Accord 
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122-24. However, because" 'the 
ultimate burden' of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 
remains at all times with the plaintiff ... the plaintiff might 
be well advised to present additional evidence of 
discrimination, because the factfinder is not required to 
find in her favor simply because she establishes a prima 
facie case and shows that the employer's proffered reasons 
are false." Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124 (citing St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, --, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 
2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993». For summary judgment 
purposes, a non-moving plaintiff must only "produce 
evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that 
[her employer] lied" about its proffered reasons for *1460 
dismissal. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124; Shager, 913 F.2d at 
401. 
2. Pattern or Practice Discrimination Claims: 
[12) [13) [14) An analogous analytical framework applies 
to an ADEA representative action brought by either the 
EEOC or an individual plaintiff alleging a pattern or 
practice of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson 
& Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 531 (7th Cir.1985) (race 
discrimination case under Title VII). In the Seventh 
Circuit, "[p ]laintiffs who raise a pattern or practice class 
claim have as their initial burden the task of demonstrating 
that unlawful discrimination has been the regular policy of 
the employer, i.e., that 'discrimination was the company's 
standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the 
unusual practice.' " Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (quoting 
International Bhd. o{Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324,336,97 S.Ct. 1843,1854-55,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977». 
Again, such plaintiffs meet their burden by either 
producing direct or circumstantial evidence that their 
employer effectuated a pattern of discriminatory age-based 
decisionmaking, or utilizing a burden-shifting method of 
proof similar to that articulated in McDonnell Douglas. 
[15) [16) Under the burden-shifting approach, pattern or 
practice discrimination actions are generally bifurcated at 
trial into two parts; a liability, or prima facie phase, where 
the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory policy by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and a remedial phase, 
where the scope of relief awardable to each individual 
plaintiff is litigated. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324,361,97 S.Ct. 1843,1867-68,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); 
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 
867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2799-2800, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 
(1984); In re W. Dist. Xerox Litigation, 850 F.Supp. 1079, 
1081--82 (W.D.N.Y.1994); Forehand v. Florida State 
Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 839 F.Supp. 807, 813 
(N.D .Fla.1993). Under this procedure, efficiency is best 
enhanced if the same jury makes liability and remedial 
factual findings, as (I) the plaintiffs need not reintroduce in 
the remedial phase anecdotal evidence already presented 
during the liability phase, (2) the defendants need not 
re-introduce in the remedial phase defenses already 
presented in the liability phase, and (3) conflicting 
discrimination findings as to plaintiffs whose cases are 
litigated in the liability phase are avoided. 
a. Liability phase: 
1) Plaintiffs' proof: 
[17) [18] In the liability, or prima facie phase, of trial, the 
plaintiffs "have as their initial burden the task of 
demonstrating that unlawful discrimination has been the 
regular policy of the employer, i.e., that 'discrimination 
was the company's standard operating procedure-the 
regular rather than the unusual practice.' " Coates, 756 
F.2d at 532 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336,97 S.Ct. 
at 1854-55). Accord King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 
617,623 (7th Cir.1992); Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. A 
formal written policy is not required to establish such a 
pattern or practice; an informal or unstructured method of 
decision-making may be sufficient to invoke this doctrine. 
See Reed v. Lockheed Aircrafi Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 760-
61 (9th Cir.1980); Glass v. IDS Fin. Serv., Inc., 778 
F.Supp. 1029, 1052 (D.Minn.1991). At this stage, the 
plaintiffs need not "offer evidence that each person for 
whom [they] will ultimately seek relief was a victim ofthe 
employer's discriminatory policy. [Their] burden is to 
establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed." 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867. Accord 
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081. 
[19) [20) [21) [22) [23) In establishing their prima facie 
case, the plaintiffs should produce "statistical evidence 
demonstrating substantial disparities in the application of 
employment actions as to [the protected] and the 
unprotected group, buttressed by [anecdotal] evidence of 
general policies or specific instances of discrimination." 
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532.2 *1461 Where the plaintiff class 
is prohibitively large for each plaintiff to provide 
individual testimony of alleged discriminatory conduct, 
plaintiffs regularly present anecdotal testimony from a 
subset of plaintiffs in seeking to establish their prima{acie 
case. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338,357,97 S.Ct. at 
1855-56, 1865-66 (prima fc/cie case met where plaintiff 
class of over three-hundred employees provided specific 
evidence of company-wide discrimination against only 
forty plaintiffs); King, 960 F.2d at 619 (prima facie case 
not met where plaintiff class of fifteen employees provided 
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testimony of six such employees in support of pattern or 
practice claim); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 
665 F.2d 482, 495 (4th Cir.1981) (prima facie case met 
where plaintiffs provided testimony of subset of twenty 
plaintiffs in support of discrimination claim). Anecdotal 
evidence must suggest broad-based discrimination, 
however, as providing mere "isolated or sporadic 
discriminatory acts by the employer is insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination." King, 960 F.2d at 622. See also 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-55; 
Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. 
2) Defendants' rebuttal: 
[24J [25J [26] During the liability, or prima facie, stage of 
proceedings, the defendants may, of course, counter the 
plaintiffs' proof through cross-examination and the 
presentation of rebuttal evidence, both statistical and 
anecdotal, in an "attempt to show that the plaintiff's 'proof 
is either inaccurate or insignificant.' " Craik v. Minnesota 
State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867). See also 
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532.3 The strength of rebuttal evidence 
that the defendants must produce "to prevent the 
plaintiffTs] from carrying the burden of persuasion as to 
disparity [in treatment among employee groups] depends, 
as in any case, on the strength of the plaintiffs' proof." 
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 
1249,1268 (D.C.Cir.1984». 
[27J [28J [29J [30] As previously indicated, because 
plaintiffs at this stage generally elicit anecdotal evidence 
from only a subset of the plaintiff class, defendants in most 
cases do not provide rebuttal evidence against every named 
plaintiff; instead, their proof is limited to evidence and 
testimony which counters the plaintiffs' prima facie 
presentation. As noted in Teamsters, 
"[t]he employer's defense must, of 
course, be designed to meet the prima 
facie case of t,he [plaintiffs]. We do not 
mean to suggest that there are any 
particular limits of the type of evidence 
an employer may use. The point is that at 
the liability stage of a 
pattern-or-practice trial the focus often 
will not be on individual hiring decisions, 
but on a pattern of discriminatory 
decisionmaking. " 
(Emphasis added). During this stage, then, the defendants' 
rebuttal evidence is tailored to the plaintiffs' prima facie 
case. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267. While defendants may 
attempt to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for an 
adverse employment decision against a testifying plaintiff, 
see Coates, 756 F .2d at 532, they need not do so depending 
on their assessment of the strength of the plaintiffs' 
evidence; again, the focus is on the presence or absence of 
a company-wide discriminatory policy, and not on 
individual employment decisions.4 It is only during the 
second, or remedial, phase of trial that the defendants must 
establish that individual *1462 plaintiffs were not, in fact, 
victims of the discriminatory practice to escape liability. 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362,97 S.Ct. at 1868; Craik, 731 
F.2d at 470; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82; Forehand, 
839 F.Supp. at 813. 
3) Jury determination: 
[31] [32] [33 J [34 J Throughout this stage of proceedings, 
the plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion as to 
establishing a prima facie case of pattern or practice age 
discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 
1867; King, 960 F.2d at 623; Coates, 756 F.2d at 532; 
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82; Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 
813. At the close of the liability phase of trial, the jury is 
asked through appropriate instructions whether or not the 
plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants engaged 
in a pattern or practice of age discrimination during the 
relevant time frame. If the jury responds negatively, then 
trial of the plaintiffs' pattern or practice claim is completed 
and the plaintiff" are left to pursue individual 
discrimination claims, presumably before a different 
factfinder.5 If, on the other hand, the jury responds 
affirmatively, the Court may award prospective relief to 
the plaintiff" as sought by the EEOC. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 
at 361, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470. As to 
the scope of individual relief to which the plaintiffs might 
be entitled, the Court must move to the second, or 
remedial, phase of trial. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361, 97 
S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470; Forehand, 839 
F.Supp. at 813. 
b. Remedial phase: 
[35J If the plaintiffs prevail in the liability, or prima facie 
phase, of trial, then the proceedings move into the second, 
or remedial phase, of trial, where "[t]he proof of the pattern 
or practice supports an inference that any particular 
employment decision, during the period in which the 
discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of 
that policy." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362,97 S.Ct. at 1868. 
Under such circumstances, it is presumed that each 
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individual plaintiff has been the vlctlm of age 
discrimination at the hands of the defendant. Cooper, 467 
U.S. at 875, 104 S.Ct. at 2799; King, 960 F.2d at 623; 
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081. 
1) Defendants' proof: 
[36J [37] This presumption of discrimination shifts to the 
defendants the burden of demonstrating that the individual 
plaintiffs were not victims of the discriminatory practice. 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1868; King, 960 
F.2d at 623; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82. This includes 
"not only the burden of production, but also the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that it is more likely than not 
that the employer did not unlawfully discriminate against 
the individual." Craik, 731 F.2d at 470. Accord King, 960 
F.2d at 623; Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.6 "The 
Teamsters approach thus differs from the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas analysis in that the burden of 
persuasion can shift from plaintiffs to defendants." Xerox, 
850 F.Supp. at 1082. 
[38J [39] [40] To rebut the presumption of discrimination 
as to each plaintiff, the defendants *1463 must establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that age discrimination 
was not a "determining factor" or a "but-for" element in 
their employment decisions. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Fisher v. Transco 
Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th 
Cir.1992). In attempting to meet this burden, the 
defendants may again present evidence demonstrating that 
the plaintiffs' "proof is either inaccurate or insignificant," 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 36 I, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Coates, 
756 F.2d at 532; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470, or that a 
nondiscriminatory explanation exists for the presumed 
discriminatory termination of each plaintiff. See Coates, 
756 F.2d at 532. The amount of damages awardable to each 
plaintiff is also litigated during this phase of trial. See 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 
731 F.2dat470;Forehand, 839F.Supp. at813. 
2) Plaintiff\" rebuttal: 
(41) (42) [43) [44) During the remedial stage of 
proceedings, the plaintiffs may, of course, counter the 
defendants' proof through cross-examination and the 
presentation of rebuttal evidence in an attempt to show that 
the defendants' non-discriminatory justifications for their 
employment decisions are merely a pretext for 
discrimination. See, e.g., Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039; Fisher, 
979 F.2d at 1243. As a general rule, "[p]retext may be 
established directly with evidence that [the defendant] was 
more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory reason, 
or indirectly by evidence that the employer's explanation is 
not credible." Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039. As previously 
indicated, however, unlike in the McDonnell Douglas 
format applied to individual discrimination claims, the 
Teamsters model imposes no burden on the plaintiffs to 
produce such evidence, and the burden of persuading the 
factfinder that age discrimination was not a determining 
factor in each of the defendants' employment decisions 
remains with the defendant. See Teamsters, 431 US. at 
362, 97 S.Ct. at 1868; King, 960 F.2d at 623; Craik, 731 
F.2d at 470; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82. The strength 
of rebuttal evidence that the plaintiffs must produce to 
prevent the defendants from carrying their burden of 
persuasion again will depend, as in any case, on the 
strength of the defendants' proof. See Coates, 756 F.2d at 
532 (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268 
(D.C.Cir.1984)). In addition, the plaintiffs are required to 
litigate the amount of damages awardable to each named 
party during this stage of proceedings. See Teamsters, 431 
US. at 361,97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470; 
Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. 
3) Jury determination: 
[45J At the end of the remedial phase of trial, the jury is 
asked through appropriate instructions whether the 
defendants "willfully" violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, and whether the defendants have proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence that each individual 
plaintiff was not a victim of age discrimination; they are 
also asked to assess damages for each named plaintiff. 
C. ANALYSIS: 
[46J Where individual and class-claims are bought 
contemporaneously, courts should "consider the evidence 
relating to the individual claims in [their] assessment of the 
class claim, and vice-versa, since evidence relevant to one 
is also relevant to the other." Coates, 756 F.2d at 533. The 
class claim, however, "is to be "Considered first, since if the 
class claim has merit, the named and unnamed individual 
class members are entitled to the burden-shifting 
presumption of Teamsters." ld. 
1. Pattern or Practice Discrimination: 
Because the Court finds that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the defendants engaged in a pattern or 
practice of age discrimination, and that this practice was 
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the determining factor, or "but for" cause, for the 
termination or "retirement" of each plaintiff named in this 
motion, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
must be denied. 
a. Plaintiffs' prima facie case: 
[47} Viewing (as we must) the factual submissions of the 
parties in a light most favorable to the non-movants, it is 
clear that *1464 the plaintiffs present adequate evidence to 
establish a prima facie case of pattern or practice 
discrimination by SI against older employees which 
emanated from its Sweden parent, SlAB. The jury may 
adopt as true the following factual summary. SlAB and SI 
had interlocking management structures and had direct, 
frequent, and substantial contact with one another through 
business and financial planning arrangements. When Mr. 
Guernsey was interviewed in Sweden by Mr. Older and 
Mr. Knuttson for the general manager position at 
Appleton, they discussed specific personnel in Appleton, 
including Mr. Weiss. While interviewing for the same 
position in Sweden, Mr. Gregor was told that SI was 
"looking for a guy in his late 30's." Dr. Joung and Mr. 
Soriano, after returuing from a conference for senior 
managers in Sweden, reported that Swedish management 
was concerned about the high average age of the workforce 
at the Milwaukee facility, and wanted action taken to bring 
in younger workers. Mr. Soriano also stated that, while 
SlAB management believed that Milwaukee had a problem 
with older workers, it found the "age problem" at Appleton 
to be even worse. Written business plans submitted to 
SlAB by Dr. Joung noted the "high average age" of SI's 
employees as a "principal weakness" of the Milwaukee 
unit, and indicated that a program had been initiated to fill 
position with younger people, thereby decreasing the 
average age of employees. 
Mr. Conradt, the Manager of Human Resources at the 
Appleton unit, and Mr. Merten shared a mutual concern 
over the perceived "youth cult" being imposed on SI by 
SlAB management, and Mr. Merten told Mr. Conradt that 
SI had a policy which favored younger workers over older 
employees. Mr. Merten also told Mr. Conradt "off the 
record" that an applicant for the Appleton General 
Manager job had been rejected because he was "too old." 
SI retained a professional executive search firm in its 
general manager search; Mr. Platner and Mr. Knuttson 
informed the firm that (1) the Appleton business unit had 
been populated by "people who had been in the business 30 
years or more, and the message was we need to get new 
and different thinking and leadership that in looking 
toward the future that isn't just a prologue to the past," and 
(2) in conducting the general manager search, SlAB 
wanted to avoid "calcified" candidates. The youngest of 
the ten finalists selected by the search firm, Mr. Guernsey, 
age thirty-seven (37), was given the position. Mr. 
Guernsey maintained regular communication with SlAB 
management regarding business objectives, planning, 
personnel issues, and related matters. 
Mr. Conradt observed employment policies and practices 
at SI in 1989 which he found to be discriminatory against 
older workers. Mr. Conradt was asked by Mr. Merten to 
calculate the average age of salaried employees at the 
Appleton facility; he was concerned that this request was 
part of an overall program to get rid of older workers. As 
he had done in prior years, he also compiled a list of 
employees ages sixty (60) and older; after receiving the 
list, Mr. Guernsey commented that "we've got an awful lot 
of long service employees. We need to get some 
young-ah, new blood into the organization." In January 
of 1990, Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Weiss that "the problem 
with Appleton is that we have too many old people in their 
jobs too long." When Mr. Conradt later objected to the 
termination ofMr. Weiss, Mr. Guernsey responded that he 
had "two choices, [ ] do as I tell you or there is the door." In 
February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted his first 
performance review of Mr. Gregor, establishing written 
performance objectives including the development of a 
"young generation of salesmen and manager candidates." 
Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that he had calculated the 
average age of the Appleton sales force to be 55-56 years 
old, that this number was too high, that they needed to hire 
a younger and more aggressive sales force, that the current 
force was "old and stale," and that he was not comfortable 
working with older employees. On a number of occasions, 
Mr. Guernsey ordered Mr. Gregor to terminate Mr. 
Meagher, an "old incompetent" who needed to be replaced 
with some "young blood." Mr. Guernsey also criticized 
Mr. Gregor for promoting Mr. Spoonamore, noting that he 
had a better candidate who was a "very young, professional 
guy." Mr. Guernsey further instructed *1465 Mr. Gregor 
that, if he could not get rid of certain employees, he would 
have Mr. Stelter find a way to do so. 
Only managers in their thirties and forties were selected by 
SlAB management to attend the Nordic Hills management 
assessment conference; nominees' job location, name, 
present title and age were primary factors considered in 
selection. Mr. Quinn was the only manager from Appleton 
selected to attend; Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy were rejected. 
Mr. Quinn was later promoted to Mr. Coxhill's position of 
Manager of Engineering. In approximately April of 1991, 
Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor that SI's program was to 
reduce the average age of its sales force by bringing in 
younger employees. In a meeting later that month, Mr. 
Gregor commented that pictures of equipment on Mr. 
Quinn's wall included some "real antiques"; Mr. Guernsey 
responded that he thought Mr. Gregor was referring to Mr. 
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Quinn's sales force. Mr. Quinn's conduct toward 
subordinates was abusive, especially toward older 
employees; SI management was aware of his behavior. 
There is evidence suggesting that Mr. Valitchka and Mr. 
Stelter revised the job description for regional sales 
representatives, adding new physical and endurance 
demands which were not necessary to the position and 
were designed to discriminate against older employees 
with medical conditions, including Mr. Smay, Mr. 
Meagher, and Mr. Pape. Before he was terminated, Mr. 
Coxhill was instructed by Mr. Guernsey to present 
information as to each Appleton engineer's age, date of 
birth, and years of service. Within two years after Mr. 
Guernsey arrived at Appleton, at least eleven employees 
above age fifty were no longer employed at the facility. 
When Mr. Lenhart was interviewed in Sweden as Mr. 
Merten's replacement, he was asked for his date of birth, 
and was told that "in Sweden they have no laws against 
asking folks for their date of birth." When Mr. Platner 
selected Mr. Fons as general counsel for SI, he used Mr. 
Fons' college graduation date to compute his name, which 
did not appear on his resume. At the Milwaukee unit, 
applications for employment from older individuals were 
routinely rejected with handwritten notes emphasizing the 
applicants' ages. 
On February 13, 1991, the Milwaukee facility carried out a 
reduction-in-force (RIF) which resulted in the termination 
of twenty (20) employees. Eighteen of these workers were 
over age forty; one of the two below-forty people released, 
as well as the youngest of the remaining eighteen 
employees, were subsequently rehired by SI. Notes from 
the management meeting preceding the RIF indicate that 
the age of employees considered for termination was 
discussed. Most of the employees terminated were fifty 
years of age or older. 
If inadequately rebutted by the defendants, and found to be 
true by the jury, these facts, coupled with the particular 
termination decisions made as to each plaintiff, adequately 
(though not overwhelmingly) establish the adoption of a 
pattern or practice of age discrimination at SI at the behest 
of its corporate parent, SlAB. Because a reasonable 
factfinder could conclude that the plaintiffs have met their 
prima facie case, we presume for the purposes of this 
motion that the individual plaintiffs are entitled to the 
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters previously 
discussed. 
b. Defendants' rebuttal: 
A reasonable jury could further conclude that the 
defendants have not met their burden of establishing that, 
despite the presumption of age discrimination, age 
discrimination was not a "but for" cause, or determining 
factor, in the termination of any of the named plaintiffs. 
1) Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard 
Spoonamore: 
[48) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that SI's 
explanations for the termination of Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel 
and Mr. Spoonamore are merely a pretext for age 
discrimination. As to Mr. Weiss, Appleton's Manager of 
Manufacturing, the defendants suggest that he was 
terminated because he did not have in place adequate 
programs to improve plant safety and reduce quality 
control, *1466 purchasing, and inventory costs, and 
resisted Mr. Guernsey's TQM management philosophy. 
The plaintiffs, however, present evidence that Mr. Weiss 
had a history of satisfactory performance and had instituted 
numerous safety measures, including a management safety 
council, a safety brigade, safety tours, weekly safety 
programs, safety posters, periodic safety contests and 
awards, and a full-time nurse. They also indicate that Mr. 
Platner had eliminated the total quality assurance 
department at Appleton as a cost-savings measure, 
reassigning TQM to the engineering department, that Mr. 
Weiss preserved as much of the TQM program in 
manufacturing as he could, and that, in the period 
preceding Mr. Guernsey's arrival, Mr. Weiss was working 
on a large cost reduction plan. Given these facts, a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that SI has not met its 
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Mr. Weiss was not terminated due to his age. 
The defendants present evidence that, while his 
perfonnance was satisfactory, Mr. Flavel was terminated 
because his international marketing responsibilities were 
transferred to Minco and funding for his comminution 
research was eliminated. The plaintiffs, however, indicate 
that, despite his qualifications, Mr. Flavel was passed over 
for several open positions at Appleton and Minco. They 
also indicate that, when initially responding to Mr. Flave1's 
EEOC charge, the defendants claimed that Mr. Flavel was 
terminated because comminution research had been 
transferred to Sweden, and made no mention of decreases 
in funding or the transfer to Sweden of international 
marketing functions. Again, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that SI's proffered explanations are simply a 
pretext for age discrimination, and that the defendants have 
not met their burden. 
According to the defendants, Mr. Spoonamore was 
terminated because he resisted the implementation ofTQM 
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principles espoused by Mr. Guernsey and had disobeyed 
Mr. Guernsey's directives on the costs relating to the 
above-referenced project in Mexico. The plaintiffs, 
however, indicate that Mr. Spoonamore's performance 
was "seriously undermined" by Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn, 
and Mr. Dircks, who, inter alia, routinely contacted his 
subordinates without his notification and verbally abused 
him, including making ageist comments, in front of others. 
They also assert that Mr. Spoonamore did not resist TQM 
at Appleton, is conversant with TQM principles, believes 
that they can be effective, and merely expressed doubts 
about the applicability of certain specific management 
strategies to his small department. They also present 
evidence that Mr. Guernsey was critical of his 
performance, and denied him a raise, even though he had 
never conducted a performance review of him or provided 
written notice of alleged performance deficiencies, and 
that Mr. Spoonamore followed Mr. Guernsey's 
instructions on the Mexican project. A reasonable jury may 
reject the defendants' explanation of Mr. Spoonamore's 
termination/constructive discharge as pretextual; as a 
result, their summary judgment motion must be denied as 
to this plaintiff. 
2) Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke: 
[49) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that SI's 
explanation for the termination of Mr. Van Dyke was 
merely a pretext for age discrimination. According to the 
defendants, Mr. Van Dyke was dismissed after his 
responsibility for resolving holdbacks on certain 
equipment contracts was transferred to Milwaukee in 
response to customer complaints and after further 
consolidation of the Stansteel operation with the 
Milwaukee facility obviated the need for an on-site 
manager at Stansteel. They also indicate that Mr. Faulkner 
harbored serious concerns about Mr. Van Dyke's 
performance, and that sales volume at Stansteel had 
steadily declined. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim 
that Mr. Van Dyke was not notified as to concerns over his 
performance, that he received a 7.1 % merit pay increase in 
August of 1989, and that he never received any 
performance appraisals after 1984. They also indicate that 
the termination letter handed to Mr. Van Dyke by Mr. 
Faulkner did not mention performance problems as a cause 
for termination, and that SI retained a younger employee at 
the Stansteel operation who had a history of performance 
deficiencies. The plaintiffs also contend that Stansteel 
*1467 had a reasonable backlog of business when Mr. Van 
Dyke was terminated, and good prospects for future 
business. 
In our view, a jury assessing this evidence is likely to 
conclude that the defendants have met their burden of 
establishing that Mr. Van Dyke was terminated for just 
cause, namely, a decrease in sales volume and 
consolidation of managerial functions to the Milwaukee 
facility. Nevertheless, we are unable to fmd that a 
reasonable jury could not make a contrary determination. 
Mr. Van Dyke may, for example, convince the jury that 
business prospects at Stansteel were, in fact, good, or that 
the decision to terminate him rather than the 
previously-referenced younger Stansteel employee was 
based, at least in part, on age. Accepting either proposition, 
the jury may conclude that the defendants' proffered 
justifications are merely a pretext for age discrimination. 
Again, the defendants' summary judgment request must be 
denied. 
3) Plaintiffs alleging constructive discharge: 
[50] [51) [52) Viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude 
that SI's explanations for the "retirements" of Mr. 
Meagher, Mr. Smay, Mr. Jones, Mr. Is ferding , Mr. 
Coxhill, and Mr. Conradt are merely a pretext for age 
discrimination. In the Seventh Circuit, "[ d]emonstrating 
constructive discharge requires a showing that 'a 
reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign 
under the circumstances of the case.' " Darnell v. Target 
Stores, 16 F.3d 174, 177 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Rodgers 
v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 677 (7th 
Cir.1993». A constructive discharge involves more than a 
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities; 
it is instead established by indicating "a demotion 
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly 
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that 
might be unique to a particular situation." Crady v. Liberty 
Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993). 
According to the defendants, Mr. Smay voluntarily retired 
because he was unhappy with his performance review and 
the reconfiguration of his sales territory, .and wished to 
"look after some personal investments." The plaintiffs, on 
the other hand, indicate that Mr. Smay was constructively 
discharged only after (1) Mr. Gregor was pressured into 
reducing the average age of his workforce and was 
replaced by Mr. Valitchka, (2) SI imposed an inflated sales 
quota on him during a recessionary year, and unduly 
criticized his performance, and (3) mindful ofMr. Smay's 
medical condition, Mr. Stelter created a "new" job 
description for district sales managers which included 
"trumped up" physical requirements. Given these facts, a 
reasonable fact finder could conclude that SI has not met its 
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burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Mr. Smay was not constructively discharged due to his 
age. 
The jury may reach a similar conclusion regarding Mr. 
Meagher. The defendants assert that Mr. Meagher 
voluntarily retired at age sixty-five (65), as he had planned, 
after his sales performance had been criticized as subpar, 
and that he encouraged a colleague to apply for his 
position. The plaintiffs respond that, like Mr. Smay, Mr. 
Meagher was constructively discharged only after (1) Mr. 
Gregor was pressured into reducing the average age of his 
workforce and was replaced by Mr. Valitchka, (2) SI 
imposed an inflated sales quota on him during a 
recessionary year, and unduly criticized his performance, 
(3) mindful of his medical condition, Mr. Stelter created a 
"new" job description for district sales managers which 
included "trumped up" physical requirements, and (4) Mr. 
Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that Mr. Meagher was an "old 
incompetent," and instructed him to fire that "old 
son-of-a-bitch in Florida" and replace him with "young 
blood." Again, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. 
Meagher was forced to retire as a result of discriminatory 
conduct on behalf of the defendants; there tore, the 
defendants' summary judgment request must be denied as 
to Mr. Meagher. 
According to the defendants, Mr. Isferding voluntarily 
retired because he was unhappy with his transfer to the 
parts department in a company reorganization at Appleton, 
despite the fact that he received the same pay as in *1468 
his previous position. The plaintiffs respond that Mr. 
Isferding had always received positive employment 
reviews, and that he was constructively discharged after 
being subjected to verbal harassment and adverse 
treatment by Mr. Quinn based solely on his age and being 
demoted to the parts department. They also indicate that 
Mr. Isferding believed that he would soon be tIred given 
company-wide harassment of himself and other older 
eruployees. A reasonable factfinder could agree with the 
plaintiffs that Mr. Isferding was targeted for harassment 
based on his age, and that the age hostility in his work 
environment became so unbearable that he felt he had no 
choice but to retire. For this reason, the defendants' motion 
must -be denied. 
The defendants present evidence that Mr. Jones, on his 
own admission, voluntarily retired because he wished to 
move to Colorado to be closer to his daughters and to 
pursue recreational and consulting interests. According to 
the plaintiffs, Mr. Jones was constructively discharged, 
despite a long history of satisfactory performance, after 
being subjected to verbal harassment and adverse 
treatment by Mr. Quinn based solely on his age. Neither 
party paints a particularly compelling picture; 
nevertheless, a jury could reasonably conclude that age 
hostility in his work environment effectively forced Mr. 
Jones out of his position. Again, the defendants' request 
for summary judgment must be denied. 
The defendants indicate that Mr. Cox hill voluntarily 
retired because he was unhappy with his transfer to the new 
position of Chief Engineer of Product Quality, and then to 
Field Service Manager, in a company reorganization at 
Appleton, despite the fact that he received the same pay as 
in his previous position. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
present evidence that Mr. Coxhill was constructively 
discharged on the basis of age, despite a history of solid 
performance, as (1) Mr. Guernsey decided to replace him 
as Manager of Engineering with Mr. Quinn before he had 
ever given Mr. Coxhill a performance review (2) when 
demoting him to the position of Chief Engineer of Product 
Quality in April of 1991, Mr. Guernsey "suggested" to him 
that he consider retirement, and indicated that Mr. Stelter 
was "standing by" to discuss that option with him (3) he 
was forced to report to Mr. Quinn, whose abusive behavior 
toward him and other older employees was well 
documented, and (4) he feared that he would be fired based 
on a pattern of age discrimination he observed being 
imposed on him and other older employees. A reasonable 
jury may reject the defendants' proffered explanation for 
Mr. Coxhill' s retirement, and conclude that he was forced 
out of the organization on the basis of his age. The 
defendants may therefore not meet their burden, and 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Finally, as to Mr. Conradt, the defendants indicate that he 
voluntarily retired after (1) his job responsibilities were 
reduced and he was reprimanded for several performance 
deficiencies (2) he and Mr. Guernsey had experienced a 
conflict in management style, and (3) he had become aware 
that he would receive an inheritance under his father's will. 
According to the plaintiffs, however, he was constructively 
discharged after (1) he had observed a pattern of 
discriminatory practices against older employees at SI (2) 
Mr. Guernsey told him that we need to get some 
young-ah, new blood into the organization (3) he 
unsuccessfully resisted the age-based termination of Mr. 
Weiss (4) he concluded that SI management wanted him to 
partIcIpate in "illegal and immoral" employment 
discrimination policies, and feared personal liability for 
carrying out such policies, and (5) he feared that he would 
be fired based on his age. Mr. Conradt testifies that he felt 
he had not choice but to leave SI, even though he enjoyed 
his work and wanted to continue his employment. Again, a 
jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Conradt was 
effectively forced out of his position due to age hostility by 
the defendants, and that the defendants have therefore not 
met their burden. As a result, the defendants' motion must 
be denied. 
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c. Bifurcation procedure to be used at trial: 
[53) In their letter briefs, the plaintiffs in this matter stress 
that, unlike the plaintiffs in *1469 Teamsters and in most 
pattern or practice cases, their representative class is 
relatively small. See, e.g., Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. 
As a result, they indicate that 
"every living Plaintiff will testify in the 
first phase of trial as part of Plaintiffs' 
evidence of Defendants' pattern or 
practice of discrimination. In other 
words, the evidence of discrimination 
against every Plaintiff in this lawsuit will 
be part of the Plaintiffs' pattern or 
practice case." 
By adopting this added degree of caution in providing 
anecdotal evidence of discrimination, the plaintiffs, no 
doubt, are mindful of the above-referenced admonishment 
in King and Teamsters, that plaintiffs highlight the " 
'manifest' difference between individual claims of 
discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern 
or practice." King, 960 F.2d at 622. See also Cooper, 467 
U.S. at 876, 104 S.Ct. at 2799-2800; Forehand, 839 
F.Supp. at 813. Given the relatively small size of the 
plaintiff class, the plaintiffs' need to present more than 
"isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts" to meet their 
prima facie case, and our general reluctance to limit the 
degree of evidence deemed necessary by the plaintiffs to 
meet their evidentiary burden, the Court shall allow the 
plaintiffs to call each of the named plaintiffs as witnesses 
in establishing their prima facie case.7 
[54) Because the plaintiffs in this matter intend on having 
each named plaintiff testify in presenting their prima facie 
case, they suggest that the Court "adjust" the Teamsters 
analytical framework by requiring the defendants to 
present all defense evidence relevant to liability, including 
non-discriminatory reasons for each plaintiffs termination 
or constructive discharge, during the liability, or prima 
/clcie, stage of trial. According to the plaintiffs, 
"because Defendants will need to tailor their defense to 
the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs at the liability 
phase, the only new evidence to be presented by 
Defendants in the remedial stage will be their damages 
evidence '" 
In their letter brief to the Court, Defendants argue that a 
finding as to whether the Plaintiffs were the victims of a 
pattern or practice of discrimination can only be made in 
the remedial phase of the trial. However, it makes no 
sense to wait until after the second phase of the trial to 
submit questions to the jury regarding evidence 
submitted in the first phase of the trial. To proceed in 
that fashion would not only confuse the jury as to what it 
was to decide and on what evidence, but would also 
invite the parties to resubmit their evidence and thereby 
substantially lengthen the time required for trial. 
Clearly, because all of the liability evidence will be 
presented in the first phase, efficiency would be 
enhanced if the jury were asked to decide the existence 
of the pattern or practice of discrimination and whether 
Plaintiffs were a victim of that pattern or practice at the 
end of Phase I of trial." 
This procedure, of course, 
single-plaintiff Title VII cases 
alleged by only one employee. 
is commonplace m 
where discrimination is 
While mindful of the differences between this case and 
Teamsters,8 and cognizant of the intuitive appeal of the 
approach advanced by the plaintiffs,9 the Court shall 
nevertheless institute the Teamsters analytical framework 
in trying this case. We do so for several reasons. First of 
all, implementation *1470 of the plaintiffs' approach may 
unduly prejudice the defendants by unnecessarily 
lengthening the number of days spent in trial. A significant 
component of the Teamsters framework is potential 
cost-savings in defending a pattern or practice charge; the 
employer assesses the strength of the plaintiffs' prima 
facie proof, produces the volume and strength of rebuttal 
evidence it deems necessary to defeat that charge (which, 
as previously indicated, often does not include giving 
non-discriminatory reasons for employment decisions 
regarding testifying plaintiffs), and gets a jury 
determination as whether the plaintiffs have met their 
prima facie case. Requiring the defendants to use all of 
their ammunition during the first phase of trial, including 
glvmg nondiscriminatory explanations for adverse 
employment decisions, eradicates this cost-containment 
strategy established in Teamsters, and may unnecessarily 
lengthen the first stage 0 f trial if the plaintiffs' prima facie 
proof is ultimately rejected by the jury. Secondly, should 
the jury find that the plaintiffs failed to prove their prima 
facie case, the plaintiffs may nevertheless be entitled to 
pursue individual discrimination claims under the 
McDonnell Douglas format in separate jury trials for each 
business unit; under such circumstances, the defendants 
would be forced to defend themselves against the same 
discrimination charges twice in three different lawsuits. 
Again, adoption of the traditional Teamsters format may 
eliminate otherwise-unnecessary litigation costs in the first 
stage of proceedings without compromising the plaintiffs' 
right to bring individual claims, and seems more fair to the 
defendants. Finally, the defendants raise justifiable 
concerns regarding undue complication of the special 
verdict form to be issued to the jury. 
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The Court, then, shall adopt the traditional Teamsters 
model in conducting proceedings in this case. The 
defendants will be permitted to rebut the plaintiffs' prima 
facie proof during the liability phase with any evidence 
they deem necessary to establish the absence of a 
company-wide policy of age discrimination. They need 
not, however, "lay all their cards on the table" as to 
justifications for the termination or constructive discharge 
of testifying plaintiffs if they believe that such evidence is 
not necessary to defeat the plaintiffs' prima facie case. 
Should the jury determine that the plaintiffs have not met 
their burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination, then the defendants may, in fact, have 
preserved resources and costs accruing to the litigants and 
the Court in these proceedings, although they may be 
required to expend those resources in subsequent 
individual discrimination actions. 
If, on the other hand, the jury finds that the plaintiffs have 
met their prima facie case, then the defendants may 
introduce appropriate defenses not presented in the liability 
phase to meet their burden of proving non-discriminatory 
terminations regarding each plaintiff in the remedial stage 
of proceedings. This may include justifications for the 
termination of particular plaintiffs, and may require the 
defendants to recall certain witnesses to the stand for 
further testimony. Because the same jury will decide these 
issues, neither the defendants nor the plaintiffs will be 
permitted to elicit duplicative testimony or reintroduce 
evidence already presented during the first stage of 
proceedings. This will ensure that the trial proceeds in an 
efficient and orderly fashion. 
2. Individual discrimination claims: 
ISS] The Court shall defer ruling on the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs' 
individual discrimination claims until after completion of 
the liability, or prima facie, phase of trial. If the jury finds 
that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age 
discrimination, then the plaintiffs would be entitled to the 
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters which, unlike 
the McDonnell Douglas format in individual 
discrimination cases, obligates the defendants to prove by 
Footnotes 
a preponderance of the evidence that age discrimination 
was not a "but for" cause, or determining factor, in any 
particular employment decision. Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 
l082. Presumably, because the burden of persuasion may 
shift to the defendants under the Teamsters approach, but 
not under the McDonnell Douglas format, a finding of 
pattern or practice discrimination obviates the need to 
separately pursue individual discrimination claims. See 
Coates, 756 F.2d at 533. Should the jury, however, 
determine *1471 that the defendants did not engage in a 
pattern or practice of age discrimination, we previously 
saw that the plaintiffs may pursue individual 
discrimination claims in subsequent proceedings before 
two different juries; under these circumstances, the 
defendants' motion as to individual discrimination claims 
would require Court resolution under the McDonnell 
Douglas format. Until completion of the liability stage of 
trial, then, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
as to individual discrimination claims brought by the 
plaintiffs is premature; as a result, the Court will not 
address it at this time, and will consider it in subsequent 
proceedings only if required to do so pursuant to the jury's 
determination in the liability phase of the pattern or 
practice trial and at the request of either party. 
IV. SUMMARY 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as to 
(1) the Age Discrimination Claim of Plaintiff Robert Van 
Dyke (2) the Age Discrimination Claims of Plaintiffs 
Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard Spoonamore, 
and (3) those Plaintiffs Alleging Constructive 
Discharge-Byron Smay, William Meagher, Robert 
Isferding, Robert Jones, Major Coxhill, and James Conradt 
be DENIED in the above-captioned matter. 
SO ORDERED. 
Parallel Citations 
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1 An April 18, 1990 memorandum to Swedish personnel manager Lars Reverman similarly listed a pre felTed age range of " late 30's or 
early 40's" for the replacement for the general manager of Boliden Allis UK, Ltd., a British subsidiary of SlAB. (PI. Resp. to Def. 
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 61.) 
2 This is not to say, however, that '·the absence of statistical evidence must invariably prove fatal in every pattern or practice case. 
Where the overall number of employees is small, anecdotal evidence may sutlice." Xerox. 850 F.Supp. at 1084. Accord Pitre v. 
Western £lee. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir.1988); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984). In other cases, "a 
plaintiffs statistical evidence alone might constitute a primajacie case." Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 n. 6 (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 
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1249, 1278) (D. C. Cir.1984 )). "Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence is automatically entitled to reverence to the exclusion of the 
other," id. at 533; however, "[w]hen one type of evidence is missing altogether, the other must be correspondingly stronger for 
plaintiffs to meet their burden." Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1085. 
3 "An employer might show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful 
post-Act discrimination, or that during the period it is alleged to have pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment 
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a regular practice of discrimination." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 
1867. 
4 The defendants, for example, may simply question the accuracy of a testifying plaintiffs' recollection, or attempt to show the absence 
of any age-based references toward that employee. 
5 The effect of such a determination on the plaintiffs' individual discrimination claims "is to leave the plaintiffs with the burden of 
proving-without assistance from the pattern and practice evidence--that each actionable [termination] suffered by the plaintiffs was 
the product of intentional discrimination on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs, in other words, can neither bolster their 
individual claims for relief with proof that the defendants engaged in a systemwide practice of racial discrimination, nor can they [ ] 
shift the burden of proof to the defendants." Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. 
6 Citing Coates. 756 F.2d at 532-33 and Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir.1981), the defendants argue that the burden 
of persuasion remains with the plaintiffs throughout both phases oftrial. The Coates decision, however, is limited to a discussion of 
the burden of persuasion during the liability phase of a pattern or practice trial. and does not directly address the issue of burden 
shifting during the remedial phase of trial, where a presumption of discrimination exists. See Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (noting that 
"[ n]onetheless, at the liability stage of a pattern or practice suit, the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion with respect to 
discrimination"). Croker, on the other hand, is a Third Circuit decision whose efficacy in the Seventh Circuit is questionable after the 
decision in King, 960 F.2d at 623. 
7 This matter is currently scheduled for a six-week trial; because the Court may limit both the time used by the plaintiffs to prove their 
prima facie case and the introduction of duplicative evidence, the plaintiffs, of course, may be required to adjust their prima facie 
presentation, including limiting the number of plaintiffs called to present anecdotal evidence, accordingly. 
8 The Court recognizes that pattern or practice cases do not always fit comfortably into the standard proof sequences. See, e.g., 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1866; Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267 n. 12; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470 n. 7. 
9 The plaintiff:, correctly note that, should we adopt the Teamsters approach and the jury finds at the end of the prima facie stage of trial 
that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination, then trial efficiency may be lost by allowing the defendants 
to potentially "reserve" justification arguments for the second phase of trial; however, it is by no means certain that the defendants 
will withhold such arguments, and the Court nevertheless intends on honoring its promise to the parties that duplicative testimony 
will be kept at a minimum. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Ruby J. GIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE 
RAILWAYCOMPANY, a Corporation; 
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline 
Clerks, Defendants-Appellees. 
Nos. 80-5074, 80-5169 and 80-5246. I 
Argued and Submitted Sept. 9,1981. I 
Decided Aug. 31, 1982. I As Modified on 
Denial of Rehearing Oct. 25, 1982. I As 
Corrected Nov. 9,1982. I Rehearing En Banc 
Denied Dec. 20, 1982. 
Female employee brought action against her employer and 
union for sex discrimination. The United States District 
Court for the Central District of California, Harry 
Pregerson, 1., granted summary judgment for the employer 
and union, and employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) challenge to policy 
requiring clerks to accept assignments at all locations in 
their district was time-barred; and (2) issues of material 
fact existed on questions whether requiring heavy lifting 
for position of wire chief was bona fide occupational 
qualification, and whether employer's reasons for firing 
employee were pretextual, precluding, summary judgment. 
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. 
Opinion on remand, 549 F.Supp 1. 
Wright, Circuit Judge, concurred specially and filed 
opinion. 
West Headnotes (10) 
[11 Civil Rights 
Persons Protected and Entitled to Sue 
Ordinarily, if Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission retains control over charge of 
employment discrimination, private plaintiff will 
not be charged with its mistakes. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
[2) 
[3) 
[4) 
[5) 
Federal Civil Procedure 
\}",Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
In female employee's discrimination action 
against employer and union, issues of material 
fact existed on question whether employee was 
guilty of laches, precluding summary judgment. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
\r,~'Operation; Accrual and Computation 
Challenge to policy requiring clerks to accept 
assignments at any location in their district as 
disadvantageous to women was time-barred 
where plaintiff was not employed in position 
subject to allegedly discriminatory policy at any 
time within 300 days of date on which she filed 
charges with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
seq. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.. Pleading 
Female employee's allegation that making 
application for promotion to position of wire 
chief would have been futile because of 
employer's prior refusal to hire women for that 
position was sufficient to state claim of 
- employment discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Defenses in General 
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[6) 
[7) 
[8) 
Bona fide occupational qualification defense to 
employment discrimination complaint is 
affirmative defense. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
~~'Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
In female employee's action against employer 
alleging that failure to promote her to position of 
wire chief was result of sex discrimination, issue 
of material fact existed on question whether 
lifting requirement for position was bona fide 
occupational qualification, precluding summary 
judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e)(l), 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(l). 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
To establish claim of discrimination against 
employee in retaliation for employee's 
participation in any investigation or proceeding 
under the Civil Rights Act, employee need only 
show that she was discharged following conduct 
on her part that constituted protected activity and 
that employer was aware of conduct. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
20 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Matters Affecting Right to Judgment 
Summary judgment is generally not proper when 
intent of party is placed in issue. 
[9) Federal Civil Procedure 
,W""Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
In female employee's action against employer for 
sex discrimination, issues of material fact existed 
on question whether employer's reason for firing 
employee was pretextual or in retaliation for her 
partIcIpation in investigation, precluding 
summary judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
[10) Civil Rights 
,·,Activities Protected 
Female employee's opposition to provlslOn in 
collective bargaining agreement which she 
reasonably believed was discriminatory was 
protected activity under civil rights statute 
making it illegal for employers to retaliate 
against employees for opposing illegal practices. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq. 
16 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*1151 Bennett Rolfe, LeBel & Rolfe, Santa Monica, Cal., 
for Gifford. 
Mitchell M. Kraus, Rockville, Md., argued for 
defendants-appellees; Richard L. Rosett, Raymond W. 
Thomas, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California. 
Before WRIGHT and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and 
EAST,* District Judge. 
Opinion 
FLETCHER, Circuit Judge. 
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Plaintiff Gifford appeals from the grant of summary 
judgment to defendants Santa Fe and the Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks (Union) in her Title VII action, 
42 U.s.C. s 2000e et seq. We note jurisdiction under 28 
U.s.C. s 1291. We conclude that summary judgment was 
proper as to one of plaintiffs claims, but improper as to 
both defendants on the remaining claims. Accordingly, we 
affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's 
judgment. 
I 
Plaintiff was hired by Santa Fe on April 20, 1944. In 1965, 
she was working as an "extra board printer clerk." On 
October 1, 1965, Santa Fe and the Union signed a new 
collective bargaining agreement which required extra 
board printer clerks to accept assignments at all locations 
in their district. Prior to the 1965 agreement, extra board 
printer clerks could elect to accept assignments only at 
their home point without loss of seniority. For the purposes 
of summary judgment the parties stipulated that both the 
Union and the employer recognized that the new rule 
would probably cause several female printer clerks to quit 
and that more women than men, in fact, resigned or were 
discharged as a result ofthe new policy. 
On three occasions in 1966, plaintiff was asked to accept 
assignments at points other than her home point of 
Bakersfield. On all three occasions, she refused the 
assignment and immediately resigned. The parties 
stipulated that if she had not resigned, she would have been 
fired. On all three occasions she was rehired almost 
immediately by Santa Fe. Because of her resignation and 
rehire, she lost all of her accrued seniority rights and other 
benefits. 
In 1967, plaintiff stopped paying the union dues required 
by the contract. According to plaintiff, her failure to pay 
was the result of her continuing dispute with the Union and 
Santa Fe over the changed work rule and her consequent 
loss of benefits. During 1967 the Union sent her three 
notices that her dues were delinquent. On November 20, 
1967, the Union requested Santa Fe to terminate plaintiff 
for nonpayment of dues, pursuant to the Union security 
clause. On November 29, plaintiff wrote to Santa Fe and to 
the Union, stating that she was tendering her delinquent 
dues under protest, and that she intended to file a charge 
with the EEOC. The Union did not accept the tendered 
dues. On December 4, she sent a letter to the EEOC. 
On December 6, Santa Fe wired plaintiff to inquire 
whether her November 29 letter constituted a request for a 
hearing on her termination. She responded by wire the 
same day, although for some reason the wire did not reach 
Santa Fe until December 21, after the time for requesting a 
hearing had expired. Plaintiff was terminated without a 
hearing on December 22, 1967. 
Plaintiff filed a formal charge with the EEOC on January 4, 
1968. The EEOC did not issue a right-to-sue letter until 
August 24, 1977. The EEOC was apparently pursuing 
conciliation efforts and considering filing suit itself during 
the nine years' delay. Plaintiffs suit was timely filed after 
her receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 
Defendants moved in the district court for dismissal, 
asserting untimely filing of the suit and laches. The motion 
was denied *1152 by minute order. Defendants then 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
plaintiff s charge to the EEOC was not timely filed and that 
plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to both defendants on January 24, 
1980. On appeal, plaintiff argues that her charge to the 
EEOC was timely filed, and that there were unresolved 
issues of material fact so that summary judgment was 
improper. Defendants argue that the charge was not timely, 
that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that although they 
did not appeal the denial of summary judgment on the basis 
of laches, even if plaintiff timely filed the charge with the 
EEOC and has stated a claim in the complaint, the 
judgment below should be affirmed on the alternate basis 
that plaintiff was guilty of laches as a matter of law. 
II 
LACHES 
The district court, in denying defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the ground of laches, must have 
concluded either that there were disputed issues of material 
fact or that plaintiff was not guilty of laches as a matter of 
law. This court could affirm the judgment for defendants 
on the grounds of laches only if we conclude that there are 
no remaining issues of fact, and that plaintiff was guilty of 
laches as a matter oflaw. 
[I) Laches is an equitable doctrine, its application 
depending on the facts of the particular case. This court has 
affirmed the dismissal on the ground of laches of both 
private Title VII suits, Boone v. Mechanical Specialities 
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979), and suits brought by the 
EEOC, EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 
1980). In both cases, the district court had found 
unreasonable and unexplained delays in bringing suit. In 
Boone, this court emphasized that "(I)n the present case we 
state the exception and not the general rule. Normally, it 
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may be reasonable for an aggrieved employee to allow the 
EEOC to retain jurisdiction over a Title VII action." 609 
F.2d at 960 (footnote omitted). Boone involved a plaintiff 
who, the court found, had deliberately delayed seeking a 
right-to-sue letter. Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control 
over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with 
its mistakes. See, e.g., Watson v. Gulf & Western 
Industries, 650 F.2d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1981). 
(2) In the instant case, plaintiff's attorney submitted an 
extensive affidavit in response to defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, detailing repeated and continuous 
efforts of plaintiff and her attorneys to monitor the 
progress of her charge through the EEOC. Documents 
were also submitted showing that the EEOC had found 
reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff had been 
discriminated against. Plaintiff's attorney also alleged that 
the EEOC had informed him on several occasions that it 
intended to file suit on plaintiff's behalf The district court 
did not err in denying summary judgment on the ground of 
laches because it is apparent there are material factual 
issues to be resolved. Accordingly, we decline to affirm on 
the alternate basis oflaches. 
III 
THE MERITS 
In her complaint, Gifford alleges four distinct violations of 
Title VII. She alleges: (1) that the provisions of the 1965 
bargaining agreement had a discriminatory effect on her 
continuing until the day she was terminated; (2) that the 
employer continually refused to promote her to the 
position of wire chief, a position for which she was at all 
times eligible until the time of her termination; (3) that her 
termination for nonpayment of union dues was actually in 
retaliation for her threat to file a charge with the EEOC, 
rather than for nonpayment of dues; (4) that her 
termination resulted from her continued opposition to 
policies she considered discriminatory. Summary 
judgment was granted defendants on the first claim on the 
ground that the charge was not timely filed with the EEOC. 
As to the remaining three, there was no *1153 contention 
that the charge was untimely. Summary judgment was 
granted to defendants on the merits. We conclude that the 
charge on the first claim was not timely filed and that 
summary judgment was proper on the first claim only. 
Summary judgment on the merits of each of the other three 
claims was improper. 
A. The 1965 Agreement 
Plaintiff alleges that the policy on extra board printer 
clerks contained in the 1965 bargaining agreement was 
instituted with the knowledge and intent on the part of the 
Union and the employer that the policy would be 
disadvantageous to women. The parties stipulated that the 
policy did cause a larger number of women than men to 
resign. Plaintiff alleges that this was because more of the 
women were unwilling and unable to travel long distances 
on short notice to accept temporary assignments. The 
women, including plaintiff, either resigned to avoid being 
fired, or were fired for violating a rule on insubordination. 
The facts alleged by plaintiff constitute both disparate 
impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII. See 
Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157, 
1163 (9th Cir. 1981). 
(3) Before reaching the merits of these claims, however, 
we must determine whether the challenge to the extra 
board printer clerk policy was timely filed with the EEOC. 
At the time plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC, the 
statute permitted only 90 days after a discriminatory act in 
which to file a charge. The statute was amended in 1972, 
however, to allow 180 days. The new limit is applied to 
charges pending in 1972. Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
565 F.2d 554, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1977). In states such as 
California that have their own enforcement agencies, a 
complainant has 300 days in which to file a charge. See 
Watson v. Gulf & Western, 650 F.2d at 992. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs charge was timely if filed within 300 days after 
any discriminatory act. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 
449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555, 
97 S.Ct. 1885, 1887,52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971). 
Plaintiff characterizes her challenge to the extra board 
printer clerk policy as one based on a continuing violation 
of Title VII. She contends that because the policy 
continued in effect and was never discontinued during her 
tenure, she could have been disadvantaged by it any time 
by being forced to resign or accept distant assignments. 
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that an employment policy 
may constitute a continuing violation of Title VII and 
hence support a charge of discrimination filed at any time 
the policy is jn effect by an employee subject to the policy. 
In Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th 
Cir. 1982), we noted by way of illustration that: 
[a] minority employee who is not 
promoted in 1973, for example, and is 
subject to a continuing policy against 
promotion of minorities, may then file a 
timely charge in 1976, because the policy 
against promoting him or her continued 
to violate the employee's rights up to the 
time the charge was filed. 
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Thus if plaintiff was employed by Santa Fe in a position 
subject to the allegedly discriminatory extra board printer 
clerk policy at any time within 300 days of the date on 
which she filed charges with the EEOC, her challenge to 
the policy would be timely. 
It appears beyond dispute from the record in this case, 
however, that plaintiff was last employed by Santa Fe in a 
position subject to the extra board printer clerk policy in 
April of 1966, more than 300 days before she filed charges 
challenging the policy. Although plaintiff was rehired by 
the Railway in May of 1966 and continued to work for the 
company until December of 1967, this last reemployment 
was in a regular position not subject to the extra board 
provision of the 1965 agreement. 
As we noted in Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 
[a] refusal to hire or a decision to fire an employee may 
place the victim out of *1154 reach of any further effect 
of company policy, so that such a complainant must file 
a charge within the requisite time period after the refusal 
to hire or termination, or be time-barred. If in those cases 
the victims can show no way in which the company 
policy had an impact on them within the limitations 
period, the continuing violation doctrine is of no 
assistance or applicability, because mere "continuing 
impact from past violations is not actionable. 
Continuing violations are." 
665 F.2d at 924 (quoting Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 
613 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1980)). In the instant case, 
plaintiffs reemployment with Santa Fe in a regular 
position placed her "out of reach of any further effect" of 
the allegedly discriminatory extra board printer clerk 
policy.! There was no longer a continuing violation with 
respect to her. She therefore had 300 days from her last 
employment on the extra board in which to file charges 
challenging the assignment away from home provisions of 
the 1965 agreement. This she failed to do and we are 
accordingly compelled to hold that her challenge to the 
extra board printer clerk policy is time-barred. 
B. Refusal to Promote 
Plaintiffs second claim is that defendant Santa Fe 
consistently failed to promote her to the position of wire 
chief, a position for which she was qualified, although she 
never applied. She contends that her failure to apply was 
the result of Santa Fe's well-known policy of excluding 
women from the job. Santa Fe responds that the position of 
wire chief required the lifting of 25 pounds or more, and 
that at the time, state protective legislation prevented it 
from hiring women in jobs requiring lifting. Plaintiff 
agrees that such legislation existed and had not yet been 
held invalid. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 
F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971). However, she also 
contends that lifting was not necessary to the job of wire 
chief, and that Santa Fe could and should have required 
other employees to do what little lifting was necessary. 
[4] The threshold question is whether it was necessary for 
plaintiff to allege that she applied for the position of wire 
chief in order to make out a prima facie case. Plaintiff 
contends that it was not. She is correct if the employer's 
promotional policies made application futile, or if the 
employer normally initiated the promotion. Reed v. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 
1980). Plaintiffs allegation that an application would have 
been futile because of Santa Fe's prior refusal to hire 
women for the position of wire chief is sufficient to state a 
claim. 
As to Santa Fe's defense of reliance on a state statute, this 
court held in 1971 that state protective legislation which 
restricts the employment opportunities of women based on 
stereotyped characteristics of the sexes is invalid under 
Title VII. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d at 
1224-25. One of the statutes held invalid in that case was 
the very California statute at issue here. The question of 
what relief could appropriately be given the plaintiffs was 
not addressed in Rosenfeld, because no individual 
plaintiffs remained before the court. In a subsequent case, 
however, this court held that while reliance on an invalid 
state statute is not a defense to a Title VII suit, good-faith 
reliance on the part of the employer may in some cases 
make it inequitable to award back pay. *1155 Schaeffer v. 
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F .2d 1002, 1006-07 (9th 
Cir. 1972).2 
Plaintiffs argument here is somewhat different than that 
confronted in Rosenfeld and Schaeffer. In both those cases, 
the protective legislation unquestionably prevented the 
employment of women in the jobs at issue (heavy lifting in 
Rosenfeld, 9 hour days in Schaeffer ). Gifford argues that 
the lifting requirement was not necessary to the job. Even 
if one were to assume the good-faith reliance of Santa Fe 
on the statute, it is irrelevant since Santa Fe should not 
have included heavy lifting as a job requirement for wire 
chiefs. 
What the court should examine, then. is whether heavy 
lifting capability is a "bona fide occupational 
qualification" (BFOQ) for the position of wire chief under 
the BFOQ exception in Title VII. 42 U.S.c. s 
2000e-2(e)(l). Since the lifting element effectively made 
sex a requirement for the job under then-existing state law, 
the question to be addressed is whether lifting was 
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business." Id. See Diaz v. Pan American World 
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[5] [6] The district court held that Gifford had failed to 
produce any facts to support her assertion that whatever 
lifting was necessary to the wire chiefs job could have 
been assigned to other available male employees, and that 
therefore defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 
What the court failed to recognize, however, is that the 
BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense. Defendants were 
required to produce facts in support of the BFOQ claim, 
rather than plaintiff being required to disprove it. See 
Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 
670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980). If lifting was not "reasonably 
necessary" to this particular job, then Santa Fe may not 
plead good-faith reliance on the statute. The facts 
underlying the BFOQ defense have not yet been addressed 
by the district court. We conclude that summary judgment 
on this claim was improper. The district court should 
consider the merits of plaintiff s claim. Both damages and 
injunctive relief may be appropriate if the requirement was 
not a BFOQ. If it was a BFOQ, injunctive relief may still 
be appropriate since the statute is invalid. 
C. Retaliation for Threat to File Charge 
Section 2000e-3(a) of Title 42 makes it unlawful to 
discriminate against an employee in retaliation for the 
employee's participation in any investigation or 
proceeding under Title VII. 42 U.s.C. s 2000e-3(a); Sias v. 
City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 694-96 (9th 
Cir. 1978). Plaintiff here contends that she was both 
wrongfully fired and not rehired by Santa Fe, not because 
she failed to pay her union dues but because she threatened 
to file a charge with the EEOC. In support of this claim, she 
alleges that at least two male employees retained their jobs 
under similar circumstances. The district court held that 
plaintiff had failed to raise any issues of material fact on 
these claims because: (1) plaintiff was not similarly 
situated to the two male employees who were not 
terminated; (2) plaintiff did not show that it would have 
been futile to request Santa Fe to rehire her. 
[7] [8] Although the district court made no finding, it is 
clear that plaintiffs allegations were enough to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation. To do so, she need only 
show that she was discharged following conduct on her 
part that constituted protected activity and that the 
employer was aware of the conduct. Kauffman v. Sidereal, 
667 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1982); Aguirre v. Chula Vista 
Sanitary Service, 542 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam). It is undisputed *1156 that Gifford wrote a letter 
to Santa Fe and the Union prior to her firing, in which she 
threatened to file a charge with the EEOC.3 Defendants 
then advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the firing, i.e., Gifford's failure to pay her union dues. The 
issue here, then, centers on pretext: did Gifford come 
forward with enough evidence to create an issue of fact as 
to whether her failure to pay union dues was merely a 
pretext for her firing. See Aguirre, 542 F.2d at 781. This 
question involves a determination of the intent of the 
Union in requesting and the employer in discharging 
plaintiff. Summary judgment is generally not proper when 
the intent of a party is placed in issue. Haydon v. Rand 
Corp., 605 F.2d 453, 455 & n. 2 (9th Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam). 
[9] We conclude that Gifford offered sufficient evidence to 
raise an issue offact. The district court erred in deciding as 
a matter of law that Gifford and the two male employees 
who were not fired were not similarly situated. Gifford's 
allegations and her opposition to defendants' motion for 
summary judgment were supported by the "reasonable 
cause" determination made by the EEOC.4 The EEOC, 
after an impartial investigation, found reasonable cause to 
believe that Gifford had been treated differently than 
similarly situated male employees. See Plummer v. 
Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 
569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978). The EEOC's report 
was sufficient at least to create an issue of fact on this 
question. It was therefore improper for the trial court to 
resolve the issue on summary judgment. 
We reach the same conclusion on the issue of futility. 
Gifford argues that it would have been futile to apply for 
rehire. In support of this argument, Gifford submitted an 
affidavit in which she stated that a Santa Fe employee had 
told her that neither she nor anyone with the surname 
Gifford would ever again work for Santa Fe. Additionally, 
she submitted a copy of a Santa Fe employment form 
noting her discharge, and marked "Do Not Rehire." The 
Santa Fe Superintendent of Communications stated in his 
deposition that the "Do Not Rehire" notation on the form 
was unusual, and that he did not understand it. 
Furthermore, it is stipulated that on the prior occasions 
when Gifford had resigned and been rehired, Santa Fe had 
initiated the rehire. 
On remand, the district court should permit plaintiff to 
proceed on her claim that the defendants retaliated against 
her for threatening a Title VII proceeding. 
D. Retaliation for Opposition to Illegal Practice 
[10] Title VII also makes it illegal for employers and 
unions to retaliate against employees for opposing 
practices made illegal by Title VII. 42 U.s.C. s 2000e-3(a). 
Plaintiff claims that one of the reasons for her termination 
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was her opposition to the collective bargaining agreement. 
The district court held that plaintiff lacked a good-faith 
belief that the agreement was discriminatory, so that she 
could not rely on this section. The district court reasoned, 
based on Gifford's deposition testimony, that Gifford 
believed that the 1965 bargaining agreement discriminated 
against old but not new female employees, and that 
although she had complained about the policy since its 
inception, she did not label it "sex discrimination" until 
1967. The court concluded that her initial failure to label 
the policy as sex-discrimination indicated that her 
opposition to it was actually based on other grounds. 
We conclude that the district court analyzed the opposition 
issue incorrectly. This *1157 circuit has held that an 
employee who opposes employment practices reasonably 
believed to be discriminatory is protected by the 
"opposition clause" whether or not the practice is actually 
discriminatory. Sias, 588 F.2d at 695. It does not follow 
that the employee must be aware that the practice is 
unlawful under Title VII at the time of the opposition in 
order for opposition to be protected. It requires a certain 
sophistication for an employee to recognize that an 
offensive employment practice may represent sex or race 
discrimination that is against the law. Here, Gifford argued 
from the outset that the collective bargaining agreement 
had a harsher impact on some of the women than it had on 
men. It is not necessary that a practice disadvantage all 
women in order for it to be unlawful under Title VII. See, 
e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 
53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). A fortiori, an employee who 
complains of a practice that has a disproportionate impact 
on a protected group complains of unlawful discrimination 
and is protected by the opposition clause. 
Here, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe the 
practice objected to was discriminatory. We have held that 
Gifford's allegations and supporting evidence are 
sufficient to survive summary judgment on this issue. This 
is enough to make Gifford's opposition to the collective 
bargaining agreement activity protected under Title VII. 
See Sias, 588 F.2d at 695; Pettway v. American Cast Iron 
Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1969). The 
district court erred in dismissing this charge for failure to 
state a claim. 
IV 
We conclude that summary judgment was proper with 
respect to plaintiffs challenge to the extra board printer 
clerk policy contained in the 1965 collective bargaining 
agreement. As to each of plaintiffs other three claims, 
however, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and 
remand to the district court for trial. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 
REMANDED. 
WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring specially: 
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but the 
application of laches to a backpay claim deserves some 
discussion. 
The delays in this case are astounding. They deserve a 
detailed recital. 
Gifford filed charges with the EEOC in January 1968. 
Sante Fe received a copy of those charges in June 1968. 
The EEOC completed its field investigation by February 
1969. Then ended any effort to attend promptly to the 
matter. Almost two years passed before the EEOC 
determined that reasonable cause supported Gifford's 
charges. Gifford and Sante Fe received notice of the 
reasonable cause determination in January 1971. 
In October 1971, the EEOC notified Gifford that a 
representative would be in Bakersfield soon to meet with 
her and Santa Fe. No one came. Almost a year and a half 
later, in February 1973, Gifford wrote to EEOC inquiring 
about her case. She received no answer. 
Gifford employed counsel in January 1974, and some 
efforts at conciliation followed. But in February 1974 
Santa Fe notified the EEOC that under no circumstances 
would it reinstate her. Santa Fe last heard from the EEOC 
in October 1974, when the agency officially notified it that 
conciliation had ended. 
In April 1974, Gifford's attoruey requested that a right to 
sue letter be issued. When he called the EEOC in June 
1974, he was told that it was considering filing suit itself 
and that, if it did so, Gifford could intervene at little 
additional cost. Gifford and her attorney then awaited the 
EEOC's decision. 
From June 1974 to June 1977 the EE9C continually 
misassigned and mishandled Gifford's file. It was sent to 
the wrong places, forgotten on desks, and transferred 
through numerous personnel changes. An affidavit filed 
with the district court by Gifford's attorney details his calls 
and letters to the EEOC urging action. The saga *1158 was 
indeed, as one EEOC analyst stated, a "flying dutchman 
odyssey." 
Despite the efforts of Gifford's attorney, the EEOC took 
three years to decide thaat it would not file suit. Had it 
ddone so in 1977, it faced a strong possibility of dismissal 
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for laches. See EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (delay of 20 months after conciliation ended 
before EEOC filed suit and 62-month delay in total from 
when charges were filed found unreasonable.). 
The EEOC finally issued Gifford a notice of right to sue in 
August 1977, and she brought action soon thereafter. By 
then, the events underlying the suit were almost ten years 
old. The clock has not stopped running. After remand here, 
the case returns for trial. Even with expeditious handling, 
the trial could not be held before 1983 or later. The 
prospect oflitigation over 15 or 16 year-old facts must give 
pause, as must the prospect of 15 or 16 years of backpay 
should Gifford prove her claims. 
Viewed abstractly, and without assigning blame, the delay 
clearly is shocking. But laches is an equitable defense, and 
cannot be applied in the abstract. Nor can it be decided, as 
Santa Fe urges, as a matter oflaw on a record that presents 
unresolved issues of fact. 
Affidavits from both sides chronicle the defendant's 
prejudice and plaintiff's actions to expedite the case. But 
these merely reveal factual disputes and, of greater 
importance, are insufficient to resolve a laches claim. 
Dismissal for laches requires inexcusable delay by the 
plaintiff and resulting prejudice to the defendant. Boone v. 
Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Laches applies both to suits brought by the EEOC, EEOC 
v. Alioto Fish Co. Ltd., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980), and to 
those brought by private plaintiffs. Boone v. Mechanical 
Specialties Co., supra. 
It may bar the entire complaint or only certain claims, the 
whole remedy sought or only a portion of it. Occidental 
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372-73, 97 S.Ct. 
2447,2457-58,53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) (may bar backpay); 
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424, 95 
S.Ct. 2362, 2374, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (may bar 
backpay); EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 
276 (7th Cir. 1980) (may bar entire complaint, certain 
claims, or backpay); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
567 F.2d 429,469 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (may limit or preclude 
backpay); Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282, 
1288 (9th Cir. 1977) (may bar or limit backpay); Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), 
rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747,96 S.Ct. 1251,47 
L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (may bar entire claim or only portion 
or just backpay). 
A district court must examine each claim alleged and 
remedy sought to determine if sufficient prejudice and 
delay support defendant's request for dismissal or 
limitation. 
Issues of delay and prejudice are intertwined closely. 
Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 807 
(8th Cir. 1979). Shorter delays require greater prejudice. 
Longer delays require less. Id. Similarly, greater prejudice 
requires more reason for delay, and less prejUdice will 
allow longer delays for less compelling reasons. 
A defendant's showing of prejudice will necessarily differ 
for each claim or remedy it seeks to bar or limit. For 
example, if a defendant asserts laches to bar a claim of 
disparate treatment, the court will ordinarily examine the 
availability of witnesses and records to counter that claim. 
See, e.g., Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 
956 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Proof of the reasonableness of delay will not necessarily 
differ for the various claims and remedies sought. But, 
because of delay's relationship to prejudice, if delay in 
seeking a certain type of claim or remedy causes more 
prejudice than normal, the proof of excuse required may 
vary accordingly. 
In addition to the usual prejudice from lost records and 
dimmed memories associated with defending substantive 
claims, delay *1159 in asserting backpay claims presents 
the defendant with a distinct prejudice. After an allegedly 
discriminatory discharge or failure to hire, an employer 
soon loses touch with the plaintiff. The plaintiff must 
mitigate any damage, but the defendant bears the burden of 
proving a failure to mitigate. Sangster v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). As time passes, 
meeting this burden becomes progressively more difficult, 
if not impossible. 
To prove failure to mitigate, the defendant must show the 
availability of suitable positions and plaintiff's lack of due 
diligence in seeking them. Sias v. City Demonstration 
Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978). Once an 
employer has lost contact with the plaintiff, showing 
availability of positions and plaintiff's lack of diligence 
could become nearly impossible. 
Nor is this prejudice to the defendant's burden of proof 
balanced by a similar prejudice to the plaintiff's proof, as 
occurs with the plaintiff's substantive claims. A long delay 
may prejudice a plaintiff in proving her claims as much as 
a defendant in countering them. See Harris v. Ford Motor 
Co., 487 Supp. 429 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
But once the substantive claim is made, little additional 
proof is needed for a backpay claim. He or she need only 
introduce pay scales to show what he or she should have 
earned. To defend, however, an employer must show other 
jobs were available and that the plaintiff could havelocated 
them. The defendant is unlikely to have any of this 
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information in its files. 
The Seventh Circuit may have assumed prejudice to the 
defendant when it reduced a Title VII plaintiffs backpay 
award by the four years from the time she could have 
requested a right to sue letter and the time of filing suit. 
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 
603 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060, lO2 S.Ct. 
612, 70 L.Ed.2d 599 (1981). Because the plaintiff knew 
she could request a right to sue letter 180 days after she 
filed charges, the court concluded that she could not 
increase her award by taking advantage of the EEOC's 
slowness in processing claims. Id. The court did not 
discuss prejudice. 
Kamberos at least suggests that the analysis of laches in 
asserting backpay claims differs from that in asserting 
substantive claims. See also Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 
634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The potential for prejudice to 
the defendant is great and the plaintiff bears little 
additional prejudice over and above the burden of proving 
the underlying claim. Should this defendant reassert laches 
on remand, as it is free to do, the court should have the 
distinction in mind. 
Footnotes 
In addition, it should consider whether a plaintiff s delay 
after conciliation, pending EEOC decision to sue, is 
reasonable. Gifford argues that she waited for the EEOC 
because if it filed suit, she could intervene at little or no 
extra cost. Her affidavit states that she had limited funds 
for a law suit. Inability to pay legal fees normally does not 
excuse a delay in filing suit. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 
634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Because Title VII provides for 
attorney's fees, the excuse is even less persuasive. 
I concur in the remand because the record is inadequate to 
support finding laches as a matter of law. But I stress that 
the issue remains open. Should Gifford prove her 
substantive claims of discrimination, the district court may 
feel compelled to award backpay for 15 or 16 years. I 
cannot believe Congress intended such a result. 
Parallel Citations 
29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1345, 34 Fair 
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 240, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,118 
* Honorable William G. East, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation. 
1 Gifford claims that even though in May of 1966 she was rehired by Santa Fe in a regular position, she was still subject to the allegedly 
discriminatory printer clerk policy because, at any time, a more senior regular employee of Santa Fe could "bump" her from regular 
employment so that she would return to an extra board position. This potential application of the extra board policy to plaintiff is too 
speculative. It is akin to a terminated employee arguing that because he or she might be rehired, a charge filed more than 300 days 
after termination is nonetheless timely. See Williams, 6!3 F.2d at 760. Were plaintiff able to show that her regular position with 
Santa Fe was limited in duration or that, for some other reason, she would necessarily be returned to an extra board position, we 
would face a substantially different question. 
2 The district court treated Plaintiffs claim as one solely for damages, and therefore found SchacHer controlling on the question of 
relief. Plaintiff in her complaint, however, also sought reinstatement and injunctive relief. Schaeffer is not relevant to the merits of 
her claim of discrimination, nor to those forms of relief. 
3 We see no legal distinction to be made between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected, Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1978), and threatening to file a charge. 
4 This court held in Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502,505 (9th Cir. 1981) that a Title VII plaintiff has an absolute 
right to introduce the EEOC's reasonable cause detennination into evidence. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
v. 
Nos. 96-56830. I Argued and Submitted 
April 8, 1998. I Decided Aug. 11, 1998. I As 
Amended Aug. 31, 1998. 
Female employee who was denied promotion brought sex 
discrimination action against employer pursuant to 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, 1., granted employer's 
summary judgment motion, and employee appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) 
employee's direct evidence of sex discrimination raised 
genuine issues of fact as to whether employer's 
nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting employee 
were pretext, and (2) employee provided substantial 
circumstantial evidence that employer's proffered reasons 
for not promoting employee were pretext for sex 
discrimination, and thus, employer was not entitled to 
summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
California law under the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) mirrors federal law under 
Title VII, and thus, federal cases are instructive. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
8 
Female employee established a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination under California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), where 
employee belonged to protected class, employee 
was performing according to employer's 
legitimate expectations, employee suffered 
adverse employment action, and other employees 
with qualifications similar to her own were 
treated more favorably. 
Employee may establish pretext in a sex 
discrimination action either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly 
by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 
When an employee, alleging gender 
discrimination, offers direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the 
actual motivation ofthe employer is created even 
if the evidence is not substantial. 
"Direct evidence" is evidence that, if believed, 
proves the fact of discriminatory animus without 
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inference or presumption. 
Female employee's direct evidence of sex 
discrimination in violation of California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) raised 
genuine issues of fact as to whether employer's 
nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting 
employee were pretext, where employee offered 
manager's statement that director did not want to 
deal with another female after dealing with 
current female manager and evidence that former 
female manager was not invited on employer 
sponsored hunting and fishing trips and was 
given doll kit containing dildos and oil. 
Manager's statement that director did not want to 
deal with another female after dealing with 
current female manager was properly admitted as 
admission by agent in sex discrimination action 
under California Fair Employment and Housing 
Act (FEHA), where comment was not stray 
remark uttered in ambivalent manner but was 
instead related directly to positions employee 
sought. 
I 
Female employee provided substantial 
circumstantial evidence that employer's 
proffered reasons for not promoting employee, 
that males promoted had better experience and 
more easy going personalities, were pretext for 
sex discrimination in violation of California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and thus, 
employer was not entitled to summary judgment, 
where all evidence supporting employer's 
reasons came from statements prepared after 
employment decision was made and while 
litigation was in progress and such statement 
were inconsistent with statements made at time 
of employment decision. 
Circumstantial evidence that an employer's 
proffered motives for adverse employment action 
were not the actual motives because they were 
inconsistent or otherwise not believable must be 
specific and substantial in order to create a triable 
issue with respect to whether the employer 
intended to discriminate on the basis of sex in 
violation of the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA). 
*1218 Sunil, Lewis, Vatave, 
Newport Beach, California, for the plaintiff-appellant. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Irvine, 
California, for the defendant-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California; 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00178-AHS. 
*1219 Before: and 
Circuit Judges. 
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Circuit Judge: 
The issue in this case is a familiar one: what showing of 
pretext by a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit is 
sufficient to overcome a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, where the defendant asserts that its refusal to 
promote the plaintiff was based on legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons? This is an issue that has 
troubled the courts in their endeavors to follow the 
in this field. See 
("The federal courts ... have not been entirely 
clear on what constitutes a showing ofpretext."). 
The district court granted the employer's summary 
judgment motion, holding that the plaintiff did not offer 
sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct was 
discriminatorily motivated. A close review of our 
decisions reveals that in this circuit a plaintiff who offers 
substantial evidence that the employer's proffered reasons 
were not reliable, see, e.g., 
showing to create triable issues with respect to the 
employer's motivation. The plaintiff-appellant in this case 
did both. We therefore reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff-appellant, Marsha Godwin, had been a 
member of the Hunt Wesson sales force for nine years 
when two marketing manager positions became available 
in the Rosarita and Wesson brands division. AIcy Grimes, 
the most senior female executive for the defendant, 
resigned from her position as senior marketing manager for 
the Wesson brand, creating a vacancy. Jim Ruschman, the 
marketing manager for the Rosarita brand, took her 
position, and therefore, the Rosarita marketing manager 
position became available. In addition, Ruschman 
persuaded Ron Guthier, the Director of Marketing, to 
create another Wesson marketing manager position to 
assist Ruschman. Godwin applied for both the Rosarita and 
Wesson positions. 
Guthier and Ruschman had primary responsibility for 
selecting the qualified candidates for the marketing 
manager positions. Guthier and Ruschman considered 
Godwin and Jim Rossi for the Wesson position and 
Godwin and Mark Smith for the Rosarita position. They 
selected the male candidates over Godwin for both jobs. 
Although Guthier and Ruschman offer facially 
nondiscriminatory explanations for their selection of the 
male candidates, Godwin contends she has direct and 
circumstantial evidence to support her allegations that 
Guthier and Ruschman wanted to give the positions to 
males. She relies upon evidence that the selected 
candidates would reside on the almost all-male 10th floor 
and that the only female marketing manager on the 10th 
floor, Louise De Pre Fontaine, had caused dissension 
among the all-male employees, in support of her position 
that Guthier and Ruschman discriminatorily refused on 
account of her gender to consider Godwin seriously for 
either marketing position. 
Godwin seeks general and punitive damages for gender 
discrimination in employment in violation of the California 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) Cal. Gov't 
Code 33 12.900-12.955. 
DISCUSSION 
Because California law under the FEHA mirrors 
federal law under Title VII, federal cases are instructive. 
See 
We review the district court's decision to grant summary 
*1220 judgment de novo. See 
We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether any genuine 
issues of material fact exist and whether the district court 
correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See 
The parties debate the required showing to create a triable 
issue with respect to the employer's motivation at the 
so-called "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
shifting analysis. The McDonnell Douglas analysis 
imposes on the plaintiff an initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of discrimination. 
To establish a prima facie 
case, a plaintiff must offer evidence that "give[ s] rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." 
"The prima facie case may be based 
either on a presumption arising from the factors such as 
those set forth in McDonnell Douglas, or by more direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent." 
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"The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a 
prima facie case for Title VII .. , on summary judgment is 
minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
121 Here, Godwin unquestionably established the 
McDonnell Douglas factors for a prima facie case: (1) she 
belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing 
according to her employer's legitimate expectations, (3) 
she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other 
employees with qualifications similar to her own were 
treated more favorably. See 
Once Godwin established her prima facie case, the burden 
then shifted to the defendant to articulate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory 
conduct. See id Hunt Wesson, in its motion for summary 
judgment, produced evidence that it chose the male 
candidates because of their better experience and more 
"easygoing" personalities. 
The employer's articulation of a facially 
nondiscriminatory reason shifts the burden back to the 
plaintiff to show that the employer's reason was a pretext 
for discrimination. See 
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Jd 
The district court required Godwin to present substantial 
direct evidence of discrimination at the pretext stage. After 
reviewing our cases, we conclude that this ruling is 
incorrect for it conflates the standards we have articulated 
for two different types of evidence-circumstantial and 
direct-available at the pretext stage to prove discriminatory 
motive. 
Confusion is understandable, because although we 
have articulated two different ways in which a plaintiff 
may prove pretext, we have not expressly recognized the 
difference. Our law stems from the Supreme Court's 
holding that the plaintiff may establish pretext "either 
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence." 
We have held, clearly, that a plaintiff at the pretext stage 
must produce evidence in addition to that which was 
sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut the 
defendant's showing. See We have 
been less clear about what additional showing is required. 
We have said that the plaintiff "need produce very little 
evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact." see also, 
(quoting 
Lindahl); (when a 
plaintiff introduces "direct or circumstantial" evidence "a 
factual question will almost always exist with respect to 
any claim of a nondiscriminatory *1221 reason"); 
775 
("[a]ny indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice 
to raise a question that can only be resolved by a 
factfinder"). 
We have also said, however, that the plaintiff must produce 
"specific, substantial evidence of pretext." See 
("plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the proffered reasons are pretexts" in a Title 
VII retaliation case); 
"sufficiently probative"). 
These apparently differing standards, however, are 
reconcilable, for they depend upon the nature of the 
plaintiff's evidence. When the plaintiff offers direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the 
actual motivation of the employer is created even if the 
evidence is not substantial. As we said in Lindahl, it need 
be "very little." (direct evidence 
of sexual stereotyping where employer believed that the 
female candidates get "nervous" and "easily upset"); see 
also (direct evidence of race 
discrimination where employer referred to a 
Mexican-American employee as a "dumb Mexican."); 
(direct evidence of sex 
stereotyping where employee referred to female plaintiff as 
"an old warhorse" and to her students as "little old ladies"). 
"Direct evidence is evidence which, ifbelieved, proves the 
fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or 
presumption." 
(alterations 
quotations and citations omitted). 
As did the plaintiffs in Cordova and Lindahl, Godwin 
produced evidence of direct discrimination. See 
at She presented 
a statement made by Ruschman to Hunt Wesson's national 
sales manager, Bernie Stipetic, that Guthier "did not want 
to deal with another female after having dealt with ... 
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Louise De PreFontaine." This comment directly suggests 
the existence of bias and no inference is necessary to find 
discriminatory animus. See 
Hunt Wesson raises a number of arguments to counter 
that evidence, but none are availing at this stage. Hunt 
Wesson is incorrect in asserting that this statement is 
inadmissable hearsay. We have held that an admission by 
an agent within the scope of his employment is admissable. 
See 
(multiple hearsay is admissable if each of the 
speakers was involved in the employer's decision). Hunt 
Wesson also disputes that Stipetic was involved in the 
employment decision, but this dispute is for the trier offact 
to resolve. Furthermore, the comment is not a "stray 
remark" that is "uttered in an ambivalent manner and [is] 
not tied directly to [the plaintift]'s termination," which we 
have held to be insufficient. See n4,wvu'// 
,} 
(statement of 
corporate officer having no direct relationship to plaintiff 
that "[W]e don't necessarily like grey hair" in age 
discrimination suit not sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment); (employer's "old 
timers" comment was ambivalent and not tied to 
termination and thus insufficient to establish age 
discrimination). Ruschman's comment was not ambivalent 
and it is related directly to the positions that Godwin 
sought. 
The record also contains direct evidence of discriminatory 
animus toward women as employees. Alcy Grimes, the 
former senior marketing manager for the Wesson brand, 
testified that while she was giving a presentation at a sales 
meeting, someone gave her a "Barbie doll kit" containing 
two dildos and a bottle of Wesson oil. She also testified 
that the company sponsored hunting and fishing trips to 
which she was not invited and other women did not attend. 
Godwin testified that the president of the company, 
Marshall Ransam, made derogatory comments about 
women at meetings. In sum, Godwin's direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus satisfies the required showing at the 
pretext stage. See 
* 1222 In those cases where direct evidence is 
unavailable, however, the plaintiff may come forward with 
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the 
employer's proffered motives were not the actual motives 
because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable. 
Such evidence of "pretense" must be "specific" and 
"substantial" in order to create a triable issue with respect 
to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the 
basis of sex. See (no evidence 
beyond that produced for the prima facie case presented); 
(no evidence beyond that 
produced for the prima facie case presented); 
(no evidence beyond that produced for the 
prima facie case); see also 
(circumstantial evidence of shifting explanations are not 
"sufficiently probative"). 
In this case, Godwin did show substantial evidence of the 
unreliability of the reasons proffered by the employer. All 
of the evidence supporting the employer's proffered 
reasons came from statements, depositions, and 
declarations prepared after the employment decision was 
made and while this litigation was in progress. This alone 
is not disqualifying. "Simply because an explanation 
comes after the beginning of litigation does not make it 
inherently incredible." The 
evidence in this record of the contemporaneous reasons for 
the selection of the male applicant, however, is 
inconsistent in material ways with the statements upon 
which the employer relies. 
In their declarations prepared for litigation, Guthier and 
Ruschman explain that they selected Rossi for the Wesson 
position because he had demonstrated creativity in 
marketing and they believed he would work well with both 
sales and marketing personnel. They explain further that 
they did not select Godwin because Guthier had concerns 
about Godwin's ability to get along with Ruschman and 
the sales force. As to the Rosarita position, Guthier and 
Ruschman assert that they selected Smith not only because 
of his marketing experience, but also because of his 
easygoing personality. 
Although the employer's declarations and depositions 
indicate that "creativity" was the most important criterion 
for selecting the male Wesson marketing manager, the 
criterion of "creativity" does not appear in the 
contemporaneous memorandum prepared at the time of the 
selection. Although "shifting explanations are acceptable 
when viewed in the context of other surrounding events < •• 
such weighing of the evidence is for a jury, not a judge." 
Moreover, the recommendations received during the 
review of Godwin described her repeatedly as getting 
along well with others and also referred to her as being 
"creative." In fact, the only negative recommendations 
with respect to Godwin's personality in the 
contemporaneous notes of her application reflect an 
inability to get along with persons on the "tenth floor." The 
tenth floor housed all the marketing executives' offices. 
Because all of the marketing executives were male with 
only one exception, we cannot assume those generic 
negative references are necessarily gender neutral. 
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Godwin also presented evidence that one of the male 
candidates had received poor evaluations on his 
personality. Facts tending to show that the chosen 
applicant may not have been the best person for the job are 
probative as they "suggest that [the explanation] may not 
have been the real reason for choosing [the chosen 
applicant] over the [plaintiff]." 
Godwin's indirect evidence of discriminatory motive, as 
well as her direct evidence was sufficient to raise genuine 
issues of fact as to whether Hunt Wesson's 
nondiscriminatory explanations were the true reasons or 
whether they masked discriminatory motives. See 
3 
conclude that summary judgment should not have been 
granted. 
Footnotes 
Judge 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision is REVERSED and 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit. 
Harvey R. GREENBERG, Plaintiff, 
Appellant, 
v. 
UNION CAMP CORPORATION, Defendant, 
Appellee. 
No. 94-1312. I Heard Nov. 9,1994. I Decided 
Feb. 17, 1995. 
Fonner sales representative brought suit against employer 
alleging that employer violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) by constructively discharging 
him, and further violated the Act by retaliating against him 
for invoking his ADEA rights. The United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Edward F. 
Harrington, J., granted directed verdict in favor of 
employer, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Stahl, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) plaintiff did not 
establish that he was constructively discharged when 
employer required him to spend two additional days a 
week making sales calls in his sales territory, and (2) 
plaintiff did not establish that employer acted with a 
retaliatory motive in requiring plaintiff to work five days a 
week in his sales territory. 
Affinned. 
West Headnotes (2) 
[1) Civil Rights 
Constructive Discharge 
Former sales representative failed to establish in 
age discrimination suit that he was constructively 
discharged when employer required him to spend 
two additional days a week making sales calls in 
his sales territory; plaintiff did not assert that new 
conditions would be humiliating or demeaning, 
and it was not unreasonable for employer to 
expect sales representatives to spend their work 
days making sales calls; moreover, single inquiry 
concerning plaintiffs retirement plans, and fact 
that no employee over age 40 had been hired in 
Maine plant during tenure of plant manager was 
not sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus 
[2] 
to substantiate constructive discharge claim. 
53 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
·,,?,,,Particular Cases 
Fonner sales representative did not establish that 
employer acted in retaliation against him for 
invoking his ADEA rights when employer 
required plaintiff to work five days a week, rather 
than three days as fonneriy, in his sales territory; 
rather, order was inexorable result of plaintiffs 
persistence in refusing to modify his work 
schedule. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
22 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*22 Douglas G. Moxham, with whom Geoffrey R. Bok and 
Lane & Altman, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellant. 
John T. Murray, with whom Jeffrey K. Ross, Seyfarth, 
Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, John A. 
Nadas, Kevin P. Light, Karen L. Cartotto and Choate, Hall 
& Stewart, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee. 
Before CYR, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit 
Judge, and ST ARL, Circuit Judge. 
Opinion 
ST ARL, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-appellant Harvey Greenberg appeals from a 
directed verdict granted in favor of defendant-appellee 
Union Camp on Greenberg's claims of wrongful 
tennination due to age and retaliatory discrimination. 
Because Greenberg failed to adduce sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of constructive discharge or retaliatory 
motive, we affirm. 
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Background 
In October of 1971, Harvey Greenberg, at age thirty-five, 
began working as a sales representative for Union Camp.! 
Union Camp hired Greenberg primarily to cover the Maine 
sales territory for its Dedham, Massachusetts, plant. Union 
Camp manufactures (and Greenberg sold) corrugated 
cardboard boxes for industrial and commercial use. 
Throughout his career at Union Camp, Greenberg resided 
in Swampscott, Massachusetts. 
When Union Camp hired Greenberg, it had virtually no 
existing customer base in the State of Maine. Greenberg 
initially spent one week a month prospecting for new 
accounts in Maine and the rest of the month selling to 
existing Massachusetts customers. Greenberg, however, 
successfully built up Union Camp's client base in Maine 
and in short order concentrated his sales efforts almost 
exclusively in Maine. Indeed, Greenberg was primarily 
responsible for securing the Maine client base which was a 
prerequisite for Union Camp to open a corrugated 
container plant in Auburn, Maine. By 1977, Union Camp's 
client base in Maine had grown such that Greenberg's sales 
territory was narrowed to approximately the southern half 
of the State of Maine.2 
Greenberg increased his sales every year, from $190,000 in 
1972 to over $5,400,000 in 1989. Greenberg's profit 
contribution (roughly a measure of how much money 
Union Camp earned on the sales) consistently compared 
very favorably with that of other Union Camp sales 
representatives. Moreover, at least by some measures, 
Greenberg successfully sold not only to established 
accounts, but also to new customers.3 Greenberg received 
annual pay increases with his compensation rising from 
about $12,500 in 1972 to almost $65,000 in 1989. In July 
of 1990, at his annual performance review, Greenberg, 
who like all Union Camp sales representatives worked on a 
salary rather than a commission basis, received the largest 
merit increase of his career. 
Throughout most of his nineteen years at Union Camp, 
Greenberg called on his Maine customers only on 
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. He attributed this 
work schedule, at least in part, to his basic sales philosophy 
that prospective customers were generally too busy for and 
unreceptive to sales pitches on Mondays and Fridays. 
During a typical week, Greenberg would leave his home in 
Massachusetts at 5:30 a.ill. on Tuesdays, meet his first 
customer in Maine at 7:00 a.m. and continue to make sales 
calls until around 3:00 p.m., when he would check into a 
motel where he would spend Tuesday and Wednesday 
nights. Often he would entertain clients on the company 
expense account during the evenings. Wednesdays, he 
typically left his hotel at 8:00 a.m. and would call on 
customers until the middle of the afternoon. On Thursdays 
starting sometime after 8:00 a.m., he would visit customers 
while working his way back to Massachusetts, generally 
arriving home sometime near the middle of the afternoon. 
Early in his career, Greenberg reported to the Dedham, 
Massachusetts, plant on Mondays to speak to supervisors, 
tum in expense reports and meet with box designers about 
customer orders. After Greenberg began reporting to the 
Maine plant in 1983, he still periodically went to the 
Dedham plant to work with designers until the facility 
closed around 1986. From 1986 until he left the company, 
Greenberg generally worked out of *24 his home on 
Mondays and Fridays, completing paperwork4 and making 
telephone calls to the plant and to customers. Greenberg 
normally finished this work before noon, usually leaving 
the rest of the day for personal matters. Greenberg 
periodically did visit a New Hampshire customer on 
Mondays. 
In 1987, Union Camp assigned Gerald Redman to the 
Auburn, Maine, plant as plant manager. In the summer of 
1987 at Greenberg'S annual performance review, Redman 
told Greenberg that, "[y]our reputation goes all the way to 
Wayne [ (Union Camp's headquarters) ], you don't work 
Monday and Friday. Ifit ever gets to be a problem, I will be 
the first to tell you about it." Bob Ritter, the Maine plant 
sales manager, testified that, at this meeting and at 
Greenberg'S 1988 performance review, Greenberg stated 
that he intended to retire at age fifty-five. 
In November 1989, Redman and Ritter required Greenberg 
and the other sales representatives to make presentations 
regarding their top five new-account prospects. Redman 
was extremely dissatisfied with Greenberg's performance 
at his individual meeting, and Greenberg described the 
meeting as "two hours of insults and threats." At one point 
during the meeting, Greenberg stated, "I don't have to 
listen to this garbage anymore," and threatened to walk 
out. At another, Greenberg commented to Redman that 
there seemed to be "[a] sword of[D]amocles hanging over 
my head in my best sales year." To which Redman 
responded, "You'd better believe it." Ritter testified that at 
this meeting he told Greenberg that his three-day schedule 
was not satisfactory. Though Greenberg maintained that he 
was not ordered at this point to make sales calls on 
Mondays and Fridays, he admitted that his work schedule 
may have been discussed. Following the meeting, 
Greenberg avoided speaking with Redman and Ritter 
except as business required.5 
Greenberg asked Ritter to visit some customers with him in 
February of 1990. During the trip, the two discussed the 
previous November meeting. Greenberg testified that they 
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also discussed Greenberg's own belief that Union Camp's 
sales force was too 01d.6 He also admitted that they may 
have discussed his work schedule and sales philosophy, 
but he did not specifically recall. 
At a meeting in May 1990, Ritter asked Greenberg, who 
would tum fifty-four the following July, whether he had 
plans to retire early at age fifty-five. Though Greenberg 
testified that he had never told anyone at Union Camp that 
he intended to retire early, he admitted that a story he often 
told about his father might have suggested that he wished 
to do so.7 During the meeting, Greenberg told Ritter that 
there was no way he could afford to retire early. Directly 
following the meeting, Ritter informed Redman that 
Greenberg did not intend to retire early. Redman testified 
that this fact increased the need to do something about 
Greenberg's work schedule. 
In July 1990, Ritter gave Greenberg his annual review, at 
which he told Greenberg *25 about his raise, which was 
the largest of Greenberg'S career, and about areas of his job 
performance that needed improvement. Following the 
meeting, Ritter sent Greenberg a letter purporting to 
summarize the main points of the review. Ritter noted in 
the letter that he had informed Greenberg that he must 
show improvement "in the immediate future" in areas of 
"base accounts, new account development, communication 
with management, work schedules, expenses and 
communication." More specifically, Ritter wrote: 
New account penetration in recent years 
has been unsatisfactory. Regardless of 
base account level, new account focus, 
planning and development must 
improve. Work habits and methods must 
be reviewed with action taken to better 
utilize open available weekly time to 
achieve job responsibilities. Not 
communicating with management 
because of the difference of opinion is 
unacceptable, and actions such as these 
cannot occur again. 
Greenberg testified that he could not recall Ritter 
counselling him about any significant performance 
problems in past reviews.8 
Greenberg responded with a four-page missive of his own, 
dispatched to Ritter and Redman, in which he contested the 
substance of Ritter's complaints. Though Greenberg 
testified at trial that the fact that he only called on 
customers on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays was 
not discussed at his review, in his letter he specifically 
responded: "[']Work habits and methods [ (referring to 
Ritter's letter) ] .... ['] We have talked about this before and 
my position has never changed .... It's been my experience 
, .~ ~ . ~ 
that successful salesmen have different methods and if they 
are successful they should be rewarded [and] not made to 
walk to the same beat of some drummer." (Second ellipsis 
added). 
Redman replied to Greenberg with a short letter stating: 
We received your letter of August 18, 1990, and we 
would prefer not to continue a letter writing exchange 
regarding your Sales Philosophy. 
Bob Ritter's memo of August 8, 1990 was written to 
document the fact that your performance has not been up 
to expected standards in the areas of: expenses, expense 
reporting, communications, work schedules and new 
account penetration. The memo also intended to 
emphasize the seriousness of continued resistance to 
change and critical opposition to suggestions for 
improvement. 
After receiving this letter, Greenberg consulted a lawyer, 
who, on September 13, 1990, wrote to Redman's superior 
suggesting that Greenberg was being subjected to age 
discrimination. On September 19, 1990, shortly after 
Union Camp received this letter, Redman and Ritter met 
with Greenberg and informed him that, from that point on, 
he was expressly required to spend five days a week in his 
sales territory. Greenberg requested time to consider this 
requirement and Redman agreed, telling Greenberg to " 
'take time to think about it.' " 
Finally, at a meeting nearly a month later on October 15, 
1990, Greenberg refused to sign a letter that explicitly 
listed six conditions of employment that he would be 
required to meet, including the 
five-days-in-the-sales-territory requirement. 9 Greenberg's 
*26 decision not to sign the letter ended his employment 
relationship with Union Camp. Subsequently, no other 
sales representative, including Greenberg's replacement, 
was required to sign a similar document. Moreover, Union 
Camp has never made five days in the sales territory an 
explicit job requirement for any other sales representative. 
Greenberg brought this action in the district court alleging 
that Union Camp terminated his employment in violation 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 
29 U.s.c. §§ 621-634. Greenberg alleged that Union 
Camp's actions were motivated by an anti-age animus and 
a desire to retaliate against Greenberg for seeking to 
invoke his ADEA-protected rights. Following the close of 
Greenberg's case, the district court granted Union Camp's 
motion for a directed verdict, holding that Greenberg had 
failed to show any evidence of age discrimination and that 
Union Camp "did not terminate [Greenberg] but that 
[Greenberg] left [Union Camp's] employment because he 
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blatantly refused to work five days a week in the territory 
of Maine as required by his employer." This appeal 
followed. 
II. 
Discussion 
We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a 
motion for a directed verdict (or more properly judgment 
as a matter oflaw), employing the "same stringent standard 
incumbent upon the trial court in the first instance." 
Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir.1994). In 
performing this task, we take the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and ask whether a rational 
jury could find in that party's favor. E.g., Murray v. 
Ross~Dove Co., 5 F.3d 573,576 (1st Cir.1993). 
A. Age Discrimination Claim 
[1) In a wrongful termination case under the ADEA the 
plaintiff must establish " 'that his years were' the 
determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would 
not have been fired but for his age.' " Mesnick v. General 
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting 
Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1 st 
Cir.1988», cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 
L.Ed.2d 586 (1992); see also Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, 
Ltd., 3 F.3d476, 478 (1st Cir.1993). Where direct evidence 
of discriminatory animus is lacking, the burden of 
producing evidence is allocated according to the 
now-familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Sanchez v. 
Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 719 (1st Cir.1994). 
discrimination vanishes and the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to show that the employer's alleged justification is 
merely pretext for discrimination. *27 Woods v. Friction 
Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255,260 (1st Cir.1994). 
Greenberg's termination claim fails at the outset, however, 
because he has not adduced sufficient evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably conclude that he was 
constructively discharged. Greenberg maintains that Union 
Camp constructively discharged him by requiring him to 
sign the October 15 letter, which explicitly listed six job 
requirements that he needed to fulfill. Except for the 
requirement that he make sales calls in his territory five 
days a week, Greenberg testified that he was substantially 
complying with the conditions listed in the letter. 
Primarily, Greenberg contends that, by requiring him to 
spend two additional days a week making sales calls in 
Maine, Union Camp constructively discharged him. We 
disagree. 
It is well settled in this Circuit that, to establish a claim of 
constructive discharge, the evidence must support a 
finding that " 'the new working conditions would have 
been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in 
the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.' 
" Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 
(I st Cir.1986) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 
562 F.2d 114, 119 (I st Cir.1977»; see also Vega, 3 F.3d at 
480 (new conditions must make work so "arduous" 
"unappealing" or "intolerable" that a reasonable pers;n 
would resign). The legal standard to be applied is 
"objective," with the inquiry focused on "the reasonable 
state of mind of the putative discriminatee." Calhoun, 798 
F.2d at 561 (internal quotations omitted). Consequently, 
"an employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his or 
her working environment." Jd. (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Vega, 3 F.3d at 476. 
Within the context of this case, we believe that no rational 
jury could find that requiring Greenberg to spend two 
Under the McDonnel! Douglas framework, the employee additional days in Maine making sales calls to be so 
must initially come forward with sufficient evidence to intolerable that a reasonable person in Greenberg'S shoes 
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. would have felt compelled to resign. Initially, we note that 
Thus, here, Greenberg needed to establish that (i) he is a Greenberg does not assert that the new conditions would 
member of a protected class, i.e., over forty years of age, be humiliating or demeaning, often an important factor in 
(ii) his job perfonnance was sufficient to meet Union evaluating a claim of constructive discharge. See, e.g., 
Camp's legitimate job expectations, (iii) he was actually or Aviles-Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir.1992) 
constructively discharged, and (iv) Union Camp sought a (sufficient evidence to find constructive discharge where 
replacement with roughly equivalent qualifications. Vega, evidence included scolding and ridiculing plaintiff in front 
3 F.3d at 479; see also Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 719. Once the of clients on a daily basis). Moreover, in explicitly 
plaintiff has met this relatively light burden, a presumption imposing the six conditions on Greenberg, Union Camp 
of discrimination arises and the onus is then shifted to the did not demote Greenberg or reduce his payor total 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory compensation. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 
reason for its actions. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823. If the F.2d 885, 888-89 (3d Cir.1984) (constructive discharge 
employer produces such a justification, the presumption of where, along with other factors, change in sales 
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representative's territory constituted substantial cut in 
pay); cf Nunez-Soto v. Alvarado, 918 F.2d 1029, 1030-31 
(1st Cir.1990) (demotion without salary cut insufficient for 
constructive discharge). Indeed, at his July 1990 review, 
just prior to imposing the conditions of employment, 
Union Camp gave Greenberg the largest merit increase of 
his career. In effect, Greenberg contends that the 
requirement is intolerable because it would require him to 
spend more time on the road, and possibly (though not 
necessarily) another weeknight or two away from home. In 
the context of this case, this is not enough. 
Greenberg was a sales representative. It is hardly 
unreasonable for an employer to expect its sales 
representatives to spend their workdays making sales calls. 
That calling on his customers meant spending time on the 
road is more an unhappy aspect of Greenberg's vocation 
than an unreasonable or intolerable working condition. See 
Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1254-56 (4th 
Cir.1985) (no constructive discharge where conditions, 
though unpleasant, are part and parcel to the job), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 1461, 89 L.Ed.2d 718 
(1986). 
Requiring Greenberg to spend two additional days in 
Maine appears-burdensome only if we focus narrowly on 
the fact that Greenberg resides in Massachusetts. The 
degree to which requiring Greenberg to work two 
additional days in Maine is unreasonable, however, must 
be measured within the context of this case. Union Camp 
originally hired Greenberg specifically to be its sales 
representative for the State of Maine. Therefore, 
Greenberg, who lived in Massachusetts at the time, 
accepted employment knowing that he was hired to sell to 
Maine *28 customers. 10 Thus, this case is distinguishable 
from one in which an employee who lives and works in one 
city is offered the choice between tennination and a 
transfer to another city. See Hazel v. United States 
Postmaster Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 5 (1 st Cir.1993) (suggesting 
that transfer from one city to another would support 
finding of constructive discharge); but see Cherchi v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 693 F.Supp. 156, 162-64 (D.N.J.) (no 
constructive discharge where employer offered transfer 
from New Jersey to Baltimore), afJ'd, 865 F.2d 249 (3d 
Cir.1988). Because Greenberg voluntarily chose to work as 
the sales representative for the Maine territory, while 
living in Massachusetts, he cannot now complain of 
changes in his work schedule that would not be 
burdensome but for that choice. 
Nonetheless, Greenberg makes much of the fact that Union 
Camp did not explicitly impose the mandatory 
five-day-a-week-sales-call condition on any of its other 
sales representatives or his younger replacement. He 
argues that this disparate treatment amply supports a 
finding of constructive discharge. Union Camp officials, 
however, all testified that the condition was a basic, albeit 
unwritten, requirement of the sales representative position. 
Moreover, Greenberg does not point to any other sales 
representative who similarly made calls in his or her 
assigned territory only three days a week that Union Camp 
treated differently. At most, Greenberg elicited testimony 
from his replacement that, due to the need to finish 
paperwork, handle customer requests and/or complaints, 
and tend to other vagaries of the job, he occasionally 
passed a day without making sales calls, but nonetheless 
was not required to sign a similar 
conditions-of-employment statement. This evidence is 
insufficient. See Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 
11, 17 (1 st Cir.1994) ("In a disparate treatment case, the 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that she was treated 
differently from persons situated similarly in all relevant 
aspects." (internal quotations omitted». I I 
Moreover, our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that 
Greenberg couples his allegation of constructive discharge 
with virtually no evidence that Union Camp's motives 
stemmed from an animosity towards age. Direct or 
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory animus could 
help substantiate a claim that one's working conditions had 
become intolerable to an unreasonable degree. See, e.g., 
Acrey v. American Sheep Indus., 981 F.2d 1569, 1574-75 
(10th Cir.1992) (employer request that employee quit on 
account of age cited as evidence of both animus towards 
age and unreasonable working conditions); Goss, 747 F.2d 
at 888 (verbal abuse that conveyed animosity towards 
employee's gender supported finding of constructive 
discharge). As evidence of age discrimination, Greenberg, 
however, essentially points to just two factors-( 1) the 
single May 1990 inquiry concerning Greenberg's 
retirement plans, and (2) the fact that no employee over age 
forty had been hired by Union Camp at the Maine plant 
during Redman's tenure as plant manager. 
A single inquiry by an employer as to an employee's plans 
for retirement, however, does not necessarily show 
animosity towards age. See Colosi v. Electri-Flex Co., 965 
F.2d 500, 502 (7th Cir.1992). An employer may 
legitimately inquire about an employee's plans so that it 
can prepare to meet its hiring needs. Though repeated 
and/or coercive inquiries can clearly give rise to a 
reasonable inference of an anti-age bias (and lend support 
*29 to a finding of constructive discharge), see Calhoun, 
798 F.2d at 562-63 (three inquires over seven months 
coupled with demotion requiring employee to report to 
younger person employee had previously trained, and 
threat of onerous working conditions if no resignation), 
that is not the case here. Greenberg alleges only that Ritter 
made a single inquiry at the May 1990 meeting as to 
whether Greenberg had plans to retire at age fifty-five. 
Moreover, though Greenberg testified that he never told 
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Ritter or Redman that he intended to retire early, he 
admitted that an anecdote he frequently recounted could 
have led them to think he desired to do so. 
The fact that Union Camp's Maine plant did not hire any 
employees over age forty during Redman's tenure as plant 
manager adds little to Greenberg's claim. As we have 
noted before, without any attempt to establish the 
demography of the available hiring pool, this evidence has 
little probative value. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins .• 6 F.3d 
836,848 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 
S.Ct. l398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); cf Goldman v. First 
Na!'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1119 n. 5 (1st 
Cir.1993). Moreover, Greenberg offered no evidence at 
trial concerning the number of employees actually hired, 
thus precluding any reasonable evaluation of the statistical 
data in terms of sample size. Finally, that two years after 
his departure three of seven sales representatives employed 
at the Maine plant were over age forty, and that Redman, 
himself, was five years older than Greenberg, makes any 
inference of animosity towards age on this evidence 
dubious at best. Therefore, Greenberg's proffered evidence 
of anti-age bias provides little support for his claim of 
intolerable working conditions and consequent 
constructive discharge, and thus his age-bias claim falls 
short. 
B. Retaliatory Claim 
[2] Greenberg's claim of retaliatory discrimination 
likewise fails because no rational jury could conclude on 
this evidence that Union Camp acted with a retaliatory 
motive in requiring Greenberg to work five days a week in 
his sales territory. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 827 (plaintiff 
must show that employer's reason for adverse action taken 
against employee is pretext masking retaliation for 
employee invoking his ADEA-protected rights). Even 
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Greenberg, it is clear that his work schedule had been an 
issue with his superiors at Union Camp since at least the 
November 1989 meeting. Moreover, it is not disputed that 
Greenberg did not adjust his work schedule in response to 
the August 8 letter, in which Ritter unequivocally wrote, 
"Work habits and methods must be reviewed with action 
taken to better utilize open available weekly time to 
achievejob responsibilities." (Emphasis added). 
Greenberg responded to this directive with his own letter 
stating, "We have talked about this before and my position 
Footnotes 
has never changed.... It's been my experience that 
successful salesmen have different methods and if they are 
successful they should be rewarded [and] not made to walk 
to the same beat of some drummer." (Emphasis added). 
Furthermore, Redman's August 28 letter clearly warned 
Greenberg that Ritter's letter "was written to document the 
fact that [Greenberg's] performance ha[d] not been up to 
expected standards in the areas of: expenses, expense 
reporting, communications, work schedules and new 
account penetration." Redman concluded by stating that 
Ritter's letter was "intended to emphasize the seriousness 
of continued resistance to change and critical opposition 
to suggestions for improvement." (Emphasis added). 
Any rational view of these interchanges makes clear that 
Greenberg'S continued refusal to adapt his work schedule 
would result in further action by Union Camp. Hence, no 
rational jury could conclude that the September 19 order 
directing Greenberg to spend five days a week in his sales 
territory ensued because Union Camp sought to retaliate 
against Greenberg for invoking his ADEA rights. Rather, 
the order was the inexorable result of Greenberg's 
persistence in refusing to modify his work schedule. See 
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828 (ADEA should not permit a 
disgruntled employee to "inhibit a well-deserved discharge 
[or other sanction] by *30 merely filing, or threatening to 
file, a discrimination complaint."). 
III. 
Conclusion 
In sum, because Greenberg failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge or 
retaliatory motive, the district court did not err in granting 
Union Camp's motion for a directed verdict on the claims 
of age and retaliatory discrimination. Accordingly, the 
decision of the district court is 
affirmed. 
Parallel Citations 
67 Fair Emp1.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 120, 129 Lab.Cas. P 57,842 
1 In 1971, the entity that retained Greenberg was a subsidiary of Union Camp operating under the name Allied Container. About 1985, 
the Allied Container subsidiary adopted the Union Camp logo. For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to Greenberg'S employer, 
whether before or after 1985, as Union Camp. 
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2 By 1977, Greenberg had essentially discontinued calling on any Massachusetts customers. 
3 The parties disputed Greenberg's performance in securing and selling new accounts. In maintaining that he perfonned well in this 
area, Greenberg pointed out that he ranked third, second and first for the years 1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively, in terms of square 
feet of corrugated cardboard sold to new accounts. Union Camp, on the other hand, pointed to other measures, that indicated whether 
the new-account customers were one-time purchasers or became recurring customers, which shed a less favorable light on 
Greenberg's performance. 
4 The paperwork consisted of expense and sales-call reports. Greenberg testified that, for the last several years of his career, he filled 
out identical sales-call reports every other week. He stated that, though in general they reflected his activities, they did not accurately 
state on a day-to-day basis the clients he visited. 
5 Greenberg also testified that his expenses were discussed during this meeting. He recalled stating "I never pocketed a nickel." 
Redman replied, "It better be that way." 
At trial, Greenberg admitted that he often entertained individuals who were not Union Camp customers and later attributed the cost 
of the entertainment on his expense reports to actual clients. Greenberg resolutely maintained, however, that the expenditures 
always benefitted Union Camp, albeit sometimes indirectly. 
6 Greenberg had previously brought this point to both Redman and Ritter's attention. Deposition testimony of Greenberg's 
replacement read into the record at trial established that, at the time of the deposition, three of seven sales representatives at the Maine 
plant were older than age forty. Though not elicited as a fact in Greenberg's case-in-chief, Redman, who testified and was present for 
the four days of trial, is five years older than Greenberg. 
7 Greenberg's written performance reviews dated February 1989 and February 1990, include the statement "Retirement in the near 
future," under a section entitled "Career Development." Greenberg neither signed nor saw these reviews prior to leaving the 
company. 
8 Greenberg's unsigned performance reviews from 1987 to 1990 rate him as either an excellent or effective employee. Areas needing 
attention or improvement, however, are listed as "[p Jrospecting and attention to detail" (February 1987); '·time in marketplace, 
tolerance/understanding to differing opinions" (April 1987); "[aJcknowledgement and adaptability to changing conditions. Time 
Management and prospecting" (February 1989); "[aJcknowledgement & adaptability to changing conditions. Time management and 
prospecting." (February 1990). The February 1990 review also states, "Salesman understands consequences of performance level 
drop with present inclination not to change work methods & time management issues presented to him:' 
9 The six conditions were stated as follows: 
I. You must present a plan analyzing your top 10 new account prospects as to total dollar potential, how each account fits our 
mix and volume profile, our present sales position with each project, and an immediate action plan for penetrating the accounts. 
2. Call the Sales Manager or General Manager every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday (or on a daily basis whenever conditions 
warrant) to communicate account problems or concerns, review competitor actions, and update management on market 
conditions. 
3. Provide Sales Manager with written feedback on customer reaction to quotations within 30 days of the quotations being 
issued. 
4. Increase weekly sales calls from current average of 12-13 to a minimum of 20 per week. 
5. Maintain 5 day sales schedule in your telTitory and bc actively involved in making customer calls Monday through Friday. 
6. Accurately repOli expenses incurred in entertaining customers. Reduce customer entertainment expenses by 15% in July 
through December, 1990 from January through June, 1990's expenses. 
1 0 Nowhcre does Greenberg assert that he originally accepted employment with Union Camp on the condition that he spend no more 
than three days a week calling on Maine customers. 
11 Greenberg relies on Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. 507 U.S. 604, ----, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 1708, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), which he asserts 
establishes that an employee who refuses to sign an onerous job contract not imposed on a younger replacement is constructively 
discharged. While this premise may be true (though we do not agree that the Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue), 
Greenberg has failed to show that the "contract" here was sufficiently onerous. In Hazen, the contract included a non-compete clause 
that would have prohibited the employee, who was a trained chemist, from working in his field of expertise for two years after 
leaving the company. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1411 (I st Cir.1992), vacated, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 123 
L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Union Camp sought no such restriction on Greenberg's future employment. 
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Supreme Court of the United States 
Jack GROSS, Petitioner, 
v. 
FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 
No. 08-441. I Argued March 31, 2009. I 
Decided June 18, 2009. 
Synopsis 
Background: Employee brought action against employer 
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) , 
alleging he was demoted because of his age. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 
Thomas 1. Shields, 1., rendered judgment on jury verdict 
for employee. Employer appealed. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Colloton, Circuit Judge, 
526 F.3d 356, reversed. Certiorari was granted. 
[Holding:] The Supreme Court, Justice Thomas, held that 
mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in ADEA 
case. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. 
Justice Breyer filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg joined. 
West Headnotes (7) 
[1] Federal Courts 
Review on Certiorari 
Although petition for certioraii, asking Supreme 
Court to decide whether a plaintiff had to present 
direct evidence of discrimination in order to 
obtain mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title 
VII discrimination case, did not specifically 
frame the question to include threshold inquiry of 
whether burden of persuasion ever shifted to 
party defending alleged mixed-motives 
discrimination claim brought under ADEA, 
statement of question presented was deemed to 
comprise every subsidiary question fairly 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
included therein. Age Discrimination III 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
60 I Cases that cite this headnote 
Statutes 
\,vConstruction with Reference to Other Statutes 
When conducting statutory interpretation, 
Supreme Court must be careful not to apply rules 
applicable under one statute to different statute 
without careful and critical examination. 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
Statutes 
Amendatory and amended acts 
When Congress amends one statutory provision 
but not another, it is presumed to have acted 
intentionally. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Statutes 
Implications and inferences 
Negative implications raised by disparate 
statutory prOVISIOns are strongest when 
provisions were considered simultaneously when 
language raising the implication was inserted. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Motive or intent; pretext 
Civil Rights 
Disparate treatment 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
ADEA does not authorize mixed-motives age 
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discrimination claim, since ordinary meaning of 
ADEA's requirement that employer took adverse 
action "because of' age is that age was the 
"reason" that employer decided to act; therefore, 
to establish disparate-treatment claim, plaintiff 
must prove that age was "but-for" cause of 
employer's adverse decision, and burden of 
persuasion does not shift to employer to show 
that it would have taken the action regardless of 
age, even when plaintiff has produced some 
evidence that age was one motivating factor in 
that decision. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(1), 29 US.C.A. 
§ 623(a)(1). 
632 Cases that cite this headnote 
[6] Statutes 
;r,Meaning of Language 
Statutory construction must begin with language 
employed by Congress and assumption that 
ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses legislative purpose. 
23 Cases that cite this headnote 
[7] Evidence 
Party asserting or denying existence of facts 
Where statutory text is silent on allocation of 
burden of persuasion, ordinary default rule is that 
plaintiffs bear risk of failing to prove their 
claims. 
120 Cases that cite this headnote 
**2344 *167 Syllahus* 
Petitioner Gross filed suit, alleging that respondent (FBL) 
demoted him in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it 
unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an 
employee "because of such individual's age," 29 U.S.c. § 
623(a). At the close of trial, and over FBL's objections, the 
District Court instructed the jury to enter a verdict for 
Gross if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that he was demoted and his age was a motivating factor in 
the demotion decision, and told the jury that age was a 
motivating factor if it played a part in the demotion. It also 
instructed the jury to return a verdict for FBL if it **2345 
proved that it would have demoted Gross regardless of age. 
The jury returned a verdict for Gross. The Eighth Circuit 
reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury 
had been incorrectly instructed under the standard 
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, for cases under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when an employee alleges 
that he suffered an adverse employment action because of 
both permissible and impermissible considerations-i.e., a 
"mixed-motives" case. 
Held: A plaintiff bringing an ADEA disparate-treatment 
claim must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
age was the "but-for" cause of the challenged adverse 
employment action. The burden of persuasion does not 
shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the 
action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has 
produced some evidence that age was one motivating 
factor in that decision. Pp. 2348 2352. 
(a) Because Title VII is materially different with respect to 
the relevant burden of persuasion, this Court's 
interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by Title VII 
decisions such as Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 US. 90, 94-95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 
L.Ed.2d 84. This Court has never applied Title VII's 
burden-shifting framework to ADEA claims and declines 
to do so now. When conducting statutory interpretation, 
the Court "must be careful not to apply rules applicable 
under one statute to a different statute without careful and 
critical examination." Federal Express Corp. v. 
Holowecki, 552 US. 389, 128 S.Ct. 1147,1153, 170 
L.Ed.2d 10. Unlike Title VII, which has been amended to 
explicitly authorize discrimination claims where an 
improper consideration was "a motivating factor" for the 
adverse *168 action, see 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the ADEA does not provide that a 
plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age 
was simply a motivating fa~tor. Moreover, Congress 
neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it 
added §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g) (2)(B) to Title VII, 
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in 
several ways. When Congress amends one statutory 
provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted 
intentionally, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
US. 244, 256, III S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274, and 
"negative implications raised by disparate provisions are 
strongest" where the provisions were "considered 
simultaneously when the language raising the implication 
was inserted," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 US. 320, 330, 117 
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(b) The ADEA's text does not authorize an alleged 
mixed-motives age discrimination claim. The ordinary 
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer 
took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the 
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 
123 L.Ed.2d 338. To establish a disparate-treatment claim 
under this plain language, a plaintiff must prove that age 
was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse 
decision. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 
553 U.S. 639, 128 S.Ct. 2l31, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. It 
follows that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the 
burden of persuasion to establish that "but-for" cause. This 
Court has previously held this to be the burden's proper 
allocation in ADEA cases, see, e.g., Kentucky Retirement 
Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. l35, -- --, ----
-, 128 S.Ct. 2361, 171 L.Ed.2d 322, and nothing in the 
statute's text indicates that Congress has carved out an 
exception for a subset of ADEA cases. Where a statute is 
**2346 "silent on the allocation of the burden of 
persuasion," "the ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs 
bear the risk of failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v. 
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387. 
Hence, the burden of persuasion is the same in alleged 
mixed-motives cases as in any other ADEA 
disparate-treatment action. Pp. 2350 - 2351. 
(c) This Court rejects petitioner's contention that the 
proper interpretation of the ADEA is nonetheless 
controlled by Price Waterhouse, which initially 
established that the burden of persuasion shifted in alleged 
mixed-motives Title VII claims. It is far from clear that the 
Court would have the same approach were it to consider 
the question today in the first instance. Whatever Price 
Waterhouse's deficiencies in retrospect, it has become 
evident in the years since that case was decided that its 
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. The 
problems associated with its application have eliminated 
any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to 
ADEA claims. Cf. Continental T. V, Inc. 1'. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36,47,97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568. Pp. 
2351 2352. 
526 F.3d 356, vacated and remanded. 
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
ROBERTS, C.1., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, 
n., joined. STEVENS, 1., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, n., joined. 
BREYER, 1., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. 
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Opinion 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
*169 The question presented by the petitioner in this case 
is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age 
discrimination *170 in order to obtain a mixed-motives 
jury instruction in a suit brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 
Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.s.c. § 621 et seq. Because we 
hold that such a jury instruction is never proper III an 
ADEA case, we vacate the decision below. 
I 
Petitioner Jack Gross began working for respondent FBL 
Financial Group, Inc. (FBL), in 1971. As of 2001, Gross 
held the position of claims administration director. But in 
2003, when he was 54 years old, Gross was reassigned to 
the position of claims project coordinator. At that same 
time, FBL transferred many of Gross' job responsibilities 
to a newly created position-claims administration 
manager. That position was given to Lisa Kneeskem, 
**2347 who had previously been supervised by Gross and 
who was then in her early forties. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a 
(District Court opinion). Although Gross (in his new 
position) and Kneeskem received the same compensation, 
Gross considered the reassignment a demotion because of 
FBL's reallocation of his former job responsibilities to 
Kneeskem. 
In April 2004, Gross filed suit in District Court, alleging 
that his reassignment to the position of claims project 
coordinator violated the ADEA, which makes it unlawful 
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for an employer to take adverse action against an employee 
"because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
The case proceeded to trial, where Gross introduced 
evidence suggesting that his reassignment was based at 
least in part on his age. FBL defended its decision on the 
grounds that Gross' reassignment was part of a corporate 
restructuring and that Gross' new position was better 
suited to his skills. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a (District 
Court opinion). 
At the close of trial, and over FBL's objections, the District 
Court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for 
Gross if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that FBL "demoted [him] to claims projec[t] coordinator" 
and *171 that his "age was a motivating factor" in FBL's 
decision to demote him. App. 9-10. The jury was further 
instructed that Gross' age would qualifY as a " 'motivating 
factor,' if [it] played a part or a role in [FBL]'s decision to 
demote [him]." Id., at 10. The jury was also instructed 
regarding FBL's burden of proof. According to the District 
Court, the "verdict must be for [FBL] ... if it has been 
proved by the preponderance of the evidence that [FBL] 
would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age." Ibid. 
The jury returned a verdict for Gross, awarding him 
$46,945 in lost compensation. Id., at 8. 
FBL challenged the jury instructions on appeal. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury 
had been incorrectly instructed under the standard 
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). See 526 F.3d 356, 
358 (2008). In Price Waterhouse, this Court addressed the 
proper allocation of the burden of persuasion in cases 
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 
Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e et seq., when an 
employee alleges that he suffered an adverse employment 
action because of both permissible and impermissible 
considerations-i.e., a "mixed-motives" case. 490 U.S., at 
232, 244-247, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). The 
Price Waterhouse decision was splintered. Four Justices 
joined a plurality opinion, see id., at 231-258, 109 S.Ct. 
1775, Justices White and O'Connor separately concurred 
in the judgment, see id., at 258-261, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 261-279, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(opinion of O'Connor, J.), and three Justices dissented, see 
id., at 279-295, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of KENNEDY, 
J.). Six Justices ultimately agreed that if a Title VII 
plaintiff shows that discrimination was a "motivating" or a 
" 'substantial' " factor in the employer's action, the burden 
of persuasion should shift to the employer to show that it 
would have taken the same action regardless of that 
impermissible consideration. See id., at 258, 109 S.Ct. 
1775 (plurality opinion); id., at 259-260, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 276,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion 
*172 of O'Connor, 1.). Justice O'Connor further found that 
to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, the 
employee must present "direct evidence that an illegitimate 
criterion was a substantial factor in the [employment] 
decision." Id., at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775. 
**2348 In accordance with Circuit precedent, the Court of 
Appeals identified Justice O'Connor's opllllOn as 
controlling. See 526 F.3d, at 359 (citing Erickson v. 
Farmland Industries, Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (C.A.8 
2001)). Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals found 
that Gross needed to present "[ d]irect evidence ... sufficient 
to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an 
illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse 
employment action." 526 F.3d, at 359 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In the Court of Appeals' view, "direct 
evidence" is only that evidence that "show[ s] a specific 
link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the 
challenged decision." Ibid. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Only upon a presentation of such evidence, the 
Court of Appeals held, should the burden shift to the 
employer" 'to convince the trier of fact that it is more 
likely than not that the decision would have been the same 
absent consideration of the illegitimate factor.' " Ibid. 
(quoting Price Waterhouse, supra, at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(opinion of O'Connor, 1.)). 
The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the District 
Court's jury instructions were flawed because they allowed 
the burden to shift to FBL upon a presentation of a 
preponderance of any category of evidence showing that 
age was a motivating factor-not just "direct evidence" 
related to FBL's alleged consideration of age. See 526 
F.3d, at 360. Because Gross conceded that he had not 
presented direct evidence of discrimination, the Court of 
Appeals held that the District Court should not have given 
the mixed-motives instruction. Ibid. Rather, Gross should 
have been held to the burden of persuasion applicable to 
typical, non-mixed-motives claims; the jury thus should 
have been instructed * 173 only to determine whether 
Gross had carried his burden of "prov [ing] that age was 
the determining factor in FBL's employment action." See 
ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 680, 172 
L.Ed.2d 649 (2008), and now vacate the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
II 
[1) The parties have asked us to decide whether a plaintiff 
must "present direct evidence of discrimination in order to 
obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII 
discrimination case." Pet. for Cert. i. Before reaching this 
question, however, we must first determine whether the 
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burden of persuasion ever shifts to the party defending an 
alleged mixed-motives discrimination claim brought under 
the ADEA.! We hold that it does not. 
A 
Petitioner relies on this Court's decisions construing Title 
VII for his interpretation of the ADEA. Because Title VII 
is materially different with respect to the relevant burden 
of persuasion, however, these decisions do not control our 
construction of the ADEA. 
**2349 In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Court and 
two Justices concurring in the judgment determined that 
once a "plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that [the 
plaintiff's membership in a protected class I played a 
motivating part in an *174 employment decision, the 
defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken [that 
factor I into account." 490 U. S., at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775; see 
also id., at 259-260,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of White, J.); 
id, at 276,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). But 
as we explained in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 
90, 94-95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), 
Congress has since amended Title VII by explicitly 
authorizing discrimination claims in which an improper 
consideration was "a motivating factor" for an adverse 
employment decision. See 42 U.S.c. * 2000e-2(m) 
(providing that "an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating filctor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice" 
(emphasis added»; * 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (restricting the 
remedies available to plaintiffs proving violations of § 
2000e-2(m». 
[21 This Court has never held that this burden-shifting 
framework applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do 
so now. When conducting statutory interpretation, we 
"must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical 
examination." Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 
U.S. 389, ---,128 S.Ct. 1147, 1153, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 
(2008). Unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not provide 
that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing 
that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover, 
Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA 
when it amended Title VII to add ** 2000e-2(m) and 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously 
amended the ADEA in several ways, see Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, * 115, 105 Stat. 1079; id., § 302, at 1088. 
(3) (4) We cannot ignore Congress' decision to amend 
Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar 
changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one 
statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have 
acted intentionally. *175 See EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256, III S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 
274 (1991). Furthermore, as the Court has explained, 
"negative implications raised by disparate provisions are 
strongest" when the prOVISIOns were "considered 
simultaneously when the language raising the implication 
was inserted." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330, 117 
S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). As a result, the 
Court's interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by 
Title VII decisions such as Desert Palace and Price 
Waterhouse.2 
**2350 B 
(5) (6) Our inquiry therefore must focus on the text of the 
ADEA to decide whether it authorizes a mixed-motives 
age discrimination claim. It does not. "Statutory 
construction must begin with the language employed by 
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of 
that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose." *176 Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air 
Quality Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct. 
1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that "[ilt 
shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's age." 29 U.S.c. * 623(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). 
The words "because of' mean "by reason of: on account 
of." 1 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 194 
(1966); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933) 
(defining "because of' to mean "By reason of, on account 
of" (italics in original»; The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language 132 (1966) (defining "because" to 
mean "by reason; on account"). Thus, the ordinary 
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer 
took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the 
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 
123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (explaining that the claim "cannot 
succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually 
played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process 
and had a determinative influence on the outcome " 
(emphasis added». To establish a disparate-treatment 
claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a 
plaintiff must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the 
employer's adverse decision. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond 
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& Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, --, 128 S.Ct. 2l31, 
2141-2142,170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008)(recognizing that the 
phrase, "by reason of," requires at least a showing of "but 
for" causation (internal quotation marks omitted»; Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63-64, and n. 14, 
127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007) (observing that 
"[i]n common talk, the phrase 'based on' indicates a 
but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical 
condition" and that the statutory phrase, "based on," has 
the same meaning as the phrase, "because of' (internal 
quotation marks omitted»; cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 
265 (5th ed. 1984) *177 ("An act or omission is not 
regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event 
would have occurred without it").3 
**2351 (7) It follows, then, that under § 623(a)(l), the 
plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that 
age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse 
action. Indeed, we have previously held that the burden is 
allocated in this manner in ADEA cases. See Kentucky 
Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. l35, -----,-
128,128 S.Ct. 2361, 2363-2366, 2369-2371, 171 
L.Ed.2d 322 (2008); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. l33, 141, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). And nothing in the statute's text 
indicates that Congress has carved out an exception to that 
rule for a subset of ADEA cases. Where the statutory text is 
"silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion," we 
"begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiff" bear the 
risk of failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v. Weast, 546 
U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005); see 
also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 
U.S. 84, --, 128 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-2401, 171 L.Ed.2d 
283 (2008) ("Absent some reason to believe that Congress 
intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of 
persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party 
seeking relief' (internal quotation marks omitted». We 
have no warrant to depart from the general rule in this 
setting. 
Hence, the burden of persuasion necessary to establish 
employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motives 
cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment action. A 
plaintiff: must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
(which may *178 be direct or circumstantial), that age was 
the" but-for" cause of the challenged employer decision. 
See Reeves, supra, at 141-143, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097.4 
III 
Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that our 
interpretation of the ADEA is controlled by Price 
Waterhouse, which initially established that the burden of 
persuasion shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII 
claims.S In any event, it is far **2352 from clear that the 
Court would have the same approach were it to consider 
the question today in the first *179 instance. C£ 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. --, --, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 
1472, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (declining to "introduc[ e] a 
qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text"); 
Meacham, supra, at --, 128 S.Ct., at 2406 (explaining 
that the ADEA must be "read ... the way Congress wrote 
it"). 
Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in 
retrospect, it has become evident in the years since that 
case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is 
difficult to apply. For example, in cases tried to a jury, 
courts have found it particularly difficult to craft an 
instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework. See, 
e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 
(C.A.2 1992) (referring to "the murky water of shifting 
burdens in discrimination cases"); Visser v. Packer 
Engineering Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (C.A.7 
1991) (en banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("The difficulty 
judges have in formulating [burden-shifting] instructions 
and jurors have in applying them can be seen in the fact 
that jury verdicts in ADEA cases are supplanted by 
judgments notwithstanding the verdict or reversed on 
appeal more frequently than jury verdicts generally"). 
Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, the 
problems associated with its application have eliminated 
any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to 
ADEA claims. C£ Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977) 
(reevaluating precedent that was subject to criticism and 
"continuing controversy and confusion"); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 839-844, III S.Ct. 2597, 115 
L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (SOUTER, 1., concurring).6 
*180 IV 
We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment 
claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the "but-for" 
cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The 
burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to 
show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, 
even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age 
was one motivating factor in that decision. Accordingly, 
we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice 
GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA), **2353 29 U.s.c. § 621 et seq., makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any 
employee "because of' that individual's age, § 623(a). The 
most natural reading of this statutory text prohibits adverse 
employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the 
age of the employee. The "but-for" causation standard 
endorsed by the Court today was advanced in Justice 
KENNEDY's dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,279, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 
268 (1989), a case construing identical language in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.c. § 2000e-
2(a)(I). Not only did the Court reject the but-for standard 
in that case, but so too did Congress when it amended Title 
VII in 1991. Given this unambiguous history, it is 
particularly inappropriate for the Court, on its own 
initiative, to adopt an interpretation of the *181 causation 
requirement in the ADEA that differs from the established 
reading of Title VII. I disagree not only with the Court's 
interpretation of the statute, but also with its decision to 
engage in unnecessary lawmaking. I would simply answer 
the question presented by the certiorari petition and hold 
that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of age 
discrimination to obtain a mixed-motives instruction. 
I 
The Court asks whether a mixed-motives instruction is 
ever appropriate in an ADEA case. As it acknowledges, 
this was not the question we granted certiorari to decide.l 
Instead, the question arose for the first time in respondent's 
brief, which asked us to "overrule Price Waterhouse with 
respect to its application to the ADEA." Brief for 
Respondent 26 (boldface type deleted). In the usual course, 
this Court would not entertain such a request raised only in 
a merits brief: " 'We would normally expect notice of an 
intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the 
respondent's opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this 
Court's Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation 
time for those likely affected and wishing to participate.' " 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660, n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 
1764,152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting South Central Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 171, 119 S.Ct. 
1180, 143 L.Ed.2d 258 (1999». Yet the Court is 
unconcerned that the question it chooses to answer has not 
been briefed by the parties or interested amici curiae. Its 
failure to consider the views of the United States, which 
represents the agency charged with administering the 
ADEA, is especially irresponsible.2 
*182 Unfortunately, the majority's inattention to 
prudential Court practices is matched by its utter disregard 
of our precedent and Congress' intent. The ADEA 
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer ... to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.c. 
§ 623(a)(I) (emphasis added). As we recognized in Price 
Waterhouse when we construed the identical "because of' 
language of Title VII, see 42 US.c. § 2000e-2(a)(I) 
(making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual ... with respect to his 
compensation, terms, **2354 conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin" (emphasis added», the 
most natural reading of the text proscribes adverse 
employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the 
age ofthe employee. 
In Price Waterhouse, we concluded that the words " 
'because of' such individual's ... sex ... mean that gender 
must be irrelevant to employment decisions." 490 U.S., at 
240, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 260, 
109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, J., concurring in judgment). To 
establish a violation of Title VII, we therefore held, a 
plaintiff had to prove that her sex was a motivating factor 
in an adverse employment decision.3 We recognized that 
the employer had an affirmative defense: It could avoid a 
finding of liability by proving *183 that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken the 
plaintiff's sex into account. Id., at 244-245, 109 S.Ct. 1775 
(plurality opinion). But this affirmative defense did not 
alter the meaning of "because of." As we made clear, when 
"an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors 
at the time of making a decision, that decision was 
'because of' sex." Id., at 241,109 S.Ct. 1775; see also id., 
at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, 1., concurring in judgment). 
We readily rejected the dissent's contrary assertion. "To 
construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for 
'but-for' causation," we said, "is to misunderstand them." 
Id., at 240, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion).4 
Today, however, the Court interprets the words "because 
of' in the ADEA "as colloquial shorthand for 'but-for' 
causation." ibid. That the Court is construing the ADEA 
rather than Title VII does not justify this departure from 
precedent. The relevant language in the two statutes is 
identical, and we have long recognized that our 
interpretations of Title VII's language apply "with equal 
force in the context of age discrimination, for the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA 'were derived in haec 
verba from Title VII.' " Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 US. 111,121,105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 
523 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 US. 575, 584, 
98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978». See generally 
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Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 
US. 427,428,93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973) (per 
curiam). For this reason, Justice KENNEDY's dissent in 
Price Waterhouse assumed the plurality's mixed-motives 
framework extended to the ADEA, see 490 U.S., at 292, 
109 S.Ct. 1775, and the Courts of Appeals *184 to have 
**2355 considered the issue unanimously have applied 
Price Waterhouseto ADEA claims.5 
The Court nonetheless suggests that applying Price 
Waterhouse would be inconsistent with our ADEA 
precedents. In particular, the Court relies on our statement 
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 
S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), that "[a 
disparate-treatment] claim 'cannot succeed unless the 
employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the 
employer's decisionmaking] process and had a 
determinative influence on the outcome.' " Ante, at 2350. 
The italicized phrase is at best inconclusive as to the 
meaning of the ADEA's "because of' language, however, 
as other passages in Hazen Paper Co. demonstrate. We 
also stated, for instance, that the ADEA "requires the 
employer to ignore an employee's age," id., at 612, 113 
S.Ct. 1701 (emphasis added), and noted that "[w]hen the 
employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other 
than age," there is no violation, id., at 611 (emphasis 
altered). So too, we indicated the "possibility of dual 
liability under ERISA and the ADEA where the decision to 
fire the employee was motivated both by the employee's 
age and by his pension status," id.. at 613, 113 S.Ct. 
170 I-a classic mixed-motives scenario. 
Moreover, both Hazen Paper Co. and Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), on which the majority also relies, 
support the conclusion that the ADEA *185 should be 
interpreted consistently with Title VII. In those 
non-mixed-motives ADEA cases, the Court followed the 
standards set forth in non-mixed-motives Title VII cases 
including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 101 
S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See, e.g., Reeves, 530 
US., at 141-143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Hazen Paper Co., 507 
US., at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701. This by no means indicates, 
as the majority reasons, that mixed-motives ADEA cases 
should follow those standards. Rather, it underscores that 
ADEA standards are generally understood to conform to 
Title VII standards. 
II 
The conclusion that "because of' an individual's age 
means that age was a motivating factor in an employment 
decision is bolstered by Congress' reaction to Price 
Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As part of its 
response to "a number of recent decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court that sharply cut back on the scope 
and effectiveness of [civil rights] laws," H.R.Rep. No. 
102-40, pt. 2,p. 2 (1991), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News 
1991, p. 694 (hereinafter H.R. Rep.), Congress eliminated 
the affirmative defense to liability that Price Waterhouse 
had furnished employers and provided instead that an 
employer's same-decision showing would limit only a 
plaintiffs remedies. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Importantly, 
however, Congress ratified Price Waterhouse's 
interpretation of the plaintiffs burden of proof, rejecting 
the dissent's suggestion in that case that but-for causation 
was the proper standard. See **2356 § 2000e-2(m) ("[A]n 
unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice"). 
Because the 1991 Act amended only Title VII and not the 
ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court 
reasonably declines to apply the amended provisions to the 
*186 ADEA.6 But it proceeds to ignore the conclusion 
compelled by this interpretation of the Act: Price 
Waterhouse's construction of "because of' remains the 
governing law for ADEA claims. 
Our recent decision in Smith V. City of Jackson. 544 U.S. 
228, 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005), is 
precisely on point, as we considered in that case the effect 
of Congress' failure to amend the disparate-impact 
provisions of the ADEA when it amended the 
corresponding Title VII provisions in the 1991 Act. Noting 
that "the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the 
coverage of Title VII [but] did not amend the ADEA or 
speak to the subject of age discrimination," we held that 
"Wards Cove's pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII's 
identical language remains applicable to the ADEA." 544 
U.S., at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (discussing Wards Cove 
Packing CO. V. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 
L.Ed.2d 733 (1989»; see also Meacham V. Knolls Atomic 
Power Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84, --, 128 S.Ct. 2395, 
2405-2406, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008). If the Wards Cove 
disparate-impact framework that Congress flatly 
repudiated in the Title VII context continues to apply to 
ADEA claims, the mixed-motives framework that 
Congress substantially endorsed surely applies. 
Curiously, the Court reaches the opposite conclusion, 
relying on Congress' partial ratification of Price 
Waterhouse to argue against that case's precedential value. 
It reasons that if the 1991 amendments do not apply to the 
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ADEA, Price Waterhouse likewise must not apply because 
Congress effectively codified Price Waterhouse's holding 
in the amendments. Ante, at 2348 2349. This does not 
follow. To the contrary, the fact that Congress endorsed 
this Court's *187 interpretation of the "because of' 
language in Price Waterhouse (even as it rejected the 
employer's affirmative defense to liability) provides all the 
more reason to adhere to that decision's motivating-factor 
test. Indeed, Congress emphasized in passing the 1991 Act 
that the motivating-factor test was consistent with its 
original intent in enacting Title VII. See, e.g., H.R. Rep., 
pt. 2, at 17 ("When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Congress made clear that it intended to prohibit all 
invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or 
national origin in employment decisions"); id., at 2 (stating 
that the Act "reaffirm[ ed] that any reliance on prejudice in 
making employment decisions is illegal"); see also H.R. 
Rep., pt. I, at 45; S.Rep. No. 101-315, pp. 6, 22 (1990). 
The 1991 amendments to Title VII also provide the answer 
to the majority's argument that the mixed-motives 
approach has proved unworkable. Ante, at 2351 - 2352. 
Because Congress has codified a mixed- **2357 motives 
framework for Title VII cases-the vast majority of 
antidiscrimination lawsuits-the Court's concerns about 
that framework are of no moment. Were the Court truly 
worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, 
moreover, it would not reach today's decision, which will 
further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises 
both ADEA and Title VII claims. 
The Court's resurrection of the but-for causation standard 
is unwarranted. Price Waterhouse repudiated that standard 
20 years ago, and Congress' response to our decision 
further militates against the crabbed interpretation the 
Court adopts today. The answer to the question the Court 
has elected to take up--whether a mixed-motives jury 
instruction is ever proper in an ADEA case-is plainly yes. 
III 
Although the Court declines to address the question we 
granted certiorari to decide, I would answer that question 
by following our unanimous opinion in Desert Palace, Inc. 
v. *188 Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 
84 (2003). I would accordingly hold that a plaintiff need 
not present direct evidence of age discrimination to obtain 
a mixed-motives instruction. 
The source of the direct-evidence debate is Justice 
O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in Price 
Waterhouse. Writing only for herself, Justice O'Connor 
argued that a plaintiff should be required to introduce 
"direct evidence" that her sex motivated the decision 
before the plurality'S mixed-motives framework would 
apply. 490 U.S., at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775.7 Many courts have 
treated Justice O'Connor's opinion in Price Waterhouse as 
controlling for both Title VII and ADEA mixed-motives 
cases in light of our statement in Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188, 193,97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977), 
that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " Unlike the cases 
Marks addressed, however, Price Waterhouse garnered 
five votes for a single rationale: Justice White agreed with 
the plurality as to the motivating-factor test, see supra, at 
2354, n. 3; he disagreed only as to the type of evidence an 
employer was required to submit to prove that the same 
result would have occurred absent the unlawful 
motivation. Taking the plurality to demand objective 
evidence, he wrote separately to express his view that an 
employer's credible testimony could suffice. 490 U.S., at 
261, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Because Justice White provided a 
fifth vote for the "rationale explaining the result" of the 
Price Waterhouse decision, Marks, 430 U.S., at 193, 97 
S.Ct. 990, his concurrence is properly understood as 
controlling, and he, *189 like the plurality, did not require 
the introduction of direct evidence. 
Any questions raised by Price Waterhouse as to a direct 
evidence requirement were settled by this Court's 
unanimous decision in Desert Palace, in which we held 
that a plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence to meet 
her burden in a mixed-motives case under Title VII, as 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In construing 
**2358 the language of § 2000e-2(m), we reasoned that 
the statute did not mention, much less require, a heightened 
showing through direct evidence and that "Congress has 
been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof 
requirements." 539 U.S., at 99, 123 S.Ct. 2148. The 
statute's silence with respect to direct evidence, we held, 
meant that "we should not depart from the '[c]onventional 
rul[ e] of civil litigation ... [that] requires a plaintiff to prove 
his case by a preponderance of the evidence', ... using 
'direct or circumstantial evidence.' "Ibid. (quoting Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S., at 253, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality 
opinion), and Postal Service Ed. of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711,103 S.Ct. 1478,75 L.Ed.2d403 (1983)). We 
also recognized the Court's consistent acknowledgment of 
the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination 
cases. 
Our analysis in Desert Palace applies with equal force to 
the ADEA. Cf ante, at 2351- 2352, n. 4. As with the 1991 
amendments to Title VII, no language in the ADEA 
imposes a heightened direct evidence requirement, and we 
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have specifically recognized the utility of circumstantial 
evidence in ADEA cases. See Reeves, 530 U.S., at 147, 
120 S.Ct. 2097 (cited by Desert Palace, 539 U.S., at 99-
100, 123 S.Ct. 2148). Moreover, in Hazen Paper Co., we 
held that an award of liquidated damages for a "willful" 
violation of the ADEA did not require proof of the 
employer's motivation through direct evidence, 507 U.S., 
at 615, 113 S.Ct. 1701, and we have similarly rejected the 
imposition of special evidentiary rules in other ADEA 
cases. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N A., 534 U.S. 
506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); 0 'Connor v. 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 
S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Desert Palace thus 
confirms the answer provided by the plurality *190 and 
Justice White in Price Waterhouse: An ADEA plaintiff 
need not present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain 
a mixed-motives instruction. 
IV 
The Court's endorsement of a different construction of the 
same critical language in the ADEA and Title VII is both 
unwise and inconsistent with settled law. The but-for 
standard the Court adopts was rejected by this Court in 
Price Waterhouse and by Congress in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991. Yet today the Court resurrects the standard in an 
unabashed display of judicial lawmaking. I respectfully 
dissent. 
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOUTER and Justice 
GINSBURG join, dissenting. 
I agree with Justice STEVENS that mixed-motive 
instructions are appropriate in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act context. And I join his opinion. The 
Court rejects this conclusion on the ground that the words 
"because of' require a plaintiff to prove that age was the 
"but-for" cause of his employer's adverse employment 
action. Ante, at 2350. But the majority does not explain 
why this is so. The words "because of' do not inherently 
require a showing of "but-for" causation, and I see no 
reason to read them to require such a showing. 
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show 
·'but-for" causation. In that context, reasonably objective 
scientific or commonsense theories of physical causation 
make the concept of "but-for" causation comparatively 
easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an 
entirely different matter to determine a "but-for" relation 
when we consider, not physical forces, but the 
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive. 
Sometimes we speak of determining or discovering 
motives, but more often we **2359 ascribe motives, after 
an event, to an individual in light *191 of the individual's 
thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of 
decision. In a case where we characterize an employer's 
actions as having been taken out of multiple motives, say, 
both because the employee was old and because he wore 
loud clothing, to apply "but-for" causation is to engage in a 
hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if 
the employer's thoughts and other circumstances had been 
different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often 
be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows 
less than does the employer about what the employer was 
thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a 
stronger position than the employee to provide the answer. 
All that a plaintiff can know for certain in such a context is 
that the forbidden motive did playa role in the employer's 
decision. And the fact that a jury has found that age did 
play a role in the decision justifies the use of the word 
"because," i.e., the employer dismissed the employee 
because of his age (and other things). See Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,239-242, 109 S.Ct. 
1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion). I 
therefore would see nothing wrong in concluding that the 
plaintiff has established a violation of the statute. 
But the law need not automatically assess liability in these 
circumstances. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality 
recognized an affirmative defense where the defendant 
could show that the employee would have been dismissed 
regardless. The law permits the employer this defense, not 
because the forbidden motive, age, had no role in the 
actual decision, but because the employer can show that he 
would have dismissed the employee anyway in the 
hypothetical circumstance in which his age-related motive 
was absent. And it makes sense that this would be an 
affirmative defense, rather than part of the showing of a 
violation, precisely because the defendant is in a better 
position than the plaintiff to establish how he would have 
acted in this hypothetical situation. See id., at 242, 109 
S.Ct. 1775; cf. ante, at 2356 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) 
(describing *192 the Title VII framework). I can see 
nothing unfair or impractical about allocating the burdens 
of proof in this way. -
The instruction that the District Court gave seems 
appropriate and lawful. It says, in pertinent part: 
"Your verdict must be for plaintiff if all the following 
elements have been proved by the preponderance of the 
evidence: 
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"[The J plaintiff s age was a motivating factor in 
defendant's decision to demote plaintiff 
"However, your verdict must be for defendant ... if it has 
been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant would have demoted plaintiff regardless of 
his age. 
"As used in these instructions, plaintiffs age was 'a 
motivating factor,' if plaintiffs age played a part or a 
role in the defendant's decision to demote plaintiff 
However, plaintiffs age need not have been the only 
Footnotes 
reason for defendant's decision to demote plaintiff" 
App.9-1O. 
For these reasons as well as for those set forth by Justice 
STEVENS, I respectfully dissent. 
Parallel Citations 
129 S.Ct. 2343, 106 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 833, 92 
Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,584, 174 L.Ed.2d 119, 77 BNA 
USLW 4531, 09 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7539,2009 Daily 
Journal D.A.R. 8888,21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 958 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of 
the reader. See United States V. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.C!. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. 
1 Although the parties did not specifically frame the question to include this threshold inquiry, "[t]he statement of any question 
presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein." This Court's Rule 14.1; see also City of Sherrill 
v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214, n. 8, 125 S.C!. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005) (" 'Questions not explicitly 
mentioned but esscntial to the analysis of the decisions below or to the correct disposition of the other issues have been treated as 
subsidiary issues fairly comprised by the question presented' " (quoting R. Stem, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme 
Court Practice 414 (8th ed.2002»); Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 46-47, and n. 2, 125 S.C!. 1270, 161 L.Ed.2d 227 (2005) 
(evaluating "a question anterior" to the "questions the parties raised"). 
2 Justice STEVENS argues that the Court must incorporate its past interpretations of Title VII into the ADEA because "the substantive 
provisions of the ADEA werc derived in haec verba from Title VII," post. at 2354 (dissenting opinion) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and because the Court has frequently applied its interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA, see post, at 2354 2356. But the 
Court's approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII has not been unifonn. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 124 S.C!. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004), for example, the Court declined to interpret the phrase "because of ... 
age" in 29 U.S.c. * 623( a) to bar discrimination against people of all ages, even though the Court had previously interpreted "because 
of ... race [or] sex" in Title VII to bar discrimination against people of all races and both sexes, see 540 U.S., at 584, 592, n. 5, 124 
S.C!. 1236. And the Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792,93 S.C!. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), utilized in Title VlI cases is appropriate in the ADEA context. See Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,142,120 S.C!. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311,116 S.C!. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). In this instance, it is thc textual differences between 
Title VII and the ADEA that prevent us trom applying Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace to federal age discrimination claims. 
3 Justice BREYER contends that there is "nothing unfair or impractical" about hinging liability on whether "forbidden motive ... play 
[ed] a role in the employer's decision." Post, at 2359 (dissenting opinion). But that is a decision for Congress to make. See Florida 
Dept. of Revenue j'. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, --, 128 S.C!. 2326, 2338-2339, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008). Congress 
amended Title VII to allow for employer liability when discrimination "was a motivating.factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U.S.c. * 2000e-2(m) (emphasis addcd), but did not similarly amend the ADEA, 
see supra, at 2348 - 2349. We must give efIect to Congress' choicc. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. --, --, 129 S.C!. 
1456,1472,173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). 
4 Because we hold that ADEA plaintifIs retain the burden of persuasion to prove all disparatc-treatment claims, we do not need to 
address whethcr plaintiffs must present direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence to obtain a burden-shifiing instruction. There is no 
heightened evidentiary requirement for ADEA plaintifIs to satisfy their burden of persuasion that age was the "but-for" cause of their 
employer's adverse action, sec 29 U.s.c. § 623(a), and we will imply none. "Congress has been unequivocal when imposing 
heightencd proof requirements" in other statutory contexts, including in other subsections within Title 29, when it has seen fit. See 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99, 123 S.C!. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003); see also, e.g., 25 U.s.c. § 2504(b)(2)(B) 
(imposing "clear and convincing evidence" standard); 29 U.s.c. § 722(a)(2)(A) (same). 
5 Justice STEVENS also contends that we must apply Price Waterhouse under the reasoning of Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 
125 S.C!. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005). See post, at 2356. In Smith, the Court applied to the ADEA its pre-1991 interpretation of 
Title VII with respect to disparate-impact claims despite Congress' 1991 amendment adding disparate-impact claims to Title VII but 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 246 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) 
"'~h'~'~WT'_"~O'" "NM~NN'''W~_'W',~,',~'c'c'~'N~N~''~''~'_''m'~_'r_V'~hr'n''_"'/~"'''~,"'/N'',''''~,''''v/h'''''Y/»/A~~''''''''''''"u''h,h''r_''~''~~if/~~'=_Aw_r"','" • ~'v,'r»r' 
129 S.Ct. 2343,106 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 833,92 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,584 ... 
not the ADEA. 544 U.S., at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536. But the amendments made by Congress in this same legislation, which added the 
"motivating factor" language to Title VII, undermine Justice STEVENS' argument. Congress not only explicitly added "motivating 
factor" liability to Title VII, see supra, at 2348 2349, but it also partially abrogated Price Waterhouse's holding by eliminating an 
employer's complete affirmative defense to "motivating factor" claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If such "motivating 
factor" claims were already part of Title VII, the addition of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) alone would have been sufficient. Congress' careful 
tailoring of the "motivating factor" claim in Title VII, as well as the absence of a provision parallel to § 2000e-2(m) in the ADEA, 
confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework into the ADEA. 
6 Gross points out that the Court has also applied a burden-shifting framework to certain claims brought in contexts other than pursuant 
to Title VII. See Brieffor Petitioner 54-55 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp .. 462 U.S. 393,401-403, 
103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (claims brought under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA»; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568,50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (constitutional claims». These cases, however, do not require the 
Court to adopt his contra statutory position. The case involving the NLRA did not require the Court to decide in the first instance 
whether burden shifting should apply as the Court instead deferred to the National Labor Relation Board's determination that such a 
framework was appropriate. See NLRB, supra, at 400-403, 103 S.Ct. 2469. And the constitutional cases such as Mt. Healthy have no 
bearing on the correct interpretation of ADEA claims, which are governed by statutory text. 
1 "The question presented by the petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age discrimination in order 
to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit brought under the [ADEA]." Ante, at 2346. 
2 The United States filed an amicus curiae brief supporting petitioner on the question presented. At oral argument, the Government 
urged that the Court should not reach the issue it takes up today. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20~21, 28~29. 
3 Although Justice White stated that the plaintiff had to show that her sex was a "substantial" factor, while the plurality used the term 
"motivating" factor, these standards are interchangeable, as evidenced by Justice White's quotation of Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. 
Doyle. 429 U.S. 274,287,97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977): " '[T]he burden was properly placed upon [the plaintiff to show that 
the illegitimate criterion] was a "substantial factor"-or, to put it in other words. that it was a "motivating factor" , " in the adverse 
decision. Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S., at 259, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (emphasis added); see also id., at 249, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality 
opinion) (using "substantial" and "motivating" interchangeably). 
4 We were no doubt aware that dictionaries define "because of' as "by reason of' or "on account of." Ante, at 2350. Contrary to the 
majority's bald assertion, however, this does not establish that the term denotes but-for causation. The dictionaries the Court cites do 
not, for instance, define "because of' as "solely by reason of' or "exclusively on account of.'· In Price Waterhollse, we recognized 
that the words "because of' do not mean "solely because of," and we held that the inquiry "commanded by the words" of the statute 
was whether gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision. 490 U.S., at 241, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). 
5 See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57 (C.A.I 2000); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (C.A.2 
1992); Starceski v. Westinghouse £lec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (C.A.3 1995); EEOC 1'. Warfield Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160 (C.A.4 
2004); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (C.A.5 2004); Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture. Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (C.A.6 
2003); Visser v. Packer Eng. Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (C.A.7 1991) (en bane); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771 
(C.A.8 1995); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303 (C.A.II 2000) (per curiam); sec also Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744, 749 
(C.A.IO 1997). 
6 There is, however, some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-motivcs amendments to apply to the ADEA as well. See 
H.R. Rep., pt. 2, at 4 (noting that a "number of other laws banning discrimination, including ... the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.c. § 621, et seq., are modeled after and havc bcen interprcted in a manner consistent with Title 
VII," and that ·'these other laws modeled after Title VII [should] be interpretcd consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as 
amended by this Act," including the mixed-motives provisions). 
7 While Justice O'Connor did not define precisely what she meant by "direct evidence," we contrasted such evidence with 
circumstantial evidence in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). That Justice O'Connor 
might have intended a different definition does not affect my conclusion, as I do not believe a plaintiff is required to introduce any 
special type of evidcnce to obtain a mixed-motives instruction. 
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Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
Alan HAGY, PiaintijJ-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Idaho, Bannock County, City of 
Pocatello, Idaho, Defendants-
Respondents. 
No. 27015. I May 8, 2002. I Review Denied 
Aug. 1, 2002. 
Brother of mentally ill vIctIm brought negligent 
investigation action against city and county, alleging that 
they failed to properly investigate circumstances 
surrounding victim's death, and brought a wrongful death 
action against state, asserting that it breached its duty to 
involuntarily commit victim to mental health institution. 
The Sixth Judicial District Court, Bannock County, Peter 
D. McDermott, J., granted defendants' motions to dismiss 
and requests for Rule 11 sanctions, and brother appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Perry, e.J., held that: (1) negligent 
investigation was not recognizable cause of action; (2) 
county coroner did not owe duty to order autopsy; (3) 
brother did not have standing to bring wrongful death 
action against state; (4) brother's letter to state requesting 
investigation into victim's death was insufficient to put 
state on notice that he was filing wrongful death action; 
and (5) imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was warranted for 
claims against city and county only. 
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; remanded. 
West Headnotes (15) 
[I] Counties 
. Acts of officers or agents 
Municipal Corporations 
Health and education 
Brother's claim against city and county for 
negligent investigation of mentally ill sister's 
death was not cause of action recognizable under 
Idaho law. I.e. § 6-901 et seq. 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
Municipal Corporations 
•. pNature and grounds ofliability 
Idaho Tort Claims Act (!TCA) subjects 
government entities to liability for negligent or 
wrongful acts committed by the entity or its 
employees where a private person would also be 
liable. I.e. § 6--901 et seq. 
Coroners 
Autopsy 
County coroner did not have actionable duty to 
perform autopsy after victim's body was 
discovered in river; rather, coroner had statutory 
discretion to order medical doctor to perform an 
autopsy and give opinion as to cause of death. 
I.e. § 19-430lB. 
Statutes 
General and special statutes 
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the 
more specific statute or section addressing the 
issue controls over the statute that is more 
general. 
Death 
Death of plaintiff or beneficiary 
Brother did not have standing to bring wrongful 
death action against state, based on its alleged 
failure to involuntarily commit sister to mental 
health facility prior to her death; action, which 
was brought by brother as personal representative 
of mother's estate, abated when mother died prior 
to bringing claim. I.e. § 5-311. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
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[6] 
[7) 
[8] 
[9] 
Death 
;;;ccHeirs and next of kin 
If there are no heirs, no right of action for 
wrongful death vests in anybody. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
"""",Scope and theory of case 
An appellate court may affinn a lower court's 
decision on a legal theory different from the one 
applied by that court. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
States 
io··,Fonn and sufficiency 
Brother's letter to state requesting investigation 
into mentally ill sister's death, stating that 
circumstances surrounding sister's death and 
individuals responsible for death were unknown, 
was insufficient to put state on notice that brother 
was filing wrongful death claim as personal 
representative of mother's estate, where brother 
made only one reference to mother, near bottom 
of notice, that mother's heart attack, which 
caused her death, was result of trauma from 
sister's death. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
Costs and Allowances 
In detennining whether a district court's 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper, an 
appellate court shall detennine: (1) whether the 
trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 11. 
[10] Attorney and Client 
",Liability for costs; sanctions 
Rule 11 sanctions against attorney of brother for 
filing action against city and county alleging 
negligent investigation into sister's death after 
her body was found in river, where attorney 
failed to provide evidentiary support for 
allegations in complaint, failed to produce 
reports of private investigator hired by brother 
and could not recall investigator's name, failed to 
request copy of police report concerning its own 
investigation of sister's death, and failed to make 
reasonable inquiry as to law involved, but instead 
filed suit based on claim that was not 
recognizable under state law. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule II(a)(l). 
[11) Costs 
Nature and Grounds of Right 
Pleadings, motions, and other papers signed by 
an attorney must meet certain criteria, and failure 
to meet such criteria will result in the imposition 
of sanctions. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule ll(a)(l). 
[12) Attorney and Client 
Liability for costs; sanctions 
In evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a 
pleading for the purposes of detennining whether 
an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is justified, 
the district court must detennine whether the 
attorney exercised reasonableness under the 
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circumstances and made a proper investigation 
upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal 
theories before signing and filing the document. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule II(a)(1). 
[13] Attorney and Client 
,./"Liability for costs; sanctions 
Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted against 
attorney of brother who filed wrongful death 
action against state based on brother's status as 
personal representative of mother's estate, even 
though brother had no standing to bring claim 
and he failed to provide adequate notice to state 
that he was filing wrongful death action in 
addition to claims against city and county; 
brother could have raised legitimate arguments as 
to legal issues of standing and adequate notice. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 11 (a)( 1). 
[14] Costs 
Nature and form of judgment, action, or 
proceedings for review 
Brother's appeal from dismissal of claims against 
city and county for negligent investigation into 
mentally ill sister's death was pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without legal or 
factual foundation, and thus, city and county 
were entitled to award of attorney fees incurred 
on appeal, where brother urged appellate court to 
grant relief for cause of action that did not exist. 
I.c. § 12-121; Appellate Rule 41. 
[151 Costs 
Right and Grounds 
An award of attorney fees may be granted to the 
prevailing party on appeal, if appellate court is 
left with abiding belief that appeal was brought, 
or defended, frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation, but attorney fees will not be 
awarded where the losing party brought the 
appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of 
law was presented. I.c. § 12-121; Appellate Rule 
41. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**434 *620 Richard D. Vance, Pocatello, for appellant. 
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Jack H. Robison, 
Special Deputy Attorney General, Pocatello for 
respondent, State ofIdaho. Jack H. Robison, argued. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, Idaho Falls, for 
respondents, Bannock County and City of Pocatello. 
Donald L. Harris argued. 
Opinion 
PERRY, ChiefJudge. 
Alan Hagy appeals from the district court's orders 
dismissing his complaint against defendants State ofIdaho, 
Bannock County, and the City of Pocatello. Hagy's 
counsel, Richard D. Vance, challenges the district court's 
order imposing sanctions against Vance, individually, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11. We affirm in part, vacate in part, 
and remand. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 5, 1998, the body of Hagy's sister, Karen, was 
found in the Portneuf River in Pocatello. Approximately 
three weeks later, Hagy's mother, Delores, suffered a heart 
attack and died. On October 13, Hagy mailed a letter to the 
Secretary of State's office, requesting that all agencies 
undertake appropriate inquiry in order to determine who 
was responsible for Karen's death. On April 17, 2000, 
Hagy filed a complaint against the state, county, and city. 
Specifically, Hagy alleged that the city police and county 
sheriff negligently investigated Karen's death and that the 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 251 
Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (2002) 
51 432 
county coroner was negligent in failing to conduct an 
autopsy on Karen's body. With regard to the state, Hagy 
contended that the state breached its duty to involuntarily 
commit Karen to a mental health facility. 
Hagy also purported to bring a civil action of homicide 
alleging that, approximately five months prior to Karen's 
death, she purchased a life insurance policy and that it was 
unknown to Hagy where Karen was able to acquire the 
money to purchase the policy. Hagy further alleged that, 
because two of the beneficiaries of the life insurance policy 
were two of Karen's mental health care providers, those 
two mental health care providers directly or indirectly 
intentionally caused Karen's death. However, Hagy did not 
allege which of the three defendants these two mental 
health care providers were employed by. Hagy's complaint 
alleged that as a result, the state was responsible for the 
deaths of Karen and his mother. Hagy sought 
compensation for the "suffering and emotional **435 *621 
distress that he has suffered and will suffer for the death of 
his sister and mother" and compensation for the 
"emotional distress that he has incurred because of his 
inability to know the cause of his sister's death." 
The state, county and city each filed a motion to dismiss 
Hagy's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted and requested Rule 11 sanctions. 
After a hearing, the district court dismissed Hagy's 
complaint against the county and city, concluding that 
Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent 
investigation. The district court took the remainder of the 
motions under advisement pending the filing of an 
amended complaint by Hagy. 
Hagy filed a motion to reconsider the order dismissing the 
complaint against the county and city and a motion to 
amend his complaint. The district court denied Hagy's 
motion to reconsider and his motion to file an amended 
complaint and dismissed Hagy's complaint against the 
state with prejudice. Additionally, the district court ordered 
Vance to pay Rule 11 sanctions of$3,000. Hagy appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free 
review in determining whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 
III Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279,1280 (Ct.App.1986). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all 
controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of 
the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 
119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); Sanders v. 
Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 
156 (Ct.App.1994). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Claim Against the City 
[1) [2) Hagy contends that the district court erred in 
dismissing his complaint against the city, asserting that the 
cause of action alleged is a valid claim pursuant to I.C. § 6~ 
903. The Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.c. §§ 6-901 to 
929, subjects government entities to liability for negligent 
or wrongful acts committed by the entity or its employees 
where a private person would also be liable. Limbert v. 
Twin Falls County, 131 Idaho 344, 346, 955 P.2d 1123, 
1125 (Ct.App.1998), Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 
1021,729 P.2d 1075, 1084 (Ct.App.1987). When a trial 
court is considering a motion for dismissal of a complaint 
against a governmental entity and its employees under the 
ITCA, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that: 
[A] trial judge should first detem1ine whether the 
plaintiffs' allegations and supporting record generally 
state a cause of action for which "a private person or 
entity would be liable for money damages under the 
laws of the state ofldaho." Walker v. Shoshone County, 
112 Idaho 991, 995, 739 P.2d 290,294 (1987) .... In 
consideration of the initial inquiry as to whether a 
private individual or entity could be held liable under the 
facts alleged in the complaint, we essentially ask "is 
there such a tort under the laws ofldaho?" Id. 
Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 
In reviewing a trial court's order granting a motion to 326,330,775 P.2d 640, 644 (1989). 
dismiss, our standard of review is the same as our summary 
judgment standard. Rim View Trout Co. v. Idaho Dep't of In this case, the district court concluded that under Wimer 
Water Res., 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 P.2d 1155, 1156 v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 841 P.2d 453 (Ct.App.1992), 
(1991). We first note that summary judgment under Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue investigation. In Wimer, the appellants brought a claim 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to against the state under the ITCA contending that two 
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Department of Fish and Game officers had negligently 
conducted **436 *622 their investigation into the 
appellant's alleged poaching of elk. This Court stated: 
Our own research has uncovered no 
states that have held that a cause of action 
for negligent investigation exists. 
Therefore, we accept the statement in 
Dirienzo v. United States, 690 F.Supp. 
1149 (D.Conn.1988), that the common 
law did not impose liability upon even a 
private person for mere negligence in 
instituting or continuing a criminal 
prosecution for a crime which has 
actually occurred. 
ld. at 925, 841 P.2d at 455. Because Idaho does not 
recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation, the 
district court did not err in dismissing Hagy's complaint 
against the city. 
B. Claim Against the County 
With regard to the county, Hagy first argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it determined that 
negligent investigation is not a cause of action recognized 
in this state. Based on our analysis of this issue with regard 
to the city, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion with regard to this issue as it also applies to 
the county sheriff. 
[3) Hagy further argues that the district court erred when it 
dismissed his claim that the county is liable due to the 
county coroner's failure to perform an autopsy. Hagy 
contends that I.e. § 19-4301 (b) imposes a duty on a county 
coroner to investigate a death that occurs under unknown 
or suspicious circumstances and that the coroner in this 
case breached that duty by not performing an autopsy on 
Karen. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4301(b) requires that, when a 
coroner is informed that a person in the county has died 
under unknown circumstances, the coroner must refer the 
investigation to either the county sheriff or chief of police. 
There is no dispute between the parties in this case that an 
investigation was conducted. 
[4) However, Idaho Code Section 19-4301B provides that 
a coroner may request a medical doctor to perform an 
autopsy and give a professional opinion as to the cause of 
death. As this section deals directly with the issue of when 
an autopsy may be ordered, it is the more specific statute in 
this case. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the 
more specific statute or section addressing the issue 
controls over the statute that is more general. See Mulder v. 
Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 58,14 P.3d 372, 
378 (2000). Therefore, I.e. § 19-430lB controls in this 
case and dictates that the performance of an autopsy is not 
mandatory, but rather falls within the discretion of the 
coroner. We conclude that based on the language of this 
statute, the district court did not err when it determined that 
the coroner did not owe a duty to perform an autopsy on 
Karen and properly dismissed Hagy's complaint against 
the county. 
C. Claims Against the State 
[5) Hagy next argues that the district court erred when it 
dismissed his complaint against the state. The district court 
dismissed the complaint on the basis that Hagy's letter sent 
to the state was insufficient to constitute an effective notice 
of tort claim under the ITCA. The state responds on appeal 
that Hagy did not have standing to sue and that he failed to 
provide proper notice of his claims under the ITCA. 
Hagy's claims were wrongful death actions brought 
pursuant to I.e. § 5-311. That section defines who may 
pursue a wrongful death action and states, in pertinent part: 
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal 
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action 
for damages against the person causing the death ... 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, 
"heirs" mean: 
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to 
the property of the decedent according to the provisions 
of subsection (21) of section 15-1-201, Idaho Code. 
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) of 
this section, the decedent's spouse, children, 
stepchildren, parents, and, when partly or wholly 
dependent on the decedent for support or services, any 
**437 *623 blood relatives and adoptive brothers and 
sisters. 
With regard to the claim for Karen's death, Hagy is not an 
heir entitled to maintain an action under I.e. § 5-311. 
Hagy contends that his mother was an heir of Karen under 
the terms of the statute and that her right to maintain a 
wrongful death action passed to her estate when she died. 
Hagy argues that he, as personal representative of his 
mother's estate, is thus entitled to bring a claim for Karen's 
death on behalf of his mother's estate. However, we 
construe 1. e. § 5-311 (1) to use "personal representative" 
to mean the personal representative of the decedent, not of 
the heirs. Thus, an action may be maintained for wrongful 
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death of a person by the decedent's heirs or the decedent's 
personal representative on behalf of the heirs. 
[6] A number of courts in other states have held that where 
no wrongful death action is commenced during the life of 
the beneficiary, the action is abated upon the death of the 
beneficiary. See Re Estate of Dillman, 8 Il1.App.2d 239, 
l31 N.E.2d 634 (1956); Pedro Ii v. Missouri P. Railroad, 
524 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.Ct.App.1975); Simons v. Kidd, 73 
S.D. 280,41 N.W.2d 840 (1950); Carterv. Van Meter, 495 
S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); Murray v. Dewar, 6 
Wis.2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959). Furthermore, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that no right of action is 
given to the estate of the victim of a tort, but is granted only 
to his or her heirs. See Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 605, 
151 P.2d 765, 770 (1944), overruled on other grounds by 
Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888, 
477 P.2d 511 (1970). If there are no heirs, no right of action 
vests in anybody. Id. 
[7] Upon our review of the law, we conclude that the 
wrongful death action for Karen's death abated with the 
death ofHagy's mother. For this reason, Hagy did not have 
standing to pursue a claim against the state for Karen's 
death. Although argued by the parties below, the district 
court did not dismiss Hagy's complaint on that precise 
reasoning. However, an appellate court may affirm a lower 
court's decision on a legal theory different from the one 
applied by that court. Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 
1091,1093,793 P.2d 1263,1265 (Ct.App.1990). Thus, we 
conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing 
Hagy's complaint against the state for Karen's death. 
[8] With regard to Hagy's claim against the state for his 
mother's death, Hagy is an heir under the terms ofI.C. § 5-
311 and had standing to bring such a claim. However, the 
record lacks evidence that Hagy sent the state a sufficient 
notice of tort claim as required by the !TCA. Hagy asserts 
that the notice sent regarding his sister's death was detailed 
enough to put the state on notice regarding his claim for his 
mother's death. The notice, in the form of a letter from 
Hagy's attorney, stated, "I have been retained by Alan 
Hagy to represent him with regard to the wrongful death of 
his sister Kathy [sic] Hagy." The remaining portions of the 
notice deal exclusively with the circumstances of Karen's 
death and only request that the state, county and city 
conduct an investigation into the circumstances of Karen's 
death. The notice further stated: 
The events prior to and subsequent to Karen's death are 
questionable, unknown and potentially criminal. The 
individuals responsible for her death, at this point, are 
unknown. 
As Mr. Hagy's attorney, I would respectfully request 
that all agencies induce appropriate inquiry in order to 
determine who is responsible for Karen's death. 
The only mention of Hagy's mother in the notice occurs 
near the end and consists of one reference: "After Karen's 
death, her mother suffered a heart attack and died because 
of Karen's death. The events and circumstances 
subsequent to Karen's death are unfortunate and are also a 
result of these defendant's responsibility." We conclude 
that this passing reference to Hagy's mother was 
insufficient to put the state on notice that Hagy was also 
filing a claim for the death of his mother. Therefore, we 
find no error in the district court's dismissal of Hagy's 
complaint against the state. 
D. Rule 11 Sanctions 
[9] [10] Vance, as counsel for Hagy, challenges the district 
court's order imposing **438 *624 Rule 11 sanctions 
against him individually. In determining whether a district 
court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper, we 
determine: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
[11] [12] Pursuant to I.R.C.P. II(a)(1), pleadings, motions, 
and other papers signed by an attorney must meet certain 
criteria, and failure to meet such criteria will result in the 
imposition of sanctions. See Durrant v. Christensen, 117 
Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990). Rule l1(a)(1) 
requires that pleadings be: (1) well grounded in fact; (2) 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) 
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increases in the 
costs of litigation. In evaluating an attorney's conduct in 
filing a pleading, the district court must determine whether 
the attorney exercised reasonableness under the 
circumstances and made a proper investigation upon 
reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories before 
signing and filing the document. Riggins v. Smith, 126 
Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). 
The district court ordered sanctions against Vance after 
finding that Hagy's complaint was commenced without 
conducting any investigation. The district court concluded, 
as a matter oflaw, that sanctions were proper based on the 
frivolous and unsupported pursuit of the action and 
Vance's failure to provide the district court with any 
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evidence to support the allegations made in the complaint. 
After a review of the record in this case, we conclude that 
the district court did not err in imposing sanctions in favor 
of the city and county. At a hearing held on September 11, 
2000, Vance represented to the district court that a private 
investigator had been hired and that the county's and city's 
actions after Karen's death had been investigated 
thoroughly. Vance was unable to produce the private 
investigator's reports or even recall the investigator's 
name. Vance never requested a copy of the police report 
regarding Karen's death. The record reveals that Vance did 
not make a reasonable inquiry into the facts prior to filing 
Hagy's initial complaint. It is also clear from the record 
that Vance failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law 
involved as required by Rule 11. Hagy alleged a civil case 
against the city and county for a cause of action that, under 
clear precedent, is not recognized in this state. 
[13) Rule 11 sanctions, however, were not proper to be 
awarded in favor of the state. Although we have 
determined that Hagy had no standing to file suit on behalf 
of his mother's estate and did not give any notice to the 
state that he was filing a claim regarding his mother's 
death, a legitimate argument can be proffered on those 
issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Vance in favor of the 
city and county, but vacate as to any award in favor of the 
state. Because the district court did not delineate individual 
amounts awarded to each defendant, we must remand for a 
determination of such. 
E. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
(14) (15) On appeal, the state, county, and city seek an 
award of attorney's fees, claiming that Hagy's appeal was 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
An award of attorney fees may be granted to the prevailing 
party pursuant to I.e. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. Excel 
Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708,712,769 P.2d 
585, 589 (Ct.App.1989). Such an award is appropriate 
when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal 
has been brought, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
- or without foundation. Id. However, attorney fees will not 
be awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in 
good faith and where a genuine issue oflaw was presented. 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 
End of Document 
591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). 
**439 *625 After having thoroughly reviewed all the 
issues raised and the arguments presented on this appeal, 
we are left with the abiding belief that Hagy's appeal 
against the city and county was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without legal or factual foundation. As 
he did below, Hagy urged this Court to grant relief for a 
cause of action that is not recognized in this state. 
Therefore, we award the county and city attorney fees on 
appeal. For the same reasons that we vacate the Rule 11 
sanction awarded below, no attorney fees will be awarded 
to the state on appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in dismissing Hagy's 
complaint against the state, county, and city. Negligent 
investigation is not a recognized cause of action in this 
state. Hagy did not have standing to bring a claim for 
Karen's death on behalf of his mother's estate. 
Furthermore, although Hagy had standing to pursue a tort 
claim against the state for the death of his mother, his 
notice of tort claim failed to give adequate notice to the 
state regarding that claim. Accordingly, the district court's 
orders dismissing Hagy's complaint are affirmed. In 
addition, the district court's order imposing sanctions 
against Vance in favor of the city and county is affirmed. 
Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded to the 
county and city. The Rule 11 sanctions awarded to the 
state, however, are vacated and remanded. Costs, but not 
attorney fees, on appeal are awarded to the state. 
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, concur. 
Parallel Citations 
51 P.3d 432 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 255 

Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc., 615 F.3d 1151 (2010) 
N,"~",~""~~,,,,_,m~",~" _v,,~_~/' • • ,.N"·"uk""yr·~~·HY,,·~y,,· ·Y __ '._ //Y 'YN,,""N,,'»N • _y.,,' "'''Y'Y''NN~' __ /'Ym'm''m''mY'''my~y,~_~,",~~h''Mn".hm,~~=''",,~,,"""" ·Y'~YNwh~Y. 
109 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1824, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 10,544 ... 
615 F.3d 1151 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Gregory S. HAWN; Michael R. Prince; Aric 
A. Aldrich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 08-15903. I Argued and Submitted Jan. 
12,2010. I Filed Aug. 16, 2010. 
reason for the challenged action, and if defendant 
meets that burden, plaintiffs must then raise a 
triable issue of material fact as to whether the 
defendant's proffered reasons for their 
terminations are mere pretext for unlawful 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
29 Cases that cite this headnote 
[2] Civil Rights 
Synopsis 
Background: Terminated airline pilots brought Title VII 
action against employer, alleging that they were 
discriminated against on basis of gender, race, and national 
origin when they were discharged for allegedly sexually 
harassing flight attendant. Employer moved for summary 
judgment. The United States District Court for the District 
of Arizona, Stephen M. McNamee, 1., 546 F.Supp.2d 703, 
granted employer's motion. Pilots appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Senior Circuit 
Judge, held that: 
[1] pilots were required to show that they were similarly 
situated to female flight attendants; 
[2] pilots failed to show that they were similarly situated to 
flight attendants; and 
[3] pilots were not entitled to strike Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) probable cause 
determination. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (12) 
[1] Civil Rights 
Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden 
Court of Appeals analyzes plaintiffs' Title VII 
claims through the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas, under which plaintiffs must 
first establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination; if plaintiffs establish a prima 
facie case, the burden of production, but not 
persuasion, then shifts to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
[3] 
[4] 
~,Prima facie case 
To establish a prima facie case in a Title VII 
action, plaintiffs must offer evidence that gives 
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
Civil Rights 
Prima facie case 
Plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case in a 
Title VII action based on circumstantial evidence 
by showing: (1) that they are members of a 
protected class; (2) that they were qualified for 
their positions and performing their jobs 
satisfactorily; (3) that they experienced adverse 
employment actions; and (4) that similarly 
situated individuals outside their protected class 
were treated more favorably, or other 
circumstances surrounding the adverse 
employment action give rise to an inference of 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.c.A. § 1981. 
25 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Discrimination against men; reverse 
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(5] 
[6] 
discrimination 
Male airline pilots who brought Title VII action 
against employer after they were terminated for 
alleged sexual harassment of female flight 
attendant, were required, as part of prima facie 
case, to show that they were similarly situated to 
female flight attendants who were not terminated 
for allegedly engaging in similar conduct, where 
plaintiffs themselves invoked the comparison to 
make out a claim of disparate treatment. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
"",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
A Title VII plaintiff may show an inference of 
discrimination in whatever manner is appropriate 
in the particular circumstances, and may do so 
through comparison to similarly situated 
individuals, or any other circumstances 
surrounding the adverse employment action that 
give rise to an inference of discrimination. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
II Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Discrimination against men; reverse 
discrimination 
Strict "same supervisor" requirement did not 
apply to male airline pilots who brought Title VII 
claims against employer after they were 
terminated for alleged sexual harassment of 
female Hight attendant, alleging that similarly 
situated female flight attendants received more 
favorable treatment despite similar behavior; 
whether plaintiffs and the female Hight 
attendants shared the same direct supervisor 
should not have been determinative of whether 
they were similarly situated, because plaintiffs' 
direct supervisor was excluded from the decision 
to terminate them. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
[7] 
[81 
[9] 
703, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1981. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
"lv"'Questions oflaw or fact 
For purposes of making prima facie case in Title 
VII case, similarity between two persons or 
groups of people is a question of fact that cannot 
be mechanically resolved by determining 
whether they had the same supervisor without 
attention to the underlying issues. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.,·,Prima facie case 
Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework, a Title VII plaintiff s burden is much 
less at the prima facie stage than at the pretext 
stage. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.. Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
in a Title VII action is not intended to be rigid, 
mechanized, or. ritualistic; rather, it is merely a 
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in 
light of common experience as it bears on the 
critical question of discrimination. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 
U.S.c.A. § 1981. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
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(10) Civil Rights 
,)'"Discrimination against men; reverse 
discrimination 
Male airline pilots who brought Title VII action 
against employer after they were terminated for 
alleged sexual harassment of female flight 
attendant failed to demonstrate that female flight 
attendants who allegedly engaged in similar 
behavior but were not terminated were similarly 
situated; although pilots alleged that flight 
attendants engaged in sexualized banter and other 
conduct similar to what pilots were accused of, 
only the pilots' conduct gave rise to a complaint 
of sexual harassment, and pilots never 
complained of discriminatory treatment or sexual 
harassment to employer contemporaneous to the 
alleged conduct by the female flight attendants or 
otherwise indicated that the conduct was 
unwelcome or harassing. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 703, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e-2; 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
(11) Civil Rights 
.. Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence 
General rule that a plaintiff has a right to 
introduce an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) probable cause 
determination in a Title VII lawsuit is not 
applicable to all EEOC determinations, and 
district court should exercise its discretion to 
admit or exclude a letter of violation. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e-2; 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1981. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
(12) Federal Civil Procedure 
Admissibility 
Terminated male airline pilots who brought Title 
VII action against employer after they were 
terminated for alleged sexual harassment of 
female flight attendant were not entitled to strike 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) probable cause determination based on 
charge by flight attendant, which found evidence 
of a hostile work environment; pilots' motion to 
strike was made in the context of a summary 
judgment proceeding where there could be no 
jury and pilots made no showing of prejudice 
from its admission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.c.A. § 
1981. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*1153 Tod F. Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.c., 
Phoenix, AZ, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Bradley H. 
Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.c., Phoenix, AZ, on the 
brief 
Celeste M. Wasielewski, Duane Morris LLP, Washington, 
D.C., for the defendant-appellee. Lorraine P. Ocheltree, 
Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, CA, and Maureen 
Beyers, Osborne Maledon P A, Phoenix, AZ, on the brief 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona, Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, 
Presiding. D.C. No. 2:04-CV-02954-SMM . 
Before ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, J. CLIFFORD 
WALLACE, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAM H. ALSUP, 
District Judge. * 
Opinion 
OPINION 
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge: 
Gregory Hawn, Michael Prince and Aric Aldrich 
(collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from the district court's 
summary judgment in favor of their former employer, 
Executive Jet Management (Executive Jet). We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.s.c. § 1291, and we affirm. 
I. 
Plaintiffs are male pilots who were employed by Executive 
Jet, which is in the business of aircraft management and 
charter operations. All of the plaintiffs were terminated 
after a female flight attendant, Robin McCrea, alleged that 
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plaintiffs had sexually harassed her and created a hostile 
work environment through an array of conduct including 
sexualized banter, crude jokes, and the sharing of crude 
and/or pornographic emails and websites. According to 
plaintiffs, however, McCrea was an active participant in, 
or initiator of, much of the conduct of which she accused 
them. Plaintiffs contend that their terminations were illegal 
because McCrea and other Executive Jet female flight 
attendants engaged in similar conduct but were not 
terminated because they were females. 
Plaintiffs and McCrea were stationed at Executive Jet's 
base at Williams Gateway Airport in Arizona. On January 
6,2003, McCrea complained to her immediate supervisor, 
Amy Jackson, that Aldrich had behaved inappropriately 
during a training seminar a few days earlier. Jackson 
reported the complaint to Executive Jet's Human 
Resources Director, Cynthia Brusman. On January 10, 
2003, McCrea faxed a letter to Brusman that stated she had 
experienced a hostile work environment at *1154 the 
Williams Gateway base and requested a transfer. 
In response, Executive Jet's Chief Pilot, Michael 
Chakerian, interviewed McCrea, Aldrich, Prince, and 
several other Executive Jet employees. Chakerian 
submitted the results of his interviews in a written report to 
Executive Jet. Chakerian's report reflected that Prince and 
Aldrich were "shocked" by McCrea's allegations because 
she had participated in, and often encouraged, the banter 
and joking of which she complained. Chakerian's report 
also reflected that another male pilot stationed at the 
Williams Gateway base was similarly surprised by 
McCrea's allegations. A female flight attendant 
interviewed by Chakerian described McCrea as 
short-tempered, aggressive, and negative. A female pilot 
interviewed by Chakerian similarly described McCrea as 
personally insecure and moody, and also described 
McCrea as flustered during the training exercise. Both this 
female pilot and the female flight attendant implied to 
Chakerian that McCrea's allegations may have been 
motivated by her desire for a transfer to a different 
Executive Jet base. 
On January 14, 2003, McCrea faxed another letter to 
Brusman. This time, McCrea attached a twelve-page 
document that detailed her allegations against Aldrich 
stemming from the training seminar. This document also 
contained new allegations of sexual harassment against 
Aldrich, Prince, Hawn, and others. Following receipt of 
these new and more detailed allegations, Executive Jet 
hired an independent investigator, James Sterling, to look 
into McCrea's accusations. This investigation lasted 
approximately two months. In the meantime, on January 
27, 2003, McCrea filed a discrimination charge against 
Executive Jet with the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
Around March 31, 2003, Sterling'S report was submitted to 
Executive Jet. In the "Synopsis" of his report, Sterling 
stated: 
The results of this investigation indicate 
that there have been confirmed instances 
of a few of the behaviors indicated in Ms. 
McCrea's document of complaint. 
However, there are also a greater number 
of incidents that she has alleged 
happened that have been unconfirmed, 
denied or told to me in a different light, 
implying that Ms. McCrea either 
participated in the actions or m some 
instances initiated them. 
In the concluding "Summary" of his report, Sterling stated 
that "[t]hroughout the duration of this investigation, I have 
continually found there to be some items in Ms. McCrea's 
document of complaint to be verified." Sterling continued, 
"in the same vein, I must say that there have been 
numerous items, which have not been corroborated by this 
investigation." He concluded: "The bottom line is that 
there appears to be some fact as well as some fiction 
interwoven throughout Ms. McCrea's document of 
complaint.... To conclude this investigation I believe that 
the company will have to 'sift the wheat from the [chaff],' 
in Ms. McCrea's document of complaint...." 
On April 18,2003, all three plaintiffs were terminated. A 
few months later, in July 2003, the EEOC issued a 
determination of the merits of McCrea's complaint, 
finding in part that "the evidence revealed that Respondent 
fostered a hostile work environment created by demeaning, 
crude, derogatory sex-based remarks." 
In February 2004, each of the plaintiffs filed a claim of 
discrimination with the EEOC. All of these claims were 
dismissed. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action, 
alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex and 
national origin in violation of Title *1155 VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.s.c. § 
1981. 
Plaintiffs complain that Executive Jet was aware that a 
group of five female flight attendants, one of whom was 
McCrea, had "engaged in sexual e-mails [and] sexual 
discussions" similar to the conduct that led to plaintiffs' 
terminations. Unlike plaintiffs, however, the female 
employees were not disciplined in any way, much less 
terminated. Plaintiffs argue that their terminations were 
thus discriminatory because, in effect, Executive Jet 
singled them out for termination because they were "risk 
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free" young, white, American males, while it failed to 
terminate females who had engaged in the same 
objectionable behavior. Plaintiffs point, in particular, to 
Executive Jet's position statement in its response to 
McCrea's EEOC charges. In that document, the company 
represented that "virtually all" of McCrea's claims were 
denied or uncorroborated and that, in many instances, 
McCrea was a participant in or initiator of the conduct at 
issue. According to plaintiffs, McCrea's allegations came 
suspiciously on the heels of a training exercise in which 
she exhibited an abysmal performance. 
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Executive Jet, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish 
a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The 
district court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a 
triable issue of material fact that their terminations were a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs seek review 
of the summary judgment and the district court's denial of 
their motion to exclude all evidence of and references to 
the EEOC's determination regarding McCrea's charge. 
Although plaintiffs' complaint states claims for gender, 
race, and national origin discrimination, plaintiffs press 
only their gender discrimination claims before us. 
Similarly, although plaintiffs asked the district court to 
strike all references to the EEOC's determination in 
McCrea's charge and the EEOC's dismissal of their 
complaints, plaintiffs here press only for the exclusion of 
evidence relating to the EEOC's determination of 
McCrea's charges. 
II. 
We review the district court's summary judgment de novo. 
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 
1019 (9th Cir.2004). "We must determine, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact 
and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant 
substantive law." EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & 
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.2003). We may affirm 
the district court's summary judgment on any ground 
supported by the record. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C \'. 
Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 941 (9th 
Cir.200 1). 
[1] We analyze plaintiffs' Title VII claims through the 
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973). Under this analysis, plaintiffs must first establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination. Noyes V. 
Kelly Sen1s., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.2007). If 
plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, "[t]he burden of 
production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer 
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the challenged action." Chuang V. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. 
of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2000). If 
defendant meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a 
triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's 
proffered reasons for their terminations are mere pretext 
for unlawful discrimination. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1168; see 
also Coleman *1156 V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 
1282 (9th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs must "introduce evidence 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact" as to 
pretext). 
[2] [3] To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs "must 
offer evidence that 'givers] rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.' " Godwin V. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 
1217, 1220 (9th Cir.1998) (alteration in original), citing 
Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Plaintiffs may 
establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial 
evidence by showing: (1) that they are members of a 
protected class; (2) that they were qualified for their 
positions and performing their jobs satisfactorily; (3) that 
they experienced adverse employment actions; and (4) that 
"similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected 
class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 
surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an 
inference of discrimination." Peterson V. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.2004); see also Wallis V. 
JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.l994). 
The focus in the case before us is on the fourth element of 
plaintiffs' prima facie case: whether similarly situated 
employees engaged in similar conduct but received more 
favorable treatment by Executive Jet. The district court 
concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie 
case because they did not show that the female employees 
who allegedly received more favorable treatment by 
Executive Jet were in fact similarly situated to plaintiffs. 
The district court offered two primary reasons for this 
conclusion: First, the female flight attendants were not 
similarly situated because they did not report to the same 
supervisor as plaintiffs, and second, even if the female 
flight attendants had reported to the same supervisor as 
plaintiffs, they were not similarly situated because 
plaintiffs' conduct gave rise to a complaint, while the 
female flight attendants' alleged conduct did not. 
A. 
[4] At the outset, plaintiffs assert that the district court 
engaged in an overly narrow inquiry in conducting its 
examination of their prima facie case. Plaintiffs complain 
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that the district court erroneously focused on whether 
similarly-situated persons received more favorable 
treatment. Instead, according to plaintiffs, the district court 
should have looked more broadly at whether the record as a 
whole gave rise to an inference of discrimination. 
[5] It is true that the elements and contours of a prima facie 
case will differ according to the facts at hand. In 
McDonnell Douglas, the Court explained that a prima facie 
case will vary according to the unique factual 
circumstances presented in every action: "the prima facie 
proof required from respondent is not necessarily 
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 
411 U.S. at 802 n. 13,93 S.Ct. 1817. We have also stated 
that a plaintiff may show "an inference of discrimination in 
whatever manner is appropriate in the particular 
circumstances." Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 
1361 (9th Cir.1985). A plaintiff may do so through 
comparison to similarly situated individuals, or any other 
circumstances "surrounding the adverse employment 
action [that] give rise to an inference of discrimination." 
Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. 
Here, however, plaintiffs' case relies on a comparison 
between themselves and a group of female employees. 
Plaintiffs' action sounds in disparate treatment and seeks to 
raise an inference of discrimination based solely on 
circumstantial evidence. Plaintiffs' proof of discrimination 
is that McCrea engaged in or encouraged the *1157 
language and conduct of which she later complained, and 
that she and other female flight attendants engaged in lewd 
and inappropriate conduct but were not disciplined or 
terminated as were plaintiffs. Plaintiffs invoke the 
comparison to a group of allegedly similarly situated 
female employees to make out a claim of disparate 
treatment. The district court did not err by focusing on the 
inference of discrimination that is central to plaintiffs' 
case. 
B. 
Plaintiffs next take issue with the district court's analysis 
insofar as it determined that plaintiffs and the suspect 
female flight attendants were not similarly-situated 
because they did not report to the same supervisor. The 
district court held that to be similarly situated, "coworkers 
must have been dealt with by the same supervisor, subject 
to the same standard, and engaged in similar conduct" 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly focused 
on whether the female employees had the same supervisor 
as them. 
[6] It was error for the district court to impose a strict 
"same supervisor" requirement. We have stated that 
"whether two employees are similarly situated is ordinarily 
a question of fact." Beck v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 885 n. 5 (9th 
Cir.2007). The employees' roles need not be identical; they 
must only be similar "in all material respects." Moran v. 
Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.2006); see also Aragon v. 
Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 660 
(9th Cir.2002). Materiality will depend on context and the 
facts ofthe case. 
Generally, we have determined that "individuals are 
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display 
similar conduct." Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 
F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2003). In Vasquez, for example, we 
considered that employees were not similarly situated 
where the type and severity of an alleged offense was 
dissimilar. Id. Likewise, in Nicholson v. Hyannis Air 
Service, Inc., a case decided after entry of summary 
judgment here, we held that an alleged distinction between 
a female pilot and several male pilots was not material. 580 
F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (9th Cir.2009). Under the allegations 
of that case, we concluded that a female pilot, who had 
deficient communication and cooperation skills, was 
similarly situated to male pilots, who had deficiencies in 
their technical piloting skills, because both types of 
deficiencies could be addressed through retraining. Any 
distinction between the two types of skill sets was "not 
material for purposes of determining whether the male 
pilots were 'similarly situated' to" the plaintiff; therefore, 
the female pilot had made out a prima facie case of 
discrimination by showing that the male pilots received 
remedial training for their deficiencies while she received 
no such instruction. Id. at 1126. Nicholson again 
demonstrates that whether employees are similarly 
situated-i.e., whether they are "similar in all material 
respects," id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)-is a fact-intensive inquiry, and what facts are 
material will vary depending on the case. 
[7] We do not exclude the possibility that the presence or 
absence of a shared supervisor might be relevant in some 
cases. But here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
whether plaintiffs and the female flight attendants shared 
the same direct supervisor should not have been 
determinative of whether they were similarly situated, 
because plaintiffs' direct supervisor, Chakerian, was 
excluded from the decision to terminate them. Instead, the 
decision to terminate plaintiffs was made directly by 
Executive Jet's president, Albert Pod. The fact that 
plaintiffs and the female flight attendants had different 
*1158 direct supervisors did not render them dissimilar in 
a material respect, because the relevant decision-maker, 
Albert Pod, was aware of both the allegations against 
plaintiffs and the allegations plaintiffs had made against 
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the female flight attendants. Similarity between two 
persons or groups ofpeople is a question offact that cannot 
be mechanically resolved by determining whether they had 
~he same supervisor without attention to the underlying 
Issues. 
III. 
Therefore, we tum to the alternate ground on which the 
district court concluded that plaintiffs were not similarly 
situated to the female flight attendants. The district court 
held that, even assuming the female flight attendants 
reported to the same supervisor as plaintiffs, the two 
groups were not similarly situated because the female 
employees' alleged conduct was not unwelcome and never 
resulted in a complaint. This consideration provides an 
independent and sufficient basis to affirm the district 
court's summary judgment. See Venetian Casino Resort, 
257 F.3d at 941. 
A. 
The concept of "similarly situated" employees may be 
relevant to both the first and third steps of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. In this case, plaintiffs sought to 
establish that the relevant female flight attendants were 
"similarly situated" to them but received more favorable 
treatment in step one of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
See, e.g, Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. Turning to step three 
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiffs alleged that 
Executive Jet's explanation for their terminations was 
pretextual because, among other things, the company 
failed to discipline or terminate McCrea even though she 
was similarly situated to them. See Vasquez. 349 F.3d at 
641; see generally Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., 
inc., 374 F.3d 840,849 (9th Cir.2004) (describing different 
ways in which an employment discrimination plaintiff 
might establish pretext). 
(8) Even though a comparison to "similarly situated" 
individuals may be relevant both to plaintiffs' prima facie 
case and proof of pretext, these inquiries constitute distinct 
stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 
See generally Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567,577,98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Lynn v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Ca !. , 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.1981) 
(first and third stages must remain distinct because, "[t]o 
do otherwise would in many instances collapse the three 
step analysis into a single step at which all issues would be 
resolved"); Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1124. The difference 
between the first and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework is not without some consequence. Among other 
things, a plaintiff s burden is much less at the prima facie 
stage than at the pretext stage. Compare Tex. Dep't of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 
1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889, 
with Godwin, 150 F .3d at 1220-22, and Steckl v. Motorola, 
Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring "specific, 
substantial evidence of pretext" to defeat employer's 
motion for summary judgment); see also Wheeler v. 
Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir.2004) 
(describing pretext stage as "rigorous," but prima facie 
stage as "not onerous"). 
The district court considered the relevant 
inquiry-whether plaintiffs and the subject female 
employees were similarly situated-in the context of both 
plaintiffs' prima facie case and at the pretext stage. Insofar 
as the district court considered Executive Jet's argument in 
the context of plaintiffs' prima facie case of 
discrimination, *1159 this was unusual. Our cases 
generally analyze an employer's reasons for why 
employees are not similarly situated at the pretext stage of 
McDonnell Douglas, not the prima facie stage. See, e.g, 
Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. It may well be that the present 
inquiry is more appropriate for resolution at the third stage 
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis rather than that of 
pretext. The pretext determination is often cast in terms of 
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the 
employer for taking adverse employment action against a 
plaintiff. See, e.g, Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641; Wall v. Nat 'I 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906,909 (9th Cir.1983). 
(9) Although we seek to conduct our inquiry at the proper 
McDonnell Douglas step, we keep in mind that "[t]he 
prima facie case method established in McDonnell 
Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to 
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it 
bears on the critical question of discrimination.' " u.s. 
Postal Servo Bd. of Governors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715, 
103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), citing Fumco, 438 
U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943. Thus, we keep sight of the 
ultimate issue in this case: "whether the employer is 
trea~ing some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Furnco, 
438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). In this case, there is no need to discuss 
the issue further. The district court held that plaintiffs had 
not made out a prima face case because, among other 
reasons, they had not shown they were similarly situated to 
the female employees in question. The district court then 
went on to hold that Executive Jet's argument was not 
pre textual for the same reasons. We may therefore tum to 
the substance of plaintiffs' claims. 
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B. 
[10] Turning to the substance of the issue, plaintiffs seek to 
blunt the relevance of the complaints made against them. 
They argue that the presence or absence of a complaint is 
not a sufficient justification for differential treatment and 
that McCrea's complaint was not actually the basis for 
their terminations. Plaintiffs point to (I) the Sterling report, 
which reflected that many of McCrea's allegations were 
uncorroborated; (2) Executive Jet's position statement 
submitted to the EEOC, in which it maintained that 
McCrea could not establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination because the "overwhelming majority" of 
the incidents could not be corroborated and McCrea could 
not show that the conduct was unwelcome; and finally, (3) 
Brusman's testimony that the use of sexual language or the 
telling of sexual jokes to coworkers was inappropriate 
behavior warranting termination, "whether anybody is 
offended by it or not." 
Executive Jet management was aware, at the time of 
plaintiffs' terminations, of plaintiffs' accusations that 
McCrea and several female flight attendants had engaged 
in sexualized banter and other similar conduct. 
Chakerian's report to his superiors indicated that plaintiffs 
Aldrich and Prince found McCrea's allegations surprising 
because she had participated in the conduct giving rise to 
her complaint. Sterling'S report reflected an allegation by 
Prince that McCrea had "hit him on the butt twice," an 
allegation by Aldrich that McCrea asked "quite frequently 
about his sex life," and allegations that McCrea 
participated in "raunchy" banter, as well as some 
sexually-oriented emails sent by another flight attendant. 
Plaintiffs' accusations, nevertheless, do not demonstrate 
that the designated female employees were similarly 
situated to *1160 plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cite the Sterling 
report selectively. The report confirmed several of 
McCrea's complaints, including that Hawn pinched 
McCrea on the buttocks; that Prince forwarded obscene 
emails to his coworkers; that pilots, including Prince, had 
romantic relationships with flight attendants; and that 
Aldrich called the lead flight attendant a "fat cow." 
Sterling's report concludes that "the company will have to 
'sift the wheat from the [chaff]' in Ms. McCrea's 
document of complaint...." Even if Executive Jet believed 
that the majority of McCrea's allegations were not 
corroborated, and that McCrea participated in some of the 
complained-of conduct, several instances of sexually 
harassing behavior by Aldrich, Prince and Hawn were 
undisputed. 
Moreover, plaintiffs and the female flight attendants are 
distinguishable because plaintiffs' conduct gave rise to a 
complaint of sexual harassment, while the female flight 
attendants' alleged conduct did not. Plaintiffs never 
complained of discriminatory treatment or sexual 
harassment to Executive Jet contemporaneous to the 
alleged conduct by the female flight attendants. When 
plaintiffs did report such conduct, it was made defensively 
in the context of the company's investigations into 
McCrea's accusations against them. Even in the context of 
the company's investigations, plaintiffs did not lodge a 
complaint at any time, and they did not report that they 
found the female flight attendants' alleged conduct 
harassing or unwelcome. We have distinguished 
misconduct by one employee from misconduct by another 
employee on the basis of whether it prompted complaints 
or consternation by other employees. In Meyer v. 
California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., we upheld summary 
judgment for an employer where the female plaintiff had 
been terminated after making racially insensitive remarks, 
even though male employees also had made racist remarks 
but received no discipline, because the female plaintiffs 
comments "had such an adverse impact on minority 
employees that they impaired her usefulness in her 
sensitive duties in the Personnel Department and, coming 
from her, reflected unfavorably on [the employer's] 
policies toward its minority employees." 662 F.2d 637, 
640 (9th Cir.1981). We concluded that, where there was no 
evidence that the male employees' remarks had "provoked 
anything comparable to the vigorous reaction" that resulted 
from the plaintiffs comments, the other incidents were 
"not such parallels to her case as to raise a genuine issue of 
pretext." Id. 
The presence of complaints has also been deemed a valid 
distinguishing factor by other circuits. See Yeager v. City 
Water & Light Plant, 454 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir.2006) 
("An employer that promulgates a sex harassment policy 
may reasonably distinguish between sexually oriented 
conduct that elicits a complaint from an offended 
co-worker, and arguably comparable conduct that is 
nonetheless tolerated by co-workers without complaint"). 
In a case presenting similar facts to this action, Morrow v. 
Waf-Mart Stores. Inc., two male employees were 
terminated after complaints of sexual harassment were 
brought against them. 152 F .3d 559, 560 (7th Cir.1998). 
They filed an action, complaining that their employer had 
enforced its sexual harassment policy more strictly against 
males than against similarly-situated females. Id. at 560.-
Affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor 
of the employer, the Seventh Circuit stated, 
Wal-Mart's quick decision to terminate 
the plaintiffs may seem unfair in a work 
environment that appears rife with 
similarly off-color conduct.... Although 
some of Wal-Mart's female employees 
seem to have engaged in questionable 
behavior, there is no evidence that any of 
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this behavior sparked complaints of 
*1161 harassment like those that Wal-
Mart received concerning [plaintiffs]. 
Without evidence of similar employee 
complaints, Wal-Mart cannot be faulted 
for failing to respond to these incidents in 
the same way that it responded to 
[plaintiffs'] situations. 
We do not support a "race to the Human Resources office" 
as the sole determinant of the relevance of a complaint. 
The existence of a complaint may not always be material or 
determinative in light of the facts in a given case. We stress 
again that the determination whether a plaintiff and a 
coworker are similarly situated will generally be a question 
of fact. But in the case before us, plaintiffs' conduct was 
the subject of a complaint to Executive Jet, while the 
conduct of McCrea and other female flight attendants was 
not. Moreover, plaintiffs' reports of inappropriate conduct 
by female employees were made only in the context of the 
independent investigation by an outsider, and contain no 
indication that the conduct was unwelcome or harassing to 
them. In the course of that investigation, several 
allegations of harassing conduct by plaintiffs was not only 
corroborated, but also admitted by plaintiffs. That 
difference was properly taken into consideration when the 
district court entered summary judgment. 
IV. 
[11] In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., we 
held that a plaintiff has a "right to introduce an EEOC 
probable cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit." 656 
F .2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.198l). But Plummer's rule was 
created in the context of the admissibility of an EEOC 
probable cause determination in a Title VII action by the 
same plaintiff who complained to the EEOC. The Plummer 
rule is not applicable to all EEOC determinations. In 
Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., we held that a letter 
of violation was a "substantially different" document than 
an EEOC probable cause determination in that a letter of 
violation represented the EEOC's conclusion that a 
violation has occurred. The letter of violation thereby 
posed a much greater risk of unfair prejudice, because a 
"jury may find it difficult to evaluate independently 
Footnotes 
evidence of age discrimination after being informed that 
the EEOC has already examined the evidence and found a 
violation." 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir.1986). We 
therefore concluded that Plummer did not establish a per se 
rule of admissibility for all EEOC documents, and that the 
district court should instead exercise its discretion to admit 
or exclude a letter ofviolation.Id. 
[12] Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying their motion to strike all reference to 
the EEOC's determination in the McCrea charge. They 
assert that, because the rule of per se admissibility of 
EEOC findings applies "only in cases in which the issue in 
the court proceeding was identical to that which the EEOC 
had earlier investigated," the EEOC's detennination 
should not have been admitted here. Further, plaintiffs 
assert that the McCrea determination is irrelevant because 
it was issued months after they were terminated. 
Admission of the EEOC determination was not an abuse of 
discretion. As Plummer stated, there is little reason to fear 
prejudice in a bench trial, where "the admission of 
incompetent evidence over objection will not ordinarily be 
a ground of reversal if there was competent evidence 
received sufficient to support the findings. The judge will 
be presumed to have disregarded the inadmissible and 
relied on the competent evidence." Plummer, 656 F.2d at 
505 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same rationale 
applies here, where plaintiffs' motion to strike was made in 
the *1162 context of a summary judgment proceeding 
where there could be no jury, thereby reducing the danger 
of the type of prejudice expressed in Gilchrist. See 
Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 ("[T)here is support for the 
general proposition that the admissibility of evidence 
varies between jury and non-jury trials"). The district court 
exercised its discretion in weighing the admissibility of the 
document, as required under Gilchrist, and plaintiffs have 
made no showing of prejudice from its admission. 
AFFIRMED. 
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103 Idaho 33 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Betty HOPPE, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Scott McDONALD, Director of the Idaho 
Department of Employment and the 
IdahoDepartment of Employment, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
After the Supreme Court, 100 Idaho 133, 594 P.2d 643, 
reversed and remanded judgment of the District Court in 
favor of former female employee in sex discrimination 
suit, the District Court, Twin Falls County, Theron W. 
Ward, 1., on remand, held that employer had not 
discriminated against former employee on the basis of her 
sex, and she appealed. The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., 
held that: (1) trial court had authority to try case of 
advisory jury on its own motion; (2) substantial evidence 
supported finding that female employee was not denied 
promotion by reason of her sex; and (3) substantial and 
competent evidence supported finding that female 
employee was not denied equal pay to that of male 
employees on the basis of her sex. 
Affirmed. 
Bistline, J., filed opinion concurring and dissenting. 
West Headnotes (8) 
[I) Appeal and Error 
pNecessity of Objections in General 
A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed 
error during trial and later urge his objections 
thereto for the first time on appeal. 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
[2] Appeal and Error 
... Necessity of Objections in General 
Appeal and Error 
WestlawNexr 2 No 
pOrganization and Jurisdiction of Lower Court 
Appeal and Error 
pFailure to State Cause of Action 
Ordinarily an objection not made at trial will not 
be considered on appeal unless objection raises a 
question of jurisdiction or that pleading fails to 
state cause of action. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
(3) Appeal and Error 
[4] 
... Mode and Conduct of Trial or Hearing 
Trial 
e-Conclusiveness 
Although sex discrimination action was one 
triable of right by jury and neither party 
demanded jury trial, trial court had authority on 
its own motion to try the case with an advisory 
jury, because neither party objected to the 
advisory jury; in addition, the court's action did 
not constitute "plain" or "fundamental" error. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 39(c). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
pEmployment Practices 
Record did not support rmding of sex 
discrimination suit that trial court depended 
upon advisory jury's answers to the court's 
interrogatories, rather, it demonstrated that trial 
court did not believe itself bound by advisory 
jury's findings and instead made its own 
independent findings of fact. 
[5) Civil Rights 
"'Employment Practices 
A plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination 
must prove by preponderance of evidence that 
us. Governrnen( Works 15 
Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33 (1982) 
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(6) 
(7) 
she applied for an available position for which 
she was qualified but was rejected under 
circumstances which give rise to inference of 
unlawful discrimination. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
~Employment Practices 
Evidence, including proof that female employee 
was not rated among top three candidates for job 
promotion and that she was not even the 
top-rated female applicant, that employee was 
rejected because of her lack of qualifications 
relative to the other applicants, that is, that she 
had no experience in field of unemployment 
insurance, she had no supervisory experience, 
and that individual selected for position had 
experience in all of employer's programs and 
had exhibited superior performance in 
supervisory position for nearly three years, 
supported finding that promotion was not denied 
to female employee on basis of her sex. 
Labor and Employment 
~Equal Work; Skill, Effort, and Responsibility 
Labor and Employment 
~Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
Claimant has burden of proving that she did not 
receive equal pay for equal work but is not 
required to show that jobs performed were 
identical, rather, unlawful discrimination may be 
shown by proving that the skill, efforts and 
responsibility required in performance of the 
jobs are substantially equal; in that 
determination, it is the actual job performance in 
content which is significant rather than job titles, 
classifications or descriptions, so that it is the 
overall job, and not its individual segments, 
which must form the basis of comparison. Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d) as amended 
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d); I.C. § 67-5909. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
WestlawNexr 2012 
(8) Civil Rights 
~Employment Practices 
Substantial and competent evidence supported 
findings that female employee did not perform 
work equivalent in nature to work being 
performed by male employees in higher pay 
grades, and that therefore she was not denied 
pay equal to that of male employees on the basis 
of her sex. I.C. § 67-5909; Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l); 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d) as 
amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d). 
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*34 **356 Lloyd J. Walker, Twin Falls, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Jeanne T. 
Goodenough, Carol Lynn Brassey, Deputy Attys. Gen., 
Boise, for defendants-respondents. 
Opinion 
SHEPARD, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a judgment which denied claims of 
sex discrimination brought by plaintiff-appellant, Betty 
Hoppe, against her former employers, 
defendants-respondents. Hoppe asserted that while she 
was employed by the Department she was, on the basis of 
her sex, denied a promotion, and also that she did not 
receive pay equal to male co-employees, although her 
work was substantially equal in nature to male 
co-employees. Following trial, the district court held that 
Hoppe had failed to prove that she had been the victim of 
any unlawful discrimination. We affIrm. 
Hoppe was employed in the Twin Falls office of the 
Department from October 1, 1970, through December l3, 
1973. She had no college education but had graduated 
from high school and had a significant amount of prior 
work experience. She was hired in the highest job 
Works 
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classification for which she was qualified in view of her 
prior work experience, i.e. "Interviewer II", in pay grade 
7. It is not disputed that Hoppe was an outstanding 
employee and received excellent job performance 
evaluations. Although she received no promotions as 
such, she did receive several in-grade, or "step" pay 
increases, which were granted automatically upon an 
employee's satisfactory job performance. As a result of 
those pay increases, her salary increased over the 
three-year period of her employment from $527 to $673 
per month. 
Hoppe was initially assigned the duties of "Selection and 
Referral Officer" and she worked in that capacity until 
January, 1972, when she became an "Employer Relations 
Representative". In May, 1973, Hoppe was additionally 
assigned a portion of the duties of "Twin Falls Labor 
Market Analyst". Prior to Hoppe's employment, one 
Siotten had performed the duties of "Selection and 
Referral Officer". Siotten's actual job classification was 
that of "Employment Counselor", and he was in pay grade 
10. Hoppe replaced Siotten as "Selection and Referral 
Officer", In January, 1972, Hoppe was replaced as 
"Selection and Referral Officer" by one Clark. Clark held 
a job title of "Employment Counselor" and was in pay 
grade 10. When Hoppe was assigned to the position of 
"Employer Relations Representative", she replaced one 
Omlid, whose job title was "Employment Consultant II", 
and was in pay grade 10. 
*35 **357 During the summer of 1973, an opening was 
announced for the position of manager of the 
Department's office in Jerome. Twelve applicants, 
including Hoppe, applied for the position. A promotional 
review board was convened and the applicants were rated. 
The top three rated applicants were certified to a selecting 
official, and the top rated applicant, a male, was appointed 
to the position. Hoppe was not rated among the top three 
applicants, nor was she the highest rated female applicant. 
In the fall of 1973, Hoppe applied for a promotion to the 
classification of "Consultant I" in pay grade 8. That 
position was to be filled from a register of the individuals 
who met the minimum qualifications and who had passed 
an examination. Hoppe took and passed the exam, was 
approved for the promotion, would have received the 
promotion in February, 1974, but she resigned from the 
Department on December 13, 1973. 
promotional policies denied women equal opportunity 
with men, and concluded that the Department had 
discriminated against Hoppe, recommending, among 
other measures, that Hoppe be awarded back pay. The 
Department refused to conciliate and this action resulted. 
Upon motion for summary judgment, the district court 
held that it was bound by the findings of the Commission 
and granted judgment in favor of Hoppe. On appeal, this 
court held that the findings and recommendations of the 
Commission on Human Rights had no binding effect on 
the district court, and therefore reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 
594 P.2d 643 (1979). On remand, a trial de novo was held 
by the district court, sitting with an advisory jury. The 
district court held that the Department had not 
discriminated against Hoppe on the basis of her sex and 
entered judgment in favor of the Department. 
Hoppe first asserts that the district court erred in its 
utilization of an advisory jury. I.R.C.P. 39(c) provides: 
"In all actions not triable of right by a 
jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an 
advisory jury or, the court, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial 
with a jury whose verdict has the same 
effect as if trial by jury had been a 
matter of right." 
Here the action was one triable of right by a jury and 
neither party demanded a jury trial. Hence Hoppe argues 
that the court was without authority to, on its own motion, 
try the case with an advisory jury. 
[I) [2) [3) Although neither party requested a jury trial or 
explicitly consented to the use of an advisory jury, neither 
party objected to the advisory jury. A litigant may not 
remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later 
urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal. 
Bradford v. Simpson, 97 Idaho 188,541 P.2d 612 (1975). 
Ordinarily an objection not made at trial will not be 
considered on appeal, Kock v. Elkins, 71 Idaho 50, 225 
P.2d 457 (1950), unless the objection raises a question of 
jurisdiction, Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 
97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d 382 (1976), or that the pleading 
fails to state a cause of action, Webster v. Potlatch 
Forests, 68 Idaho 1, 187 P .2d 527 (1947). The instant case 
falls into none of the exceptions to the rule. Nor is this a 
Thereafter Hoppe filed a complaint with the Idaho State case in which the trial court committed "plain" or 
Commission on Human Rights, alleging sex "fundamental" error so substantial as to result in injustice 
discrimination in the promotion and pay practices of the or to take from the appellant a right essential to her case. 
Department and also asserting that she had been Johnson v. Elliott, 112 Ariz. 57, 537 P.2d 927 (1975); 
constructively discharged. That Commission found that Heacock v. Town, 419 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1966); cf. State 
the practices and procedures of the Department' s~_.~.~~_._Y.~?~~~(lt~: 94 Idaho 24~., 486 ~:?~2.~gQ 97 ~)~ 
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(4) Hoppe asserts that the trial court erred in depending 
upon the advisory jury's answers to the courts 
interrogatories, rather than making its own independent 
findings of fact, but this argument is not supported *36 
**358 by the record. The trial court's memorandum 
decision contains a detailed discussion of the jury's 
answers to each interrogatory as well as the court's own 
factual findings in regard to those interrogatories. While 
the court's fmdings are largely in agreement with those of 
the advisory jury, there is some specific disagreement 
with the jury's answers and it is thus clear that the trial 
court did not believe itself bound by the advisory jury's 
findings and made its own independent fmdings of fact. 
(5) [6] Hoppe next asserts that the trial court erred in its 
finding that Hoppe was not denied promotion to the 
position of manager of the Department's Jerome office by 
reason of her sex. I.e. s 67-5909, upon which Hoppe's 
claim is based, provides in pertinent part: 
"Acts prohibited. It shall be a prohibited act to 
discriminate against a person because of, or on the 
basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in 
any of the following: 
(1) For an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to 
discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an 
individual with respect to compensation or the terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment..." 
Federal case law under Title VII, 42 U.S.e. s 2000e-2(a), 
is instructive as to the necessary quantum of proof and the 
applicable standards for adjudication in sex discrimination 
cases. Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 606 P.2d 458 
(1979). 
It is held that a plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
applied for an available position, for which she was 
qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which 
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Fumco 
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 
2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973). Here Hoppe presented a prima facie case creating 
the inference of sex discrimination, thus shifting to the 
Department the burden to "articulate some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason" for Hoppe's rejection. 
McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 
1824. Burdine, supra, clarified the nature of the burden 
that thus shifts to the defendant: 
"The burden that shifts to the defendant ... is to rebut 
the presumption of discrimination by producing 
evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone 
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that 
it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. 
(citation). It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence 
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it 
discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, 
the defendant must clearly set forth, through the 
introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the 
plaintiffs rejection. The explanation must be legally 
sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the 
defendant carries this burden of production, the 
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, 
and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of 
specificity." 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. 
(footnotes omitted). 
Here the evidence of the Department, if believed by the 
trial court, rebutted the inference of discrimination raised 
by Hoppe's prima facie case. The evidence of the 
Department indicated that Hoppe was not rated among the 
top three candidates for the job and that she was not even 
the top-rated female applicant. It also indicated that 
Hoppe was rejected because of her lack of qualifications 
relative to the other applicants; i.e., that Hoppe had no 
experience in the field of unemployment insurance, which 
was a major program administered by the Department and 
that she had no supervisory experience. On the other 
hand, the individual selected for the position had 
experience in all of the Department's programs, and had 
exhibited superior performance in a supervisory position 
*37 **359 within the Department for nearly three years. 
Thus the Department's evidence could be viewed as 
articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
Hoppe's rejection, and further, as tending to indicate that 
the person hired for the position was better qualified than 
was Hoppe. Such a showing exceeded that necessary to 
merely rebut Hoppe's prima facie case. Burdine, supra. 
The burden of production then returned to Hoppe, 
merging with her ultimate burden of persuasion as set 
forth in Burdine, supra. 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She 
now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
proffered reason was not the true reason for the 
employment decision. This burden now merges with 
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has 
been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may 
succeed in this either directly by persuading the court 
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 
Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 256, 101 S.Ct. 1095. 
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Synopsis 
Background: Former curriculum director sued school for 
age discrimination in demoting her to elementary school 
principal. The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma, 
granted school summary judgment. Plaintiff 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, 
held that: 
Circuit Judge, 
McDonnell Douglas applies to Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) claims; 
plaintiff suffered adverse employment action; and 
district court engaged in improper "pretext plus" 
analysis. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes (8) 
To succeed on claim of age discrimination, 
plaintiff must prove by preponderance of 
evidence that her employer would not have taken 
challenged action but for plaintiffs age; age need 
not have been the only factor, rather, ifthere were 
other factors, employer may be held liable if age 
was the factor that made a difference. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
4(a)(1), 
McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis, in which 
plaintiff must first demonstrate prima facie case 
of unlawful discrimination, which shifts burden 
of production to employer to identity legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse 
employment action, which shifts burden back to 
plaintiff to prove employer's proffered reason 
was pretextual, applies to age discrimination 
cases under ADEA. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
To prove prima facie case of age discrimination, 
plaintiff must show: (1) she is member of class 
protected by ADEA; (2) she suffered adverse 
employment action; (3) she was qualified for 
position at issue; and (4) she was treated less 
favorably than others not in protected class. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., § 
Adverse employment action, as element of prima 
facie case of age discrimination, is not simply 
limited to monetary losses in form of wages or 
benefits, rather court takes "case-by-case 
approach," examining unique factors relevant to 
situation at hand; although mere inconvenience 
or alteration of job responsibilities would not be 
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adverse employment action, the prong is satisfied 
by significant change in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or 
decision causing significant change in benefits. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 
Although former curriculum director's salary 
was not immediately decreased when she was 
reassigned to position as elementary school 
principal, she suffered adverse employment 
action, as required for her age discrimination 
claim, where she suffered $17,000 decrease in 
salary the following year, her vacation benefits 
were reduced immediately upon reassignment, 
her retirement benefits were reduced the 
following year, and she lost professional prestige, 
falling to lower position in school district's 
organizational hierarchy. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
Having established prima facie case of age 
discrimination and demonstrated that school 
district's proffered reasons for her reassignment 
to elementary school principal, superintendent's 
desire to undertake reorganization of school 
district's executive team in revenue-neutral 
fashion and his belief that director's former 
position contained only narrow duties that could 
be absorbed by other directors, were pretextual, 
former curriculum director was not required to 
produce additional evidence of discrimination in 
order to avoid summary judgment; former 
director produced evidence that her former 
position stayed on books for the next fiscal year 
and that staff in her department remained 
employed in same positions after her transfer, 
and that a new position, created shortly after her 
transfer, had strikingly similar job 
responsibilities, and district court improperly 
favored district's version ofthe facts in reasoning 
that director generated only weak question of fact 
regarding whether school district's proffered 
reasons were pretextual. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
Plaintiff in employment discrimination case 
produces sufficient evidence of pretext when she 
shows such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions 
in employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its 
action that reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer 
that employer did not act for asserted 
non-discriminatory reasons. 
When evaluating sufficiency of evidence of 
pretext, on motion for summary judgment in 
employment discrimination case, court looks to 
several factors, including strength of employee's 
prima facie case, probative value of proof that 
employer's explanation is false, and any other 
evidence that supports employer's case and that 
properly may be considered on motion for 
summary judgment. 
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Before 
Judges. 
Opinion 
and 
Circuit Judge. 
Judy F. Jones appeals from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of her employer, Oklahoma 
City Public Schools ("OKC"), dismissing her claim of 
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 
Although the district court found that Jones produced 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination and submitted *1275 evidence to show that 
OKC's proffered explanations for her demotion were 
pretextual, the court granted summary judgment to OKC 
on the ground that no reasonable juror could find that OKC 
had committed age discrimination. Because we conclude 
that the district court engaged in a "pretext plus" analysis 
in rendering its decision, we reverse. 
I 
Jones began working for OKC as a teacher in 1969. She 
then served as a principal of an elementary school for 
approximately fifteen years. In 2002, Jones was promoted 
to Executive Director of Curriculum and Instruction. 
Colleagues evaluated Jones' performance in this position 
as satisfactory or better. For the 2006-2007 fiscal year, 
Jones' negotiated salary was $98,270, with a daily pay rate 
of$396.25 per day. 
In July 2006, Linda Brown became OKC's interim 
superintendent. Brown altered OKC protocol such that 
Jones reported first to Manny Soto and later to Linda 
Toure, two ofOKC's five executive directors in charge of 
schools and support services. Over the course of the next 
year, both Soto and Toure asked Jones when she was going 
to retire. On one occasion, Brown also questioned Jones 
about her retirement plans. 
OKC eventually hired John Porter as its permanent 
superintendent in spring 2007. Porter was to start full-time 
work in July 2007, but was employed as a consultant 
during the months of May and June. According to Porter, 
he and Brown "worked closely" during this period "to 
ensure a smooth transition into the position of 
Superintendent." After reviewing the district's 
organizational chart, Porter determined that OKC's 
executive team should be reorganized. In particular, he 
decided that Jones' position could be eliminated and its 
duties absorbed by other directors. This elimination would 
allow Porter to reorganize the district's administration in a 
budget-neutral manner. Porter directed Michael Shanahan, 
OKC's senior human resources officer, to notify Jones that 
her position would be eliminated and she would be 
reassigned as an elementary school principal. Brown was 
present during this exchange, but averred that she did not 
have any input into Porter's decision. 
Jones met with Shanahan in early June 2007. Shanahan 
communicated Porter's orders and informed Jones that her 
salary would stay the same for the ensuing school year 
only.l Jones asked Shanahan who made the decision to 
demote her, and Shanahan responded that it was Brown 
and Porter. Shanahan subsequently stated that four other 
executive directors were involved in the reassignment 
decision. Scott Randall, OKC's senior finance officer, later 
told Jones that she was the only director the administration 
had "gone after." Randall also stated that if Porter was 
transferring Jones for financial or budgetary reasons, 
Porter would have "run" it by him. 
After her reassignment and during her first year of 
employment as an elementary school principal, Jones 
retained her previous salary level. Her vacation benefits, 
however, were affected immediately. After Jones 
completed her first year as principal, her salary was 
decreased by approximately $17,000. This pay cut had the 
effect of reducing her retirement benefits. Jones' daily pay 
rate was also reduced by roughly five dollars per day. 
One month after Jones' reassignment, Porter decided to 
create a new OKC executive *1276 position, Executive 
Director of Teaching and Learning. The job description 
and responsibilities for this position were quite similar to 
those of Jones' former position of Executive Director of 
Curriculum and Instruction. Both positions required a 
master's degree in curriculum and instruction, and the job 
responsibilities for both positions included oversight of 
programs designed to improve teacher instruction and 
curricular development. OKC filled this new position with 
an individual who was forty-seven years of age. At the 
time of Jones' reassignment, she was nearly sixty years 
old. 
110 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 4,93 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,967,260 Ed. Law Rep. 541 
In May 2008, Jones filed suit in the District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma alleging OKC violated the 
ADEA when it demoted her to the position of elementary 
school principaJ.2 OKC filed a motion for summary 
judgment, denying that Jones was demoted and arguing, in 
the alternative, that if Jones had suffered an adverse 
employment action it was due exclusively to the 
elimination of her former position. 
Analyzing Jones' claims under the traditional 
framework, the district court concluded that 
Jones had established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. The court determined that Jones suffered 
an adverse employment action because her transfer 
resulted in an immediate reduction in her vacation pay, 
retirement benefits, and the prestige of her position. 
Proceeding to the next step of the fYiLUCmn", 
analysis, the district court concluded that OKC met its 
burden of offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
for its actions: (I) Porter decided to create a new deputy 
superintendent position in a revenue-neutral manner; and 
(2) Jones' position was eliminated to fund the new 
position. The court held that this evidence was sufficient to 
shift the burden back to Jones to demonstrate that OKC's 
reasons for her reassignment were pretextual. 
In response, Jones noted that funding for her previous 
position stayed on the books for the 2007-2008 fiscal year, 
and staff in her former department continued working in 
that department before and after the position of Executive 
Director of Teaching and Learning was created. Moreover, 
Jones stressed the similarities between her previous 
position and the new position created just after her 
demotion. She also stated under oath that fellow OKC 
directors, including Brown, made age-related comments 
regarding her retirement plans and that these comments 
occurred outside of the context of a normal course of 
conversation. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Jones, the district court determined that a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that OKC's proffered 
reasons for Jones' reassignment were inconsistent or 
unworthy of belief. 
however, the court reasoned: "[T]here will be 
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject 
the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could 
conclude that the action was discriminatory." According to 
the district court, Jones' case fell within this exception. Her 
evidence for pretext was not "particularly strong" and "a 
reasonable juror could very * 1277 well find no 
inconsistencies in [OKC's] position." Although the court 
acknowledged that OKC leadership had made age-related 
comments, it faulted Jones for not providing any 
"additional evidence" to show that age played a role in the 
reassignment decision. As a result, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of OKC. This appeal 
followed. 
II 
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de 
novo, applying the same legal standard used by the lower 
Summary judgment is proper only if"there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
"We examine the factual record and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [Jones], 
who opposed summary judgment." 
A 
1 
Before reaching the merits of parties' arguments, we must 
first determine whether the Supreme Court's holding in 
decided after the 
district court issued its summary judgment order, affects 
our analysis on appeal. OKC argues that compels 
dismissal of Jones' claim because it requires an ADEA 
plaintiff to provide some evidence that her employer was 
motivated solely by age when making an adverse 
employment decisionA 
III OKC's argument is flawed on several levels, but we 
need address only one: It conflates two separate standards 
for causation. The ADEA, like other anti-discrimination 
statutes, includes a causation requirement. It prohibits 
employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
age." ) (emphasis added). The statute, 
however, does not define the phrase "because of," and 
before it was unclear which causal standard applied. 
clarified that the ADEA requires "but-for" 
causation. . Consequently, to succeed on 
a claim of age discrimination, a plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that her employer would 
not have taken the challenged action but for the plaintiffs 
age. OKC argues that in mandating but-for causation, 
established that "age must have been the only 
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factor" in the employer's decision-making process. 
We disagree. The Tenth Circuit has long held that a 
plaintiff must prove but-for causation to hold an employer 
liable under the ADEA. See 
*1278 (requiring an ADEA 
plaintiff to show that age had a "determinative influence on 
the outcome" of her employer's decision-making process). 
does not hold otherwise. Accordingly, does 
not disturb longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent by 
placing a heightened evidentiary requirement on ADEA 
plaintiffs to prove that age was the sole cause of the 
adverse employment action. 
2 
A more nuanced question is whether rendered the 
framework of proving discrimination 
inapplicable to claims brought pursuant to the ADEA. 
Under a plaintiff may survive 
summary judgment by providing circumstantial rather than 
direct evidence of discrimination. See 
To do so, the plaintiff must first demonstrate 
a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. 
If she succeeds at this first stage, the burden 
of production then shifts to the employer to identifY a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action. Once the employer advances such 
a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the 
employer's proffered reason was pretextual. See 
12] This circuit has long held that plaintiffs may use the 
three-step analysis to prove age 
discrimination under the ADEA. See 
We will not overrule our prior decisions applying this 
framework to ADEA claims unless those decisions are in 
("Under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, this panel cannot overturn the decision of 
another panel ofthis court barring en banc reconsideration, 
a superseding contrary Supreme Court decision, or 
authorization of all currently active judges on the court." 
(quotation and citation omitted)). 
But rather than barring our use of the 
paradigm, expressly left open the question of 
"whether the evidentiary framework of 
lJ"J~Fl1L' ], utilized in Title VII cases[,] is appropriate in the 
ADEA context." see also 
(applying 
to an ADEA claim "[b]ecause the 
parties do not dispute the issue"). accordingly does 
not overturn circuit precedent applying 
UIIJAVflA.' to ADEA cases. 
Moreover, the rule articulated has no logical 
effect on the application of to age 
discrimination claims. held that "the burden of 
persuasion [n]ever shifts to the party defending an alleged 
mixed-motives discrimination claim brought under the 
ADEA." however, 
does not shift the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to 
the defendant. Rather, it shifts only the burden of 
7, Throughout the three-step 
process, "[t]he plaintiff ... carries the full burden of 
persuasion to show that the defendant discriminated on 
[an] illegal basis." 
Although we recognize that created some 
uncertainty regarding burden-shifting in the ADEA 
context, we conclude that it does not 
continued application of 
claims. See 
(unpublished) 
did not overrule circuit precedents in which we 
*1279 have consistently employed the 
] burden-shifting framework in ADEA cases."). 
is not precedential, see 10th Cir. R. 32.1, we 
agree with its reasoning and join all of our sibling circuits 
that have addressed this issue. See 
(unpublished) (same). 
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B 
(4) "The Tenth Circuit liberally defines the phrase 'adverse 
employment action.' Such actions are not simply limited to 
monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. Instead, 
we take a 'case-by-case approach,' examining the unique 
factors relevant to the situation at hand." ,VlnUlez 
(citations omitted). Although we do not deem "a 
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities 
to be an adverse employment action," (quotation 
omitted), the prong is satisfied by a "significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change 
in benefits," I 
151 Under the facts of this case, the district court correctly 
determined that Jones suffered an adverse employment 
action. Jones' reassignment letter specifically stated that 
her salary level would remain the same for the ensuing 
school year only, and Jones suffered a $17,000 decrease in 
salary the following year. Her vacation benefits were 
reduced immediately upon reassignment, and her 
retirement *1280 benefits were reduced the following year. 
Although OKC argues that Jones did not experience a 
demotion, she certainly lost professional prestige and fell 
to a lower position in the district's organizational 
hierarchy. Also, OKC's argument that a five-dollar 
reduction in daily pay is not sufficient to constitute an 
adverse employment action is simply incorrect. All told, 
the record in this case conclusively shows that Jones 
suffered an adverse employment action and proved a prima 
facie case of age discrimination. 
c 
(61 We thus consider the ultimate question of whether 
OKC was entitled to summary judgment. Despite holding 
that Jones established a prima facie case of discrimination 
and demonstrated that OKC's proffered reasons for her 
reassignment were pretextual, the district court granted 
OKC's motion for summary judgment. It concluded that 
Jones' claim fell within the exception outlined in 
because, "even when the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to [Jones], no reasonable juror could find 
that [OKC's] decision to reassign her was based on her 
age." Jones argues that this determination constitutes 
reversible error because the rare conditions necessary to 
establish the exception are not present in this case. 
We agree. 
In the Supreme Court rejected the so-called 
"pretext plus" standard that required plaintiffs using the 
framework to both show pretext and 
produce "additional evidence of discrimination" in order to 
avoid summary judgment. 
expressly held that "a plaintiff's prima facie case 
[of discrimination], combined with sufficient evidence to 
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may 
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated." No 
additional evidence is necessary to show discrimination 
because "[p ]roof that the defendant's explanation is 
unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial 
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination." 
17J [81 Consistent with the Tenth Circuit has 
"definitively rejected a 'pretext plus' standard." 
Consequently, 
presents evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual 
dispute regarding the veracity of a defendant's 
nondiscriminatory reason, we presume the jury could infer 
that the employer acted for a discriminatory reason and 
must deny summary judgment." 
A plaintiff produces sufficient evidence of pretext when 
she shows "such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy 
of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act 
for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." IfJr!JYnfL 
When evaluating the sufficiency this evidence, we look to 
several factors, "includ[ing] the strength of the 
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[employee's] prima facie case, the probative value of the 
proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any 
other evidence that supports the employer's case and that 
properly may be considered" on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
OKC proffered two legitimate reasons for Jones' 
reassignment: Porter's desire to undertake a reorganization 
ofOKC's executive team in a revenue-neutral fashion and 
his belief that Jones' former position contained only 
narrow duties that could be absorbed by other directors. 
With respect *1281 to Porter's first goal, Jones produced 
evidence that her former position stayed on the books for 
the 2007-2008 fiscal year and that staff in her department 
remained employed in the same positions after her transfer. 
Further, Randall told Jones that ifher transfer was actually 
motivated by budgetary reasons, Porter would have "run" 
it by him. Similarly, Randall attested to the fact that OKC 
could have easily taken Jones' former position off the 
books if it so desired. 
Second, Jones presented evidence that a new position, 
Executive Director of Teaching and Learning, was created 
shortly after her transfer. As noted supra, this position's 
job responsibilities were strikingly similar to those of 
Jones' former position as Executive Director of 
Curriculum and Instruction. Although OKC argues that the 
new position entailed more responsibility, it also admits 
that the position reabsorbed many of the same duties of 
Jones' former position and was filled by someone thirteen 
years Jones' junior. Together, this evidence was sufficient 
to satisfy McDonnell Douglas'S third step, and the district 
court's grant of summary judgment was therefore 
improper. 
In reversing the district court, we recognize that 
carved out a narrow exception to our general rule against a 
"pretext plus" requirement. Under "there will be 
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject 
the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could 
conclude that the action was discriminatory." 
For example, an employer would be 
entitled to summary judgment "if the record conclusively 
revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak 
issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was 
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted 
independent evidence that no discrimination had 
occurred." (emphasis added). 
But the exception does not apply here. In reasoning 
Footnotes 
that Jones generated only a weak question offact regarding 
whether OKC's proffered reasons were pretextual, the 
district court improperly favored OKC's version of the 
facts. It stated, for instance, that "[o]f the persons who 
[inquired into Jones' retirement plans], only one, Ms. 
Brown, was even arguably involved in the reassignment 
decision, but [OKC] strongly argues she had no role in the 
decision process." After noting that "Brown's own 
testimony clearly states that the decision regarding [Jones'] 
reassignment was made by ... Porter," the court concluded 
that Jones' "lack of evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find discrimination place[d][her] case squarely 
within the contours of the exception." 
However, the district court was required to view the facts 
in the light most favorable to Jones. See 
Accordingly, it should have credited Shanahan's 
statement that four other directors were involved in the 
decision to reassign Jones. Properly considered at the 
summary judgment stage, Jones' evidence of 
discrimination therefore included age-related comments by 
three executive directors, all involved in the reassignment 
decision.6 Finally, even if we were to assume *1282 that 
Jones "created only a weak issue of fact as to whether 
[OKC's] reason was untrue," the corollary "abundant and 
uncontroverted independent evidence that no 
discrimination had occurred" did not exist in this record. 
Rather than properly applying the district court 
erroneously held Jones to the discredited "pretext plus" 
standard. The court faulted Jones for not presenting 
"additional evidence" that age was a determining factor in 
her reassignment. But after showing that OKC's reasons 
for her transfer were pretextual, Jones was under no 
obligation to provide additional evidence of age 
discrimination. See 
accord 
Accordingly, because we agree with Jones that the rare 
conditions necessary to satisfy the exception are 
not present, we REVERSE the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and REMAND for further 
proceedings. 
Parallel Citations 
110 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 4,93 EmpJ. Prac. Dec. P 
43,967,260 Ed. Law Rep. 541 
Shanahan also told Jones that she could apply for other open positions. Jones declined to apply for these positions because doing so 
110 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 4,93 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,967, 260 Ed. Law Rep. 541 
would require her to apply to "the very people" who made the decision to eliminate her former position. 
Jones also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, 
conceded below that this claim should be dismissed. 
As discussed 
allows plaintiffs to prove age discrimination using a three-step, burden-shifting method of proof. 
but 
"Although this argument was not raised below, inasmuch as ] was decided after [Jones] filed her notice of appeal, we may 
consider changes in governing law arising during the pendency ofthe appeal." 
OKC does obliquely reference the "undisputed" fact that, during his tenure as superintendent, Porter promoted and employed several 
persons over the age of forty. However, OKC makes this reference in an effort to counter Jones' assertions that she was demoted. 
OKC does not debate Jones' ability to satisfy the fourth factor of the prima facie test and has therefore has waived any argument to 
that effect. See (,,[Parties] who fail to argue [an] issue in their brief are deemed 
to have waived [that] contention on appeal."). 
At the time of the decision to transfer Jones, OKC employed five executive directors (including Jones). Two of these directors had 
made comments concerning Jones' retirement plans: Linda Toure and DeAnn Davis. As previously noted, Toure questioned Jones at 
least once about when she was going to retire. Also, Davis asked Jones on two occasions when she was going to retire. A witness to 
one of these occasions interpreted Davis' questions as "indicating that things would be better if Dr. Jones would go ahead and retire 
and that she really ought to consider retiring." 
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State employee, a Caucasian female, brought Title VII 
action against employer alleging racial and sexual 
harassment and retaliation. The United States District 
Court for the Central District of California, 
1., entered summary judgment 
for employer. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Circuit Judge, held that: (I) court would consider 
evidence of supervisor's actions occurring prior to date 
referenced in employee's complaint, deposition, and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge as 
being the onset date of allegedly harassing incidents; (2) 
though supervisor's sexually-related comments about 
women were offensive, conduct was not frequent, severe, 
or abusive enough to interfere unreasonably with 
plaintiff's employment, as required for Title VII sexual 
harassment claim; and (3) employee failed to support Title 
VII retaliation claim. 
Affirmed. 
Circuit Judge, filed opinion dissenting in part. 
West Headnotes (J ]) 
With respect to employee's hostile work 
environment claim, court would consider 
evidence of supervisor's actions occurring during 
the four to five months prior to date referenced in 
employee's complaint, deposition, and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
charge as being the onset date of allegedly 
harassing incidents, as relevant background 
evidence to put timely claims in context. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., § 
Title VII is violated if sexual harassment is so 
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work 
environment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703(a)(l), ). 
Employer is liable under Title VII for conduct 
giving rise to a hostile environment where 
employee proves (l) that he was subjected to 
verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, 
(2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that 
the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter conditions of victim's employment and 
create abusive working environment, but conduct 
must be extreme to amount to a change in the 
terms and conditions of employment. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), 
To be actionable under Title VII, sexually 
objectionable environment must be both 
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, 
and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be 
so. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703( a)(1), 
83 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 618, 78 EmpL Prac. Dec. P 40,189 ... 
Harassing conduct need not be motivated by 
sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of 
Title VII, and the motivation can be a general 
hostility to the presence of women in the 
workplace. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 
In considering sexual harassment claim, courts 
are to determine whether an environment is 
sufficiently hostile or abusive by looking at all 
the circumstances, including frequency of 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with employee's work performance. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703( a)(l), 
c 
~ 
Though supervisor's sexually-related comments 
about women were offensive, conduct was not 
frequent, severe, or abusive enough to interfere 
unreasonably with plaintiff's employment, as 
required for Title VII sexual harassment claim, 
where offensive conduct was concentrated on 
one occasion, it occurred in the wake of a dispute 
about a nurse's failure to follow instructions and 
plaintiff's telling supervisor that she would no 
longer serve as "acting senior psychologist" in 
his absence, and supervisor's comments were 
about other people. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703(a)(I), ). 
Former employee could not support Title VII 
retaliation claim based on allegations that 
supervisor stood outside her door and laughed, 
saying "she got me on sexual harassment 
charges," that supervisor ridiculed her to other 
employees, falsely accused her of not submitting 
a work order, and was hypercritical, and that she 
was forced to take medical leave because of the 
stress ofretaliatory actions; laughing incident did 
not permit inference that supervisor's conduct 
would continue without sanction or that 
employee had no choice but to quit, and there 
was no evidence that other alleged conduct 
actually occurred. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), 
To make out prima facie case of retaliation under 
Title VII, plaintiff must establish that she acted to 
protect her Title VII rights, that an adverse 
employment action was thereafter taken against 
her, and that a causal link exists between those 
two events. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 
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*1106 
Former medical clinic employee could not 
support Title VII retaliation claim based on 
allegations that supervisor gave employee lower 
performance evaluations after employee accused 
supervisor of sexual harassment, where assistant 
superintendent of clinic raised the three low 
marks that supervisor had given, supervisor's 
evaluation was not disseminated beyond assistant 
superintendent, who corrected it, assistant 
superintendent's evaluation was not sub-average, 
nor did employee ascribe any retaliatory motive 
to it, and employee was not demoted, stripped of 
work responsibilities, fired or suspended, or 
otherwise treated adversely. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 704(a), 
To establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination based on sex, employee was 
required to show that she was a member of a 
protected group (females), that she was 
adequately performing her job, and that she 
suffered an adverse employment action, or was 
treated differently from others similarly situated. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 
§ 
and Law Firms 
Los Angeles, California, for 
the plaintiff-appellant. 
Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, 
California, for the defendants-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California Edward Rafeedie, District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV -96-08518-ER 
Before: and Circuit Judges, and 
GEORGE, Senior District Judge." 
Opinion 
Circuit Judge: 
Aybike Kortan, a Clinical Staff Psychologist for the State 
of California Department of Youth Authority (CY A), 
appeals the summary judgment entered in CY A's favor on 
her action under alleging hostile work 
environment, retaliation, and gender discrimination. In a 
published opinion, the district court declined to consider 
evidence of harassment not mentioned in the complaint or 
in Kortan's charge with the California Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing; and held that a negative 
evaluation (after Kortan complained about her supervisor's 
conduct), unaccompanied by any other adverse impact 
such as a demotion or change of responsibilities, is 
insufficient to allow a retaliation claim to go forward. 
opinion published after the 
district court's decision, 
indicates that evidence outside the 
limitations period should be considered at least as relevant 
background, it does not affect the result here. As we 
otherwise agree that no triable issues are raised, we affirm. 
Kortan, who is a Caucasion female, began working at the 
Southern Youth Reception Center and Clinic (SYCC) in 
June 1988 as a Clinical Staff Psychologist. On June 29, 
1989, her supervisor, Dr. Albert Atesalp, appointed Kortan 
as "acting senior psychologist" with the authority to act on 
his behalfin his absence. This was a special designation for 
which Kortan received no extra remuneration or benefits. 
On January 26, 1994, she was honored as Outstanding 
Employee of the Year. Kortan had no complaints about 
Atesalp's behavior until February 1994. 
On February 1, she left instructions with the nursing staff 
that a ward who had been admitted to the hospital was not 
to be discharged back into the general population without 
her approval, but the next day discovered that her 
instructions had been tom up and the ward had been 
returned. Kortan believed that Nurse Chavez was 
responsible and reported this to Atesalp. Atesalp did not 
seem to Kortan to take her problem seriously. On February 
3, Kortan wrote Atesalp that she no longer wanted to be 
"acting senior" in his absence, stating that "for the past 5 
years, I have been acting in your capacity when you are 
absent. I have been trying to do my best. However, 
regardless of how much I try, I am unable to improve in 
any way how things are around here." Over coffee after 
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Atesalp received the memo, Kortan says that he referred to 
one female, who was *1107 formerly a superintendent of 
the SRCC, as a "regina," and said that this person "laughs 
like a hyena." He also referred to a former assistant 
superintendent as a "madonna," "regina" and a "castrating 
bitch." In the same conversation, Atesalp referred to 
women generally as "bitches" and "histrionics."2 
Sometime between February 3 and 10, Kortan complained 
about Atesalp's conduct to Assistant Superintendent 
Schulman. He seemed empathetic and encouraged Kortan 
to "take him [Atesalp] on." Kortan then complained to 
Superintendent Manual Carbajal and memorialized her 
charges against Atesalp in a February 10, 1994 
memorandum. The memorandum details a number of 
difficulties, including the incident with Nurse Chavez; 
complaints from other psychologists that Atesalp 
pressured them to write reports; being called to Atesalp's 
office to listen to a tape by Dr. Abrams (a male 
psychologist on staff) whose language was shocking to 
Kortan and later, to read a letter Atesalp had written to 
Abrams that used the phrase "masturbate yourself'; and 
Atesalp's referring to a former Superintendent as "regina," 
and making racial remarks about blacks. The Office of the 
Superintendent forwarded Kortan's complaints together 
with a request for investigation to the Headquarters of the 
California Youth Authority in Sacramento. Brian Rivera of 
Internal Affairs was assigned to investigate. 
After Kortan complained about Atesalp, he started to give 
her "the looks" and to stare at her instead of smiling, as he 
had before. Atesalp told Kortan that "All this time, I 
assumed you were 'Artemis' ... I made a mistake, and you 
are not 'Artemis.' You are 'Medea.' " She also heard him 
laughing outside her door, saying "Yeah, she got me on 
sexual harassment charges. Ha. Ha." 
Meanwhile, Kortan was concerned about having an 
upcoming evaluation conducted by Atesalp. She asked that 
her supervision be transferred from Atesalp to Dr. 
Pastrana, the Senior Psychologist of the Marshall program. 
However, that program was separate from the diagnostic 
program in which Kortan was working and was fully 
staffed with clinical psychologists at the time. 
Consequently, Atesalp did the evaluation. He rated 
Kortan's performance as "E" ("performance consistently 
exceeds expected standards") in five of the eight areas of 
evaluation and "I" ("improvement needed to meet 
expected standards") in three areas: work habits, 
relationships with people, and meeting work 
commitments. These were the lowest overall evaluations 
Kortan had received, although she had received an "M" 
("performance fully meets expected standards") in the 
"work habits" section on her 1989 evaluation. To avoid 
any perception of retaliation, Schulman independently 
reviewed Atesalp's evaluation of Kortan; because he did 
not believe that Atesalp's initial evaluation was completely 
accurate, and felt there was retaliation, he changed the 
three low ratings to "M." He explained that he could not 
give Kortan higher ratings because she had been on 
vacation or leave for a significant part of the evaluation 
period (between May and August 1993), and the 
maintenance staff had complained about how she treated 
them. Both Kortan and Atesalp refused to sign the 
evaluation. Only Schulman's evaluation (signed April 26) 
ended up in Kortan's personnel file. 
On March 11 Schulman instructed Atesalp to conduct 
business with Kortan so there could be no perception of 
retaliation or harassment. On March 22, after reviewing 
Atesalp's initial performance evaluation, Schulman told 
him to stop any type of behavior that might be perceived as 
retaliatory or harassing. He also forwarded * 11 08 
information about Atesalp's possibly retaliatory conduct to 
Rivera. 
Kortan asked Schulman for a temporary transfer to the 
Ventura facilty, but Schulman had no discretion to effect 
such a transfer. When Kortan inquired of Vivian Crawford, 
the Superintendent of the Ventura facility, regarding a 
position, she was told there was none available but that her 
letter would be kept on file. Kortan also indicated to Rivera 
that she would like to change offices, as hers was located 
next to Atesalp's. Alternatives were discussed with her and 
her office was eventually moved in September. 
Rivera completed his report May 7, 1994; he found the 
charges of harassment in Kortan's February 10 
memorandum unsubstantiated. Kortan was advised of 
CY A's conclusion that there was no evidence of sexual 
harassment on October 5, 1994. Her last day of work was 
October 24, and she was hospitalized the next day. Since 
then, Kortan has been on leave of absence. 
Kortan filed charges with the EEOC on October 31, 1994. 
She claimed that starting February 2, 1994, Atesalp created 
a hostile work environment by using racist and sexist 
terminology, and that after complaining about his conduct 
she was given a lowered performance rating, had a 
temporary transfer request denied, and had been threatened 
with disciplinary action if she spoke about the allegations. 
She received a right to sue letter in September 1996, and 
filed this action December 6, 1996. 
CY A moved for summary judgment, which the district 
court granted. Kortan timely appeals. 
II 
83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 618, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,189 ... 
Kortan makes two arguments with respect to her hostile 
work environment claim. First, she argues that there is a 
triable issue as to the existence of a hostile work 
environment; and second, she asserts that the district 
court's decision to grant summary judgment was based in 
large part on its decision not to consider evidence of 
Atesalp's actions occurring during the four to five months 
prior to February 3, 1994. 
A 
I I I The pre-February 3, 1994 evidence Kortan proffered 
consists of her declaration that beginning in late 1993 and 
continuing into 1994, Atesalp used gender derogatory 
language in her presence, including referring to various 
staff members as a "castrating bitch," "Madonna," and 
"regina. Kortan also states that Atesalp referred to her as 
"Rapunzel" and "Medea" and wrote postcards to her at 
home. Asked at her deposition about Atesalp's use ofterms 
such as "Madonna" or "castrating bitch," Kortan indicated 
that prior to February 3, 1994 he did so "[v]ery 
infrequently," "[p]robably once or twice" in the case of the 
term "castrating bitch." Also, once, in talking about his 
license, he described a woman who interviewed him as 
"histrionic." 
The district court did not consider this evidence because 
Kortan expressly limited the onset of the allegedly 
harassing incidents to February 1994 in her complaint, her 
EEOC charges,4 and her deposition. * 11 09 Kortan 
submits that this was wrong under our opinion in 
, because 
Atesalp's prior actions were "like and reasonably related" 
to her allegations of harassment occurring after February 3, 
1994, and would have been within the scope of a 
reasonably thorough EEOC investigation. 
In Farmer, the employer decided to reduce the number of 
women employed in production jobs and to accomplish 
this by a gender neutral lay-off followed by rehires that 
would be mostly male. The plaintiff raised a 
discriminatory layoff claim in her federal complaint, which 
Farmer Bros. sought to have dismissed for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies on the ground that she had 
not included the layoff claim (as compared with a failure to 
rehire claim) in the charges filed with the EEOC. In that 
context we stated that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the lay-off claim if that claim fell within 
the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an " 
'EEOC' investigation which can reasonably be expected to 
grow out of the charge of discrimination.' " Id. at 899 
(quoting 
We went on to note that Farmer had included 
her claim of discriminatory lay-off in her EEOC charge, 
but even if she hadn't, it was "necessary for the EEOC to 
investigate the circumstances of [plaintiffs] layoff' in 
order to understand the failure to rehire. Id. Therefore, we 
held that the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction 
over the layoff claim. Unlike Farmer, here it was not 
"necessary" for the EEOC to investigate pre-February 
1994 events in order to evaluate the claim Kortan actually 
made-that Atesalp's comments beginning in February 
created a hostile work environment-nor had it done so, 
would the investigation have revealed anything probative 
except for the same comments "very infrequently" made. 
However, after the district court rendered its decision in 
this case, we addressed a somewhat similar situation in 
Anderson 
was a veteran of the FBI who brought a Title VII action 
alleging sexual harassment occurring over many years. In 
granting summary judgment on her claim of a hostile work 
environment, the district court declined to consider any 
incident that did not occur within the statutory limitations 
period before the EEOC proceedings were brought. We 
held that the excluded incidents were part of a pattern of 
alleged discrimination that continued within the statutory 
period, and that regardless of whether "actionable in and of 
themselves, untimely claims serve as relevant background 
evidence to put timely claims in context." 
Therefore, we shall consider the evidence to which Kortan 
points that occurred four to five months prior to February 
3,1994. 
B 
131 Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an 
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
§ Title VII is violated if sexual 
harassment is so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile 
work environment. See !VU\i!IT!no 
"An employer is liable under Title VII 
for conduct giving rise to a hostile * 111 0 environment 
where the employee proves (1) that he was subjected to 
verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, (2) that 
this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
the victim's employment and create an abusive working 
environment." 
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amount to a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment.' To be actionable under Title VII, 'a sexually 
objectionable environment must be both objectively and 
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did 
perceive to be so.' " (quoting 
"[H]arassing 
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support 
an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." 
The motivation can be a "general 
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Id. 
161 Courts are to determine whether an environment is 
sufficiently hostile or abusive by " 'looking at all the 
circumstances,' including the 'frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee's work performance.' " 
(quoting 
171 There is no question that Atesalp's comments were 
offensive. The difficulty is that they were mainly made in a 
flurry on February 3rd. Once or twice before he had 
referred to a former female superintendent as a "castrating 
bitch" or "madonna" or "regina," but Kortan did not regard 
this as harassing and she thought Atesalp behaved like a 
"perfect gentleman" prior to February 3. He used "regina" 
again on February 9. As unpleasant as Atesalp's outburst 
was, the comments were about other people. He never 
directed a sexual insult at Kortan. He also told her, on or 
after February 3, that she wasn't Artemis as he had 
previously thought but Medea. Even so, Atesalp's 
utterances were just offensive. See !I!!v·vn,"w ,/w;vun 
(mere utterance of epithet which engenders 
offensive feelings would not affect conditions of 
employment to sufficiently significant degree necessary 
for violation of Title VII). 
Kortan argues that whether a reasonable woman would 
have found Atesalp's action hostile or abusive was an issue 
of fact for the jury to decide. She points to 
where we 
affirmed the district court's findings and conclusions 
following a bench trial that repeated vulgarities, sexual 
remarks, and requests for sexual favors by a hotel 
employee subjected female maids to severe and pervasive 
sexual harassment that seriously tainted the working 
environment and altered the terms and conditions of their 
employment. Among other things, the chief of engineering 
(Nusbaum) told a pregnant maid "that's what you get for 
sleeping without your underwear," asked her why she was 
pregnant by another man, and made comments about her 
"ass." Nusbaum regularly offered to give another maid 
money and an apartment to live in if she would "give him 
[her] body"; he assured her she would never be fired if she 
would have sex with him; and he told another * 1111 "You 
have such a fine ass. It's a nice ass to stick a nice dick into. 
How many dicks have you eaten?" The evidence also 
showed that the Executive Housekeeper merely laughed at 
such remarks and herself called one of the maids a "dog," 
"whore" and "slut." 
However offensive his language, Altesalp's conduct is not 
so severe or pervasive as Nusbaum's in Hacienda Hotel. 
Although Kortan urges that improper conduct does not 
have to rise to the level of that present in Hacienda Hotel to 
be actionable, other cases in which a hostile work 
environment has been found to exist are also quite 
different. Anderson is a good example. Anderson was an 
FBI agent who "endured a host of sexually harassing 
incidents between 1986 and 1994," including being 
referred to by her supervisor as the "office sex goddess," 
"sexy," "gorgeous," and "the good little girl" instead of by 
name; at a presentation she was to make about an arrest 
plan, finding an easel with a drawing of a pair of breasts 
and the words, "Operation Cupcake," and being told by the 
supervisor in front of the assembled group "This is your 
training bra session"; receiving various vulgar notes 
including a cartoon depicting varieties of female breasts 
with her initials next to an example labeled "cranberries"; 
and being patted on the buttocks by another agent, who 
commented on her "putting on weight down there" and 
informed Anderson of his observations from time to time. 
a female employee of a mmmg company 
alleged that over a two-year period her supervisor made 
sexual remarks about her, in and out of her presence; 
frequently called her "beautiful" and "gorgeous" rather 
than her name; told her about his sexual fantasies, 
including his desire to have sex with her as well as his wife; 
joked that the answer to a riddle about what a Mexican 
prostitute was called is "frijole"; several times remarked 
about Draper's "ass" and commented to others that "it 
would be fun to get into [Draper's] pants"; and on one 
occasion used the loudspeaker to ask whether she needed 
help changing clothes and said there were several guys 
willing to help, and on another, after Draper had taken off a 
sweatshirt, to ask whether that was all she was going to 
take off. 
Montero further illustrates the type of conduct that gives 
rise to a hostile working environment. Montero was the 
only female employee at a parts distribution center. Over a 
two-year period, one supervisor called her a "butt-kiss," 
told Montero he was going to spank her, rested his chin on 
her shoulder, grabbed her arms until she said "ouch," and 
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made crude gestures. Another supervisor grabbed his 
crotch while speaking with her, placed his face on her 
bottom, told her he had sexual dreams about her, put his 
hand on her chair as she sat down, tried to bite her neck, 
and knelt in front of her and tried to put his head between 
her knees. Another employee had pulled her pants up from 
behind by the belt loop, commented about the small size of 
his penis, and placed notes on her desk telling Montero to 
dance naked on the desk or to take off her clothes. 
The conduct in this case is simply not of this order of 
magnitude. Considering all the circumstances, including 
the fact that Atesalp's offensive conduct was concentrated 
on one occasion, and that it occurred in the wake of a 
dispute about a nurse's failure to follow instructions and 
Kortan's telling Atesalp that she would no longer serve as 
"acting senior psychologist" in his absence, we conclude 
that no triable issue exists about whether the conduct was 
frequent, severe or abusive enough to interfere 
unreasonably with Kortan's employment. 
III 
181 191 Kortan next argues that the district court ignored 
retaliatory actions that were taken after she complained 
about Atesalp's conduct, and that it applied an incorrect 
legal standard in determining *1112 whether she had been 
the subject of an "adverse employment decision." To make 
out a prima facie case ofretaliation, Kortan must establish 
"that she acted to protect her Title VII rights, that an 
adverse employment action was thereafter taken against 
her, and that a causal link exists between those two 
Kortan identifies the following as adverse employment 
actions: 
· Atesalp's laughing and stating that Kortan "got him 
on sexual harassment charges"; 
· Atesalp's ridiculing Kortan to other employees; 
Atesalp's hostile stares; 
· Atesalp's calling Kortan "Medea"; 
· Atesalp's falsely accusing Kortan of not submitting 
a work order to have her desk repaired; 
· Atesalp's increased criticism of Kortan; 
· Atesalp's low ratings of Kortan's performance in 
three categories whereas before her complaints, she 
had been Outstanding Employee ofthe Year; 
· CY A's failure to respond to Kortan's requests for 
transfer and a different office; 
· CY A's failure to investigate complaints about 
retaliation; 
· Shulman telling her on October 24, 1994 to 
communicate with him rather than with CYA 
headquarters about complaints, and Atesalp yelling at 
her during the meeting; 
Constructively discharging her. 
Of these, Kortan contends that being forced to take medical 
leave because of the stress of retaliatory actions is the most 
obviously "adverse" employment decision. She analogizes 
to Draper, where a woman employee who had been 
subjected to extreme harassment by a supervisor and had 
complained to management, confronted him months later 
about continuing harassment and was met with a response 
that included telling his direct supervisor that Draper was 
in his office "digging up old bones" and laughing. From 
this she could reasonably conclude that nothing was going 
to be done to stop the conduct. Kortan views evidence that 
Atesalp stood outside her door and laughed, saying "she 
got me on sexual harassment charges" as similar; however, 
unlike Draper, Atesalp's response was his own 
immediate-albeit inappropriate-reaction to her complaint. 
From this, it is not possible to infer either that Atesalp's 
conduct would continue without sanction or that Kortan 
had no choice but to quit. Nor can we say that the 
combination of incidents after Kortan lodged her 
complaint February 10 were such that a "reasonable person 
would feel that the conditions of employment have become 
intolerable." Although she 
claims that Atesalp ridiculed her to other employees, 
falsely accused her of not submitting a work order, and was 
hypercritical, there is no evidence showing that these 
things happened. Thus, at most he was less civil, stared at 
her in a hostile fashion, and became more critical of her 
performance. 
This leaves Kortan's evaluation by Atesalp, which 
appraised her work as "exceeds expected standards" in five 
categories but was lower than average in three-and was 
admittedly retaliatory. However, Schulman raised the three 
low marks that Atesalp had given to "performance fully 
meets expected standards." Thus, the evaluation in 
Kortan's file shows that she exceeded expected standards 
in most categories and fully met them in the others. Kortan 
does not ascribe any retaliatory motive to Schulman's 
evaluation, which is the one that counts. 
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Kortan maintains that she should not be expected to show a 
tangible injury, relying on 
and V~.A~ •• ", 
In Hashimoto, an Asian-American woman 
alleged that *1113 the Department of Navy gave her a 
negative job reference in retaliation for filing an EEO 
complaint. We recognized that unlike most cases alleging 
retaliation where the retaliatory conduct takes the form of 
discharge, demotion, failure to promote, or the like, a 
retaliatory negative job reference does not itself inflict 
tangible employment harm because it requires a 
prospective employer's subsequent, adverse action in 
response to the reference to create the employment harm. 
Accordingly, we held that disseminating a negative job 
reference is a personnel action that violates Title VII even 
if it does not affect a decision not to hire the victim. In 
Yartzoff, an employee at an EPA research laboratory 
alleged that the Agency made a number of adverse 
employment decisions because of his pursuit of Title VII 
grievances in May 1979. Among them were the transfer of 
various job duties between August 1979 and February 
1980, the issuance of a sub-average performance rating in 
April 1980, and the transfer of additional job duties in 
February 1981. We stated that "[t]ransfers of job duties and 
undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would 
constitute 'adverse employment decisions' cognizable 
under this section." However, 
neither Hashimoto nor Yartzojf rescues Kortan's claim 
based on Atesalp 's negative evaluation. The Atesalp 
evaluation was not disseminated beyond Schulman, who 
corrected it; and the Schulman evaluation was not 
sub-average or undeserved to the extent it was less than 
perfect in three of eight categories. Beyond this, Kortan 
was not demoted, was not stripped of work responsibilities, 
was not handed different or more burdensome work 
responsibilities, was not fired or suspended, was not denied 
any raises, and was not reduced in salary or in any other 
benefit. Thus. Kortan has not shown that her evaluation 
was discriminatory or retaliatory, or was such an 
"intolerable" act that it would force an employee to quit. 
See (evaluation characterizing 
plaintiff as "acceptable" is not "intolerable"). Compare 
(unfounded negative evaluations that led to 
denial of merit pay in evaluation constituted constructive 
discharge). 
IV 
1111 Finally, Kortan argues that a triable issue off act exists 
whether she was discriminated against because of her sex. 
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, Kortan must show that she was a member 
of a protected group (females); that she was adequately 
performing her job; and that she suffered an adverse 
employment action, or was treated differently from others 
similarly situated. See 
1 
The district court properly dismissed this claim because, 
for reasons we have already explained, Kortan failed to 
show an adverse employment action. 
AFFIRMED. 
Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 
I respectfully dissent from the majority'S conclusion that 
Aybike Kortan failed to raise genuine issues of material 
fact regarding her retaliation and hostile working 
environment claims. Admittedly, this is a close case, and 
there is an attraction to the majority's resolution in not 
setting the bar for Title VII claims so low as to encourage 
litigation over commonplace, although objectionable, 
behavior in the workplace. Nonetheless, I believe that, 
given the particular circumstances here and that this is a 
ruling on summary judgment where the close call should 
go to the plaintiff, Kortan has met her burden for both 
claims and should be allowed to proceed to trial on the 
merits. 
The significant aspect of this case that causes me to differ 
with the majority is the overt retaliation against Kortan by 
her supervisor, Atesalp-conduct that elevates *1114 this 
case from a misogynist's rantings against his female 
colleagues into a hostile work environment for this 
individual subordinate. For this supervisor did more than 
demean with words; he used his superior position to punish 
Kortan with a dramatically lowered and undeserved 
performance evaluation that even Atesalp's supervisor, 
Schulman, recognized as retaliation for Kortan's 
complaints against Atesalp. The majority, I fear, 
diminishes the true nature of the hostile work environment 
Kortan faced by isolating the retaliatory performance 
review from its analysis of the work environment, 
notwithstanding that retaliation was a critical aspect of the 
totality of the circumstances we are bound to consider. See 
7, 
( "[W]hether an environment is 
'hostile' or 'abusive' can only be determined by looking at 
all the circumstances."); also 
("[R]etaliation can take the form of a hostile work 
environment."). Although Schulman took some steps to 
ameliorate Atesalp's retaliatory review, Atesalp-on the 
undisputed record before us-remained recalcitrant and 
unrepentant, suffered no reprimand other than a 
83 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 618, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,189 ... 
memorandum directing him to avoid the perception of 
retaliation or harassment and retained his supervisory 
authority over Kortan. I believe Atesalp's offensive and 
demeaning outbursts, his humiliating treatment of Kortan 
and-most significantly-the undeserved, retaliatory 
performance review comprise a totality of circumstances 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on Kortan's 
hostile work environment claim. 
Moreover, even Schulman's revised evaluation largely 
relied upon Atesalp's tainted evaluation and left Kortan 
with the lowest performance rating of her career with the 
California Youth Authority ("C.Y.A.") notwithstanding 
her having just been awarded "Outstanding Employee of 
the Year" for the same time period. Thus, I believe Kortan 
has also raised a triable issue that even Schulman's 
evaluation was impermissibly tainted by retaliation. 
I. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT: THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
The record, construed favorably to Kortan, reasonably 
shows the following circumstances that turned Kortan's 
work environment into one of gender-based hostility. Until 
February 1994, Kortan and Atesalp-her immediate 
supervisor-enjoyed a relatively congenial professional 
relationship in a close-knit work environment. They 
interacted frequently to coordinate responsibility given 
Kortan's special designation as acting senior psychologist 
in Atesalp's absence, and Atesalp occasionally turned to 
her as a confidant. As Kortan testified in her deposition, 
however, this relationship made her "a captive audience" 
for Atesalp's sexist remarks-and ultimately captive to his 
retaliation as welL Kortan on several occasions had to 
listen as Atesalp unburdened himself of his offensive and 
demeaning attitudes toward women, with particular 
invective for certain women who were superintendents at 
C.Y.A. These sexist, hostile statements about others are 
relevant to show Kortan was subjected to a hostile work 
environment. See 
*1115 (concluding that 
environment includes "general hostility to the presence of 
women in the workplace"); 
(concluding that "conduct 
tending to demonstrate hostility towards a certain group" is 
relevant to show discrimination against an employee who 
is a member of that group). Most offensive in Atesalp's 
misogynistic vocabulary was his use of certain terms to 
label women he held in highest contempt: "castrating 
bitch" and "regina," a term he let Kortan know was a 
double-entendre for vagina.2 The term "regina" is not the 
gutter language other cases have condemned, but given its 
intended meaning is just as offensive to women. See 
(relying on supervisor's references to 
women in a "derogatory fashion using sexually explicit 
and offensive terms," such as "dumb fucking broads" and 
"cunt" as evidence he created a hostile work environment); 
(concluding that such "vulgar and 
offensive" words " 'are widely recognized as not only 
improper, but as intensely degrading' " and thus frequent 
use of such words "clearly violates Title VII" (quoting 
(holding that "pervasive use of derogatory and insulting 
terms relating to women generally and addressed to female 
employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile 
work environment"). Although Kortan for a time tolerated 
AtesaJp's derogatory statements about other women, and 
acknowledges that as to her personally Atesalp was "a 
perfect gentleman," his offensive references bothered her 
and she objected to his use of them. Nonetheless, during 
the four to five month period before February 1994, 
Atesalp's verbal attacks on women "got worse and worse" 
and eventually contributed to her February 3 decision to 
step down from her role as acting senior psychologist.} 
At that point, Atesalp's attitude toward Kortan plainly 
shifted and became hostile. In a particularly emotional 
outburst, Atesalp directed invective at other female 
colleagues and females in general that, in context, Kortan 
could and did reasonably understand now included 
her-including relegating her to the despised "regina" 
category. Had that been the end of it-the emotional 
outburst of a supervisor who felt his trusted subordinate 
had unfairly abandoned him-there would not be cause for 
invoking Title VII. But that was not the end of it. Atesalp 
persisted in his retaliation, committing acts of increasing 
severity which transform this case from mere offensive 
conduct into a valid hostile work environment claim. 
Atesalp publicly directed his scorn against Kortan and 
made mockery of her sexual harassment charge outside the 
door of her office. Such humiliating conduct is an 
important factor in determining whether an employee was 
subjected to a hostile or abusive work environment. See 
Kortan also 
presented evidence, which on summary judgment we must 
construe in her favor, that Atesalp retaliated by purposely 
scheduling Kortan's performance evaluation on the day 
Kortan was to meet with the C.Y.A.'s internal investigator 
and falsely accusing Kortan of not submitting a work 
order. Atesalp also stared and glared at her and became 
hypercritical of her work-prompting Schulman to 
admonish Atesalp to behave himself in a March 11 
memorandum suggesting Atesalp was harassing *1116 
Kortan and retaliating against her through "excessive 
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corrections on Psychological evaluations, lack of 
flexibility of work hours, and documentation for minor 
behavior irritants."4 
Atesalp did not back off, however. Instead he invoked his 
supervisory authority to retaliate against Kortan-using her 
annual performance review to send an unmistakable 
message of retribution. Thus Kortan, who had a five-year 
record of receiving the highest ("E") rating in all 
performance categories (with the exception of one "M"-an 
average rating-in one category in her first year), and who 
was awarded "Outstanding Employee of the Year" for 
1993 (the evaluation period in question), dropped two 
levels in three categories to the substandard "I" rating in 
Atesalp's evaluation. Those ratings were admittedly 
retaliatory, as the majority recognizes. 
Although Schulman partially revised Atesalp's evaluation, 
those revisions neither negated the hostility of the work 
environment nor defeat Kortan's retaliation claim. In sum, 
C.Y.A. management effectively ratified Atesalp's 
retaliation, and added to the hostility of the work 
environment, by failing to take any disciplinary action 
against him. Not surprisingly, Atesalp remained 
recalcitrant and refused to sign the upgraded evaluation. 
As the Supreme Court has observed, management's 
knowledge of sexual harassment and failure to take any 
disciplinary action "may be seen as ... the employer's 
adoption of the offending conduct and its results, quite as if 
they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer's 
policy." accord 
529 
("Title VII does not permit employers to stand 
idly by once they learn that sexual harassment has 
occurred. To do so amounts to a ratification of the prior 
harassment."). Faced with management's failure to punish 
Atesalp for his known acts of retaliation, Kortan 
reasonably perceived her work environment as hostile.5 
The majority effectively insulates Atesalp's retaliatory 
conduct, however, first by excluding his retaliatory 
evaluation from its analysis of the hostile work 
environment and, second, by finding no actionable 
retaliation because Schulman's evaluation superseded 
Atesalp's-essentially, "no harm, no foul." I believe both 
grounds are in error: the totality of the circumstances, 
including Atesalp's retaliatory evaluation, add up to a 
triable case of a hostile work environment; and-as I discuss 
next-even Schulman's evaluation supports a separate claim 
of retaliation. 
II. RET ALIA TION BASED ON THE POOR 
EVALUATION 
The majority accepts that Atesalp's performance 
evaluation was retaliatory, and recognizes that an 
undeserved performance evaluation is actionable under 
It 
attempts to distinguish Yartzoff, however, because only 
Schulman'S "corrected" evaluation went into Kortan's 
personnel file, and it characterizes Schulman's evaluation 
as not undeserved. See maj. op. at 11l3. I disagree with this 
analysis in several respects. First, although Schulman did 
modifY Atesalp's retaliatory-and therefore 
undeserved-evaluation, he did not go so far as to correct it 
Rather, Schulman largely relied on the retaliatory 
evaluation to give Kortan the lowest evaluation of her 
five-year career at C.Y.A., and thereby ratified Atesalp's 
retaliation. 
As to the three undeserved ratings Atesalp gave Kortan, in 
the categories "relationships *1117 with people," "work 
habits" and "meeting work commitments," Schulman 
merely struck a compromise between the highest ("E") 
rating and Atesalp's unwarranted "I" ratings-moving 
Kortan up one rating to "M". Schulman may have 
independently investigated Kortan in the "relationships 
with people" category, but he did not independently 
investigate the other two. Schulman contends he lacked a 
"sufficient record of her performance ... to give her 
anything more than 'M' ratings" in those categories 
because she was on evacation or leave for a significant part 
of the yearly evaluation period, between May and August 
1993. This "justification" rings hollow given that Kortan 
was named "Outstanding Employee of the Year" for the 
same year, absences and all. Moreover, rather than allow 
Atesalp's punitive ratings to drag Kortan down, Schulman 
could have declined to rate Kortan in those two categories 
for want of personal knowledge, defaulted to Kortan's 
prior history of "E's" over the years or otherwise 
memorialized his uncertainty. Instead, he simply 
compromised and left Kortan with her lowest performance 
evaluation at C.Y.A. At the end of the day, Schulman's 
evaluation was at least as harmful to Kortan because, by 
failing to remove the retaliatory taint of Atesalp's 
evaluation, Schulman made clear to Kortan that 
management would not eliminate the adverse effect of 
Atesalp's retaliation-only lessen it.6 
Not only does the majority decline to recognize the effect 
of Schulman's tainted evaluation on Kortan, it also 
declines to address the "chilling effect which [a 
supervisor's] retaliatory conduct might have on the 
remaining employees under his supervision." 
accord 
doubt many C.Y.A. employees observed the conflict 
between Atesalp and Kortan and learned that the 
consequence of Kortan exercising her Title VII rights was 
that she went from "Outstanding Employee" to a 
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disfavored employee and became the focus of Atesalp's 
wrath. These employees will likely be deterred from 
reporting sexual harassment out of fear of retaliation by 
Atesalp and ending up in the same predicament as Kortan. 
Because Schulman's evaluation did not cure, but 
effectively ratified and perpetuated the" 'deleterious effect 
on the exercise of [Title VII] rights,' " caused by Atesalp's 
evaluation, (quoting 
I would hold 
that Kortan has presented sufficient evidence to defeat 
summary judgment on her retaliation claim. 
Parallel Citations 
83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 618, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 
40,189,00 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 5514,2000 Daily Journal 
DAR. 7386 
Footnotes 
Honorable Senior United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation. 
Also in February of 1994, Atesalp made derogatory comments about two blacks which were offensive to Kortan. She originally sued 
on account of these remarks as well, but has not appealed dismissal of claims based on racial discrimination. 
Apparently Atesalp told Kortan that a Georgia O'Keefe poster she had in her office was "suggestive." When Kortan asked what he 
meant. he said "\ will not say it because I'll be in trouble." Then he said: 'Til say it this way, it reminds me of a 'regina.' " Kortan 
replied: "Oh, you have a dirty mind." 
The EEOC charge, filed October 31, 1994, alleges that "[ sltarting February 2, 1994, my supervisor, Doctor Atesalp, created a hostile 
work environment by using racist and sexist terminology in my presence." In the attached Affidavit, Kortan avers that "[iln early 
February of 1994 my immediate supervisor, Dr. Atesalp, began to make verbal comments in my presence that were both racist and 
sexist. I have heard him refer ... to females as 'bitches', 'Madonnas' 'casterating bitches'. 'Regina' and 'histronic' these are just 
examples, he has used many negative terms to describe both females and Blacks." [sic.l 
Kortan's EEOC charge also refers to the CYA investigation, which covered the November 1993 incidents involving the Abrams 
tape and Altesalp letter responding to it. But Kortan does not base her hostile work environment claim on these incidents. 
Kortan testified that before she wrote her February 3, 1994 letter, Atesalp treated her well and that she was never harassed by him 
until she wrote the February 3 memorandum. 
Recent Supreme Court opinions (rendered after the district court's decision) have discussed an employer's vicarious liability for a 
hostile work environment, and have recognized the availability of an affirmative defense in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 
Since we hold that Kortan has failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work 
environment, we do not address the effect, if any, of these recent opinions on this case. 
Prior to February 1994, Atesalp, referred to Crawford, a superintendent at C.Y.A., as a "regina" as well as "a castrating bitch." 
Atesalp had referred to Chavira, another superintendent, as a "castrating bitch" more than once and as a "madonna." The majority 
overlooks Atesalp's pre-February 1994 statements about Crawford when it says Kortan testified that Atesalp had used the term 
castrating bitch "[v lery infrequently" and madonna "once or twice." Maj. Op. at 1108. This testimony was only referring to Atesalp' s 
statements about Chavira. Later in her deposition, Kortan testified that Atesalp had also used these terms to refer to Crawford. 
Several months prior to February 1994, Atesalp made clear to Kortan that he intended regina to mean vagina when he told her the 
Georgia O'Keeffe poster in her office was "suggestive" because it reminded him "of a regina." 
Atesalp also subjected Kortan to his racist comments. He repeatedly referred to one African-American employee as a "black ape," 
referred to another as a "black goon" and referred generally to African-American wards as "thugs." 
Schulman's memo contradicts the majority's statement that "there is no evidence showing" Atesalp retaliated by becoming 
hypercritical of Kortan. See maj. op. at 1112. 
5 Kortan had reason to be disheartened, because Schulman had initially encouraged her to "take him [Atesalp] on," suggesting Atesalp 
was a known abuser who needed to be challenged. Yet when Kortan did "take him on," she was the one who sutTered adverse 
consequences. 
The majority also seems to distinguish YartzofJ because Shulman's evaluation was not "subaverage." Ratings need not be 
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subaverage, however, to constitute retaliation. Rather, it is "undeserved performance ratings, if proven, [that] would constitute 
'adverse employment decisions' "actionable under the retaliation provision of Title VII. (quotation marks 
and citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord Brooks see also 
(holding that performance evaluation with only three below average ratings out of seven categories was sufficient 
adverse employment decision to create prima facie case of retaliation). 
Lam v. of 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
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4oF.3d1551 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Maivan LAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF HA WAI'I; Albert Simone, 
in his capacity as President of the 
University ofHawai'i; and Jeremy 
Harrison, in his capacity as Dean of the 
Richardson School of Law, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 91-16587. I Argued and Submitted Nov. 5, 
1992. I Submission Deferred Nov. 19, 1992 . I 
Resubmitted April 12, 1993. I Submission 
Deferred Feb. 17, 1994. I Resubmitted May 
26, 1994. I Decided Oct. 11, 1994. I As 
Amended Nov. 21 and Dec. 14,1994. 
Female applicant of Vietnamese descent sued state 
university's law school, alleging discrimination in 
application process on basis of race, sex and national 
origin. The United States District Court for the District of 
Hawai'i, Harold M. Fong, Chief Judge, entered summary 
judgment for university on claim relating to first search 
and hiring process for director of legal studies program, 
and, following bench trial, entered judgment for university 
on claim relating to second search. Applicant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(I) as to first search, evidence of bias on part of members 
of appointments committee precluded summary judgment, 
but (2) trial court did not clearly err in finding that 
discrimination or retaliation did not play motivating part in 
decision not to appoint applicant following second search. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
West Headnotes (24) 
III Civil Rights 
,"··Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden 
Once prima facie case of employment 
discrimination is established, burden then shifts 
to defendant to articular legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
decision, and then, in order to prevail, plaintiff 
must demonstrate that employer's alleged reason 
[21 
131 
[41 
for adverse employment decision is pretext for 
another motive which is discriminatory. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703 (a)(l ), as amended, 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
14 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
~.=Retaliation claims 
Retaliation claims under Title VII are included 
within McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens 
framework. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
16 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
'S~Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
To survive employer's summary judgment 
motion, only genuine factual issue with regard to 
discriminatory intent behind employment 
decision need be shown, and this requirement is 
almost always satisfied when plaintiff's 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, consists of 
more than McDonnell Douglaspresumption. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(l); 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA. 
47 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Courts 
>·"Summary judgment 
Federal Courts 
::Y,,·Summary judgment 
On review of trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for defendant, Court of Appeals would 
make all factual inferences in favor of plaintiff 
and not make any credibility determinations. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
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I Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
","',Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
With respect to hiring process for director of 
public university law school's Pacific Asian legal 
studies program, summary judgment for 
university on unsuccessful applicant's claims of 
race, sex and national origin discrimination was 
precluded by evidence of discriminatory bias at 
two stages of hiring process, including evidence 
that head of appointments committee had biased 
attitude toward women and Asians and that he 
had disparaged abilities of applicant, who was 
female and of Vietnamese descent, and evidence 
that another white male professor had stated that, 
given Japanese cultural preferences, program 
director should be male. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-2(a)(1 ). 
20 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
i;~Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
Existence of third-party preferences for 
discrimination does not justify discriminatory 
hiring practices. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 
2000e-2(a)( J). 
J Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.".""Hiring 
Civil Rights 
,~~Promotion, demotion, and transfer 
Discrimination at any stage of academic hiring or 
promotion process may infect ultimate 
employment decision, and thus plaintiff in 
university discrimination case need not prove 
18) 
intentional discrimination at every stage of 
decision making process; impermissible bias at 
any point may be sufficient to sustain liability. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
~:Hiring 
Limitations on liability which are appropriate in 
context of sexual harassment cases involving 
employer liabil ity for creation of hostile work 
environment under doctrine of respondeat 
superior are wholly inapplicable to 
discriminatory hiring context. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 
2000e-2(a)(I). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
191 Civil Rights 
;."'" Vicarious liabil ity; respondeat superior 
University may be liable where university has 
delegated employment decision to committee, 
and members of that committee have allegedly 
engaged in discriminatory treatment. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 703(a)(J), as amended, 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
PO) Civil Rights 
.. ~Hiring 
For purposes of unsuccessful employment 
applicant's Title VII claim, different national 
origins of applicant and another candidate for 
position was relevant, even though both 
candidates were of Asian descent, since applicant 
alleged not only race discrimination but also 
national origin discrimination. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
lam v. of 40 F.3d 1551 
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2000e-2(a)(l ). 
I I I I Civil Rights 
>=Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence 
Nondiscriminatory employer actions occurring 
subsequent to filing of discrimination complaint 
will rarely even be relevant as circumstantial 
evidence in favor of employer, given incentive in 
such circumstances for employer to take 
corrective action in attempt to shield itself from 
liability. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)( I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1121 Civil Rights 
,,>cQuestions of law or fact 
Federal Civil Procedure 
~./'C Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
For purposes of sex, race, and national ongm 
discrimination claim brought by unsuccessful 
female applicant of Vietnamese descent, 
evidence of employer's favorable treatment of 
other Asian women creates, at most, a genuine 
dispute as to material factual question, and such 
evidence does not necessarily defeat claim at 
trial, nor can it do so at summary judgment. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I); Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA. 
18 Cases that cite this headnote 
1131 Federal Courts 
".=Summary judgment 
Because district court was barred from weighing 
conflicting evidence in ruling on motion for 
summary judgment, Court of Appeals would not 
decide whether evidence of employer's favorable 
treatment of other Asian women could be 
deemed relevant to, though not determinative of, 
claim of sex and race discrimination, or whether 
such evidence was wholly irrelevant. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I); Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
114) Civil Rights 
.>",Motive or intent; pretext 
Civil Rights 
.F"Motive or intent; pretext 
Civil Rights 
.",+Other particular bases of discrimination or 
classes protected 
When Title VII plaintiff is claiming both race and 
sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether 
employer discriminates on basis of that 
combination of factors, not just whether it 
discriminates against people of same race or of 
same sex. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(l), 
as amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
19 Cases that cite this headnote 
1151 Civil Rights 
.p.Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence 
Professor's testimony as to biases held by 
chairman of appointments committee was 
admissible in race, sex, and national origin 
discrimination suit brought by unsuccessful 
applicant for university law school position, 
since professor testified not to remote acts but to 
consistent pattern of behavior on part of 
chairman, with one manifestation of his alleged 
discriminatory attitude having occurred only a 
few months before position search. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I); Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
403,28 U.S.C.A. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
lam v. University of 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
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[161 Civil Rights 
';."".Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
In antidiscrimination cases, as in other areas of 
law, plaintiff bears heavier evidentiary burden if 
factual context renders his claim implausible. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1171 Civil Rights 
";,,,Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
Fact that adverse economic consequences may 
flow from alleged act of employment 
discrimination does not render alleaation 
. b 
Implausible; antidiscrimination laws are not 
predicated upon existence of economically 
"rational" discrimination, but rather problem that 
exists and which such laws target is, to large 
extent, stubborn but irrational prejudice. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
IIS1 Civil Rights 
~;c"'Education, employment in 
Sex discrimination claims brought by 
unsuccessful applicant for university position 
were not rendered implausible in context of 
present academic climate, despite university's 
contention that, in that climate, acts that would 
have even appearance of bias would constitute 
professional suicide. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-2(a)(I). 
1191 Federal Courts 
,~.o~Clearly Erroneous Findings of Court or Jury in 
General 
District court's findings of fact are reviewed 
under "clearly erroneous" standard. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1201 Federal Courts 
,>c·Trial de novo 
District court's legal conclusions are reviewed de 
novo. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1211 Civil Rights 
.,;"Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Under Title VII, ultimate burden of persuading 
trier of fact that employer intentionally 
discriminated remains at all times with plaintiff. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
122) Civil Rights 
.",,"Defenses in general 
Civil Rights 
·~.; •. Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Under Price Waterhouse rule, employer who is 
proven to have discriminated can still avoid 
liability by showing by preponderance of 
evidence that employment decision would have 
been same even if discrimination had played no 
role, and burden is on employer to make this 
showing as affirmative defense. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, §§ 703(a)(I), (m), 706(g)(2)(B)(i), as 
amended, 42 U .S.C.A. § § 2000e-2(a)(I), (m), 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
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123) Civil Rights 
<I",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Once employer has met its initial burden of 
production in employment discrimination case, 
district court may rule in its favor on basis of any 
facts in record supporting its position, even 
though court may entirely disbelieve employer's 
proffered rationale. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
124) Civil Rights 
'v"'~Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden 
Civil Rights 
<.·~Retaliation claims 
Although there was strong circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination and retaliation with 
respect to hiring process for university position, 
trial court's determination that discrimination or 
retaliation did not play motivating part in 
decision not to appoint female Asian applicant to 
position was not clearly erroneous, and thus 
burden never shifted to university to show that it 
would not have appointed her even in absence of 
discriminatory or retaliatory motives, where trial 
court found that each member of appointments 
committee independently found applicant 
insufficiently qualified to merit inclusion as 
finalist. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawai'i. 
Before: BROWNING, NORRIS and REINHARDT, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
Professor Maivan Clech Lam, a woman of Vietnamese 
descent, claims that the University of Hawai'i's 
Richardson School of Law ("the Law School") 
discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex and 
national origin both times she applied for the position of 
Director of the Law School's Pacific Asian Legal Studies 
Program. Lam first applied for the directorship during the 
Law School's 1987-1988 hiring search (the "first search") 
and became a finalist in that search; however, the faculty 
cancelled the search without hiring anyone. She again 
applied during the Law School's 1989-1990 search (the 
"second search"), but the Law School offered the position 
to another candidate. When that candidate declined to 
accept the position, the faculty again cancelled the search. 
Lam also claims that the Law School's actions constituted 
unlawful retaliation. 
Lam filed suit under 42 U .S.c. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") 
and other anti-discrimination statutes. I The district court 
granted partial summary judgment to defendants as to the 
first search, then, after a bench trial, granted final judgment 
to defendants as to the second search. Because we find a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the 
defendants violated Title VII in considering Lam's 
application during the first search, * J 555 we reverse the 
award of partial summary judgment and remand for trial as 
to that search.2 However, finding no material legal errors 
in the district court's decision as to the claimed 
discrimination and retaliation during the second search, we 
affirm the court's award of final judgment as to that search. 
I. 
Lam was born in Vietnam of French and Vietnamese 
parentage, and is fluent in French, English, Vietnamese 
and Thai. She graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in 
English and Economics from Marygrove College in 
Lam v. n"',~.,."'" of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1 
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Detroit, Michigan in 1965. After college she received a 
masters degree in Southeast Asian studies at Yale 
University in 1967, and was later awarded a Ford 
Foundation Fellowship. After several years as a full-time 
mother, Lam taught anthropology courses at Hawai'i Loa 
College between 1974-1981. She then obtained a second 
masters degree from Yale in Anthropology. 
In 1982, she collaborated with her husband, a professor at 
the University of Hawai'i, on two monographs on 
administration and social movements in Vietnam. In 1984, 
she graduated from the Richardson School of Law, after 
having completed an externship with the Chief Justice of 
the Federated States of Micronesia. While she was a law 
student, she wrote two law review articles on Hawai'ian 
land law that were published after her graduation: one in 
the Journal of Legal Pluralism and the other in the 
University of Washington Law Review. During and after 
law school, Lam was assistant director of the Law of the 
Sea Institute, an organization that was affiliated with the 
University of Hawai'i and under the direction of Emeritus 
Law Professor John Craven. After graduating from law 
school, Lam taught courses at Hawai'i Loa College, served 
as a lecturer in the University ofHawai'i's political science 
department, and gave guest lectures before Professor 
Craven's ocean law class at the Law School.3 
A. 
In the fall of 1987, the Law School began a hiring search 
for a full-time director for its Pacific Asian Legal Studies 
("PALS") program A Approximately 100 persons applied 
for the position, including Lam. The Law School 
established an appointments committee consisting of 
Professor Mari Matsuda, who was the chair, Professors 
Eric Yamamoto and Randall Roth, and two students to 
screen applicants and to recommend a list of finalists for 
review by the full faculty. By *1556 some time in January 
1988, the appointments committee had prepared a list of 
ten names, including Lam's, for submission to the faculty. 
Five of the ten candidates were women, among whom were 
two of the three ethnic Asians recommended. Matsuda 
chose Lam as one of her top two candidates. 
Because of a previously scheduled semester's leave, 
Matsuda had to resign from the appointments committee. 
Professor A., a senior faculty member, approached 
Matsuda expressing his interest in becoming chair and 
asking that she forward his request to the Dean of the law 
school. Matsuda, who was a friend of Lam's, knew that 
Professor A. and Lam had had a "run-in" the previous 
year.s Matsuda nonetheless passed along Professor A.'s 
request to the Dean while also recommending that a 
woman faculty member be appointed to the committee. 
Subsequently, Professor A. was appointed to the 
Next 
committee along with a woman professor. At the same 
time, Professor Williamson Chang, a member of the PALS 
committee, began to attend appointments committee 
meetings on an ex officio basis.6 
After Professor A. became chair of the appointments 
committee, the group discussed forwarding one name, that 
of a white male, rather than ten names to the facuIty. When 
Chang informed Lam of this development, she became 
concerned and set up a meeting with the Dean to discuss 
the situation. Lam told the Dean of her prior problems with 
Professor A., but said that she was worried that if Professor 
A. were forced to resign from the committee his colleagues 
would blame her. She thus did not request Professor A.'s 
removal from the committee, but instead asked that the 
committee recommend five names to the faculty instead of 
one. 
The Dean, in turn, mentioned to her the idea of cancelling 
the search and reopening it to accommodate an Asian male 
candidate who had missed the application deadline. In his 
view, this course of action had the dual benefit of mooting 
any possibility of obstruction by Professor A., since there 
would be a new chair for the new search, and of allowing 
consideration of the late applicant. Lam disagreed with his 
proposal, stating that it would be unfair to reopen the 
search. 
There was vigorous debate regarding Lam's application at 
a March 2, 1988 joint meeting of the PALS and 
appointments committees. Professor A., in particular, 
asserted that Lam was not collegial, was a poor scholar, 
and had poor administrative ability. He finally stated that 
in his view Lam was unfit to teach anywhere on the 
University of Hawai'i campus. He also labelled Lam's 
in-print criticism of another (white male) facuIty member 
inappropriate. Craven spoke up strongly for Lam at this 
meeting. 
Both Craven and Chang later went to the Dean to complain 
of Professor A.'s behavior and to recommend his removal 
as chair of the appointments committee. At approximately 
the same time, Lam spoke to the campus EEO officer about 
the Dean's idea of reopening the search in order to consider 
the late applicant, leading the EEO officer to call the Dean 
and advise him against that plan. In accordance with Lam's 
request and the EEO officer's recommendation, the Dean 
then announced that the faculty was not to consider the late 
applicant. The Dean also announced that Professor A. had 
resigned from the committee and that Roth had replaced 
him as chair. Although most of the faculty believed that 
Professor A. resigned because of a conflict with Lam, the 
Dean never attempted to alleviate the resulting controversy 
by publicly explaining the events. 
Lam v. University of 40 F.3d 1551 
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The candidate list was eventually narrowed down to four, 
including Lam, whose applications *1557 were considered 
by the full fifteen-member faculty of the law school at a 
meeting on March 18. At that meeting both Craven and 
Professor A, spoke strongly for their respective positions 
regarding Lam. Their polarization apparently made the rest 
of the faculty uncomfortable. Although a white male 
candidate apparently received the highest number of votes, 
a consensus did not form around any of the candidates and 
there was no decision to extend any offer of employment. 
Two weeks later a bare majority of the faculty voted to 
cancel the search. 
B. 
In response to the first search's cancellation, Lam filed a 
discrimination complaint with the office of the University 
vice-president. Although the University rejected her 
administrative grievance after an investigation, it issued a 
report detailing confidential ity breaches and procedural 
violations in the PALS director search process. The 
University vice-president told Lam that he would issue 
stern instructions to the Law School Dean requiring that 
the next search for the PALS directorship be conducted 
pursuant to strict guidelines, with the position's 
qualifications explicitly drawn. He asserted that it would 
be a "fishbowl operation" consistent with the highest 
standards of procedure. 
At a Law School faculty meeting in September 1988, two 
University EEO officers discussed selection procedures 
and recommended, among other things, the use of rating 
sheets and a clear definition of the PALS program and its 
director. At the Dean's request, Professor Matsuda 
prepared a memo on search procedures for the law school 
in which she proposed that desired characteristics be 
ranked and that minority applicants be encouraged. Further 
procedures outlined in University affirmative action 
guidelines mandated that interview questions, rating 
sheets, selection evaluation sheets, and copies of 
recruitment/selection forms be kept on file for three years. 
Lam and a support group that had formed around the issue 
of her treatment by the University leveled charges of 
discrimination and procedural irregularities in the first 
search in many outside fora, including the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS), the ABA, the 
Hawai'i legislature, and the press. As a result, Lam's 
allegations received both newspaper and radio coverage, 
and the Dean of the Law School and the President of the 
University were "cross-examined" about them at an AALS 
meeting relating to the Law School's request for 
accreditation. 
The faculty decided to reopen the search for a PALS 
director in 1989. The announcement for the position was 
essentially identical to the one employed during the first 
search, and Lam again applied, along with 87 other 
applicants. All of the members of the 1987-88 
appointments committee were either unwilling or unable to 
serve again. The Dean asked two faculty members who had 
voted for Lam the first time to serve on the committee, but 
they declined. The appointments committee ultimately 
consisted of three white members of the faculty who did 
not support Lam in 19887 (one was an untenured woman 
professor), along with two students of Asian ancestry. 
Early in the 1989-90 academic year, the new appointments 
committee reviewed applications for a commercial law 
position. At one meeting, a male committee member stated 
that the Law School should not have two women teaching 
commercial law. This comment was reported to the Dean, 
who said that he recognized that the professor had 
difficulty dealing with women but took no action to 
remove him from the committee or otherwise to remedy 
the problem,8 
When the appointments committee concluded its 
deliberations regarding the commercial *1558 law 
position, the chair distributed copies of the announcement 
for the PALS directorship and a brief description of the 
program to aid the committee in reviewing the applicants 
for the position, Besides these materials, guidance for the 
selection process was minimal: members of the committee 
independently selected the 15 to 20 candidates that they 
considered most promising and the committee list was 
compiled based on these separate lists, The chair, who had 
been on leave the previous semester, had not been 
informed by the Dean of the extensive discussions and 
developments that had taken place regarding selection 
procedures. None of the suggestions or recommendations 
of Professor Matsuda or of the EEO officers was 
employed. Despite all of the past debate over the 
possibility of discrimination and the need for careful 
selection procedures, no mechanism was put into place to 
screen out potential bias or retaliatory sentiments resulting 
from the prior search. 
Lam did not appear on any of the committee member's 
lists, and neither Lam nor her application was ever 
discussed at any committee meetings. The final list of 
candidates that the committee recommended to the faculty 
consisted entirely or almost entirely of persons of United 
States origin, both white and non-white,9 in contrast to the 
substantial number of non-whites and foreign-born 
candidates appearing on the list prepared by the previous 
appointments committee. The faculty met with six of the 
top candidates, three of whom had applied during the first 
search and been awarded lower ratings than Lam.lO 
Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
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The faculty voted to offer the PALS position to Alison 
Conner, a white Harvard Law graduate with a Ph.D in 
Chinese History who had substantial law teaching 
experience and several publications. Conner, however, 
declined to accept the offer. Rather than make an offer to 
any of the other applicants, the faculty again cancelled the 
search. 
c. 
Lam filed suit in May 1989 against the University of 
Hawai'i, the Dean of the Law School, and the President of 
the University, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex and national origin with regard to the 1987-88 search, 
as well as retaliation. Defendants moved for summary 
judgment in July 1990 and Lam amended her complaint to 
allege discrimination and retaliation during the second 
search. In response, defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment regarding that search. The district court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the 
first search, but determined that there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether the defendants intentionally 
discriminated against Lam, or retaliated against her, in 
connection with the 1989-90 search. After a bench trial, the 
district court entered judgment for the defendants as to the 
second search. Lam now appeals both rulings. 
II. 
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to 
hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 USc. § 
2000e-2(a)(l). It also prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an applicant for employment because 
the applicant has opposed any unlawful employment 
practice, or has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in an employment discrimination *1559 
investigation or proceeding. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a). 
A. 
We turn first to Lam's appeal ofthe district court's grant of 
summary judgment as to the first search. 
1. 
A primafacie case of unlawful employment discrimination 
on the basis of protected characteristics may be established 
through indirect evidence under the familiar McDonnell 
Douglas four-part test. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). In 
McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing that 
(I) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she applied for and 
was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking 
applicants, (3) despite being qualified, she was rejected, 
and (4) after her rejection, the position remained open and 
the employer continued to seek applicants from people of 
comparable qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 
1824. 
II) 12) After a prim a facie case is established, "the burden 
then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. 
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse 
employment decision is a pretext for another motive which 
is discriminatory." Wallis v. JR. Simp/of Co., 26 F.3d 885, 
889 (9th Cir.1994 ) (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 
F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.1985), as amended, 784 F.2d 1407 
(9th Cir.1986)).11 
13) On summary judgment, the existence of a 
discriminatory motive for the employment decision will 
generally be the principal question. To survive an 
employer's summary judgment motion, only a genuine 
factual issue with regard to discriminatory intent need be 
shown, a requirement that is almost always satisfied when 
the plaintiffs evidence, "direct or circumstantial, consists 
of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption." 
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 
F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991); compare JR. Simp/Of Co., 
26 F.3d at 890 (summary judgment appropriate, after 
showing of a "bare prima facie case," where evidence to 
refute defendant's legitimate explanation is "totally 
lacking"). Because we find that Lam satisfied this 
requirement, we reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to defendants. 
2. 
The district court found that Lam had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the four-part McDonnell 
Douglas test.l2 It then found that defendants had *1560 
met their burden of proffering legitimate reasons for not 
hiring Lam-specifically, Lam's lack of scholarship, and 
faculty disagreement regarding the desired characteristics 
of the PALS director-shifting the burden back to Lam to 
show the existence of a triable issue of fact. 
lam v. of Hawai'i, 40 F.30 1551 (1994) 
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14115) 16) Lam submitted evidence of discriminatory bias 
at two stages of the hiring process, with respect to at least 
two senior white male professors. Most significantly, 
Craven testified that Professor A., who headed the 
appointments committee for a month and disparaged 
Lam's abilities before the committee and the faculty as a 
whole, had a biased attitude toward women and Asians. 
Indeed, the district court specifically found that "the 
evidence suggests that Professor A. harbored prejudicial 
feelings towards Asians and women." There was also 
evidence that another white male professor had stated that, 
given Japanese cultural prejudices,I3 the PALS director 
should be male. This evidence is, as a matter of law, 
sufficient to preclude the award of summary judgment for 
defendants. 
The district court articulated two reasons in support of its 
decision to grant summary judgment, the primary one 
being that any faculty prejudice that existed could not, in 
its view, be attributed to the named defendants in the 
action. Although the court acknowledged that members of 
the faculty "may very well have harbored prejudices 
against Asians and women in general, and against plaintiff 
in particular," it ruled that "without proof that the named 
defendants either shared those prejudices or conformed 
their conduct under influence of those prejudices, [the 
facts] are insufficient to support a showing of intentional 
discrimination by defendants." Consistent with its focus on 
the individual defendants, the court found it crucial that the 
Dean asked Professor A. to resign as chair of the 
appointments committee. 14 As this undue emphasis on the 
Dean and corresponding disregard of the faculty members 
demonstrates, however, the court failed to give proper 
consideration to the nature of the university's hiring 
process. 
The principal defendant in this case is the University, 
which has delegated to the faculty near-total control over 
hiring. The faculty, first in committee, then as a whole, 
reviews applications, chooses the final candidates, and 
votes on whether to extend any candidate an offer of 
employment. The hiring process is therefore not insulated 
from the illegitimate biases of faculty members. Indeed, 
since the faculty is small-only fifteen members-and great 
emphasis is placed on collegiality and consensus 
decision making, even a single person's biases may be 
relatively influential. That is particularly true where, as 
here, that person plays a significant role in the selection 
process and leads the fight pro or con with respect to a 
particular candidate. See Gutzwiller v. Fenik. 860 F.2d 
1317, 1327 (6th Cir.1988) (two biased faculty votes 
sufficient to establish discriminatory employment decision 
in tenure process that required decisions at four separate 
levels). 
17) As other courts have recognized, discrimination at any 
stage of the academic hiring or promotion process may 
infect the ultimate employment decision. Roebuck v. 
Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir.1988). 
Accordingly, a plaintiff in a university discrimination case 
need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of 
the decisionmaking process; impermissible bias at any 
*1561 point may be sufficient to sustain liability. ld.; 
Fields v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 933-35 (1 st 
Cir.1987) (where departmental recommendation 
important, evidence of sexist bias within sociology 
department sufficient to sustain liability under Title VII, 
even absent evidence of improper bias on the part of the 
ultimate deciding authority). Here, the purported bias 
allegedly had its ultimate impact at the faculty meeting 
stage. 
181 19) Defendants argue, nonetheless, that they can only 
be held liable if it is shown that they "knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known" of 
Professor A.'s biased attitudes. They cite EEOC v. 
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir.1989); 
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir.1991), as 
mandating this rule. However, Hacienda Hotel and Ellison 
are both sexual harassment cases involving employer 
liability for the creation of a hostile work environment 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Limitations on 
liability appropriate in that context are wholly inapplicable 
to the discriminatory hiring context. As numerous cases 
involving discrimination in faculty hiring and promotion 
demonstrate, where a university has delegated employment 
decisions to a committee and members of that committee 
have allegedly engaged in discriminatory treatment, the 
university is liable.IS See, e.g., Ruggles, 797 F.2d at 784; 
Fields, 817 F.2d at 932. 
PO] r III The district court's second justification for 
granting summary judgment was based on the defendants' 
favorable consideration of two other candidates for the 
PALS position: one an Asian man, the other a white 
woman. In assessing the significance of these candidates, 
the court seemed to view racism and sexism as separate 
and distinct elements amenable to almost mathematical 
treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an 
Asian woman became a simple matter of performing two 
separate tasks: looking for racism "alone" and looking for 
sexism "alone," with Asian men and white women as the 
corresponding model victims. The court questioned Lam's 
claim of racism in light of the fact that the Dean had been 
interested in the late application of an Asian male.I6 
Similarly, it concluded that the faculty'S subsequent offer 
of employment to a white woman indicated a lack of 
gender bias.I7 We conclude that in relying on these facts as 
a basis for its summary judgment decision, the district 
court misconceived important legal principles. 
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1]21 113) 1141 To begin with, even the Law School's 
favorable treatment of other Asian women would not 
necessarily defeat Lam's claim at trial. See Gutzwiller, 860 
F.2d at 1320-21 (tenure position denied one white female 
professor in favor of another). Certainly it could not do so 
at summary judgment, for such evidence creates at most a 
genuine dispute as to a material factual question. * 1562 18 
At least equally significant is the error committed by the 
court in its separate treatment of race and sex 
discrimination. As other courts have recognized, where 
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly 
reduced to distinct components. See Jefferies, 615 F .2d at 
1032-34; Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F.Supp. 1036, 
1047 (N.D.lnd.1984); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 
F.Supp. 925, 946 n. 34 (D.Neb.1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 
(8th Cir.1987).19 Rather than aiding the decisional process, 
the attempt to bisect a person's identity at the intersection 
of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular 
nature of their experiences.2o Cf Moore v. Hughes 
Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th CiL1983) (black 
female not necessarily representative of interests of black 
males and white females). Like other subclasses under 
Title VII, Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes 
and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white 
women.21 In consequence, they may be targeted for 
discrimination "even in the absence of discrimination 
against [Asian] men or white women." Jefferies, 615 F.2d 
at 1032 (discussing black women); Hicks v. Gates Rubber 
Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir.1987) (same). 
Accordingly, we agree with the Jefferies court that, when a 
plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to 
determine whether the employer discriminates on the basis 
of that combination of factors, not just whether it 
discriminates against people of the same race or of the 
same sex. Cf Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 102 
S.Ct. 2525, 2535, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982) ("Title VII does 
not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to 
be told that he has not been wronged because other persons 
of his or her race or sex were hired."). 
3. 
I] 5) The defendants assert several additional arguments in 
support of the grant of summary judgment. First, citing 
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th 
Cir.1986), and Garvey v. Dickinson College, 763 F.Supp. 
799, 801-02 (M.D.Pa.1991), they argue that Craven's 
testimony as to Professor A.'s biases was inadmissible 
because it concerned acts and comments on Professor A.'s 
part that were too remote in time or too attenuated from 
Lam's situation. Although the Allis-Chalmers court stated 
that acts "remote in time or place" may be excluded under 
Fed.R.Evid. 403, it affirmed the admission of evidence of 
long-term harassment of black workers because such 
evidence demonstrated a "persistent pattern" of racial 
hostility. 797 F.2d at 1423-24. The Garvey court affirmed 
the admissibility of evidence of discriminatory incidents 
that occurred within the plaintiffs department, while 
excluding such evidence from other departments. 763 
F.Supp. at 802. Even *1563 read broadly, neither case is 
helpful to defendants. Craven testified not to remote acts 
but to a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of 
Professor A.-a member of the relevant department-with 
one manifestation of his alleged discriminatory attitude 
having occurred only a few months before the directorship 
search. 
Next, defendants argue that Matsushita E/ec. Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 
89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), establishes a rule, triggered here, 
that if the factual context renders a plaintiffs claim 
implausible, she must come forward with more persuasive 
evidence to support her claim than would otherwise be 
necessary. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. They argue 
that because Professor A. 's alleged ethnic and gender 
biases would amount to professional suicide in today's 
politically correct academic climate, Lam's charges 
"simply make[ ] no economic sense," id., thus justifYing 
this more demanding evidentiary burden. Specifically, 
they cite to the lack of corroboration of Craven's testimony 
as to Professor A., insisting on other evidence of his bias. 
We find defendants' reliance on Matsushita to be 
misplaced. 
The rule established in Matsushita pertains only to the 
plausibility of inferences drawn from circumstantial 
evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th 
CiLI988). Matsushita does not, therefore, affect our 
consideration of Craven's allegations-which we accept as 
true for purposes of summary judgment-even if it would 
require us to question implausible inferences therefrom. 
116) [17) 118) Moreover, while in antidiscrimination cases 
as in other areas of law, a plaintiff bears a heavier 
evidentiary burden if the factual context renders his claim 
implausible, see Morales v. Merit System Protection 
Board, 932 F.2d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir.1991), Lam's 
charges are by no means implausible. The fact that adverse 
economic consequences may flow from an alleged act of 
employment discrimination does not render the allegation 
implausible. Antidiscrimination laws are not predicated 
upon the existence of economically "rational" 
discrimination; the problem that exists and which such 
laws target is, to a large extent, stubborn but irrational 
prejudice. Thus, we cannot say that Lam's charges are 
"implausible" simply because the discriminatory actions 
might have an adverse economic impact on Professor A. or 
the University. Cf Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1110 
lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
66 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 74, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,341, 95 Ed. law Rep. 875 ... 
n.IO (finding no circumstances rendering Title VII claim 
implausible).22 Nor are we persuaded by the University's 
assertion that Lam's claims are implausible in the present 
academic climate because acts that have even the 
appearance of bias would constitute professional suicide. 
To accept the University's argument would be to create a 
presumption that acts of academic employment 
discrimination are implausible and that the Matsushita 
burden applies to all such cases. This presumption is 
patently contrary to fact and we squarely reject it. There is 
no question that acts of bias and discrimination occur in 
university hirings today. The process of rooting out 
discrimination against women and minorities on our 
nation's facuIties is far from ended. 
Finally, not only is the point of defendants' argument that 
"charges of bias should not be made lightly," somewhat 
elusive, but the cases they cite, which concern recusal of 
administrative law judges and other impartial arbitrators in 
judicial and administrative hearings, are inapposite.23 
AUs and judges are presumed to be impartial in their 
decisions. * 1564 A member of a faculty appointments 
committee is, in contrast, likely to be personally interested 
in the outcome of the process. 
4. 
As we have previously explained, "[w]e require very little 
evidence to survive summary judgment" in a 
discrimination case, "because the ultimate question is one 
that can only be resolved through a 'searching inquiry'-one 
that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, 
upon a full record." Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111. 
Besides an overall more particularized factual inquiry, a 
trial provides insight into motive, a critical issue in 
discrimination cases. The existence of an intent to 
discriminate may be difficult to discern in depositions 
compiled for purposes of summary judgment, yet it may 
later be revealed in the face-to-face encounter of a full trial. 
The university setting-in which, as in this case, 
employment decisions are made by a group, and 
collegiality and personal relationships are often significant 
factors-presents an especially difficult one in which to 
evaluate allegations of discrimination. As with all group 
decisionmaking, a complex of motives may exist. Personal 
animus, factional infighting and politics may influence and 
even determine certain faculty employment decisions, and 
are legally permissible if not praiseworthy bases for such 
decisions. Without a full factual inquiry, however, it may 
be extremely difficult to distinguish these types of 
permissible, though relatively personal, motivations from 
unlawful ones. Accordingly, although for purposes of this 
appeal we have considered the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Lam, because the district court granted 
summary judgment for defendants, we express no view on 
the reasons underlying the faculty's decision to cancel the 
first search. Instead, we necessarily reserve the resolution 
of all factual issues to the district court following a full 
presentation of the evidence. 
B. 
We turn next to Lam's appeal of the final judgment 
regarding discrimination and retaliation in the second 
search. 
1. 
119) 120) We review the district court's findings of fact 
under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Muntin v. State of 
Cal. Parks & Recreation Dept., 738 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th 
Cir.1984). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Miller 
v. Fairchild Industries, lnc., 885 F.2d 498, 503 (9th 
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 
108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). 
121) 122) Under Title Vll the ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally 
discriminated" 'remains at all times with the plaintiff.' " 
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, ----, I 13 
S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas 
Dep 't ojCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 
101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); see a/so 
United States Postal Service Ed. oj Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478,1482,75 L.Ed.2d 403 
(1983). However, under the rule enunciated in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 
L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion), an employer who 
is proven to have discriminated can still avoid liability by 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that "the 
employment decision would have been the same even if 
[discrimination] had played no role." Sischo-Nownejad, 
934 F.2d at 1110 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
243-47, 109 S.Ct. at 1786-89).24 The burden is on the 
employer to make this showing as *1565 an affirmative 
defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. at 
1788.25 
2. 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district 
court first determined that Lam had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination and retaliation. It then found 
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that "[s]ome members of the faculty and administration 
resented Lam's actions and one committee member had 
difficulty dealing with women." It did not, however, 
conclude that discrimination or retaliation played a 
motivating factor in the Law School's failure to hire Lam. 
Instead, it held that the discriminatory and retaliatory 
animus was not causally linked to either the selection of 
appointments committee members or the decision of the 
appointments committee not to submit Lam's name to the 
faculty. The court also noted that there was no "concerted 
action" among committee members to keep her name off 
each of their lists. 
In addition, the court found that subjective hiring criteria 
were unevenly applied. Nonetheless, it concluded that this 
was due to faculty uncertainty regarding the desired goals 
and attributes of the PALS program and the unorganized 
and inefficient search conducted by the Law School, rather 
than to discrimination or retaliation. Likewise, the court 
concluded that the Dean's inquiry regarding whether one 
candidate's application was weaker than Lam's did not 
evidence prohibited motivations but instead reflected 
concern over the Law School's legal difficulties with 
Lam.26 
The court ultimately determined that Lam would not have 
been hired by the Law School, "even given a 
well-organized and thorough search procedure," because 
the members of the appointments committee had each 
determined that she was less qualified than the candidates 
they recommended. Accordingly, the court ruled that Lam 
failed to prove a violation of Title VII. 
3. 
Lam alleges four principal errors in the district court's 
rUling. First, she claims that the court erred by "inventing a 
non-discriminatory reason" for the defendants' failure to 
hire Lam. Second, she claims that the proffered reason is 
insufficient as a matter of law. Third, she claims that the 
court improperly required that Lam show "concerted 
action" to retaliate. Fourth, she claims that the court 
misapplied the applicable legal standards. 
[231 Lam's first and second arguments pertain to her 
contention that the district court improperly supplied the 
rationale that disorganization was the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision not to hire Lam 
in the second search. For two reasons, however, these 
arguments must fail. First, although the district court found 
that the search was disorganized, it attributed the ultimate 
decision not to appoint Lam to the search committee's 
lawful determination that her qualifications were weaker 
than those of the candidates it recommended. The court's 
discussion of disorganization was included simply to 
explain the uneven application of *1566 hiring criteria, 
which Lam had asserted was evidence of discrimination. 
Second, St. Mary's Honor efr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,113 
S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), precludes Lam's 
argument. In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that, once the 
employer has met its initial burden of production, the 
district court may rule in its favor on the basis of any facts 
in the record supporting its position, even though the court 
may entirely disbelieve the employer's proffered rationale. 
Id. at ---- - ----. 113 S.Ct. at 2755-56. In any event, here the 
court did rely on the nondiscriminatory reason advanced 
by the defendants, and that reason was clearly sufficient as 
a matter of law. 
Lam also argues that the district court improperly required 
that concerted action among committee members be 
shown. Lam is of course correct in asserting that there is no 
requirement under Title VII of concerted action to 
discriminate or retaliate. In the present case, however, the 
court simply noted the absence of concerted action as 
relevant to his conclusion that each committee member 
independently found Lam insufficiently qualified to merit 
inclusion as a finalist; there is no indication that the court 
thought that concerted action was required. 
[241 Lam's fourth argument for reversal is that the district 
court misapplied the relevant legal standards. In her view, 
there was sufficient evidence of discrimination and 
retaliation to trigger the burden-shifting requirement of 
Price Waterhouse. Therefore, Lam contends, the district 
court erred by failing to require the defendants to show that 
they would not have appointed her even in the absence of 
the discriminatory and retaliatory motives. 
It is true that the district court here recited the Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting rule in its opinion. It is also 
true that the court failed to shift the burden to the 
defendants. Because, however, the burden shifts only when 
the court finds that unlawful discrimination played a part in 
the employment decision, and because here the court 
clearly found that impermissible motives were not a factor 
in the decision, the court had no reason to apply the Price 
Waterhouse rule. Even though Lam presented strong 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination and retaliation, 
she did not, in the court's view, show that it is more likely 
than not that discrimination or retaliation " 'played a 
motivating part in [the] employment decision.' " 
Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at III 0 (quoting Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244, 109 S.Ct. at 1787). Upon a 
review of the record, we cannot say that this finding is 
clearlyerroneous.27 
III. 
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We therefore reverse the district court's award of summary 
judgment for the defendants * 1567 as to the first search 
and remand for further proceedings, but affirm the decision 
granting final judgment for the defendants as to the second 
search. The fact that we find no clear error in the district 
court's findings of fact in connection with the second 
search does not affect our decision to remand for trial as to 
the first search. In its decision regarding the second search, 
the court did not itself find Lam objectively less qualified 
than the other candidates: it simply found that the search 
committee members had come to that conclusion and that 
it was lawful for them to do so. The court did not conclude, 
moreover, that it would have been unreasonable for the 
committee members to have chosen Lam, nor did it 
conclude that the faculty would have failed to select her 
had she been recommended. In the first search, of course, 
Footnotes 
the members of the search committee did find Lam 
sufficiently qualified to merit consideration by the full 
faculty.28 Her name was included in the final list of four 
recommended candidates. On the basis of the record before 
us, we cannot say that absent the alleged bias the faculty 
would have failed to select Lam for the PALS directorship 
following the first search. 
REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part. 
Parallel Citations 
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Lam also alleged violations of42 U.s.C. § 1981,42 U.S.c. § 1983,42 U.S.c. § 2000d (Title VI) and 20 U.s.c. § 1681 et seq. (Title 
IX). The Title VII claim was the focus of the litigation, however, and the district court's conclusions of law regarding the other 
alleged statutory violations are extremely summary, simply restating the overall conclusion that Lam did not prove discrimination on 
the basis of racc, sex or national origin. Insofar as our remand of Lam's Title VII claim causes the district court to amend its 
conclusions regarding discrimination, a reconsideration of its other statutory rulings will, of course, be necessary. 
2 Since it was ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court made all factual inferences in favor of Lam and did not 
make credibility determinations. We must do the same on review of the court's decision. In doing so, of course, we express no view 
regarding the truth of such allegations of bias. Specifically, we do not intend by anything we say in this opinion to suggest or imply 
that any individual engaged in any speech or conduct of a biased or prejudicial nature. 
3 Lam also belongs to several professional associations and has served on the Board of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal 
Pluralism of the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. In addition, she is a member of the Hawai'i 
bar. 
After the initiation of the present litigation, Lam was hired by the University of Wisconsin law school. She later accepted an 
associate professorship at CUNY law schooL which began in the fall of 1992. 
4 The advertisement for the position read: 
Duties: To develop an internationally recognized comparative law program, with a focus on the Pacific Basin region. The 
position may entail conference organizing, grant-writing, liaison with Pacific-Asian scholars, and working with students and 
systems. Additionally, teaching of related courses, scholarship, professional activities, committee. Desirable Qualifications: An 
outstanding academic record and proven or potential excellence in scholarship and teaching. Foreign language abilities; 
familiarity with Asian, Pacific and international scholars, organizations, international law, or comparative law. Ability to teach 
courses in the J.D. program. Should be able to teach courses in Public or Private International Law, International Business 
Transactions or a comparative law course on specific legal systems. Administrative experience and creative talents are 
important... .. Closing Date: January 15, 1988. 
5 The incident involved funding sought by Professor A. for a workshop he attended in Goa, India. Lam allegedly exposed certain 
misrepresentations made by Professor A. in connection with this funding. embarrassing him. As a result, Lam was dismayed when 
she found out that Professor A. would be replacing Matsuda as chair of the appointments committee. 
6 The PALS Committee was a separate committee charged with developing policy with respect to the PALS program; Craven was 
another of its members. 
7 Since faculty balloting during the first search was open and in the presence of the Dean, he would have been aware of faculty 
members' previous votes. 
8 The woman law professor who spoke to the Dean about the male professor's comment testified that she believed the comment was 
seriously meant, and that the search was "seriously tainted" by the male professor's attitude toward women applicants. She suggested 
that it was inappropriate to continue the application process with the committee as then constituted. The male professor did, however, 
eventually vote for the woman applicant who had prompted his comments. 
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9 The list was divided into tiers, with a first group offive candidates described as the most qualified, a second group of three candidates 
as qualified, and then an "also ran" group. Of the thirteen people on the list. only one had a last name denoting non-European ancestry 
(his ancestry was never confirmed at trial but his resume indicates that he was born in Kansas), and only two were women. 
10 The other three were first-time applicants. 
11 Retaliation claims are included within this framework. Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc .. 885 F.2d 498, 504 n. 4 (9th Cir.1989); 
Yartzoflv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987). As noted in Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State University. 797 F.2d 
782 (9th Cir.1986), "[r]etaliation is simply one sort of discrimination." Id. at 788 n. I (Nelson, 1., concurring); see 42 U.S.c. § 
2000e-3(a) (using term "discrimination" to describe retaliation). Most commonly, of course, we rely on the tem1 discrimination as 
shorthand to describe discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics. while using the term retaliation to describe 
discrimination on account of an employee's, or potential employee's. opposition to an unlawful employment practicc. 
12 Since Lam, in her opposition to summary judgment in connection with the first search, focused on discrimination on the basis of 
protected characteristics rather than retaliation, the district court never specifically addressed the retaliation issue. 
Since we conclude that Lam presented sut1icient evidence of discriminatory bias to survive summary judgment, we need not rule 
on the adequacy of her asserted evidence of retaliation. We note, nonetheless, that the district court determined that most members 
of the faculty believed that Professor A. recused himself from the appointments committee because of Lam's opposition to him. 
and it found that some faculty members "were outraged that Professor A. had been asked to resign due to possible bias:' It would 
certainly bc possible to infer that those faculty members allowed their anger at Professor A. 's forced resignation to shade their 
consideration of Lam's application. 
13 The existence of such third party preferences for discrimination does not. of course, justify discriminatory hiring practices. See, e.g., 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.1971) (holding that customer preference for female flight attendants does 
not constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" under Title VII); c/ C. Sunstein. Three Civil Rights Fallacies. 79 CaLL.Rev. 
751, 760-61 (1991 ) (economically "rational" discrimination has powerful reinforcing effect on ordinary prejudice). 
14 The court stated that summary judgment for defendants would have been inappropriate had Professor A. been allowed to remain as 
chair. 
15 In their argument on this point, the defendants make no distinction between the University's liability and that of the Dean and 
President (who are both sued in their ot1icial capacities). 
16 Aside from the difference in gender, it is significant that Lam and the Asian male candidate were of different national origins-Lam 
being Vietnamese-French, the male candidate, Chinese. Lam alleged not only race discrimination but also national origin 
discrimination, thereby raising this distinction as relevant under Title VII. Moreover. the particular geographical consciousness of the 
PALS program means that the distinction might be more salient than it otherwise might be. 
17 The district court should have noted, besides the difference in race. the chronological considerations that preclude reliance on this 
fact to defeat Lam's discrimination claim. The offer of employment to the female applicant was made long after Lam had complained 
of discrimination both publicly and by filing the present discrimination action. By that time, the Law School was on notice that its 
employment actions would be subject to scrutiny. Given the obvious incentive in such circumstances for an employer to take 
corrective action in an attempt to shield itself from liability, it is clear that nondiscriminatory employer actions occurring subsequent 
to the filing of a discrimination complaint will rarely even be relevant as circumstantial evidence in favor of the employer. Gonzales 
v. Police Dept. o/San Jose. 90 I F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.1990). 
18 Since the district court is barred from weighing conflicting evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we need not decide 
if such evidence might be deemed relevant to, though not detern1inative of a claim of race and sex discrimination. We note, 
nonetheless, that in Jefferies v. Harris County Commul1ity Action Ass '11.. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.1980). the Fifth Circuit held that 
evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment of black males and white females is wholly irrelevant to the question of discrimination 
against a black female plaintiff claiming bias on both racial and gender grounds. Id. at 1034. On the other hand. evidence of 
discriminatory treatment of~ for example, a black male clearly is relevant to the discrimination claim of a black woman. See, e.g.. 
EEOC v. Beverage Cal1ners. Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir.1990). We express no view on whether such a one-way bar is 
justified in either some or all cases. 
19 In essence, the district court's approach reduces discrimination against Asian women to discrimination against Asian men plus 
discrimination against white women. The inherent fallacy of this approach is obvious when one considers that discrimination against 
white men could be similarly analyzed. using the same models: Asian men plus white women. 
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20 See K. Crenshaw. Demarginalbng the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminatory Doctrine, 
Feminist TheO/~v alld Antiracist Politics. 1989 U.Chi.Legal F. 139; J. Winston, l'v/irror, Alirror on the Wall: Title UI. Section 1981 
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1 990, 79 Cal.L.Rev. 775 (1991). 
21 See. e.g., 1. Hagedorn, Asian Women in Film: No Joy, No Luck, Ms., lan.!Feb. 1994, at 74 (listing stereotypes of Asian women such 
as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, lotus blossom). 
22 In /YfcLaughlin, we emphasized the Matsushita rule's particular relevance to antitrust conspiracy cases (see 849 F.2d at 1207), though 
we note that courts have applied Matsushita's reasoning to other contexts in which economic rationality might safely be presumed. 
See. e.g.. Knight v. Shanf 875 F.2d 516. 523 (5th Cir.1989) (breach of contract); In re Fortune S:vs. Sec. Litigation, 680 F.Supp. 
1360, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (securities fraud). Title VII, by contrast, applies to a very ditTerent kind of motivation, so that such cases 
arc inappositc. 
23 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826-27, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1588,89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); AfcLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. 
of California. 869 F.2d 1039. 1047 (7th Cir.1989): Glass v. Pfej/er, 849 F.2d 1261. 1268 (10th Cir.1988): iv/aiel' v. Orr, 758 F .2d 
1578. 1583 (Fed.Cir.1985). 
24 Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the rule of Price Waterhouse. In cases in which § 107 applies, the employer is 
liable once the plaintiff shows that a protected characteristic played a motivating part in the employment decision (the employer's 
proof that the same employment decision would have been made in the absence of the impermissible motive goes only to the issue of 
relief). See 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). Lam argues that § 107 is applicable here, but we need not decide this 
issue in light of our holding that Lam did not prove that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating factor in the Law School's 
decision not to appoint her. 
25 As the Court explained in Price Waterhouse. the rule that the burden shifts to the employer to prove this affirmative defense does not 
affect the rule that the plaintitT retains the burden of persuasion regarding discrimination, since these burdens involve two separate 
and not inconsistent propositions. 490 U.S. at 246 n. II, 109 S.Ct. at 1788 n. II. 
26 In her brief: Lam states that "the Dean admitted, and [Professor K.] agreed. that Lam was more qualified than a white male finalist in 
the second search." However, that professor testified only that she "agreed with [the Dean] that [the white male finalist's] file was 
less strong than Alison Conner's," not Lam's. Although Professor K. was eritical of both finalists' qualifications. she never compared 
their qualifications with Lam's. Similarly, although Professor K. stated that the Dean expressed concern that that finalist's file might 
be weaker than Lam's, she did not say that the Dean in fact believed that the finalist's file was weaker. 
27 Lam presented a variety of evidence in support of her allegations of bias. Most obviously, Lam's absence from everyone of the 
selection lists of the appointments committee members was suspect in light of her strong showing in the first search. Moreover, 
non-white and foreign-born candidates were conspicuously missing from the final list of candidates prepared in the second search, in 
contrast to the more diverse origins of candidates considered during the first search. 
Additionally, the defendants failed to institute any of the procedural reforms suggested in the aftermath of Lam's original 
allegations. As wc have previously explained, although an employer's violation of its own hiring policies does not constitute a 
prima facie violation of Title VII, it may be circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Gonzales, 90 I F.2d at 761; compare 
Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464. 465 (1st Cir.) (affirming district court finding of no discrimination in light of "exacting 
protocol" of tenure decision process, including "prescribed standards" by which to measure candidates), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
848.111 S.Ct.137.112L.Ed.2d 104(1990». 
Lam also showed evidence that one search committee member was reluctant to hire a woman commercial law professor, although 
that member did in fact vote in favor of otTering the position to a woman. 
Finally. Lam presented substantial evidence that, given the Law School's "collegial" atmosphere and corresponding emphasis on 
consensus, the notoriety of her protest against the school's alleged discrimination was likely to afTect her chances of being otTered 
a position there. Certain professors testified that the Dean and the President were strongly opposed to hiring Lam, and that this 
opposition was known to the Law School faculty. (In her brief. Lam asserts that "two search committee members considered her 
[oppositional] activities in rejecting her application." implying that their view of her activities affected their consideration of her 
application. However, of the two professors cited, one was not on the second search committee, and the other stated that his view 
of Lam's activities would not have affected his judgment on the merits of her application.) 
Accordingly, the court's assertion that "no evidence has been adduced to point even to an inference of discriminatory or retaliatory 
motives on the part of the second search committee members in the selection of recommended candidates" (Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, at 14) is clearly erroneous. The above-described circumstantial evidence certainly supports an inference of 
discriminatory/retaliatory intent. It does not, however, necessitate the conclusion that the defendants' failure to appoint Lam was 
based on impermissible motivations. As we have emphasized, it often requires a searching factual inquiry to ascertain the 
motivations for a hiring decision, a difficult task that is exacerbated when mUltiple decisionmakers are involved. Here, over the 
course ofa five-day bench trial, the district court heard testimony from a variety of sources, including Lam, each of the members of 
the search committee, various Law School facultyn1embers,and the Dean. The search committee members unif()rll1lx~tate~ that 
Lam v. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994) 
66 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 74, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,341,95 Ed. Law Rep. 875 ... 
their decisions wcre not motivated by impermissible bias: the court. assessing their credibility and exercising its judgment. chose 
to believe them. We cannot say that the court clearly erred in doing so. 
28 We note, in addition, that substantial evidence was adduced regarding faculty uncertainty as to the goals of the PALS program and 
the desirable attributes of its director. In particular, there was a good deal of debate in the faculty regarding whether a "public law" or 
"private law" emphasis was preferable. As a result, therefore, ofthe two years intervening between the first and second searches, Lam 
may have appeared a less attractive candidate to the 1989-90 search committee members. 
End of Document 2012 Thomson Fleuters. No to original U.S Government Works. 
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930 F.2d 1434 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Michelle LINDAHL, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
AIR FRANCE, a French Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 89-55936. I Argued and Submitted Feb. 
11,1991. I Decided April 22, 1991. 
A 49-year-old female airline employee sued airline for sex 
discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination 
under ADEA for giving promotion to younger male instead 
of to her. The United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, Edward Rafeedie, J., granted 
summary judgment for airline and employee appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Rymer, Circuit Judge, held that 
employee raised factual questions material to 
demonstrating that airline's proffered explanations for 
promoting male employee were not credible and that 
discrimination was more likely explanation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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rebutted. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California. 
Before BOOCHEVER, HALL and RYMER, Circuit 
Judges. 
Opinion 
RYMER, Circuit Judge: 
Michelle Lindahl brought this suit against her employer, 
Air France, for sex discrimination under Title Vil of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and age discrimination under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) based on 
Air France giving a promotion to a young male instead of 
to her, a 49-year-old female. The district court granted Air 
France's motion for summary judgment. We reverse. 
*1436 I 
Lindahl worked as a Customer Promotion Agent in Air 
France's Los Angeles office. The office had two groups of 
employees to handle sales activities, Customer Promotion 
Agents and Sales Representatives. Sales Representatives 
worked mostly in the field promoting sales, while the 
Customer Promotion Agents worked inside, providing 
backup to the Sales Representatives. 
In 1982, the District Manager, Karl Kershaw, told the 
Customer Promotion Agents that Air France was planning 
to create a new position of Senior Customer Promotion 
Agent and invited all of them to apply for the position. 
After considering their qualifications, Kershaw told 
Lindahl that she was the most qualified and would be given 
the promotion. Subsequently, however, Air France decided 
not to create the position, and Lindahl did not get the 
promotion. 
In 1987, without any prior notification to the Customer 
Promotion Agents, Kershaw announced that he had chosen 
Edward Michels to fill a new Senior Customer Promotion 
Agent position. At that time, there were four eligible 
candidates: two women over age 40 (including Lindahl), 
and two men under age 40 (including Michels). 
Lindahl, upset about the decision, decided to pursue Air 
France's grievance procedure. First, she asked Kershaw to 
give an explanation. After about six weeks, he responded 
that Michels had the "best overall qualifications." 
Unsatisfied, she wrote to Regional Manager Robert 
Watson. Watson responded by affirming Kershaw's 
decision. Finally, Lindahl had her attorney take her 
grievance to Personnel Services Manager Eugene Carrara. 
At this time, she made clear that she felt that the decision 
was the product of age and sex discrimination. Carrara held 
a hearing and decided to reject her claim because he 
believed the promotion decision was reasonable. In his 
decision, he stated that Michels's computer expertise was 
the principal reason for selecting him. 
While the grievance proceeding was pending, Kershaw 
apparently became dissatisfied with the new organization 
of the group, and Watson suggested a reorganization to 
General Manager USA, Jean-Claude Baumgarten, that 
would have put Michels in a purely technical function and 
would have created another Senior Customer Promotion 
Agent position to deal with sales backup. The new position 
would have gone to Lindahl, but Baumgarten rejected the 
proposal. 
Lindahl then filed claims with the California Department 
of Fair Employment and Housing and with the federal 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
After exhausting her administrative remedies, she filed suit 
in the district court, alleging age and sex discrimination 
under 29 USc. §§ 623, 631 (ADEA) (prohibiting age 
discrimination against individuals over age 40) and 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII) (prohibiting sex 
discrimination). Air France moved for summary judgment 
on both causes of action. 
The district court granted summary judgment on the 
ground that Lindahl had not raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Air France's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory explanations are pretexts for 
discrimination. Lindahl filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, 
amend, and vacate the judgment, which the district court 
denied. She now appeals. 
II 
111 We review the district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & 
Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. 
denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 
(1990). 
A 
Summary judgment is proper if no factual issues exist for 
trial. The party opposing summary judgment must 
demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 
fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the 
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evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party. *1437 Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 
2510,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts 
placed before the court must be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 
2513. However, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the 
opposing party "must do more than simply show that there 
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... 
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
'genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp .. 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.C!. 1348, 
1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 ( 1986) (citations omitted) (quoting 
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 
S.Ct. 1575, 1592,20 LEd.2d 569 (1968». 
12/ 131 Lindahl argues that Air France's decision to 
promote Michels was disparate treatment on the basis of 
sex and age in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.l The 
Supreme Court established the allocation of proof in Title 
VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff 
"must carry the initial burden under the statute of 
establishing a prima facie case of ... discrimination." Id. at 
802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiff can establish a prima 
facie case by showing, for example, that she belongs to a 
protected group, that she applied and was qualified for a 
job which was open for applications, that she was rejected, 
and that the position remained open after her rejection and 
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
the plaintiff's qualifications. Id.; see also Texas Dep't of 
Community Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6, 101 
S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 6, 67 LEd.2d 207 (1981) (explaining 
that the McDonnell Douglas formulation is flexible and 
can be adapted to fit the facts of each case). 
141 15/ 16/ "The burden then must shift to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. At that point, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiffto show that the employer's reason was 
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. 
The plaintiff may carry this burden "either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 10 1 S.Ct. at 1095. 
Disparate treatment claims under the ADEA "are analyzed 
by the same standard used to analyze disparate treatment 
claims under Title VII." Merrick V. Farmers Ins. Group, 
892 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.1990). 
Lindahl contends that once she has made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, summary judgment is necessarily 
improper. She reasons that the prima facie case raises an 
inference of discrimination, and because on summary 
judgment all inferences must be resolved in her favor, she 
need not produce any additional evidence of pretext to 
defeat summary judgment. 
17/ 181 We have made clear that a plaintiff cannot defeat 
summary judgment simply by making out a prima facie 
case. Steckl V. lv/otorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th 
CiLI983). It is true that the prima facie case raises an 
inference of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 10 I 
S.Ct. at 1094. However, when the employer produces 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment 
decision, the inference of discrimination is rebutted. Id. at 
255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. "[T]he defendant's articulation of a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves ... to shift the 
burden back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine factual 
question as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual." 
Lmve V. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th 
CiLI985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986). 
19/ The plaintiff cannot carry this burden simply by 
restating the prima facie *1438 case and expressing an 
intent to challenge the credibility of the employer's 
witnesses on cross-examination. She must produce specific 
facts either directly evidencing a discriminatory motive or 
showing that the employer's explanation is not credible. 
See Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393. Still, because of the inherently 
factual nature of the inquiry, the plaintiff need produce 
very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a 
gen uine issue 0 f fact. 
[A]ny indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice 
to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfindeL 
Once a prima facie case is established ... , summary 
judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be 
appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because 
the crux of a Title VII dispute is the "elusive factual 
question of intentional discrimination." 
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 
n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 8). 
B 
The district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, 
that Lindahl made out a prima facie case of discrimination. 
She is a woman over age 40 who, in effect, applied for a 
promotion, was qualified for it, but lost it to a man under 
age 40. The parties also do not dispute that Air France met 
its burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for promoting Michels and not Lindahl. Air France 
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points to the deposition testimony of Watson and Kershaw, 
indicating that their reasons for promoting Michels were 
(I) his computer proficiency, and (2) his leadership 
abilities as they related to Air France's need to establish 
order, rules, and regulations in a chaotic office. 
1101 The issue on appeal is therefore whether Lindahl 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. We 
believe Lindahl has raised factual questions material to 
demonstrating that Air France's explanations are not 
credible and that discrimination was the more likely 
explanation for Michels's promotion.2 
As to Air France's explanation that Michels was chosen for 
his computer proficiency, Lindahl argues that it is not 
credible because neither Kershaw nor Watson (the ones 
most closely associated with the decision) mentioned it as 
the reason for choosing Michels. Kershaw had said only 
that Michels had "the best overall qualifications to lead the 
group," and Watson had simply affirmed Kershaw's 
decision. The computer explanation did not come out until 
Personnel Services Manager Carrara, who was not 
involved with the decision, mentioned it four months later 
in response to a letter from Lindahl's attorney. 
Simply because an explanation comes after the beginning 
of litigation does not make it inherently incredible. 
Merrick, 892 F.2d at 1438. Nevertheless, in this case, the 
computer explanation would have been such a 
straightforward answer to Lindahl's inquiries that one 
might expect that Kershaw and Watson would have 
mentioned it if it really were the explanation. That they 
instead gave vague explanations about "overall 
qualifications" might suggest that the computer 
explanation was a later fabrication. 
Moreover, computer expertise was not clearly related to 
the leadership position. Indeed, computer proficiency had 
never been listed as a qualification for the position of 
Senior Customer Promotion Agent. While Michels's 
computer knowledge might have been helpful to Air 
France generally, it is not clear that it made him a better 
candidate to lead the Customer Promotion Group. 
Lindahl also challenges the credibility of Air France's 
explanation that Michels was chosen for his leadership 
abilities. Kershaw testified in his deposition that "being 
accepted" is an important part of being a leader, but he 
admitted that Michels "was not well liked by the group." 
By contrast, Kershaw described Lindahl as having "a good 
relationship with the staff." 
Lindahl also stated that Michels was preoccupied with the 
computer and neglected his duties backing up the Sales 
Representatives * 1439 and that these backup duties were 
traditionally part of the Customer Promotion Group's 
responsibilities. Finally, the record shows that Michels was 
the most junior member of the Customer Promotion 
Group. 
All of these facts tend to show that Michels may not have 
been the best person to lead the group, and they therefore 
suggest that leadership ability may not have been the real 
reason for choosing Michels over Lindahl. See Williams v. 
Edward ApfJels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th 
Cir.1986) (choosing inexperienced candidates can raise 
question about motives). But see Cotton v. City of 
Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir.1987) (experience 
is not sole criterion employer may use to determine 
qualifications). 
Moreover, even if Kershaw did make his decision based on 
leadership abilities, other evidence could suggest that his 
evaluation of leadership ability was itself sexist. Lindahl 
points out that Kershaw made statements about the 
candidates' relative qualifications that reflect male/female 
stereotypes. Kershaw testified in his deposition that he 
believed that both female candidates get "nervous" and 
that the other female candidate "gets easily upset [and] 
loses contro!''' By contrast, Kershaw described Michels's 
leadership qualities as "not to back away from a situation, 
to take hold immediately of the situation, to attack the 
situation right away, to stay cool throughout the whole 
process." He went on to comment that "sitting and griping 
and getting emotional is not contributing to, No.1, getting 
the job done, number two, to the morale and atmosphere of 
the group." 
The Supreme Court has made clear that sex stereotyping 
can be evidence of sex discrimination, especially when 
linked to the employment decision. Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1790-92, 
104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Kershaw apparently saw Michels 
as aggressive and cool (in addition to being the one who 
could impose order), while he saw the female candidates as 
nervous and emotional. His comments could suggest that 
Kershaw made his decision on the basis of stereotypical 
images of men and women, specifically that women do not 
make good leaders because they are too "emotional." 
Finally, Lindahl points to evidence showing that Air 
France handled the promotion decision differently when 
only women were eligible than when young men were 
eligible. In 1982, when the possibility of an opening for 
Senior Customer Promotion Agent position first arose, the 
only eligible candidates for the position were women. 
Kershaw told all of them about the possible opening and 
that they would have to take a test. Air France abandoned 
the idea to add the position. In 1987, two men under age 40 
and two women over age 40 were eligible. Kershaw did not 
tell the candidates about the position, and Michels got the 
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promotion without taking a test or having an interview. 
This difference in treatment might further support an 
inference that Air France was discriminating against older 
women. 
While not overwhelming, Lindahl's evidence of 
discriminatory motive is sufficient to raise a genuine issue 
offact. She has pointed to facts that could call into question 
the credibility of Air France's nondiscriminatory 
explanations and could suggest discriminatory motives. 
Whether the facts do indicate discrimination is a question 
that should ordinarily be resolved by a factfinder, and we 
believe it is possible that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find that Air France discriminated against Lindahl in 
Footnotes 
promoting Michels. We therefore conclude that summary 
judgment should not have been granted.3 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Parallel Citations 
55 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1033, 56 Empt Prac. Dec. 
P 40,712,59 USLW 2726 
Lindahl could also show illegal discrimination by demonstrating sut11cient disparate impact. Although she presented this theory to 
the district court. she has not argued it in her brief and has therefore abandoned this claim on appeal. 
2 Because we would reach the same conclusion whether the case would be tried by a judge or a jury, we do not reach the issue of 
whether 28 U.s.c. § 1330 precludes a jury trial in this case. 
3 Lindahl also argues that the district court erred in concluding that she was barred from raising a claim for retaliation for the first time 
in her opposition to summary judgment. Her retaliation theory is that General Manager Baumgarten rejected the reorganization 
proposal that would have given her a promotion in order to get back at her for bringing discrimination charges. The district court did 
not consider the merits of the claim because it was not raised in the EEOC complaint or in the federal court complaint. 
End 
In light of our disposition, we need not reach this issue. We express no opinion as to whether leave to amend might be appropriate, 
whether the issue may be preserved in the pre-trial order, or whether the facts have evidentiary significance. 
Thomson original U.S Government Works. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Kathryn LOWE, PlaintijJ-Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF MONROVIA, Paul Stuart, Robert 
Bartlett, Monrovia City Council, John 
Nobrega, Mary Wilcox, Ed Zoolalian, 
Robert Ovrom and Betty Logans, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 84-5960. I Argued and Submitted March 
4,1985· I Decided Oct. 30, 1985. I As 
Amended Dec. 26, 1985 and Jan. 21, 1986. 
Unsuccessful applicant for position of city police officer 
brought civil rights action against city and city officials, 
alleging that defendants' failure to hire her was result of 
discrimination on basis of race and sex. The United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, 
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, J., granted city's motion for 
summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that evidence 
raised material issue of fact as to whether city's motivation 
in failing to hire plaintiff was based on race, precluding 
summary judgment. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 
Schwarzer, District Judge, sitting by designation, filed 
opinion dissenting in part. 
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Federal Courts 
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Except where jurisdictional issue requires 
determination of facts relevant to merits of the 
dispute, district court is ordinarily free to hear 
evidence regarding jurisdiction, and to rule on 
that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes 
where necessary. 
Federal Courts 
,;.,Particular Issues and Questions 
When case is dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, clearly erroneous standard in 
reviewing district court's underlying factual 
findings is applied. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Courts 
;>.cDefinite and Firm Conviction of Mistake 
Under clearly erroneous standard, Court of 
Appeals accepts district court's findings of fact 
unless upon review it is left with definite and firm 
conviction that mistake has been made. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,,=Particular Cases 
Applicant for city police officer position was 
barred from bringing Title VII sex discrimination 
claim in district court where she failed to first file 
such claim with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17. 
Lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1985) 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (SNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
[61 
[7[ 
19 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
\.:,Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
In order to prevail in a Title VII case on disparate 
impact theory, plaintiff must show that business 
practice, neutral on its face, has a substantial 
adverse impact on group protected by Title VII; 
once plaintiff establishes prima facie case of 
disparate impact, burden shifts to defendant to 
show that practice is justified by business 
necessity. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
32 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.~.·Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, a 
"disparate impact" plaintiff, unlike plaintiff 
proceeding on a "disparate treatment" theory, 
may prevail without proving intentional 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-l7. 
[8[ Civil Rights 
·;JPrima Facie Case 
Allegations of unsuccessful applicant for city 
police officer position that city's use of eligibility 
lists with delayed effective dates which expired 
automatically, combined with practice of lateral 
hiring resulted in disproportionately low number 
of job offers to Blacks were insufficient to 
establish prima facie case of disparate impact 
under Title VII, absent affidavits or documentary 
evidence sufficient to support her claim. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42 
[9[ 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.c.··Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
If plaintiff establishes prima facie case of 
discrimination in Title VII disparate treatment 
case, burden then shifts to defendant to articulate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
decision; then, in order to prevail, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that employer's alleged reason for 
adverse employment decision is pretext for 
another motive which is discriminatory. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
155 Cases that cite this headnote 
[101 Civil Rights 
~=Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Availability of Title VII discriminatory treatment 
claim is not dependent on plaintiff's ability to 
prove discriminatory impact claim; as long as 
plaintiff can establish individual case of 
intentional discrimination, there is no need to 
show that employer has also discriminated 
against an entire class. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§§ 701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e 
to 2000e-17. 
97 Cases that cite this headnote 
[11[ Civil Rights 
.~.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
To establish prima facie case of discrimination in 
disparate treatment case, plaintiff must offer 
evidence that gives rise to inference of unlawful 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
Lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1985) 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
2000e-17. 
51 Cases that cite this headnote 
/12/ Civil Rights 
',rPresumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Common way to establish inference of 
discrimination in Title VI I disparate treatment 
case is to show that four requirements are met: 
that plaintiff belongs to class protected by Title 
VII; that plaintiff applied and was qualified for 
job for which employer was seeking applicants; 
that, despite being qualified, plaintiff was 
rejected; and that, after plaintiff's rejection, 
position remained open and employer continued 
to seek applicants from persons of comparable 
qualifications. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
/13/ Civil Rights 
.=Prima Facie Case 
Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city 
police officer position was qualified, that 
position was open when she filed her application, 
and that city continued to accept applications 
from similarly qualified candidates after 
eligibility list upon which applicant's name 
appeared expired was sufficient to establish 
prima facie case of race discrimination under 
Title VII, despite evidence that position was no 
longer open when the eligibility list became 
effective, and that no openings occurred during 
period list was effective. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e to 2000e- 17. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
114/ Civil Rights 
·,/",Prima Facie Case 
Evidence that applicant for city police officer 
position was told that she should apply in Los 
Angeles, and that no Blacks were employed by 
city police department at the time was sufficient 
to create inference of discrimination sufficient to 
establish prima facie case of employment 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
/15) Federal Civil Procedure 
,.=Burden of Proof 
On motion for summary judgment in Title VII 
disparate treatment case, defendant's articulation 
of legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
employment decision serves only to shift burden 
back to plaintiff to raise genuine factual question 
as to whether proffered reason is pretextual. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
40 Cases that cite this headnote 
/16/ Federal Civil Procedure 
./QEmployees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
In Title VII disparate treatment case, evidence 
that applicant for city police officer position was 
told that she should apply in Los Angeles because 
the Los Angeles police force was "literally 
begging for minorities and especially females" 
raised genuine issue of material fact with respect 
to whether city's reasons or motivations in failing 
to hire her were in fact discriminatory, precluding 
summary judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
/17) Federal Civil Procedure 
Lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 9913 (1985) 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
.·."Proceedings in Which Judgment Is Authorized 
When Title VII plaintiff has presented sufficient 
facts to meet his burden with respect to prima 
facie aspect of employment discrimination case, 
summary judgment for defendant will ordinarily 
not be appropriate on any ground relating to the 
merits. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
117/ Federal Civil Procedure 
,.=Proceedings in Which Judgment Is Authorized 
Once Title VII plaintiff has established prima 
facie employment discrimination case, summary 
judgment for defendant will ordinarily not be 
appropriate on any ground relating to the merits. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
118) Civil Rights 
.,,,,Public Employment 
Unsuccessful applicant for city police officer 
position could not bring sex discrimination claim 
under 42 U.S.CA. § 1981, since that section 
redresses only discrimination based on race. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
[19/ Civil Rights 
v~Employment Practices 
Civil Rights 
.~,=Existence of Other Remedies; Exclusivity 
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 
U.S.CA. § 1981 are overlapping but independent 
remedies for racial discrimination in 
employment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
120/ Civil Rights 
q •• v..Employment Practices 
Civil Rights 
,.>.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of 
Proof 
Claims of disparate treatment arising under Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.CA. 
§ 1981 are parallel because both require proof of 
intentional discrimination; same standards are 
used to prove both claims, and facts sufficient to 
give rise to one are sufficient to give rise to the 
other. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 70 I -718, as 
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
13 Cases that cite this headnote 
121/ Civil Rights 
>.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burdens of 
Proof 
Plaintiff suing under 42 U.S.CA. § 198 I may 
prevail only by establishing intentional 
discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment; proof of 
disparate impact is insufficient. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1221 Federal Civil Procedure 
w····Employees and Employment Discrimination. 
Actions Involving 
Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city 
police officer position was told to apply in Los 
Angeles because the Los Angeles police force 
was "literally begging for minorities and 
especially females" raised material issue of fact 
as to whether city's hiring procedures 
discriminated on basis of race, precluding 
summary judgment. 42 U.S.CA. § 1981. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1985) 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
I23J Federal Civil Procedure 
(,cEmployees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city 
police officer position was told that she should 
apply for position in Los Angeles because the 
Los Angeles police department was "literally 
begging for minorities and especially females" 
raised material issue of fact as to whether city 
purposefully discriminated against her because 
of her race and sex, precluding summary 
judgment on her claim under42 U.S.c.A. § 1983. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
1241 Civil Rights 
,cGood Faith and Reasonableness; Knowledge 
and Clarity of Law; Motive and Intent, in 
General 
Government officials are entitled to qualified 
immunity only if reasonable person would not 
have been aware that actions at issue violated 
well-established statutory or constitutional 
rights. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
1251 Civil Rights 
<",Municipalities and Counties and Their 
Officers 
Whether city employees are immune turns on 
objective reasonableness of their conduct in light 
of clearly established law, not under subjective 
good faith. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
1261 Civil Rights 
, .. =Employment Practices 
City officials were not shielded from liability 
under 42 U .S.C.A. §§ 1981 and 1983 with 
respect to alleged discriminatory hiring practice 
in city police department, since reasonable 
person would have been aware that practices 
complained of were unlawful. 
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*1002 Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California. 
Before PREGERSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, 
and SCHWARZER, * District Judge. 
Opinion 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
Kathryn Lowe, a Black woman, brought this action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USc. §§ 
2000e to 2000e- I 7 (1982), alleging that the failure by the 
City of Monrovia ("the City") and the individual 
defendants to hire her for a position on the City's police 
force resulted from discrimination on the basis of race and 
sex. Lowe also sought reliefunder 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982) 
and 42 U.s.c. § 1983 (1982) for the City'S alleged 
discriminatory employment acts. The district court granted 
the City'S motion for summary judgment, ruling that Lowe 
could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
because she was not rejected during the effective dates of 
the employment eligibility list on which her name was 
placed. We reverse. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The City of Monrovia hires both inexperienced recruits 
and experienced officers ("lateral hires") to fill entry-level 
police officer vacancies. The City accepts applications for 
entry-level police officers at all times, even when no 
openings exist. After receiving applications from recruits, 
Lowe v. of 775 F.2d 998 (1 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair Empl.prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
the City requires these candidates to pass both a written 
and an oral examination. Applicants who pass both tests 
are placed on an eligibility list. They are ranked on the list 
according to their scores. The eligibility list, however, does 
not become effective until a designated later date. Once a 
list does become effective, it remains in effect for six 
months. According to the City, when openings occur, 
positions are offered to the applicants on the then active 
"Entry Level Police Officer" list in the order of their rank 
on that list. The City also maintains a list of lateral entry 
candidates, although it is not clear how that list is 
compiled. Nor is it clear when the City hires laterally for an 
available entry-level position instead of offering the 
position to an eligible recruit applicant. It does appear, 
however, that most entry-level positions are filled by 
recruits rather than experienced officers. 
Kathryn Lowe, an inexperienced graduate of a police 
officer training program, applied for an entry-level police 
officer position on the Monrovia police force in January 
1982. At that time there were no women or Blacks on the 
police force. 
There is no dispute that an opening actually existed for an 
entry-level police officer when Lowe applied. The City 
contends, however, that although an opening existed and 
although she was qualified, Lowe never became eligible to 
fill that opening. Lowe passed both the written and the oral 
examinations by May 28, 1982 and was notified on June 3, 
1982 that she had been accepted for the eligibil ity list. 
Nevertheless, according to the City, the list that contained 
her name did not become effective until August I, 1982 
and the opening that existed when Lowe first applied was 
filled prior to that date. According to the City, Lowe was 
not eligible for employment after February 1, 1983 
because the list on which her name appeared automatically 
expired on that date. It is undisputed that there was no 
opening for an entry-level police officer at any time 
between August 1, 1982 and February I, 1983. 
Lowe claims that during her oral examination, Betty 
Logans, Personnel Division Manager for Monrovia, told 
her that the City's police force had no women and no 
Blacks and it "[had] no facilities." Logans suggested that 
Lowe apply for a position in Los Angeles where the police 
department is "literally begging for minorities and 
especially *1003 females."] Citing that statement, Lowe 
filed a complaint against the City with the EEOC on June 
18, 1982. On June 7, 1982, prior to the effective date of 
Lowe's eligibility list but after Lowe had been notified that 
she had qualified for placement on the list, Louis Razo was 
hired laterally for an entry-level police officer position. 
Lowe amended her EEOC complaint on June 24, 1982 to 
include that information. 
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Lowe 
brought this suit. Her complaint alleged three independent 
causes of action. The first cause of action, brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e to 2000e- 17 (1982), alleged discrimination for 
failure to hire Lowe as a police officer based on her race 
and her sex.2 The second cause of action, brought under 42 
USc. § 1981 (1982), alleged that Lowe's right to contract 
for her personal services as a police officer on a basis equal 
to other persons was denied to her because of her race and 
sex. The third cause of action, brought under 42 U.S.c. § 
1983 (1982), alleged that Lowe was denied employment 
based on her race and sex in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
II/ 121 13/ 14) The district court found that Lowe was 
barred from bringing an action for sex discrimination 
pursuant to Title VII because she failed to file a complaint 
for sex discrimination with the EEOC. When a plaintiff 
fails to raise a Title VII claim before the EEOC, the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. Shah v. 
Mr. Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 
27 I -72 (9th Cir.1981). Except where the jurisdictional 
issue requires a determination of facts relevant to the 
merits of the dispute, a district court "is ordinarily free to 
hear evidence regarding jurisdiction, and to rule on that 
issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where 
necessary." Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 
1077 (9th Cir. I 983). When a case is dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, we apply the clearly erroneous 
standard in reviewing the district court's underlying factual 
findings. Under that standard, we accept the district court's 
findings of fact unless upon review we are left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Bohemia, 
Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., 725 F.2d 506, 509 (9th 
Cir.1984). 
The district court disposed of the remainder of Lowe's 
claims, including the Title VII race discrimination claim, 
by granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Lojek v. 
Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. I 983), and like the 
trial court, we are governed by the standard set forth in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327,1328 (9th 
Cir.1983). We must determine whether, viewing the facts 
and the law in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, there is any genuine issue of material fact and 
whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Amaro 
lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 99B (1985) 
39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 749 (9th CiLI984); 
Lojek, 716 F.2d at 677; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
III. THE TITLE VII CLAIMS 
A. Sex Discrimillatioll 
[51 When determining that Lowe's Title VII sex 
discrimination claim was jurisdictionally barred, the 
district court considered Lowe's amended EEOC 
complaint. In contrast to the initial complaint she filed 
*1004 with that agency, Lowe's amended EEOC 
complaint explicitly states: "I feel the sole reason for my 
denial of the job is because I am Black." The amended 
complaint does not allege discrimination on the basis of 
sex. Because the district court correctly found that Lowe 
did not file a sex discrimination claim with the EEOC, we 
affirm its dismissal of the Title VII sex discrimination 
charge. 
B. Disparate Impact 011 the Basis of Race 
161 Lowe alleges that the City's policy of using eligibility 
lists that have delayed effective dates and that expire 
automatically, along with its reliance on lateral-hire 
employees to fill entry-level positions, has a disparate 
impact on Blacks. In order to prevail in a Title VII case on 
a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must show that a 
business practice, neutral on its face, has a substantial 
adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII. Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 40 I U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 
L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the practice is justified by "business 
necessity." Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen 's Union, 
Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982); Contreras 
v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th 
Cir.1981). The district court concluded that Lowe failed to 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. We agree. 
[7J A "disparate impact" plaintiff, unlike a plaintiff 
proceeding on a "disparate treatment" theory, may prevail 
without proving intentional discrimination. American 
Federation ()[ State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th 
Cir.1985); Gay, 694 F.2d at 537. However, the 
requirements a disparate impact plaintiff must meet "are in 
some respects more exacting than those of a disparate 
treatment case. A disparate impact plaintiff 'must not 
merely prove circumstances raising an inference of 
discriminatory impact; he must prove the discriminatory 
impact at issue.' " Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 
F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Johnson v. Uncle 
Ben's, Inc., 657 F .2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 293, 74 L.Ed.2d 277 (1982) ). This 
is usually done by establishing "that an employment 
practice selects members of a protected class in a 
proportion smaller than their percentage in the pool of 
actual applicants." ld. 
181 Lowe does not question the validity of the tests that are 
used to rank the applicants on the eligibility lists. Rather, 
she claims that the use of eligibility lists that have delayed 
effective dates and that expire automatically, combined 
with the practice of lateral hiring, has a disparate impact on 
Blacks. She contends that these practices, regardless of the 
City's motivation, result in a disproportionately low 
number of job offers to Blacks. 
Assuming arguendo that Lowe asserted a cognizable 
disparate impact claim, her claim did not survive the City's 
motion for summary judgment. Lowe did not offer 
affidavits or documentary evidence sufficient to support 
her claim; her assertions are made primarily in memoranda 
of law, not by way of proferred facts.3 Thus, the district 
court correctly concluded that Lowe failed to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact. 
C. Db.parate Treatment 011 tile Basis of Race 
191 fl 0 I Lowe also contends that the City intentionally 
discriminated against her and that she is therefore entitled 
to proceed under Title VII on a disparate treatment theoryA 
In a Title VII disparate * 1005 treatment case, a plaintiff 
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then 
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. 
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse 
employment decision is a pretext for another motive which 
is discriminatory. McDonnell Doug/as Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973); Dia::: v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752 
F.2d 1356, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1985). 
I. The Prima Facie Case 
1111 1121 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
in a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must offer 
evidence that "give[ s] rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination." Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); accord United States Postal Service v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481,75 L.Ed.2d 
lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 99B (1985) 
39 Fair Emp'LPrac.Cas. (BNA) 350. 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
403 (1983). A common way to establish an inference of 
discrimination is to show that the four requirements set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas are met: 
1. that the plaintiff belongs to a class protected by 
Title VII; 
2. that the plaintiff applied and was qualified for ajob 
for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
3. that, despite being qualified, the plaintiff was 
rejected; and 
4. that, after the plaintiff s rejection, the posItIOn 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of comparable qualifications. 
See McDonnell Douglas, 4 I I U.S. at 802,93 S.Ct. at 1824. 
Satisfaction ofthe McDonnell Doug/as criteria is sufficient 
to establish a primafacie case. Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-49,57 
L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1359; Spaulding v. 
University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 511, 83 L.Ed.2d 401 
(1984); O'Brien v. Sky Chef~, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 868 n. I 
(9th Cir.1982); Lynn v. Regents of the University of 
California, 656 F.2d 1337,1340-41 (9th Cir.1981); White 
v. City of San Diego, 605 F.2d 455,458 (9th Cir.1979). 
1131 As a Black, Lowe belongs to a class protected by Title 
VII. Both parties agree that she was qualified for the 
position because she passed the examination and that at 
some point she was rejected. Thus there is no disagreement 
that Lowe met the first and third parts of the McDonnell 
Douglas requirements for establishing a prima facie case. 
But in order to satisfy the remaining requirements it was 
necessary for Lowe to establish that an opening existed at 
the time she applied or afterwards, and that after she was 
rejected the City continued to accept applications from 
comparably qualified applicants. See Gay, 694 F.2d at 547; 
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District, 565 F.2d 
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1977). 
The City contends that Lowe failed to establish a prima 
facie case because no entry level job existed on the police 
force during the time the eligibility list which contained 
Lowe's name was active. According to the City, Lowe did 
not "apply," for purposes of the McDonnell Doug/as test, 
until the eligibility list which contained her name became 
effective. The City also contends that the automatic 
expiration of the eligibility list on February I, 1983 did not 
constitute a rejection. We cannot accept either of the City's 
arguments. 
* 1 006 McDonnell Douglas' s second prima facie case 
r~911iE~rnent relat~?~I1IX to whether there was all~p~l1ing. 
either when the plaintiff applied or at any time her 
appl ication was pending. The City advertised job openings 
on the police force prior to the time Lowe filed her 
application and Logans acknowledged that there was an 
opening after the time Lowe completed the application 
process-the opening that Razo was subsequently hired to 
fill. The City does not contend that there was "no opening" 
at any relevant time prior to the date of Razo's 
employment. It is not relevant for purposes of this 
requirement whether the City had a legitimate reason for 
delaying the effective date of the eligibility list on which 
Lowe's name was placed. Any such reason might 
undermine the inference of discrimination raised once a 
prima facie case has been established, but the order of 
proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas does not permit us to 
consider rebuttal evidence at the prima facie case stage. 
Rather, in a Title VII disparate treatment case such 
evidence is considered during the next analytic steps when 
we evaluate the City'S articulated nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring the plaintiff. Thus, Lowe "applied" 
when she filed her application; she clearly met the second 
requirement. 
Lowe also satisfied the fourth McDonnell Douglas 
requirement. After February I, 1983, the City no longer 
considered Lowe an active, eligible applicant. Yet, the City 
does not contend that it ceased hiring entry-level police 
officers at that time, or that it suddenly changed the 
qualifications required of eligible candidates. Rather, it 
explains that eligibility lists automatically expire after six 
months. As with its practice of delaying the effective dates 
of its eligibility lists, the City may have a legitimate reason 
for maintaining the lists for only six months. However, any 
such justification, like any justification the City asserts for 
delaying the effective dates of the lists, may be considered 
only when we evaluate the articulated nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring the plaintiff. Whatever its reason, the 
City rejected Lowe on February 1, 1983 and continued to 
accept applications from similarly qualified candidates. 
Lowe has thus satisfied the final part of the McDonnell 
Douglas four-part test and established a primafacie case of 
discrimination.5 
Jl41 In addition, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case 
of disparate treatment without satisfying the McDonnell 
Douglas test. See Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1361; Gay. 694 F.2d at 
550. Lowe has provided * I 007 evidence that suggests that 
"the employment decision was based on a discriminatory 
criterion illegal under the [Civil Rights] Act." 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1977). Logans' statement to Lowe regarding the 
composition of the Monrovia police force and her 
suggestion that Lowe apply in Los Angeles instead of 
Monrovia, when viewed in conjunction with the fact that 
no Blacks were employed by the Monrovia Police 
lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 99B (1 
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Department at the time Lowe applied, create an inference 
of discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case.6 Because Lowe has met the four-part McDonnell 
Douglas requirements and alternatively because she has 
provided direct and circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent, she established a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment on the basis of race. Thus the district 
court erred when it based its award of summary judgment 
on the ground on which it relied. 
2. The City's Articulated Nondiscriminatory Reason for 
Rejecting Lowe and the Evidence of Pretext 
Because we are reviewing a district court's order granting 
summary judgment, we must examine the record to 
determine if there is any other basis for affirmance. Diaz, 
752 F.2d at 1362. If the result below were correct, we 
would affirm even if the district court relied on an 
erroneous ground. Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 
1300 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1983) (citing He/vering v. Gowran, 
302 U.S. 238, 58 S.Ct. 154,82 L.Ed. 224 (1937)). In order 
to determine whether any other basis for affirmance exists, 
we must examine the portions of the record that relate to 
the second and third steps governing the order of proof in 
disparate treatment cases. 
After Lowe established a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, the burden shifted to the City to rebut the 
presumption of discrimination by articulating a 
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her. To accomplish 
this, the City was only required to set forth a legally 
sufficient explanation for rejecting Lowe's application. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95; 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 97 S.Ct. at 1866-67. The 
City's articulated reason for not hiring Lowe was that it 
followed a long-standing nondiscriminatory practice with 
respect to the creation and maintenance of eligibility lists. 
The City contends that under the procedures it follows no 
entry-level job opening existed during the time the 
eligibility list which contained Lowe's name was in effect. 
There may very well be administrative constraints that 
would justify the City's use of a delayed effective-date, 
automatic-expiration system for eligibility lists. It may also 
be that it is preferable for the City to hire experienced 
officers in some instances. In any event, we assume, 
arguendo, that the City succeeded in articulating a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire 
Lowe.7 
*10081151 However, on a motion for summary judgment 
in a disparate treatment case, the defendant's articulation 
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves only to 
shift the burden back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine 
factual question as to whether the proffered reason is 
pretextual. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 
1094-95. Lowe contends that the reason the City uses 
eligibility lists that have delayed effective dates and expire 
automatically is to mask its discriminatory hiring practices. 
She alleges that the City hires from eligibility lists if the 
candidates who rank high on the list are not Black but hires 
laterally when Blacks rank high on the lists. Lowe attempts 
to support this contention with a claim that Blacks are 
selected in a proportion smaller than their percentage in the 
pool of actual applicants. She alleges that six Blacks 
qualified on the eligibility lists between 1979 and 1982 but 
none were hired.8 
A disparate treatment plaintiff may rely on statistical 
evidence to establish aprimafacie case, see Diaz, 752 F.2d 
at 1362, or "to show that a defendant's articulated 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision in 
question is pretextual," id. at 1363. As we explained in 
Diaz, 
Statistical data is relevant because it can 
be used to establish a general 
discriminatory pattern in an employer's 
hiring or promotion practices. Such a 
discriminatory pattern is probative of 
motive and can therefore create an 
inference of discriminatory intent with 
respect to the individual employment 
decision at issue. 
Id. While statistical data may be extremely useful in 
demonstrating that a defendant's articulated reason for an 
employment decision is pretextual, in this case, however, 
as we noted earlier, Lowe's assertions of racial disparities 
in hiring are not suppol1ed by a proper statistical record. 
See supra p. 1005 & note 3. 
116) Nevertheless, we conclude that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to whether the reasons or 
motivations for the City's actions were in fact 
discriminatory. A plaintiff"may succeed in persuading the 
court that she has been the victim of intentional 
discrimination ... either by directly persuading the court 
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 256,101 S.Ct. at 1095. In order to do so, the 
plaintiff need not necessarily offer evidence beyond that 
offered to establish a prima(acie case. Id. at 255 n. 10, 101 
S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10. The trier of fact may consider the same 
evidence that the plaintiff has introduced to establish a 
prima facie case in determining whether the defendant's 
explanation for the employment decision is pretextual. See 
id. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363 n. 8. 
In other civil rights contexts, we have made it clear that 
"the decision as to an employer's true motivation plainly is 
Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1985) 
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one reserved to the trier of fact." Peacock v. Du Val, 694 
F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. I 982) (quoting Nicholson v. Board 
of Education Torrance Unified School District. 682 F.2d 
858, 864 (9th Cir.1981) ). This notion-that the question of 
an employer's intent to discriminate is "a pure question of 
fact," *1009 Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 456 U.S. 273, 
287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982), to 
be left to the trier offact-is well-established, id. at 288, 102 
S.Ct. at 1789-90 (citing Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman. 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 
L.Ed.2d 720 (1979); Commissioner v. Duberstein. 363 
U.S. 278, 286, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1197, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 
(1960); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 
341, 70 S.Ct. 177, 179, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949) ), and clearly 
applies in Title VII cases.ld. Moreover, an employer's true 
motive in an employment decision is rarely easy to discern. 
As we have previously noted, "[w]ithout a searching 
inquiry into these motives, those [acting for impermissible 
motives] could easily mask their behavior behind a 
complex web of post hoc rationalizations." Peacock, 694 
F.2d at 646. 
117J As explained above, a plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment by satisfying the 
McDonnell Douglas four-part test, thereby creating a 
rebuttable presumption of discriminatory treatment, or by 
presenting actual evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the 
employer's discriminatory motive. When a plaintiff does 
not rely exclusively on the presumption but seeks to 
establish a prima facie case through the submission of 
actual evidence, very little such evidence is necessary to 
raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's 
motive; any indication of discriminatory motive-including 
evidence as diverse as "the [defendant's] reaction, if any, 
to [plaintiff's] legitimate civil rights activities; and 
treatment of [plaintiff] during his prior term of 
employment; [defendant's] general policy and practice 
with respect to minority employment," McDonnell 
Douglas, 4 I I U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26-may 
suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a 
factfinder. Once a prima facie case is established either by 
the introduction of actual evidence or reliance on the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption, summary judgment for 
the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any 
ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII 
dispute is the "elusive factual question of intentional 
discrimination," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 8.See, e.g, 
Foster v. A rcafa Associates, Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (courts generally cautious about granting 
summary judgment in Title VII cases where intent 
involved); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co .. 708 F.2d 655, 657 
(11th Cir. 1983) (" 'granting of summary judgment is 
especially questionable' " in employment discrimination 
cases (quoting Hayden v. First National Bank, 595 F.2d 
994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979))); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 
62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (factual disputes in most Title VII 
cases preclude summary judgment). Moreover, when a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of 
disparate treatment through direct or circumstantial 
evidence of discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have 
raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the 
legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated 
reason for its employment decision. 
According to the plaintiff's sworn affidavit, Logans, the 
Personnel Division Manager for the City, made a point of 
telling Lowe that the Monrovia police force had no women 
and no Blacks. Logans then encouraged Lowe to apply for 
a position as a police officer in Los Angeles rather than 
Monrovia. Logans explained that Lowe should do so 
because the Los Angeles police force was "literally 
begging for minorities and especially females." One clear 
inference that could reasonably be drawn from this 
statement is that the Monrovia police force was not 
begging for-or even interested in-such applicants. 
Viewing all the evidence, including Logans' statements, in 
the light most favorable to Lowe and resolving all 
inferences in her favor, as we must, we conclude that there 
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City'S 
motive in failing to hire Lowe.9 Accordingly, we cannot 
affirm *1010 the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as to the Title VII race discrimination claim. 
IV. SECTION 1981 AND SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
A. Section 1981 
1181 Lowe alleges that the City'S hiring procedures 
violated 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982). Her claim is based on 
both alleged sex and race discrimination. However, section 
1981 redresses only discrimination based on race. Shah v. 
Mount Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 
272 n. 4 (9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, the district court 
properly dismissed Lowe's section 1981 sex 
discrimination claim. See White v. Washington Public 
Power Supply System, 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir.1982). 
Jl9] 1201 121J We cannot agree, however, with the district 
court's rejection of Lowe's section 1981 race 
discrimination claim. Title VII and section 1981 are 
overlapping but independent remedies for racial 
discrimination in employment. Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 
1720-21, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Claims of disparate 
treatment arising under Title VII and section 1981 are 
parallel because both require proof of intentional 
discrimination. Gay, 694 F.2d at 537.10 The same 
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standards are used to prove both claims, Gay, 694 Fold at 
537, and facts sufficient to give rise to one are sufficient to 
give rise to the other. 
[22[ For the same reasons that we held the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on Lowe's Title VIi claim to 
be improper, we must reverse its grant of summary 
judgment on Lowe's section 1981 claim. Lowe has 
presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive to 
entitle her to a trial on this claim as well. 
B. Section 1983 
[23[ Lowe also alleges that she is entitled to reliefunder42 
U.S.c. § 1983 (1982). Because section 1983 incorporates 
the equal protection standards that have developed in 
fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, see Chavez v. Tempe 
Union High School District, 565 F.2d 1087, 1095 (9th 
Cir.1977), in order to prevail on her section 1983 claim 
alleging race and sex discrimination Lowe must first prove 
that the defendants purposefully discriminated against her 
either because of her race or her sex. See Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60 
L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
239-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). 
The City could then successfully defend against the charge 
only if it could demonstrate that the discriminatory 
treatment was justified. Because a plaintiff does not have 
to exhaust * 1011 administrative remedies before bringing 
a section 1983 action, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557,2560,73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), Lowe's 
failure to file an EEOC sex discrimination complaint does 
not bar her section 1983 sex discrimination claim. 
The City denies that it has intentionally discriminated 
against Lowe. In the equal protection context, just as in a 
Title VII disparate treatment case, discriminatory intent 
need not be proved by direct evidence. "[D]etermining the 
existence of a discriminatory purpose demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 
intent as may be available." Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 
102 S.Ct. 3272, 3276,73 L.Edold 1012 (1982) (quoting 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 
450 (1977); citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, 
96 S.Ct. at 2049). 
Lowe has established a triable issue regarding her claim 
that the City purposefully discriminated against her 
because of her race. See supra Section III.C. Because the 
evidence that satisfied the McDonnell Douglas test and the 
evidence ofLogans' statements is at least as probative with 
regard to sex discrimination as it is with regard to race 
discrimination, Lowe has also established a triable issue 
regarding her claim that the City purposefully 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The City does 
not claim in this case that it has a constitutionally 
permissible justification for intentional discrimination on 
the basis of race or sex. 
Accordingly, summary judgment on the section 1983 
claims was inappropriate. 
C. Qualified Immunity 
[241 [25[ [26[ The district court concluded as a matter of 
law that the individual defendants were shielded from 
liability under section 1981 and section 1983. Government 
officials are entitled to qualified immunity only if a 
reasonable person would not have been aware that the 
actions at issue violated well established statutory or 
constitutional rights. Davis v. Scherer, --- U.S. ----, 104 
S.Ct. 3012, 3018, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 
396 (1982). Whether the City employees are immune turns 
on the objective reasonableness of their conduct in light of 
clearly established law, not on their subjective good faith. 
Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 Fold 401,405 (9th Cir.1984). 
When the conduct that Lowe challenges took place it was 
well established that Lowe had a constitutional right not to 
be refused employment as a police officer because of her 
race or sex. See supra pp. 10 10-10 I I. A reasonable person 
would have been aware that the practices that Lowe 
complains of were unlawful if, as she alleges, they were 
intended to deprive Blacks or women of employment 
opportunities. Therefore, the district court erred in 
concluding that the officials were immune from suit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly dismissed Lowe's Title VII and 
section 1981 sex discrimination claims; the Title VII claim 
was jurisdictionally barred and sex discrimination cannot 
be redressed under section 1981. However, the district 
court erred when it granted the City's summary judgment 
motion with respect to Lowe's Title VII, section 1981, and 
section 1983 race discrimination claims. Although Lowe 
did not offer sufficient facts to support her assertions of 
disparate impact, she did establish a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment on the basis of race and raised a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the City'S 
motivation in failing to hire her. The district court also 
erred with respect to Lowe's section 1983 sex 
discrimination claim. Lowe alleged sufficient facts to 
withstand the City's motion with respect to that claim. 
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that the 
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individual defendants enjoy a qualified immunity from the 
section 198 I and section 1983 claims. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND 
REMANDED. 
*1012 SCHWARZER, District Judge, dissenting in part. 
The maJonty opinion holds that Lowe has made out a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment simply by showing 
that she was not hired by the City to fill a vacancy. It treats 
the City's rules and practices under which an applicant 
must qualifY to be hired as mere evidence admissible at 
trial to rebut an inference of discrimination. 
In so doing, the majority stands the case on its head, I 
ignores the settled law of this circuit, and creates a 
precedent that threatens the integrity of commonly used 
non-discriminatory civil service hiring systems. 
In addressing the question whether Lowe made out a prima 
facie case, it is useful to recall the Supreme Court's 
observation that 
[t]he method suggested in McDonnell 
Douglas for pursuing this inquiry 
[whether a prima facie case has been 
established], however, was never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, 
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in 
light of common experience as it bears on 
the critical question of discrimination. A 
prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas raises an inference of 
discrimination only because we presume 
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors. 
Furnco Construction Co/po v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 
98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). This court 
elaborated on the reasoning in Furnco in Gay v. Waiters' 
and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531 (9th 
Cir.1982), stating that the McDonnell Douglas test 
"presents the legal question whether the plaintiff has met 
his burden of production, coming forward with sufficient 
probative evidence to permit a rational jury or court to find 
the material facts in his favor, thus avoiding a directed 
verdict or motion for judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 
543, n. 10. 
The material facts are undisputed. Lowe filed her 
application with the City on January 19, 1982. She took 
and passed the written and oral examinations in May, 
1982. The results of the examinations and the ranking of 
the applicants were announced in June, 1982, and an 
eligibility list of successful applicants was certified to take 
effect on August I, 1982. Lowe ranked eleventh on that 
list, based on her grades on the examinations. 
Meanwhile on June 7, 1982, the City hired a male hispanic 
applicant from its lateral transfer list to fill a vacancy. No 
additional persons were hired until after February I, 1983, 
the date on which the list with Lowe's name expired. 
It is not disputed that the procedure followed in this case 
conformed to the City's established rules and practices. 
Every six months the City certifies a new list of eligible 
applicants for entry level positions ranked in order of 
grades. The list remains in effect for six months when a 
new list is certified. In addition the City maintains a lateral 
entry level eligibility list from which it also fills vacancies 
for lateral entry. 
These facts demonstrate that Lowe failed to establish a 
prima facie case for three reasons: 
(I) At the time when Razo was hired in June, Lowe was not 
yet eligible to be hired because her name did not appear on 
a then effective eligibility list; 
(2) During the period when she was eligible, there were no 
job openings; 
*]013 (3) Even if Lowe were treated as having been 
eligible in June, her position as the eleventh on the 
eligibility list precludes any inference that the failure to 
hire her "more likely than not [was] based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco, supra.2 
This case falls squarely within principles well-settled in 
this circuit. A plaintifffails to establish the second element 
of McDonnell Douglas if she does not show that she 
completed the application process for the position, Tagupa 
v. Board of Directors, 633 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.1980), and 
that she was a qualified applicant when the job opening 
existed. Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical 
Group, supra; Chavez v. Tempe U High Sch. Dist. No. 
213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.1977); Gay v. Waiter's and 
Dairy Lunchmen's Union, supra. A plaintiff fails to 
establish the third element by failing to show that she was 
barred from consideration for the position or that she was 
not considered when others of her qualifications were. 
White v. City orSan Diego, 605 F.ld 455 (9th Cir. 1979).3 
The majority sweeps all of this aside by holding that 
"Lowe 'applied' when she filed her application" and that 
"the City rejected Lowe on February I, 1983 [when the 
eligibility list expired]." (At 1006) To reach those 
conclusions, however, the majority has to disregard 
entirely the City's established rules and practices in 
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accordance with which it acted. Lowe challenged those 
rules and practices as having a disparate impact on Blacks. 
The court below granted summary judgment on that issue 
and the majority affirms. Thus we must accept those rules 
and practices as racially neutral.4 
Under those rules and practices, the City hired only 
persons whose names appeared on a then certified 
eligibility list and a person did not become eligible for hire 
until she had qualified and been placed according to her 
rank on a certified list. There is no evidence to support the 
majority's characterization of the City's practice as 
"delaying the effective dates of its eligibility lists." 
(Majority at 1006) What the evidence shows is that the 
City regularly prepares a new list every six months and 
maintains it in effect for six months. Before a new list is 
prepared it advertises for applicants who may then take the 
examinations to qualify for placement on the new list. 
There is no evidence that the City in preparing and 
certifying the August I, 1982, eligibility list acted other 
than in the ordinary course. 
Nor is there any evidence that in permitting the August I, 
1982, list to expire on February I, 1983, to be replaced by a 
new list, the City acted other than in accordance with its 
established rules and practices. 
"[I]t is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly 
situated employees were not treated equally." Texas Dept. 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra 450 U.S. at 258, 
101 S. Ct. at 1096. Who are similarly situated employees? 
Presumably it would be others who had applied but whose 
eligibility list had not yet gone into effect when a job was 
filled, or whose eligibility list had expired when ajob was 
filled. There is no evidence of any other person so situated, 
*1014 let alone that anyone in that position was treated 
differently. When the City made the decision to fill a 
position in June, it did not hire anyone who under its 
system was not eligible for consideration. During the 
period when Lowe was eligible, it did not hire anyone. 
When Lowe's list expired, it did not prevent her from 
reapplying for future consideration. 
The majority's concern, of course, is that the City'S system 
enables it to fill a vacancy with some one else if a minority 
applicant is coming up on the next eligibility list before 
that eligibility list goes into effect. It may be assumed that 
the City'S system, as the majority says, "permil[s} the 
manipulation of hiring dates and job openings." (At 1010 
n. 10, emphasis added). The trouble with that reasoning, 
however, is that a defendant cannot be held liable for a 
wrongful act without some evidence from which a trier of 
fact could find by a preponderance ofthe evidence not that 
he was capable of committing it but that he did commit it. 
Here there is not an iota of such evidence.s 
Inasmuch as there is no evidence of disparate treatment, 
the City'S Personnel Division Manager's alleged statement 
to Lowe that the City'S police force had no women and no 
Blacks and her encouraging Lowe to apply to the Los 
Angeles Police Department instead is irrelevant. Evidence 
of motive is insufficient to establish a prima facie case in 
the absence of evidence of disparate treatment. See Hagans 
v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Hagans v. Wall, 454 U.S. 859, 102 S.Ct. 313, 70 
L.Ed.2d 157 (1981); cf. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 
F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir.1983).6 Here there is none. 
It is appropriate to take note that the system of hiring off 
eligibility lists ranking applicants in order of their 
examination scores and having a limited life is common 
practice for public agencies. See, e.g. Cal.Gov't Code §§ 
18900 et seq., §§ 19050 el seq. Such a system promotes fair 
and open hiring based on qualifications; it offers early 
applicants a chance to qualify for job openings created 
after they have first applied while giving later applicants a 
chance to gain high ranking on a new list if their 
qualifications entitle them to it. So long as such a system is 
not shown to have a disparate impact, mere adherence to it 
does not afford a basis for finding disparate treatment. The 
majority's conclusion to the contrary raises the spectre ofa 
rule under which minority employees must be considered 
for employment whenever openings exist, regardless of 
whether they are eligible under the public agency's hiring 
procedures. Title VI I does not call for such preferential 
treatment. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
supra, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096. See also Atonia 
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 768 F.2d 1120, 1132 (9th 
Cir.1985) ("essential that employers remain free to set 
employment qualifications as they honestly saw fit, so long 
as those qualifications were not based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin."); and EEOC Uniform 
*1015 Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 
CFR § 1607.1 B (no restriction on "selection procedures 
where no adverse impact results") § 1607.11 (prohibition 
against disparate treatment does not preclude selection 
procedures in compliance with guidelines). 
Because the undisputed facts would not permit a rational 
jury or judge to find that Lowe was subjected to disparate 
treatment or that, as the eleventh on the list, she would 
have been hired but for the City'S discriminatory motive, I 
dissent from parts JII.c. and IV and would affirm the 
judgment below.7 
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Footnotes 
* Hon. William W. Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California. sitting by designation. 
We accept Lowe's version of her conversation with Logans because when we review an order granting summary judgment to the 
defendant we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356. 
1358 n. I (9th Cir.1985). 
2 In the section of her brief devoted to her disparate treatment claim, Lowe argues that the City is obligated to adhere to its affirmative 
action plan. She does not raise the affirmative action contentions as a separate claim on appeal. See infra note 7. 
3 Lowe's assertions of racial disparities in hiring are not supported by a proper statistical record. The only racial breakdown of 
applicants is for the year 1982. 
4 The dissent is based on the proposition that a plaintiff who claims intentional employment discrimination. and alleges that an 
established procedure under which she was denied employment permits discriminatory treatment in particular cases, may not 
challenge the discriminatory application of the procedure to her unless she can show that it has been applied with similar 
discriminatory results to an entire class of job applicants. We disagree. The availability of a discriminatory treatment claim is not 
dependent on the plaintiffs ability to prove a discriminatory impact claim. To the contrary. as long as a plaintiff can establish an 
individual case of intentional discrimination. there is no need to show that the employer has also discriminated against an entire class. 
5 We note that one of our recent cases, Hagans v. Clark. 752 F.2d 477 (9th Cir.1985), if read casually, could suggest that even a 
plaintiff who has satisfied the four-part McDonnell Douglas test may have failed to establish a prima facie case for purposes of some 
employment decisions. Of course, we did not intend in that case to establish a rule in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's 
statement of the law, as a more careful reading of the case makes clear. When we used the term "prima facie case" in Hagans. we 
were referring to the plaintitrs burden of putting on a case-in-chiefthat is sufficient to defeat a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and 
thus to require the defendant to put on its case in opposition. We were not referring to the rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff must 
establish, as the first step in a Title VII case, before the defendant must articulate a legitimate. nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employment decision. See Burdine. 450 U.S. at 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 7 (defining "prima facie case" for purposes of 
McDonnell Douglas test). In Hagans, as in Correa v. Nampa School District No. J 31, 645 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.1981), the plaintiff had 
already presented her case-in-chief at trial and the defendant had introduced evidence by way of cross-examination and depositions. 
See Hagans, 752 F.2d at 483. It was irrelevant at that stage of the proceedings whether the plaintiff had "met her initial fprimafacie 
case] burden under McDonnell Douglas, [since the defendant! presented sufficient evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions and 
cross-examination of [the plaintitrsj witnesses to establish a reasonable, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge .... " Correa, 
645 F.2c1 at 816; see also Un ired States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711. 103 S.Ct. 1478. 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (When 
evidence is presented to a fact-finder at trial, "the McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,' ... and 'the factual inquiry 
proceeds to a new level of specificity.' "); Kimbrough v. Secretary ofU.S. Air Force, 764 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1985) (same). 
6 Lowe also contends that the City's failure to comply with its voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan raises an inference of 
intentional discrimination. Both public and private employers may voluntarily adopt race-conscious affirmative action plans to 
eliminate traditional patterns of segregation and imbalances in the work force, and Congress may require such plans. See Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482,100 S.Ct. 2758, 2776-77, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193,207-09, 99 S.Ct. 2721. 2729-30, 61 L.EcI.2d 480 (1979); johnson v. Transport. Agency, 748 F.2d 1308. 1314 
(9th Cir.1984). We need not determine at this time whether a defendant's failure to follow an affirmative aetion plan, once voluntarily 
adopted, could by itself demonstrate discriminatory intent. In any particular case the significance of such a failure may depend on the 
circumstances, including the reasons why the defendants failed to comply with the plan. Any evidence that indicates that a defendant 
intentionally circumvented an affirmative action plan would, of course, be probative regarding the defendant's motives in making a 
given employment decision. 
7 The City also contends that even if it had filled the June 7, 1982 opening by hiring from the eligibility list that contained Lowe's 
name, Lowe would not have been offered the job. According to the City, Lowe was the eleventh candidate on the list. Lowe offered 
evidence purporting to show that she should have been second on the list. Lowe's proper place on the list does not matter. Whether 
Lowe was second or eleventh on the list, she would not have been the first person offered the position that was filled on June 7, 1982. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Lowe was not the first person on the list does not justify the City's failure to hire her. Regardless where 
Lowe ranked on the list, she eventually would have received ajob offer if the City did not treat lists as automatieally expiring after six 
months and did not occasionally hire laterally, practices that Lowe alleges the City engages in so that it can avoid hiring from its 
"Entry Level" list when Blacks and women qualify for inclusion. 
8 Lowe also claims that the City "holds over" non-Blacks from old "Entry Level" eligibility lists and hires them later. This assertion is 
without support in the record; it is made by way of a memorandum of law rather than by proferred facts . 
.... Next 
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39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ... 
9 Our dissenting colleague concludes that no discriminatory act could have occurred in this case because the original opening was 
filled before the plaintitTbecame eligible for employment under the applicable civil service rules and no other openings were created 
until after her eligibility expired. The point is, however, that the rules at issue permit the manipulation of hiring dates and job 
openings. They are not as mechanical as the dissent suggests. When the City receives an application from a minority recruit applicant 
it can fill existing vacancies from a separate lateral list and thus foreclose the existence of an opening at the time the minority member 
completes the eligibility requirements and the new eligibility list becomes effective. Similarly, it can allow a list with high-ranking 
minority members to expire before announcing the existence ofthe next set of openings. Whether the City acted with discriminatory 
intent in any particular case is a matter for determination by a factfinder. It is not correct to say, as our dissenting colleague does, that 
the mere existence ofa system of the nature of the City's precludes plaintiffs trom showing intentional discriminatory treatment. The 
existence of such a system may provide a basis for the City's articulation ofa nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, but it does not 
foreclose a plaintifffrom challenging the City's motivation for adopting or invoking the system, or applying it in a particular manner. 
Here, as we have explained supra. the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue offact as to whether the true motive for the City's actions 
was discriminatory. 
lOA plaintiff suing under section 1981 may prevail only by establishing intentional discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment. Proof of 
disparate impact is insufficient. Gay v. Waiters' and Daily Lunchmen 's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982); Craig v. County oj 
Los Angeles. 626 F.2d 659. 668 (9th Cir.1980). 
The majority confuses the framework of rules and practices within which the City acted with non-discriminatory reasons for an 
employment decision which may rebut a prima facie case. (pp. 1007-1008) See AlcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 
802,93 S.O. 1817. 1824.36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (after plaintiff has made a prima facie case, burden shifts to employer "to articulate 
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection") It does so by in effect shifting a part of plain tiffs burden 
to make a prima facie case-her qualification to be hired-onto defendant by making it a part of its rebuttal casco See Texas Dept. oj 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 254, 10 I S.O. 1089. 1094.67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); ,"flvforila V. Southern Cal. Permanente 
AIedical Group. 541 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir.1976). The error in this approach is discussed in what follows. 
2 At oral argument, moreover, counsel for the City represented that the City is obligated to hire from among the top three candidates on 
any list. 
Inasmuch as the only issue concerns the tilling of the vacancy in June 1982, it is not necessary to address the majority's point that 
if the lists did not automatically expire, the City would have had to hire Lowe eventually, no matter how low she ranked. (Majority 
at 1007 n. 7) 
3 The City contends that Lowe failed to satisfy both the second and third elements. See App'ee Br. 10-16. 
4 The majority rejects "Lowe's challenge to lateral hiring and the use of eligibility lists with delayed effective dates and automatic 
expiration times" because she "did not offer affidavits or documentary evidence sufficient to support her claim [of disparate 
impact]." (At 1005) It is difficult to follow the majority's logic under which these same practices. held to be neutral under the impact 
analysis, are held to raise an inference of disparate treatment. (At 1006) 
5 Thus the majority misconceives the basis of this dissent. Obviously, it is not that "[tJhe availability of a discriminatory treatment 
claim is ... dependent on the plaintiffs ability to prove a discriminatory impact claim." (At 1005 n. 5) Nor is it "that the mere 
existence of a system of the nature of the City'S precludes plaintiffs from showing intentional discriminatory treatment." (At 1010 n. 
10) Rather it is that a showing of nothing more than hiring in accordance with rulcs and practices found by the majority not to have 
been shown to have a discriminatory impact is insuflicient to prove a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment. 
6 The majority opinion correctly states that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment without satisfying the 
McDonnell Douglas test" (At 1007) but no case to this writer's knowledge has ever held that a plaintiff can do so without some proof 
of disparate treatment. See the cases cited by the majority (At 1007), Diaz v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 
(9th Cir.1985) (plaintiff not precluded trom suit merely because person of same protected class selected for challenged position); Gay 
V. Waiters and Dairy Lunchmen 's Union, supra. 694 F.2d at 550 (reliable generalized statistical data relevant and admissible at prima 
facie stage of disparate treatment case to determine whether employment decision was product of intentional discrimination.) 
7 In the light of the conclusion I reach, it is not necessary to address the majority's discussion of the individual defendants' qualified 
immunity. I do not understand, however, how "[a] reasonable person would have been aware that the practices Lowe complains of 
were unlawful" when this court itself has failed to find them so (At 10 II); that awareness surely cannot be attributed ex post facto on 
the strength of allegations of discriminatory intent subsequently made in litigation. 
Lowe v. of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1 
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Before ANDERSON AND CANBY, Circuit Judges and 
NIELSEN,' District Judge. 
Opinion 
ORDER 
The panel orders the following amendment to its opinion in 
this case, filed July 22, 1985: 
Replace the language at page 9, lines 16-18, which states: 
The proposed TRPA Regional Plan will 
require the installation of best management 
practices on all shorezone property. 
with the following: 
TRPA's goals include ultimately putting 
best management practices in place for all 
land in the Lake Tahoe region. 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
* The Honorable Leland C. Nielsen, United States District Judge for thc Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 
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Sydney Mae LOWRY, Individually, and 
Sydney Mae Lowry, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Steven 
Douglas Lowry, Deceased, Plaintiff-
Counterdefendant -Appellant-Cross 
Respondent, 
v. 
IRELAND BANK, an Idaho banking 
corporation, and R. Brad Bowen, 
Defendants-Counterplaintiffs-
Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
No. 17624. I Sept. 1, 1989. 
Widow brought action against bank seeking payment of 
credit life insurance proceeds and bank counterclaimed for 
payment on promissory note. The District Court, Sixth 
Judicial District, Bannock County, P. McDermott, 1., 
granted summary judgment in favor of the bank in the 
action for insurance proceeds and entered judgment in 
favor of the bank on its counterclaim for payment on the 
promissory note. Widow and bank appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Burnett, J., held that: (I) fact issues existed 
precluding summary judgment on widow's insurance 
claim; (2) widow could not raise lack of acknowledgement 
of her signature on deed of trust as defense to bank's 
counterclaim to collect on note; (3) bank was entitled to 
recover on promissory note without filing claim against 
husband's estate; and (4) where deed of trust that had been 
signed by widow and her husband authorized husband to 
obtain a further loan secured by the encumbered property, 
widow consented to additional loan made at her husband's 
request and such loan commensurately increased the 
encumbrance of the community property, despite the fact 
that widow signed no document increasing the loan, and, 
therefore, bank was entitled to collect the additional loan 
by foreclosure of the deed of trust. 
Summary judgment vacated, judgment on counterclaim 
vacated in part, and case remanded. 
West Headnotes (II) 
111 Appeal and Error 
.;"",Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
[2J 
[31 
141 
[5J 
In reviewing summary judgment, Court of 
Appeals determines whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact and, if not, 
whether prevailing party below was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
c" ... Judgment 
In reviewing summary judgment, Court of 
Appeals views the narrative facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
Witnesses 
.. =Actions and Proceedings in Which Testimony 
Is Excluded 
Dead man's statute did not apply to evidence 
used to defend against claim. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 601(b). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
J""Weight and Sufficiency 
Determination of credibility should not be made 
on summary judgment if credibility can be tested 
in court before trier of fact. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
~ ••• Banks, Cases Involving 
In suit against bank alleging negligence in failing 
Lowry v. !reland Bank, 116 Idaho 70S (1 
779 P.2d 22 
to obtain credit life policy, fact issues existed 
precluding summary judgment as to whether 
bank manager's conduct was negligent and as to 
whether such negligence was superseded or 
outweighed by negligence on borrower's part. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
16) Husband and Wife 
0~~Estoppel to Assert Invalidity 
Wife could not raise lack of acknowledgement of 
her signature on deed of trust as defense to suit by 
bank to collect on note, where wife's conduct at 
the time the loan was made was consistent with 
the existence of a valid encumbrance, in that she 
and her husband accepted the loan proceeds and 
she admitted she signed the deed of trust. I.e. § 
32-912. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
171 Alteration of Instruments 
<"ccAdmissibility of Instrument in Evidence 
IS) 
Promissory note executed by husband and wife 
was admissible in evidence despite fact that it 
was altered to increase amount, where alteration 
was made with husband's participation and 
obvious consent. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Executors and Administrators 
'0c~Claims Which Must Be Presented 
Bank was entitled to recover on promissory note 
executed by husband and wife, without filing 
claim against husband's estate, where trust deed, 
which is a form of lien, was involved. I.e. §§ 9-
601,15-3-803. 
[91 Bills and Notes 
•. =Parties Plaintiff 
Bank which took over bank that made loan, 
assuming all of its assets, accounts, and 
liabilities, was real party in interest entitled to 
recover on promissory note. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 17(a). 
[10) Husband and Wife 
v=Mortgage by Husband and Wife 
General rule that community real property can be 
validly encumbered only if both spouses join in 
executing the instrument of encumbrance is 
subject to an exception if one spouse is 
authorized to act as an agent for the management 
and disposition of community real property. I.e. 
§ 32-912. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1111 Husband and Wife 
.:;=Estoppel to Assert Invalidity 
Where deed of trust signed by husband and wife 
authorized husband to obtain further loan secured 
by encumbered property, wife consented to 
additional loan made at her husband's request 
and the loan commensurately increased the 
encumbrance of community property, despite 
fact that wife signed no document increasing the 
loan; bank was entitled to collect the additional 
loan by foreclosure ofthe deed oftrust. I.e. § 32-
912. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**23 *709 A. Bruce Larson, Soda Springs, for appellant. 
Guy R. Price, argued, and Archie W. Service, Green, 
Service, Gasser & Kerl, Pocatello, for respondent. 
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Opinion 
BURNETT, Judge. 
This appeal presents issues relating to a bank loan, credit 
life insurance and an encumbrance of community real 
property. Sydney Mae Lowry, a widow, brought this action 
against Ireland Bank, seeking payment of credit life 
insurance proceeds allegedly due upon her husband's 
death. The Bank counterclaimed, demanding payment 
**24 *710 on a promissory note she and her husband had 
signed. The district court entered summary judgment 
dismissing Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim, but the court 
held a bench trial on the bank's claim to recover on the 
note. Following that trial, the court entered a judgment for 
the bank, but for less than the amount sought. Both parties 
appealed. For reasons explained below we vacate the 
judgments and remand the case for further proceedings. 
The background facts are as follows. Mrs. Lowry and her 
husband borrowed money to build an auto body repair 
shop on a parcel of land which they owned as community 
property. The loan was evidenced by a $20,000 revolving 
credit note in favor of Downey State Bank, a predecessor 
ofIreland Bank. The note was secured by a deed of trust on 
the shop property. The documents were prepared by the 
bank and signed by the Lowrys. The bank manager 
notarized the documents even though Mrs. Lowry's 
signature and acknowledgement did not occur in his 
presence. Later, Mr. Lowry amended the note by 
interlineation, increasing the loan to $25,600. The bank 
disbursed the additional $5,600 to the Lowrys' joint 
account. Mrs. Lowry did not initial the amendment of the 
note. 
Approximately six months after the original note was 
signed, Mr. Lowry asked the bank to add credit life 
insurance to the note. The bank manager agreed, and he put 
a statement on the promissory note that Mr. Lowry had 
requested life insurance. The note was then submitted to 
the bank's insurance carrier. A few days later, the 
insurance carrier informed the bank that credit life 
insurance could not be added to an existing note. 
What happened next is in dispute. The bank manager stated 
in a deposition that he called Mr. Lowry and told him about 
the insurance problem. The bank manager also stated that 
he offered to execute new loan documents if Mr. Lowry 
still wanted the insurance. If this conversation took place, 
it occurred at least three weeks after the insurance carrier 
had informed the bank it could not insure an existing note. 
Shortly after the alleged conversation, Mr. Lowry was 
killed in an airplane crash. The bank's files subsequently 
were found to contain new loan documents apparently 
awaiting signatures. 
In her suit against the bank, Mrs. Lowry cast the insurance 
question as one of negligence. She alleged that the bank's 
manager negligently had failed to obtain the credit life 
insurance in a timely fashion. She demanded $25,600 in 
damages. As mentioned above, the bank counterclaimed 
on the amended note and sought foreclosure of the deed of 
trust. The district court dismissed Mrs. Lowry's claim and 
sustained the bank's claim, but limited the bank's recovery 
to the original $20,000 obligation. 
On appeal, Mrs. Lowry has argued that dismissal of her 
claim by summary judgment was improper because there 
was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the bank 
manager's alleged negligence. She further contends that 
the note cannot be collected by foreclosure on the deed of 
trust, in any amount, because (a) the deed of trust is void 
for lack of proper acknowledgement of her signature; (b) 
the note has been materially altered and, therefore, should 
not have been admitted into evidence; (c) the bank did not 
timely file a claim in probate against her husband's estate; 
and (d) Ireland Bank, as successor to Downey State Bank, 
is not the real party in interest. In its cross appeal, Ireland 
Bank argues that it should be entitled to collect the full 
amount of the amended note, $25,600, from the 
encumbered real property. 
III 121 We first address Mrs. Lowry's contention that 
summary judgment should not have been entered against 
her insurance claim. In our review of a summary judgment, 
we determine whether there are any genuine issues of 
material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party 
below was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In reaching our decision, we view the 
narrative facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Boise Car and Truck Rental Co. v. **25 
*711 Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818 (1985). 
131 Here, the district court held there was no genuine issue 
of material fact as to the bank's negligence because the 
bank manager said he had telephoned Mr. Lowry and had 
told him that new loan documents were required for the 
credit life insurance.l The district court concluded that this 
statement disproved any negligence by the bank because 
the conversation put Mr. Lowry on notice of the need to 
sign new documents. The court further concluded that Mr. 
Lowry was contributorily negligent in failing to sign the 
documents promptly. 
lowry v.lre!and Bank, 116 Idaho 708 (1989) 
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14] As noted, there is a dispute as to whether the bank 
manager actually did so notity Mr. Lowry. Mrs. Lowry 
suggests he did not. The only person who could confirm or 
directly controvert the bank manager's story is dead. The 
record contains a telephone bill showing the existence of a 
call from the bank to the Lowrys' telephone number. 
However, the bank concedes that the call occurred some 
three weeks after the insurance carrier informed the bank 
of its refusal to issue the credit life insurance. Moreover, 
the bank manager admitted falsely notarizing Mrs. 
Lowry's signature on the deed of trust. Taken together, 
these facts frame an issue of the bank manager's 
credibility. A determination of credibility should not be 
made on summary judgment if credibility can be tested in 
court before the trier of fact. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 
668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984). 
IS] Moreover, even if Mr. Lowry was told during the 
telephone call of the need to sign new documents, this 
would not necessarily establish that the bank manager had 
acted in a timely fashion or that Mr. Lowry was 
contributorily negligent. If the bank manager did notity 
Mr. Lowry, he evidently waited several weeks before 
doing so. Mr. Lowry died a few days after the alleged 
notification. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Mrs. Lowry, a jury could find that the bank manager's 
conduct was negligent. In addition, the jury could find that 
such negligence was not superseded or comparatively 
outweighed by any negligence on Mr. Lowry's part. 
Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment against 
Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim was improper. 
II 
We turn now to Mrs. Lowry's challenge to the judgment 
allowing the bank to collect the original $20,000 note by 
foreclosing against the shop property. She raises several 
issues, which we will address in turn. 
A 
Mrs. Lowry's first contention is that the deed of trust is 
void because her signature was not acknowledged as 
required by I.e. § 32-912. This statute provides that in 
order to conveyor to encumber community realty, both 
spouses must sign and acknowledge the instrument of 
conveyance or encumbrance. However, the statute does not 
create an inexorable rule. In Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 
50,480 P.2d 896 (1971), our Supreme Court held that a 
party can waive the protective requirements of I.e. § 32-
912. The Court stated that even if an instrument lacks an 
acknowledgment of a spouse's signature, the spouse will 
be deemed to have waived the defect ifhis or her conduct is 
consistent with the existence and validity of the 
instrument. Jd. at 54, 480 P.2d at 900. 
16] Here, the Lowrys treated the deed of trust as valid, and 
they accepted the loan proceeds from the bank. Mrs. 
Lowry later admitted that she had signed the deed of trust. 
Consequently, we hold that her conduct was consistent 
with the existence ofa valid encumbrance. She cannot now 
raise the lack of acknow ledgment as a defense. 
**26 *712 B 
We turn next to Mrs. Lowry's contention that the amended 
promissory note is an altered document that should not 
have been admitted into evidence. Idaho Code § 9-60 I 
provides that an altered document may be admitted if the 
alteration is not "material to the question in dispute." It 
also provides that an altered document can be used as 
evidence if the alteration was made with the consent of the 
affected parties. The parties have not contended that the 
statute is inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Evidence; 
accordingly, we will assume that it is effective and 
pertinent to the issue here. See I.R.E. 1102. 
17] It is undisputed that $20,000 was loaned to Mr. and 
Mrs. Lowry. Mrs. Lowry admits signing the note for that 
amount. Consequently, the document could be used to 
prove the $20,000 obligation. Moreover, Mrs. Lowry 
conceded in her complaint that her husband had borrowed 
the additional $5,600. She later verified that the initials on 
the note, appearing next to the amendment, were in Mr. 
Lowry'S handwriting. As we will explain later, the bank 
has not contended that Mrs. Lowry is individually liable 
for the $5,600. Rather, it has contended that Mr. Lowry 
incurred the obligation and that it may be collected from 
the couple's community real property described in the deed 
of trust. Because the alteration of the note was made with 
Mr. Lowry's participation and obvious consent, we hold 
that the amended note was admissible as to the particular 
claim presented in this case. 
c 
181 Mrs. Lowry further contends that the bank cannot 
recover on the note because it did not file a timely claim 
against her husband's estate under I.e. § 15-3-803. The 
bank filed no claim in probate against Mr. Lowry's estate; 
rather, it made a demand through its counterclaim in Mrs. 
Lowry's action, naming the estate as an additional 
counterdefendant. Neverthel.~ss,.IY,1£~.:~0':VrX:~Eeliance 
Lowry v. lreiand 8ank, 116 Idaho 70S (1989) 
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upon I.c. § 15-3-803 is misguided. The statute itself 
contains an exception regarding proceedings to enforce a 
mortgage or other lien upon estate property. See I.c. § 15-
3-803( c). Because this case involves a trust deed, which is 
a form of lien, the bank was not required to comply with 
the requirements elsewhere contained in the statute. 
Therefore, the statute is inapplicable to this case. 
o 
19) Finally, Mrs. Lowry argues that Downey State Bank, 
not Ireland Bank, is the real party in interest. She invites 
attention to Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P., which requires every 
action to be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest." In this case, Downey State Bank made the loans. 
Mrs. Lowry filed her complaint against Downey State 
Bank. However, as noted by the district court, Ireland Bank 
subsequently took over Downey State Bank, assuming all 
of the bank's assets, accounts and liabilities. We deem it 
clear that Ireland Bank thereby became the real party in 
interest for this action, within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 
17(a). See Caughey v. George Jensen & Sons, 74 Idaho 
132,258 P.2d 357 (1953) (real party in interest is one who 
has substantial interest in the subject matter and whose 
satisfaction ofajudgment will bar fUliher suit on the same 
matter). We see no error in treating Ireland Bank as the 
proper party in this case. 
III 
We now arrive at Ireland Bank's cross-appeal. The bank 
contends that the district court erred in its determination 
that the community real estate-i.e., the shop property 
described in the deed of trust-was encumbered only for 
the amount of the original note, $20,000. The bank argues 
that the additional $5,600 loan also was secured by the 
deed of trust. Mrs. Lowry counters that because she signed 
no document increasing the loan, the property is not a 
source of repayment beyond the original $20,000 
obligation. 
Of course, the bank does not assert that Mrs. LOWry is an 
individual obligor on the **27 *713 $5,600 loan.2 The 
mere fact that her husband borrowed the money would not 
impose personal liability upon her as a spouse. Idaho's 
community property laws do not displace fundamental 
principles governing individual liability for a debt. Rather, 
they simply affect the property to which creditors may look 
for satisfaction of the debt. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Holley, III Idaho 349, 723 P.2d 893 (1986). Here, the 
bank argues that the shop property is a source of payment 
for the $5,600 debt because it was community property 
when the debt was incurred and has been encumbered by 
the deed of trust. 
110) We have noted that community real property can be 
validly encumbered only if both spouses join in executing 
the instrument of encumbrance. I.c. § 32-912. The statute 
evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real 
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in 
writing to incur the debt. Thus, the statute usually requires 
two signatures. However, an exception to this general rule 
exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the 
management and disposition of community real property. 
Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,367,421 
P.2d 444, 447 (1966). Our Supreme Court has held that 
such an agency may be created by an express power of 
attorney, as authorized by I.c. § 32-912, or may be 
inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties. 
Noble, 91 Idaho at 368,421 P.2d at 448. 
Ill) In this case, the deed of trust recited that it was 
executed for the following purposes: 
[S]ecuring payment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by a promissory note, of even 
date herewith, executed by Grantor in the 
sum of Twenty Thousand and noll OOths 
dollars ($20,000.00), final payment due 
8/ I 0/89, and to secure payment of all 
such further sums as may hereafter be 
loaned or advanced by the beneficiary 
herein to the Grantor herein, or any or 
either of them, while record owner of 
present interest, for any purpose, and of 
any notes, drafts or other instruments 
representing such further loans, advances 
or expenditures together with interest on 
all such sums at the rate therein provided. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Both spouses signed this instrument. It clearly authorized 
Mr. Lowry to obtain a further loan secured by the 
encumbered property. Nevertheless, the district court held 
that the property was not encumbered by the additional 
loan because Mrs. Lowry did not sign or initial the 
amendment to the promissory note. In so holding, the court 
focused too narrowly on whether Mrs. Lowry participated 
directly in obtaining the additional loan. The dispositive 
question is whether she consented to the additional loan, 
and to the commensurately increased encumbrance of the 
property, by agreeing that the bank could make such a loan 
at her husband's request. We hold that she did. Therefore, 
we must set aside the district court's determination that the 
bank was not entitled to collect the additional loan by 
foreclosure of the deed of trust. 
V. ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708 (1989) 
779 P.2d 22 
In conclusion, we vacate the summary judgment 
dismissing Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim. We also vacate 
that part of the subsequent judgment limiting the bank's 
recovery to the original note obligation. We remand the 
case for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Because the credit life insurance claim and the promissory 
note obligation are interrelated and potentially offsetting, 
and because this appeal has produced a mixed result, we 
decline to specify a prevailing party on appeal. 
Accordingly, we award no costs or attorney fees. 
Footnotes 
SWANSTROM, J., and HART, 1. Pro Tern., concur. 
Parallel Citations 
779 P.2d 22 
We note. incidentally, that Mrs. Lowry contends the "dead man's" statute, see I.R.E. 601(b), bars evidence concerning a telephone 
conversation between Mr. Lowry and the bank manager. We disagree. The statute does not apply to evidence used to defend against 
a claim. Because the evidence at issue here was used to defeat Mrs. Lowry's claim, I.R.E. 601(b) is inapposite. 
2 Presumably because Mrs. Lowry has no individual liability for the $5,600 loan, the bank has conceded in oral argument that it can 
make no claim against any of her separate property. Neither does the bank appear to claim an encumbrance upon any real estate other 
than the shop property. 
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Opinion 
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
The case before us raises significant questions as to the 
proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title 
*794 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 
U.S.c. s 2000e et seq. 
Petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp., is an aerospace and 
aircraft manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, 
where it employs over 30,000 people. Respondent, a black 
citizen of St. Louis, worked for petitioner as a mechanic 
and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28, 
19641 when he was laid off in the course of a general 
reduction in petitioner's work force. 
Respondent, a long-time activist in the civil rights 
movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the 
general hiring practices of petitioner were racially 
motivated.2 As part of this protest, respondent and other 
members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally 
stalled their cars on the main roads leading to petitioner's 
plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at the time of 
the morning shift change. The District Judge described the 
plan for, and respondent's participation in, the 'stall-in' as 
follows: 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) 
93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
'(F)ive teams, each consisting of four cars would 'tie up' 
five main access roads into McDonnell at the time of the 
morning rush hour. The drivers of the cars were instructed 
to line up next to each other completely blocking the 
intersections or roads. The drivers were also instructed to 
stop their cars, tum off the engines, pull the emergency 
brake, raise all windows, lock the doors, and remain in 
their cars until the police arrived. The plan was to have the 
cars remain in position for one hour. 
*795 'Acting under the 'stall in' plan, plaintiff (respondent 
in the present action) drove his car onto Brown Road, a 
McDonnell access road, at approximately 7:00 a.m., at the 
start of the morning rush hour. Plaintiff was aware of the 
traffic problems that would result. He stopped his car with 
the intent to block traffic. The police **1821 arrived 
shOlily and requested plaintiff to move his car. He refused 
to move his car voluntarily. Plaintiff's car was towed away 
by the police, and he was arrested for obstructing traffic. 
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic 
and was fined.' 318 F.Supp. 846. 
On July 2, 1965, a 'lock-in' took place wherein a chain and 
padlock were placed on the front door of a building to 
prevent the occupants, certain of petitioner's employees, 
from leaving. Though respondent apparently knew 
beforehand of the 'lock-in,' the full extent of his 
involvement remains uncertain.3 
*796 Some three weeks following the 'lock-in,' on July 25, 
1965, petItIOner publicly advertised for qualified 
mechanics, respondent's trade, and respondent promptly 
applied for re-employment. Petitioner turned down 
respondent, basing its rejection on respondent's 
PaJilclpation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in.' Shortly 
thereafter, respondent filed a formal complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming 
that petitioner had refused to rehire him because of his race 
and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement, in 
violation ofss 703(a)(I) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.c. ss 2000e-2(a)(I) and 2000e-3(a).4 The 
former section generally prohibits racial discrimination in 
any employment decision while the latter forbids 
discrimination against applicants or employees for 
attempting to protest or correct allegedly discriminatory 
conditions of employment. 
*797 The Commission made no finding on respondent's 
allegation of racial bias under s 703(a)(I), but it did find 
reasonable cause to believe petitioner had violated s 704(a) 
by refusing to rehire respondent because of his civil rights 
activity. After the Commission unsuccess-fully attempted 
to conciliate the dispute, it advised respondent in March 
1968, of his right to institute a civil action in federal court 
within 30 days. 
On April 15, 1968, respondent brought the present action, 
claiming initially a violation of s 704(a) and, in an 
amended **1822 complaint, a violation of s 703(a)(I) as 
wel!.s The District Court, 299 F.Supp. 1100, dismissed the 
latter claim of racial discrimination in petitioner's hiring 
procedures on the ground that the Commission had failed 
to make a determination ofreasonable cause to believe that 
a violation of that section had been committed. The District 
Court also found that petitioner's refusal to rehire 
respondent was based solely on his participation in the 
illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights 
activities. The court concluded that nothing in Title VI I or 
s 704 protected 'such activity as employed by the plaintiff 
in the 'stall in' and 'lock in' demonstrations.' 318 F.Supp., 
at 850. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful 
protests were not protected activities under s 704(a),6 but 
reversed the dismissal of respondent's s 703(a)( I) claim 
relating to racially discriminatory hiring practices, holding 
that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause 
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim 
under that section in federal court. The court *798 ordered 
the case remanded for trial of respondent's claim under s 
703(a)(I). 
In remanding, the Court of Appeals attempted to set forth 
standards to govern the consideration of respondent's 
claim. The majority noted that respondent had established 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that petitioner's 
refusal to rehire respondent rested on 'subjective' criteria 
which carried little weight in rebutting charges of 
discrimination; that, though respondent's participation in 
the unlawful demonstrations might indicate a lack of a 
responsible attitude toward performing work for that 
employer, respondent should be given the opportunity to 
demonstrate that petitioner's reasons for refusing to rehire 
him were mere pretexu In order to clarify the standards 
governing the disposition of an action challenging 
employment discrimination, we granted certiorari, 409 
U.S. 1036,93 S.Ct. 522,34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972). 
11)12) We agree with the Court of Appeals that absence of 
a Commission finding of reasonable cause cannot bar suit 
under an appropriate section of Title VII and that the 
District Judge erred in dismissing respondent's claim of 
racial discrimination under s 703(a)( 1). Respondent 
satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action 
(i) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination 
with the Commission and (ii) by receiving and acting upon 
the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue, 42 
McDonnell V. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1 
93 S.C!. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas.(BNA) 965,5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
U.S.c. ss 2000e-5(a) and 2000e-5(e). The Act does not 
restrict a complainant's right to sue to those charges as to 
which the Commission has made findings of reasonable 
cause, and we will not engraft on the statute a requirement 
which may inhibit the review of *799 claims of 
employment discrimination in the federal courts. The 
Commission itself does not consider the absence of a 
'reasonable cause' determination as providing employer 
immunity from similar charges in a federal court, 29 CFR s 
1601.30, and the courts of appeal have held that, in view of 
the large volume of complaints before the Commission and 
the nonadversary character of many of its proceedings, 
'court actions under Title VII are de novo proceedings 
**1823 and ... a Commission 'no reasonable cause' 
finding does not bar a lawsuit in the case.' Robinson v. 
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (CA4 1971); Beverly v. 
Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (CA,5 
1971); Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers International Union of 
North America, 431 F.2d 205 (CA 7 1970); Fekete v. 
United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (CA 3 1970). 
13] Petitioner argues, as it did below, that respondent 
sustained no prejudice from the trial court's erroneous 
ruling because in fact the issue of racial discrimination in 
the refusal to re-employ 'was tried thoroughly' in a trial 
lasting four days with 'at least 80%' of the questions 
relating to the issue of 'race.'8 Petitioner, therefore, 
requests that the judgment below be vacated and the cause 
remanded with instructions that the judgment of the 
District Court be affirmed.9 We cannot agree that the 
dismissal of respondent's s 703(a)(I) claim was harmless 
error. It is not clear that the District Court's findings as to 
respondent's s 704(a) contentions involved the identical 
issues raised by his claim under s 703(a)(I). The former 
section relates solely to discrimination against an applicant 
or employee on account of his participation in legitimate 
civil rights activities or protests, while the latter section 
deals with the broader and centrally *800 important 
question under the Act of whether for any reason, a racially 
discriminatory employment decision has been made. 
Moreover, respondent should have been accorded the right 
to prepare his case and plan the strategy of trial with the 
knowledge that the s 703(a)(I) cause of action was 
properly before the District Court. I 0 Accordingly, we 
remand the case for trial of respondent's claim of racial 
discrimination consistent with the views set forth below. 
II 
The critical issue before us concerns the order and 
allocation of proof in a private, non-class action 
challenging employment discrimination. The language of 
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure 
equality of employment opportUl1ltles and to eliminate 
those discriminatory practices and devices which have 
fostered racially stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens. Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 40 I U.S. 424,429,91 S.Ct. 849, 852,28 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1971); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CA 1 1972); 
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2 
1972); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (ED 
Va.1968). As noted in Griggs, supra: 
'Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to 
guarantee a job to every person regardless of 
qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any 
person be hired simply because he was formerly the 
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a 
minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, 
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress 
has proscribed. *801 What is required by Congress is the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.' Id., 40 I U.S., at 430-431,91 S.Ct., at 853. 
141 There are societal as well as personal interests on both 
sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest, 
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient 
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and 
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. In 
the implementation of **1824 such decisions, it is 
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial 
discrimination, subtle or otherwise. 
In this case respondent, the complainant below, charges 
that he was denied employment 'because of his 
involvement in civil rights activities' and 'because of his 
race and color.' II Petitioner denied discrimination of any 
kind, asserting that its failure to re-employ respondent was 
based upon and justified by his participation in the 
unlawful conduct against it. Thus, the issue at the trial on 
remand is framed by those opposing factual contentions. 
The two opinions of the Court of Appeals and the several 
opinions of the three judges of that court attempted, with a 
notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules as to 
burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a 
prima facie case.12 We now address this problem. 
*802151161 The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry 
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by 
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he 
applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer 
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, 
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications.13 In the instant case, we agree with the 
McDonnell Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965,5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
Court of Appeals that respondent proved a prima facie 
case. 463 F.2d 337, 353. Petitioner sought mechanics, 
respondent's trade, and continued to do so after 
respondent's rejection. Petitioner, moreover, does not 
dispute respondent's qualifications14 and acknowledges 
that his past work perfonnance in petitioner's employ was 
'satisfactory.' 15 
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant 
case to detail every matter which fairly could be *803 
recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire. Here 
petitioner has assigned respondent's participation in 
unlawful conduct against it as the cause for his rejection. 
We think that this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden 
of proof at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie 
case of discrimination. 
171 The Court of Appeals intimated, however, that 
petitioner's stated reason for refusing to rehire respondent 
was a 'subjective' rather than objective criterion which 
'carr[ies] little weight in rebutting charges of 
discrimination,' 463 F.2d, at 343. This was among the 
statements which caused the dissenting judge **1825 to 
read the opinion as taking 'the position that such unlawful 
acts as Green committed against McDonnell would not 
legally entitle McDonnell to refuse to hire him, even 
though no racial motivation was involved ... .' Id., at 355. 
Regardless of whether this was the intended import of the 
opinion, we think the court below seriously underestimated 
the rebuttal weight to which petitioner's reasons were 
entitled. Respondent admittedly had taken part in a 
carefully planned 'stall-in,' designed to tie up access to and 
egress from petitioner's plant at a peak traffic hour.16 
Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and 
rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful 
activity against itJ 7 In upholding, under the National 
Labor Relations Act, the discharge of employees who had 
seized and forcibly retained *804 an employer's factory 
buildings in an illegal sit-down strike, the Court noted 
pertinently: 
'We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to 
compel employers to retain persons in their employ 
regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to invest those who 
go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of 
trespass or violence against the employer's property ... 
Apart from the question of the constitutional validity of an 
enactment of that sort, it is enough to say that such a 
legislative intention should be found in some definite and 
unmistakable expression.' NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 
U.S. 240,255, 59 S.Ct. 490, 496, 83 L.Ed. 627 (1939). 
[81 Petitioner's reason for rejection thus suffices to meet 
the prima facie case, but the inquiry must not end here. 
While Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of 
respondent, neither does it penn it petitioner to use 
respondent's conduct as a pretext for the sort of 
discrimination prohibited by s 703(a)(I). On remand, 
respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be 
afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner'S stated 
reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext. 
Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence 
that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of 
comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless 
retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to 
rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts 
against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to 
members of all races. 
Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of 
pretext includes facts as to the petitioner's treatment of 
respondent during his prior tenn of employment; 
petitioner's reaction, ifany, to respondent's legitimate civil 
rights activities; and petitioner's general policy and *805 
practice with respect to minority employmentl 8 On the 
latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment policy 
and practice may be helpful to a detennination of whether 
petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this case 
confonned to a general pattern of discrimination against 
blacks. **1826 Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 
F.2d 245 (CA 10 1970); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich.L.Rev. 59, 91-94 
(1972).19 In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a 
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent 
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his 
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially 
discriminatory decision. 
19] The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., supra, in which the Court stated: 'If an 
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes 
cannot *806 be shown to be related to job perfonnance, the 
practice is prohibited.' 40 I U.S., at 431, 91 S.Ct., at 853, 
28 L.Ed.2d 158.20 But Griggs differs from the instant case 
in important respects. It dealt with standardized testing 
devices which, however neutral on their face, operated to 
exclude many blacks who were capable of performing 
effectively in the desired positions. Griggs was rightly 
concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and 
background of minority citizens, resulting from forces 
beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative 
and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of 
their lives. Id., at 430, 91 S.Ct., at 853. Respondent, 
however, appears in different clothing. He had engaged in 
a seriously disruptive act against the very one from whom 
he now seeks employment. And petitioner does not seek 
his exclusion on the basis of a testing device which 
overstates what is necessary for competent perfonnance, or 
w , ",",m , 
McDonnell Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1 
93 S.C!. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965,5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
through some sweeping disqualification of all those with 
any past record of unlawful behavior, however remote, 
insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal 
qualifications as an employee. Petitioner assertedly 
rejected respondent for unlawful conduct against it and, in 
the absence of proof of pretext or discriminatory 
application of such a reason, this cannot be thought the 
kind of 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment' which the Court found to be the intention of 
Congress to remove. Id., at431, 91 S.Ct., at 853.21 
*807 III 
In sum, respondent should have been allowed to pursue his 
claim under s 703(a) (I). I f the evidence on retrial is 
substantially in accord with that before us in this case, we 
think that respondent carried his burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination and that petitioner 
successfully rebutted that case. But this does not end the 
matter. On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair 
Footnotes 
opportunity to demonstrate **1827 that petitioner's 
assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or 
discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so 
finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy. In 
the absence of such a finding, petitioner's refusal to rehire 
must stand. 
The cause is hereby remanded to the District Court for 
reconsideration in accordance with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Remanded. 
Parallel Citations 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. P 8607,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of 
the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co .. 200 U.S. 321. 337,26 S.C!. 282. 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. 
His employment during these years was continuous except for 2 I months of servicc in the military. 
2 The Court of Appeals noted that respondent then 'filcd formal complaints of discrimination with the President's Commission on 
Civil Rights, the Justice Department, the Department of the Navy. the Defcnse Department, and the Missouri Commission on Human 
Rights.' 463 F.2d 337 (8 Cir., 1972). 
3 The 'lock-in' occurred during a picketing demonstration by ACTION, a civil rights organization. at the entrance to a downtown 
office building which housed a part of petitioner's ot1ices and in which certain of petitioner's employees were working at the time. A 
ehain and padlock werc placed on the front door of the building to prevent ingress and egress. Although respondent acknowledges 
that he was chairman of ACTION at the time, that the demonstration was planncd and stagcd by his group. that he participated in and 
indeed was in charge of the picket line in front of the building, that he was told in advance by a member of ACTION 'that he was 
planning to chain the front door,' and that he 'approved of chaining the door. there is no evidence that respondent personally took 
part in the actual' lock-in.' and he was not arrested. App. 132-133. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, found that the record did 'not support the trial court's conclusion that Green 'actively 
cooperated' in chaining the doors of the downtown St. Louis building during the 'lock-in' demonstration.' 463 F.2d, at 341. See also 
concurring opinion of Judge Lay. Id., at 344. Judge Johnsen, in dissent, agreed with the District Court that the 'chaining and 
padlocking (were) carried out as planned, (and that) Green had in fact given it ... approval and authorization.' Id., at 348. 
In view of respondent's admitted participation in the unlawful 'stall-in.' we find it unnecessary to resolve the contradictory 
contentions surrounding this 'lock-in.' 
4 Section 703(a)( I) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. s 2000e-2(a) (I). in pertinent part provides: 
'It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fbil or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual. or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation. terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. because of 
such individual's race. color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .' 
Scction 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.s.c. s 2000e-3(a). in pcrtinent part provides: 
'It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter .... ' 
5 Respondent also contested the legality of his 1964 discharge by petitioner, but both courts held this claim barred by the statute of 
limitations. Respondent does not challenge those rulings here. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
6 Respondent has not sought review ofthis issue. 
7 All references are to Part V of the revised opinion of the Court of Appeals, 463 F.2d. at 352. which superseded Part V of the eourt's 
initial opinion with respect to the order and nature of proof. 463 F.2d 337. 
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. 
9 Brief for Petitioner 40. 
10 The trial court did not diseuss respondent's s 703(a)( 1) claim in its opinion and denied requests for diseovery of statistical materials 
which may have been relevant to that elaim. 
11 The respondent initially charged petitioner in his complaint filed April IS, 1968, with discrimination beeause of his 'involvement in 
civil rights aetivities.' App. 7, 8. In his amended complaint, filed Mareh 20, 1969. plaintitlbroadened his eharge to inelude denial of 
employment beeause ofraee in violation ofs 703(a)(l). App. 27. 
12 See original opinion of the majority of the panel whieh heard the ease. 463 F.2d. at 338; the eoncurring opinion ofJudge Lay, id., at 
344; the first opinion of Judge Johnsen, dissenting in part, id., at 346; the revised opinion of the majority, id .. at 352; and the 
supplemental dissent of Judge Johnsen, id .. at 353. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by an evenly divided Court of 
Appeals. 
13 The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the speeification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not 
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. 
14 We note that the issue of what may properly be used to test qualifications for employment is not present in this case. Where 
employers have instituted employment tests and qualifieations with an exclusionary effect on minority applieants, sueh requirements 
must be 'shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to sueeessful performance of the jobs' for whieh they were used, Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424. 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CAl 1972); Chance v. 
Board of Examiners. 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2 1972). 
15 Tr. of Oral Arg. 3; 463 F.2d, at 353. 
16 The trial judge noted that no personal injury or property damage resulted from the 'stall-in' due 'solely to the fact that law 
enforcement of1ieials had obtained notice in advance ofplaintitrs (here respondent's) demonstration and were at the seene to remove 
plaintiff s ear from the highway.' 318 F.Supp. 846. 851. 
17 The unlawful activity in this case was directed specifically against petitioner. We need not eon sider or decide here whether, or under 
what eircumstanees. unlawful activity not direeted against the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for refusing to 
hire. 
18 We are aware that some of the above faetors were, indeed, considercd by the Distriet Judge in finding under s 704(a), that 
'defendant's (here petitioner's) reasons for refusing to rehire the plaintitl were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff's 
participation in the 'stall in' and 'lock in' demonstrations.' 318 F.Supp .. at 850. We do not intimate that this finding must be 
overturned after consideration on remand of respondent's s 703(a)(l) claim. We do, however, insist that respondent under s 703(a)( 1) 
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his rejection. the 
decision was in reality racially premised. 
19 The District Court may, for example, determine, after reasonable discovery that 'the (raeial) composition of defendant's labor force is 
itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.' See Blumrosen, supra. at 92. We caution that such gcneral determinations, 
while helpful. may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision. particularly in the presence of an 
otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire. See generally United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977, 992 
(WDNY 1970), order modified. 446 F.2d 652 (CA2 1971). B1umrosen, supra, n. 19, at 93. 
20 See 463 F.2d, at 352. 
21 It is, of course, a predictive evaluation, resistant to empirical proof~ whether 'an applicant's past participation in unlawful conduct 
directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that 
employer.' 463 F.2d. at 353. But in this casc, given the seriousness and harmful potential of respondent's participation in the 'stall-in' 
and the accompanying inconvenience to other cmployees, it cannot be said that petitioner's refusal to employ lacked a rational and 
neutral business justification. As the Court has noted elsewhere; 
'Past conduct may well relate to PE~~ent fitness;p~stloyalt)l m~x~ave a reasonable relationship to present and future trust.' Gamer v. 
McDollneH Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ... 
Board of Public Works of Los Angeles. 341 U.S. 716. 720. 71 S.Ct. 909, 912. 95 L.Ed. 1317 (1951). 
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United States District Court, 
D. Oregon. 
Michael MORROW, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BARD ACCESS SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, Defendant. 
Civil No. 3:10-cv-00209-JO. I June 20, 
2011. 
Synopsis 
Background: Former employee brought action in state 
court against former employer, alleging age discrimination 
and wrongful discharge in violation of Oregon law. 
Following removal, employer filed motion for summary 
judgment. 
Holdings: The District Court, Jones, J., held that: 
[I] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
employee was terminated because of his age, and 
[2] there was no evidence that employee's complaints 
about safety of products were a factor in decision to 
terminate him. 
Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
West Headnotes (3) 
111 
[21 
Federal Civil Procedure 
,-Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether employee was terminated because of his 
age, precluding summary judgment in his age 
discrimination claim under Oregon law. West's 
Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659A.030( I )(a). 
Civil Rights 
[3) 
,,~ •• Disparate Treatment 
The ultimate factual question that must be 
addressed in a civil action for age discrimination 
under Oregon law is whether the plaintiff has 
proved that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff, that is, 
whether the defendant treated the plaintiff 
differently, and adversely, because of age. 
West's Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659A.030(l)(a). 
Labor and Employment 
.>,Causal Connection; Temporal Proximity 
There was no evidence that employee's 
complaints about safety of products were a factor 
in decision to terminate him, as required for his 
wrongful discharge claim under Oregon law. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Richard C. Busse, Busse & Hunt, Portland, OR, for 
Plaintiffs. 
Jeffrey S. Bosley, Man Overbeck, Winston & Strawn, 
LLP, San Francisco, CA, Ryan S. Gibson, Victor 1. Kisch, 
Stoel Rives, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants. 
Opinion 
OPINION AND ORDER 
JONES, District Judge: 
*1 Plaintiff Michael Morrow brought this action against 
defendant Bard Access Systems, Inc., in state court, 
alleging claims for age discrimination under ORS Chapter 
659A, and common law claims for wrongful discharge. 
Defendant removed the action to this court based on 
diversity jurisdiction. 
The case is now before the court on defendant's motion (# 
Morrow v. Bard Access "',"".~"'~ Inc., ---
25) for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, 
defendant's motion is denied as to plaintiffs age 
discrimination claim and granted as to the wrongful 
discharge claims. 
STANDARDS 
Summary judgment should be granted if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
If the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the 
pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,106 S.Ct. 
2548, 9 I L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or 
evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly 
probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact. 
United Steelworkers o[America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 
1539, 1542 (9th Cir.1989). 
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether 
a fact is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242,248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986): see also 
T W Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 
626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Reasonable doubts as to the 
existence of a material factual issue are resolved against 
the moving party. T W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. 
Inferences drawn from facts are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 630-31. 
DISCUSSION 
The parties are familiar with their extensive evidentiary 
submissions, and 1 find it unnecessary to repeat the factual 
background of this dispute here. Having thoroughly 
reviewed the parties' arguments and submissions, I 
conclude that summary judgment on plaintiffs age 
discrimination claim must be denied, but that his wrongful 
discharge claims are not viable and must be dismissed. 
I. Age Discrimination 
[I J The record establishes that during his employment with 
defendant, plaintiff "was his own worst enemy," as 
defendant points out and has thoroughly documented. But 
the record also shows that plaintiff consistently was a top 
performer in sales. Despite plaintiffs success in sales, 
defendant contends that plaintiffs long history of 
administrative failings, misconduct, and other behavior, 
including the final unprofessional emaill that is central to 
defendant's arguments, resulted in the decision to 
terl'l1inate his empl(j)lIl1ent. The evidence strol1~I)I~upp()l1:s 
1 ) 
defendant's position. 
Plaintiff, in turn, contends that age, not misconduct, was 
the reason for his tennination. In support of his argument, 
plaintiff largely relies on his own affidavit, in which he 
describes statements made by several of defendant's 
managers that may be construed as demonstrating age bias. 
Because this is a summary judgment proceeding, the 
veracity of plaintiffs testimony is not before the court. 
Accepting plaintiffs testimony as true for purposes of the 
pending motion, a reasonable trier of fact could find that 
plaintiffs termination was an unlawful employment 
practice under ORS Chapter 659A.2 
*2 The parties debate whether causation is measured by the 
"but for" test the United States Supreme Court articulated 
in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 
2343, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009), for federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEN') cases, or 
the "substantial factor" test ordinarily applied in Oregon 
state law discrimination claims. See, e.g., Seitz v. State by 
and Through Albina Resources Center, 100 Or.App. 665, 
675,788 P.2d 1004 (1990)(sex and race discrimination). 
Neither party has cited an Oregon appellate court decision 
that addresses the specific issue of causation in a ORS 
Chapter 659A age discrimination case, nor has this court 
found one. 
12) It is tempting to construe the language of the Oregon 
law as the Supreme Court did in Gross, because the 
pertinent language interpreted in Gross is identical in both 
statutes, i.e., with respect to causation, both statutes 
prohibit discrimination "because of age." Compare 29 
U.S.c. § 623(a)(I) with ORS 659A.030(l)(a). The ADEA, 
however, specifically applies only to age discrimination, 
while ORS 659A.030(I)(a) prohibits discrimination 
"because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
national origin, marital status or age .... " As noted above, 
although no Oregon appellate decision interprets the 
"because of language in the context of an age 
discrimination case, the courts have clarified that the 
'substantial factor' " test applies to other fonns of 
discrimination prohibited by the same statute. See, e.g., 
Ettner v. City of Medford, 178 Or.App. 303, 35 P.3d 1140 
(200 I) (gender); Winnett v. City of Portland, 118 Or.App. 
437,847 P.2d 902 (1993) (sex); Seitz, supra, 1000r.App. 
at 675, 788 P.2d 1004 (sex and race); see also Ventura v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 2010 WL 3767882 at *[0 (D.Or. 
Sept. [6, 20 I 0). And as the Oregon Court of Appeals 
recently noted: 
The ultimate factual question that must 
be addressed in such a civil action is 
whether the plaintiff has proved that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff, that is, whether the 
Morrow v. Bard Access ,-,,,,,torn,, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ---- (2011) 
defendant treated the plaintiff differently, 
and adversely, because of ... age. 
Christianson v, State of Oregon, 239 Or.App. 451, 455, 
244 P.3d 904 (2010). 
The record in this case strongly supports an inference that 
plaintiff was, indeed, terminated for performance 
deficiencies and misconduct. On the other hand, the record 
also demonstrates that defendant initially planned to 
respond to plaintiffs unprofessional email by disciplining 
him and giving him a formal letter of reprimand, not 
terminating him. The fact that defendant terminated 
plaintiff just weeks before his second installment of 
deferred stock awards was to vest, coupled with plaintiffs 
testimony concerning age-based comments by defendant's 
managers, permits an inference, albeit a weak one, that 
plaintiffs age was a substantial factor in defendant's 
decision to terminate him. Based on the above, I conclude 
that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish his prima 
facie case of discrimination under the evidentiary 
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp, v, 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973), which this court applies to both federal and Oregon 
state law discrimination claims. Snead v. Metropolitan 
Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 237 F.3d 1080, 
1094 (9th Cir.200 I). 
2. Wrollg/ul Discharge 
*3 Plaintiff alleges two claims for wrongful discharge, one 
tort claim and one contract claim. In the tort claim, plaintiff 
alleges that he was wrongfully discharged for complaining 
about allegedly unsafe products that defendant marketed. 
In his so-called "wrongful termination-contract" claim, 
plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated him to avoid 
having to pay certain stock awards that had not yet vested. 
See Amended Complaint, Claims 2 and 3. 
Oregon courts have repeatedly affirmed the validity of the 
Footnotes 
"at-will employment rule," holding that" '[g]enerally an 
employer may discharge an employe[e] at any time and for 
any reason, absent a contractual, statutory or constitutional 
requirement [to the contrary].' " Babick v. Oregon Arena 
Corporation, 333 Or. 40 I, 407 and n. 2, 40 P.3d 1059 
(2002) (quoting Patton v. J.C Penney Co., 301 Or. 117, 
120, 719 P.2d 854 (1986)). Oregon courts also recognize, 
however, that discharge of an at-will employee may be 
deemed "wrongful" under certain circumstances, for 
example, "when the discharge is for exercising a 
job-related right that reflects an important public policy" or 
"when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public 
duty." Babick. 333 Or. at 407, 40 P.3d 1059 (citations 
omitted). 
13) Plaintiffs "wrongful discharge" tort claim fits neither 
example. More importantly, plaintiff has presented no 
plausible evidence that his complaints about products were 
a factor, let alone a substantial factor, in defendant's 
decision to discharge him. Similarly, even ifthe court were 
to accept plaintiffs "wrongful termination-contract" 
theory of recovery,3 there is no plausible evidence that the 
future vesting of stock awards, standing alone, resulted in 
defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff or even was a 
substantial factor in that decision. The possible vesting of 
future stock awards is relevant only as some circumstantial 
evidence, albeit weak evidence, of age discrimination, as 
plaintiff suggests and the court, with reservation, accepts. 
See discussion supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's motion (# 25)is granted 
in part and denied in part, as follows: GRANTED as to 
plaintiffs wrongful discharge claims (Claims 2 and 3) and 
DENIED as to plaintiffs age discrimination claim (Claim 
I). 
1 In response to an inquiry from a clinical nurse at OI-ISU, one of defendant's significant customers. concerning whether plaintiff 
wanted to continue as the industry representative on the Oregon Vascular Access Network ("ORVAN'"), plaintiff responded: 
2 
You are kidding. right? I have heard the terrible and untrue things you. Jamie. and Leslie have said about me, I have heard it 
from [defendant]. and I have heard it from several different reps as well. I hope I never have to be in the same room as any of 
you, You have disparaged me and killed my career at [defendant], You should all be ashamed of yourselves, [ will pray for you 
all. but I will not put myself in a position to be your scapegoat ever again, The lack of integrity and truthfulness you have all 
demonstrated is deplorable, and I cannot pretend for political reasons that it is not. So, no. I do now want anything to do with 
[ORVAN], 
See, e,g, Declaration of Richard Busse, Attachment 21 , Plaintiff sent the email on January 11,2009; he was terminated on January 
26, 2009. a mere two weeks later. 
Defendant filed evidentiary objections to plaintiirs declaration (# 40), but I decline to rule on those objeetions at this juncture. 
Morrow v. Bard Access s,,~r'''ml~ !nc., --- .":>UlUU."U ---- (2011) 
3 I agree with defendant that plaintiffs "wrongful discharge-contract" claim fails as a matter of law for the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's Reply, pp. 29-30. Further, whether ERISA is or is not implicated by plaintiWs contract claim is not an issue this court 
must address to resolve defendant's motion; the court also rejects plaintiffs argument that he has a valid ERISA claim because his 
Amended Complaint alleges no such claim. 
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O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996) 
116 S.C!. 1307, 70FairEmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 486,67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,927 ... 
116 S.Ct. 1307 
Supreme Court of the United States 
James O'CONNOR, Petitioner, 
v. 
CONSOLIDATED COIN CATERERS 
CORPORATION. 
No. 95-354. I Argued Feb. 27, 1996. I Decided 
April 1 , 1996. 
Employee who was discharged after reorganization 
brought Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
action against former employer. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Robert D. 
Potter, Senior District Judge, 829 F.Supp. 155, granted 
summary judgment in favor of former employer. Former 
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hamilton, 
Circuit Judge, 56 F.3d 542, affirmed. Certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia held that fact 
that ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside 
protected class is not a proper element of McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes (3) 
II] 
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Civil Rights 
.p~Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
Civil Rights 
'~'''''Age Discrimination 
Assuming that Title VII's McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA 
cases, there must be at least a logical connection 
between each element of prima facie case and 
illegal discrimination. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of I 967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(I), as 
amended, 29 U.S.CA. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I). 
939 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
".~Discharge or Layoff 
131 
Fact that ADEA plaintiff was replaced by 
someone outside protected class is not a proper 
element of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case; 
given that discrimination prohibited by ADEA is 
discrimination because of individual's age, fact 
that one person in protected class has lost out to 
another person in protected class is irrelevant, so 
long as he has lost out because of his age. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
4(a)(I), as amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 623(a)(I). 
1439 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
Age Discrimination 
The ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of age and not class membership. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 62 I et seq. 
197 Cases that cite this headnote 
**1308 *308 Syllabus * 
At age 56, petitioner was fired by respondent corporation 
and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. He then filed this 
suit, alleging that his discharge violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The 
District Court granted respondent's summary judgment 
motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case of age 
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
41 I U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668, because he 
failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the 
age group protected by the ADEA. 
Held: Assuming that Title VII's McDonnell Douglas 
framework is applicable to ADEA cases, there must be at 
least a logical connection between each element of the 
prima facie case and the illegal discrimination. 
Replacement by someone under 40 fails this requirement. 
Although the ADEA limits its protection to those who are 
40 or older, it prohibits discrimination against those 
protected employees on the basis of age, not class 
membership. That one member of the protected class lost 
out to another member is irrelevant, so long as he lost out 
because a/his age. The latter is more reliably indicated by 
O'Connor v. Consolidated COin Caterers 517 U.S. 308 (1996) 
116 S.Ct. 1307, iOFair Empl.prac.Cas. (BNA) 486,67 Empl. PI-ac. [)ec. P 43,927. ... 
the fact that his replacement was substantially younger 
than by the fact that his replacement was not a member of 
the protected class. 
56 F.3d 542 (CA4 1995), reversed and remanded. 
SCALIA, 1., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
George Daly, Charlotte, NC, for petitioner. 
Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Washington, DC, for U.S., as amicus 
curiae by special leave of the Court. 
*309 James B. Spears, Jr., Greenville, SC, for respondent. 
Opinion 
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a plaintiff alleging 
that he was discharged in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 8 I 
Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.c. § 621 et seq., must show 
that he was replaced by someone outside the age group 
protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case 
under the framework established by McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. V. Green, 41 I U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 
668 (1973). 
Petitioner James O'Connor was employed by respondent 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation from 1978 until 
August 10, 1990, when, at age 56, he was fired. Claiming 
that he had been dismissed because of his age in violation 
of the A DEA, petitioner brought suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. 
After discovery, the District Court granted respondent's 
motion for summary judgment, 829 F.Supp. 155 (1993), 
and petitioner *310 appealed. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stated that petitioner could establish a prima 
facie case under McDonnell Douglas only if he could 
prove that (I) he was in the age group protected by the 
ADEA; (2) he was discharged or demoted; (3) at the time 
of his discharge or demotion, he was performing his job at 
a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and 
(4) following his discharge or demotion, he was replaced 
by someone of comparable qualifications outside the 
protected class. Since petitioner's replacement was 40 
years old, the Court of Appeals concluded that the last 
element ofthe prima facie case had not been made out. I 56 
F.3d 542, 546 (1995). Finding that petitioner's claim could 
not survive a motion for summary judgment without 
benefit of the McDonnell Douglas presumption (i.e., 
"under the ordinary standards of proof used in civil cases," 
56 F.3d, at 548), the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment of dismissal. We granted O'Connor's petition for 
certiorari. 516 U.S. 973, 116 S.Ct. 472, 133 L.Ed.2d 401 
(1995). 
In McDonnell Douglas, we "established an allocation of 
the burden of production and an order for the presentation 
of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases." St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 
S.Ct. 2742,2746,125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). We held that a 
plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et 
seq., could establish a prima facie case by showing "(i) that 
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
appl icants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of [the] complainant's 
qualifications." *311 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 
802,93 S.Ct., at 1824. Once the plaintiff has met this initial 
burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer "to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection." Ibid. If the trier of fact finds that 
the elements of the prima facie case are supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence and the employer remains 
silent, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff. St. 
Mary's Honor Center, supra, at 509-510, and n. 3, 113 
S.Ct., at 2748-2749, and n. 3; Texas Dept. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 
1094, 67 L. Ed.2d 207 (1981). 
[11 In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under 
the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others,2 has applied 
some variant **1310 of the basic evidentiary framework 
set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had 
occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII 
rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do 
not contest that point, we shall assume it. Cf. St. Mary's 
Honor Center, supra, at 506, n. I, 113 S.Ct., at 2747,~. 1 
(assuming that "the McDonnell Douglas framework is 
fully applicable to racial-discrimination-in-employment 
claims under 42 U .S.c. § 1983"). On that assumption, the 
question presented for our determination is what elements 
must be shown in an ADEA case to establish the prima 
facie case that triggers the employer's burden of 
production. 
121 As the very name "prima facie case" suggests, there 
must be at least a logical connection between each element 
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of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for 
which it *312 establishes a "legally mandatory, rebuttable 
presumption," Burdine, supra, at 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct., at 
1094, n. 7. The element of replacement by someone under 
40 fails this requirement. The discrimination prohibited by 
the ADEA is discrimination "because of [an] individual's 
age," 29 U.S.c. § 623(a)(I), though the prohibition is 
"limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age," § 
631(a). This language does not ban discrimination against 
employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans 
discrimination against employees because of their age, but 
limits the protected class to those who are 40 or older. The 
fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to 
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so 
long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to put the 
point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of 
age discrimination (as opposed to "40 or over" 
discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 
39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 
40-year-old. Because it lacks probative value, the fact that 
an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the 
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case. 
131 Perhaps some courts have been induced to adopt the 
principle urged by respondent in order to avoid creating a 
prima facie case on the basis of very thin evidence-for 
example, the replacement of a 68-year-old by a 
65-year-old. While the respondent's principle theoretically 
permits such thin evidence (consider the example above of 
a 40-year-old replaced by a 39-year-old), as a practical 
matter it will rarely do so, since the vast majority of 
age-discrimination claims come from older employees. In 
Footnotes 
our view, however, the proper solution to the problem lies 
not in making an utterly irrelevant factor an element of the 
prima facie case, but rather in recognizing that the prima 
facie case requires "evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based on a[nJ 
[illegal] discriminatory criterion . ... " Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358,97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866,52 L.Ed.2d 
396 (1977) (emphasis *313 added). In the 
age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be 
drawn from the replacement of one worker with another 
worker insignificantly younger. Because the ADEA 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class 
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially 
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of 
age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was 
replaced by someone outside the protected class. 
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Rexburg, May 2000 Term. 
Sondra OLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
EG&G IDAHO, INC., and Constance C. 
Blackwood, Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 23611. I Sept. 7,2000. 
Employee whose employment was terminated based upon 
her alleged poor performance and no indication of her 
willingness to improve brought action against employer 
and her supervisor, alleging wrongful discharge, 
defamation, self-defamation, and emotional distress. The 
District Court, Bonneville County, Brent, J. Moss, J., 
granted summary judgment to employer on many of 
employee's claims, and following jury trial on remaining 
claims, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(JNOV) on claims in which the jury found for employee. 
Employee appealed. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., held 
that: (I) supervisor's statements in employee's notice of 
termination were not made with malice; (2) employer was 
not liable to employee on employee's defamation claim; 
and (3) substantial competent evidence supported jury's 
determination that employee failed to prove severe 
emotional distress. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (10) 
/1/ Libel and Slander 
."'~Falsity 
Supervisor of employee's statements in 
employee's notice of termination that employee 
had failed to comply with requirements of the 
Corrective Action Plan (CAP), and that 
employee was not willing to improve, were 
truthful, and thus were not made with malice, so 
as to support employee's defamation claim 
against supervisor, where employee testified that 
she had not attended word processing training or 
database training, as required by CAP, and she 
admitted that she had not achieved mastery of the 
database system. 
12/ 
13/ 
14/ 
Appeal and Error 
,~Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Appeal and Error 
c.·",Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct 
Verdict 
In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(JNOV), or a directed verdict, the Supreme Court 
applies the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court when originally ruling on the motion. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
"/,,,Where Directed Verdict or Binding 
Instructions Would Have Been Proper 
When a trial court reviews a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the motion 
is treated as a delayed motion for a directed 
verdict and the same standard is applied for both. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b). 
Judgment 
>·.Where There Is Some Substantial Evidence to 
Support Verdict 
When ruling on a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial 
court must determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b). 
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151 Judgment 
.,,,,,Evidence and Inferences That May Be 
Considered or Drawn 
Judgment 
;~'Where There Is Some Substantial Evidence to 
Supp0l1 Verdict 
Upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (JNOV), the moving party admits the 
truth of all the adverse evidence and all 
inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it; 
it is not a question of no evidence on the side of 
the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is 
substantial evidence upon which ajury could find 
for the non-moving party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
50(b ). 
[61 Appeal and Error 
171 
".~Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Supreme Court will not make a finding of 
substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving 
party when reviewing a decision to grant or deny 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (JNOV) if it concludes that there can be 
but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable minds could have reached. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
<.c,·Evidence and Inferences That May Be 
Considered or Drawn 
Judgment 
.. ·Credibility of Witnesses and Weight of 
Evidence 
In deciding a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial 
court may not reweigh the evidence or consider 
the credibility of the witnesses; instead, it must 
draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
181 
191 
Appeal and Error 
,",·"Review of Evidence 
In determining whether a jury properly found that 
there is clear and convincing evidence of actual 
malice in a defamation suit, the Supreme Court 
must determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion that the 
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of her statements or that subjectively 
defendant had a high degree of awareness of the 
probable falsity of the statements; the Supreme 
Court's focus will be on whether the evidence 
indicates that defendant purposely avoided the 
truth. 
Libel and Slander 
"",.Malice 
Employer was not liable to employee on 
employee's defamation claim against employer, 
based on supervisor's comments in employee's 
notice of termination, which indicated that 
employee had failed to comply with requirements 
of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and was not 
willing to improve, absent evidence that 
supervisor acted with malice in making such 
statements. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1101 Damages 
,.,.·Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress 
Substantial competent evidence supported jury's 
determination that employee failed to prove 
severe emotional distress, based on employer's 
termination of her employment, though 
employee's psychiatrist testified that employee's 
loss of her employment was a very serious 
stressor; testimony of psychiatrist was rebutted 
by testimony of witness who was employed in 
employer's human resources office that six 
Olson v. EG&G Idaho, Inc., 134 idaho 778 (2000) 
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months after employee's termination, witness 
saw employee and employee seemed cheerful 
and pleased to see her, and witness agreed that 
she did not notice any change in employee's 
demeanor or behavior between their meeting or 
when employee left her employment. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**]245 *779 Stephen A. Meikle, Idaho Falls, for 
appellant. 
Pike & Shurtliff, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Edward W. 
Pike argued. 
Opinion 
KIDWELL, Justice. 
In this employment discrimination case, the appellant was 
terminated for "poor performance" and "no indication of 
willing[ness] to improve." The appellant claimed that the 
allegations were false and that the employer was 
discriminating against her. Prior to trial, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the employer on many of the 
appellant's claims. Following ajury trial on the remaining 
claims, the district court granted judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict (j.n.o.v.) on the claims in which the jury found 
for the appellant. The decision of the district court is 
affirmed. 
J. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In June of 1975, Sondra Olson began working for Aero Jet 
Company at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL) (now INEEL). In 1976, when Aero Jet was 
replaced by EG&G Idaho, Olsen was employed as a 
project control representative. Thirteen years later, Olson 
was promoted to EG&G's Academic Programs Office 
CAPO). In this **1246 *780 position, Olson was 
responsible for the fellowship research program of the 
Associated Western Universities (A WU). The A WU, a 
consortium of 50 universities, was under contract with the 
U.S. Department of Energy. The A WU was responsible for 
recrmtmg university students, usually at the 
under-graduate level, for summer jobs. When applications 
were received, Olson would pair the students with 
appropriate mentor engineers who requested assistance for 
research projects. Olson also coordinated student security 
clearances and assisted students with finding 
accommodations during the summer. Between 1989 and 
1993, the APO grew significantly, as did Olson's 
responsibilities for the A WU program. During this time of 
growth, Olson was rated good to excellent on the 
performance of her responsibilities. 
In March of 1993, the Department of Energy gave EG & G 
Idaho a negative performance evaluation during a 
semi-annual review. Also in March of 1993, respondent 
Constance C. Blackwood was appointed manager of the 
APO as well as Olson's supervisor. Soon after becoming 
Olson's supervisor, Blackwood began to require Olson to 
perform specific tasks in limited amounts of time. On 
March 22, 1993, Blackwood directed Olson to input 700-
800 A WU applications and to develop an 
acknowledgement letter all in the same day. Olson testified 
that Blackwood gave her similar directives that were not 
possible to accomplish in the time allotted. 
Blackwood testified that after being appointed manager of 
the APO, she began receiving phone calls about Olson's 
performance. Blackwood noted that Olson had not 
submitted several weekly reports to the Department of 
Energy. She further stated that although she had met with 
Olson on several occasions to remedy Olson's poor 
performance, Olson had not been responsive to her 
suggestions. 
On May 7, 1993, Blackwood met with the Women's 
Program Manager, Arantza Zabala, to discuss Olson's 
performance. Sherree Schell of EG&G Idaho's Human 
Resource Office was also at the meeting. During the 
meeting, it was determined that a corrective action plan 
would be implemented to educate Olson on her 
deficiencies and to determine whether Olson was capable 
of adequately performing the job. Blackwood showed the 
plan to Olson on July 9, 1993. Thereafter Olson and 
Blackwood met every Friday to discuss Olson's 
performance under the plan. Blackwood testified that 
during these meetings Olson was unresponsive to 
Blackwood's suggestions. Olson described the meetings as 
extremely unpleasant and uncomfortable. 
On August 12, 1993, Blackwood terminated Olson as an 
EG&G Idaho employee because Olson had failed to 
comply with the corrective action plan in a satisfactory 
manner. After being informed of the termination, Olson 
returned to her work station where she was met by armed 
Olson v. EG&G Idaho, inc., 134 Idaho 778 (2000) 
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security guards. The security guards escorted Olson to her 
car with her belongings, consisting of a refrigerator and 
several boxes of personal items. 
Olson testified that following her termination she suffered 
from anxiety attacks and depression. Olson stated that she 
constantly worried about what her fellow employees at 
EG&G Idaho were thinking about her being escorted by 
armed security guards. Olson's psychiatrist testified that 
Olson required medication to control depression and that 
without medication Olson had a 90% chance of relapsing 
into depression. 
On December 28, 1993, Olson filed a complaint against 
EG&G Idaho, Blackwood, and John Does I-X, alleging 
wrongful discharge, defamation, self-defamation and 
emotional distress. Olson made her first motion to amend 
her complaint on June 21, 1994, seeking to add claims for 
violation of privacy and violation of civil rights. Following 
the EEOC's notice of right to sue, Olson filed a second 
amended complaint on December 15, 1994, adding age and 
disability discrimination claims as well as a claim under 
the False Claims Act (31 U.S.c. § 3729). 
On January 20, 1995, EG&G Idaho and Blackwood 
(respondents) moved to dismiss portions of Olson's second 
amended complaint. On August 10, 1995, the district court 
dismissed John Does I-X and Olson's False Claims Act 
claim. Olson filed her third amended complaint on August 
30, 1995. On ** 1247 *781 February 13, 1996, she moved 
to amend her complaint a fourth time, this time adding 
another False Claims Act claim as well as breach of 
contract and equal protection claims. Also on February 13, 
1996, respondents filed for summary judgment on all 
claims. 
In an order dated April 9, 1996, the district court granted 
respondents summary judgment on Olson's claims for 
wrongful termination, self-defamation, negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, violation ofprivacy, violation of due 
process/civil rights (42 U.s.c. § 1983), and age and 
disability discrimination under the Idaho Human Rights 
Act. The court denied the motion as to defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also 
denied the motion to dismiss Blackwood as a party 
defendant. On April 18, 1996, Olson moved for 
reconsideration, however the district court denied her 
motion. 
Olson moved to amend her complaint for a sixth time on 
August 8, 1996. The district court denied Olson's sixth 
amended complaint but allowed her to file a seventh 
amended complaint to provide more specific and definite 
allegations than those contained in the sixth. On August 
28, 1996, Olson filed a motion to amend her seventh 
amended complaint to add a claim under the False Claims 
Act and to add EG&G, Inc., the parent corporation of 
EG&G Idaho, as a party. 
On September 19, 1996, respondents moved to dismiss 
EG&G, Inc. as a party and to dismiss Olson's False Claims 
Act claim. The district court granted respondents' motions, 
denied Olson leave to amend her seventh amended 
complaint to add EG & G, Inc. and dismissed Olson's 
False Claims Act claim. 
A jury trial began on December 3, 1996. At the close of 
Olson's case, respondents moved for a directed verdict on 
all claims. The district court granted the motion as to the 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
Blackwood, but denied the motion as to the remainder of 
Olson's claims. On December 18, 1996, the jury began 
deliberations. During deliberations the jury sent out a note 
concerning jury instruction number 15, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Over Olson's objection, 
the district court modified the instruction to include 
examples from cases where courts had found intentional 
infliction of extreme emotional distress. 
The jury entered special verdicts on December 19, 1996. 
The jury found that Olson had established a case of 
defamation against Blackwood, but not against EG&G 
Idaho. The jury also found that Olson had not proven her 
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
EG&G Idaho. Following the jury's special verdicts, the 
parties made opposing motions for j.n.o.v. The district 
court granted Blackwood's motion and denied Olson's. On 
February 3, 1996, Olson filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting 
Blackwood's Motion For J.N.O.V. On Olson's 
Defamation Claim. 
III The district court granted Blackwood's motion because 
it found there was not enough evidence that Blackwood 
acted with malice. On appeal, Olson claims that the district 
court erred because it ruled contrary to its ruling on 
Blackwood's motion for a directed verdict following the 
close of Olson's case. Alternatively, Olson argues that the 
jury was presented with substantial evidence of 
Blackwood's malice. 
12113114) In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion 
for j.n.o.v., or a directed verdict, this Court applies the 
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same standard as that applied by the trial court when 
originally ruling on the motion. Quick v. Crane, III Idaho 
759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). When a court 
reviews a motion for j.n.o.v. under LR.C.P. 50(b), the 
motion is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict 
and the same standard is applied for both. Quick, I I I Idaho 
at 763, 727 P.2d at I 191. When ruling on a motion for 
j.n.o.v., the trial court must determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Lanham 
v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495,943 P.2d 912, 921 
(1997). 
*782 151 161 171 **1248 "Upon a motion for JNOY, the 
moving party ... adm its the truth of all the adverse evidence 
and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." 
Id. at 496, 943 P.2d at 922. It is not a question of no 
evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather, 
whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury 
could find for the non-moving party. Quick, I I I Idaho at 
763, 727 P .2d at I 191. This Court will not make a finding 
of substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving party if 
it concludes "that there can be but one conclusion as to the 
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached." Id. at 
764, 727 P.2d at 1192. In deciding a motion for j.n.o.v. the 
trial court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the 
credibility of the witnesses. Instead, it must draw all 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Lanham, 130 
Idaho at 496, 943 P.2d at 922. 
At the close of Olson's case, respondents moved for a 
directed verdict. Concerning Blackwood's motion, the 
district court ruled that: 
On the defamation matter, the issue I 
believe there is malice. I believe there 
was communication, it was privileged 
and, of course, the question now is was it 
made maliciously. And all I would 
indicate (sic) there is I think if the jury 
took all the inferences in favor of 
Plaintiff's case, they could, perhaps, find 
malice. And I will allow them to do so. 
Following the jury's verdict that Olson had proved a cause 
of action for defamation against Blackwood, Blackwood 
made a motion for j.n.o.v. In ruling upon that motion, the 
court held that: 
Now, defamation has to be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence. Now, as 
to defamation, the jury has determined 
that. However, the Court cannot agree 
with it on the basis of the law, that there 
was sufficient evidence presented to 
show actual malice in this telmination. In 
doing that, I'm not deciding who was 
right in this matter, but I'm just simply 
deciding what the law requires me to 
decide. I cannot decide that the evidence, 
perhaps a preponderance of the evidence 
would support that claim, but I cannot 
find clear and convincing, based on 
everything I've heard, everything I've 
reviewed, to show actual malice. 
On Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v., the district court was 
required to determine whether there was substantial and 
competent evidence to support the jury's conclusion that 
there was clear and convincing evidence that Blackwood 
acted with malice. The district court ruled that while there 
might have been a preponderance of evidence upon which 
the jury could have found that Blackwood acted with 
malice, there was not clear and convincing evidence. Thus, 
we must review the record to determine whether, taking all 
inferences in favor of Olson, there was substantial and 
competent evidence to support the jury's conclusion that 
Olson proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
Blackwood acted with malice. 
181 In determining whether a jury properly found that there 
is clear and convincing evidence of actual malice in a 
defamation suit, this Court "must determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that 
[Blackwood] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of [her] statements or that subjectively [Blackwood] 
had a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of 
the statements. Our focus will be on whether the evidence 
indicates that [Blackwood] purposely avoided the truth." 
Wiemer v. Rankin, I 17 Idaho 566, 576, 790 P.2d 347, 357 
( 1990). 
The difficulty presented by this issue is that Olson has not 
cited any singular, particular comment made by 
Blackwood, but rather, ambiguously cites "statements by 
Blackwood to the EEO office and the Human Resources 
Office as documented in the record." The record contains 
three documents which Olson has argued make up the 
defamatory comments: (I) the notice of termination, (2) 
the EEO memorandum, and (3) the Corrective Action Plan 
(CAP). Olson argues that the "most damaging defamatory 
statements made by Blackwood against Olson were in the 
notice of termination which alleged poor performance and 
failure to meet any of the requirements of the CAP as well 
as unsatisfactory or inadequate skills and unwillingness to 
improve." 
**1249 *783 Olson responds to these allegations by 
arguing that "she documented substantial completion or 
scheduled for completion all of the items required in the 
CAP." The CAP noted seven items that Olson was to 
Olson v. EG&G 
9 P.3d 1244 
Inc., 134 Idaho 778 (2000) 
complete in order to improve her performance. At trial, 
Olson testified that she had completed, attempted to 
complete, or had scheduled for completion each of the 
seven items listed in the CAP. For example, she testified 
that she was scheduled to begin WordPerfect training the 
day after she was terminated. Olson testified that she 
prepared a program plan and presented it to Blackwood but 
that Blackwood did not consider it sufficient. Additionally, 
Olson testified that for each of the requirements of the CAP 
she communicated her progress to Blackwood. 
From this testimony, Olson concludes the Blackwood 
acted with malice because Blackwood knew that Olson 
was attempting to complete the requirements of the CAP. 
However, the evidence does not support her conclusion. 
While Olson testified that she was in the process of 
completing the CAP requirements, she also testified that 
she had not completed all of the requirements prior to her 
termination. She testified that she had not attended 
WordPerfect training or database training. She also 
admitted that she had not achieved mastery ofthe database 
system. 
Therefore, while there is some evidence that Blackwood 
may have acted with malice, there is also evidence that 
Blackwood was truthful when she indicated that Olson had 
failed to comply with the requirements of the CAP and was 
not willing to improve. 
Additionally, we disagree with Olson's claim that the 
district court was inconsistent when it granted 
Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v. after having denied her 
motion for directed verdict on the defamation claim. At the 
time of Blackwood's motion for directed verdict, the 
district court had not heard the evidence presented by both 
sides. After considering the entire evidence of both sides, 
the district court was in a better position to determine the 
merits of each litigant's case. Therefore, we affirm the 
district court's decision granting Blackwood's motion for 
j.n.o.v. on Olson's defamation claim. 
B. The District Court Properly Denied Olson's Motion 
For J.N.O.V. On Her Defamation Claim Against 
EG&G Idaho. 
[91 Olson claims that the district court erred in refusing to 
grant her motion for j.n.o.v. in the face of inconsistent jury 
verdicts. She claims that EG&G is liable because 
Blackwood was acting within the scope of her employment 
when she defamed Olson. 
We have determined that the district court did not err in 
granting Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v. on Olson's 
defamation claim. Therefore, the district court did not err 
in refusing to grant Olson's motion for j.n.o.v. Absent a 
ruling that Blackwood acted with malice, and thus 
defamed Olson, there is no basis upon which EG&G could 
be liable for defamation against Olson. 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Olson's Motion 
For J.N.O.V. On Her Claim Of Intentionallntliction 
Of Emotional Distress. 
110] Olson argues that she provided the jury with 
substantial and competent evidence that her emotional 
distress was severe. She contends that the district court 
should have granted her motion for j.n.o.v. because 
respondents did not rebut that evidence. 
As stated above, this Court reviews the record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence upon 
which the jury could find that Olson's emotional distress 
was not severe. Lanham v. idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho at 
495,943 P.2d at 921. 
At trial, Olson's psychiatrist testified that Olson was 
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder and that the 
stress had been aggravated by the armed guards. The 
psychiatrist testified that Olson's depression "markedly 
decreased her enjoyment of life," and that Olson suffered 
from "psychiatry agoraphobia, which is a fear of going 
outside." Additionally, the psychiatrist stated that "At the 
time of my evaluation, Mrs. Olson would not have been 
able to work because of the severe anxiety, the 
uncontrolled pan ic attacks, her fears, her performance 
**1250 *784 anxiety and just the tremendous panic that 
she had about leaving the house." The psychiatrist 
concluded that Olson's loss of her employment was, on the 
severity scale, close to losing a spouse, and was a "very 
serious stressor, it's in the top four or five." 
This testimony, as Olson contends, could have provided 
the jury with sufficient evidence to determine that Olson's 
emotional distress was extreme. However, Olson IS 
incorrect in her claim that the evidence was unrefuted. 
As pointed out by respondents, this testimony was rebutted 
by testimony from Olson and from Sherree Schell. Olson 
testified that she began working for Mary Kay Cosmetics 
while she was still employed by EG & G and that she 
continued to sell them after her termination. Schell 
testified that she talked with Olson at a craft fair about six 
months after Olson's termination. During their 
conversation Olson seemed cheerful and generally pleased 
to see Schell. Finally, Schell agreed that she did not notice 
any change in Olson's demeanor or behavior between their 
meeting at the craft fair or when Olson had left EG & G. 
Olson v. EG&G Idaho, 
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Thus, the jury was provided with evidence which it could 
have relied upon to determine that Olson's emotional 
distress was not as severe as indicated by Olson's 
psychiatrist. The district court properly determined that 
there was substantial and competent evidence to support 
the jury's determination that Olson had failed to prove that 
her emotional distress was severe. 
D. The Remainder OrOlson's Issues On Appeal Are 
Without Merit. 
After having carefully considered the rest of Olson's issues 
on appeal, we find them to be without merit. The decision 
of the district court is affirmed on all issues relevant to this 
appeal. 
III. 
of Document 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in granting Blackwood's 
motion for j.n.o.v. on the issue of defamation. Likewise, 
the district court correctly granted EG&G's motion for 
j.n.o.v. on the issue of EG&G's liability for Olson's 
defamatory comments. The decision of the district court is 
affirmed. No attorney fees are awarded on appeal. Costs to 
respondents. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER 
and WALTERS concur. 
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Synopsis 
Background: Former state employee brought action 
against her former employer, the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare (IDHW), alleging constructive 
discharge in violation of the Human Rights Act and the 
Protection of Public Employees Act. The District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Michael R. 
McLaughlin, J., dismissed claims. Employee appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, J. Jones, J., held that: 
[I] IDHW did not waive statute oflimitations defense; 
[2] claim arose when employee tendered her resignation; 
[3] employee's complaints were not protected activity; and 
[4] employee's belief that employer was engaged in 
unlawful employment practices was not objectively 
reasonable. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (22) 
II J Appeal and Error 
,~;",Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Supreme Court reviews the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment on the same standard used by 
the district court. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56( c). 
J2J 
13J 
14J 
Judgment 
,;",,,Presumptions and burden of proof 
When considering a motion for summary 
judgment, disputed facts are liberally construed 
in favor of the nonmoving party and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
Judgment 
<.",Existence or non-existence of fact issue 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
nonmoving pm1y bearing the burden of proof 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's 
case. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
Limitation of Actions 
;~Waiver or estoppel by failure to plead 
Employer did not waive statute of limitations 
defense by failing to plead it as an affirmative 
defense in its answer to employee's complaint in 
action in which state employee alleged 
constructive discharge in violation of Idaho 
Human Rights Act (IHRA) and Idaho Protection 
of Public Employees Act (lPPEA), where 
employer raised the affirmative defense in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, and employee responded to 
defense in her opposition memorandum. West's 
LC.A. §§ 6-2101, 67-5901; Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule S(c). 
[51 Pleading 
v"Necessity for defense 
Patterson v. State, 
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16) 
171 
18) 
A party does not waive an affirmative defense for 
failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it 
is raised before trial and the opposing party has 
time to respond in briefing and oral argument. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 8(c). 
Limitation of Actions 
",,,,Liabilities Created by Statute 
State employee's claim for constructive 
discharge pursuant to the Idaho Protection of 
Public Employees Act (lPPEA) arose when 
employee provided unequivocal notice of her 
intent to resign, rather than on date her 
resignation became effective. West's LC.A. §§ 
6-2104,6-2105(2). 
Officers and Public Employees 
·J··Grounds for removal 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
(lPPEA) seeks to protect the integrity of the 
government by providing a legal cause of action 
for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting 
waste and violations ofa law, rule, or regulation. 
West's l.C.A. § 6-2101. 
Officers and Public Employees 
>,,·Grounds for removal 
For purposes of a claim pursuant to the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA), 
where the alleged adverse action is a constructive 
discharge, a plaintiff must prove that working 
conditions became so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee's position 
would have felt compelled to resign. West's 
l.C.A. § 6--2104. 
191 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
9~,·Activities protected 
States 
,y,,·Appointment or employment and tenure of 
agents and employees in general 
State employee's complaints regarding 
intra-office affair between her supervisor and her 
co-workers was not protected activity under the 
Idaho Human Rights Act (lHRA), and therefore 
employee failed to show the existence ofa hostile 
work environment; although supervisor's 
conduct certainly violated employer's policy 
regarding intra-office relationships, and could 
well have resulted in paramour favoritism, the 
favoritism affected all concerned on a 
gender-neutral basis. West's LC.A. § 67-5911. 
[10) Civil Rights 
/.·Activities protected 
The opposition clause protects employees who 
both subjectively and reasonably believe that 
they are opposing activity that violates Title VII. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-3(a). 
1111 Civil Rights 
.•. /.,Hostile environment; severity, pervasiveness, 
and frequency 
Pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex 
includes the creation of a hostile work 
environment. West's LC.A. § 67-5909. 
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112) Civil Rights 
f·~Hostile environment; severity, pervasiveness, 
and frequency 
Pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), 
in order to show that a work environment is 
sufficiently hostile, a plaintiff must show the 
occurrence of numerous improper acts which 
establish a pattern of conduct sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
employment. West's LCA, § 67-5909. 
1131 Civil Rights 
···Hostile environment: severity, pervasiveness, 
and frequency 
The standard to prove a hostile environment 
under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) is 
that the environment is both subjectively and 
objectively perceived as hostile based on a 
totality of the circumstances. West's LCA. § 67-
5909. 
1141 Civil Rights 
".=Activities protected 
States 
;ZF",Appointment or employment and tenure of 
agents and employees in general 
State employee's belief that employer was 
engaging in unlawful employment practices due 
to intra-office relationship between supervisor 
and employee's co-worker was not objectively 
reasonable, and therefore employee failed to 
maintain claim for retaliation pursuant to the 
Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); existing 
substantive law was to the contrary, employee 
training materials that were more restrictive than 
Title VII did not create a reasonable belief on the 
part of employee that conduct violated Title VII, 
and employee could base her good faith belief 
that employer had engaged in unlawful 
employment practices based on the good faith 
belief of another employee. West's I.CA. § 67-
", ,Ne:d 
5909; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 
U.S.CA. § 2000e-3(a). 
1151 Civil Rights 
,,~"~Activities protected 
A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation under the opposition clause of Title 
VII if he shows that he had a good faith, 
reasonable belief that the employer was engaged 
in unlawful employment practices. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U,S.CA, § 2000e-3(a), 
1161 Civil Rights 
~c"Activities protected 
In order to establish a retaliation claim under 
Title VII, a plaintiff must not only show that he 
subjectively, that is, in good faith, believed that 
his employer was engaged in unlawful 
employment practices, but also that his beliefwas 
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 
record presented. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), 42 U,S,CA. § 2000e-3(a). 
117) Civil Rights 
>,Activities protected 
It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that his 
belief that his employer was engaged in unlawful 
employment practice was honest and bona fide; 
the allegations and record must also indicate that 
the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was 
objectively reasonable in order to establish a 
retaliation claim under Title VII. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-3(a). 
Patterson v. State, Dept of Health 8. Welfare, 151 Idaho 310 (201 i) 
256 P.3d 718 
118) Civil Rights 
>zActivities protected 
For purposes of establishing a retaliation claim 
under Title VII, a critical element of the inquiry 
regarding objective reasonableness of an 
employee's belief that she was participating in a 
protected activity is the existing case law at the 
time of the incident. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), 42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
[191 Appeal and Error 
\pReply briefs 
Public employee failed to preserve for appellate 
review her assertion that her activities in 
complaining about intra-office relationship 
between supervisor and co-worker were 
protected activity pursuant to participation clause 
of the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) and Title 
VII, where, although employee argued in her 
reply brief that she was entitled to relief under the 
participation clause, she did not make the same 
argument in her opening brief. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-3(a); 
West's I.e.A. § 67-5909. 
120] Appeal and Error 
(;.oRulings by Lower Court 
In order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the 
record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms 
the basis for an assignment of error. 
1211 Appeal and Error 
,,~Necessity of presentation in general 
Issues not raised below but raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered or 
reviewed. 
1221 Appeal and Error 
\"c.;Form and requisites in general 
Appeal and Error 
;".",Points and arguments 
In order to be considered by the Supreme Court, 
the appellant is required to identify legal issues 
and provide authorities supporting the arguments 
in the opening brief. Appellate Rule 35. 
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Opinion 
1. JONES, Justice. 
*313 Lynette Patterson appeals the dismissal of her claims 
against her former employer for alleged violation of the 
Idaho Human Rights Act and the Idaho Protection of 
Public Employees Act. We affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural History 
This is a constructive discharge case arising under the 
Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), I.e. § 67-5901 et seq., 
and the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
(IPPEA), I.e. § 6-2101 et seq. Appellant, Lynette 
Patterson, argues that she was constructively discharged 
from her position as the Program Supervisor of the Fraud 
Unit at the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
.QI?11\\2ciue to her ~oll1pIaint~ E~~arding an intra-office 
Patterson v. State, 
256 P.3d 718 
of Health 8. 151 Idaho 310 (2011) 
romance between her supervisor, Mond Warren (Warren), 
and a lateral employee, Lori Stiles (Stiles). Stiles was the 
Program Supervisor of the Surveillance Utilization and 
Review Unit (SUR Unit) and Warren was the direct 
supervisor for both Stiles and Patterson. Patterson made 
multiple complaints regarding the relationship and 
favoritism, which she alleges resulted in her first negative 
performance review with IDHW, culminating in a 
constructive discharge. 
IDHW had an internal policy discouraging intra-office 
relationships. Its manual provided the following guidance 
on such relationships: 
Cohabitation and Romantic Relationships. Cohabitation 
of and/or romantic relationships between employees and 
their supervisors and others holding positions of 
authority over them is not condoned. If such 
relationships exist, the disciplinary action such as 
involuntary transfer may be considered. The possibility 
of intentional, unintentional or perceived abuse of power 
should be strongly considered in such relationships. 
Patterson's first complaint regarding the affair and 
preferential treatment came in the fall of 2004. Patterson 
went to Human Resource (HR) Specialist Bethany 
Zimmerman (Zimmerman) and told her that Warren and 
Stiles were having an affair and, as a result of the affair, 
"Warren was not treating her fairly." As a result of this 
complaint and others, Zimmerman and Warren's direct 
supervisor, David Butler (Butler), confronted Stiles, but 
Stiles denied the existence of the affair. Butler and 
Zimmerman conducted an interview with Warren who 
similarly denied the allegation. Two months later, 
Zimmerman again went to Butler to alert him to ongoing 
rumors regarding the inappropriate relationship and 
preferential treatment. Thereafter, Butler and another HR 
employee questioned Warren about the relationship for a 
second time, but he again denied the affair. However, 
several days after this second interview, Warren went to 
Butler and admitted to having had an intimate relationship 
with Stiles some five years previously (in approximately 
1999 or 2000). The relationship was said to have lasted one 
year, with sporadic intimate encounters thereafter. 
After Warren admitted to the romantic relationship, IDHW 
Civil Rights Department Manager Heidi Graham 
(Graham) conducted *314 **722 an investigation 
regarding the complaints of preferential treatment. Graham 
interviewed Patterson on December 28, 2004. During the 
interview, Patterson alleged that the SUR Unit received 
preferential treatment, including better pay, better 
equipment, access to evidence rooms, more recognition, 
and preferential disciplining of subordinate employees. 
Graham's investigation concluded that Warren and Stiles 
had engaged in a romantic relationship but also concluded 
that there was no evidence to support the allegations of 
preferential treatment. "[A ]ny differences complained of 
by Fraud Unit staff and Ms. Patterson regarding the SUR 
Unit were either inconsequential, were based on perception 
and lacked factual bases, were the result of legitimate 
program needs or were merely territorial rivalries between 
the two groups." 
At the conclusion of the investigation, Employee Relations 
Manager Monica Young (Young) met with Patterson to 
discuss the investigation outcome. After explaining 
Graham's conclusions, Young noted that Patterson was 
upset that Graham "was lied to and fell for it" and 
wanted to know where she could 
complain and I told her she could file a 
complaint with the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission or consult with an attorney. 
She told me she knew she would be 
retaliated against. .... She cut me off 
before I could finish and said she could 
talk about [Ms. Stiles and Mr. Warren 
having an affair] if it was impacting her 
and other's work and she stormed out of 
my office. 
Because Warren had been dishonest about the relationship, 
a "Notice of Employment Status" letter was placed in his 
permanent employee file. This letter indicated that "the 
work environment in the unit is disruptive, dysfunctional, 
and laden with mistrust, resentment, and anger." However, 
Warren retained his position as Bureau Chiet: and as the 
supervisor of both Stiles and Patterson. 
In February of2005, Butler attended a Fraud Unit meeting 
at Patterson's request, wherein staff voiced concerns 
regarding the alleged relationship and preferential 
treatment. The Fraud Unit provided Butler with an "Issues 
Memorandum" describing the concerns of the unit, and 
Patterson personally provided Butler with an additional 
document entitled "Summary of Issues Fraud and Sur 
Units." After further discussions between Butler and 
Graham, Butler decided not to re-open the investigation 
because there were no new allegations raised in the 
complaints. 
Patterson had a performance review in May of 2005, 
approximately three months after the meeting with Butler, 
wherein she received "Achieves Performance Standards" 
but it was noted that she had not completed one 
performance objective. I Patterson strenuously objected to 
the notation and attached a personal explanation to the 
performance review. 
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Patterson met with Graham again on May 25, 2005, 
alleging "that there was retaliation and 'hostility' between 
the Fraud and SUR Units." Patterson further stated that 
"things had gotten worse since [Graham's December 2004] 
investigation had concluded." However, no new 
investigation resulted from these allegations. 
On September 27, 2006, Patterson met with the new 
Director of IDHW, Richard Armstrong (Armstrong), to 
discuss her allegations of preferential treatment. Patterson 
told Armstrong that she "felt discriminated against in that 
she and the employees in her Fraud unit did not get an 
equal amount of resources (as the SUR unit) and were not 
getting the recognition of good work that she felt was being 
done by the members in the Fraud unit." She also made 
allegations of unequal pay. Following his meeting with 
Patterson, Armstrong met separately with Butler and 
Graham to discuss Patterson's complaints. He met with 
Patterson again on November 22, 2006, indicating that her 
concerns had been adequately investigated and, since no 
new incidents had occurred, he did not intend to reopen the 
previous investigation. 
Approximately four months later, Warren gave Patterson a 
draft performance evaluation *315 **723 which rated her 
as "Does Not Achieve Performance Standards." This 
document specifically identified staff involvement in 
searches and continued use of deferred prosecution 
agreements as the basis for the negative review. This 
document was provided to Patterson on March 16,2007, 
via an e-mail in which Warren requested a 2:00 p.m. 
meeting to discuss the evaluation. Patterson typed a 
resignation note before attending the afternoon meeting. 
The note stated, in relevant part: 
Please consider this as my resignation from the 
Department of Health and Welfare Fraud Unit. After 25 
Yz years with the state, I can no longer work under these 
conditions. The work environment has become 
increasingly hostile over the past few years. Retaliation 
is becoming unbearable. For health concerns and my 
own peace of mind, I am resigning effect[ive] March 30, 
2007 and will be taking vacation from now until then. 
I have left keys, badges, ID etc. with Susan Slade GrossI. 
Patterson did not return to work after March 16,2007.2 
On September 14,2007, Patterson filed a complaint with 
the Idaho Human Rights Commission (IHRC), alleging 
sexual discrimination and retaliation. On September 25, 
2007, Patterson filed her initial complaint in district court 
alleging violations of the IPPEA. Subsequently, Patterson 
amended this complaint by adding an unlawful retaliation 
claim in violation of the IHRA. IDHW moved for 
summary judgment on both claims, which the court 
granted because: (I) Patterson did not file her IPPEA claim 
within 180 days of her constructive discharge on March 16, 
2007; and (2) Patterson failed to demonstrate that she 
engaged in protected activity in order to sustain her IHRA 
claim. Patterson moved for reconsideration on the IHRA 
claim, but the district court denied her motion. She timely 
appealed to this Court. 
II. 
Issues on Appeal 
I. Is Patterson's IPPEA claim time-barred? 
II. Did the district court err in determining that 
Patterson failed to demonstrate that she was 
engaging in protected activity under the IHRA? 
III. 
Discussion 
A. Standard of Review 
)1) 12] 13) This Court reviews the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment on the same standard used by the 
district court. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 
Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Summary 
judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts are liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party and "all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Mackay, 
145 Idaho at 410, 179 P.3d at 1066. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden 
of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case." lei. 
B. Patterson's IPPEA claim is time-barred. 
Patterson contends the district court erred in dismissing her 
IPPEA claim on statute of limitations grounds, both 
because IDHW waived any statute of limitations defense 
and because, even ifit did not, her complaint on this claim 
was timely filed. Patterson first argues IDHW waived any 
statute of limitations defense regarding her IPPEA claim 
because it was not pleaded as an affirmative *316 **724 
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defense in IDHW's initial answer to her complaint. 
Patterson next argues that, even if the defense was not 
waived, her complaint was timely filed and the district 
court erred in using the notification date of her resignation, 
on March 16, 2007, rather than the effective date of her 
resignation, on March 30, 2007, as the appropriate accrual 
date for her IPPEA claim. IDHW argues it properly raised 
the statute of limitations defense at the time of the 
summary judgment proceedings and, therefore, never 
waived the issue. Additionally, IDHW argues that the 
relevant accrual date for Patterson's IPPEA claim is the 
date she provided her notice of resignation because she 
communicated her intent to resign on that date, and it was 
the last time IDHW could have engaged in unlawful 
employment activity. 
The district court ruled that IDHW did not waive its statute 
of limitation defense, even though it was not pleaded in the 
answer to the complaint, because Patterson had the 
opportunity to fully argue the issue before trial. The court 
then determined that Patterson's constructive discharge 
claim was untimely filed on September 25,2007, because 
it accrued on March 16, 2007, when the "atmosphere at 
work was so intolerable she could stay no longer and had to 
resign." The court rejected Patterson's allegation that the 
adverse actions constituted a continuing incident, 
culminating with the effective date of her resignation on 
March 30, 2007, because the constructive discharge was a 
discrete act. 
[41 151 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that 
"[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively" a statute of limitations defense. This 
Court has interpreted IRCP 8( c) as requiring affirmative 
defenses to be plead, but without identifying the 
consequences for failing to do so. Fuhriman v. State, Dep't 
of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153 P.3d 480, 483-84 
(2007). In Fuhriman, the Court held that the State's failure 
to raise the affirmative defense of statutory employer 
immunity, until filing its memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, was not fatal to that 
defense. fd. at 804, 153 P.3d at 484. The Court determined 
that because the State's memorandum alerted the 
appellants to the affirmative defense, and the appellants 
responded to this argument in reply briefing, as well as in 
oral argument before the district court, the defense had not 
been waived for failing to plead it in the initial answer. fd. 
See also Bluestone v. l'vfathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455, 649 
P .2d 1209, 1211 (1982) (finding no waiver of a statute of 
frauds defense where it was raised "for the first time in the 
summary judgment motion even though the reply to the 
counterclaim has been filed."). Therefore, pursuant to 
Fuhriman, a party does not waive an affirmative defense 
for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is 
raised before trial and the opposing party has time to 
respond in briefing and oral argument. Like the State in 
,,""-~ . . . ... -- . . . --. 
Fuhriman, IDHW raised its statute of limitations 
affirmative defense in its memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, and Patterson responded to 
this defense in her opposition memorandum. 
Consequently, IDHW did not waive its statute of 
limitations defense regarding Patterson's IPPEA claim.3 
/6) [7) We next consider whether Patterson's claim was 
timely filed. The IPPEA seeks to protect the integrity of the 
government "by providing a legal cause of action for 
public employees who experience adverse action from 
their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations 
of a law, rule or regulation." Van v. Portneu( Med. Ctr., 
147 Idaho 552, 557, 212 P.3d 982, 987 (2009). To establish 
an IPPEA claim, a plaintiff must establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, "that the employee has 
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a 
person acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage 
in an activity protected *317 **725 under section 6-2104, 
Idaho Code." I.e. § 6-21 05( 4). "An employee who alleges 
a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for 
appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, 
within one hundred eighty (180) days after the occurrence 
of the alleged violation of this chapter." I.e. § 6-2105(2). 
181 Where the alleged adverse action is a constructive 
discharge, a plaintiff must prove that "working conditions 
bec[a]me so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign 
[.]" Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 
672, 20 I P.3d 640, 645 (2009). Assuming that Patterson 
met this evidentiary burden, this Court must determine 
whether her claim for constructive discharge arose with her 
resignation notice on March 16, or with the effective date 
of her termination on March 30. We hold that Patterson's 
IPPEA claim is untimely because her claim for 
constructive discharge arose on March 16 when she 
provided unequivocal notice of her intent to resign. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that in constructive discharge 
cases, it is the date of resignation that starts the relevant 
statute of limitations period. 
We hold ... that the date of discharge 
triggers the limitations period in a 
constructive discharge case, just as in all 
other cases of wrongful discharge. 
Constructive discharge is, indeed, just 
one form of wrongful discharge. The fact 
that the actual act of terminating 
employment is initiated by the employee, 
who concludes that she is compelled to 
leave as a result of the employer's 
actions, rather than by the employer 
directly does not change the fact that the 
Patterson v. 
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employee has been discharged. 
Therefore, if the date of [plaintiffs] 
quitting falls within the relevant period 
of limitations, as it unquestionably does 
here, her claim is timely filed. 
Draperv. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th 
Cir.1998). 
Similarly, the Second Circuit has expanded on this holding 
and determined that a constructive discharge claim accrues 
on the date the employee gives "definite notice of her 
intention to retire," rather than upon the effective date of 
that resignation. Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 
133, 138 (2d Cir.2000). In Flaherty, the plaintiff submitted 
a formal statement to her employer on June 12, 1997, that 
she would be retiring from the corporation effective 
November I, 1997. Id. at 139. The court held that the June 
12 notification date was the date that the plaintiff 
"effectively communicated her intention to resign" and 
was, therefore, the relevant date for her constructive 
discharge claim. Id. 
Like the plaintiff in Flaherty, wherein the court treated the 
resignation notice date as the appropriate accrual of the 
plaintiffs cause of action, rather than the effective date of 
her termination, Patterson gave IDHW definitive notice of 
her intent to resign on March 16, 2007, even though that 
resignation was not to become effective until March 30, 
2007. Specifically, Patterson's resignation note stated that 
she could no longer work for IDHW due to the unbearable 
conditions to which she was subjected and that she would 
take vacation time until the effective date of her 
resignation. Indeed, Patterson turned in her keys and badge 
and did not return to work after her March 16 notice. 
IDHW was in no position to subject her to additional 
discriminatory treatment after that date. While Patterson 
points to documents created by IDHW, identifying her 
termination date as March 30, 2007, to establish her 
discharge date, the accrual of the constructive discharge 
claim is based on when the work environment became 
unbearable for the employee, not when the employer 
believed she was no longer employed there. Therefore, we 
affirm the decision of the district court that Patterson's 
IPPEA claim was time-barred under I.e. § 6-2105(2). 
C. The district court did not err in determining that 
Patterson failed to demonstrate she was engaging in 
protected activity under the IHRA. 
[9) Patterson alleges that her supervisor's intra-office affair 
and consequent favoritism toward his paramour's work 
group created a hostile work environment, that she 
opposed the actions creating that environment *318 **726 
and that, as a consequence, she was retaliated against in 
violation of the IHRA. She argues that, even if the affair 
and favoritism were not legally sufficient to constitute a 
hostile work environment, she engaged in protected 
activity in opposing such actions because she had a 
reasonable and good faith belief that they were violative of 
the IHRA. IDHW contends that the district court did not 
err in determining otherwise because overwhelming case 
law holds that paramour favoritism is not violative of Title 
VII and, therefore, opposition to such activity is not 
protected activity under the IHRA. The district court 
concluded, as a matter oflaw, that Patterson could not have 
reasonably believed her complaints regarding the 
intra-office romance and alleged favoritism amounted to 
protected activity under the opposition clause of the IHRA 
and Title VII because case law overwhelmingly holds that 
paramour favoritism is not proscribed activity. 
The IHRA not only prohibits discriminatory actions 
against persons in protected groups, but also prohibits 
retaliation against persons who oppose such actions. Idaho 
Code § 67-5911 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for a person or any 
business entity subject to regulation by 
this chapter to discriminate against any 
individual because he or she has opposed 
any practice made unlawful by this 
chapter or because such individual has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or litigation 
under this chapter. 
(emphasis added). A claim under I.e. § 67-5911 is 
commonly referred to as a retaliation cause of action. 
There is no Idaho case law regarding a retaliation claim 
based on allegations of paramour favoritism. However, 
"[t]his Court has previously determined that the legislative 
intent retlected in I.e. § 67-5901 allows our state courts to 
look to federal law for guidance in the interpretation of the 
state provisions." Mackay, 145 Idaho at 413, 179 P.3d at 
1069. 
In order to make a prima facie retaliation claim, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that: (I) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered 
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal 
link between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action. See E.E.o.C v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir.2002). 
"Protected activities include: (I) opposing an unlawful 
employment practice; and (2) participating in a statutorily 
authorized proceeding." Id. 
1101 The opposition clause protects employees who both 
subjectively and reasonably believe that they are opposing 
Patterson v. State, 
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activity that violates Title VII. Little v. United 
Technologies Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956,960 
(II th Cir.1997). In this case, it is undisputed that Patterson 
subjectively believed that she engaged in protected 
opposition activitYA Therefore, only the objective 
reasonableness of her belief is at issue before this Court. 
[111 [12) [13) In detennining whether it was objectively 
reasonable for Patterson to believe that she was engaging 
in protected opposition activity, we first consider whether 
a paramour relationship resulting in favoritism toward the 
paramour, in and of itself, constitutes unlawful conduct. 
The IHRA prohibits employers from discharging or 
otherwise discriminating against employees because of 
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. I.e. § 67-
5909. The relevant portion of this provision provides: 
It shall be a prohibited act to discriminate against a 
person because of, or on a basis of, race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin, in any of the following 
subsections .... 
(I) For an employer ... to discharge, or to otherwise 
discriminate against an individual with respect to 
compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment or to reduce the wage of any employee in 
order to comply with this chapter.. .. 
ld. Unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex includes the 
creation of a hostile work environment. "In order to show 
that a work *319 **727 environment is sufficiently hostile, 
a plaintiff must show the occurrence of numerous improper 
acts which establish a pattern of conduct sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment." 
Frazier v. JR. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 105,29 P.3d 
936, 941 (2001). "[T]he standard to prove [a] hostile 
environment is that the environment is both subjectively 
and objectively perceived as hostile based on a totality of 
the circumstances." Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop. Inc., 
131 Idaho 242, 248, 953 P.2d 992, 998 (1998) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
Patterson claims that the affair and favoritism created a 
hostile work environment. However, based on our review 
of the record, we conclude that the activity alleged by 
Patterson is not sufficient to constitute a hostile work 
environment. Her supervisor's conduct certainly violated 
IDHW's policy regarding intra-office relationships, and 
could well have resulted in favorable treatment being 
received by Stiles and the SUR Unit, as Patterson alleges. 
However, as IDHW points out, the favoritism affected all 
concerned on a gender-neutral basis. That is, Patterson 
provides no evidence that either the romantic relationship 
or the alleged favoritism was directed against, or that the 
results had an unfavorable effect upon, a person or group 
protected by the IHRA. 
Although none of this Court's decisions have dealt 
specifically with a paramour favoritism case, previous 
cases have dealt with the issue of hostile work 
environment. In Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128 Idaho 
740,918 P.2d 1185 (1996), while we rejected a contention 
that "if an employer equally abuses men and women no 
claim would arise [under the IHRA] because both sexes are 
accorded equal treatment," we held that the effect of 
abusive activity upon persons in a protected group is the 
critical factor in determining whether a hostile work 
environment has been shown. Jd. at 744-45, 918 P.2d at 
1189-90. We stated, "Title VII is aimed at the 
consequences or effects of an employment practice and not 
at the ... motivation of co-workers or employers." Jd. 
(quoting Ellison v. Brady. 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th 
Cir.1991 )). In this case, Patterson has failed to present facts 
to show that the effect of the affair and alleged favoritism 
on her or other women in her unit was such that it created a 
hostile work environment. While the affidavit she 
submitted in opposition to IDHW's motion for summary 
judgment refers to and incorporates a large volume of 
meeting notes, emails, pay records, and other documents, 
and asserts a number of instances of favoritism toward the 
SUR Unit, it fails to provide narrative testimony as to how 
Patterson or other women were adversely impacted by the 
same. Patterson's affidavit provides little guidance 
regarding the sequence of events that led to her 
unfavorable performance review and resignation. 
Strongman v. Idaho Potato Commission, 129 Idaho 766, 
932 P.2d 889 (1997), also dealt with a hostile work 
environment claim. There, the Court held that, "[ s ]exual 
conduct is not a necessary element of a hostile 
environment claim based on gender-specific 
discrimination." Jd. at 770, 932 P.2d at 893. In that case, 
the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiff's hostile work environment claim on summary 
judgment because the plaintiff had presented evidence 
indicating "that not only was [she] treated differently than 
her male counterparts in the amount of travelling she was 
required to do, but that her job was relocated to a city to 
which the director knew the employee would not move, 
and that she was criticized for taking sick leave." fd. at 771, 
932 P.2d at 894. Once again, Patterson has failed to present 
specific facts showing that she or other members of a 
protected group were subjected to abusive treatment that 
would constitute a hostile work environment. What her 
allegations boil down to, in essence, is that her supervisor 
had a relationship with a lateral employee, resulting in 
more favorable treatment for the paramour and her unit. 
Where courts in other jurisdiction have dealt specifically 
with the issue, the overwhelming weight of the decisions is 
Patterson v. State, Dept of Hea!th 8. Welfare, 15i idaho 310 
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that paramour favoritism does not violate Title VII. See 
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 
308 (2d Cir.1986) (finding that paramour favoritism does 
not constitute gender discrimination because it affects men 
and women equally). While the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunities *320 **728 Commission and some federal 
courts recognize I imited exceptions to this rule where (I) 
paramour favoritism is a result of coerced sexual behavior 
in which case, the quid pro quo analysis of sexuai 
harassment would apply; or (2) the paramour activity is so 
widespread that there is an expectation of sexual favors in 
exchange for advancement or promotion in the workplace, 
Patterson's allegations do not fall within either of these 
limited exceptions and, therefore, a claim for hostile work 
environment would not lie here. See EEOC, Policy 
Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title V!lfor Sexual 
Favoritism, No. 915.048,1990 WL 1104702 at *2-3 (Jan. 
12,1990). 
[141 [151 /161 1171 However, that is not the end of our 
inquiry. Patterson's claim is not for a hostile work 
environment but, rather, for retaliation as a result of her 
complaints about the work environment resulting from the 
affair and favoritism. Because a hostile work environment 
claim is distinct from a retaliation claim, some courts have 
found that, even where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a 
hostile work environment, the plaintiff's retaliation claim 
may proceed to the jury based on her reasonable belief that 
she engaged in protected activity. See Drinkwater v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865--66 (3rd Cir.1990) 
(despite the fact that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a 
hostile work environment claim, the court allowed her 
retaliation claim to go to the jury because she believed the 
activity was prohibited and because there was case law in 
existence at the time of her opposition activity that 
arguably supported the reasonableness of her belief that 
paramour favoritism violated Title VII). As articulated in 
United Technologies: 
[a] plaintiff can establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under the opposition 
clause of Title Vll ifhe shows that he had 
a good faith, reasonable belief that the 
employer was engaged in unlawful 
employment practices .... It is critical to 
emphasize that a plaintiff's burden under 
this standard has both a subjective and an 
objective component. A plaintiff must 
not only show that he subjectively (that 
is, in good faith) believed that his 
employer was engaged in unlawful 
employment practices, but also that his 
belief was objectively reasonable in light 
of the facts and record presented. It thus 
is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that 
i} 
his belief in this regard was honest and 
bona fide; the allegations and record 
must also indicate that the belief, though 
perhaps mistaken, was objectively 
reasonable. 
103 F.3d at 960 (emphasis omitted) 
Patterson argues her belief that she was engaging in 
protected activity was objectively reasonable because: (I) 
she filed a complaint with the IHRC and she personally 
complained and participated in the internal investigation 
regarding the affair and alleged preferential treatment and 
(2) IDHW treated her complaints as potential violations of 
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
referring Patterson to the civil rights investigator and by 
providing her training materials indicating that paramour 
favoritism could be illegal. IDHW argues that Patterson's 
factual allegations do not support the reasonableness of her 
belief because: (I) Patterson's complaints to IDHW, as 
well as her IHRC complaint, do not support a finding that 
her belief was objectively reasonable; (2) the IDHW 
training materials provide that discrimination must be 
because of the victim's gender and these materials cannot 
create a heightened standard for Title VII violations; (3) 
Patterson's allegations of unequal pay affected both the 
men and women in Patterson's fraud unit equally; and (4) 
Patterson cannot form an objective belief that her activity 
is protected based on discussions with third parties. 
The district court agreed with the arguments advanced by 
IDHW, finding that Patterson's belief was not objectively 
reasonable because: (I) existing substantive law was to the 
contrary; (2) employee training materials that are more 
restrictive than Title Vll do not create a reasonable belief 
on the part of an employee that conduct violates Title VII; 
and (3) an employee cannot base her good faith belief that 
an employer has engaged in unlawful employment 
practices based on the good faith belief of another 
employee. The district court also pointed out that Patterson 
had failed to demonstrate that the alleged favoritism was 
due to plaintiff's, or any other *321 **729 person's, 
gender. As the court stated, "In sum, the Court is not aware 
of any evidence in the record demonstrating that the 
Plaintiff drew a connection between the affair and the 
favoritism and a violation of the IHRA, be it gender or sex 
discrimination or otherwise. In fact, common sense 
dictates that any adverse actions stemming from the affair 
and favoritism of the SUR Unit would have fallen upon 
male and female fraud investigators alike." 
/18] A critical element of the inquiry regarding objective 
reasonableness of an employee's belief that she was 
participating in a protected activity is the existing case law 
at the time of the incident. In Drinlovater. the plaintiff'S 
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claim was allowed to proceed because of an eXlstmg 
decision favorable to her position. The Drinkwater court 
noted, however, that that holding had been vacated after 
Drinkwater's case arose. Id at 865---66. The only case 
favorable to her position that Patterson cited was decided a 
month and a half after her letter of resignation and could 
not have been relied upon in making her determination as 
to the reasonableness of her belief that she was engaging in 
protected activity. See Alaniz v. Peppercorn. 2007 WL 
1299804 (E.Dist.Cal. May 3, 2007). Because the great 
weight of the case law did not support Patterson's position, 
she had no grounds to believe that she was engaging in 
protected activity. See Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (a plaintiffs 
belief that she engaged in protected opposition activity 
cannot be reasonable when faced with voluminous case 
law to the contrary); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 
FJd 1346, 1351 (II th Cir.1999) ("The objective 
reasonableness of an employee's belief that her employer 
has engaged in an unlawful employment practice must be 
measured against existing substantive law."). The district 
court did not err in dismissing Patterson's IHRA claim. 
1191 Patterson also argues that her activities were protected 
activity under the participation clause of the IHRA and 
Title VII because she complained to human resources 
personnel, as well as to the civil rights investigator at 
IDHW, regarding the alleged favoritism and retaliatory 
treatment. An employee can engage in protected activity 
by participating in the statutory proceedings created by 
Congress to assist in Title VII violations. "Title VII ... 
make[ s] it unlawful for an employer to discriminate or 
retaliate against an employee or an applicant for 
employment because that person has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated, in any manner in a 
proceeding." Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation 
omitted). A "proceeding includes instituting a civil action," 
and also extends to an employee "who informs his 
employer of his intention to participate in a statutory 
proceeding, even ifhe has not yet done so." fd at 1006-07 
(internal quotation omitted). 
[20) 1211122) Although Patterson argues in her reply brief 
that she was entitled to relief under the participation clause, 
she did not make the same argument in her opening brief. It 
Footnotes 
is true that she made reference to having participated in the 
investigations precipitated by her complaints, but her 
argument was premised on the opposition clause. Her 
arguments before the district court were premised on the 
opposition clause and that is the basis upon which the 
district court appears to have ruled. "It is well established 
that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record 
must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an 
assignment of error." Krempasky v. Nez Perce County 
Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,236,245 P.3d 983, 988 
(2010). "Issues not raised below but raised for the first time 
on appeal will not be considered or reviewed". Id Further, 
"In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is 
required to identify legal issues and provide authorities 
supporting the arguments in the opening brief." Hogg v. 
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 PJd 1087, 1095 (2006) 
(citing I.A.R. 35). This requirement ensures that the 
respondent has an opportunity to respond to the appellant's 
arguments. See Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 
120, 122 (2005). Patterson failed to raise her participation 
clause argument in her opening brief, which denied IDHW 
the opportunity to respond. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the judgment of the district courts Costs to 
IDHW. 
*322 **730 Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices 
BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON concur. 
Parallel Citations 
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1 Prior to giving Patterson her May 2005 performance review, Zimmerman reviewed the rating and concludcd it was appropriate and 
supported by documentation. 
2 By precipitously resigning. Patterson elected to forego pursuit of statutory remedial procedures available to state employees. 
Employee problem solving and due process procedures are mandated by I.e. § 67-5315 and provided for in Rule 200 of the Rules of 
the Division of Human Resources & Idaho Personnel Commission (IDAPA 15.04.01.200). 
3 Patterson cites Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 443, 235 P.3d 387, 393 (2010) for the proposition that 
unpleaded claims cannot be preserved for appeal. However, A40rtensen clearly addresses claims, rather than affirmative defenses, 
and this Court has stated that the Fuhriman and Bluestone cases speak only to "when an aftirmative defense may be properly raised 
Patterson v. State, 
256 P.3d 718 
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and thus provides no basis jor a different result" regarding a cause of action not raised in the initial pleadings. Edmondson v. Shearer 
Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 178-79, 75 P.3d 733. 739-40 (2003). Thus, Mortensen is of no consequence to the situation at issue 
in this case. 
4 The district court noted that "[t]he Court fully credits the Plaintiffs assertion throughout this litigation that she believed in good faith 
the conduct she opposed was unlawful." 
5 The district court's judgment contained a Rule 54(b) certificate stating that the judgment was final with regard to the issues dealt with 
therein. It is unclear why a Rule 54 (b) certification was required because the complaint only raised the IPPEA and IHRA claims, both 
of which were dismissed upon summary judgment. It appears the Rule 54(b) certificate was superf1uous. as all issues were resolved 
by the judgment and the case has been fully disposed of on appeal. 
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v. Potlatch 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
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32 9 F·3d740 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Charles R. POITENGER, 
PlaintUT-Appellant, 
v. 
POTLATCH CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 02-35235. I Argued and Submitted 
March 4, 2003. I Filed May 19,2003· 
Former employee brought action against his former 
employer, alleging that he was forced to retire in violation 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
and the Idaho Human Rights Act and setting forth state law 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
defamation. The United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho, Edward 1. Lodge, J., granted summary 
judgment to employer, and employee appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that: 
( I) employee sufficiently made out prima facie case of age 
discrimination under the ADEA; (2) employer met burden 
of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
terminating employee; (3) evidence was insufficient to 
demonstrate that employer's proffered reason for firing 
employee was pretext for age discrimination; (4) under 
Idaho law, employer's statement was not defamatory; and 
(5) under Idaho law, employee's allegations were 
insufficient to support claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Affirmed. 
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summary judgment de novo. 
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Civil Rights 
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the ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment 
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60-year-old employee, as required to rebut prima 
facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, 
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contained negative comments specifically 
singling out concerns with employee's 
management, process of evaluation and 
deliberation prior to termination was much 
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Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. 
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discriminatory motive required for employee's 
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Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
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Statistical analysis of employer's reduction in 
force plan (RIF) was insufficient to support 
inference of age discrimination in employee's 
age discrimination action for alleged disparate 
treatment under the ADEA in connection with his 
termination; analysis took into account only two 
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Fact that 60-year-old employee's replacement 
was only 43 years old and that shortly before 
employee's discharge, employer moved a 
younger employee, who held a higher position, 
ahead of him on the successor list for promotion, 
without more, was insufficient to create inference 
of discriminatory motive required to support 
claim of disparate treatment age discrimination 
under the ADEA. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. 
v. Potlatch 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
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§ 623(a)( J). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Ill) Civil Rights 
.~~~.Age Discrimination 
Statistical analysis of employer's reduction in 
force plan (RIF) was insufficient to support 
inference of age discrimination in employee's 
age discrimination action for alleged disparate 
impact under the ADEA, although analysis did 
tend to show at least some relationship between 
age and termination, where employee was not 
subject to, nor terminated as part of, the RIF, 
which was not put into place until a month after 
employee was terminated and applied only to 
lower-level employees. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
1121 Civil Rights 
. ' " Disparate Impact 
A disparate impact claim challenges employment 
practices that are facially neutral in their 
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall 
more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business necessity. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
1131 Civil Rights 
.~."cDisparate Impact 
To make out a prima facie case of disparate 
impact under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show: 
(I) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral 
employment practices, and (2) a significantly 
adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of 
a particular age produced by the employer's 
facially neutral acts or practices. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
1141 Civil Rights 
$'''' Disparate Impact 
A disparate impact claim under the ADEA must 
challenge a specific business practice. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
1151 Federal Civil Procedure 
, ... Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Summary judgment is appropriate on a claim of 
disparate impact age discrimination under the 
ADEA when statistics do not support a disparate 
impact analysis. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq . 
14 Cases that cite this headnote 
[161 Libel and Slander 
,>c. Employees 
Under Idaho law, employer's statement that 
employee "elected to take early retirement," even 
if false, was not defamatory. 
1171 Libel and Slander 
.",,,Actionable Words in General 
Under Idaho law, defamatory statements are 
actionable without allegation and proof of special 
damages if they impute to the plaintiff: (I) a 
criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) a 
matter incol11p~tiblewith his trade, b~sil1~~~: 
Pottenger v. Potlatch 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
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profession, or office; or (4) serious sexual I Cases that cite this headnote 
misconduct. 
118J Libel and Slander 
'c0"Nature and Meaning in General 
Under Idaho law, even if employee alleged 
special harm stemming from statement by 
employer in notice to remaining employees that 
employee "elected to take early retirement," 
when in actuality employee was terminated, was 
insufficient to support claim of defamation per 
quod; although employee claimed that a reader 
could infer that he had committed some misdeed 
and was therefore terminated immediately, the 
notice stated that the retirement became effective 
a week from that time, and there was no evidence 
that anyone misconstrued the notice or that 
anyone would. 
/191 Libel and Slander 
.,=Special Damages 
Under Idaho law, in order to state a claim for 
defamation per quod, the plaintiff must allege 
and prove that some special harm resulted from 
the statement. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
120J Damages 
\,~Other Particular Cases 
Under Idaho law, employee's allegations that 
employer's conduct in firing him was outrageous 
because he worked for employer for 32 years, 
was not given an opportunity to save face, and 
because people might infer he was discharged for 
misconduct or that he was "deadwood," were 
insufficient to support claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against employer. 
121J Damages 
.,~~Elements in General 
In order to prove intentional infliction of 
emotional distress under Idaho law, plaintiff 
must show that defendant's conduct was extreme 
and outrageous and either intentionally or 
recklessly caused severe emotional distress. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho; Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, 
Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00612-EJL. 
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER and GOULD, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
OPINION 
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
Charles R. Pottenger worked for the Potlatch Corporation, 
a diversified forest products company, for 32 years until he 
was discharged in April 2000 at age 60. During his tenure 
at Potlatch, Pottenger rose to Group Vice President of Pulp 
and Paper, reporting directly to Potlatch's President, 
Richard Paulson. After his dismissal, Pottenger sued 
Potlatch alleging that he was forced to retire in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEN'), 29 
U.S.c. §§ 621 et seq., and the Idaho Human Rights Act, 
Idaho Code §§ 67-590 I et seq. Pottenger also claims 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation 
under Idaho law. The district court dismissed all 
V. Potlatch 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
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Pottenger's claims on summary judgment, and we affirm. 
I 
Pottenger joined Potlatch in 1968 after receiving his Ph.D. 
in paper technology. He held a variety of positions in the 
company, generally moving up through the ranks. In 1993, 
he became a group vice president, and at the date of his 
termination he was Group Vice President of Pulp and 
Paper. As a group vice president, Pottenger reported 
directly to the President and Chief Operating Officer of 
Potlatch, Richard Paulson, who reported to the CEO, 
Pendleton Siegel. Pottenger worked in Lewiston, Idaho, 
and oversaw Potlatch's operations in Idaho and Arkansas, 
including the Idaho Pulp and Paperboard Division 
("IPPD") based in Lewiston. After the cost of capital, 
IPPD lost $63.7 million in 1997, $67.4 million in 1998, 
$85.0 million in 1999, and $14.5 million in the first quarter 
of2000. 
In January 1999, shortly before he became president of 
Potlatch, Paulson attended an executive training course at 
the University of Michigan. After attending the training 
course, Paulson decided that Potlatch needed to make "real 
and significant" changes in order to improve its 
performance. On November 23, 1999, Pottenger and three 
of his colleagues responsible for pulp and paperboard met 
with Paulson in Spokane, Washington, to talk about 
turning the pulp and paperboard business around. At the 
meeting, Paulson characterized Pottenger and his team as 
an "old management team" using an "old business modeL" 
In February 2000, Paulson gave Pottenger his performance 
review for 1999. Pottenger received an MR- rating. In the 
Potlatch rating system, MR+ means that the individual has 
more than met the requirements of the job. MR means that 
the individual has fully met the requirements of the job. 
MR- means that there is some reason for concern. MM 
means that *744 the individual has met the minimum 
requirements for the job. Out of twelve managers listed in 
Potlatch's records that year, two received MR+ ratings, six 
received MR ratings, three received MR- ratings, and one 
received an MM rating. On the review form, Paulson 
characterized Pottenger's strengths as "smart," "knows 
business," "loyal to Potlatch," "technical knowledge," 
"enthusiastic leader," and "wants Potlatch to succeed." He 
also wrote the following under areas for improvement: 
"break victim mentality in IPPD," "be a strong leader in 
stopping the 'mill town' mentality in Lewiston," "set 
higher expectations for people," and "think in terms of 
opportunities and develop change strategies to get there." 
In March 2000, the Potlatch management committee, 
which included Pottenger, met to discuss cost-cutting 
strategies. Because the company was in financial trouble, 
the committee members made a commitment to each other 
to eliminate "deadwood," and to do so quickly. At the end 
of March, the committee distributed a memo announcing 
that the company was embarking on a course of significant 
change in response to poor earnings. The changes included 
a wide array of cost-cutting measures (including cuts in 
travel, mail, cell phone, and trade association expenses). 
The memo also announced that over the next two months 
the committee would be "evaluating where to make 
significant reductions in the number of salaried positions." 
The management committee met again on April 12,2000, 
to discuss the company's plan for a reduction in force. 
During the day, Paulson and Siegel (Potlatch's CEO) met 
separately from the committee for 10-15 minutes to discuss 
Pottenger. Paulson described his concerns that Pottenger 
was not capable of bringing about real and significant 
change in the Lewiston operation. At their meeting, 
Paulson and Siegel decided to fire Pottenger. 
Paulson told Pottenger of his termination on April 18, 
2000. When Pottenger asked Paulson why he was being 
fired, Paulson stated that he lacked confidence that 
Pottenger had the commitment to make the hard decisions 
necessary to make Potlatch successfuL] Paulson offered 
Pottenger an enhanced severance package as part of his 
termination. Without the enhancement, Pottenger was 
entitled to 52 weeks of severance pay (equaling his yearly 
base pay of $324, 120) and one year of employee benefits 
(medical, dental, and life insurance). After a year, Potlatch 
would pay monthly retirement benefits of$15,134.74 and 
75% of Pottenger's medical, dental, and life insurance 
premiums. The enhanced severance package included an 
additional 26 weeks of base pay (for a total of78 weeks or 
$486,180) and an additional monthly payment thereafter of 
$5,401.74 (for a total monthly payment of $20,536.48). 
The enhanced package also offered fully-paid medical, 
dental, and life insurance until age 65 (the mandatory 
retirement age for executives at Potlatch), and 75% 
payment thereafter. In return for the enhanced severance 
package, Paulson asked Pottenger to sign a separation 
agreement waJvmg any claim under the Age 
Discrimination Employment Act. 
The next day, the company distributed a memo to all 
employees from Paulson stating that Pottenger had 
"elected to take early retirement." Pottenger had declined 
Paulson's offer the previous day to help *745 write the 
notice. The memo stated that Craig Nelson, formerly the 
Consumer Products Division Vice President, was 
assuming Pottenger's position. At the time, Pottenger was 
60 years old and Nelson was 43. 
I'nr:rAnnpr v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
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Pottenger ultimately declined the enhanced severance 
package and refused to waive his claims under the ADEA. 
He then brought suit in federal district court claiming age 
discrimination under the ADEA, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621 et seq., 
and the Idaho Human Rights Act,2 Idaho Code § 67-5909, 
and claiming defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
The district court granted Potlatch's motion for summary 
judgment. The court found that Pottenger had made out a 
prima facie case of age discrimination, but that Potlatch 
had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
discharging Pottenger-that he was not prepared to make the 
tough decisions necessary to tum around the Idaho Pulp 
and Paper Division. The court found that Pottenger had not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
the reason articulated by Potlatch was pretext. Pottenger, 
the court noted, did not contest that lPPD lost money 
during his tenure as head of that division. Rather he 
attacked the company's decision to address the losses by 
replacing him. The court also rejected Pottenger's 
disparate impact age discrimination claim because of the 
unreliability of his statistical evidence. 
The court also granted summary judgment against 
Pottenger on his defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims. It found that the company's 
statement that Pottenger had "elected" early retirement did 
not constitute defamation per se. It concluded that 
Pottenger had not supported his intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim because there was no evidence in 
the record tending to show that Potlatch's conduct was 
"extreme and outrageous." 
fll We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 
Frank V. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 849 (9th 
Cir.2000). 
II 
A. Disparate Treatment Age Discrimination Claim 
12 J 131 The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer ... to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual [who is 
at least 40 years old] ... because of such individual's age." 
29 U .S.C. § 623(a)(I). To prove age discrimination under a 
disparate treatment theory, Pottenger must show that his 
age" 'actually played a role in [Potlatch's decisionmaking] 
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.' 
" Reeves V. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133,141,120 S.Ct. 2097,147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(quoting 
Hazen Paper CO. V. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 
1701 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (I?93)):II1.~'I~11I~til1~ 
discrimination claims, we employ the familiar framework 
developed in McDonnell Douglas COlp. V. Green, 411 
U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Wallis 
V. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). 
141 Pottenger has made out a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. He was 60 years old; his most recent 
performance review grade ofMR- was not outstanding, but 
indicated that he was meeting the requirements of the job; 
he was discharged; and he was replaced by Craig *746 
Nelson, then 43 years old, a substantially younger 
employee with equal or inferior qualifications. See 
Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th 
Cir.2000). Potlatch, in tum, has articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Pottenger: a lack 
of confidence that Pottenger could make the hard decisions 
necessary to tum around the ailing Idaho Pulp and 
Paperboard Division, which he headed. It is undisputed 
that IPPD lost over $200 million during 1997, 1998, 1999, 
and the first quarter of2000. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 
120 S.Ct. 2097 (holding that the employer's burden is one 
of production, not persuasion). 
Pottenger may establish pretext through evidence showing 
that Potlatch's explanation is unworthy of belief or through 
evidence showing that discrimination more likely 
motivated its decision. Pottenger need not rely on only one 
type of evidence, and he has offered evidence both to cast 
doubt on Potlatch's credibility and to show a 
discriminatory motive. Id. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Chuang 
V. Univ. orCal. Davis, Bd. or Trs., 225 F.3d 1115,1127 
(9th Cir.2000). At the summary judgment stage, 
Pottenger's burden is not high. He must only show that a 
rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, find that 
Potlatch's explanation was pretextual and that therefore its 
action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons. 
If he does so, then summary judgment for Potlatch is 
inappropriate. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. 
151161 Pottenger advances several reasons that, in his view, 
undermine Potlatch's explanation of his discharge. They 
include positive comments in his performance review, 
shifting justifications for his dismissal, the brevity of the 
meeting at which the president and CEO reached their 
decision to discharge him, and the procedures followed in 
his termination. Considering all of Pottenger's evidence 
together, however, we conclude that he has not created a 
genuine issue of material fact. Pottenger's performance 
review did contain some positive comments, but it also 
contained negative comments specifically singling out 
concerns with his performance in managing IPPD. 
Potlatch's proffered explanation does not state that 
Pottenger was incompetent or a generally bad employee; 
rather, it states that Potlatch lacked confidence that 
Pottenger could help tum the company around. Instead of 
v. Potlatch 329 F.3d 740 
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casting doubt on Potlatch's explanation, the statements in 
the performance review are consistent with it. Moreover, 
although" 'fundamentally different justifications for an 
employer's action ... give rise to a genuine issue of fact 
with respect to pretext: " Payne V. Norwest Corp., 113 
FJd 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Washington v. 
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.I993 », Pottenger has 
pointed to no evidence suggesting that Potlatch has ever 
offered a reason for his dismissal other than doubt about 
his commitment to making hard decisions to help the 
company. 
Finally, the duration of the meeting between Paulson and 
Siegel at which they made the termination decision and the 
manner of Pottenger's discharge do not create a factual 
issue regarding the company's credibility. The meeting 
between Paulson and Siegel at which they ultimately made 
the decision to terminate Pottenger was short, but it 
obviously came at the end of a much longer process of 
evaluation and deliberation. There is also little evidence of 
an established formal or informal company procedure for 
discharging high-level employees. In fact, when Pottenger 
himself discharged the then-head of the Idaho Pulp and 
Paper Division in 1997, he did so in a manner similar to his 
own discharge. Potlatch's failure to follow some 
unspecified procedure in its treatment *747 of Pottenger 
does not cast any doubt on its proffered reason for his 
termination. 
[71 To show discriminatory motive, Pottenger states that 
Paulson made comments referring to an "old management 
team," an "old business model," and "deadwood." 
Remarks can constitute evidence of discrimination. The 
Supreme Court has held that telling an employee he "was 
so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower" and 
"was too damn old to do [his] job" constituted evidence of 
age discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 
2097 (alteration in original). We have found a triable issue 
of material fact when an employee was told upon applying 
for an executive position that the board "wanted somebody 
younger for the job," Schnidrig V. Columbia Mach., lnc., 
80 F.3d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir.1996), and, in a Title VII 
case, when an employee was told, during the period that he 
was otherwise eligible for a university position, that "two 
Chinks" in the department was "more than enough," 
Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1128. These remarks are clearly 
sufficient to support an inference that the decisionmaker 
acted in a discriminatory fashion. In other cases, we have 
held that some remarks lead to no reasonable inference of 
discrimination and thus no triable issue of material fact 
exists. We have found that a supervisor's comment about 
getting rid of "old timers" because they would not "kiss 
[his] ass" did not sufficiently support an inference of age 
discrimination, Nidds V. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 
F.3d 912,918-19 (9th Cir.1996), that a comment that "we 
don't necessarily like grey hair" constituted "at best weak 
circumstantial evidence" of discriminatory animus, Nesbit 
V. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1993), that the 
use of the phrase "old-boy network" is generally 
considered a colloquialism unrelated to age, Rose V. Wells 
Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,1423 (9th Cir.1990), and that 
an employer's comment describing a younger employee 
promoted over an older employee as a "bright, intelligent, 
knowledgeable young man" did not create an inference of 
age discrimination, Merrick V. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 
F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1990). 
Paulson's remarks in this case do not sufficiently support 
an inference of age discrimination so as to create a triable 
issue of material fact that would defeat summary 
judgment. In the context of this case, the phrase "old 
business model," does not support an inference of age 
discrimination. Similar to the language in Rose, the phrase 
is a colloquialism not generally associated with the target's 
age. Nor does Paulson's use of the term "old management 
team" during the same meeting create a triable issue of 
fact. Similarly, the management committee's use of the 
term "deadwood" does not suggest age discrimination. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines "deadwood" as "[a] 
person or thing regarded as useless or unprofitable; a 
hindrance or impediment." 4 Oxford English Dictionary 
293 (2d ed.1989). 
18] [91 Pottenger also contends that the company's June 
2000 reduction in force ("RIF") disproportionately 
affected older employees. However, the statistical analysis 
of the RIF offered by Pottenger is insufficient to raise a 
triable issue of discrimination. A plaintiff may use 
statistics to show an intent to discriminate. See, e.g., 
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1282-83; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1423. 
Potlatch, however, objects to the use of statistics from the 
RIF because Pottenger's dismissal was not formally part of 
the RIF. Nevertheless, if Pottenger can show that age was a 
motivating factor in determining who would be terminated 
under the RIF, that would constitute circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination in his dismissal. 
*748 Pottenger's statistical analysis of the RIF takes into 
account only two variables-the employee's age at the time 
of the RIF and whether the employee was terminated. The 
numbers show a statistically significant relationship 
between these two variables, but this court and others have 
treated skeptically statistics that fail to account for other 
relevant variables. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283 (holding 
that to raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext based 
solely on statistics, the statistics "must show a stark pattern 
of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than 
age" (internal quotation marks omitted»; see also Frank V. 
United Airlines, Inc., 216 FJd 845, 856 (9th Cir.2000) 
("An employer does not violate the ADEA by 
v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740 (2003) 
91 Fair Empi.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1530, 61 Fed. R:Evid. Servo 388 ... 
discriminating based on a factor that is merely empirically 
correlated with age."); Sheehan V. Daily Racing Form, 104 
FJd 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1 997) (criticizing a statistical 
analysis showing a correlation between age and discharge 
for failing to take account of any other relevant variable 
and finding the statistics without evidentiary significance); 
Rea V. Martin Marietta Corp .. 29 FJd 1450, 1456 (lOth 
Cir. I 994) ("[A] plaintiff's statistical evidence must focus 
on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the 
disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment 
between comparable individuals." (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Pottenger's expert had data about other relevant variables 
besides age and termination status, yet his statistical 
analysis makes no attempt to take these variables into 
account. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283; Rose, 902 F.2d at 
1425. In addition, Pottenger declined the opportunity to 
make use of the variable most likely to have offered a 
legally appropriate explanation of why certain employees 
were selected for lay-off: job performance. Although job 
performance may have been an important factor in 
determining who would be laid off, Pottenger specifically 
acquiesced in the suggestion that obtaining data about 
individual employees' performance reviews was 
unnecessary. If Pottenger had had access to only two 
variables, we would be presented with a different case. But 
here, where Pottenger had or had access to additional 
relevant data and chose not to use it, we conclude that 
Pottenger's statistical analysis is insufficient to raise a 
triable issue of fact regarding pretext. 
/1 01 Pottenger also argues discriminatory motive may be 
inferred from the fact that his replacement was only 43 
years old and that shortly before his discharge the company 
moved a younger employee ahead of him on the successor 
list for CEO. Evidence that forms part of the prima facie 
case may also be considered to show that a proffered 
explanation is pre-textual. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 
S.Ct. 2097. Without more, however, the fact that Nelson 
was younger than Pottenger does not create a triable issue 
of pretext. Nor does the fact that the company moved a 
younger employee ahead of Pottenger on the CEO 
successor list suggest that Potlatch acted with any 
discriminatory motive, for that employee had held a higher 
position in the company than Pottenger. 
We have considered all of Pottenger's evidence of pre-text 
and conclude that it does not refute Potlatch's basic 
rationale for Pottenger's termination-that IPPD was losing 
money and the company lacked faith that Pottenger was 
the one to turn IPPD around. Potlatch has leeway to make 
subjective business decisions, even bad ones. See 
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285; Cotton V. City of Alameda, 812 
F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir.1987). It may have been unfair 
(and perhaps unwise) for Potlatch to blame Pottenger for 
IPPD's losses, but it is not surprising that Pott;nger's 
bosses would try to make a change in leadership *749 in a 
division that was having such consistent trouble. We hold 
that Pottenger has not created a genuine factual issue of 
pretext and the district court properly dismissed his 
disparate treatment claim on summary judgment. 
B. Disparate Impact Age Discrimination Claim 
111J 1121 The Supreme Court has not addressed whether 
plaintiffs may bring disparate impact claims under the 
ADEA, but this circuit permits such claims. See Katz v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 229 F.3d 831, 835 (9th 
Cir.2000); Frank, 216 F.3d at 856; EEOC v. Local 350, 
Plumbers and Pipe jitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n. 2 (9th 
Cir.1993). A disparate impact claim challenges 
"employment practices that are facially neutral in their 
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more 
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity." Int'l Bd of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 
396 (1977). 
1131 /141 To make out a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, Pottenger must show "( I) the occurrence of certain 
outwardly neutral employment practices, and (2) a 
significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on 
persons of a particular [age] produced by the employer's 
facially neutral acts or practices." Katz, 229 F.3d at 835 
(quoting Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th 
Cir.1986» (alteration in original). A disparate impact 
claim must challenge a specific business practice. The RIF 
would constitute such a practice. See Rose, 902 F.2d at 
1424-25 (holding that Wells Fargo's policy of committing 
employment decisions in a RIF to the subjective discretion 
of its managers constituted a specific employment practice 
subject to disparate impact analysis). 
I] 51 The district court found that Potlatch had discredited 
Pottenger's statistical evidence and therefore dismissed his 
disparate impact claim. Summary judgment is appropriate 
when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis. 
See Katz, 229 F.3d at 835 (affirming summary judgment 
dismissal where the plaintiffs were "unable to set forth a 
substantial statistical disparity that would raise an 
inference of intentional discrimination"). To make out a 
prima facie case of disparate impact, Pottenger must show 
only that a facially neutral business practice had a 
significant adverse effect on older workers. Arnett v. Cal. 
Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 697 (9th 
Cir.1999), vacated on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111, 120 
S.Ct. 930, 145 L.Ed.2d 807 (2000). Pottenger's statistical 
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analysis of the RIF does tend to show at least some 
relationship between age and termination. It does not tend 
to show that age motivated RIF decisions, which is why it 
does not help Pottenger establish a disparate treatment 
claim. But such a showing of causation is not necessary for 
a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
In the context of this case, Pottenger's disparate impact 
claim nonetheless fails because Pottenger was not 
terminated as part of the RIF. When Potlatch discharged 
Pottenger in April, the RIF was under consideration, but it 
did not actually begin until June. Pottenger argues, 
however, that his discharge was functionally part of the 
RIF because the enhanced severance package offered to 
him was similar in structure (though not in dollar amount) 
to that suggested for use in the RIF, and because he was 
given 45 days to consider the package, as had been 
suggested for employees subject to the RIF. Pottenger 
acknowledges, however, that when Potlatch terminated 
him, the company did not use the objective, four-step 
evaluation process used to identify employees to be 
terminated *750 as part of the RIF. Moreover, Pottenger 
was a high-level executive, while the RIF targeted 
rank-and-file employees. To bring a disparate impact 
claim, Pottenger must show that he was subject to the 
particular employment practice with the alleged disparate 
impact. Because Pottenger was not formally or 
functionally subject to the RIF, his disparate impact claim 
cannot survive summary judgment. 
C. State-Law Tort Claims 
(16) [1711181 1191 Finally, we affirm the district court's 
summary judgment dismissal of Pottenger's state-law tort 
claims. Potlatch's statement that Pottenger "elected to take 
early retirement," even if false, was not defamatory. Under 
Idaho law, defamatory statements are actionable without 
allegation and proof of special damages if they impute to 
the plaintiff I) a criminal offense; 2) a loathsome disease; 
3) a matter incompatible with his trade, business, 
profession, or office; or 4) serious sexual misconduct. 
Footnotes 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 
416, 425 (I996). The statement that Pottenger "elected to 
take early retirement" does not impute to Pottenger any of 
these things.3 
120 J 1211 Pottenger's intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim also fails. In order to prove intentional 
infliction of emotional distress under Idaho law, Pottenger 
must show that Potlatch's conduct was "extreme and 
outrageous" and either "intentionally or recklessly" caused 
"severe emotional distress." Brown v. A1atthews Mortuary, 
Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37, 41 (1990); Hatfield v. 
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 
944,953-54 (1980). Pottenger argues that the company's 
conduct was outrageous because he was fired after 32 
years at the company, because he was not given an 
opportunity to save face, because people might infer he 
was discharged for misconduct or because he was 
"deadwood," and because the company incorrectly stated 
that he "elected" early retirement. The Idaho Supreme 
Court requires "very extreme conduct" before finding 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brown, 80 I 
P.2d at 41. None of these allegations approach the sort of 
extreme conduct described by the Idaho court in cases 
where plaintiffs recovered for emotional distress from 
discharge. See Holmes v. Union Oil Co., 114 Idaho 773, 
760 P.2d 1189, 1197 (1988) (describing cases where a 
supervisor made abusive and racially motivated remarks 
when terminating an employee and where a manager fired 
waitresses in alphabetical order to coerce them into 
disclosing *751 whether one of them was stealing from the 
restaurant ). 
AFFIRMED. 
Parallel Citations 
91 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1530, 61 Fed. R. Evid. 
Servo 388, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 4127, 2003 Daily 
Journal D.A.R. 5320 
1 Pottenger and Paulson characterize Paulson's words slightly differently, but the parties agree to the substance of the remarks. 
2 The Idaho Human Rights Act incorporates the major protections of the ADEA into statc law. See Idaho Code §§ 67-5901,67-5909. 
The parties have not separately briefed the state and federal discrimination claims, and we treat them together. 
3 Pottenger also alleges defamation per quod-a broader category of defamation that allows a plaintiff to show injury from a statement 
based on extrinsic evidence or innuendo. See Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173,249 P.2d 192. 195 (1952). In order to state 
such a claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that some special harm resulted from the statement. Yoakum. 923 P.2d at 425. The 
district court concluded that Pottenger did not allege special hann. We need not decide whether this is so. because even assuming that 
Pottenger did allege special harm, his defamation claim still fails. Pottenger claims that a reader could infer from Potlatch's statement 
that he had committed some misdeed and was therefore terminated immediately. First. the announcement, dated April 19, stated that 
329 F.3d 740 
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Pottenger's retirement was effective June I. Therefore. it is not reasonable that anyone could infer he had been immediately 
dismissed. Second, Pottenger otTers no evidence that anyone misconstrued the announcement or that anyone would. See Bistline V. 
Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 40 I P.2d 555. 558 (1965) ("'The fact that the plaintiff himself places an actionable connotation on the 
statements does not make such statements actionable."). There is simply no reason to believe that anyone would infer that when 
Potlatch wrote that Pottenger had "elected to take early retirement," the phrase connoted anything disparaging about him. 
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217 F.3d 1234 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
William J. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster 
General, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 99-15289. I Argued and Submitted April 
26, 2000. I Filed July 7, 2000. 
United States Postal Service employee sued government 
for retaliation in violation of Title VII. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
Garland E. Burrell, J., entered summary judgment for 
government. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Betty B. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) as set forth 
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
guidelines, "adverse employment action" required for 
Title VII retaliation claim is adverse treatment that is 
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in 
protected activity; (2) employee suffered cognizable 
adverse employment actions when employer, in alleged 
retaliation for employee's complaints concerning 
management's treatment of women employees, eliminated 
employee meetings, eliminated flexible start-time policy, 
instituted workplace "lockdown," and reduced 
employee's workload and salary; (3) as matter of first 
impression, hostile work environment may be basis for 
retaliation claim under Title VII; and (4) genuine fact 
issue existed as to whether employee was subjected to 
hostile work environment, thus precluding summary 
judgment on hostile work environment-based retaliation 
claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes (18) 
II) Postal Service 
·~··Officers, Clerks, and Employees 
Postal employee may bring suit under Title VII 
anti-retaliation provision pursuant to statute 
extending Title VII protection to federal 
employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 704(a), 
717, as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 2000e-3(a), 
12] 
13) 
14) 
2000e-16. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
'V'cpractices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
To make out prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII, employee must show that (1) he 
engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer 
subjected him to adverse employment action; 
and (3) a causal link exists between protected 
activity and adverse action. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U .S.C.A. § 
2000e-3( a). 
241 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
·;'.=Retaliation Claims 
If plaintiff has asserted prima facie retaliation 
claim under Title VII, burden shifts to defendant 
to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its decision. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§ 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-3(a). 
69 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
v=Retaliation Claims 
In Title VII retaliation action, if defendant 
articulates legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for adverse employment decision, plaintiff bears 
ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason 
was merely a pretext for a discriminatory 
motive. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
92 Cases that cite this headnote 
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Civil Rights 
>c; Activities Protected 
Making an informal complaint to a supervisor is 
a protected activity under Title VII 
anti-retaliation provision. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e-3(a). 
16 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,"~Activities Protected 
Employee's complaints about the treatment of 
others is considered a protected activity under 
Title VII anti-retaliation provision, even if 
employee is not a member of the class that he 
claims suffered from discrimination, and even if 
discrimination he complained about was not 
legally cognizable. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,,},Adverse Actions in General 
While mere ostracism by co-workers does not 
constitute an "adverse employment action" for 
purposes of Title VII anti-retaliation provision, a 
lateral transfer does. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
35 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.",Adverse Actions in General 
"Adverse employment action," as required for 
Title VII retaliation claim, is adverse treatment 
that is reasonably likely to deter employees from 
engaging in protected activity, and this includes 
such actions as lateral transfers, unfavorable job 
[91 
references, and changes in work schedules. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
240 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,;.,,,,Administrative Agencies and Proceedings 
Although Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) Guidelines are not binding 
on the courts, they constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance. 
(10) Civil Rights 
·>··Adverse Actions in General 
Definition of adverse employment action, as 
required for Title VII retaliation claim, does not 
cover every offensive utterance by co-workers, 
because offensive statements by co-workers do 
not reasonably deter employees from engaging 
in protected activity. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
133 Cases that cite this headnote 
1111 Postal Service 
.>Officers, Clerks, and Employees 
Postal employee suffered cognizable "adverse 
employment actions," as required for Title VII 
retaliation claim, when employer, in alleged 
retaliation for employee's complaints 
concerning management's treatment of women 
employees, eliminated employee meetings and 
flexible start-time policy, instituted "Iockdown" 
of workplace, and reduced employee's workload 
and salary disproportionately to reductions faced 
by other employees; actions decreased 
employee's pay, decreased amount of time he 
had to complete same amount of work, and 
v. 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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decreased his ability to influence workplace 
policy, and so were reasonably likely to deter 
employees from complaining about workplace 
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
704(a), 717, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e-3(a),2000e-16. 
34 Cases that cite this headnote 
II 21 Postal Service 
.. "'''Officers, Clerks, and Employees 
Postal employee established causal link between 
his protected complaint activity under Title VII 
and adverse employment actions, as required for 
Title VII retaliation claim, by demonstrating that 
each action was implemented close on the heels 
of his complaints. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 
704(a), 717, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e-3(a),2000e-16. 
24 Cases that cite this headnote 
1131 Federal Civil Procedure 
.}~Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Fact questions existed as to whether 
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by United 
States Postal Service (USPS) for adverse actions 
taken against employee, including elimination of 
flexible start-time policy, institution of 
workplace lockdown in alleged response to 
death threat, and reduction in employee's pay as 
part of across-the-board cuts, were pretexts for 
retaliation following employee's complaints 
conceming management's treatment of women 
employees, thus precluding summary judgment 
on Title VII retaliation claim. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, §§ 704(a), 717, as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-3(a), 2000e-16. 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
1141 Civil Rights 
... =Harassment; Work Environment 
Hostile work environment may be the basis for a 
retaliation claim under Title VII. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e-3(a). 
II Cases that cite this headnote 
1151 Civil Rights 
;~=Hostile Environment; Severity, 
Pervasiveness, and Frequency 
Harassment is actionable under Title VII only if 
it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
conditions of victim's employment and create 
abusive working environment, and it must be 
both objectively and subjectively offensive. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
22 Cases that cite this headnote 
[161 Civil Rights 
,y··Hostile Environment; Severity, 
Pervasiveness, and Frequency 
To determine whether an environment is 
sufficiently hostile to support harassment claim 
under Title VII, courts look to totality of the 
circumstances, including frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with employee's work performance. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
20 Cases that cite this headnote 
(17) Civil Rights 
.,,'Hostile Environment; Severity, 
Pervasiveness, and Frequency 
Repeated derogatory or humiliating statements 
can constitute a hostile work environment under 
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et 
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq . 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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118) Federal Civil Procedure 
'~''''Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Evidence that postal service employee was, inter 
alia, subjected to verbal abuse by supervisors, 
subjected to pranks, and falsely accused of 
misconduct raised genuine fact issue as to 
whether employee was subjected to hostile work 
environment after he complained about 
treatment of women in his workplace, thus 
precluding summary judgment on hostile work 
environment-based retaliation claim under Title 
VI L Civil Rights Act of 1964, § § 704( a), 717, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-3(a), 2000e-16. 
33 Cases that cite this headnote 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California; Garland E. Burrell, District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-0l776-GEB. 
Before: B. FLETCHER, ALARCON, and HAWKINS, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
Betty B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
In this case we are called upon to determine whether 
William J. Ray suffered adverse employment actions after 
complaining of harassment at his workplace. We hold that 
in our circuit an adverse employment action is adverse 
treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees 
from engaging in protected activity. Under this standard, 
we conclude that Ray suffered cognizable adverse 
employment actions when his employer, in retaliation for 
Ray's complaints concerning management's treatment of 
women employees, eliminated employee meetings, 
eliminated its flexible starting time policy, instituted a 
"lockdown" of the workplace, and cut Ray's salary. We 
also hold that Ray has a cognizable claim for retaliation 
based on his supervisors' creation of a hostile work 
environment. 
William Ray has been a rural postal carrier in Willits, 
California for over 28 years. In addition to Ray, there are 
four other rural carriers. Ray's immediate supervisor at 
the Willits Post Office is Dale Briggs, and the Postmaster 
is Dan Carey. 
Prior to the events at issue in this case, the rural carriers 
had a flexible start-time. Ray and the other carriers 
generally arrived at work between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00 
A.M, and they went out on their delivery routes at 9:45 
A.M. Because their salaries were fixed, arriving early did 
not affect their incomes, however it did give them time to 
sort mail and do other administrative tasks before leaving 
on their routes. 
In 1994, Ray and his co-workers became concerned about 
gender bias and harassment at the post office. Several 
female employees had apparently sought medical advice 
and transfers because of harassment by Briggs. The 
subject of the harassment of women first came up at a 
March 30, 1994 Employee Involvement meeting. I At that 
meeting, a female janitorial employee raised her hand and 
asked to be recognized to speak. Postmaster Carey 
"immediately wheeled around, swinging his arm, yelled 
and pointed. He ordered [the employee] out of the 
meeting." After she had left, Ray spoke up. He stated his 
objections to the treatment of women at the post office. 
Postmaster Carey vehemently denied the charges, and 
berated Ray as a "liar." 
Ray next made a complaint about the treatment of women 
at an April 7, 1994 Rural Carriers Employee Involvement 
meeting. Carey again angrily denied the charges. After 
these complaints failed to spur any change, Ray and two 
of his co-workers wrote a letter complaining of the 
harassment of women to Lito Sajones, Carey's supervisor. 
The letter prompted a meeting, held in the nearby Ukiah 
Post Office on June IS, 1994, regarding the alleged 
harassment. At that meeting, Carey stated his displeasure 
that Ray had written the complaint to his supervisor. He 
said that, because of the letter, "I may have to change my 
*1238 whole approach to management. I've been a 
manager f()reil?,~teen'years. I have left Y()U alone. Its 
V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 753,78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,196 ... 
called self-management. I may have to change that." 
Carey did not effectuate that threat until February 1995. 
However, in the meantime Briggs and Carey publicly 
berated Rayon a regular basis. For example, Briggs 
yelled at Ray at a staff meeting on November 10, 1994, 
after Ray had made a suggestion for improving efficiency 
at the office. On December 24, 1994, Postmaster Carey 
called Ray a "rabble rouser" and a "troublemaker," and 
said he would cancel all future Employee Involvement 
meetings at the post office, apparently to avoid further 
complaints about gender bias and harassment. He also 
stated that "if Bill Ray has so much time for talking, 
maybe he is coming in [to the office] too early." This was 
another veiled threat to end the "self management" policy 
under which workers set their own starting and finishing 
times. 
One week later, Ray met with Briggs and Carey to discuss 
employees' rights to communicate with other employees. 
Ray fled the meeting after Carey yelled at him and made 
physically threatening gestures toward him. 
One month later, on January 31, 1995, Ray and the union 
shop steward, Bob Daitoku, met with Carey to discuss 
Carey's recent decision to cancel the Employee 
Involvement meetings. Carey stated that "We're not 
having any E./. program as long as you're writing letters 
over my head." 
Postmaster Carey made good on his threat to eliminate 
both the Employee Involvement program and the 
"self-management" policy soon after the January meeting. 
In February 1995, Briggs announced that all rural carriers 
were required to come to work at a fixed starting time: 
7:00 A.M. When the fixed start time was instituted, the 
postal carriers found themselves with less time to sort the 
mail prior to going out on their routes. Ray states that he 
had the longest route and the largest amount of mail to 
sort; the 7:00 A.M. start time forced him to work at top 
speed, sorting 60 letters per minute and 40 magazines per 
minute, even though the Rural Carrier Handbook states 
that the standard allowable rate for sorting mail is 16 
letters per minute and 8 magazines per minute. The 7:00 
A.M. start time also forced Ray to work later in the 
afternoon so that he could finish some of the 
administrative tasks that he had previously done in the 
morning. 
In May 1995, Ray's wife became extremely ill. Ray 
wanted to leave work earlier in order to take care of her, 
and he therefore requested to come to work half an hour 
early-at 6:30 A.M. While Briggs granted the request, he 
repeatedly threatened to retract the early start time. 
Ray continued to be the target of Briggs and Carey's 
hostility during the summer and fall of 1995. On one 
occasion, after Ray made a suggestion at an office 
meeting, Briggs yelled at him, telling him to "shut up" 
and "that's a direct order." 
Ray was twice falsely charged with misconduct. He was 
accused, and then cleared, of opening a package. He was 
later accused, and then cleared, of knocking down a 
mailbox on his route. Also, a series of pranks were played 
on Ray during this time. For example, someone left a dog 
biscuit near Ray's work space. On another occasion, Ray 
found a ball bearing in his work space. 
On October 13, 1995, Ray filed a request for counseling 
with the EEOC, complaining of a hostile work 
environment. He alleged that the management at the 
Willits Post office employed a "singling-out-and-punish 
method of controlling and frightening and eventually 
demoralizing the workers." In his EEOC request he also 
stated that: 
It is because of [management's] 
conviction they are doing the right thing 
that makes the situation so troubling and 
actionable at law. The Joint Statement 
on Violence and Behavior In the 
Workplace clearly outlaws their 
practices and * 1239 a contin uati on of 
their pattern will be dire. Four people 
have said to me the SPO should be 
killed. They were speaking out of 
frustration and pain. But this should 
show that the situation is not isolated to 
my complaint. 
On November 7, 1995, Ray took stress leave from work. 
On November 22, while Ray was still out on stress leave, 
Postmaster Carey received a copy of the EEO complaint. 
He immediately instituted a procedure called "lockdown" 
at the Willits Post Office.2 During lockdown, the doors to 
the loading docks were kept locked at all times. Every 
time Ray (or another postal carrier) needed to load his 
vehicle with mail, he would have to unlock the doors, 
push his mail cart out onto the loading dock, go back 
inside and lock the doors, and then exit through a side 
door to take the mail from the cart into his car. To get 
back inside the post office, he would have to ring a bell 
and wait for another postal employee to open the door. 
The lockdown procedure turned a process that had taken 
seconds into one taking several minutes. 
Postmaster Carey states that he instituted the lockdown 
because Ray's complaint to the EEO contained a death 
threat. Briggs ordered Ray not to come back to the office, 
V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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and called in a Postal Inspector to determine whether the 
EEO letter constituted a threat. The Inspector, Robert 
Dortch, conducted an investigation into the matter. He 
determined that no death threat had been made, and Ray 
was allowed to return to work. Nonetheless, even after the 
inspector had cleared Ray of wrongdoing, a temporary 
supervisor, Bill Wilber, announced to the staff that Ray 
had made a death threat. The lockdown at the Willits Post 
Office continued until February 1996, when it was 
discontinued without explanation. 
Also in response to the supposed death threat, on 
December 1, 1995 Postmaster Carey canceled Ray's 6:30 
start time, requiring him to arrive at work at 7:00 A.M. 
Carey stated that he did not want Ray coming to work 
early because he "had to be supervised at all times." 
Ray wrote additional EEO complaint letters on December 
13,1995, January 15 and 21, 1996, and April 1, 1996. In 
March 1996, Ray's postal route was reduced by 90 boxes, 
causing him to lose approximately $3,000 from his annual 
salary. Although all the postal carriers suffered cuts In 
their routes, Ray's route was cut the most. 
Ray's EEO complaint was heard by an Administrative 
Law Judge (All) on May 28, 1997. The All found that 
the United States Postal Service (USPS) had retaliated 
against Ray after he filed his written EEO counseling 
request, but rejected Ray's remaining claims. The USPS 
rejected the All's finding of retaliation and entered a 
final agency decision rejecting all of Ray's claims on 
August 13, 1997. 
Ray then filed suit in federal district court. His First 
Amended Complaint alleged retaliation for engaging in 
protected activity, discrimination, and failure to make 
accommodations for Ray to allow him to care for his ill 
wife. The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant on all claims. Ray appeals only the grant of 
summary judgment on his retaliation claim. 
II 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.s.c. § 1291. We review the district court's decision to 
grant summary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173 
F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952, 120 
S.Ct. 375, 145 L.Ed.2d 293 (1999). In reviewing an order 
denying or granting summary judgment, we must 
determine, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact and whether the *1240 
districtcourt correctlyappI}~d the substantive law. See id. 
III 
II) Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating 
against an employee because that employee "has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a). A postal employee 
may bring suit under § 2000e-3(a) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-16. See Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 450 (9th 
Cir.1976). 
12) 13/14/ To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, 
an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected 
activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse 
employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between 
the protected activity and the adverse action. See Steiner 
v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th 
Cir. I 994). If a plaintiff has asserted a prima facie 
retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
decision. Id. at 1464- I 465. If the defendant articulates 
such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of 
demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for a 
discriminatory motive. Id. 
15) 161 The parties do not contest that Ray engaged in 
protected activities when he complained of the treatment 
of women at the Willits Post Office both informally and 
formally with the EEOC.3 The heart of this dispute is 
whether Ray suffered cognizable adverse employment 
actions. Ray asserts that he suffered from changes in 
workplace policy and pay, as well as from a hostile work 
environment. We first examine the definition of an 
adverse employment action. We then discuss whether the 
changes in workplace policy and pay constitute adverse 
employment actions, and whether Ray has established a 
causal link between his protected activities and those 
adverse employment actions. Finally, we examine 
whether Ray's allegation that he was subjected to a 
hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in 
protected activity is cognizable under the anti-retaliation 
provisions of Title VII. 
IV 
The circuits are currently split as to what constitutes an 
adverse employment action. Although we have yet to 
V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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articulate a rule defining the contours of an adverse 
employment action, our prior cases situate us with those 
circuits that define adverse employment action broadly. 
Other circuits that define adverse employment action 
broadly are the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. 
Circuits. An intermediate position is held by the Second 
and Third Circuits. The most restrictive view of adverse 
employment actions is held by the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits. Below, we set forth the Ninth Circuit's position 
within this split, and explain the case law in the other 
circuits. Then, we examine what guidelines we should 
follow in analyzing whether an action constitutes an 
adverse employment action. 
I7J We have found that a wide array of disadvantageous 
changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment 
actions. *1241 While "mere ostracism" by co-workers 
does not constitute an adverse employment action, see 
Strother v. Southern Caliji'Jrnia Permanente AIedical 
Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir.1996), a lateral transfer 
does. In Yartzojf v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th 
Cir.1987), we held that "[t]ransfers of job duties and 
undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would 
constitute 'adverse employment decisions.' " The YartzofJ 
decision was in line with our earlier decision in Sf. John v. 
Employment Development Dept., 642 F.2d 273, 274 (9th 
Cir.1981), where we held that a transfer to another job of 
the same pay and status may constitute an adverse 
employment action.4 
Similarly, in Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 67 I. 676 (9th 
Cir. 1997), we found that the dissemination of an 
unfavorable job reference was an adverse employment 
action "because it was a 'personnel action' motivated by 
retaliatory animus." We so found even though the 
defendant proved that the poor job reference did not affect 
the prospective employer's decision not to hire the 
plaintiff: "That this unlawful personnel action turned out 
to be inconsequential goes to the issue of damages, not 
liability." Jd 
In Strother, we examined the case of an employee who, 
after complaining of discrimination, was excluded from 
meetings, seminars and positions that would have made 
her eligible for salary increases, was denied secretarial 
support, and was given a more burdensome work 
schedule. 79 F.3d at 869. We determined that she had 
suffered from adverse employment actions. Id. 
These cases place the Ninth Circuit in accord with the 
First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. These 
Circuits all take an expansive view of the type of actions 
that can be considered adverse employment actions. See 
Wyatt v. City olBoston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.1994) 
(adverse employment actions include "demotions, 
disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to 
promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and 
toleration of harassment by other employees"); Knox v. 
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (employer can 
be liable for retaliation if it permits "actions like moving 
the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy 
closet, depriving the person of previously available 
support services or cutting off challenging 
assignments"); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Group, 
76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir.1996) (employee 
demonstrated adverse employment action under the 
ADEA by showing that her employer "required her to go 
through several hoops in order to obtain her severance 
benefits"); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 
(10th Cir. I 996) (malicious prosecution by former 
employer can be adverse employment action); *1242 
Wideman v. Wal-lvfart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 
(11th Cir.1998) (adverse employment actions include an 
employer requiring plaintiff to work without lunch break, 
giving her a one-day suspension, soliciting other 
employees for negative statements about her, changing 
her schedule without notification, making negative 
comments about her, and needlessly delaying 
authorization for medical treatment); Passer v. American 
Chemical Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 330-331 (D.C.Cir.1991) 
(employer's cancellation of a public event honoring an 
employee can constitute adverse employment action 
under the ADEA, which has an anti-retaliation provision 
parallel to that in Title VII). 
The Second and Third circuits hold an intermediate 
position within the circuit split. They have held that an 
adverse action is something that materially affects the 
terms and conditions of employment. See Robinson v. 
City ol Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.1997) 
("retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough 
to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment ... to constitute [an] 'adverse 
employment action' "); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 
640 (2nd Cir. 1997) (to show an adverse employment 
action employee must demonstrate "a materially adverse 
change in the terms and conditions of employment") 
(quoting lvfcKenney v. New York City Orf-Track Betting 
Corp., 903 F.Supp. 619, 623 (S.D.N.Y.1995)). 
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, adopting the most 
restrictive test, hold that only "ultimate employment 
actions" such as hiring, firing, promoting and demoting 
constitute actionable adverse employment actions. See 
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th 
Cir.1997) (only "ultimate employment decisions" can be 
adverse employment decisions); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 
122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (transfer involving 
only minor changes in working conditions and no 
reduction in payor benefits is not an adverse employment 
action). 
V. Henderson, 211 F .3d i 234 (2000) 
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The government urges us to turn from our precedent, and 
to adopt the Fifth and Eighth Circuit rule that only 
"ultimate employment actions" such as hiring, firing, 
promoting and demoting constitute actionable adverse 
employment actions.s But we cannot square such a rule 
with our prior decisions. Actions that we consider adverse 
employment actions, such as the lateral transfers in 
Yartzoff and St. John, the unfavorable reference that had 
no affect on a prospective employer's hiring decisions in 
Hashimoto, and the imposition of a more burdensome 
work schedule in Strother are not ultimate employment 
actions. Nor, for that matter, does the test adopted by the 
Second and Third Circuits comport with our precedent. 
While some actions that we consider to be adverse (such 
as disadvantageous transfers or changes in work schedule) 
do "materially affect the terms and conditions of 
employment," others (such as an unfavorable reference 
not affecting an employee's job prospects) do not. 
[81 [91 The EEOC has interpreted "adverse employment 
action" to mean "any adverse treatment that is based on a 
retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the 
charging party or others from *1243 engaging in 
protected activity." EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, 
"Retaliation," ~ 8008 (1998). Although EEOC Guidelines 
are not binding on the courts, they "constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 
91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140,65 S.Ct. 161,89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)); 
see also Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 
1049 (9th Cir.1988). We find the EEOC test to be 
consistent with our prior holdings, and with the holdings 
in the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. 
fl 0) The EEOC test covers lateral transfers, unfavorable 
job references, and changes in work schedules. These 
actions are all reasonably likely to deter employees from 
engaging in protected activity. Nonetheless, it does not 
cover every offensive utterance by co-workers, because 
offensive statements by co-workers do not reasonably 
deter employees from engaging in protected activity. 
As we stated in Hashimoto, the severity of an action's 
ultimate impact (such as loss of payor status) "goes to the 
issue of damages, not liability." 118 F.3d at 676. Instead 
of focusing on the ultimate effects of each employment 
action, the EEOC test focuses on the deterrent effects. In 
so doing, it effectuates the letter and the purpose of Title 
VII. According to 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a), it is unlawful 
"for an employer to discriminate" against an employee in 
retaliation for engaging in protected activity. This 
provision does not limit what type of discrimination is 
covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity 
for actionable discrimination. See Knox 93 F.3d at 1334 
("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts 
the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an 
employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a 
complaint."). We agree with the D.C. Circuit, which 
noted in Passer that: 
The statute itself proscribes "discriminat[ion]" against 
those who invoke the Act's protections; the statute does 
not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take 
the form of cognizable employment actions such as 
discharge, transfer or demotion ..... "[T]o establish a 
prima facie case under section 704(a) [42 U.S.c. § 
2000e-3(a) ], a plaintiff must show: I) that he or she 
engaged in activity protected by the statute; 2) that the 
employer ... engaged in conduct having an adverse 
impact on the plaintiff; and 3) that the adverse action 
was causally related to the plaintiffs exercise of 
protected rights." 
935 F.2d at 331 (emphasis in original) (citing Berger v. 
Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 
1395, 1423 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), supplemented on 
other grounds on reh 'g, 852 F.2d 619 (D.C.Cir.1988)). 
Because the EEOC standard is consistent with our prior 
case law and effectuates the language and purpose of Title 
VII, we adopt it, and hold that an action is cognizable as 
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to 
deter employees from engaging in protected activity.6 
We now turn to the question of whether the actions 
alleged by Ray constitute adverse employment actions 
under this standard, whether Ray has provided sufficient 
evidence of a causal link between his protected activities 
and the adverse employment actions, and whether he can 
overcome the USPS' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the actions. 
V 
Ill) Ray claims that, in retaliation for his complaints, his 
supervisors eliminated the Employee Involvement 
program, eliminated the flexible start-time policy, 
instituted lockdown procedures, and reduced *1244 his 
workload-and his pay-disproportionately to the reductions 
faced by other employees.7 
We conclude that all four qualify as adverse employment 
actions. The actions decreased Ray's pay, decreased the 
amount of time that he had to complete the same amount 
of work, and decreased his ability to influence workplace 
policy, and thus were reasonably likely to deter Ray or 
other employees from complaining about discrimination 
V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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in the workplace. 
1121 We also find that Ray has established a causal link 
between his protected activity and the employment 
actions by demonstrating that each action was 
implemented close on the heels of his complaints. That an 
employer's actions were caused by an employee's 
engagement in protected activities may be inferred from 
"proximity in time between the protected action and the 
allegedly retaliatory employment decision." Yart::off, 809 
F.2d at 1371. 
113/ What remains, therefore, is an examination of 
whether Ray has produced sufficient evidence supporting 
his contention that the nondiscriminatory reasons 
proffered by the Postal Service are pretexts for retaliation. 
We find that he has. The USPS alleges that Carey and 
Briggs eliminated flexible starting times because of an 
increase in the amount of mail and because of later 
delivery of the mail to the post office. However, it is 
undisputed that Postmaster Carey announced publicly that 
he was instituting the fixed start time in response to Ray's 
complaints. Furthermore, the USPS' assertion is belied by 
the fact that even after the policy change several of the 
postal carriers continued to arrive at work early with 
official sanction. 
The Postal Service also asserts that Carey instituted the 
lockdown procedures in response to a death threat, not for 
retaliatory reasons. Ray contends that this is false, and 
points to the fact that his supervisors continued the 
lockdown even after the postal inspector had stated 
definitively that there was no death threat. Also, 
supervisory employees continued to say publicly that Ray 
had made a threat when they knew that that was not the 
case. We are sensitive to the Postal Service's desire to 
protect its employees and customers from violence, and 
nothing should prevent management from taking 
precautionary steps. Certainly, locking the doors ensured 
that unauthorized persons could not enter the building, 
and thus enhanced security. Nonetheless, a lockdown 
such as that implemented by the postal service seems 
unlikely to prevent harm from a disgruntled employee 
working inside the building, nor would the lockdown stop 
a violent postal employee from entering the post office, 
since an employee would probably open the door from 
inside for any co-worker; indeed, if anything, the 
lockdown ensured that employees would find it more 
difficult to leave. Although the reasons for the lockdown 
present a close question, we conclude that Ray has raised 
a genuine issue of material fact, and that there is sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment on this claim. 
Finally, the USPS claims that the reduction in Ray's pay 
was part of across-the-board cuts, and was 
nondiscriminatory. However, Ray has sufficiently 
rebutted this assertion by demonstrating that he suffered 
the greatest loss in pay. 
We therefore hold that, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Ray, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the retaliation claim. 
VI 
/14J We now examine whether Ray's allegation that he 
was subjected to a hostile work environment is cognizable 
under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. We have 
not previously decided whether a hostile work 
environment may be the basis for a retaliation claim under 
Title VII. See * 1245 Gregmy v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 
1075 (9th CiLI998). However, the Second, Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits have held that an employer may be liable 
for a retaliation-based hostile work environment. See 
Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional 
Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2nd Cir.1999) ("co-worker 
harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute adverse 
employment action so as to satisty the second prong of 
the retaliation prima facie case"); Drake v. Minnesota 
Mining & M[g. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th CiL1998) 
("retaliation can take the form of a hostile work 
environment"); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 
F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1998) ("co-worker hostility or 
retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may 
constitute 'adverse employment action' for purposes of a 
retaliation claim"). 
We agree with our sister circuits. Harassment is obviously 
actionable when based on race and gender. Harassment as 
retaliation for engaging in protected activity should be no 
different-it is the paradigm of "adverse treatment that is 
based on retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to 
deter the charging party or others from engaging in 
protected activity." EEOC Compliance Manual ~ 8008. 
115/ /16) Harassment is actionable only if it is 
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
the victim's employment and create an abusive workin a 
. b 
envIronment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 
17,21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 LEd.2d 295 (1993). It must be 
both objectively and subjectively offensive. See Faragher 
v. City 0.[ Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 
141 LEd.2d 662 (1998). To determine whether an 
environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality 
of the circumstances, including the "frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
v. 217 F.3d 1234 (2000) 
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employee's work performance." Jd. (quoting Harris, 510 
U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). 
Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a 
hostile work environment. In Gregory v. Widnall, we 
rejected a claim of a hostile work environment based on 
"[a] single drawing of a monkey on a memo circulated by 
senior NCO's, accompanied by the verbal explanation 
that it was intended to remind officers not to 'get the 
monkey off their back' by passing their responsibilities to 
others." 153 F.3d at 1074-75; see also Strother, 79 F.3d at 
869 ("mere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to 
show an adverse employment decision"). 
[171 Repeated derogatory or humiliating statements, 
however, can constitute a hostile work environment. In 
Hacienda Hotel, for example, we found that the plaintiffs 
had demonstrated sufficiently "severe or pervasive" 
harassment by demonstrating that one supervisor 
"repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made sexual remarks, 
and requested sexual favors" while another supervisor 
"frequently witnessed, laughed at, or herself made these 
types of comments." 881 F.2d at 1515. And in Draper v. 
Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th 
Cir.1998), we found that the appellant's allegations that 
her supervisor had regularly made sexual remarks about 
her throughout her employment, and that he laughed at 
her complaints to him, raised a genuine factual issue 
regarding a hostile work environment. 
(181 Here, after Ray made his complaint about the 
treatment of women at the Willits Post Office, he was 
targeted for verbal abuse related to those complaints for a 
period lasting over one and half years. His supervisors 
regularly yelled at him during staff meetings; they called 
him a "liar," a "troublemaker," and a "rabble rouser," and 
told him to "shut up." Additionally, Ray was subjected to 
a number of pranks, and was falsely accused of 
misconduct. 
Footnotes 
Not only did his supervisors make it harder for Ray to 
complete his own tasks, they made Ray an object lesson 
about the perils of complaining about sexual harassment 
in the workplace. Carey and Briggs made it clear to the 
other staff members *1246 that disadvantageous changes 
in management style were due to Ray's complaints. Carey 
linked the change to a fixed starting time to Ray's letter to 
Carey's supervisor. He canceled the Employee 
Involvement meetings in response to Ray's complaints. 
Carey and Briggs also fostered animus in other employees 
whose working conditions were affected. Other 
employees began to distance themselves from Ray, and 
some stopped talking to him. In November of 1995, the 
difficulties at work rose to such a level that Ray took 
stress leave from his job. 
We conclude that Ray has presented evidence that is, for 
purposes of summary judgment, sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to a 
hostile work environment. We therefore hold that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
hostile work environment-based retaliation claim. 
VII 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district 
court grant of summary judgment and REMAND for a 
trial on the merits of Ray's retaliation claim. 
Parallel Citations 
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Employee Involvement meetings are a means for employees to communicate with the management regarding workplace issues. 
2 It is unclear from the record whether lockdown is a standard post office procedure. Ray asserts that lockdown procedures had never 
been instituted in the Willits Post Oftice before November 1995. 
3 As the statutory language quoted above indicates. filing a complaint with the EEOC is a protected activity. See 42 U.S.c. ~ 
2000e-3(a). Making an informal complaint to a supervisor is also a protected activity. See Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504. 1514 (9th Cir.1989). 
Furthermore. an employee's complaints about the treatment of others is considered a protected activity, evcn if the employee is 
not a member of the class that he claims suffered from discrimination, and even if the discrimination he complained about was 
not legally cognizable. See jHoyo V. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir.1994) (prison guard had a claim for retaliation if he was 
discharged for complaining about the trcatment of black inmates and he was acting on a reasonable belief that a Title VII 
violation had occurred, even though the complained-of discrimination was not actually a Title VII violation). 
4 The governmcnt cites Steiner V. Showboat Operating Co .. 25 F.3d 1459 and Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., I I3 F.3d 912,912 
(9th Cir.1996),for the proposition that a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action. 
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In Steiner, this court stated in dicta and in a footnote that "the transfer is just barely-if at all-characterizable as an 'adverse' 
employment action: Steiner was not demoted, or put in a worse job, or given any additional responsibilities. In fact, at first she 
even claimed to enjoy the day shift." 25 F.3d at 1465 n. 6. The court did not reach the question of whether the transfer was an 
adverse employment action because it found that the action was not retaliatory in nature. Jd. at 1465. In Nidds, this court, citing 
Steiner, found that the plaintiffs transfer was not an adverse employment action. 113 F.3d at 919. However, it conducted no 
analysis to reach this point, merely asserting that "Although we decline to view Nidds' transfer to the restoration department as 
an adverse employment action, his ultimate termination on July 28, 1992 certainly was." Id. 
Neither Steiner nor Nidds establish that a lateral transfer can never be an adverse employment action. Had they done so, they 
would have had to abrogate this court's earlier decisions in YartzofJ and St. John, supra, neither of which were cited in the 
Steiner and Nidds decisions. We therefore reject the government's assertion that a lateral transfer cannot be an adverse 
employment action for the purposes of Title VII. 
5 The govcrnment relies on Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 14 I L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) for the 
proposition that only ultimate employment actions such as "hiring, tiring, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
diffcrent responsibilities [and] a decision causing a significant change in benefits" constitute adverse employment actions. But the 
discussion in Burlington Industries cited by the government concerns the types of employment actions which, if taken by a 
supervisor, would subject the employer to vicarious liability for harassment. See 524 U.S. at 760-761. 118 S.Ct. 2257. Although 
the Supreme Court cited to circuit-level Title VII cases that defined "adverse employment actions," the Court specifically declined 
to adopt the holdings of those cases: "Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the 
concept ofa tangible employment action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here." Jd. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. 
Therefore, we reject the contention that Burlington Industries set forth a standard for adverse employment actions in the 
anti-retaliation eontext. 
6 The iirst part of the EEOC's detinition of adverse employment aetion, which requires that the action be "based on a retaliatory 
motive," collapses into the "eausallink" prong of the prima faeie test for retaliation. 
7 He also alleges that his supervisors created a hostile work environment that constituted an adverse employment action. We discuss 
the hostile work environment claim in the following section. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Jack RI1TER, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 93-56711. I Argued and Submitted April 
3,1995. I Decided June 22,1995· 
Former employee sued former employer for age 
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment ACT (ADEA), and for termination to prevent 
his retirement benefits from vesting in violation of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The 
United States District Court for the Central District 
California, A. Andrew Hauk, J., granted summary 
judgment for former employer. Former employee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Leavy, Circuit Judge, 
held that: (I) former employee failed to establish prima 
facie case of age discrimination; (2) former employee 
failed to establish prima facie claim of termination to 
prevent vesting of retirement benefits in violation of 
ERISA; (3) former employee failed to rebut legitimate 
nondiscriminatory business reasons articulated by former 
employer for termination of former employee; and (4) 
district court properly took judicial notice of widespread 
layoffs at former employer. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (10) 
III Civil Rights 
121 
,c~Age Discrimination 
Standards of proof in ADEA discrimination 
actions parallel those in Title VII actions. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.CA § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e 
et seq. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
131 
141 
.F~Age Discrimination 
Allocation of burdens of proof and order of 
analysis in ADEA in Title VII actions follow 
three step pattern: plaintiff must first establish 
prima facie of discrimination; then burden shifts 
to defendant to articulate legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
decision; then, in order to prevail, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that employer's alleged reason for 
adverse employment decision was pretext for 
another motive which was discriminatory. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e 
et seq. 
18 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
fcAge Discrimination 
Former employee failed to establish prima facie 
case of age discrimination based on replacement 
by younger and less qualified employee; former 
employee's claim as to who allegedly replaced 
him was different in complaint and opposition to 
summary judgment and former employee 
presented no specific evidence regarding 
identity, age, or inferior qualifications of second 
alleged replacement. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
, .•. ,Age Discrimination 
Former employee failed to establish prima facie 
of age discrimination through circumstantial, 
statistical or direct evidence that discharge 
occurred under circumstances giving rise to 
inference of discrimination; fact that he worked 
in a number of projects and positions which were 
eventually subject to cutbacks and layoffs did not 
give rise to inference of subterfuge based on age 
discrimination. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
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U.S.CA. § 621 et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,;,,=Retaliation Claims 
Labor and Employment 
",,,"Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis 
applicable to Title VII and ADEA claims also 
applies to claims for discriminatory discharge to 
prevent vesting of ERISA pension rights. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U .S.CA. § 2000e 
et seq.; Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA. § 1140. 
II Cases that cite this headnote 
Labor and Employment 
~Particular Cases in General 
Labor and Employment 
"~i'",Causal Connection; Temporal Proximity 
Former employee failed to establish prima facie 
case of discriminatory discharge to prevent 
vesting of retirement benefits in violation of 
ERISA; he failed to show how layoff policy was 
plan was covered by ERISA or that there was any 
nexus between revised layoff policy and vesting 
of his retirement rights. Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA. 
§ 1140. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
171 Labor and Employment 
" .. =Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
Former employer articulated sufficient 
nondiscriminatory reasons for layoff of former 
employee to shift burden of going forward back 
to former employee to present evidence that 
reasons advanced by former employer were mere 
18J 
19J 
pretext, in action for discriminatory discharge to 
prevent vesting of retirement benefits in violation 
of ERISA, where it stated that it laid him off due 
to reduction in work force after carrying him in 
temporary positions for over a year after his 
discharge for cause. Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA. 
§ 1140. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Evidence 
.,~""Corporations and Associations and Members 
Thereof 
District court could take judicial notice of layoffs 
at employer, in action brought by former 
employee alleging that he was discharged 
because of his age and to prevent his ERISA 
retirement benefits from vesting, where fact of 
layoffs was generally known in area and was 
capable of sufficiently accurate and ready 
determination. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA. 
§ 1140; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 20 I (b), 28 
U.S.CA. 
30 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Courts 
<",Reception of Evidence 
Appellate court reviews district court's decision 
to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. 
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 20 I (b), 28 U.S.CA. 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
I]OJ Labor and Employment 
,,,,Motive and Intent; Pretext 
Former employer's presentation of two reasons 
for discharge of former employee, namely, his 
prior dismissal for cause and his final layoff due 
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to reduction in force (RIF) did not establish 
sufficient proof of pretext to avoid summary 
judgment in ERISA action for termination to 
prevent his retirement benefits from vesting, 
where rationales were not inconsistent. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, § 510,29 U.S.C.A. § 1140. 
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Before: NOONAN, O'SCANNLAIN, and LEAVY, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
LEAVY, Circuit Judge: 
Jack Ritter appeals from a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Hughes Aircraft Co. Ritter claims that Hughes 
unlawfully discharged him: I) because of his age, in 
violation of § 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act ("ADEN'), 29 U.S.c. § 623,1 and 2) in order to 
prevent his retirement benefits from vesting, in violation of 
§ 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.c. § 1140.2 We affirm. 
*456 FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
Jack Ritter ("Ritter") was employed by Hughes Aircraft 
Co. ("Hughes") from July of 1962 until August of 1979, 
when he voluntarily quit to pursue work as a real estate 
agent. Ritter was rehired as a Senior Project Engineer in 
the Fall of 1981, and he subsequently held a variety of 
positions in the company. Sometime after 1984, Ritter was 
appointed a Staff Manager. Six months after his last 
transfer, his supervisor suffered a heart attack and was 
replaced by a new supervisor. Ritter then began to receive 
negative evaluations. In 1987 he was notified that unless he 
could find employment elsewhere in the company he 
would be laid off. 
Ritter was able to find employment as a Senior Project 
Engineer reporting to a former colleague of his. In order to 
obtain this position, however, Ritter was forced to accept a 
job declassification, but not a decrease in salary. In this 
new position, Ritter was given responsibility for the 
Automatic TOW 2 Field Test Set Program ("A T2FTS"), a 
new product being developed by Hughes. Ritter was also 
assigned to work on the Ground TOW Program ("TFTS"), 
devoted to supplying spare parts and equipment updates 
for older units in the field. George Hall ("Hall") became 
Ritter's immediate supervisor, and, in 1989, Richard 
Kagimoto ("Kagimoto") became his Operations Manager. 
Kagimoto was responsible for making sure that the 
A T2FTS and TFTS programs were on schedule and within 
budget. 
While Ritter worked in the A T2FTS and TFTS a variety of 
problems developed. Ritter acknowledges that Kagimoto 
viewed his (Ritter's) employment performance as deficient 
and the source of many of the problems. Ritter also 
acknowledges that Hall had notified him of specific areas 
of upper management dissatisfaction with his work. In 
May of 1990, Hall informed Ritter that upper management 
had decided that unless he (Ritter) could find another 
position at the company within six weeks he would be laid 
off. 
Ritter appealed the six week deadline to the Human 
Resources Manager and was allowed to remain on payroll 
for over one year while seeking a permanent reassignment. 
During this time Ritter occasionally found temporary 
assignments but most of his work was charged to an 
overhead account. In June of 1991, having been unable to 
find a permanent position, Ritter was laid off. 
Approximately ten weeks after Ritter was laid off, Hughes 
revised its layoff policy. The new layoff policy provided 
that employees with at least 15 years of service and who 
were within 5 years of a retirement milestone would be 
offered alternate employment, in a downgrade/demotion 
position if necessary, prior to being laid off. 
In February of 1992, Ritter brought this action against 
Hughes claiming that the company unlawfully terminated 
him because of his age and in order to prevent the vesting 
of his retirement benefits. In November of 1993, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Hughes. The court held that Ritter had failed to present a 
prima facie claim under the ADEA, and that although 
Ritter had established a prima facie case of a violation of 
Ritter v. Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454 (1995) 
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ERISA, he did not present adequate evidence that the 
reasons offered by Hughes to justifY his layoff were mere 
pretexts. Ritter now appeals from the decision of the 
district court. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment on the ADEA Claim 
III 12) Standards of proof in ADEA discrimination suits 
parallel those in Title VII suits. "We combine the Title VII 
and ADEA claims for analysis because the burdens of 
proof and persuasion are the same." Wallis V. J.R. Simp/ot, 
Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. I 994). The allocation of the 
burdens of proof and order of analysis follow a three step 
pattern: 
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination. If the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its employment decision. 
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the employer's 
alleged reason for the adverse 
employment decision is a *457 pretext 
for another motive which IS 
discriminatory. 
Jd. at 889 (quoting Rose V. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 
1417,1420 (9th Cir.1990)). 
13) Ritter was 5 I years old at the time of his termination, 
and he raised a material issue of fact as to whether he was 
qualified for the position of Senior Project Engineer and 
other positions he sought. In his Amended Complaint, 
Ritter alleged that after his discharge, work originally 
performed by him was taken by another Hughes' 
employee, Ernie Lau ("Lau"), "who was substantially 
younger ... and less qualified." But, in his opposition to 
summary judgment, Ritter argued not that Lau took his 
position, but that Lau had hired some other unnamed 
person outside the protected age group. Yet, in support of 
this claim, Ritter presented no specific evidence 
establishing the identity, age, or inferior qualifications of 
this employee. In view of the inconsistency of Ritter's 
claims and the vagueness of the evidence offered in 
support of them, we conclude, as did the district court, that 
Ritter failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any 
genuine material issue of fact as to whether he had been 
replaced by a person outside the protected class. See 
Anderson V. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
[4) Ritter, however, could also prove age discrimination 
"through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence that 
the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to 
an inference of age discrimination." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891 
(quoting Rose, 902 F .2d at 1421). Ritter contends that 
because he worked in a number of projects and positions 
which were eventually subject to cutbacks and layoffs, 
there exists an inference of "subterfuge" based on age 
discrimination. 
We find Ritter's argument meritless. In Nesbit v. Pepsico, 
Inc., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993), an employee claimed 
that his employer had violated the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act by discriminating against 
him because of his age. The plaintiff relied on the 
following evidence: 
(1) statistical evidence that some older workers were 
terminated while some younger workers were retained 
and that employees hired after the RIF were generally 
younger than those terminated; (2) a comment by [the 
employee's] direct superior to [the employee] that '[w]e 
don't necessarily like grey hair'; and (3) an interview of 
[the employer's] Senior Vice President of Personnel in 
which he stated, "We don't want unpromotable 
fifty-year olds around." 
Id. at 705. Observing that California courts have adopted 
the analysis applicable to ADEA claims, we concluded that 
"[v]iewing the evidence cumulatively, and in a light most 
favorable to the appellants, it falls short of creating an 
inference of age discrimination." Id. at 704-05. Ritter 
presented less evidence than that offered by the 
unsuccessful plaintiff in Nesbit. His employment history 
does not give rise to an inference of age discrimination. 
We hold that the district did not err in concluding that 
Ritter failed to present a prima facie case of age 
discrimination and properly granted summary judgment. 
II. Summary Judgment on the ERISA Claim 
IS) We adopt the Second Circuit's view in Dister V. 
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2nd Cir. 1988), 
that the burden shifting analysis applicable to Title VII and 
ADEA claims, described in section I above, applies also to 
§ 510 ERISA claims: 
Because the existence of a specific intent to interfere 
with an employee's benefit rights is critical in § 510 
cases-yet is seldom the subject of direct proof-the 
Ritter v. Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454 (1995) 
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district court allocated the burdens of production and 
order of proof in a manner similar to the approach used 
in Title VII and ADEA cases, where direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent is also scarce or nonexistent. 
... We hold that the McDonnell Douglas presumptions 
and shifting burdens of production are equally 
appropriate in the context of discriminatory discharge 
cases brought under § 510 of ERISA. 
Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111-12. 
16J Section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.c. § 1140, prohibits an 
employer from terminating *458 an employee in order to 
prevent the vesting of pension rights. Hughes challenged 
Ritter's assertion that the layoff policy was covered by 
ERISA. It argued that Ritter failed to establish that the 
layoff policy qualified as an "employee welfare benefit 
plan" or an "employee pension plan" covered by § 510 of 
ERISA. Hughes also points out that the layoff policy in 
question was revoked one year after it was instituted. 
In Dister, the Second Circuit found that the termination of 
an employee four months prior to vesting of his pension 
rights, and the savings to his employer brought about by 
that termination, were sufficient to create an inference of 
discrimination. 859 F.2d at 1115. Ritter's claim, however, 
is much more attenuated. He argues that his ERISA rights 
were violated because he was prevented from taking 
advantage of the revised layoff policy adopted about ten 
weeks after he was laid off. Ritter, however, has failed to 
show how the layoff policy itself constitutes a plan covered 
by ERISA, or that there is any nexus between the revised 
layoff policy and the vesting of his retirement rights. If 
Ritter could have taken advantage of the layoff policy, 
which was terminated one year later, it is not evident that 
he would have obtained vesting of his retirement benefits. 
We disagree with the district court's finding that it was an 
undisputed fact that the revised layoff policy was covered 
by ERISA, and we conclude that Ritter has failed to raise a 
material issue of fact as to this element of his prima facie 
ERISA claim. 
I7J Ritter also failed to rebut the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory business reasons articulated by Hughes 
for Ritter's layoff. Hughes said that it laid Ritter off due to 
a reduction in workforce after carrying him in temporary 
positions for over a year after his discharge for cause from 
the A T2FTS and TFTS programs. 
Both Kagimoto and Hall state that Ritter was laid off 
because of a variety of problems in their programs caused 
by Ritter's deficient performance. Ritter himself testified 
that he was aware at the time that upper management was 
disappointed with his performance, and that Kagimoto was 
not familiar with the programs and believed that Ritter 
could not perform his duties on time and within budget. 
Hughes kept Ritter on the payroll for over a year while he 
attempted to find other permanent work. Hughes contends 
that Ritter was finally laid off due to a lack of work and a 
company wide reduction in workforce. Hughes offered the 
declaration of Marie Jaqua, Human Resources Manager, 
who stated that she made repeated efforts to find Ritter a 
permanent position after his discharge from A T2 FTS and 
TFTS. Hughes relied on portions of Ritter's own 
deposition testimony acknowledging work shortages. 
Hughes also requested judicial notice of significant layoffs 
occurring at Hughes. We conclude that Hughes succeeded 
in articulating sufficient nondiscriminatory reasons for 
Ritter's layoff, and the burden of going forward then 
shifted back to Ritter to present evidence that the reasons 
advanced by Hughes were mere pretexts. Washington v. 
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1432-33 (9th Cir.1993). 
Ritter contends in part that he is in fact not required to 
present evidence rebutting the reasons offered by Hughes. 
He argues that Hughes never successfully articulated 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge and 
layoff. We reject this contention. 
18J 19J Ritter also argues that the district court improperly 
took judicial notice of widespread layoffs at Hughes based 
on a newspaper article and that general evidence of layoffs 
was not sufficient to explain Ritter's individual layoff. 
Fed.R.Evid. 20 I (b) provides that judicial notice must be 
"one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (I) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned." An appellate court reviews the 
district court's decision to take judicial notice under Rule 
201 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chapel, 41 
FJd 1338, 1342 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 
1135,115 S.Ct. 2017. 131 L.Ed.2d 1015 (U.S.1995). 
We conclude that judicial notice of layoffs at Hughes was 
not an abuse of discretion. *459 This is a fact which would 
be generally known in Southern California and which 
would be capable of sufficiently accurate and ready 
determination. Apart from the court's taking notice of the 
layoffs at Hughes, Ritter in his own depositions had 
indicated that the general shortage of jobs at Hughes had 
affected his ability to find work. 
11 0 J Finally, Ritter argues that Hughes' presentation of two 
reasons, namely, his prior dismissal for cause from his 
position under Kagimoto and his final layoff due to 
reduction in workforce, establishes sufficient proof of 
pretext to avoid summary judgment. Ritter relies on our 
Ritter v. Aircraft 58 F.3d 454 (1995) 
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holding in Washington, that in the "ordinary case, ... 
fundamentally different justifications [given by the 
employer] for an employer's action would give rise to a 
genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext since they 
suggest the possibility that neither of the official reasons 
was the true reason." 10 F.3d at 1434. 
Ritter's reliance on Washington is inappropriate. The 
rationales offered by Hughes are not inconsistent. The 
distinct timing and justifications offered by Hughes for its 
separate decisions to dismiss Ritter from his position under 
Kagimoto and his layoff one year later distinguish this 
case from Washington, where an employer simultaneously 
offered two distinct and arguably inconsistent reasons for 
an employee's discharge. 
Footnotes 
Section 623 provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
Having considered Ritter's other contentions and finding 
them meritless, we hold that Ritter failed to raise any issue 
of material fact as to essential elements of his prima facie 
ADEA and ERISA claims, and also failed to rebut the 
nondiscriminatory reasons offered by Hughes for his 
discharge and layoff. 
AFFIRMED. 
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(I) to fail or refuse to hire to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions. or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate. or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age. 
2 Section I 140 provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge. fine. suspend, expel, diseipline. or discriminate against a participant ... for the 
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this 
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. 
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Former employee brought action against former employer 
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) for 
allegedly denying him promotion because of his age and 
constructively discharging him. The United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, Malcolm F. Marsh, J., 
granted summary judgment for employer, and employee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Trott, Circuit Judge, held 
that: (I) employee's allegations and evidence to show 
employer's discriminatory intent in hiring company 
president made summary judgment for employer 
inappropriate on age discrimination claim; (2) employee 
failed to establish that his working conditions were so 
intolerable and discriminatory that reasonable person 
would have felt forced to resign, as required for claim of 
wrongful constructive discharge; and (3) employer's 
discovery of after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing by 
employee did not warrant summary judgment in favor of 
employer. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. 
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Opinion 
OPINION 
TROTT, Circuit Judge: 
Herman Schnidrig appeals the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Columbia Machine, Inc. 
("Columbia") in Schnidrig's Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEN') action alleging Columbia 
improperly denied him a promotion because of his age and 
constructively discharged him. We review the district 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Jesinger v, 
Nevada Fed Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127. 1130 (9th 
Cir.1994), and reverse. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Columbia is a closely held Washington Corporation owned 
by the Neth family. Fred Neth, Sr., is the majority 
shareholder, chairman of the Board of Directors, and chief 
executive officer of Columbia. The Board consisted of six 
directors: Fred Neth, Sr.; three of his children, Fred Neth 
V. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (1996) 
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Jr., Dorothy Osadchuk, and one other daughter; Bill Wells, 
a long time employee; and Joe Barclay, president of the 
Cascade Corporation. 
Schnidrig, who was born in 1930, began working for 
Columbia as a production manager in 1980. In 1981, he 
was promoted to vice-president of manufacturing. In 
February of 1991, the president of the company, Tom 
Neth, resigned under pressure. Schnidrig was asked to take 
over the responsibilities of Tom Neth and run the company 
as general manager/vice-president of operations while the 
Board searched for a new president. 
Schnidrig alleges, and we accept as true for purposes of 
summary judgment, that as early as June of 1991, Bill 
Wells told Schnidrig that during a Board of Directors 
meeting, Joe Barclay voiced the opinion that Columbia 
needed a president in the 45-50 year old range and that 
other directors agreed. In addition, the affidavit of Robert 
Showman, the manager of cost accounting, states that in 
the Fall of 1991, Bill Wells told him the Board was not 
considering Schnidrig because they wanted someone in his 
or her mid to late forties. Schnidrig also presented the 
shorthand notes of the minutes ofa Board meeting held on 
February 25, 1992. The notes indicate during discussion 
regarding the preparation of materials to be sent to the 
executive search firm, Joe Barclay stated "they should 
send a copy of job description, maximum compensation 
level, only perk, company car, age 45-50 years, and past 
experience with long-term potential." Bill Wells omitted 
the reference to an age requirement from the final draft of 
the minutes. 
On February 12, 1992, Schnidrig sent a memo to Fred 
Neth, Sf. indicating he was interested in the president's 
position. Schnidrig alleges that on February 19, Fred Neth, 
Sf. told him Joe Barclay wanted a younger man for the job 
and that his daughters were leaning that way as well. 
Schnidrig also alleges that on February 27, Fred Neth, Sf. 
admitted the Board discussed wanting somebody younger 
as the new president. 
In March of 1992, the Board hired Ronald Goerss of the 
recruiting firm Smith, Goerss, & Ferneborg, to conduct a 
nationwide search for a new president and to present 
candidates for the position to the Board. The Board agreed 
the president would be selected from the candidates 
submitted by Goerss. The Board gave Goerss a list of six 
minimum qualification requirements for the position. The 
list included four general requirements: I) strong work 
ethic; 2) warm, friendly personality; 3) effective 
communication skills; *1409 and 4) team leadership. In 
addition, the list contained two specific requirements: 
(I) a minimum of 5 years broad general management 
experience and proven track record with a medium sized 
company or a division of a larger firm engaged in the 
design, manufacture and sale of industrial machinery 
and equipment; and 
(2) strong operations (manufacturing) background with 
a thorough working knowledge of accounting and 
financial reporting. 
Goerss indicated he relied solely on the criteria given him 
by the Board and that he was never instructed to, nor did he 
consider age in making his decisions. 
Schnidrig alleges that on May 8, he again asked Fred Neth, 
Sf. why he could not be president of Columbia and was 
again told the Board was looking for somebody younger. 
In June of 1992, Goerss completed his search, including 
interviews of all three Columbia vice-presidents, and 
submitted a list of five candidates to the Board. All five 
candidates were from outside the company. The Board 
interviewed two of the five candidates and, in July, entered 
into negotiations with Gerald O'Meara to be the president 
of Columbia. 
Also in July, Schnidrig again applied for the position of 
president and alleges he was again told the Board was 
looking for somebody younger in the 45-50 year old range. 
Thereafter, Schnidrig filed his first complaint with the 
EEOC. Schnidrig claims that from this point on his work 
environment deteriorated. Particularly, Schnidrig 
complains Robin Popple, another Columbia 
vice-president, was given a raise so that he earned more 
than Schnidrig; he was excluded from a lunch meeting 
with the officers of First Interstate Bank; company 
executives and other personnel were instructed not to talk 
to Schnidrig about various matters including corporate 
finances; and he was moved out of his office and given a 
much smaller office. 
On October 8, 1992, O'Meara accepted Columbia's offer 
and agreed to begin work on November 2, 1992. Schnidrig 
resigned on October 27, 1992. 
Schnidrig filed suit against Columbia claiming that he was 
denied the promotion to president because of his age, and 
that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for 
filing a complaint with the EEOC. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia on all 
claims. 
II 
Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (1996) 
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AGE DISCRIMINATION 
The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of 
proof for claims of discrimination arising under the ADEA 
follow three steps: 
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination. If the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its employment decision. 
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the employer's 
aIleged reason for the adverse 
employment decision is a pretext for 
another motive which is discriminatory. 
Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994) 
(quoting Lowe v. City ol Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 
(9th Cir.1986)). 
III "The prima facie case may be based either on a 
presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by more 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Wallis, 26 F.3d 
at 889 (citing Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009). Furthermore, 
"[ w ]hen a plaintiff does not rely exclusively on the 
presumption but seeks to establish a prima facie case 
through the submission of actual evidence, very little such 
evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact 
regarding an employer's motive; any indication of 
discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question 
that can only be resolved by a factfinder." Lowe, 775 F.2d 
at 1009. 
In this case, Schnidrig clearly established a prima facie 
case of age discrimination. Schnidrig did not attempt to 
establish the factors giving rise to a presumption of 
discrimination. Rather, Schnidrig offered direct evidence 
of discriminatory motives in the *1410 form of statements 
made by directors and notes taken during Board meetings. 
121 Columbia argues that whether Schnidrig chooses to 
establish a prima facie case through a presumption or 
through direct evidence of discrimination, he must stiIl 
show that he is qualified for the job. This argument is 
premature. Schnidrig established a prima facie case that he 
was treated differently on the basis of his age. Therefore, 
Schnidrig's qualifications are irrelevant to the existence of 
the prima facie case of discrimination. The burden shifts to 
Columbia to articulate nondiscriminatory motives 
regardless of Schnidrig' s qualifications. 
Columbia offered three nondiscriminatory reasons why it 
chose not to promote Schnidrig: I) Schnidrig was 
eliminated as a candidate for the position by Goerss who 
did not include Schnidrig's name in the list of qualified 
candidates which he presented to the Board, therefore, it 
was not the Board's decision not to promote Schnidrig; 2) 
Schnidrig was not qualified for the job; and, 3) O'Meara 
was more qualified for the job than was Schnidrig. 
13) 141 The district court found that Columbia produced 
evidence to support its claim that O'Meara met the 
qualifications of the job profile and that Schnidrig did not. 
This was sufficient to shift the burden back to Schnidrig to 
show that Columbia'S reasons for not promoting him were 
pretextual. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether 
Schnidrig produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether Columbia's proffered reasons 
were pretextual. "If a rational trier of fact could, on all the 
evidence, find that the employer's action was taken for 
impermissibly discriminatory reasons, summary judgment 
for the defense is inappropriate." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. 
Schnidrig presented the following aIlegations and evidence 
to show discriminatory intent by Columbia: I) Allegation 
that BiII Wells told Schnidrig that during a Board meeting 
in June of 1991, Joe Barclay expressed wanting a president 
in the 45-50 year old range; 2) Affidavit of Robert 
Showman, manager of cost accounting, stating that 
following a Board meeting in the faIl of 1991, Bill Wells 
told Showman the Board was not seriously considering 
Schnidrig for president because they wanted someone in 
his or her mid to late forties; 3) Allegation that on February 
19, 1992, Fred Neth, Sr. told Schnidrig some of the 
directors wanted a younger man as president; 4) Shorthand 
notes of the minutes of the Board meeting on February 25, 
1992, indicating Joe Barclay that the requirement of being 
45-50 years old be included in the job profile for president; 
5) AIIegation that on February 27, 1992, Fred Neth, Sr. 
admitted the Board discussed wanting somebody younger 
as the new president; 6) AIlegation that on May 8, 1992, 
Fred Neth, Sr. again told Schnidrig the Board wanted 
somebody younger; and 7) Allegation that in July of 1992, 
Fred Neth, Sr. again told Schnidrig the Board was looking 
for somebody younger to be president. 
This Court has set a high standard for the granting of 
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. 
Most recently, we explained that" '[ w]e require very little 
evidence to survive summary judgment' in a 
discrimination case, 'because the ultimate question is one 
that can only be resolved through a "searching 
inquiry"-one that is most appropriately conducted by the 
factfinder, upon a full record.' " Lam v. University of 
Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting 
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 
V. Columbia 80 F.3d 1406 (1 
71 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1763, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,040 ... 
F.2d 1104.1111 (9thCir.1991)). 
"[W]hen a plaintiff has established a prima facie 
inference of disparate treatment through direct or 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, he will 
necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the 
employer's articulated reason for its employment 
decision." When [the] evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption, a factual question will almost 
always exist with respect to any claim of a 
nondiscriminatory reason. The existence of this question 
of material fact will ordinarily preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. 
Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at IIII (quoting Lowe, 775 
F.2d at 1009). Cf *1411 Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890 ("[W]hen 
evidence to refute defendant's legitimate explanation is 
totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even 
though plaintiff may have established a minimal prima 
facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type 
presumption."); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 473 n. 
16 (9th Cir.1991) ("However, Lowe was subsequently 
amended to indicate that the Court did not mean to 'prevent 
the summary disposition of meritless suits but simply 
ensure that when a material fact exists a civil rights litigant 
will not be denied a trial on the merits.' "). 
The district court, in granting summary judgment, 
emphasized that Schnidrig was eliminated as a candidate 
for president by Ronald Goerss of the executive search 
firm hired by Columbia and not by the Board. The district 
court found there was no evidence Goerss was ever told to 
consider age and that he never considered age in selecting 
candidates for the Board's consideration. The district court 
concluded the comments made by Fred Neth, Sr., were 
attenuated from the decision-making process, and 
therefore, were merely "stray remarks" with no connection 
to the employment decision. 
The Ninth Circuit authority relied on by the district court is 
distinguishable. In Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 
F .2d 1434 (9th Cir.1990), an executive for Farmers made 
one comment that he chose one candidate over another 
because he was " 'a bright, intelligent, knowledgable 
young man.' " ld. at 1438. Similarly, in Nesbit v. Pepsico, 
{nco 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993), a supervisor commented 
during a meeting that" '[w]e don't necessarily like grey 
hair.' " Id. at 705. The court found this "comment was 
uttered in an ambivalent manner and was not tied directly 
to Nesbitt's termination." Id. 
Contrasting, in the instant case, Schnidrig alleges that on 
three separate occasions, when he asked to be considered 
for president, he was told the Board wanted somebody 
younger for the job. Significantly, at least one of these 
instances occurred after Goerss had submitted his list of 
candidates to the Board. Furthermore, Schnidrig did more 
than offer mere allegations of discriminatory intent; he 
produced evidence in the form of shorthand notes taken at 
the February 25, 1992, Board meeting and the affidavit of a 
coworker. 
Although it is possible that Columbia sufficiently insulated 
the decision-making process from the discriminatory 
remarks of the directors, in light of the reluctance of this 
Circuit to allow summary judgment where there is direct or 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the 
district court was premature in resolving this issue on 
summary judgment. Whether Columbia relied on 
impermissible factors in refusing to promote Schnidrig is a 
question appropriately answered by a trier of fact. 
III 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
IS) Schnidrig also contends Columbia constructively 
discharged him by making working conditions so 
intolerable that he felt forced to resign. Specifically, 
Schnidrig submitted six factors which, taken together, 
were designed to humiliate him and force him to resign: I) 
He was replaced as head of the company by a man fifteen 
years younger than him; 2) Columbia did not give him a 
new position; 3) Another vice-president was given a pay 
raise so that he was earning more than Schnidrig; 4) He 
was forced to move out of his office and into a much 
smaller office; 5) He was excluded from a lunch meeting 
with officers from First Interstate Bank; and 6) Other 
executives were told not to speak to him about financial or 
other matters. 
16) To establish a claim for constructive discharge, 
Schnidrig "must show there are triable issues of fact as to 
whether 'a reasonable person in [his] position would have 
felt that [he] was forced to quit because of intolerable and 
discriminatory working conditions.' " Steiner v. Showboat 
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir.1994)(quoting 
Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989)). 
Whether working conditions were so 
intolerable and discriminatory as to 
justify a reasonable employee's decision 
to resign is normally a factual question 
for the jury. In general, however, a single 
isolated incident *1412 is insufficient as 
V. Columbia Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (1 
71 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1763, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,040 ... 
a matter of law to support a finding of 
constructive discharge. Thus, a plaintiff 
alleging a constructive discharge must 
show some aggravating factors, such as a 
continuous pattern of discriminatory 
treatment. 
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th 
Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 815, 112 S.Ct. 66, 116 L.Ed.2d 41 (1991). 
Schnidrig was not demoted, did not receive a cut in pay, 
was not encouraged to resign or retire, and was not 
disciplined. Accepting all of Schnidrig's allegations as 
true, his working conditions were not so intolerable and 
discriminatory that a reasonable person would feel forced 
to resign. Additionally, Columbia offered legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the actions 
complained of by Schnidrig. 
The district court correctly found no evidence to suggest 
either that any of these actions were motivated to force 
Schnidrig to resign or that they made Schnidrig's working 
conditions intolerable. Therefore, the district court's grant 
of summary judgment for Columbia on the claim of 
wrongful constructive discharge is affirmed. 
IV 
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE 
(7J Columbia argues that even if this Court should find a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Schnidrig was 
denied the promotion for improper reasons, summary 
judgment is still appropriate because after Schn idrig 
resigned, Columbia discovered a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for which Schnidrig would have 
been discharged. Columbia claims it later learned 
Schnidrig copied and removed confidential and personnel 
documents without authorization in violation of the terms 
of Columbia's employee handbook. 
Footnotes 
The Supreme Court recently held that the use of 
after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing by an employee 
that would have resulted in their termination as a bar to all 
relief for an employer's earlier act of discrimination is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the ADEA. McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, ----, 115 
S.Ct. 879, 884, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995); see also 0 'Day v. 
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759 (9th 
Cir.1996) ("[I]f an employer discharges an employee for a 
discriminatory reason, later-discovered evidence that the 
employee could have been discharged for a legitimate 
reason does not immunize the employer from liability."). 
Therefore, although Columbia's discovery of 
after-acquired evidence may bear upon the specific remedy 
to be ordered, it does not warrant the granting of summary 
judgment. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Columbia on Schnidrig's 
claim of constructive discharge is affirmed. We reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Columbia on Schnidrig's claim of age discrimination and 
remand that issue to the district court for a trial on the 
merits. 
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in 
part. 
Each party shall bear its own costs ofthis appeal. 
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Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Patricia SHARP, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
W.H. MOORE, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
Anthony "Mike" Barbero, d/b/a Security 
Inveshnents; and Robert Goold, d/b/a 
Security Police, Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 16667. I July 31,1990. 
Worker who was raped while in office building brought 
negligence action against building owner, security 
contractor, and security service for failure to check that all 
doors in building were locked which allegedly resulted in 
rapist's entrance into building. The Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Ada County, Robert G. Newhouse, J., granted 
motion for summary judgment against worker, and she 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Bistline, J., held that: (I) 
genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding 
summary judgment for owners, contractor, and security 
service, on whether breach of duty to worker occurred as 
result of alleged failure to check that all doors were locked; 
(2) owners and contractor had duty of care to prevent 
unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to worker; and (3) if 
security service employees were negligent, employees 
were susceptible to liability which in turn could be imputed 
to security contractor and building owner. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bakes, C.J., filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
West Headnotes (16) 
111 Appeal and Error 
.~.cExtent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Appeal and Error 
\.",Judgment 
In reviewing order granting summary judgment, 
appellate court determines whether any genuine 
issue of material fact remains and whether 
moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of 
law by construing facts and any reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in light most 
121 
131 
141 
IS) 
favorable to nonmoving party. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
~= Tort cases in general 
Genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding 
summary judgment for building owner, security 
contractor, and security service, on whether 
building owner, contractor, or security service's 
employees owed worker who was raped in 
building duty of care to be sure that all building 
doors were locked. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Landlord and Tenant 
"",In general; defective or dangerous conditions 
Landlord and Tenant 
.>'"Questions for jury 
Landlord owes duty to tenants to exercise 
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances 
and it is for jury to decide whether that duty was 
breached. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Landlord and Tenant 
.y.1n general; defective or dangerous conditions 
Landlord who voluntarily provides security 
system is potentially subject to liability if 
security systems fails as result of landlord's 
negligence. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Detectives and Security Guards 
v·Authority, duty, and liability of private 
detectives and security providers 
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
796 P.2d 506 
161 
(71 
181 
Negligence 
.=Store and business proprietors 
Once owner of building and security contractor 
initiated locked door policy and employed 
security service with intent of keeping doors 
locked, owner and contractor undertook duty and 
were subject to liability for failure to perform that 
duty with reasonable standard of care. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
.:"" F oreseeab i I ity 
Negligence 
'J~Reasonable care 
Every person has duty of care to prevent 
unreasonable, foreseeable risk of harm to others. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
>.Foreseeability 
In determining whether duty of care is owed, if 
degree of result or harm is great and preventing it 
is not difficult, relatively low degree of 
foreseeability is required but, if threatened injury 
is minor and burdens preventing injury are high, 
higher degree of foreseeability may be required. 
22 Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
v~Protection Against Acts of Third Persons 
Proof of prior similar incidents of criminal 
activity occurring in building or in vicinity was 
not required to show that criminal activity was 
foreseeable absent sufficient security to keep 
doors in building locked. 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
191 Negligence 
~.c·Store and business proprietors 
Building owner can be held liable for negligence 
in keeping building area secure even if no prior 
similar incident of violence has occurred in 
building. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
1101 Negligence 
~.·"Protection against acts of third persons 
Even if building owners intended to provide 
security to protect only building and its contents 
and not persons inside, whether it was reasonably 
foreseeable that intruder might commit violent 
act after gaining entry to building where security 
was employed was question for jury. 
1111 Detectives and Security Guards 
.>=Authority, duty, and liability of private 
detectives and security providers 
Negligence 
."'~Intervening and superseding causes 
Hazard to be guarded against by security 
contractor and security service was possibility of 
criminal activity within building so that any 
occurrence of criminal activity was not an 
intervening superseding force breaking the chain 
of causation potentially binding security 
contractor and building owner to liability for 
attack and rape of worker in building after door 
was left unlocked. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1121 Principal and Agent 
<"",Nature of the relation in general 
Agency relationship is created if one who hires 
another retains contractual right to control other's 
v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
796 P.2d 506 
1131 
manner of perfonnance. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Detectives and Security Guards 
'd~'Authority, duty, and liability of private 
detectives and security providers 
Principal and Agent 
,,"'Contractor 
Agreement between contractor and security 
service created agency so that if service was 
negligent for not checking door through which 
rapist may have gained entry to building, security 
contractor was itself liable and its liability in turn 
could be imputed to building owner. 
1141 Principal and Agent 
<"Liabilities of agent 
Agent is liable for its own negligence. 
1151 Principal and Agent 
• "Rights and liabilities of principal 
Principal is liable for torts of agent committed 
within scope of agency relationship. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
(161 Principal and Agent 
;>",Negligence or wrongful acts of agent's 
employees 
Both principals and agents are liable for torts of 
subagent committed within agency relationship. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**507 *298 Wilson & Carnahan, Boise, for 
plaintiff-appellant. Robert R. Chastain, argued. 
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, 
defendants-respondents W.H. Moore, Inc. 
Barbero. Robert C. Moody, argued. 
Boise, for 
and Anthony 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Field, Boise, for 
defendant-respondent Robert Goold. Mark S. Prusynski, 
argued. 
Opinion 
BISTLINE, Justice. 
ON REHEARING 
A rehearing was granted; counsel reargued; the Court has 
reconsidered, and has detennined to substitute this opinion 
for the Court in place of 1989 Opinion No. 134, which is in 
significant respects different, and is now withdrawn. 
On May 12, 1985, Patricia Sharp was an employee of the 
Jess Swan Insurance Agency, whose offices were located 
in a building leased by Swan Insurance from W.H. Moore, 
Inc. W.H. Moore had contracted with Security Investment 
to act as property manager for the building. Security 
Investment, in turn, contracted with Security Police to 
provide the protective patrols for the building . 
On the Sunday morning in question, Sharp was working 
alone in her office at 1199 Shoreline Drive, Boise, Idaho. 
While there, she was assaulted and raped by an unknown 
assailant who may have gained access to the building 
through an unlocked third floor fire escape door. 
Sharp filed her complaint and demand for a jury trial on 
January 24, 1986. W.H. Moore, Inc. and Security 
Investments filed a motion for summary judgment on May 
28, 1986. Security Police filed its motion for summary 
judgment on June 26, 1986. The district court granted both 
motions on the basis that, under the circumstances of this 
case, the defendants owed no duty of care to Sharp. 
The sole issue is whether the district judge erred in this 
determination. Judge Newhouse discussed the matter in the 
following terms: 
Sharp v, W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
796 P.2d 506 
**508 *299 It is a matter of law to 
determine whether a duty of care is owed 
in the factual circumstances pled by the 
plaintiff.... In this case the plaintiff has 
alleged the breach of the duty of care 
occurred when the defendants Moore and 
Barbero allowed a third floor fire escape 
door to have a faulty lock that could be 
left unlocked. The plaintiff alleges that 
Robert Goold and his security company 
breached a duty of care in not inspecting 
the lock to make sure the door was locked 
on the night of May II, 1985, and the 
morning of May 12, 1985. It is 
speculated by the plaintiff and the police 
that the intruder gained entry into the 
building by going in through the third 
floor fire escape door. The rape and 
assault in this cause of action occurred in 
the secured area of the plaintiffs 
employer's offices on the second floor. 
The plaintiff has admitted in her 
deposition that she left unlocked the back 
door of her employer's second floor 
offices when she went to the bathroom. 
Sometime thereafter, the assault and rape 
occurred inside the offices. To further 
complicate this issue is the deposition of 
Lowell E. Michael, taken on May 28, 
1986, in which Mr. Michael states he was 
the security guard on duty that night and 
had the job of checking the doors to make 
sure they were secured. Mr. Michael, in 
his deposition, swore under oath that he 
checked the third floor fire escape door 
and it was secured at the time of his 
check around midnight and 1:00 a,m. 
This court is of the belief that even if the 
thirdfloor door had been negligently left 
unlocked and had not been inspected by 
the security guard on the night of May 
II, 1985, this court can not as a matter of 
law determine that the security company 
breached its duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff The plaintiff herself could have 
prevented the injury if she had not 
negligently left the door unlocked to her 
offices on the secondfloor. This court in 
reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances does not believe that the 
alleged breach of the duty by the 
defendants is of a high enough degree of 
foreseeability to warrant a finding of a 
breach of duty that can be imposed 
against the defendants. Therefore this 
court grants the motion for summary 
judgment on behalf of all the defendants 
in this case. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, R. Vol. I at 29-32 
(emphasis added). 
III Review of an order granting summary judament 
. b 
reqUires an appellate court to make two determinations: (I) 
Whether there remains a genuine issue as to any material 
fact; and (2) Whether the moving party was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 
Idaho 396, 582 P.2d 1074 (1978). In making those 
determinations, the Court will construe the facts and any 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case, Sharp. 
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 
(1986); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 
792,683 P.2d 440 (Ct.App.1984). 
121 With this standard of review in mind, a reading of the 
trial judge's opinion, particularly the portions excerpted 
above, clearly demonstrates reversible error. The district 
court barely touched upon the only question of law before 
it, whether the defendants owed Sharp a duty of care. 
Instead the district court reached and decided factual issues 
that are normally reserved for the jury-defendants' 
breach of a duty, if any, and the plaintiff's comparative 
negligence, if any. The court's view that "[t]he plaintiff 
herself could have prevented the injury if she had not 
negligently left the door unlocked to her offices on the 
second floor," appears to have weighed particularly 
heavily in the court's decision. In addition, the court 
actually reversed the burden of persuasion, stating that " ... 
this court cannot as a matter of law determine that the 
security company breached its duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff." Sharp did not pretend that she was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. It was both 
defendants who made that contention. It was therefore the 
defendants' burden to show that, even construing the facts 
and inferences most favorably to Sharp, the defendants 
were entitled to a **509 *300 judgment as a matter oflaw. 
This they did not do. The summary judgment in 
defendants' favor must therefore be reversed. 
However, this reversal does not end our inquiry. "[I]n 
giving a decision, if a new trial be granted, the court shall 
pass upon and determine all the questions of law involved 
in the case presented upon such appeal, and necessary to 
the final determination of the case." Idaho Code § 1-205. 
This is true even if the reversal is of a summary judgment 
rather than a judgment rendered after a trial. Layrite Prods. 
Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477,388 P.2d 105 (1964). It therefore 
remains for us to determine whether, as a matter of law, 
v.W.H. 
796 P.2d 506 
!nc., 118 Idaho 297 (1 
any of the defendants owed Sharp a duty of care under the 
circumstances of this case. 
I. THE LANDLORD 
13] The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of 
reasonable care to the tenants of the property was settled by 
our recent decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 
678 P.2d 41 (1984). There, Justice Donaldson, with three 
judges agreeing, wrote: 
[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its 
exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord 
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all 
the circumstances. 
We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to 
making the ~andlord an insurer for all injury occurring 
on the premlses, but merely constitutes our removal of 
the landlord's common-law cloak of immunity .... We 
hold that defendant Stearns did owe a duty to plaintiff 
Stephens to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances, and that it is for a jury to decide whether 
that duty was breached. 
106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added). 
14]15] In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal 
principles favor the recognition of a requirement of due 
care in the circumstances present here. One is the familiar 
proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also 
assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that 
duty. A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security 
system, is potentially subject to liability if the security 
system fails as a result of the landlord's negligence. Jardel 
Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (having provided 
security, owner must anticipate conduct of third persons); 
Feld v. iHerriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984); 
accord Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 I11.2d 203, 126 
I1I.Dec. 519,531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988); Lay v. Dworman, 
732 P.2d 455 (Okla.1987) (landlord's control over security 
creates potential liability where tenants rely on security). 
While the landlord/tenant relationship does not in and of 
itself establish a duty to keep doors locked, once Moore 
and Security Investments had initiated a locked door policy 
and had employed a security service with the intent of 
keeping the doors locked, they undertook such a duty and 
are subject to liability if they failed to perform that duty 
with a reasonable standard of care. 
16 J Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this 
case is the general rule that each person has a duty of care 
to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to 
others. Alegria v.Pqyonk, 101 Idaho 61 619 P.2d 135 
Next 
(1980); Harper v. Hojjinann, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 
(1974). 
Every person has a general duty to use 
due or ordinary care not to injure others, 
to avoid injury to others by any agency 
set in operation by him, and to do his 
work, render services or use his property 
as to avoid such injury. [Citations 
omitted.] The degree of care to be 
exercised must be commensurate with 
the danger or hazard connected with the 
activity. [Citations omitted.] 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 9 I Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 
(1966). Whether the duty attaches is largely a question for 
the trier offact as to the foreseeability ofthe risk. 
171 Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with 
the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result 
or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a 
relatively low degree of foreseeability **510 *301 is 
required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor 
but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher 
degree of foreseeability may be required. See Us. v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947) 
(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial 
Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 
658 (1985). Thus, foreseeability is not to be measured by 
just what is more probable than not, but also includes 
,,;hatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern 
hfe that a reasonably prudent person would take such into 
account in guiding reasonable conduct. Bigbee v. Pacific 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Ca1.3d 49,192 Cal.Rptr. 857,665 P.2d 
947 (1983); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 
449 N .E.2d 331 (1983). 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of foreseeability because the 
plaintiff failed to come forward with any evidence that 
prior similar incidents of criminal activity had occurred in 
the building or in its vicinity. However, the "prior similar 
incidents" rule was rejected recently by a leading case 
upon which the trial court purported to rely to the contrary. 
In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hasp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985), the California 
high court rejected a strong line of cases from California's 
intermediate appellate courts that held to the position 
espoused here by the defendants. The California court 
ruled that while prior similar incidents are relevant 
evidence of foreseeability, they are not the sine qua non on 
the issue offoreseeability. Id. at 362, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 659. 
See also Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, 401 Mass. 788, 
519 N.E.2d 1341 (1988); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 
389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983);. 
v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
796 P.2d 506 
The solid and growing national trend has been toward the 
rejection of the "prior similar incidents" rule. See, e.g., 
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 lll.2d 203, 126 
Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (simply because no 
violent crimes had been committed at the office parking 
area does not render criminal actions unforeseeable as a 
matter oflaw); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg. Inc., 
393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Aaron v. Havens, 
758 S. W.2d 446 (Mo.1988) (no need for past similar 
crimes); Small v. McKennan Hasp. (Small fl), 437 N.W.2d 
194 (S.D.1989) (failure to prove any criminal activity in 
the area is not fatal to the submission of the foreseeability 
issue to the jury because criminal assaults occur in all 
neighborhoods); Patersonv. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210,1218-
19 (Fla.App.1985) ( "[ w]e are not willing to give the 
landlord one free ride, as it were, and sacrifice the first 
victim's right to safety upon the altar of foreseeability by 
slavishly adhering to the now-discredited notion that at 
least one criminal assault must have occurred on the 
premises before the landlord can be held liable"). 
181191 Reduced to its essence, the "prior similar incidents" 
requirement translates into the familiar but fallacious 
saying in negligence law that every dog gets one free bite 
before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to 
control the dog. That license which is refused to a dog's 
owner should be withheld from a building's owner and the 
owner's agents as well. There is no "one free rape" rule in 
Idaho. 
The "prior similar incidents" requirement is not only too 
demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence law 
principle that only the general risk of harm need be 
foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury. Taco Bell v. 
Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo.1987); Galloway v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Duncavage v. 
Allen, 147 Ill.App.3d 88, 100 IlI.Dec. 455, 497 N.E.2d 433 
(1986); Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 43 at 299 
(5th ed. 1984). See also Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, 
Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 742 P.2d 377 (1987); Small v. 
McKennan Hasp. (Small I), 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D.1987). 
Such a requirement would remove far too many issues 
from the jury's consideration. Foreseeability is ordinarily a 
question of fact. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 
Cal.3d I 12, 126,211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 362, 695 P.2d 653, 659 
( 1985). 
1101 Defendants argue that security was provided to protect 
only the building and its contents, not the persons within. 
**511 *302 Otherwise put, property is entitled to 
protection, but not so with persons. In reality the question 
is whether it is foreseeable that an intruder might commit a 
violent act after gaining entry to the building where 
security was employed to protect against "prowlers, 
vandals or unauthorized intruders." Service Agreement 
between Security Police and Security Investments, R. Vol. 
1 at 26. The risk to be prevented was that of criminal 
activity. Unfortunately criminals do not tidily confine their 
crimes to property only. Even a shoplifting may turn 
violent. Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 
(De1.l987); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 
437, 439 (Iowa 1988). Accord Aaron v. Havens, 758 
S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo.1988) ("[i]fa burglar may enter so 
may a rapist"); Small v. McKennan Hospital (Small II), 
437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989). The question is one of 
foreseeability. It is therefore an issue for the jury or other 
trier of fact to decide. K.S.R. v. Novak & Sons, Inc., 225 
Neb. 498, 406 N.W.2d 636 (1987); Isaacs, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 
362,695 P.2d at 659. 
111 J Defendants also argue that the occurrence of criminal 
activity is an intervening, superseding force that breaks the 
chain of causation potentially binding defendants to 
liability. While this is a superficially pleasing statement of 
a general rule, it has no applicability under the 
circumstances of this case. Here the precise hazard to be 
guarded against was criminal activity. 
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a 
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal 
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm 
caused thereby. 
b. The happening of the very event the likelihood of 
which makes the actor's conduct negligent and so 
subjects the actor to liability cannot relieve him from 
liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to 
do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from 
this very danger. To deny recovery because the other's 
exposure to the very risk from which it was the purpose 
ofthe duty to protect him resulted in harm to him, would 
be to deprive the other of all protection and to make the 
duty a nUllity. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 and comment b 
(1965). Accord Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, 
Inc., 382 So.2d 98, 101 (Fla.App. I 980) (rejecting the 
"superseding" argument as entirely fallacious). See also 
Massie v. Godfather'S Pizza, Inc., 844 F.2d 1414 (lOth 
Cir.1988); Meyers v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 833 
F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1987); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 
lll.App.3d 88, 100 Ill. Dec. 455, 459-60, 497 N.E.2d 433, 
437-38 (1986). 
Thus, in addition to the rule of Stephens v. Stearns, 106 
Idaho at 249,678 P.2d at 41, imposing a duty of reasonable 
care, under the circumstances, running from landlords or 
owners to their tenants as a matter oflaw, there are ample 
v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
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additional reasons for imposing such a duty on the landlord 
in this case. It remains for ajury to detennine whether there 
was any breach of that duty. Therefore the summary 
judgment as to Moore is reversed and remanded. 
II. THE LANDLORD'S AGENTS 
Remaining for our consideration are the summary 
judgment rulings in favor of defendants Security 
Investments and Security Police. Two contracts in the 
record demonstrate the establishment of a principal/agency 
relationship between Moore and Security Investments and 
a subagency relationship between Security Investments 
and Security Police. 
1121 Security Investments was hired by Moore to manage 
the building housing Sharp's employer. The contract 
between them provided in relevant part: 
Contractor [Security Investments] shall 
[make] appropriate arrangements for and 
[supervise] the delivery of utility, 
security, ... and other services incidental 
to the operation of the Project, all in a 
manner consistent with the efficient 
operation of a first class office 
development and in accordance with 
such spec(jic **5] 2 *303 guidelines as 
may from time to time be given by 
Owner. 
R. Vol. 2, at 12 (emphasis added). It is axiomatic that an 
agency relationship is created where one who hires another 
has retained a contractual right to control the other's 
manner of performance. Bryant v. Sherm's Thunderbird 
Markel, 268 Or. 591, 522 P.2d 1383 (1974); Smith v. 
Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950). 
1131 The contract between the building manager and 
Security Police provided the following explicit 
agency-creating language: 
Security Police is hereby given authority 
and made agent to act in behalf of and to 
do all acts that Subscriber could do to 
protect the above premises from 
PROWLERS, V ANDALS, OR 
UNAUTHORIZED INTRUDERS. 
R. Vol. I at 26. 
1141 (151 1161 As a result of the agency relationships 
established, if Security Police was negligent for not 
checking the door through which the rapist may have 
gained entry, Security Police itself is susceptible to 
liability, which in turn may be imputed to Security 
Investments and to Moore. An agent is liable for its own 
negligence. McAlvain v. General Ins. Corp. of America, 97 
Idaho 777,781,554 P.2d 955, 959 (1976); Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 343 (1958). A principal is liable for 
the torts of an agent committed within the scope of the 
agency relationship. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 
708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985); Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 25 I (1958). Both principals and agents are liable 
for the torts of a subagent committed within the agency 
relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 255, 362 
(1958). Thus the negligence, if any, of the subagent, 
Security Police, renders it potentially liable to Sharp, and 
its liability may be imputed to the agent, Security 
Investments, and to the principal, Moore. 
All three summary judgments are reversed and the cause is 
remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellant; no 
attorney fees on appeal. 
JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., and WALTERS, J. Pro Tem., 
concur. 
BAKES, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
I concur in the reversal of summary judgment for W.H. 
Moore, Inc. However, I dissent from the reversal of 
summary judgment for the defendants Security 
Investments and Security Police. Under I.R.C.P. 56(c) 
summary judgment should be affirmed when "the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
ajudgment as a matter oflaw." The plaintiff has not shown 
any breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by either Security 
Investments or Security Police and, accordingly, the 
summary judgment in favor of these two defendants should 
be affirmed. 
Since the analysis ofthe right to summary judgment differs 
among the various defendants, a separate analysis of the 
claims against each of the defendants is necessary. 
I. CLAIM AGAINST W.H. MOORE, INC. 
As owner and landlord of Forest River Plaza # I building 
(the plaza), W.H. Moore, Inc. (Moore), owed certain duties 
to its tenants including the Jess Swan Insurance Agency 
v. W.H. Moore, !nc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
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(Swan) and to its tenants' employees, including plaintiff 
Sharp. Ownerllandlord Moore owed a duty to tenant Swan 
"to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 
678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). Under our decision in Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208, 
1210 (1984), an owner/landlord must also "exercise 
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances" to a 
tenants' employees (I) "for protection [from a dangerous 
condition] even though the dangerous condition is known 
and obvious to the employee," and under Marcher v. 
Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486,490 (I 988), (2) 
"to provide safe conditions for employment upon the 
premises." 
**513 *304 Reviewing the entire record most favorably to 
the party opposing the summary judgment motion, the 
record reflects that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding (I) whether the defendant Moore breached a 
duty to Sharp; (2) whether that breach was the actual cause 
of Sharp'S injury; and (3) was that breach the proximate 
cause of Sharp's injury. Accordingly, I agree that the 
summary judgment for Moore should be reversed. 
II. CLAIMS AGAINST SECURITY INVESTMENTS 
AND SECURITY POLICE 
Sharp also alleges that the defendants Security Investments 
and Security Police breached duties owed to her. 
Depending on the relationship of the parties, there can be 
duties owed in tort and/or in contract. See Just's v. 
Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 
P .2d 997, 1003 (1978) ("[N]egligent conduct and breach of 
contract are two distinct theories of recovery."). 
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion today fails to 
distinguish between those "two distinct theories of 
recovery." The Court's opinion recognizes the contractual 
relationship between Moore and Security Investments (the 
property manager) and between Security Investments and 
Security Police (who provided the periodic daily 
inspections). However, the Court makes no analysis of 
how Security Investments and Security Police breached 
any tort duties owed to Sharp or, for that matter, 
contractual duties to the plaintiff Sharp. While indeed 
Security Investments may have breached its contractual 
duties to Moore, and Security Police may have breached its 
contractual duties to Security Investments, neither Security 
Investments nor Security Police breached either a 
contractual or a tort duty to the plaintiff Sharp, and 
accordingly summary judgment was appropriate in favor 
of those two defendants. 
A. Tort Duties 
"A tort requires the wrongful invasion of an interest 
protected by the law .... " Just's v. Arrington Construction 
Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462,468,583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978). 
The elements of common law negligence 
have been summarized as (I) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant 
to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a 
causal connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. 
Alegriav. Payonk, 101 Idah0617,619P.2d 135(1980). 
The law recognizes that ownerllandlords owe duties to 
their tenants and their tenants' employees to exercise 
reasonable care (1) "in light of all the circumstances," 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 4 I, 50 
(1984), (2) "for protection [from a dangerous condition] 
even though the dangerous condition is known and obvious 
to the employee," Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 
593,595,691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), and (3) "to provide 
safe conditions for employment upon the premises." 
Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 
(1988). These duties of the owner/landlord are based on the 
landlord/tenant relationship with the tenant and the 
tenant's employees. Because an ownerllandlord exercises 
control of his building, he also bears responsibility for 
foreseeable injuries to the tenants and their employees 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care. Id. 
However, Security Investments and Security Police were 
not the owner/landlord, nor did they have any recognized 
legal relationship with the tenants of the owner/landlord or 
the tenants' employees such as plaintiff Sharp. They do not 
become the owner/landlord merely by contracting to 
perform services, even security services, for the landlord. 
While their contracts may have imposed some contractual 
duties upon them, there can be no recovery in tort by Sharp 
from Security Investments or Security Police because they 
owed no duty to Sharp. Strangely, the majority opinion 
does not make a tort analysis with regard to Security 
Investments and Security Police. The majority opinion 
does not point out any duty owed by Security Investments 
or Security Police to Sharp the breach of which could result 
in a negligence claim by Sharp against them. The Court's 
opinion merely **514 *305 states that, "If Security Police 
was negligent for not checking the door through which the 
rapist may have gained entry, Security Police itself is 
susceptible to liability, which in turn may be imputed to 
Security Investments and to Moore. An agent is liable for 
its own negligence." Ante at 303, 796 P.2d at 512. 
However, the Court does not go on and determine whether 
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, !nc., 11 B Idaho 297 (1990) 
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or not Security Police breached any duty to Sharp, which 
could be the basis for its negligence. Rather, the Court 
concludes that, "Thus the negligence, if any, of the 
sub-agent, Security Police, renders it potentially liable to 
Sharp, and its liability may be imputed to the agent, 
Security Investments, and to the principal, Moore." Ante at 
303,796 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added). All the Court has 
said is that if there was any negligence on the part of 
Security Police, it could be imputed to Security 
Investments and Moore. The Court may be correct in 
concluding that if there was negligence on the part of 
Security Police it would be imputed to Security 
Investments and to Moore. That would depend on whether 
Security Police was an agent rather than an independent 
contractor. However, the Court has not made any analysis 
establishing that there was a triable issue of fact 
concerning whether Security Police had breached a duty 
toward Sharp which could result in a claim of negligence 
by Sharp against Security Police. The Court has merely 
said that ifthere was any negligence on the part of Security 
Police it would be imputed to the others. The Court has not 
demonstrated how this record establishes any negligence 
on the part of either Security Investments or Security 
Police, i.e., breach of a duty owed by either to Sharp. To 
the contrary, the record demonstrates that no such tort duty 
was owed, and accordingly the summary judgment granted 
in favor of those two defendants should be affirmed. 
B. Contract Duties 
Because Sharp was not in privity of contract with either 
Security Investments or Security Police, the only possible 
contractual duty owed to her by these two defendants 
would be under a third party beneficiary theory. Here, 
Sharp alleges, and the majority opinion by reversing 
apparently assumes, that the contracts between (I) Moore 
and Security Investments, and (2) Security Investments 
and Security Police were intended to benefit her as an 
employee of Moore's tenant, Swan. However, a review of 
our prior cases clearly demonstrates that plaintiff Sharp 
was not a third party beneficiary of those contracts 
between (I) Moore and Security Investments, and (2) 
Security Investments and Security Police. 
We have previously set forth requirements for recovery 
under third party beneficiary theory: 
[8]efore recovery can be had by a third party 
beneficiary, it must be shown that the contract was made 
for his direct benefit, or as sometimes stated primarily 
for his benefit, and that it is not sufficient that he be a 
mere incidental beneficiary. 
... [T]he contract itself must express an intent to benefit the 
third party. 'This intent must be gleaned from the contract 
itself unless that document is ambiguous, whereupon the 
circumstances surrounding its formation may be 
considered.' [Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 
Idaho 526, 532, 446 P.2d 895, 90 I (1968) ]. 
Adkison COlP. v. American Building Co., 107 Idaho 406, 
409, 690 P .2d 341, 344 (1984). A third party may only 
enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a 
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Stewart v. 
Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 532, 446 P.2d at 
90 I; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 
462,464,583 P.2d 997,999 (1978). 
Here, in order for Sharp to recover from Security 
Investments under a third party beneficiary theory, the 
contract between Security Investments and Moore must 
express an intent to benefit her as a third party. However, 
the contract does not express such an intent. In its 
"Management Agreement" with Moore, Security 
Investments agreed to manage the plaza and to "provide 
for the smooth and efficient physical operation of the 
[plaza] by making **515 *306 appropriate arrangements 
for and supervising the delivery of utilities, security, 
emergency response, inspection and other services 
incidental to the operation of the [plaza ] .... " In the 
contract, Security Investments undertook no duty with 
reference to the safety of the tenants' employees. It only 
agreed "to promote a harmonious relationship with 
Tenants on behalf of Owner, and in furtherance thereof 
shall visit all tenants at their premises on a regular basis to 
express the owner's appreciation of their tenancy and to 
solicit their suggestions and comments and shall provide 
prompt and courteous response to tenant inquiries and 
problems." Such a provision is insufficient to demonstrate 
that the parties intended that employees of a tenant would 
be able to exercise rights under the contract. At most the 
tenants' employees were only incidental beneficiaries of 
Security Investments' contractual duty to manage the 
plaza. Under our prior cases such an incidental beneficiary 
may not maintain a third party beneficiary action. Just's, 
Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 
997 (1978); Stevvart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 
Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968). 
It follows that if Security Investments' contract with W.H. 
Moore did not undertake an express contractual duty to 
intentionally benefit Sharp, then it could not further pass 
on such a duty in its contract with Security Police. Even if 
it could, Security Investments in fact did not contract 
expressly with Security Police to provide safe conditions 
for employees working in the plaza. Rather, in its "Service 
Agreement" with Security Investments, Security Police 
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990) 
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merely agreed to (I) "furnish night patrol services to [the 
plaza] intermittently during the hours of 8:00 o'clock PM 
and 7:00 o'clock AM seven nights per week ... doors to be 
locked at 7-8:00 o'clock PM and unlocked at 7:00 o'clock 
AM on weekdays only"; (2) "check the above named 
premises for Forcible Entry, Unauthorized Persons, 
Unlocked Doors, Broken Windows, Fire ... "; (3) "[c]heck 
three front doors and fire escape on third floor, East end at 
opening, regular rounds and closing"; and (4) "protect the 
above premises from Prowlers, Vandals or Unauthorized 
Intruders." The contract makes no mention of providing 
personal security for either tenants or tenants' employees. 
Again, while tenants' employees may have derived some 
incidental benefits from the Security Investments-Security 
Police contract, the contract itself was not expressly 
intended to benefit them, and there is no indication that the 
contracting parties intended that third parties, such as 
Sharp, would be entitled to exercise rights under the 
contract as third party beneficiaries. The only arguable 
third party beneficiary from the Security Investments-
Security Police contract was Moore, the plaza's owner. 
Even if the contracts of the defendants Security 
Investments and Security Police had been worded so as to 
express an intention that tenants or their employees were to 
be third party beneficiaries who could exercise rights under 
those contracts, violation of such a third party beneficiary 
of Document 
provision would not have been a tort, but would merely 
have provided Sharp with contract damages. Taylor v. 
Herbold. 94 Idaho 133, 138,483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971) ( 
"Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort."). Sharp's 
claim against Security Investments and Security Police 
alleged a tort, not a breach of contract. Therefore, even if 
those two contracts had clearly provided that the tenants 
and their employees were intended to be direct third party 
beneficiaries, not merely incidental beneficiaries, Stewart 
v. Arrington Construction Co .. 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 
(1968), the mere breach of the contract would not 
constitute a tort. "To found an action in tort, there must be a 
breach of duty apart from the non-performance of a 
contract." Taylor v. Herbolcl, 94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 
669. 
Accordingly, because Security Investments and Security 
Police did not owe any contractual duty to Sharp, the 
summary judgment entered in favor of Security 
Investments and Security Police should be affirmed. 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 2003 Term. 
J. Scott SHA WVER, a/k/a Scott Shawver 
and Mary L. Shawver, a/k/a Mary 
Shawver, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross 
Appellants, 
v. 
HUCKLEBERRY ESTATES, L.L.C., an 
Idaho limited partnership, Defendant-
Appellant-Cross Respondent. 
No. 28855. I April 29, 2004. I Rehearing 
Denied June 22, 2004. 
Synopsis 
Background: Prospective purchasers of subdivision lot 
brought action against vendor, seeking both specific 
performance of sale agreement and declaration that 
amendments to restrictive covenants were void. Following 
a bench trial, the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 
Ada County, Kathryn A. Sticklen, J., concluded that 
prospective purchasers were entitled to specific 
performance, but did not offset award of attorney fees and 
costs against amount prospective purchasers owed in order 
to close on purchase. Prospective purchasers and vendor 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Schroeder, J., held that: 
(I] vendor's action of recording invalid amendment to 
original recorded restrictive covenants did not violate 
terms of sale agreement; 
(2] vendor's action of recording invalid amendment did not 
violate implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
[3] purchase was subject to amended restrictive covenants; 
and 
[4] vendor was entitled as prevailing party to award of 
appellate attorney fees and costs. 
Reversed. 
Kidwell, J., dissented. 
West Headnotes (35) 
111 Appeal and Error 
<::.: Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
[21 
13) 
141 
Decision Appealed from 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, Supreme Court employs the 
same standard as used by the district judge 
originally ruling on the motion. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 56(c). 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
,;,,,,Motion or Other Application 
Fact that both parties move for summary 
judgment does not in and of itself establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
<~=Existence or Non-Existence of Fact Issue 
Judgment 
,,"*Hearing and Determination 
When an action will be tried before the court 
without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is 
entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences 
based upon the undisputed evidence properly 
before it and grant summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
,\Ywlnferences from Facts Proved 
When reviewing trial court's decision on motion 
for summary judgment in action to be tried to the 
court, the test for reviewing the inferences drawn 
by the trial court based on undisputed evidence is 
whether the record reasonably supports the 
inferences. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
Shawverv. 
93 P.3d 685 
140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
15) 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Vendor and Purchaser 
·(~···,Covenants 
Vendor's action of recording invalid amendment 
to original recorded restricted covenants did not 
violate terms of sale agreement concerning 
subdivision lot; by terms of sale agreement, 
purchasers agreed to purchase lot governed by 
restrictive covenants, which could be amended 
by written consent of existing lot owners, and 
purchasers had no right under sale agreement to 
override amendment provision or to avoid 
compliance in event amendments were properly 
adopted. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
16) Contracts 
,~*,oAmbiguity in General 
P) 
18) 
When the language of a contract is clear and 
unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect 
are questions oflaw. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Contracts 
'J.Language of Instrument 
Unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Contracts 
'~.= Intention of Parties 
Purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine 
the intent of the contracting parties at the time the 
contract was entered. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
19) Contracts 
ti~,Construing Whole Contract Together 
In determining the intent of the parties, Supreme 
Court must view the contract as a whole. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
1101 Contracts 
;';%.Ambiguity in General 
If a contract is found ambiguous, its 
interpretation is a question of fact. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1111 Contracts 
{;=Ambiguity in General 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law. 
112) Appeal and Error 
~c"Cases Triable in Appellate Court 
Whether facts establish violation of contract is a 
question of law reviewed de novo. 
[131 Contracts 
•. ' ' Breach by Failure of Performance 
Breach of contract occurs when there is a failure 
to perform a contractual duty. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Shawver v. Huckleberry 
93 P.3d 685 
1141 Contracts 
LLC., 140 Idaho 354 (2(04) 
'F~Rewriting, Remaking, or Revising Contract 
Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite 
contracts in order to make them more equitable. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
1151 Vendor and Purchaser 
'.",Covenants 
Vendor's action of recording invalid amendment 
to original recorded restricted covenants 
concerning subdivision lot did not violate 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
regarding sale agreement; amendment was 
simply void due to failure to comply with 
amendment process, and purchasers were not 
deprived of any benefit under contract with 
vendor. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
[161 Contracts 
·~,~Tenns Implied as Part of Contract 
No covenant will be implied which is contrary to 
the terms of the contract negotiated and executed 
by the parties. 
1171 Contracts 
· •. '"""Terms Implied as Part of Contract 
Contracts 
=Acts or Omissions Constituting Breach in 
General 
Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
requires that the parties perform, in good faith, 
the obligations imposed by their agreement, and a 
violation of the covenant occurs only when either 
party violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs 
any benefit of the contract. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1181 Appeal and Error 
',FhFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Supreme Court exercises free review over the 
district court's conclusions oflaw. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1191 Appeal and Error 
>"Clearly Erroneous Findings 
In determining whether a finding by the district 
court is clearly erroneous, Supreme Court does 
not weigh the evidence as the district court did. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
1201 Appeal and Error 
."".Clearly Erroneous Findings 
When reviewing whether trial court's findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous, Supreme Court 
inquires whether findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
121 J Appeal and Error 
.. "".Substituting Reviewing Court's Judgment 
When reviewing district judge's findings offact, 
Supreme Court will not substitute its view of the 
facts for the view of the district judge. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
Shawver v. Huckleberry 
93 P.3d 685 
122/ Appeal and Error 
',J~,Substantial Evidence 
LL.C., 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
In reviewing whether trial court's findings offact 
are supported by substantial evidence, evidence 
is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of 
fact would accept it and rely upon it in 
determining whether a disputed point of fact had 
been proven. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
1231 Covenants 
,>"Agreement of Parties 
Purchase of subdivision lot was subject to 
amended restrictive covenants that increased 
mllllmUm square footage of houses to be 
constructed on lots and that were recorded after 
sale agreement had been executed; original 
recorded covenants, which were in effect at time 
of execution of sale agreement, contained 
unambiguous provision allowing amendments if 
adopted upon written consent of specified 
percentage of owners. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
124/ Covenants 
·:>~·Nature and Operation in General 
Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants that 
restrict the use of private property. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
125J Covenants 
·,,=Nature and Operation in General 
When interpreting covenants that restrict the use 
of private propelty, Supreme Court generally 
applies the same rules of construction as are 
applied to any contract or covenant; however, 
because restrictive covenants are in derogation of 
the common law right to use land for all lawful 
purposes, Supreme Court will not extend by 
implication any restriction not clearly expressed. 
1261 Covenants 
0,;...Nature and Operation in General 
When interpreting covenant restricting use of 
private property, all covenants are to be resolved 
in favor of the free use of land. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1271 Covenants 
,~·General Rules of Construction 
Beginning with the plain language of the 
covenant, the first step in interpreting covenant is 
to determine whether or not there is an 
ambiguity. 
1281 Contracts 
;>Existence of Ambiguity 
Words or phrases that have established 
definitions in common use or settled legal 
meanings are not rendered ambiguous merely 
because they are not defined in the document 
where they are used. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
129/ Covenants 
v·~General Rules of Construction 
Covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation on a 
Shawver v. 
93 P.3d 685 
given issue. 
1301 Covenants 
v~General Rules of Construction 
140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
To determine whether or not a covenant is 
ambiguous, the court must view the agreement as 
a whole. 
131) Covenants 
'.··General Rules of Construction 
Second step in contract or covenant construction 
depends on whether or not an ambiguity has been 
found; if the covenants are unambiguous, then 
the cOLlli must apply them as a matter oflaw. 
1321 Covenants 
. ",General Rules of Construction 
Covenants 
<.",Questions for Jury 
If there is an ambiguity in the covenants, then 
interpretation is a question of fact, and the court 
must determine the intent of the parties at the 
time the instrument was drafted. 
[331 Covenants 
-(,,,Nature and Operation in General 
Judicial rewriting of restrictive covenants is 
prohibited. 
134) Costs 
::'"Declaratory Judgment 
Specific Performance 
~",Costs 
Vendor was entitled as prevailing party to award 
of appellate attorney fees and costs under sale 
agreement in prospective purchasers' action 
seeking specific performance and declaratory 
relief concerning whether sale of subdivision lot 
was subject to original covenants or amended 
covenants; agreement provided that prevailing 
party in any legal action connected with 
agreement was entitled to recover fees and costs, 
including fees and costs on appeal. Appellate 
Rule 41. 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
135) Costs 
° "Attorney Fees on Appeal or Error 
Appellate rule providing procedure for 
requesting attorney fees on appeal allows 
Supreme COLlli to award attorney fees only if 
permitted by some other statutory or contractual 
authority; it is not authority alone for awarding 
fees. Appellate Rule 41 . 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**688 *357 Bohner Law Office, Boise, for appellants. AJ. 
Bohner argued. 
Westburg, McCabe & Collins, Boise, for respondent. 
William D. Collins argued. 
Opinion 
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
This case involves a real estate purchase and sale 
agreement between Scott and Mary Shawver ("Shawvers") 
Shawverv. 
93 P.3d 685 
Estates, l.l.C., 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
and Huckleberry Estates, L.L.c. ("Huckleberry"). The 
Shawvers allege Huckleberry breached the sale agreement 
by making an invalid amendment to the restrictive 
covenants applicable to the property, which rendered the 
Shawvers' proposed house designs nonconforming. Both 
parties moved for summary judgment and the district court 
found Huckleberry in breach. Following a court trial on 
issues relating to the interpretation of the original 
covenants and appropriate damages, the district court 
awarded specific performance of the sale agreement in 
favor of the Shawvers, subject only to the original 
covenants. Both parties appealed. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On November 9, 1999, Huckleberry and the Shawvers 
executed an agreement to reserve for the Shawvers the 
purchase of Lot II, Block 2, of the Huckleberry Estates 
subdivision ("the Subdivision"). The sale was to close 
within 30 days of the recording of the final plat of Phase I 
of the Subdivision. Huckleberry's agent provided the 
Shawvers with a copy of the preliminary plat and 
restrictive covenants as then drafted ("Draft CC & Rs"). 
By signing the reservation agreement, the Shawvers 
acknowledged that they had received a copy of the 
restrictive covenants that applied to the lot, had 
familiarized themselves with the covenants and agreed to 
abide by them. The Draft CC & Rs provided in relevant 
part: 
c. MINIMUM BUILDING SIZE: All residential 
buildings erected upon said property shall have a 
finished floor area of not less then 2,200 square feet of 
ground area, exclusive of garages, carports, 
breezeways, storage rooms, porches or similar 
structures; or 2,600 square feet of finished area in the 
case of a two story house. All dwellings **689 *358 
must have at least a three-car garage, attached or 
detached. Lot 3 Block 4 shall be excepted from this 
condition and shall have a minimum residential 
finished floor area of 1,600 square feet on the ground 
floor level and a two-car garage. 
****** 
r. DESIGN REVIEW: Grantor or other persons 
designated by Grantor shall review all structures and 
site plans prior to commencement of construction. 
After signing the reservation agreement, the Shawvers 
designed a house for the Huckleberry property which met 
the square-footage requirements of the Draft CC & Rs. The 
plan was for a two-story structure with 1370 square feet on 
the first floor and 1770 square feet on the second floor. The 
Shawvers engaged a contractor to build the house. 
On July 21, 2000, Huckleberry recorded the final plat and 
original CC & Rs for the Subdivision. The original 
recorded CC & Rs contained an amendment provision, 
which allowed amendment of any provision of the CC & 
Rs upon written approval of "at least seventy-five percent 
of the lot owners." The Shawvers received a copy of the 
original recorded CC & Rs on August I, 2000. Aside from 
the addition of the amendment provision, the recorded CC 
& Rs did not differ from the Draft CC & Rs in any respect 
relevant to this case. 
On July 28,2000, a real estate purchase and sale agreement 
("Sale Agreement") was initialed by HuckleberryJ and 
delivered to the Shawvers by Huckleberry's real estate 
agent. The Shawvers signed the Sale Agreement and 
delivered it to Huckleberry's real estate agent on August 
17, 2000. Pursuant to the agreement, the Shawvers were 
responsible for obtaining and reviewing a copy of the 
applicable CC & Rs. The Shawvers checked the 
corresponding "yes" box adjacent to this provision, 
indicating that they had in fact reviewed the applicable CC 
& Rs. 
The Shawvers submitted site, floor and elevation plans for 
their home to Huckleberry on August 8, 2000. On August 
11, 2000, Huckleberry returned those plans to the 
Shawvers and told the Shawvers that the plans had not 
been approved. Huckleberry subsequently recorded 
amendments to the original recorded CC & Rs ("First 
Amended CC & Rs") on August 28, 2000, which included 
an increase in the minimum square footage requirement for 
all homes built in the Subdivision. A copy of the First 
Amended CC & Rs was provided to the Shawvers on 
August 30, 2000. As amended, the CC & Rs prevented the 
Shawvers from constructing their home according to the 
plans they had previously designed and submitted to 
Huckleberry. The relevant amendments were as follows: 
Article I, Paragraph c. is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
c. MINIMUM RESIDENTIAL BUILDING FLOOR 
AREA: Floor area shall be exclusive of eaves, steps, 
porches, entrances patios and garages. The floor area 
of a one-story house shall have not less than two 
thousand two hundred (2,200) square feet on the 
ground floor. Two story houses shall have not less 
than a total of two thousand six hundred (2,600) 
Shawver v. 
93 P.3d 685 
Estates, 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
square feet and shall have the following minimums on 
each floor: one thousand six hundred (1,600) square 
feet on the ground floor and not less than 800 hundred 
(800) square feet on the second floor. All dwellings 
must have at least a three-car garage, attached or 
detached, which must be identical in architecture to 
the residential dwelling if detached. Lot 3 Block 4 
shall be excepted from this condition and may have a 
total minimum floor area of one thousand (1,600) 
square feet and a two-car garage. The Architectural 
Committee shall have the discretion to reduce the 
minimum floor areas if the proposed design warrants 
such an adjustment. Provided, however, that the 
minimum ground floor area of any dwelling shall 
**690 *359 not be reduced below one thousand five 
hundred (1,500) square feet. 
****** 
Article I, Paragraph w. is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
w. DESIGN REVIEW: Grantor or other persons 
designated by Grantor, shall act as the 
Architectural Committee. The Architectural 
Committee shall consider and act upon any and all 
proposals or plans and specifications submitted for 
its approval pursuant to this Declaration, including 
the inspection of construction in conformance with 
plans approved by the Architectural Committee. 
The Architectural Committed shall have the power 
to determine, by rule or other written designation 
consistent with this Declaration, which types of 
improvements shall be submitted for Architectural 
Committee review and approval. The Architectural 
Committee shall approve proposals or plans and 
specifications submitted for its approval only if it 
deems that the construction, alternation, or 
additions contemplated thereby in the locations 
indicated are in conformity with this Declaration, 
and that the appearance of any structure affected 
thereby will be in harmony with the surrounding 
structures on other properties within the 
Subdivision. 
Article I, Paragraph z. is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
z. AMENDMENTS: The Grantor reserves the right 
to amend this Declaration until all lots are sold in 
the subdivision. No amendments shall be made to 
this Declaration by any of the owners until ten (10) 
years after the date of the sale of the last lot in the 
subdivision and then such amendment may be only 
made by approval of seventy-five percent of the 
then lot owners. 
On August 31, 2000, the Shawvers tendered to the closing 
agent, First American Title, the balance of the purchase 
price, but only if First American could assure them they 
were purchasing under the original recorded CC & Rs and 
not the First Amended CC & Rs. When First American 
refused to close under these conditions the Shawvers filed 
suit against Huckleberry. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September I, 2000, the Shawvers filed a complaint 
against Huckleberry seeking specific performance of the 
Sale Agreement. The Shawvers amended their complaint 
on March 7, 200 I, to add damages as an alternative basis 
for relief and to seek a declaration that the August 28,2000 
amendments to the CC & Rs were void. Huckleberry 
answered the Shawvers' amended complaint and 
counterclaimed. 
On June I, 2002, the parties submitted cross motions for 
summary judgment. The Shawvers claimed that the First 
Amended CC & Rs were invalid because Huckleberry 
alone did not constitute seventy-five percent of the lot 
owners, the percentage required for the adoption of a valid 
amendment under the original recorded CC & Rs. They 
also asserted that Huckleberry's invalid amendment to the 
original CC & Rs constituted a breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and that Huckleberry was 
prevented from amending the original CC & Rs by the 
doctrine of quasi estoppel. Huckleberry claimed that 
summary judgment was inappropriate because a contested 
issue of material fact existed regarding representations 
made to the Shawvers by Huckleberry's agent concerning 
the applicability of the Draft CC & Rs. Alternatively, 
Huckleberry claimed that it was entitled to summary 
judgment because the Shawvers were seeking to reform the 
parties' agreements, which could not be accomplished 
through application of specific performance or the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
On July 23, 200 I, Huckleberry recorded a second 
amendment to the original recorded CC & Rs ("Second 
Amended CC & Rs"). The Second Amended CC & Rs 
included essentially the same provisions as the First 
Amended CC & Rs with the exception of the provision for 
amendments which was **691 *360 changed to remove 
the grantor's reservation. Unlike the First Amended CC & 
Shawver v. LLC., 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
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Rs, the Second Amended CC & Rs were approved by over 
seventy-five percent of the existing lot owners in 
compliance with the amendment provision contained in the 
original recorded CC & Rs. Neither party has challenged 
the validity of the Second Amended CC & Rs. 
On October 3, 2001, the district court issued its 
memorandum decision, finding that any contested issue 
regarding the applicability of the Draft CC & Rs was 
immaterial because there was no significant difference 
between the Draft CC & Rs and the original recorded CC 
& Rs. The district court also found Huckleberry in breach 
of the Sale Agreement. 
The case proceeded to trial on issues relating to the 
interpretation of the design review provision of the original 
recorded CC & Rs, the appropriate remedy for the breach 
and Huckleberry's counterclaim concerning a lis pendens 
filed by the Shawvers in connection with the lawsuit. The 
district court found that the only reasonable interpretation 
of the design review provision was that it allowed the 
grantor to enforce conformity with the specific provisions 
of the original recorded CC & Rs and that the Shawver's 
proposed house designs were compliant. The district court 
concluded that the Shawvers are entitled to specific 
performance of the Sale Agreement, subject only to the 
original recorded CC & Rs. The district court determined 
that, "[t]he subsequent amendments have no application to 
[the Sale Agreement]." Huckleberry's counterclaim was 
denied. Subsequently, the district court entered its 
judgment and an order staying the judgment. The 
Shawvers were awarded attorney fees and costs. 
Both parties appealed. Huckleberry claims that the district 
court erred in awarding specific performance of the Sale 
Agreement subject only to the original recorded CC & Rs. 
Huckleberry also challenges the award of attorney fees and 
costs in favor of the Shawvers. The Shawvers contend that 
the district court erred by not offsetting the award of 
attorney fees and costs against the amount they owe 
Huckleberry in order to close on the purchase of the lot. 
Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THA T HUCKLEBERRY BREACHED THE 
AGREEMENT BY AMENDING THE CC & RS AND 
ERRED IN GRANTING THE SHA WYERS 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Huckleberry argues that the district court erred in ruling, as 
a matter of that it breached the Sale Agreement 
attempting to amend the CC & Rs and that the Shawvers 
were entitled to specific performance of the Sale 
Agreement under the original recorded CC & Rs. 
A. Standard of Review 
11) [2) On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court employs the same standard as used by 
the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Wens man 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. o[ldaho, 134 Idaho 148, 151,997 P.2d 
609, 612 (2000) (citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 
152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997)). Summary judgment is 
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 
I.R.C.P. 56( c). The fact that both parties move for 
summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID 
Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549,551,716 P.2d 1321 (1986) (citing 
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 507, 600 P.2d 
1387, 1389 (1979)). The fact that the parties have filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the 
applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate 
each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v. 
Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 
(2000) (citing Bear Island Water Ass 'n, Inc., v. Brown, 125 
Idaho 717,721,874 P.2d 528,532 (1994)). 
131 [4) Neither party in this case made a demand for ajury 
trial. When an action will be tried before the court without 
a jury, the **692 *361 trial court as the trier of fact is 
entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based 
upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant 
the summary judgment despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences. Id. (citing Brown v. Perkins, 129 
Idaho 189, 191, 923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996); Loomis v. 
Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)). 
The test for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial 
court is whether the record reasonably supports the 
inferences.ld. (citing Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 
176, 968 P.2d 661, 665 (1998); Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518-19,650 P.2d 657, 660-61 
(1982)). 
B. The district court erred by finding Huckleberry in 
breach of the Sale Agreement. 
IS) The district court concluded that Huckleberry breached 
the Sale Agreement when it made an invalid amendment to 
the original recorded CC & Rs. Huckleberry claims that 
this decision constituted error because the First Amended 
CC & Rs, though invalid, did not violate the terms of the 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
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Sale Agreement. 
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161 [7J [81 [91 [101 [111 1121 When the language of a 
contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of law. State v. Barnett, 133 
Idaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999). An 
unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id. 
The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the 
intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract was 
entered. Opportunity, L.L.c. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 
607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002) (citing Rutter v. 
McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 (1980». In 
determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view 
the contract as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway 
Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735,9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000). If a 
contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question 
offact. Id. (citing Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. 
Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823, 41 P.3d 242, 251 (2002». 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw. Boe! 
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13,43 P.3d 768, 
772 (2002) (citing Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389,391-
92,957 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1998». Whether the facts 
establish a violation of the contract is a question of law 
reviewed de novo. Barnett, 133 Idaho at 234, 985 P.2d at 
114 (citing United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799,803 
(9th Cir.I99 I ». 
The original recorded CC & Rs, which were incorporated 
by reference into the Sale Agreement, provided in relevant 
part: 
GENERAL COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS: 
That all lots of said Huckleberry Estates Subdivision 
shall be subject to the following covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions, that by acceptance of any such 
conveyance, the grantee or grantees and their heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns agree 
to the conditions described as follows: 
****** 
z. AMENDMENTS: Any amendment to these 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be 
approved in writing by at least seventy-five percent of 
the lot owners. 
The Shawvers received a copy of the original recorded CC 
& Rs on August 1, 2000. On August 17, 2000, Scott and 
Mary Shawver both signed the Sale Agreement with 
Huckleberry. Paragraph five of the Sale Agreement 
provided that "buyer hereby acknowledges copies of the 
recorded plat & CCR's." Paragraph sixteen provided that 
the Shawvers were responsible to obtain and review the 
applicable CC & Rs. Pursuant to paragraph sixteen, the 
Shawvers checked the corresponding "yes" box adjacent to 
this provision, indicating that they had in fact reviewed the 
applicable CC & Rs. 
[13) /14) "A breach of contract occurs when there is a 
failure to perform a contractual duty." Daniels v. 
Anderson, 113 Idaho 838, 840, 748 P.2d 829, 831 
(Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted). The Shawvers contend 
that Huckleberry breached the Sale Agreement by 
recording the First Amended CC & Rs because 
Huckleberry had a contractual duty to convey the property 
to the Shawvers subject only to the original recorded CC & 
Rs. This argument is inconsistent with the language of the 
Sale Agreement. Under the express terms of the Sale 
Agreement, the **693 *362 Shawvers agreed to purchase 
property governed by restrictive covenants, which could be 
amended by written consent of seventy-five percent of the 
existing lot owners. Such agreements are valid under the 
law. See 20 AMJUR.2D Covenants § 236 (1995) ("[T]he 
restrictive agreements in a tract of land may provide for a 
method of abrogating or modifying such agreements, as, 
for example, by vote of a certain proportion of the property 
owners."). The Shawvers had no right under the Sale 
Agreement to override the amendment provision or to 
avoid compliance in the event amendments were properly 
adopted. "Courts do not possess the roving power to 
rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." 
Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 
680, 684, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (1988) (citation omitted). The 
Shawvers' position that the Sale Agreement was subject 
only to the original recorded CC & Rs is contrary to the 
agreement they made. 
r 15) 11611171 The Shawvers also claim that Huckleberry's 
conduct constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' 
contract. Idaho P(TWer Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 
Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000). No covenant 
will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the 
contract negotiated and executed by the parties. See First 
Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Gaige. 115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d 
683,687 (1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Etch., 115 Idaho 
298, 300, 766 P.2d 768, 770 (1988) (an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express 
provision in a contract). The covenant requires that the 
parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by 
their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs 
only when either party violates, nullifies or significantly 
impairs any benefit of the contract. See Idaho First Nat. 
Bank v. Bliss Valley Food.~, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 
P.2d 841,863 (1991). 
Under the express provisions of the Sale Agreement, 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
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amendments to the existing CC & Rs could be adopted 
upon written consent of at least seventy-five percent of the 
existing lot owners. To imply that Huckleberry was 
obligated to perform the Sale Agreement subject only to 
the original recorded CC & Rs would be contrary to the 
terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the 
parties. 
Huckleberry's first recorded amendments to the CC & Rs 
were unenforceable against the Shawvers because they 
were not adopted in compliance with the applicable 
amendment provision. This action did not breach the 
implied covenant of good faith. As applied to the Sale 
Agreement, the First Amended CC & Rs were simply void, 
and therefore the Shawvers were not deprived of any 
benefit under their contract with Huckleberry. 
The district court's determination that Huckleberry was in 
breach of the Sale Agreement was in error. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THA T THE SECOND AMENDED CC & RS DID 
NOT APPLY TO THE LOT THE SHA WVERS WISH 
TO PURCHASE FROM HUCKLEBERRY 
Huckleberry claims that the district court erred in holding 
that the Second Amended CC & Rs did not apply to the 
Shawvers' purchase of the lot in question. Specifically, 
Huckleberry claims that under the express terms of the 
parties' agreement, amendments to the original CC & Rs 
could be adopted at any time upon the written consent of at 
least seventy-five percent of the existing lot owners. 
The Second Amended CC & Rs were adopted and 
recorded on July 23, 200 I. A copy of these amendments, 
along with the lot owners' notarized signatures, were made 
part of the record before the district court. Huckleberry 
argues that the district court's order in this case essentially 
redrafted the parties' agreement by allowing the Shawvers 
to avoid compliance with the Second Amended CC & Rs 
or other future amendments despite their unchallenged 
validity or application to the property in question. 
The Shawvers do not challenge the validity of the 
amendment provision contained in the **694 *363 original 
recorded CC & Rs or the fact that the Second Amended CC 
& Rs were properly adopted in compliance with that 
provision. They contend that the adoption of the Second 
Amended CC & Rs prevented Huckleberry from being 
able to convey the property according to the terms of the 
Sale Agreement. 
The Shawvers also claim that they are entitled to recoup 
damages associated with complying with the Second 
Amended CC & Rs in the event this Court holds that they 
are applicable in this case. According to the Shawvers, 
their damages amount to $16,000, the cost of increasing 
the size of their home to make it meet the requirements of 
the Second Amended CC & Rs. The Shawvers request that 
the district court be directed to consider and enter 
judgment for that additional cost should the Shawvers be 
required to comply with the Second Amended CC & Rs. 
A. Standard of Review 
118) 119) 1201 121) 122) This Court exercises free review 
over the district court's conclusions of law. Trimble v. 
Engelking, 134 Idaho 195,196,998 P.2d 502, 503 (2000). 
The standard of review of a non-jury district court's 
findings offact is set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a). Williamson v. City oj lvfeCal!, 135 Idaho 452, 19 
P.3d 766, 769 (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). I.R.C.P. 52(a) 
provides in pertinent part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury ... the court shall find the facts 
specifically and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon and direct the 
entry of the appropriate judgment. 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. [n application 
of this principle regard shall be given to 
the special opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of those witnesses 
that appear before it. 
Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 52(a)). "In determining whether a 
finding is clearly erroneous this Court does not weigh the 
evidence as the district court did. The Court inquires 
whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "This 
Court will not substitute its view of the facts for the view of 
the district judge." Id. (citation omitted). "Evidence is 
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed 
point offact had been proven." Id. 
B. The district court erred by determining that 
performance of the Sale Agreement was subject only to 
the original recorded CC & Rs. 
1231 The district court concluded that the Shawvers were 
entitled to specific performance of the Sale Agreement and 
that "[tlhis purchase and sale transaction is subject to the 
Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC., 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
93 P.3d 685 
Restrictions for Huckleberry Estates Subdivision recorded 
July 21, 2000 as Instrument No. 100057017, only, as and 
for [sic] restrictive covenants." Huckleberry claims that the 
district court's decision constitutes error because it 
effectively prevents the adoption and enforcement of 
future amendments to the existing CC & Rs with regard to 
the Shawvers only and violates the express terms of the 
parties' agreement. 
124) 125) 126) Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants 
that restrict the use of private property. Nordstrom v. 
Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 290 (2000) 
(citing Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 
434,437 (1996)). When interpreting such covenants, the 
Court generally applies the same rules of construction as 
are applied to any contract or covenant. fd. However, 
because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the 
common law right to use land for all lawful purposes, the 
Court will not extend by implication any restriction not 
clearly expressed. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473,475,873 
P.2d 118, 120 (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 
404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984)). Further, all doubts are to 
be resolved in favor ofthe free use of land. fd. 
1271 1281 129) 1301 Beginning with the plain language of 
the covenant, the first step is to determine whether or not 
there is an ambiguity. Brown, 129 Idaho at 193,923 P.2d at 
437 (citing City of Chubbuck v. City oj Pocatello, 127 
Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995)). "Words or 
phrases that have established definitions in common use or 
settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous **695 
*364 merely because they are not defined in the document 
where they are used." City of Chubbuck, 127 Idaho at 20 I, 
899 P .2d at 414. Rather, a covenant is ambiguous when it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on a 
given issue. Post, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120 (citing 
Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 
(1980)). To detennine whether or not a covenant is 
ambiguous, the court must view the agreement as a whole. 
Brown, 129 Idaho at 193,923 P.2d at 438. 
131) 132) The second step in contract or covenant 
construction depends on whether or not an ambiguity has 
been found. If the covenants are unambiguous, then the 
court must apply them as a matter of law. City oj 
Chubbuck, 127 Idaho at 201, 899 P.2d at 414. "Where 
there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the 
plain meaning governs." Post, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d 
at 120. Conversely, if there is an ambiguity in the 
covenants, then interpretation is a question of fact, and the 
Court must determine the intent of the parties at the time 
the instrument was drafted. Brown, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 
P.2d at 438. 
Both parties agree that the original recorded CC & Rs were 
applicable when the Sale Agreement was executed. The 
original recorded CC & Rs provide in relevant part: 
GENERAL COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS: 
That all lots of said Huckleberry Estates Subdivision 
shall be subject to the following covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions, that by acceptance of any such 
conveyance, the grantee or grantees and their heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns agree 
to the conditions described as follows: 
****** 
z. AMENDMENTS: Any amendment to these 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be 
approved in writing by at least seventy-five percent of 
the lot owners. 
Paragraph z simply states that any amendment may be 
adopted upon the written consent of at least seventy-five 
percent of the existing lot owners. Because there is no 
ambiguity in this language, "there is no room for 
construction, and the plain meaning of the language 
governs." Sun Valley Ctr. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 
411,413,690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984). Huckleberry concedes 
that the First Amended CC & Rs were invalid because they 
were not adopted in compliance with the amendment 
provision. However, Huckleberry contends that the Second 
Amended CC & Rs, which were recorded on July 23,200 I, 
were properly adopted by over seventy-five percent of the 
existing lot owners. These amendments are currently in 
effect throughout the Subdivision. The issue is whether the 
district court erred in declaring that the Second Amended 
CC & Rs had no application to the parties' agreement in 
this case. 
The district court concluded that "the Shawvers are entitled 
to specific performance of the [Sale Agreement], which is 
subject to the original CC & R's. The subsequent 
amendments have no application to that agreement." The 
Shawvers subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment to include a finding that a second set of house 
plans submitted by the them in January 200 I as part of an 
attempt to settle this matter, comply in all respects with the 
First Amended and Second Amended CC & Rs. The 
district court denied the motion, stating that, "[ w ]hile there 
was some discussion of the Second Amended CC & R's at 
trial in the context of whether specific perfonnance as 
originally requested by Plaintiffs should be granted, the 
issue of different plans and compliance with any of the 
amended CC & R's was not litigated." 
133J Under the terms of the Sale Agreement, the Shawvers 
Shawver v. 
93 P.3d 685 
L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354 (2004) 
acknowledged that they had received and reviewed a copy 
of the applicable CC & Rs. When the Shawvers and 
Huckleberry negotiated and executed the Sale Agreement, 
presumably they expected that it would be fully valid and 
enforceable. See Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners & 
Taxpayers v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 590, 595, 661 
P.2d 756, 761 (1983) (courts presume that parties to a 
contract intended a lawful construction of that contract). 
Because the Shawvers had notice of the applicable CC & 
Rs, they were bound to abide by them. See **696 *36520 
Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 267 (1995) ("A purchaser with 
notice of restrictive covenants upon land is bound by such 
restrictions, although they are not such as in strict legal 
contemplation run with the land."). The practical effect of 
the district court's decision is to release the Shawvers from 
their legal obligation to abide by future amendments 
regardless of the validity or necessity of such amendments. 
"Courts possess no roving commission to rewrite 
contracts. Equity will not intervene to change the terms of 
a contract unless it produces unconscionable harm, is 
unlawful or violates public policy." Smith v. Idaho State 
Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684. 760 P.2d 19, 
23 (1988) (quoting Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho 977, 
981, 712 P.2d 678, 682 (Ct. App. 1985). A parallel 
measure of judicial restraint prohibits the judicial rewriting 
of restrictive covenants. 
The district court's order eliminates the terms of the 
original recorded CC & Rs with respect to future 
amendments. The trial court's order granting specific 
performance of the Sale Agreement subject only to the 
original recorded CC & Rs is in error. There is doubtless a 
point when a party has changed his or her position in 
reliance upon the covenants in effect to a degree that 
enforcement of an amendment would be precluded, but 
that point was not demonstrated in this case. The issue of 
whether the Shawvers could have rescinded the Sale 
Agreement is not before this Court. 
V. 
HUCKLEBERRY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
134) 135) Idaho Appellate Rule (JAR.) 41 provides the 
procedure for requesting attorney fees on appeal. I.A.R. 41 
Footnotes 
allows this Court to award attorney fees only if permitted 
by some other statutory or contractual authority; it is not 
authority alone for awarding fees. Robbins v. County of 
Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 120, 996 P.2d 813, 820 (2000). 
I.A.R. 41 requires that the request for attorney fees on 
appeal be made in the first brief from the respective party. 
IAR. 35(a)(5) and (6) also require that the requesting 
party put the request for fees in a separate section after the 
issues presented section and the request be discussed in the 
argument section. These procedural requirements have 
been met as Huckleberry made the request after the issues 
on appeal section in their first brief and the request was 
discussed in the argument section. 
In this case the authority permitting the recovery of 
attorney fees and costs is contractual. Paragraph fourteen 
of the Sale Agreement provides that, "[i]f either party 
initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or 
proceedings, which are in any way connected with this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on appeal." 
Huckleberry is the prevailing party on appeal and is 
awarded attorney fees and costs associated with the 
original trial as well as its appeal to this Court. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court is reversed. Attorney fees 
and costs are awarded to Huckleberry. 
ChiefJustice TROUT, Justices EISMANN and BURDICK 
concur. 
Justice KIDWELL, dissents without opinion. 
Parallel Citations 
93 P.3d 685 
1 Neither party disputes the fact that Huckleberry's initialing of the Sale Agreement constituted a valid execution of the Sale 
Agreement by Huckleberry. 
Shawver v. Huckleberry 
93 P.3d 685 
End of Document 
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2012 Thomson Reuters. No to original U.S Government Works. 

Y. Geren, 666 F.30 599 2) 
114 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 303, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,392 ... 
666F·3d 599 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Devon S. SHELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Pete GEREN, Secretary of the Army, 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
Agency, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 10-35014. I Argued and Submitted Nov. 
4,2010. I Filed Jan. 12, 2012. 
Synopsis 
Background: Employee brought action against Secretary 
of the Army and the Army Corps of Engineers, alleging 
that failure to promote violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA). The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Robelt H. 
Whaley, 1., granted Secretary's motion for summary 
judgment. Employee appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Wilken, District Judge, 
held that: 
[J] claims accrued on date employee was denied 
opportunity to interview; 
[2] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
supervisors considered age and projected retirement 
relevant to the hiring decision; and 
[3] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
selecting candidate for position because it was a lateral 
move was pretext for age discrimination. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bybee, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
West Headnotes (7) 
III Civil Rights 
",,·Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Before Resort to Courts 
Officers and Public Employees 
Jc.Prohibited personnel practices; discrimination 
Federal employees who believe they have been 
discriminated against on the basis of age have the 
12) 
131 
option of pursuing administrative remedies, 
either through the agency's Equal Employment 
Opportunity procedures, or through the Merit 
Systems Protection Board. 
Civil Rights 
:..=Operation; accrual and computation 
Forty-five day period in which to file 
administrative complaint for employee's claims 
of age discrimination in relation to non-selection 
for promotion to a temporary position and 
non-interview for permanent position accrued on 
date he was denied opportunity to interview, as 
required for employee to bring claims under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
against Secretary of the Army and the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers; decisions were 
part of a single, two-step hiring process, selection 
to temporary position gave advantage in hiring 
decision for permanent position, and, even if 
each was a discrete employment action, 
investigation of non-interview to permanent 
position would have led to investigation of hiring 
process for temporary position. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 et 
seq., 29 U.S.C § 621 et seq. 
Civil Rights 
,>"Motive or intent; pretext 
To prevail on a claim for age discrimination 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), a plaintiff must prove at trial that 
age was the but-for cause of the employer's 
adverse action; unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text 
does not provide that a plaintiff may establish 
discrimination by showing that age was simply a 
motivating factor. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.CA. 
§ 623(a)(I); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et 
seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599 2) 
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[4J 
151 
161 
Civil Rights 
(=Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
In a failure-to-promote case under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a 
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination in violation of the ADEA by 
producing evidence that he or she was: (I) at least 
forty years old; (2) qualified for the position for 
which an application was submitted; (3) denied 
the position; and (4) the promotion was given to a 
substantially younger person. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(l). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
.,i,=Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether supervisors considered age and 
projected retirement relevant to the hiring 
decision, precluding summary judgment in 54 
year old employee's action alleging 
non-promotion and non-interview were age 
discrimination in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(I). 
Federal Civil Procedure 
. ;~~"Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether selecting candidate for position because 
it was a lateral move, rather than promoting 54 
year old employee, was pretext for age 
discrimination, as required for employee's action 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA). Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.C.A. 
17J 
§ 623(a)(I). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,,~Motive or intent; pretext 
In an employment discrimination action, 
evidence of a plaintiffs superior qualifications, 
standing alone, may be sufficient to prove pretext 
in a stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for an adverse employment action. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*600 David M. Rose, Minnick-Hayner, P.S., Walla Walla, 
W A, for the plaintiff-appellant. 
*601 James A. McDevitt, United States Attorney, Frank A. 
Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, Spokane, 
Washington; William E. Edwards, United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, Kansas City, MO, for the 
defendant -appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington, Robert H. Whaley, District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. EDWA No. 08-cv-5045-RHW. 
Before: BETTY B. FLETCHER and JAY S. BYBEE, 
Circuit Judges, and CLAUDIA WILKEN, District Judge. * 
Opinion 
Opinion by Judge WI LKEN; Partial Concurrence and 
Partial Dissent by Judge BYBEE . 
OPINION 
WILKEN, District Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellant Devon Scott Shelley appeals the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant-Appellee Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army 
V. Geren, 665 F.3d 599 (2012) 
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and the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(collectively, the Corps). Shelley sued the Corps for 
violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 USc. § 621 et seq., by failing to interview 
him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291 to consider 
Shelley's appeal. We find that Shelley presented a prima 
facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext 
sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether 
age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' 
failure to interview and promote him. The district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps is 
reversed. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2005, the Corps sought to fill a GS-14 Supervisory 
Procurement Analyst position in the Contracting Division 
at its Kansas City District. The position was also known as 
Chief of Contracting. The Corps pursued a two-step hiring 
process, in which it advertised an opening for a l20-day 
temporary position, and then announced a formal process 
to hire a permanent Chief of Contracting. 
An email announcement of the 120-day position was made 
on October 3,2005, and courtesy copies were sent to Major 
Kelly Butler and Regional Contracting Chief Joseph 
Scanlan. The announcement explained that recruitment for 
the permanent position would begin in the near future. 
Applicants were instructed to email or fax their current 
resume/application, copies of their two most recent 
performance appraisals, proof that they had completed the 
educational requirements, and proof of eligibility for a 
Critical Acquisition Position. 
Shelley applied for the 120-day position. At the time, he 
had been serving as Assistant Chief of the Contracting 
Division for the Walla Walla District, a GS-13 position, 
for over a year. In that position, Shelley supervised, 
coordinated, and managed the work of Team Leaders. 
Shelley was supervised by Connie Oberle, the Chief of 
Contracting at Walla Walla. He held a master's degree in 
business administration, had twenty-nine years of 
experience in contracting (twenty-six of which were with 
the Corps), and had received numerous awards for his 
work. In 2005, Shelley *602 had received a "Special Act 
Award" for "major acquisition accomplishments and 
acquisition research [and] policy." In 2003, he had 
received a Bronze Star Medal for exceptionally 
meritorious acquisition service as a Contracting Officer 
with the Corps while deployed to the Afghanistan Area 
Office. He was born in 1951 and was fifty-four years old at 
the time of his application for the 120-day position. 
Butler served as the selecting official for the l20-day 
position. She received about nine resumes and rated them 
according to the criteria from the position announcement, 
which she summarized as "[b ]asically their experience." 
No other officials reviewed the resumes for the 120-day 
position. Butler also spoke with the applicants' references. 
Butler testified that Oberle gave a negative reference for 
Shelley. She stated, "I called Connie for a reference for 
[Shelley]. And, really, Connie's reference is why we did 
not choose [Shelley]." Butler explained, "When I get a big 
No feeling from the supervisor, that sends a red flag." 
Later, Butler changed her testimony, stating that Oberle's 
reference was "one of the reasons we did not choose 
[Shelley]." Oberle, however, denied ever having spoken 
with Butler regarding Shelley's qualifications. Oberle 
testified that she spoke with Scanlan and informed him that 
Shelley was interested in the I 20-day position, and that the 
job would be a "wonderful opportunity for him." 
Butler consulted about the applicants with Colonel 
Michael Rossi, Commander of the Kansas City District, 
and Steve Iverson, Deputy District Engineer for Project 
Management for the same district. They agreed that Vince 
Marsh should be hired. Marsh was serving as a 
Supervisory Procurement Analyst and Chief of the 
Business Management Division in Huntsville, Alabama, a 
GS-14 position, and had been serving in the position for 
more than a year. He supervised approximately fifteen 
employees and served as Director of Contracting for the 
Business Management Division "as requested." In his prior 
position, as Business Operations Manager at the United 
States Army Contracting Command in Europe, Marsh had 
also served as Director of Contracting "as requested," 
supervising seventy-five contract specialists on those 
occasions. He was forty-two years old at that time, born in 
1963. He had twenty years of experience in contracting 
(fourteen in contracting positions and six in procurement 
positions). He had been with the Corps for less than two 
years. The most recent award listed on Marsh's resume 
was a "Sustained Superior Performance A ward" he had 
received in 2002, before joining the Corps. 
Butler interviewed Marsh for the position. There is no 
evidence that she interviewed other candidates. 
On November 2, 2005, Kevin Brice, Business 
Management Division Chief, sent an email seeking 
approval to hire Marsh for the 120-day position. Brice 
stated that he and Rossi recommended Marsh for the 
position, that Scanlan had participated in the selection 
process, and that Butler believed Marsh was Scanlan's top 
pick. Marsh's selection was approved. 
Scanlan knew Shelley and was aware that Shelley was in 
Sheiley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599 (2012) 
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his fifties. Scanlan had served as a superior to Shelley, and 
had worked with him for about six years. He was familiar 
with Shelley's credentials and experience working for the 
Corps. He knew that, as Assistant Chief of Contracting for 
the Walla Walla District, Shelley had, at various times, 
served as Acting Chief of Contracting when Oberle was 
absent. Scanlan expressed confidence in Shelley's 
performance of his duties as Acting Chief of Contracting 
and testified that *603 both technically and professionally 
Shelley was a good contracting officer. 
At the time Scanlan supported Marsh for the 120-day 
position, he knew Marsh only by reputation. They had met 
at a social event for the Army Contracting Command in 
Germany. Scanlan's belief that Marsh was the best 
candidate for the 120-day position was not based on any 
personal experience working with him. Scanlan, however, 
told Butler, Brice, Iverson, Rossi and Kevin Bond, District 
Counsel Chief, who later joined the selection panel for the 
permanent position, that he had worked with Marsh in 
Germany, and that he believed Marsh would do very well 
in the I 20-day position. 
Shelley learned that he was not selected for the 120-day 
position on or about November 4,2005. 
Meanwhile, on October 24, 2005, the permanent position 
and job description had been announced, and the Corps 
began accepting applications. The selection plan called for 
a panel of five members to review applications. The panel 
members were Scanlan, Brice, Rossi, Bond, and Mary 
Parks, Chief Contracting Specialist. Scanlan, Brice and 
Rossi had all participated in the hiring decision for the 
I 20-day position. Rossi was assigned to chair the panel. 
The selection plan identified four criteria on which to 
screen applicants for interviews: technical competency, 
management skiIIs, leadership and teamwork. On each 
criterion, the applicants were to be evaluated as 
"outstanding," "fully successful," or "minimally 
acceptable." Possession of a graduate level degree was a 
factor in ranking a candidate as outstanding for technical 
competency. A factor to be considered with regard to 
management skills was supervision of over thirty 
employees. 
Oberle testified that, around the time the hiring process 
was taking place, Scanlan and Brice requested from the 
contracting chiefs information about projected retirement 
dates for employees in their districts and divisions. Scanlan 
did not recall asking his chiefs for information on 
retirement eligibility. He admitted, though, that in 2004 or 
2005 he had requested, from the districts, certain data 
which, at that time, was provided in a spreadsheet entitled 
Capable Workforce Matrix. Although the matrix did not 
include the names of the employees, it included 
information such as job titles, grade levels, number of 
employees in a particular position in a division, as well as 
their anticipated retirement dates. The example in the 
record of this matrix for the Walla Walla Contracting 
Division is dated March 2 I, 2006, but apparently the same 
format was used in 2004 and 2005. It is clear from the 2006 
version of the matrix for the Walla Walla Contracting 
Division that it would be a simple matter to deduce the 
names of the incumbents from the position titles within the 
division. 
Thirty-three individuals applied for the permanent 
position, including Shelley, Marsh, and Oberle. The panel 
members independently evaluated the applicants as 
outstanding, fully successful, or minimally acceptable, on 
each of the four selection criteria, based on their resumes. 
On December 19, 2005, the panel members convened by 
teleconference to select candidates for interviews. Scanlan 
testified that he did not share any age-related information 
about Shelley at the teleconference. Brice testified that age 
was not a consideration in evaluating the applicants, 
although information on the resumes could allow panelists 
to estimate applicants' ages. 
During the teleconference, each panelist placed the 
candidates in either the top *604 third, middle third, or 
bottom third of the applicant pool. The spreadsheet 
summarizing these scores does not identify the panelists by 
name, but it shows that two candidates received a top score 
from each of the five panelists. Marsh and another 
candidate received four top scores and a mid score. A fifth 
candidate received four top scores and a bottom score. An 
applicant named Robert received three top scores and two 
mid scores. These were the six candidates selected for 
interviews. Shelley was given a top score by three of the 
five panelists. He was initially given a mid score by two 
panelists. This ranking would have been equal to that 
which had earned Robert an interview. But one 
panelist-whose identity is not disclosed in the 
record-changed Shelley's mid score to a bottom score. 
Shelley was not given an interview. 
Marsh was, at forty-two years old, the youngest 
interviewee. The oldest interviewee was fifty-five years 
old, one year older than Shelley. The other interviewees 
were forty-six (two of them), fifty, and fifty-three years 
old. 
On January 20, 2006, the panel recommended Marsh for 
the permanent position. On or about February 17, 2006, 
Shelley learned that he had not been afforded an 
opportunity to interview for the permanent position. On 
April 16, 2006, Marsh was reassigned to the permanent 
Chief of Contracting position. 
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On March 6, 2006, seventeen days after Shelley learned 
that he had been denied an interview for the permanent 
position, he made initial contact with the Corps' Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) officer. On May 12, 
2006, after receiving notice of his right to file a formal 
complaint of discrimination, Shelley did so, alleging that 
he had been discriminated against between November 
2005 and January 2006 due to his age, in that he was "not 
afforded the anticipated interview opportunity ... thereby 
eliminating his promotion opportunity for the Kansas City 
District GS-14, Chief, Contracting Division position." 
After the EEO office denied his claim in its Final Agency 
Action on June 27, 2008, Shelley filed suit in federal 
district court on July 28, 2008. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Corps. The court assumed, without deciding, that 
Shelley timely exhausted his administrative remedies as to 
both the 120-day position and the permanent position. The 
court declined to analyze the motion in accordance with 
McDonnel! Douglas Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), finding it 
inapplicable to ADEA cases after the Supreme Court's 
decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 
167,129 S.Ct. 2343,174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Relying on 
Gross, the district court held that Shelley put forth 
insufficient facts that his age was the "but-for" cause of his 
non-selection for the 120-day position and for an interview 
for and promotion to the permanent position. 
Shelley appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary 
judgment. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th 
Cir.1996). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, whether 
there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether 
the district court applied the relevant substantive law. Id. 
"Whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative 
remedies as required before filing suit is a question of law, 
which we review de novo." Bankston v. White, 345 F.3d 
768,770 (9th Cir.2003). 
*605 DISCUSSION 
I. Administrative Remedies 
Preliminarily, the Corps argues that we may not consider 
Shelley's complaint of non-selection for the 120-day 
position because he failed to seek administrative remedies 
for that decision in a timely manner. The Corps argues that 
Shelley failed to contact the EEO office within fOliy-five 
days of learning that he was not selected for the 120-day 
position and failed to complain about his non-selection for 
the 120-day position in his formal complaint of 
discrimination in the EEO administrative process. 
III Federal employees who believe they have been 
discriminated against on the basis of age have "the option 
of pursuing administrative remedies, either through the 
agency's EEO procedures, or through the Merit Systems 
Protection Board." Bankston, 345 F.3d at 770 (internal 
citations omitted). Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) regulations provide that an 
aggrieved federal employee who pursues the EEO avenue 
must consult an EEO counselor within forty-five days of 
the effective date of the contested personnel action, prior to 
filing a complaint alleging age discrimination. 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 1614.103, 1614.105(a)(l).1 We have stated that 
although the regulatory pre-filing exhaustion 
requirement at § 1614.105 "does not carry the full 
weight of statutory authority" and is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for suit in federal court, we have 
consistently held that, absent waiver, estoppel, or 
equitable tolling, "failure to comply with this regulation 
[is] ... fatal to a federal employee's discrimination 
claim" in federal court. 
Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities Div.!Residential 
Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2009) 
(alterations in the original) (quoting Lyons v. England, 
307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir.2002)). 
121 Shelley took the position that he timely initiated the 
EEO process on March 6, 2006, after he learned on or 
about February 17, 2006, that he had been denied an 
opportunity to interview for the permanent Chief of 
Contracting position. In his EEO complaint, Shelley 
asserted that he was discriminated against, between 
November 2005 and January 2006, based on his age. 
Shelley asserted that because of h is age he was not given 
an interview, thereby eliminating his promotion 
opportunity. Shelley learned that he was not selected for 
the 120-day position on or about November 4,2005. Thus, 
the time period Shelley specified in his EEO complaint 
encompasses the hiring process for both the 120-day and 
the permanent Chief of Contracting positions. Reading the 
EEO complaint liberally, as we must, see Greenlaw v. 
Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir.1995), it is apparent that 
Shelley complained about both hiring decisions. 
Further, the decisions were not discrete employment 
actions, but were part of a single, two-step, hiring process. 
The Corps sought to fill the position first on a temporary 
basis, followed by a permanent appointment after 120 
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days. It is obvious that the person selected for the 
temporary position would have a significant competitive 
advantage over the other applicants *606 for the 
permanent position, and therefore that the temporary 
appointment could be seen as a step towards the permanent 
appointment. Also, the limited nature of the hiring process 
for the temporary position, and the fact that the recruitment 
for the permanent position started less than a month after 
the temporary position was announced, could have led an 
applicant to view the processes as a continuum. 
The interrelatedness of the two positions and of the hiring 
processes for them persuades us that the process for filling 
the Chief of Contracting position was a single course of 
conduct that began in 2005 with the selection of Marsh for 
the 120-day position and ended on April 16, 2006, when 
Marsh was confirmed as the new Chief of Contracting. 
Because Shelley filed his EEO complaint on March 6, 
seventeen days after he learned that he had not been 
selected to interview for the permanent position, he met the 
45-day requirement of29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). 
Even if we assume that the two promotions were discrete 
employment actions, Shelley's complaint was stilI timely. 
"Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC 
charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the 
new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations 
contained in the EEOC charge." Green v. Los Angeles 
County Superintendent of Schools. 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 
(9th Cir. I 989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
determining whether a new claim is like or reasonably 
related to allegations contained in the previous charge, the 
court inquires into "whether the original EEOC 
investigation would have encompassed the additional 
charges." ld. The same is true of a complaint of 
discrimination submitted to a federal agency's EEO office. 
See Greenlaw, 59 F.3d at 1000 (citing Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 
F.2d 1451, 1456-57 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1990». 
Here, the crux of Shelley's complaint is that he was 
bypassed for promotion to the permanent Chief of 
Contracting position because of his age. Because of the 
close relationship between the two positions and the 
temporally-overlapping hiring processes for them, an EEO 
investigation into the hiring process for the permanent 
position would necessarily have led to the investigation of 
the hiring process for the temporary position. The case is 
therefore distinguishable from Williams v. Little Rock 
Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218 (8th Cir.1994), upon 
which the Corps relies. There, the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
partial summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant on the 
plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, finding that the 
plaintiff's EEOC complaint for retaliation included no 
mention of racial discrimination, and her allegations of 
racial discrimination submitted to the EEOC years earlier 
were not deemed reasonably related to her current claim 
for retaliation. Jd. at 222-23. 
In sum, Shelley's initial contact with the Corps' EEO 
officer seventeen days after he learned that he had been 
denied the opportunity to interview for the permanent 
Chief of Contracting position timely initiated his 
administrative claim based on being denied interviews and 
selection for the 120-day and the permanent positions, all 
of which occurred as part of the same course of conduct by 
the Corps. Shelley timely exhausted available 
administrative remedies. 
II. Summary Judgment Disposition of Age 
Discrimination Claim 
[31 Shelley's failure-to-promote claim is a claim of 
disparate treatment under the ADEA. The ADEA makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate "because of[an] 
individual's age." 29 U .S.c. § 623(a)( I). The prohibition is 
"limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of *607 
age." 29 U .S.c. § 631 (a). The ADEA applies to protect 
federal employees and applicants for federal employment. 
29 U.S.c. § 633a(a). To prevail on a claim for age 
discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove at 
trial that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's 
adverse action. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350. "Unlike Title VII, 
the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may 
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a 
motivating factor." ld. at 2349. 
This case, however, was resolved on summary judgment, 
and not on the merits. Prior to Gross, our circuit applied the 
burden-shifting evidentiary framework of McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, to motions for 
summary judgment on ADEA claims. See, e.g., Coleman v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir.2000); 
Wallis v. JR. Simp/at Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. I 994); 
Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th 
Cir. I 990); Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th 
Cir. I 983). The district court declined to apply this 
framework, believing that Gross rejected it. The Corps 
argues to the same effect. 
We disagree. In Gross, the Court grappled with whether a 
mixed-motives instruction may be given to the jury in an 
ADEA case.2 129 S.Ct. at 2348. Relying on the text of29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) and case law allocating the burden of 
persuasion, the Court held that a plaintiff retains at all 
times the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the 
"but-for" cause of an employer's adverse action. Jd. at 
2352. Because Gross involved a case that had already 
progressed to trial, it did not address the evidentiary 
framework applicable to a motion for summary judgment. 
The Court, in fact, explicitly noted that it "has not 
definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of 
McDonnell Douglas utilized in Title VII cases is 
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appropriate in the ADEA context." Id. at 2349 n. 2. 
Since the decision in Gross, several sister circuits have 
continued to utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
decide motions for summary judgment in ADEA cases. 
See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487,498 (2d 
Cir.2009); Velez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 
441, 446-47 (I st Cir.2009); Connolly v. Pepsi Bottling 
Grp., LLC, 347 Fed.Appx. 757, 759-61 (3d Cir.2009) 
(unpublished).3 We join them and hold that nothing in 
Gross overruled our cases utilizing this framework to 
decide summary judgment motions in ADEA cases. The 
McDonnell Douglas test is used on summary judgment, 
not at trial. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc .. 299 F.3d 838, 855 
(9th Cir.2002) ("This legal proof structure is a tool to assist 
plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that they may 
reach trial ... [I]t is not normally appropriate to introduce 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the 
jury."). The McDonnell Douglas test shifts only the *608 
burden of production, after the plaintiff makes a prima 
facie case. See, e.g., Tusing v. Des Moines Only. Sch. Dist., 
639 F.3d 507,515 n. 3 (8th Cir.201 I) ("The lvfcDonnell 
Douglas analysis is likely still an appropriate way to 
analyze ADEA 'pretext' claims, however, because 
McDonnell Douglas only shifts the burden of 
production."); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 
691 (3d Cir.2009) ("Gross stands for the proposition that it 
is improper to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant in an age discrimination case. McDonnell 
Douglas, however, imposes no shift in that particular 
burden."). "If plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, '[t]he 
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the challenged actions.' " Hawn v. Exec. Jet 
Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting 
Chuang v. Univ. ofCa!. Davis, Bd. of Trs. , 225 F.3d 1 I 15, 
1123-24 (9th Cir.2000)). "If defendant meets this burden, 
plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of material fact as 
to whether the defendant's proffered reasons for their 
terminations are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination." 
/d. Because the continued use of McDonnell Douglas in 
summary judgment motions on ADEA claims is not 
inconsistent with Gross. we cannot overrule our prior 
precedent because of Gross. 
Thus, to survive summary judgment on his claim for a 
violation of the ADEA under the disparate treatment 
theory ofliability, Shelley must first establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1280-8 I. 
If he is successful, the burden of production shifts to the 
Corps to miiculate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for its adverse employment action. Id. at 128 I. It is then 
Shelley's task to demonstrate that there is a material 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's 
purported reason is pretext for age discrimination. Id. At 
trial, he.must carry the burden to prove that age was the 
"but-for" cause of his non-selection. 
A. Prima Facie Case 
A "prima facie case requires evidence adequate to create 
an inference that an employment decision was based on 
a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion." O'Connor v. 
Con.wl. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 I 7 U.S. 308, 3 I 2, 116 S.Ct. 
1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
14) In a failure-to-promote case, a plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the 
ADEA by producing evidence that he or she was (1) at 
least forty years old, (2) qualified for the position for which 
an application was submitted, (3) denied the position, and 
(4) the promotion was given to a substantially younger 
person. See Sleckl, 703 F.2d at 393 (holding that the 
plaintiff established a prima facie case for age 
discrimination under the lVlcDonnell Douglas framework 
because he "was clearly within the protected class, had 
applied for an available position for which he was 
qualified, and was denied a promotion which was given to 
a younger person"); see also O'Connor, 5 I 7 U.S. at 313, 
I 16 S.Ct. 1307 ("Because the ADEA prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of age and not class 
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially 
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of 
age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was 
replaced by someone outside the protected class."); Nidds 
v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th 
Cir. I 996) (finding that the requirements for a prima facie 
case of age discrimination were satisfied by evidence that 
the fifty-four year old plaintiff was discharged, he was 
performing *609 his job satisfactorily, and his duties 
continued to be performed by a substantially younger 
employee, and holding that the district court "erred in 
concluding that to establish a prima facie case, [the 
plaintiff] was required to show that he was at least as 
qualified as his replacement").4 
It is undisputed that Shelley was fifty-four at the relevant 
time, he was qualified for both the temporary and the 
permanent positions, he was denied both positions, and 
both went to a substantially younger candidate. 
Accordingly, Shelley has established a prima facie case of 
age discrimination. 
B. Facial Legitimacy of the Corps' Explanation 
The burden now shifts to the Corps to provide a 
non-discriminatory explanation for its hiring decisions. 
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281. The Corps did so here. In its 
brief on appeal, the Corps proffers as its 
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non-discriminatory explanation that Marsh was already 
employed as a GS-14 Supervisory Procurement Analyst, 
and hiring him caused a lateral move, whereas the position 
would have been a promotion for Shelley, who was serving 
at the GS-13 level. This is a facially legitimate 
explanation. 
C. Pretext 
The Corps' articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason shifts the burden back to Shelley to raise a genuine 
factual question as to whether the proffered reason is 
pretextual. The plaintiff can prove pretext "(I) indirectly, 
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is 
'unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent 
or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that 
unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the 
employer." Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124. All of the 
evidence-whether direct or indirect-is to be considered 
cumulatively. Id. We conclude that Shelley offered both 
direct and indirect evidence of pretext. 
i. Direct Evidence 
IS) Shelley presented direct evidence of age discrim ination 
to rebut the Corps' purported non-discriminatory reason. 
Oberle testified that Scanlan and Brice inquired about the 
projected retirement dates for employees in the contracting 
divisions during the hiring period for the 120-day and 
permanent positions. A fact-finder could infer from this 
that they considered age and projected retirement relevant 
to the hiring decision. Despite the absence of names in the 
Capable Workforce Matrix, the format of the matrix 
permitted the identification of specific employees. The 
matrix contradicts Scanlan's testimony that individual age 
information was not provided in that formaLS 
The Corps contends that the matrix, at best, establishes that 
Scanlan and Brice knew Shelley'S prospective retirement 
date, which, standing alone, would not support *610 an 
inference of age discrimination. But the fact that Scanlan 
and Brice sought out the retirement dates at the time of 
their participation in the hiring process for the temporary 
and permanent positions shows more than that the 
decision-makers may have known of the candidates' ages. 
It raises an inference that they considered this information 
relevant to their decisions. Although Scanlan and Brice did 
not make the hiring decisions alone, evidence of their 
inquiry and of their influence over the process supports an 
inference that the Corps' proffered explanation for hiring 
Marsh was a pretext for age discrimination. See Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital, -U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. I 186, I 194, 
179 L.Ed.2d 144 (201 I) (under Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 
discriminatory motive imputed to employer where a 
supervisor performs an act motivated by discriminatory 
animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action, and that act is a proximate 
cause of the ultimate employment action). 
ii. Indirect Evidence 
16) 17) Evidence of a plaintiffs superior qualifications, 
standing alone, may be sufficient to prove pretext. Raad v. 
Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 
1185, 1194 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Odima v. Westin Tucson 
Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir.1995». A comparison 
of Shelley's and Marsh's resumes gives rise to a factual 
dispute as to whether Shelley was better qualified for the 
position than Marsh. Compared to Marsh, Shelley had 
significantly more years of work experience related to 
contracting, and more experience employed in the Corps. 
As of October 2005, Shelley had twenty-nine years of 
experience in contracting, whereas Marsh had twenty 
years. Unlike Marsh, Shelley spent most of his career in the 
Corps. Shelley had been an employee of the Corps for over 
nineteen years, Marsh for five and a half years. 
Furthermore, Shelley was already employed in a 
Contracting Division, while Marsh was a Supervisory 
Procurement Analyst in a Business Management Division. 
Shelley had been employed as Assistant Chief in the 
Contracting Division under Oberle in Walla Walla for over 
a year, and before that for four years as a Team Leader in 
Walla Walla under Oberle. Contrary to the Corps' 
contention, Marsh served as Director of Contracting only 
"as requested." Shelley, too, served as Acting Chief of 
Contracting in his supervisor's absence. Although this fact 
was not included in his resume, Scanlan was aware of it, 
and testified that he had confidence in Shelley's 
performance as Acting Chief of Contracting. Shelley's 
resume identified more impressive and recent awards for 
on-the-job accomplishments than Marsh's. 
Shelley's educational qualifications were superior to 
Marsh's. Shelley held an M.B.A., while Marsh had no 
graduate level degree. The selection criteria for the 
permanent position indicate that possession of a graduate 
level degree is a factor in ranking a candidate as 
outstanding for technical competency. 
The selection criteria for the permanent POSItIon listed 
supervision of at least thirty employees as a factor to be 
considered in evaluating management skills. The Corps 
incorrectly asserts that Shelley's resume failed to indicate 
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that he acted as a supervisor. While Shelley's resume did 
not specify the number of employees he supervised, it did 
disclose that, as Assistant Chief of Contracting, he 
supervised, coordinated and managed the work of 
subordinate Team Leaders, who presumably led teams. 
Marsh relayed that he supervised fifteen employees in the 
position that he held at the time of his application. 
Although *611 Marsh had supervised seventy-five 
employees on occasion when he served temporarily as 
Director of Contracting in Europe, it was not part of his 
regular job duties. Neither candidate clearly demonstrated 
that he met this criterion. 
The Corps argues that, while Shelley's qualifications as 
described after the fact were extensive, he did not include 
all of his work experience and skills in his resume. On 
appeal, however, Shelley relies exclusively on information 
that was listed in his resume to argue that his qualifications 
for the position were superior. Even absent the additional 
information (e.g., the value of construction contracts he 
successfully shepherded), Shelley's resume demonstrated 
sufficient qualifications that a reasonable jury could find 
that he was substantially better qualified than Marsh. In 
addition, Scanlan testified that he had worked with Shelley 
for six years, and was familiar with Shelley's experience 
and credentials. 
Further, that Shelley was a GS-13 employee, while Marsh 
was a GS-14, was relevant only as to the 120-day position. 
Had Shelley been given that position, he would have 
become a GS-14 and his move to the permanent position 
would have been lateral, like Marsh's. 
None of the officials whose support for Marsh was cited in 
the email seeking approval for his hire for the 120-day 
position had reviewed the applicants' resumes. Only Butler 
reviewed the resumes. Viewed in the light most favorable 
to Shelley, Butler's testimony, read in conjunction with 
Oberle's testimony, could be understood to indicate that 
Butler initially favored Shelley for the position, but that 
she used an alleged negative reference from Oberle (which 
Oberle denies she ever gave) as a pretext for hiring Marsh 
after learning that Scanlan favored Marsh for the position. 
Scanlan, it bears repeating, represented to Butler, Rossi, 
Brice, Iverson and Bond that he had worked with Marsh in 
Germany. He testified, however, that he recommended 
Marsh based only on his reputation. Scanlan had met him 
at a social event, but had never worked with him. As noted, 
Scanlan had sought out information about employees' 
retirement eligibility at the time of the hiring process. 
Accordingly, Shelley's rejection for the 120-day position 
could be found to be based on age discrimination. Ifit was, 
then the inference that the decision-makers were biased 
would carry over to their decision-making for the 
permanent position. Further, the denial of the temporary 
position was clearly a causative factor in the denial of the 
interview and selection for the permanent position. I f the 
first decision was caused by discrimination, a strong 
inference is raised that the subsequent decisions were as 
well. 
The Corps argues that age bias cannot be inferred in the 
selection for the permanent position, because other 
applicants close in age to Shelley were interviewed for that 
position and Shelley was not. Those applicants, however, 
were not selected for the position, and instead Marsh, the 
significantly younger applicant, was hired. Stacking the 
interview pool with older candidates does not immunize 
the decision to hire a younger one. Of the five panelists 
who selected the interviewees, Scanlan, Brice, and Rossi 
had all participated in the hiring decision for the 120-day 
position. Shelley received a top score from three of the five 
panelists. It was only the alteration of one unidentified 
panelist's score for Shelley from mid to bottom that cost 
Shelley an interview and disqualified him for the 
permanent position. The evidence of Scanlan's 
discriminatory animus discussed above supports an 
inference that Scanlan was biased against Shelley and in 
favor of Marsh based on *612 age. The evidence of the 
workings of the hiring process supports an inference that 
Scanlan was able to influence the interview and selection 
decisions. Neither Shelley's non-selection for an interview 
for the permanent position, nor the interviews of other 
older applicants who were not selected for promotion, 
disproves Shelley's evidence suppOliing a prima facie case 
and pretext. 
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Shelley, is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that 
the Corps' reliance on Marsh's GS-14 level, as compared 
to Shelley's GS-13 level, was pretextual in the light of 
Shelley's otherwise superior experience, education and 
recognition. 
In sum, Shelley produced sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case of age discrimination, and has responded 
to the Corps' alleged non-discriminatory reason for 
refusing to promote him by identifying evidence, both 
direct and indirect, showing that the Corps' explanation is 
pretextual. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Shelley initiated a timely administrative 
complaint and produced sufficient evidence in support of 
his ADEA claim, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in the Corps' favor is reversed. The case is 
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remanded to the district court for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
This should be a straightforward case. Plaintiff Devon 
Scott Shelley ("Shelley") claims he became a victim of age 
discrimination when the Army Corps of Engineers ("the 
Corps") denied him an opportunity to interview for a GS-
14 position as Chief of the Contracting Division that 
ultimately went to a younger candidate. An unfiltered look 
at the facts reveals that of the six finalists the Corps 
interviewed, one candidate was older than Shelley, and 
two others were close to Shelley in age. The candidate the 
Corps ultimately hired, Vince Marsh, was already a GS-14 
Supervisory Procurement Analyst, while Shelley was a 
GS-13 Assistant Chief. 
On this record, there is no way Shelley can show that the 
Corps passed him over for an equally or less qualified 
candidate on account of his age. Rather, the record shows 
that 32 individuals applied for the position. A five-member 
selection committee, chaired by an army colonel and 
advised by an EEO officer, independently ranked the 
candidates on the basis of their resumes. Based on their 
individual evaluations of the candidates, the committee 
held a telephone conference and produced a list of the top 
six candidates. Shelley was not ranked among the top six, 
but was included in the second-tier group of nine 
candidates. The six finalists included three men and three 
women (one of whom was Shelley's own supervisor, 
Connie Oberle), and were born in 1950, 1952, 1955, 
1959(2), and 1963; Shelley was born in 195 I. The 
committee then jointly interviewed the finalists and 
unanimously recommended hiring Marsh. In its report, the 
committee found that Marsh had the "strongest 
interview .... [It] demonstrated [his] technical competency, 
professionalism, leadership and strategic thinking." The 
committee also found that Marsh had "the highest overall 
positive references." In the Corps's own investigation of 
Shelley's complaint, every member of the committee 
denied that age played any role in the committee's 
decision. 
To this overwhelming evidence that age was not the reason 
the committee decided to hire Marsh and not Shelley, the 
majority simply points to two facts: (I) some *613 
members of the committee likely knew how old Shelley 
was, Maj. Op. at 61 0, and (2) Shelley believed he had more 
experience and, therefore, was better qualified than Marsh, 
Maj. Op. at 610-1 I. This doesn't come close to proving 
that the Corps "refuse[ d) to hire [Shelley] ... because of 
such individual's age." 29 USc. § 623(a)(l) (emphasis 
added). And because the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA") does not permit a 
mixed-motive theory, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 
U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350,174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009), 
Shelley has no case at all. I would affirm the district court's 
award of summary judgment, and I respectfully dissent.] 
In Gross, the Supreme Court held that "under the plain 
language of the ADEA ... a plaintiff must prove that age 
was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse 
decision." Id. at 2350. This "but-for" test applies no matter 
whether the case was resolved on summary judgment or 
after a jury trial, and it does not permit the plaintiff to rely 
on a mixed-motive theory. See id. 
Because Shelley has no direct evidence of discrimination 
based on age, he must rely on the burden-shifting approach 
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 I I 
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The 
majority holds that Gross did not overrule our prior cases 
holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to 
a disparate-treatment ADEA claim. Maj. Op. at 607--08. I 
concur in that part of the opinion. Although I think the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is going to be difficult to 
apply to an ADEA claim after Gross-and the Court was 
coy about whether McDonnell Douglas is compatible with 
Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n. 2-1 agree that Gross does not 
clearly overrule our prior precedents. See Smith v. City of 
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 69 I (3d Cir.2009) ("Gross does 
not conflict with our continued application of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in age discrimination 
cases."). 
Even if we continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to the ADEA, Shelley still shoulders the 
ultimate burden of showing that the Corps's 
explanation-that Shelley was not as qualified as 
Marsh-was pretextual and that the necessaty reason 
Shelley was not hired was because of his age. "To establish 
a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language ofthe 
ADEA ... a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' 
cause of the employer's adverse decision," Gross, 129 
S.Ct. at 2350, because "the burden of persuasion [n]ever 
shifts to the party defending an alleged mix-motives 
discrimination claim brought under the ADEA," id. at 
2348. 
That is a heavy burden for Shelley to carry. And he doesn't 
come close on this record. The processes used by the Corps 
rule out impermissible bias, and the evidence relied on by 
the majority is insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. 
';,; 
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II 
The majority finds that "Shelley's rejection for the 120-
day position could be found to be based on age 
discrimination." Maj. Op. at 611. It claims that Major 
Kelly Butler's and Connie Oberle's testimonies could 
show that "Butler initially *614 favored Shelley for the 
position, but that she used an alleged negative reference 
from Oberle (which Oberle denies she ever gave) as a 
pretext for hiring Marsh after learning that Scanlan favored 
Marsh for the position." Id. at 611. I think the 120-day 
position is not really an issue.2 In any event, this is simply 
not a reasonable inference. Although there is some dispute 
over whether or how Oberle conveyed a reference to 
Butler, whether she did offer a negative reference is beside 
the point (though she was going to be a candidate for the 
permanent position herself). It is not reasonable to infer 
that Butler would have chosen Shelley but for an alleged 
reference from Oberle. See Maj. Op. at 611. Butler did 
state in the Department of Defense Fact-Finding 
Conference of March 14, 2007 that "really, Connie's 
reference is why we did not choose Scott [Shelley)." Yet 
the Fact-Finding Conference at which she testified was not 
convened to consider Shelley'S complaint, and, in context, 
her statement is not particularly probative. Moreover, in 
her deposition for this case she clarified her testimony, 
saying: "I didn't mean to indicate that I was ready to hire 
him and Connie Oberle said no. That's not the case .... 
Connie's reference is one of the reasons we did not choose 
Scott .... I did not mean to infer that she was the only reason 
that ... he wasn't chosen." She stated that she based her 
hiring decision on Marsh's being "the most qualified out of 
the nine" who applied. 
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to infer that Butler changed 
her mind after input from Scanlan. She testified that she 
was the only one who reviewed the resumes for that 
position, and she made the decision in consultation with 
Colonel Michael Rossi, Commander for the Kansas City 
District, and Steve Iverson, Deputy District Engineer for 
Project Management for the Kansas City District. 
Although Scanlan may have been "a part of the process" 
and let Butler know that Marsh was his top pick, there is no 
indication that he was involved in the substance of the 
decision, and Shelley produced no evidence to contradict 
Butler'S account of how the decision was made. A 
reasonable jury could not reasonably conclude from the 
evidence that discrimination was the but-for cause of 
Shelley failing to receive the 120-day position. 
With regard to the permanent position, Shelley's biggest 
problem is that before he can make out a case that he did 
not get the position because of his age, Shelley has to show 
that he was passed over for an interview because of his age. 
This he cannot do. Of the six candidates who were actually 
selected for a final interview (from a list of 32), one was 
older than Shelley, one was only a year younger, and 
another was *615 four years younger. The fact that the 
Corps considered qualified candidates older than (or about 
the same age as) Shelley without offering Shelley an 
interview is fatal to his claim. It is true that the fourth 
traditional element for establishing a prima facie case in 
failure to promote cases under the McDonnell-Douglas 
framework-that the employee be replaced by someone 
substantially younger, O'Connor v. Conwl. Coin Caterers 
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Edold 433 
(I 996)-is not a strict requirement. A plaintiff can produce 
more probative evidence of discrimination, or he can show 
that the decision to hire another member of the protected 
class (or in ADEA cases, a person of similar age) was a 
pretext to hide the discriminatory decision. See Diaz v. Am. 
Tel. & Tel., 752 Fold 1356, 1359-62 (9th Cir.1985) (Title 
VII); see also Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 
1201,1207-08 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2008). While I deal with the 
former type of evidence below, there is no evidence of the 
latter grand conspiracy, that candidates of the same age as 
Shelley were given interviews to hide the already-made 
decision that Marsh would be given the position. Because 
age must be the but-for cause, see Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350, 
the fact that the committee ranked other similarly-aged 
applicants higher than Shelley suggests that even without 
any alleged age bias, he still would have not received the 
job because another similarly-aged applicant would have 
taken it instead. 
Since the Corps interviewed similarly situated candidates, 
but not Shelley, the only plausible conclusion from this set 
of facts is that some reason other than age caused the 
selection committee to decide not to interview Shelley. 
And if the committee had some reason other than 
age-indeed, if it had any other reason-then Shelley 
cannot satisfy Gross's "but-for" test. 
III 
The majority finds that "Shelley presented direct evidence 
of age discrimination to rebut the Corps' purported 
non-discriminatory reason." Maj. Op. at 609. The majority 
is just wrong on all accounts. 
First, the majority (as did Shelley) framed its theory of the 
case in terms of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
analysis. See Maj. Op. at 608. But that test is used when the 
plaintiff has to rely on inferences that are not based on 
direct evidence. As we have explained, "[ w ]hen a plaintiff 
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alleges disparate treatment based on direct evidence in an 
ADEA claim, we do not apply the burden-shifting analysis 
set forth in [McDonnell Douglas ]." Enlow v. Salem-
Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 FJd 802, 812 (9th Cir.2004). 
In Enlow, we were simply following the Supreme Court's 
instruction that "the McDonnell Douglas test is 
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of 
discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 
469 U.S. Ill, 121, lOS S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). 
Second, even if we look at the majority's "direct 
evidence," it is anything but direct. As we explained in 
Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co.: "Direct evidence is 
evidence 'which, if believed, proves the fact [of 
discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.' 
" 4 I 3 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2005) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 
12 17, 122 I (9th Cir. I 998)). It "typically consists of clearly 
sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or 
actions by the employer." Id.; see also Enlow, 389 F.3d at 
812 ("Direct evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is 
defined as 'evidence of conduct or statements by persons 
involved in the decision-making process that may be 
viewed as directly reflecting *616 the alleged 
discriminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit the fact 
finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a 
motivating factor in the employer's decision.' ") (quoting 
Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 FJd 423, 426 
(8th Cir. I 999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The majority's "direct evidence" is a single fact-that two 
members of the permanent position selection committee 
(Regional Contracting Chief Joseph Scanlan and Business 
Management Division Chief Kevin Brice) obtained a 
document called the "Capable Workforce Matrix" (the 
"matrix"), which lists projected vacancies in what appears 
to be the Walla Walla Contracting Division.3 Maj. Op. at 
609. The matrix lists each of the positions in the division 
and, among other information, when the positions were 
expected to become vacant due to planned departures or 
retirements. The matrix does not mention the name of any 
member of the division, but one who is familiar with the 
division could deduce names based on the titles listed. For 
instance, the matrix indicates that the division currently 
employs one Assistant Chief of Contracting, and that the 
incumbent is scheduled to either leave or retire in fiscal 
year 2006. One who is familiar with the division would 
know that the Assistant Chief of Contracting is Shelley and 
would know, based on the matrix, that he is scheduled to 
either leave or retire from his position in the Walla Walla 
division in 2006. From this fact, the majority deduces "an 
inference that they considered this information relevant to 
their decision." Maj. Op. at 610 (emphasis added). But an 
inference, we have said quite clearly, is not direct 
evidence. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. 
Moreover, even taking this evidence as circumstantial 
evidence, it doesn't amount to a hill of beans. There is no 
evidence in the record that Scanlan or Brice actually 
looked at the list, that either of them tried to link up 
Shelley's name to the list, or (even assuming that they did) 
that either took into account Shelley's age. In fact, the only 
evidence in the record is to the contrary. Scanlan testified 
that although he probably received the matrix, he did not 
recall seeing it; both testified that age was not a 
consideration. Nothing indicates that this request was 
anything out of the ordinary. Scanlan and Brice were 
entitled to these documents by virtue of their positions. 
Scanlan testified that "the matrix is a working document 
used for regional workforce planning purposes[, a]nd it is 
updated periodically for workforce planning purposes"; all 
of the districts, not just Walla Walla, were periodically to 
provide that information for use in projecting future 
requirements for different types of positions. So even if 
Scanlan or Brice had determined Shelley's retirement date 
from the matrix, that fact, without more, is irrelevant. And 
because Shelley's supervisor, Oberle, was on the same 
sheet and as readily identifiable as Shelley, there is no 
reason to think that they would not also deduce her age and 
discriminate against her-which they did not, because she 
received an interview. 
Furthermore, as the majority concedes, all of the applicants 
had submitted resumes from which their ages could have 
been estimated, Maj. Op. at 603-04, and Scanlan had 
worked with Shelley for a number of years, so it would not 
be surprising if he knew Shelley's age. Indeed, the 
majority holds that Shelley has proved a prima facie case 
under McDonnell Douglas, *617 which in the context of 
an ADEA claim means that Shelley has shown that "the 
promotion was given to a substantially younger person." 
Maj. Op. at 608. Thus, the majority began from the premise 
that everyone knew that Marsh was younger than Shelley. 
But aside from the bare fact of knowing Shelley's age, 
there are no statements by Scanlan or Brice, no emails, and 
no off-hand remarks to Shelley or others about Shelley's 
age. Yet "[w]ithout more, ... the fact that [Marsh] was 
younger than [Shelley] does not create a triable issue of 
pretext." Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 748 
(9th Cir.2003). If mere awareness of an applicant's age is 
direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to show 
pretext, no disappointed-applicant-turned-plaintiff need 
ever worry about summary judgment again. Indeed, even 
in cases in which employers have not only noticed but also 
commented in potentially negative ways about a plaintiff's 
age, we have found that this weak evidence is insufficient 
to justify a trial. See id. at 747 (compiling cases). 
IV 
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The majority works very hard to come up with indirect 
evidence of pretext. Shelley may establish pretext 
"indirectly, by showing that the [Corps]'s proffered 
explanation is 'unworthy of credence' because it is 
internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or [ ] 
directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more 
likely motivated the employer." Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. 
Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d I I 15, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) 
(quoting Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22). Because Shelley 
has no direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence upon 
which he relies to refute the Corps's proffered explanation 
must be " 'specific' and 'substantial' to create a genuine 
issue of material fact." Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit 
Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting 
Godwin, 150 FJd at 1222). What the majority comes up 
with is strict scrutiny of Shelley's and Marsh's resumes 
and a conclusion that "Shelley's resume demonstrated 
sufficient qualifications that a reasonable jury could find 
that he was substantially better qualified than Marsh." Maj. 
Op.at6lI. 
The majority did not articulate the correct legal standard. 
While we have held that a "district court's finding that a 
Title VII plaintiff s qualifications were clearly superior to 
the qualifications of the applicant selected is a proper basis 
for a finding of discrimination," Odima v. Westin Tucson 
Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. I 995), we have yet to 
articulate a precise standard in the summary judgment 
context. In Road v. Fairbanks N Star Borough School 
Dist., 323 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.2003), we declined to 
establish the high hurdle that the Fifth Circuit adopted in 
Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir.1993) (requiring 
that the "disparities [be] so apparent as virtually to jump 
off the page and slap us in the face"). 323 FJd at 1194. The 
Supreme Court also thought the standard in Odom was 
"unhelpful and imprecise," though it did not choose to give 
its own articulation of the correct standard. Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 
L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). Thus, we are left with the notion in 
Road that a "pronounced difference" in qualifications can 
be enough, 323 F .3d at I 194, but without more guidance 
on what lesser quantum would also be sufficient. 
Yet, surely situations in which the qualifications are so 
similar that they could easily be thought to be equal cannot 
justify a trial. More importantly, it cannot be that the 
standard is that a reasonable jury could find that one 
applicant is more qualified-however slightly-than 
another; we cannot ask the jurors which of two candidates 
they prefer. Rather, it must be that *618 a reasonable jury 
could think that there is such a disparity in their 
qualifications that the choosing of Marsh over Shelley is 
only explainable because of the differences in their age. 
This is a higher threshold than the majority's new 
formulation. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 457, 126 S.Ct. 1195 
("Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence 
may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show 
pretext."); Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1033 ("[A] reasonable 
jury might also view the disparity between Cornwell's 
management experience and Hall's as proof that 
Defendants' explanation for Cornwell's demotion was a 
pretext for race discrimination."); Road, 323 F.3d at I 197 
nT]he fact that an employer hired a far less qualified 
person than the plaintiff naturally gives rise to an inference 
that the non-discriminatory explanation offered by the 
employer is pretextuaL"),4 
Shelley cannot show that his qualifications were so clearly 
superior to Marsh's that a jury could reasonably find that 
Marsh was promoted over Shelley on account of age. In 
fact, it is far from clear that Shelley was even marginally 
better qualified than Marsh. Shelley relied on no evidence 
other than his own declaration and his resume. He offered 
no expert witnesses who could evaluate the very technical 
language of contracting and procurement hierarchy, he 
proffered no colleagues who thought that he was better 
qualified, and he couldn't point to any irregularities in the 
selection process. All we have is Shelley's own opinion of 
his relative qualifications. And because he has no other 
evidence to support his claim of age discrimination, 
Shelley rests his entire case on the theory that his 
qualifications are so vastly superior to Marsh's that there is 
no other explanation for the selection committee's decision 
other than the disparity in their ages. With all due respect, 
we have no business substituting our judgment for the 
selection committee. And our judgment does not improve 
by inviting jurors to decide which of the two they would 
have hired. 
According to the selection criteria, the selection committee 
was supposed to evaluate resumes according to four 
criteria: (I) technical competency, (2) management, (3) 
leadership, and (4) teamwork. With regard to technical 
competency, the criteria required the committee to 
consider four factors: demonstrated knowledge of federal 
contracting regulations, experience in overseeing 
multimillion dollar contracts, knowledge and experience in 
applying federal regulations, and experience in developing 
contract strategies to support large acquisition programs. 
The selection criteria add that an outstanding candidate 
should possess a graduate level degree. 
Shelley had two things going for him relative to Marsh. He 
had more experience-Shelley had 29 years of contracting 
experience, while Marsh had 21 years of experience-and 
Shelley possessed an MBA from Northwest Nazarene 
University. The MBA degree was a plus for Shelley, but 
the years of experience tell us nothing. Both candidates had 
at least 20 years of experience. We have no basis for 
deciding that Shelley's additional years made him a 
superior candidate; if so, then every employer must 
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promote on the basis of years of experience alone, But 
every employer knows that mere years in service is not a 
perfect proxy for competence, And indeed, if one were to 
rely on "experience" *619 alone, Oberle would be an 
obvious choice over Shelley because she already had the 
very same position in Walla Walla as was being offered in 
Kansas City, 
More importantly, the technical competency criterion 
called for the candidates to have "[ e ]xperience in 
overseeing multi-million dollar contracts." While 
Shelley's resume lists "supervis[ing]" and 
"coordinat[ing]" contracts as among his responsibilities, he 
failed to list any specifics or examples of the contracts that 
he managed. In his declaration prepared for this lawsuit, 
Shelley claimed that he had supervised "multi-million 
dollar military construction contracts" in Afghanistan, a 
$100,000,000 power house at Minidoka Dam for the 
Bureau of Reclamation, multi-million dollar dam projects 
in the Pacific Northwest, a $200,000,000 modernization 
project at McNary Dam, and other contracts exceeding 
$10,000,000 on the Columbia and Snake rivers. All of that 
is very impressive. Unfortunately, none of it was on 
Shelley's resume. For example, Shelley testified as to the 
projects he worked on in Afghanistan, for which he was 
awarded the Bronze Star. 
Q. Are those-are those examples listed in your 
resume? 
A. They're referenced in my Bronze Star award. Not 
the contracts specifically. 
Q. But if I look at the passage on the Bronze Star 
award will I see any reference to those specific 
projects? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Should the panel have considered those projects 
when they were looking at your resume? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they have done that by finding it out from 
something other than your resume? 
A. Yes. 
He didn't fare any better on the other projects he claimed in 
his declaration. Here is the testimony on the Minidoka 
Dam project: 
Q. Is that example listed anywhere in your resume? 
A. No. 
He was asked about his experience with the dams in the 
Pacific Northwest: 
Q. Where in your resume does it mention ... the 
complex earth dams throughout the Pacific 
Northwest? Or the Grand Coulee Dam? 
A. I don't list them specifically. 
His Walla Walla experience didn't show up either: 
Q. Where is that in your resume? 
A. It's not specifically stated, but it's implied with my 
unlimited warrant in my resume. 
By contrast, Marsh's resume specifies that he "[ s ]erved as 
the Contract Administrator for the $1.3 billion Health Care 
Delivery and Administrative Support Services contract." 
The majority's answer for Shelley's failings in this regard 
is to explain that Scanlan, who served on the selection 
committee, was already personally "familiar with 
Shelley's experience and credentials." Maj. Op. at 611. But 
we have no idea whether Scanlan knew all the details 
Shelley omitted, and suggesting that one member of the 
selection committee "knows your record" is not the same 
thing as submitting a complete application to the 
committee. The decision not to interview Shelley was not 
up to Scanlan alone-it was up to a five-member selection 
committee, of which Scanlan was just one member. As 
Colonel Rossi, who chaired the selection committee, 
explained, each member of the selection committee 
independently reviewed resumes from dozens of 
applicants before convening via teleconference *620 to 
decide on who to interview. Given the structure of the 
application process, Shelley should not have expected 
Scanlan to fill in the blanks in his resume if he failed to 
submit a complete resume in the first place; it is 
unreasonable for him to expect the remaining members of 
the committee to rank him based on information he didn't 
supply. In sum, though Shelley claimed to have had 
experience managing large contracts, there is no way to tell 
based on his resume, which offers only general 
descriptions of his past experience. 
With respect to management and leadership, the selection 
criteria emphasize experience serving as branch or section 
supervisor with over 30 employees, managing "large, 
multidisciplined" organizations and overseeing the 
execution of multi-million dollar contracts. Here, the 
differences between the candidates' resumes really show. 
At the time he applied, Shelley was Assistant Chief in the 
Contracting Division, a GS-13 position. He previously had 
positions as a Team Leader,Sllper\,i~()r'y Contract 
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Specialist, and Contract Specialist. Although the criteria 
specifically mentioned that the candidates should be 
"branch or section supervisor ... with over 30 employees," 
Shelley did not list the number of employees he supervised 
in any of his positions. By contrast, Marsh was a 
Supervisory Procurement Analyst, which was a GS-14 
position, and he stated that he supervised 15 employees. In 
his previous position as Supervisory Contract Specialist, 
he had supervised 75 contract specialists, including 14 
contracting officers. And prior to that he had supervised 13 
German and American contract specialists and three 
contracting officers in Germany. 
The majority recognizes that Shelley didn't respond 
directly to the criteria, but props him up anyway: "While 
Shelley's resume did not specify the number of employees 
he supervised, it did disclose that, as Assistant Chief of 
Contracting, he supervised, coordinated and managed the 
work of subordinate Team Leaders, who presumably led 
teams." Maj. Op. at 619-20 (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, it is a big presumption. Shelley stated that, 
around 1985, he was temporarily made the Chief of the 
Walla Walla Division. Here is his testimony: 
A. How long have you served as a Division Chief, 
how many days? 
Q. I can't even number them on my head .... I was 
constantly made the Division Chief. 
Q. Is that noted on your resume? 
A. I don't see that I covered that in there .... They 
wouldn't have seen it from my resume. 
Q. So is there anywhere in your resume where it 
reflects that you acted as a Division Chief for any 
significant period of time? 
A. I don't see it in there. 
To counteract the failings in Shelley'S resume, the majority 
then disparages Marsh's resume because his supervising 
75 employees was not part of his regular job duties. See 
Maj. Op. at 610. From all of this, the majority calls the 
round a tie because "[n]either candidate clearly 
demonstrated that he met this criterion." Id. at 610. 
The majority is wrong, of course. The most notable 
distinction between the two resumes was that Shelley was 
not the head of his office and Marsh was. That 
inconvenient fact is also reflected in one other critical fact: 
Marsh's demonstrated competence had been rewarded 
with a GS-14 position, while Shelley was still a GS-13. 
The majority's answer to this is incomprehensible. It says 
that this was "relevant *621 only as to the 120-day 
position" because, if Shelley had been given the 120-day 
position, he too would have been a GS-14. Jd. at 61 I. The 
majority has missed the whole point: Marsh was already a 
GS-14 when the I20-day position opened; even though he 
was younger than Shelley and had fewer years with the 
Corps, he held a higher position, at least as measured by his 
supervisory responsibilities and his pay grade. See 
Pottenger, 329 F.3d at 748 ("Nor does the fact that the 
company moved a younger employee ahead of Pottenger 
on the CEO successor list suggest that [the company] acted 
with any discriminatory motive, for that employee had 
held a higher position in the company than Pottenger."). 
With regard to the final criterion, teamwork, the criteria 
emphasize the ability to work with customers and other 
departments, offices, and teams in a multi-disciplinary 
setting. Marsh's resume lists relevant experience such as 
serving as his directorate's point of contact with Congress 
and the Army Audit Agency, in addition to maintaining 
working relationships with counterparts throughout the 
Department of Defense, U.S. Small Business 
Administration, and other federal agencies. Shelley's 
resume, on the other hand, fails to list any comparable 
experience. The majority opinion is just silent on this 
criterion. 
From all of this, the majority deduces that "a reasonable 
jury could find that [Shelley] was substantially better 
qualified than Marsh." Maj. Op. at 611 (emphasis added). 
The majority thus sides with Shelley, who bitterly claims 
that "Marsh should have received a 'minimally acceptable' 
evaluation." But repeating it does not make it so. At the 
very least, Marsh had a resume equal to or better than 
Shelley's. And these were not the only two candidates. The 
selection committee was responsible for ranking 32 
applicants, among whom were a number of qualified 
individuals, including Shelley'S supervisor. Based on the 
relevant resume screening criteria, along with the fact that 
Marsh was already a Supervisory Procurement Analyst, 
there is no evidence to show that Shelley was 
"substantially better qualified" than Marsh. And without 
that evidence, Shelley has nothing to show that the Corps's 
explanation-that the selection committee thought there 
were six candidates better qualified than Shelley-was 
pretextual.5 
Indeed, the maJonty overlooks a straightforward 
conclusion based on evidence that it discusses. In the panel 
members' initial rankings-which were done individually 
and prior to any discussion with other panel 
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members~Marsh received four top rankings and one mid 
ranking; Shelley received three top rankings and two mid 
rankings. Even assuming that Scanlan was the one who 
gave Marsh a top ranking and Shelley a mid ranking, that 
means that the other panel members independently came to 
the conclusion that Marsh was at least as qualified as 
Shelley. Furthermore, a different panel member changed 
his score for Shelley (downgrading him from mid to 
bottom). Even if this change came after the panel 
members' discussion-in which the evidence only shows 
that age was never discussed and neither was Shelley in 
particular~that means that at least two panel members 
concluded that Marsh was a better *622 applicant than 
Shelley. Thus, even if Scanlan did have animosity toward 
Shelley based on his age (for which there is no evidence 
whatsoever), Marsh would still have been strongly 
preferred over Shelley by the committee as a whole. 
There is more than sufficient evidence to affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, even without 
considering the Gross "but-for" test. See Coleman v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir.2000) 
(holding that comments related to age, the plaintiffs own 
evaluations of his qualifications, and the use of subjective 
evaluations for promotion were still insufficient to raise an 
issue of fact concerning discriminatory motive). Once we 
Footnotes 
factor Gross into the mix, it is apparent that Shelley cannot 
show that the Corps's decision is unexplainable on any 
basis other than age discrimination. 
* * * * * * 
There is not only no evidence of age discrimination against 
Shelley, there is no evidence of age discrimination infavor 
of Marsh. On this record, Shelley has failed to satisfY even 
his minimal burden of showing that his age "actually 
played a role in [the Corps's decision-making] process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome," Reeves v. 
SandersonPlllmbingProds., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 
S.Ct.2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper 
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 6 I 0, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 123 
L.Ed.2d 338 (I 993)), much less advance any evidence of 
"but for" causation for his ADEA claim. Accordingly, I 
would affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
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* The Honorable Claudia Wilken, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 
1 As an alternative to filing an administrative complaint, a federal employee may tile a civil action in a United States district court 
under the ADEA after giving the EEOC not less than thirty days' notice of intent to sue. 29 U.s.c. § 633a(d): 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.201 (a); see Bankston, 345 F.3d at 770. There is no evidence that Shelley provided the EEOC with notice of his intent to sue the 
Corps, and he does not appear to rely on this alternative avenue. 
2 Mixed-motivesjury instructions are used in Title VII cases where an employee alleges that he or she suffered an adverse employment 
action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations. i.e., a "mixed-motives" case. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2347 (citing 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228. 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989». Under such instructions, if a Title VII plaintiff 
shows that discrimination was a "motivating" or a "substantial" factor in the employer's action, the burden of persuasion would shift 
to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible consideration. Jd. 
3 We have done the same in non-precedential, unpublished decisions. Russell v. !v/ollnlain Park Health Or. Props., LLC 403 
Fed.Appx. 195. 196 (9th Cir.20 10): EEOC v. Banner Health, 402 Fed.Appx. 289. 290~92 (9th Cir.201 0). 
4 It thus appears that, as part of the prima facie case, a plaintiff does not have to show that he was discriminated against in favor of a 
substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. If Shelley were required to show this, he has done so. as 
discussed below in connection with his showing of pretext. See Lowe v. Ci(v o/Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,1005 (9th Cir.1985), as 
amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that in order to show pretext. a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence that he 
olfered to establish a prima facie case). 
5 Although the Walla Walla Capable Workforce Matrix in the record is dated March 21, 2006. after Shelley was denied an opportunity 
to interview. it displays the same information that Scanlan and Brice had requested earlier, and shows that one could deduce the 
names of individual employees. 
1 Because I agree that Shelley exhausted his administrative remedies. I concur in Part I of the majority opinion. I also agree that the 
district court erred in holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to ADEA claims. Accordingly, I concur in Parts 
I through II.A of the majority opinion. 
v. 666 F.3d 599 2) 
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2 The majority mischaracterizes the Corps's explanation for its decisions as being that Marsh was already a GS-14 whereas Shelley 
was only a GS-13. Maj. Op. at 609. As I discuss in Part IV, Marsh's prior permanent GS-14 position is of course relevant and 
demonstrates his superior qualifications, though it is hardly the only way in which he was a better applicant than Shelley. The Corps 
has contended throughout that the six candidates selected for an interview were each generally better qualified than Shelley and that 
the selection process worked correctly; even Shelley acknowledged this as the explanation offered by the Corps. Because of this 
mischaracterization, the majority can claim that the Corps's explanation was irrelevant for the permanent hiring decision because if 
Shelley had received the temporary position, his receiving the permanent position would have been a lateral move, too. See Maj. Op. 
at 611. It also paves the way for the majority's erroneous conclusion that a "reasonable jury [could] find that the Corps' reliance on 
Marsh's GS-14 level. as compared to Shelley's GS-13 level. was pretextual." Maj. Op. at 611. 
3 For the reasons set out above, this piece of evidenee is irrelevant to the 120-<lay position and only potentially probative for 
discrimination in the selection for the permanent position. 
4 I note that in these cases the standard of proof is not as demanding as in this ADEA ease. Beeause these eases were brought under 
Title VII and similar eauses of action, demonstrating mixed motives would have been sufficient in each; the plaintiffs did not need to 
prove but-for causation. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). 
5 It should also be noted that, for the same reasons that Marsh demonstrated better qualifications for the permanent position, he also 
demonstrated better qualifications for the 120-day position. In any case, Marsh already held the same job title as the 12O-day 
position. Thus, for neither position can Shelley rebut the Corps's legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification. 
Thomson Reuters. No to original U.S. Government Works. 

V. Merced Dist, 934 F.2el 1104 (1991) 
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250,56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,844, 67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Edyna Marie SISCHO-NOWNEJAD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MERCED COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
DISTRICT; Board of Trustees of Merced 
Community College District; Bruce 
Pressly; ~largaret Randolph; Richard 
Rodini; Robert Ohki; Richard Parker; Dr. 
E. W. Bizzini; James Edmonson; Walter 
Crawford; Anthony Rose; William C. 
Martineson; Dean Ron Williams; Luc 
Janssens; Alan Beymer, in their official 
capacity as members of the Board of 
Trustees and Administrators of Merced 
Community College District, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 89-15874. I Argued and Submitted Dec. 
10,1990. I Decided June 13, 1991. 
Art instructor at community college brought action 
against college and college officials alleging age and sex 
discrimination. The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California, Robert E. Coyle, Chief 
Judge, entered summary judgment in favor of college and 
college officials, and instructor appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) instructor 
established prima facie case of age and sex 
discrimination; (2) genuine issues of material fact existed 
as to whether legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
offered for disparate treatment were pretext for 
discrimination; (3) triable issues existed with respect to § 
1983 claim; and (4) instructor did not have claim under 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act for failure 
reasonably to accommodate her handicap of high blood 
pressure. 
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded. 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California. 
Before TANG, FLETCHER and REINHARDT, Circuit 
Judges. 
Opinion 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
Edyna Sischo-Nownejad, an art instructor at Merced 
Community College on Merced campus, brought suit 
against the college and college officials alleging age and 
sex discrimination. Her complaint alleges that because of 
her age and sex, the defendants harassed her and 
subjected her to different treatment regarding class 
assignments and other working conditions. During the 
period in question, Sischo-Nownejad was 52-58 years of 
age. At the time, she was the only female, and one of the 
oldest, full-time faculty members in the art department. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants. The court held that Sischo-Nownejad had 
failed to *]] 07 prove a prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 USc. § 
1983, and that no triable issue of material fact existed 
regarding her second § 1983 claim and her related state 
law claims. Sischo-Nownejad appeals from the grant of 
summary judgment.! We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
I. FACTS2 
Sischo-Nownejad has been employed as a faculty member 
in the Merced College art department since 1968. The 
college ordinarily bases the assignment and scheduling of 
classes on the input of faculty members, and senior 
faculty who have developed particular courses are 
normally given the first choice of teaching them. Further, 
division chairpersons customarily consult with faculty 
members regarding their need for supplies. The college 
followed these practices with regard to the other faculty 
members throughout the period in question, but did not do 
so with regard to Sischo-Nownejad. Instead, from 1981 to 
1986, division chairpersons failed to consult with her 
about which courses she wanted to teach, gave her 
teaching assignments that she did not want, and 
reassigned courses that she had developed and taught for 
many years. From 1982 to 1988, they also failed to 
consult with her regarding her need for supplies 
and-although the other faculty members received all the 
supplies necessary-she received none. Moreover, from 
198 I to 1983, the division chairpersons monitored the 
enrollment of her classes but not the enrollment of classes 
taught by others. 
In March 1981, Sischo-Nownejad protested to defendant 
Williams, a college dean, regarding her class assignments. 
She stated that defendant Janssens, her division 
chairperson, had reassigned some of her high-enrollment 
courses to himself, regardless of the fact that she had 
developed the classes. Williams took no action. 
Sischo-Nownejad then wrote to Williams and sent a copy 
of the letter to the president of the college and the board 
of trustees. Janssens responded by filing a complaint with 
the faculty ethics committee that accused 
Sischo-Nownejad of charging him with unprofessional 
conduct in a widely disseminated letter, violating 
department procedure by the copying and sale of art 
department works, and physically abusing another art 
department teacher. He did not send Sischo-Nownejad a 
copy of the complaint. The ethics committee then violated 
its own policies by conducting an investigation that 
involved the entire faculty senate, rather than merely the 
ethics committee, with no advance notice to 
Sischo-Nownejad. Janssens's complaint resulted in an 
admonishment against Sischo-Nownejad, which was 
included in her personnel file. 
In 1982, Sischo-Nownejad took a leave of absence for 
medical reasons. When she returned to work, she found 
that large file cabinets had been moved into her office 
during her absence. College officials criticized her for 
allowing her daughter to use her faculty parking space 
and said that if the use continued, the space would be 
taken away. Sischo-Nownejad responded that she was on 
crutches and that her daughter was providing 
transportation; the defendants took no further action 
regarding the parking space. The defendants also 
criticized Sischo-Nownejad for not being on campus 
enough hours to fulfill her contractual obligation, for 
failing to attend division meetings, and for being absent 
during her office hours. Sischo-Nownejad denied the 
allegations. 
In February 1983, Sischo-Nownejad submitted a written 
request for a leave of absence. The defendants denied her 
request, stating that the semester had already progressed 
too far to grant the leave. Sischo-Nownejad sought 
reconsideration *1108 and defendant Martineson, 
v. Merced Community Dist, 934 F.2d 1104 (1991) 
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president of the college, asked for clarification on the type 
of leave requested. After soliciting information on the 
types of leave available, Sischo-Nownejad requested a 
paid sabbatical leave or an unpaid professional 
development leave. The letter that her attorney wrote to 
Martineson requesting the leave stated that 
Sischo-Nownejad was under no medical restrictions and 
that, unless advised to the contrary by her doctors, she 
would continue to fulfill her contractual obligations. 
Martineson did not rule on the request for reconsideration, 
and Sischo-Nownejad withdrew the request seven months 
later. 
Throughout the period in question, the defendants made 
numerous statements indicating age and gender bias. 
These statements include a reference to Sischo-Nownejad 
as "an old warhorse" and a characterization of her 
students as "little old ladies [who] have their own art 
studio." Janssens once stated, "There she is with her little 
group of women." He also made sarcastic remarks 
regarding "you women's libbers." Martineson twice urged 
Sischo-Nownejad to retire, a suggestion repeated by the 
dean of personnel. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Sischo-Nownejad's complaint contains several claims for 
relief. She alleges that the defendants discriminated 
against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act; that they discriminated against her 
on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act; and that they deprived her of equal 
protection and the right to privacy, in violation of 42 
U.s.c. § 1983. She further alleges that the defendants 
deprived her of equal protection in violation of Article I, § 
7 of the California Constitution. She claims that their 
alleged age and sex discrimination constitutes a violation 
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, as 
does their alleged refusal reasonably to accommodate her 
handicap of high blood pressure by granting her a leave of 
absence. Finally, she alleges that the defendants breached 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her 
employment contract. 
The district court granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on all claims. The court held that 
Sischo-Nownejad had failed to establish a prima facie 
case of intentional age or sex discrimination pursuant to 
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
and § 1983. It further held that no triable issue of material 
fact existed pursuant to § 1983 on the question whether 
the defendants had violated Sischo-Nownejad's right to 
privacy.3 Because of its holding that Sischo-Nownejad 
had failed to demonstrate age or sex discrimination 
pursuant to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the district court also held that she had 
failed to demonstrate age or sex discrimination pursuant 
to Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution4 and the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court 
held that no triable issue of material fact existed pursuant 
to the Fair Employment and Housing Act on the question 
whether the defendants had failed reasonably to 
accommodate Sischo-Nownejad's high blood pressure by 
granting a leave of absence. Finally, the court held that 
Sischo-Nownejad could not recover for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because 
California law limits the application of tort damages in 
employment situations.s 
The district court denied the defendants' request for 
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988. The 
defendants do not appeal this ruling. They do, however, 
request that we exercise our discretion and *1109 award 
them their costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
III. TITLE VII AND AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT ACT CLAIMS 
A. 
111 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it illegal for an 
employer "to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... 
sex." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act forbids the identical conduct when 
the discrimination is "because of such individual's age." 
29 U.S.c. § 623(a)(I). A plaintiff may show violations of 
these statutes by proving disparate treatment or disparate 
impact, or by proving the existence of a hostile work 
environment. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97 S.Ct. 1843, 
1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Jordan v. Clark, 847 
F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1006, 109 S.Ct. 786, 102 L.Ed.2d 778 (1989); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Borden's, Inc., 
724 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir.1984). Disparate treatment 
involves intentional discrimination. Borden's, 724 F.2d at 
1392. Disparate impact involves a facially neutral 
employment criterion that has an unequal effect on 
members of a protected class; discriminatory intent need 
not be proved. !d. at 1392-93. A hostile work environment 
requires the existence of severe or pervasive and 
unwelcome verbal or harassment because of a 
v. Merced Community Dist, 934 F.2d 1104 (1991) 
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plaintiffs membership in a protected class. See Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67, 106 
S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Young v. Will 
County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290, 294 (7th 
Cir.1989);Jordan, 847 F.2dat 1373. 
121 13) 14) Sischo-Nownejad's claims are based 
exclusively on a theory of disparate treatment.6 In order to 
prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff may assert either that 
the employer's challenged decision stemmed from a 
single illegitimate motive (i.e., sex discrimination) or that 
the decision was the product of both legitimate and 
illegitimate motives. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 244-48,109 S.Ct. 1775,1788-89,104 L.Ed.2d 
268 (1989). In the former case, the plaintiff may establish 
a prima facie case by introducing evidence that "give[s] 
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Texas 
Dep't ol Community Ailairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 
253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).7 The 
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 
action. ld. If the employer does so, then the burden 
returns to the plaintiff to prove that the articulated reason 
is pretextuaI. ld.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825,36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973). Ultimately, the question is whether it is more 
likely than not that the employer's conduct was motivated 
solely by intentional discrimination. United States Postal 
Service Board olGovernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 
103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). In other 
words, does the preponderance of the evidence tend to 
support the conclusion that *] ] 10 the action resulted from 
a discriminatory motive? The analysis in a case involvina 
. b 
mixed motives is somewhat different. The Price 
Waterhouse plurality found the Burdine formula 
unsuitable for mixed motives cases. Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 244-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1788-89. Instead it 
adopted a simpler approach. Under Price Waterhouse, 'the 
plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that a 
protected characteristic "played a motivating pali in [the] 
employment decision." ld. at 244, 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 
1787, 1789 n. 12. Once that is done, the employer may 
escape liability only by proving by way of an affirmative 
defense that the employment decision would have been 
the same even if the characteristic had played no role. Jd. 
at 243-47,109 S.Ct. at 1787-88. 
IS) In opposing the summary judgment motion, 
Sischo-Nownejad relied on a single-motive theory.8 
Because her complaint survives summary judgment on 
that theory, we need not decide here whether a mixed 
motives theory would be applicable as wel1.9 
Sischo-Nownejad's burden on summary judgment was 
merely to establish a prima facie case and, once the 
efl1ployer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its actions, to raise a genuine factual issue as to 
whether the articulated reason was pretextual. See Lowe v. 
City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir.1985), as 
amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986).10 Because she met that 
burden, we hold that the district court committed 
reversible error in granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on her claims under Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. ~ 
B. 
16J 171 In order to show a prima facie case of 
discrimination, "a plaintiff must offer evidence that 
'give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.' " 
ld. at 1005 (quoting Texas Dep't olCommunity Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981». The evidence may be either direct or 
circumstantial, *11]] and the amount that must be 
produced in order to create a prima facie case is "very 
little." ld. at 1009. Normally, when such evidence has 
been introduced, a court should not grant summary 
judgment to the defendant on any ground relating to the 
merits. ld. Even if the defendant articulates a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment 
decision, thus shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove 
that the articulated reason is pretextual, summary 
judgment is normally inappropriate. "[W]hen a plaintiff 
has established a prima facie inference of disparate 
treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have raised a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the 
legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated 
reason for its employment decision." ld. (emphasis 
added). Specifically, in evaluating whether the 
defendant's articulated reason is pretextual, the trier of 
fact must, at a minimum, consider the same evidence that 
the plaintiff introduced to establish her prima facie case. 
ld. at 1008. When that evidence, direct or circumstantial 
consists of more than the McDonnell Dougla; 
presumption, a factual question will almost always exist 
with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. 
The existence of this question of material fact will 
ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment. ld. 
at 1009. 
In Lowe v. City of Monrovia, we reversed a grant of 
summary judgment on facts similar to those before us 
today. In that case, a black female plaintiff applied for a 
job with Monrovia's police force. The city's personnel 
manager told her that the city had no women or black 
police officers and "had no facilities." The personnel 
manager suggested that the plaintiff apply in Los Angeles 
instead of Monrovia. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1002. We held 
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced College Dist., 934 F.2d 1 Hl4 
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250,56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,844,67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109 
that these statements, when viewed in conjunction with 
the fact that Monrovia had no black police officers at the 
time the plaintiff applied, created an inference of 
discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 
Id. at 1007. We further held that although the city had 
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
refusing to hire the plaintiff, the evidence that the plaintiff 
had introduced to establish her prima facie case was 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the articulated reason was pretextual. 
Id. at 1008-09. 
181 The defendants in the case before us distinguish Lowe 
as involving a refusal to hire, not conditions of 
employment. They suggest that discrimination which 
manifests itself in different conditions of employment 
presents a separate problem from discrimination which 
manifests itself through a refusal to hire, and that more 
evidence is required to prove a prima facie case of the 
former than of the latter. We reject this premise. Title VII 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act do not 
suggest that different standards exist for proving 
discrimination in hiring versus proving discrimination on 
the job. Moreover, our precedents indicate the importance 
of allowing the factfinder to consider the existence of 
discrimination. "[A]n employer's true motive in an 
employment decision is rarely easy to discern." As we 
have previously noted, "[ w ]ithout a searching inquiry into 
these motives, those [acting for impermissible motives] 
could easily mask their behavior behind a complex web of 
post hoc rationalizations .... " Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009 
(quoting Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th 
Cir.1982». Thus, "the question of an employer's intent to 
discriminate is 'a pure question of fact.' " Id. at 1008 
(quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 
287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982». 
We require very little evidence to survive summary 
judgment precisely because the ultimate question is one 
that can only be resolved through a "searching 
inquiry"-one that is most appropriately conducted by the 
factfinder, upon a full record. Were we to increase the 
amount of proof required to survive summary judgment 
when conditions of employment are involved, the result 
would be to remove from factfinders the ability to 
consider claims that merit full exploration. 
19] *]]]2 Applying the standards set forth in Lowe, we 
hold that Sischo-Nownejad introduced sufficient evidence 
to give rise to an inference of disparate treatment. Facts 
introduced through her deposition and the declaration of 
Penny Lowry, a college records officer, reveal that during 
the time period in question, Sischo-Nownejad was the 
only female, and one of the oldest, full-time faculty 
members in the art department. She has adduced evidence 
that she was subjected to treatment that differed from that 
accorded the remainder of the faculty. Division 
chairpersons reassigned Sischo-Nownejad's 
high-enrollment courses away from her and assigned her 
to teach courses that she did not want. They did not 
provide supplies that she needed, and they monitored the 
enrollment of her courses but not that of courses taught by 
other faculty members. "Proof of discriminatory motive ... 
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of 
differences in treatment." International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. IS, 97 
S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Moreover, 
while singling Sischo-Nownejad out for different 
treatment, the defendants-her superiors-referred to her as 
"an old warhorse" and to her students as "little old 
ladies," and made other derogatory remarks indicating age 
and gender bias. The Supreme Court has stated that 
"stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that [a 
protected characteristic] played a part" in an employment 
decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, 109 S.Ct. at 
1791 (emphasis in original). In this instance, the fact that 
stereotyped remarks were made by Sischo-Nownejad's 
superiors at the same time that they were subjecting her to 
less favorable working conditions is sufficient to raise an 
inference of discriminatory intent. 
110] The defendants attempt to rebut Sischo-Nownejad's 
prima facie case of intentional discrimination by asserting 
that the challenged actions occurred for nondiscriminatory 
reasons. They state that Janssens reassigned some of 
Sischo-Nownejad's classes to himself, for instance, 
simply because he enjoyed teaching them. As in Lowe, 
however, the evidence that Sischo-Nownejad introduced 
to establish a prima facie case is direct and consists of 
more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption. 
Accordingly, that evidence serves a dual purpose. It is 
sufficient not only to establish her prima facie case, but 
also to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether the defendants' articulated reasons are pretextual. 
See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008-10. Therefore, the district 
court committed reversible error in granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII and Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act claims. We reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on these claims and remand for a trial 
on the merits. 
IV. 42 U.S.c. § ]983 CLAIM 
111) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may 
challenge action committed under color of state law that 
amounts to a deprivation of federal constitutional or 
statutory rights. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1333 
V. Merced Dis!., 934 F.2d 1104 (1991) 
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(9th Cir.1990). Sischo-Nownejad alleges that the 
defendants, a community college and employees thereof, 
violated her rights to equal protection of the laws by 
discriminating against her on the basis of age and gender. 
Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See 
Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 875, 101 S.Ct. 218, 66 L.Ed.2d 96 
(1980). Therefore, Sischo-Nownejad states a cognizable 
claim. 
11211131 In order to prove discrimination in violation of § 
1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants 
acted with the intent to discriminate. Peters v. Liel/allen, 
746 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1984); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 
F.2d 1418, 1424 n. 7 (5th Cir.1984). A plaintiff who fails 
to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of 
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
also fails to establish intentional discrimination for 
purposes of § 1983. See Knight v. Nassau County Civil 
Service Commission, 649 F.2d 157, 161-62 (9th CiL), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818, 102 S.Ct. 97, 70 L.Ed.2d 87 
(1981 ); see * 1113 also Stones v. Los Angeles 
Community College District, 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th 
Cir.1986). The district court relied on this principle to 
grant summary judgment on Sischo-Nownejad's § 1983 
claim. However, as we explained supra, Part III, the 
district court erred in concluding that Sischo-Nownejad 
had failed to present sufficient evidence of intentional 
discrimination to defeat summary judgment for purposes 
of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act. Evidence that is sufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact for purposes of those statutes also serves 
to create a genuine issue for purposes of § 1983. See T & 
S Service Assocs., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 724 & n. 
2 (I st Cir.1981); Whiting v . .lachon State University, 616 
F.2d 116, 121-22 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, the district 
court erred when it granted summary judgment on 
Sischo-Nownejad's § 1983 claim. We reverse the district 
court on this count and remand for a trial on the merits. 
V. CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT & 
HOUSING ACT CLAIMS 
A. 
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on Sischo-Nownejad's Fair Employment and 
Housing Act claim of intentional sex and age 
discrimination. I I The court held that the standard for 
interpr~ting, the Fair Empl().YI11~nt andJ:I()usiIlg, Act is 
identical to that used in federal Title VII cases, but it cited 
a case which is not on point to support this proposition. 
See Best v. California Apprenticeship Council, 161 
CaLApp.3d 626, 207 Ca1.Rptr. 863 (1984). Because the 
district court had granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII claim, it did 
the same on her Fair Employment and Housing Act claim. 
Sischo-Nownejad argues that liability is more readily 
found under the Fair Employment and Housing Act than 
under Title VII. See Ibarbia v. Regents of the University 
of California, 191 Ca1.App.3d 1318, 1326-28, 237 
Cal.Rptr. 92, 96-98 (1987). We need not resolve this 
question. Even if the district court was correct in holding 
that the standards of liability are identical, we have 
already held that summary judgment was inappropriate on 
Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII claim. See supra, Part III. 
Therefore, summary judgment should not have been 
granted on the Fair Employment and Housing Act claim 
of intentional discrimination. We reverse on this count 
and remand for a trial on the merits. 
B. 
1141 Sischo-Nownejad's second claim under the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act is that the defendants 
failed reasonably to accommodate her handicap of high 
blood pressure by granting her a leave of absence.12 The 
record does not give rise to * 1114 a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to this allegation. The facts 
introduced below demonstrate that Sischo-Nownejad 
sought a paid sabbatical leave or an unpaid professional 
development leave. She made no request for a medical 
leave and, in fact, informed the defendants that she was 
"under no medical restrictions at the present time." The 
district court correctly granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment regarding this Fair Employment and 
Housing Act claim. We affirm on this count. 
VI. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The defendants do not challenge the lower court's refusal 
to grant them attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USc. § 
1988, but request that we exercise our discretion to award 
them their costs and attorney's fees on appeal. They cite 
no authority for this request, but presumably rely upon 
our authority to award costs and attorney's fees as a 
sanction for bringing a frivolous appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 
38; 28 U .S.c. § 1912; Glan:::man v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 
F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir.1989). This appeal was not frivolous, 
v. Merced Community Dist., 934 F.20 1104 (1991) 
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250,56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,844,67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109 
as Sischo-Nownejad's claims obviously were not wholly 
without merit. See McConnell v. Critchlmv, 661 F.2d 116, 
118 (9th Cir.1981). Therefore, we deny the defendants' 
request. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on Sischo-Nownejad's claims of intentional 
discrimination. Specifically, we remand the following 
claims for a trial on the merits: (I) Title VII claim of sex 
discrimination; (2) Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act claim of age discrimination; (3) 42 U.s.c. § 1983 
Footnotes 
claim of equal protection violation; and (4) Fair 
Employment and Housing Act claim of age and sex 
discrimination. We affirm the remainder of the grant of 
summary judgment. We deny the defendants' request for 
attorney's fees and costs, and grant costs to the appellant. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 
REMANDED. 
Parallel Citations 
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
P 40,844, 67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109 
She raises only some of her many claims on appeal. See inFa notes 3-5. 
2 For purposes of summary judgment we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Sischo-Nownejad. See 
Nilsson. Robbins, Da/garn. Berliner, Carson & Wlirst 1'. Louisiana Hydro/ec. 854 F.2d 1538, 1542 (9th CiLI988). That is what we 
do in this section of our opinion. Whether the tacts will ultimatcly be found to be differcnt in one or more respects is a matter that 
must bc determined after a trial on the merits. 
3 Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this rUling. In referring to her claim under § 1983, her briefs address only the issue of equal 
protection, and not the issue of her right to privacy. Similarly, her counsel made no reference to the § 1983 right to privacy claim 
during oral argument. 
4 Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this ruling. In her briefs and in oral argument the only state law claims she discusses are those 
arising under the Fair Employment and !-lousing Act. 
5 Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this ruling. See supra note 4. 
6 The district court, while acknowlcdging that Sischo-Nownejad's claims are based on disparate treatment, addressed much of its 
analysis to theories of disparate impact and hostile working environment. We reiterate that these are distinct theories. Disparate 
treatment, unlike disparate impact, requires proof of discriminatory intcnt. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 
335 n. 15. 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15. Moreover, disparate treatment. unlike a hostile working environment, need not involve physical 
and/or vcrbal harassment. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405. 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). 
7 One way in which a plaintilT may establish an inference of discrimination is by satisfying the four-part test set forth in McDonnell 
Doug/as Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.802.93 S.Ct. 1817.1824.36 LEd.2d 668 (1973): 
I. She belongs to a protected class. 
2. She applied for and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was sceking applicants. 
3. Despite being qualified, she was rejected. 
4. After her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from people of comparable 
qualifications. 
8 A plaintiff need not choose between a single motive and mixed motive theory at the beginning of the case. The Supreme Court has 
explained: 
[We do not] suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as either a "pretext" case or a "mixed motives" case from the 
beginning in the District Court: indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. 
Discovery otten will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played 
a part in the decision against her. At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a 
particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a 
forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine. 
that the employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual. 
]d, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 1789 n. 12. 
v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (1991) 
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,844, 67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109 
9 The Supreme Court did not decide Price Waterhouse. in which it articulatcd the standards governing a mixed motives casc, until 
after Sischo-Nownejad's complaint was filed. In her briefs on appeal. as well as in oral argument, she argues mixed motives. 
10 Although it may be self-evident, we note here that nothing in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S.C!. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1986), affects our decision in Lowe. Celotex involved the question whether a party moving for summary judgment satisfies its 
burden of production by simply pointing to the absence of any record evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Lowe, in contrast. involved the situation where the nonmoving party has produced record evidence-albeit "very 
little"-giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. 
Lowe is also unaffected by the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). and Matsushita Etec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.C!. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 
(1986). Anderson required that when a substantive claim may only be proved by "clear and convincing evidence," a district 
court considering a motion for summary judgment must take that heightened evidentiary standard into account. The ultimate 
burden of persuasion in Lowe, however, was that of proving intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 
lvfatsushita is also not on point. There, the Supreme Court held that when the factual context rendered a claimed antitrust 
violation implausible because the claim made no economic sense, the plaintiffs must produce more evidence than would 
normally be necessary in order to defeat summary judgment. No such factual considerations existed in Lowe, nor do they exist in 
the case before us today. 
11 The Fair Employment and Housing Act states, in relevant part: 
§ 129·10. Employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and other persons; unlawful employment practice; 
exceptions. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or. except where based 
upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: 
(a) For an employer, because of the ... sex of any person. to ... discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms. 
conditions or privileges of employment. 
§ 12941. Age; unlawfid employment practice by employers; exceptions. 
(a) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or employ, or to discharge, dismiss, reduce. 
suspend, or demote. any individual over the age of 40 on the ground of age, except in cases where the law compels or 
provides for such action. 
Cal.Gov.Code §§ 12940-12941 (Deering 1982 & Supp.1990). 
12 The Fair Employment and Housing Act states, in relevant part: 
§ 19240. Employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and other persons; unlawful employment practice; 
exceptions. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based 
upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: 
(a) For an employer, because of the ... physical handicap .. , of any person. to ... discriminate against the person in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 
Cal.Gov.Code § 12940 (Deering 1982 & Supp.1990). 
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Divorced husband brought legal malpractice action against 
attorney who represented him in divorce case. The District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, D. Duff 
McKee, J., entered summary judgment for attorney, and 
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Perry, 1., held 
that: (I) triable issues existed regarding whether husband 
and attorney were in pari delicto, and (2) triable issues 
existed regarding proper award of damages. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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,Judgment 
,,;zAbsence of Issue of Fact 
Summary judgment is proper only when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and moving 
party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
Appeal and Error 
,~'''Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
On appeal from summary judgment, reviewing 
court exercises free review in determining 
whether genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law. 
[31 
[4[ 
[5[ 
[61 
Judgment 
'0"0 Weight and Sufficiency 
When ruling on motion for summary judgment, it 
is not within trial court's province to assess 
credibility of affiant or deponent when credibility 
can be tested in court before trier of fact. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
,>,.Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
When assessing motion for summary judgment, 
trial court must liberally construe all controverted 
facts in favor of nonmoving party, and must 
make all reasonable inferences in favor of 
nonmoving party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
,=Attorneys, Cases Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
husband and his attorney engaged in scheme to 
defraud wife out of life insurance policy during 
divorce proceedings, or whether husband 
believed that final property settlement agreement 
would require return of policy to husband and 
would make transfer clear to wife, precluded 
summary judgment for attorney on husband's 
legal malpractice claim pursuant to in pari delicto 
defense. 
Judgment 
<","Attorneys, Cases Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
husband would actually have proceeded to trial in 
divorce case if wife had refused to transfer life 
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[71 
insurance policy to him as term of settlement 
precluded summary judgment limiting husband's 
damages in legal malpractice case against his 
divorce attorney to those economic losses 
directly attributable to or connected with policy. 
Attorney and Client 
,~.=Damages and Costs 
In legal malpractice case based upon negligence 
in handling litigation for client, measure of direct 
damages is difference between client's actual 
recovery and recovery which should have been 
obtained but for attorney's malpractice. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
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Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Boise, for 
respondent. Mark S. Geston argued. 
Opinion 
PERRY, Judge. 
Richard J. Sohn (Richard) filed an action against his 
former divorce attorney, Howard Foley (Foley), alleging 
that Foley negligently advised him during property 
settlement negotiations. The district court granted 
summary judgment to Foley, finding that the parties were 
in pari delicto and that the damages requested, which were 
based on a hypothetical trial of Sohn v. Sohn, were too 
speculative. The district court ruled, therefore, that if the 
action against Foley were to go to trial, the damages were 
limited to the economic losses directly attributable to the 
loss of an insurance policy of which Richard contends he 
would have obtained ownership, but for Foley'S 
malpractice. Richard appeals the granting of the summary 
judgment. We reverse the judgment entered by the district 
court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Richard and Margaret (Margaret) Sohn were married in 
1962. During their marriage, Richard and Margaret had 
acquired various assets and liabilities, including a **498 
*170 $300,000 indebtedness to the Internal Revenue 
Service. During the marriage, United Airlines (UAL), 
Richard's employer, began paying the premiums on a life 
insurance policy for Richard. In 1984, Richard assigned 
the policy to Margaret. 
The Sohn's marriage had been deteriorating for years, and 
the two had discussed divorce and settlement of their 
property as early as 1989. The Sohns had preliminarily 
decided how most of their property would be divided upon 
their divorce. During the course of these settlement 
discussions, Richard corresponded frequently with 
Margaret, who had moved to Florida. A letter written on 
June 18, 1990, sent by fax, indicates that Richard had 
already made a comprehensive offer. It also indicated that 
he wished to accomplish the divorce "as quickly and 
cleanly as possible." 
Richard again wrote Margaret on June 20, 1990. In this 
letter he explained his plan for distribution of the assets and 
liabilities and his belief it would be wiser for Margaret to 
accept his proposal rather than endure a trial. Richard also 
observed that a settlement would be better because "if we 
go to court I will have to list all assets to get my fair share 
and the IRS settlement is a liability and it will almost 
certainly be verified directly with the IRS. This will have 
an effect that neither of us will appreciate." The letter 
proposed that Richard would take the $300,000 tax 
liability plus a down payment on a house while Margaret 
would get the remaining assets. 
Richard first met with attorney Foley on July 5, 1990. 
During this meeting, Richard provided Foley with a copy 
of the 1984 assignment of the UAL life insurance policy, 
informing Foley that Margaret owned the policy. Richard 
claims that he also told Foley that he strongly desired to get 
the policy back and that if he could not, he would not 
accept a negotiated settlement and would go to trial. 
According to Richard, Foley told him that it did not matter 
what Margaret actually agreed to, as Richard would regain 
ownership of the UAL policy after the divorce by 
operation of the "insurable interest" doctrine. Richard and 
Foley agreed that the policy would not be mentioned to 
Margaret as a matter of strategy. Richard contends, 
however, that the final language of the property settlement 
agreement was to award him the policy. 
Following the meeting with Foley, Richard wrote to 
Margaret on a number of occasions, but did not mention 
the policy. Finally, in response to a letter from Margaret 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho i68 (1994) 
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stating that she believed she owned the insurance policy, 
Richard stated in a letter on ] uly 22, 1990, "The insurance 
policy is as you interpreted it. You own it and you control 
it, no matter how obscene it is to hold a life insurance 
policy on someone else's husband ... Don't bother to 
respond on this issue, there is nothing you could say to 
make you look righteous." 
Richard and Margaret finally agreed on the wording of the 
settlement agreement drafted by Foley, which did not 
specifically mention the UAL policy. The agreement did, 
however, state: 
The following community assets and property are 
hereby awarded to husband free of any and all claims by 
wife as his sole, separate and absolute property: 
5. All United Airline retirement benefits and programs 
accruing to the Plaintiff prior to September 7, 1962 and 
likewise all such benefits following the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein. 
Following the entry of the decree, Richard tried to recover 
the policy. UAL, however, refused to recognize that the 
settlement agreement set aside the 1984 assignment. 
Richard, through Foley, filed a post-divorce motion under 
I. R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the provision set forth above 
established that he owned the policy. This motion was 
denied. Foley then filed, on behalf of Richard, an 
independent action against Margaret and UAL to get the 
policy returned to Richard. This suit, however, is not being 
presently prosecuted. 
Following Richard's unsuccessful attempts to get the 
policy back, he filed this malpractice action against Foley. 
Richard alleged that Foley's advice regarding the insurable 
interest doctrine and his drafting of the provision in the 
property settlement agreement **499 *171 were negligent. 
The district court granted summary judgment to Foley on 
the grounds that Richard and Foley were in pari delicto and 
that no reasonable jury could render Richard relief on his 
cause of action. The district court also found that if the 
claim against Foley were to go to trial, the measure of 
damages would be limited to economic losses directly 
attributable to, or connected with, the life insurance policy. 
Richard now appeals, claiming that the district court erred 
when it granted Foley's motion for summary judgment. 
For the reasons set forth below, we agree and therefore 
reverse the ruling ofthe district court. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
IIJ 12J We first note that summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 
56( c) is only proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free 
review in determining whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 
III Idaho 851, 852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986). 
131141 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it 
is not within the trial court's province to assess the 
credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can 
be tested in court before a trier of fact. LOWlY v. Ireland 
Bank, 116 Idaho 708,711,779 P.2d 22, 25 (Ct.App.1989). 
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all 
controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of 
the non-moving party. Furthermore, the trial court must 
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 
119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851. 854 (1991). 
B. 111 Pari Delicto 
151 The district court granted Foley'S summary judgment 
motion, finding that the parties were in pari delicto and 
that, based on the undisputed facts before the district court, 
no reasonable jury could grant Richard relief upon his 
cause of action. The district court incorporated into the 
written order the oral rulings made from the bench 
following the hearing on the motion. In that oral ruling the 
district court found that: 
In my view, what is unmistakably clear is 
Mr. Sohn was representing that his wife 
was going to get and keep this insurance 
policy. Or going to get to keep it. I guess 
she already had it. And that that is 
inconsistent with his contention now that 
he and Mr. Foley, through Mr. Foley's 
advice, were conspiring to deprive her of 
that item. I think that I can find that as an 
absolute matter of law, based upon the 
uncontested documents that are in the file 
and that have been submitted in terms of 
the correspondence and communications 
between Mr. Sohn and Mrs. Sohn. 
The district court found the parties in pari delicto by virtue 
of a "scheme" to defraud Margaret out of the policy. 
Although the defense of in pari delicto has been accepted 
in Idaho in various contexts, see Wilson v. Nielson, 75 
Idaho 145,269 P.2d 762 (1954), and has been successfully 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168 (1994) 
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used as a defense to an attorney malpractice claim in other 
jurisdictions, see, e.g, Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, 
P.e, 180 Mich.App. 768,447 N.W.2d 864 (1989), we 
hold that it was improperly applied in the context of a 
summary judgment in this case. 
In Richard's complaint against Foley, as well as 
throughout his deposition, Richard maintains that he 
believed the final property settlement agreement drafted by 
Foley would conclusively require the return of the policy 
to Richard, and that the document would make that transfer 
clear to Margaret. He asserts that, to his knowledge, the 
agreement adequately and properly provided for the return 
of the policy. Therefore, his pre-agreement posturing did 
not constitute fraud. In response, Foley contends that 
Richard understood the document and that the two omitted 
the policy from the settlement agreement because they felt 
it would be returned to Richard as a matter of law. Foley 
maintains that Richard intentionally misrepresented to 
Margaret what Richard believed to be the law, hoping to 
induce Margaret to sign **500 * 172 the agreement and 
then regaining the policy in spite of the agreement. 
The district court's determination, then, was essentially an 
assessment of the parties' credibility. It is not the district 
court's province to consider credibility when making a 
summary judgment determination. Lowry, supra. There 
remains a genuine question of material fact as to Richard's 
intent during the process of negotiations. If the trier of fact 
finds that it was Richard's intent to deprive his wife of the 
policy by misrepresentations and fraud, then the doctrine 
of in pari delicto may apply. If, on the other hand, the trier 
of fact finds that Richard's intent was merely to wait until 
the final draft of the agreement was presented to Margaret 
to bring up reassignment of the policy, then the doctrine 
would not apply. 
It is not the place of the trial judge to assess the credibility 
of the parties and then to rule based on that determination. 
The trier of fact should ultimately make the credibility 
determination taking into account all the evidence, 
including the various letters sent by Richard to Margaret. 
Therefore, it was error for the district court to grant the 
summary judgment based on the doctrine of in pari delicto. 
C. Summary Judgmellt Oil Damages 
161 As part of the summary judgment order, the district 
court also found that, "It is determined that Plaintiffs 
damages, if any, shall be limited to those economic losses 
directly attributable to or connected with the term life 
insurance policy in controversy herein." In its oral ruling 
on the motion, the district court stated: 
On the partial summary judgment on the question of 
damage I'm satisfied that a relitigation of Sohn versus 
Sohn is not the measure of damage that should be 
attributable in this case. I think it would be completely 
speculative, as a matter oflaw, to attempt to try to figure 
out what might have been the result had a settlement not 
been reached and had the matter gone to trial. I agree 
with the case cited by the defendant that this is just 
beyond the realm of what the law would countenance as 
proof of damage in a tort lawsuit. 
I would further observe that in my view, the plaintiffs 
contention in this area is fundamentally not credible as a 
matter of law and that no jury would accept the 
contention that ifhe did not get his way on this insurance 
that he'd-that it was a deal breaker and that he'd go to 
litigation wherever he might have to go to litigation, 
whether in Idaho, or Florida, or Costa Rica, or wherever. 
Again, as noted above, the credibility of the parties is not a 
proper consideration when deciding a motion for summary 
judgment. The district court found it unlikely, in its view, 
that Richard would have actually proceeded to trial had he 
thought he would not get the insurance policy. Although 
this may seem unlikely, it is nonetheless a question for the 
trier of fact at trial. What Richard might have done had 
Foley correctly advised him about the insurable interest 
doctrine or had Foley properly drafted the settlement 
agreement are questions of fact. Thus, at trial, the question 
of whether Richard would actually have proceeded to trial 
in the divorce case if Margaret refused to transfer the 
policy as a term of settlement is a question for the jury. If 
the jury responds affirmatively, it will then be necessary to 
determine the measure of damages, based on what Sohn 
should have recovered upon a trial in the divorce 
proceedings. 
[71 In a legal malpractice case based upon negligence in 
handling litigation for a claimant, the measure of direct 
damages is the difference between the client's actual 
recovery and the recovery which should have been 
obtained but for the attorney's malpractice. See, I 
RONALD E. MALLEN and JEFFREY M. SMITH, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 16.1 at 890 (3d ed. 1989); 
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977); 
Pickett, Houlon & Berman v. Haislip, 73 Md.App. 89, 533 
A.2d 287 (1987). Thus, the trier of fact in the malpractice 
action must decide what the outcome would have been in 
the previous case if the lawyer had performed properly, a 
process that has been described as a "suit within a suit." 
Chocktoot, 57 I P.2d at 1257. While presenting evidence of 
such damages in the present **501 *173 case may be 
difficult and complex, this measure of recovery is not 
inherently speCUlative so as to render the claimed damages 
unrecoverable as a matter oflaw. At trial, Richard will bear 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168 (1 
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the burden of proving the existence and amount of such 
damages with reasonable certainty. Fuller v. Wolters, 119 
Idaho 415, 422, 807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991); Moeller v. 
Harshbarger, 118 Idaho 92, 93, 794 P.2d 1148, 1149 
(Ct.App.l990); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 
915,919,643 P.2d 1085, 1089, (Ct.App.1982). Ifhe fails 
to meet this burden, recovery may be denied. It was 
improper, however, for the district court to grant partial 
summary judgment foreclosing any opportunity for such 
proof. Therefore, the district court also erred when it 
granted the motion for partial summary judgment limiting 
the damages to economic losses directly attributable to the 
life insurance policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Document 
The district court erred in granting the summary judgment 
based on its detennination that Richard's statements were 
not credible. The district court also erred when it granted 
the motion for summary judgment based on the speculative 
nature of the damages. We reverse the order granting 
summary judgment and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
WALTERS, c.J., and LANSING, J., concur. 
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Opinion 
**267 *683 SILAK, Justice. 
Appellant Ann Stansbury (Stansbury) sought relief under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U .S.c. § 
1210 I, et seq., and the Idaho Human Rights Act (lHRA), 
I.e. § 67-590 I, et seq. The district court entered summary 
judgment for respondent Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
Service, Inc. (Blue Cross), finding that Stansbury had 
failed to prove that, with or without reasonable 
accommodations for her disabilities, she was qualified for 
the employment position she held. We vacate and remand. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to July 8, 1991, Stansbury worked for Blue Cross of 
Oregon as a customer service representative. Stansbury 
interviewed with Blue Cross for a similar position, but was 
informed that no such positions were available. Instead 
Blue Cross offered Stansbury a position as a claims 
analyst. Stansbury accepted the position with an 
understanding that she could later apply for a transfer to 
customer service. 
Blue Cross had in place performance goals which it 
expected its employees to meet. Blue Cross used gradually 
escalating goals over a nine month period to raise its new 
employees' abilities to the level expected of fully trained 
claims examiners. One performance goal required the 
ability to process claims at a rate of at least 85% of the 
performance standards, with no more than a 3% payment 
error rate and no more than a 6% coding error rate. At the 
completion of her three month probationary period, 
Stansbury received a production rating of 50%, with a 
1.6% payment error rate and a 6% coding error rate. 
Stansbury'S supervisor informed her that she was 
"performing above what is expected" and she was given an 
overall performance rating of 96%. 
Shortly thereafter, Stansbury began to experience back and 
right arm and shoulder pains. In a discussion with her 
supervisor, Stansbury noted a similar experience at Blue 
Cross of Oregon. She stated that her previous employer 
had successfully alleviated her pains by providing her with 
an adjustable work-station designed by an ergonomist. 
Blue Cross took no action. 
After her probationary period, Stansbury became 
increasingly unable to meet the escalating production 
goals. At the conclusion of her nine month training period, 
Stansbury was processing claims at a rate of 47% of the 
performance standards, with a 4% payment error rate and a 
5% coding error rate. Nonetheless, she received an overall 
performance rating of 86%. Her supervisor noted that 
Stansbury tended to be easily distracted and inattentive. 
Her next evaluation noted a small improvement to a 55% 
production rating, with a 2.6°i6pa)'l11ent error rate and a 1% 
V. Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
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coding error rate. She received an overall performance 
rating of 88%, 
After working at Blue Cross for over a year, Stansbury 
requested a transfer to the customer service department. 
Blue Cross denied her request on the basis that new 
performance standards required an employee seeking a 
transfer to have at least a 95% overall performance rating. 
Since her production levels were still below expectations, 
Blue Cross instituted weekly meetings between Stansbury 
and her supervisor. Blue Cross hoped the weekly meetings 
would provide suggestions and continued training to help 
Stansbury raise her production ratings. Instead, Stansbury 
felt that no help was being given to her at these meetings, 
that they placed additional stress upon her, and that they 
caused her to experience severe depression. When 
Stansbury communicated the detrimental effect that she 
believed these meetings were having on her, they were 
moved from Fridays to Mondays. At these weekly 
meetings Stansbury repeatedly informed her supervisors 
that she was experiencing back and shoulder pains and 
requested an adjustable desk set up by an ergonomist. 
In late 1992, Stansbury experienced intestinal problems 
which required surgery. She took medical leave and 
returned to work a month later. After her return, Blue Cross 
conducted another performance evaluation. Stansbury's 
production rating was 56%, with a payment error rate of 
3.4% and coding **268 *684 error rate of 1.2%, for an 
overall performance rating of 87%. As a result, Blue Cross 
placed Stansbury on a sixty day probation. She was 
informed that the failure to achieve the established 
production goals by the end of the probationary period 
would result in termination of her employment. 
After being placed on probation, Stansbury received the 
adjustable desk she had requested. She informed her 
supervisors that her arm and shoulder felt better and her 
processing rate increased to 67%. Shortly thereafter 
Stansbury developed problems with her thumb which 
resulted in her production rate falling to 54%. Blue Cross 
refused her request for an ergonomist to help her set up her 
desk. Stansbury visited a hand specialist who diagnosed 
her with carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis, later 
determined to be radial tunnel syndrome. Stansbury 
informed her supervisors and filed a worker's 
compensation claim with the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
When the probationary period expired and Stansbury still 
had not met the established production goals, Blue Cross 
terminated her employment. 
Stansbury filed suit in district court alleging disability 
discrimination under IHRA and ADA, as well as age 
discrimination under IHRA and the federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U .S.c. § 62 I, et 
seq. Blue Cross moved for summary judgment. I In 
opposition, Stansbury submitted her own affidavit 
asserting that "I could have done the work for Blue Cross, 
if they had listened to me and provided the help I 
requested." Stansbury also submitted affidavits from her 
professional counselor and a consulting physician to the 
Department of Health and Welfare. These affidavits 
indicated that Stansbury was psychologically and 
physically disabled and that Blue Cross' failure to 
recognize and accommodate her impairments made it 
"difficult ifnot impossible to perform at the level expected 
at Blue Cross of Idaho." 
The district court granted Blue Cross' motion for summary 
judgment finding that all of Stansbury'S claims failed 
because she did not prove that she was qualified to perform 
the essential functions of the position. In light of her 
consistent failure to meet the production goals set by Blue 
Cross, the district court concluded that Stansbury had 
failed to show that, with or without reasonable 
accommodation for her disabilities, she would have been 
able to process claims at a rate of 85%. 
Stansbury appealed only as to her disability claims and did 
not raise on appeal her age discrimination claims. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in considering, 
analyzing, and deciding Stansbury's disability claim solely 
as a claim for intentional disability discrimination. 
2. Whether the court erred in determining, as a matter of 
law, that Stansbury had not presented an adequate claim of 
intentional disability discrimination. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
II] ]2] 13] Stansbury appeals the district court's entry of 
summary judgment against her. In such a case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court employs the same standard as that used by 
the trial court when ruling on the motion. Avila v, 
Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331,333 (1995). 
The Court construes the record in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences 
V. Biue Cross of !daho Health Service, Inc., 128 idaho 682 (1 
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and conclusions in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable 
people could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the record the motion must be 
denied. Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 1033, 
895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995). Summary judgment is only 
proper if, after reviewing the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, and affidavits, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the **269 *685 moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.e.P. 56(c). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Exists As To 
Whether With Reasonable Accommodation For Her 
Disabilities Stansbury Could Have Performed The 
Essential Functions Of The Position. 
14] ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified 
individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C § 12 I 12(a). 
Prohibited discrimination includes "not making reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability ... " 42 U.S.e. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Similarly, 
IHRA prohibits disability discrimination but "shall not 
apply if the particular disability, even with reasonable 
accommodation by the employer, prevents the 
performance of the work required by the employer in that 
job." I.e. § 67-5909. When this Court has not had 
occasion, as here, to determine the standards applicable to 
the adjudication of state claims patterned on federal law, 
this Court may look to that body of federal law for 
guidance. See, Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 8 I 1-12, 
606 P.2d 458, 46 I -62 (1979). 
151 For purposes of the summary judgment motion below 
and again on appeal, Blue Cross assumed Stansbury was 
"disabled" as defined under ADA. As a result, we must 
determine whether Stansbury has made a sufficient 
showing that she was a qualified individual with a 
disability to preclude summary judgment. A qualified 
individual with a disability is a disabled person "who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position .... " 42 
U.S.C § 121 I 1(8). Deference is given to the employer's 
determination as to the essential functions of the position. 
Jd; see also, 29 e.F.R.App. to Part 1630-lnterpretative 
Guidance On Title I of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act, pg. 406. Blue Cross insists that the key-punch tasks, 
specifically the ability to process claims at 85% of the 
performance standards, was an essential function of 
Stansbury'S position at Blue Cross. 
The district court found that all of Stansbury's claims 
failed because she did not demonstrate that with reasonable 
accommodation she could have performed the essential 
functions of her job and processed claims at a rate of 85%. 
We disagree and find that Stansbury has raised a sufficient 
factual dispute to survive Blue Cross' motion for summary 
judgment. While at Blue Cross, Stansbury requested 
several possible accommodations which she believed 
would have enabled her to meet the 85% production goal. 
Her affidavit shows that Blue Cross ignored several of her 
requests, including (I) the provision of an ergonomist to 
analyze her work area and ensure that it was set up in a 
manner which would alleviate her back and shoulder pains, 
(2) a discontinuance of the weekly meetings, and (3) a 
transfer to a customer service position.2 
In her affidavit, Stansbury asserts that "I could have done 
the work for Blue Cross, if they had listened to me and 
provided the help that I requested." This assertion is 
reinforced by the affidavit of Charles D. Steuart who found 
that "without recognition of [her 1 impairments and job 
structuring taking the impairments into account, she would 
not have been able to function adequately" at Blue Cross. 
The affidavit of the counselor Joetta Fulgenzi also states 
that without recognition of her chronic depression, 
Stansbury "would have found it difficult ifnot impossible 
to perform at the level expected by Blue Cross of Idaho." 
Taking all of Stansbury's assertions to be true, we find that 
she has raised sufficient facts from which reasonable 
people could conclude that had Blue Cross provided the 
requested accommodations she would have **270 *686 
been able to meet the production quotas. In light of this 
factual dispute, we vacate the district court's entry of 
summary judgment against her. 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary 
Judgment on Stansbury's Intentional Discrimination 
Claim. 
]6]ln addition to her claim for failure to make reasonable 
accommodation, Stansbury also alleged an intentional 
discrimination based on disability claim. Blue Cross 
insisted that it fired Stansbury for a purely 
nondiscriminatory reason, i.e., her failure to meet the 
production standards. Stansbury asserted this basis for 
termination was pretextual. However, the district court did 
not reach this issue as it found that Stansbury failed to 
demonstrate that she was qualified to do her job, an 
essential element of both disability claims. 
]71 Both IHRA and ADA prohibit the discharge of a 
qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that 
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individual's disability. I.e. § 67-5909(1), 42 U.S.c. § 
12112(a). In Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th 
CiLI990), the Ninth Circuit noted that where a plaintiff 
alleges intentional disability discrimination and the 
defendant disavows any reliance on the disability in 
making the employment decision, the analytical 
framework of Title VII cases should be employed. ld. at 
1339. To establish unlawful discrimination based on 
disability Stansbury must prove that she (I) was disabled 
within the meaning of the statute, (2) was qualified, that is, 
was able to perform the essential functions of the job, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) was 
discharged because of her disability. See, e.g., Tyndall v. 
National Educ. Centers, Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 
212 (4th Cir.1994); White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 
357,360-61 (10th Cir. 1995). 
For the purposes of summary judgment, Blue Cross 
conceded that Stansbury was disabled within the meaning 
of the relevant statutes. The fact that Stansbury was 
discharged and replaced by a non-disabled person is also 
not in controversy. Because we conclude that a factual 
dispute exists as to whether Stansbury was qualified for the 
position, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on the 
intentional discrimination claim. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
IHRA and ADA seek to provide qualified disabled 
individuals with the same employment opportunities that 
are available to persons without disabilities. To that end, an 
employer is required to provide reasonable 
accommodations to a disabled employee which would 
enable that employee to perform the essential functions of 
his or her position. Stansbury has raised a sufficient factual 
issue concerning whether she could have met the 85% 
production rating had Blue Cross provided her with the 
accommodations she requested. 
Because we find that Stansbury has raised a sufficient 
factual dispute concerning whether she was qualified for 
the position at Blue Cross, we vacate the district court's 
entry of summary judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Costs on appeal to Stansbury. 
McDEVITT, c.1., and JOHNSON and TROUT, J1., 
concur. 
SCHROEDER, Justice dissenting. 
The district court found that Stansbury'S claims failed 
because she did not demonstrate that with reasonable 
accommodation she could have performed the essential 
functions of her job and processed claims at a rate of 85 
percent. This Court reverses the district court's decision, 
citing several bases. 
First, Stansbury asserts that Blue Cross ignored her request 
to provide an ergonomist to analyze her work area and 
ensure that it was set up in a manner which would alleviate 
her back and shoulder pains. Under the circumstances of 
this case that is a bare assertion that should be given no 
weight. In fact, Blue Cross had provided an ergonomist for 
Stansbury when she was employed in Oregon. Any 
accommodation that might have been made was within her 
knowledge, but she failed to set forth any facts establishing 
what such an accommodation might be. If a reasonable 
accommodation were possible, Stansbury knew what it 
was and should have told the district court, rather than 
simply **271 *687 making a conclusory assertion that an 
ergonomist should have been provided. 
The second ground upon which the Court relies is the 
failure of Blue Cross to discontinue weekly meetings with 
Stansbury. The record does establish that Blue Cross had 
changed the date of the weekly meetings to accommodate 
Stansbury'S concerns. In essence Stansbury says that she 
should not have been supervised. This Court should not 
impose such a burden upon an employer. 
The third basis for the Court's decision is that Blue Cross 
failed to transfer Stansbury to a customer service position. 
That would not be an accommodation. That would be a 
requirement that an employer hire a person for a job 
different from what that person was initially hired to do. 
The affidavits of the doctor and the counselor that are cited 
provide no basis to determine what reasonable 
accommodations could have been made. The assertions in 
these affidavits are simply too vague to provide guidance 
as to what Blue Cross failed to do that it could have done. 
The district court correctly analyzed the issue as follows: 
The ability to process claims at a rate of at least 85% of her 
performance standard was an essential function of Ann 
Stansbury'S job. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F.Supp. 
783, 788 n. 4 (W.D.Okla.1993) (ADA does not require an 
employer to modify the actual duties of a job in order to 
accommodate an individual who is not physically capable 
of performing those duties). Unfortunately, the plaintiff 
was not able to meet the performance standard required for 
Stansbury v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Service, Inc., 128 Idaho 682 (1996) 
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her job. 
The law also requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations so that an employee with a disability can 
perform the essential functions of her position. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that, other than 
requiring her employer to lower its performance 
standards-which is not required, the plaintiff would have 
been able to perform the essential functions of her position 
even with reasonable accommodation by Blue Cross. The 
plaintiff has failed to show that with a reasonable 
accommodation she was qualified to do her job, an 
essential element of her disability discrimination claim. 
C./, Lutter v. Fowler, I A.D. Cases 861, 864, 1986 WL 
13138 (D.D.C.J986) (granting summary judgment in favor 
of employer in Rehabilitation Act case where, assuming 
that employee in fact had a mental handicap, employee had 
failed to present any evidence that he would have been able 
to perform the essential functions of his job with a 
reasonable accommodation). 
Footnotes 
The plaintiff has failed to establish that, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, she was qualified to do her 
job, an element essential to her disability discrimination 
claim on which she would bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Because this is a key element, the claim fails. 
Conclusory and speculative assertions should not be 
sufficient to deny a motion for summary judgment that has 
been supported by specific allegations of fact. There is no 
showing of facts by Stansbury of what a reasonable 
accommodation would have been that would have allowed 
her to perform the job she was hired to do. The district 
court decision should be affirmed. 
Parallel Citations 
918 P.2d 266,17 A.D.D. 307, 8 NDLR P 105 
For purposes of its summary judgment motion below and on appeal, Blue Cross assumed that as a rcsult of her physical disability, but 
not her allegcd mental disability, Stansbury was '"disabled" as defined under ADA. 
2 We note that all of these appear to bc potential accommodations according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 
guidelines, "reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to ... job rcstructuring; part-time or modified work schedulcs: 
reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or deviccs .... " 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(0 )(2)(ii). 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington; Edward F. Shea, District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-05064-EFS. 
Before: LA Y,*FERGUSON, and GOULD, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge. 
The issue in this case is: what showing of pretext must a 
plaintiff in a retaliation suit make in order to overcome a 
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defendant's motion for summary judgment, where the 
defendant has alleged legitimate reasons for the plaintiffs 
termination. Appellant Lynda Stegall ("Stegall") appeals 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington 
("District Court")' s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Marathon Media, L.P. ("Marathon"), which 
foreclosed a jury trial on Stegall's retaliation claim under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Washington Law Against Discrimination ("WLAD"). The 
District Court held that, although Stegall established a 
prima facie claim of retaliatory discharge against 
Marathon, she was unable to demonstrate that Marathon's 
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a 
pretext for retaliation. Stegall alleges that she was fired 
from KORD, a country music radio station, in retaliation 
for making complaints about gender discrimination and 
wage disparities between male and female employees at 
*1063 KORD. Because Stegall raises a triable claim with 
respect to her retaliation claim, we reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Marathon. 
I BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
Lynda Stegall was employed by Citadel Broadcasting 
Company ("Citadel") as an on-air personality at KORD, a 
country music station that played recent country music 
hits, I since 1993. Beginning in 1997 or 1998, Stegall began 
to make complaints to her managers at Citadel that her 
male on-air personality co-host was sexually 
propositioning her and using sexually suggestive language 
on and off the air. She also complained that she was being 
paid less than her male counterparts and requested a raise. 
Allegedly, Citadel management did not adequately address 
her complaints. 
Stegall's problems with KORD escalated in October 1998 
when Stegall took time off from work because she fell ill 
from the stress and anxiety she was experiencing as a result 
of KORD's gender discrimination, and because her 
managers were being unresponsive to her grievances. 
When she returned to work, Stegall averred that Curt 
Cartier ("Cartier") who, at the time, was employed as the 
program director for another one of Citadel's radio 
stations, exhibited a great deal of hostility toward her. 
Stegall stated in her deposition that prior to her two week 
leave of absence, she and Cartier had been friends. Stegall 
had previously spoken with Cartier, as well as other station 
employees, on various occasions, about her complaints of 
gender discrimination at KORD. However, Stegall noted 
that upon her return, Cartier refused to speak with her. 
Stegall believed that Cartier was upset because she had 
walked out of KORD to protest the unequal treatment that 
she was receiving, and because she was given a raise in 
salary as a result. 
In addition, Cartier allegedly told other station employees 
that he was angry at Stegall for getting what she wanted 
and had only been able to do so because she was a woman. 
On two occasions after coming back to work, Stegall 
alleges that Cartier yelled at her and denigrated her based 
on her gender, calling her names such as "slut," "bitch," 
and "whore," in the course of arguments that were 
seemingly about unrelated station matters. 
On November 9, 1999, Marathon Broadcasting 
("Marathon") purchased five Pasco, Washington radio 
stations from Citadel, including KORD. After taking over 
KORD, Marathon initially retained most KORD 
employees, a decision that was necessary to ensure 
continual, uninterrupted broadcasting.2 Upon Marathon's 
purchase of Citadel's stations, Eric Van Winkle ("Van 
Winkle") became the new general manager ("GM"), 
responsible for supervising KORD and the four other 
stations that Marathon acquired from Citadel. Prior to 
assuming the GM position with Marathon, Van Winkle 
worked in the central sales department for the five Pasco, 
Washington radio stations when they were owned by 
Citadel. Shortly after Van Winkle's promotion, he hired 
Paul Drake and Curt Cartier to serve as co-program 
directors of KORD under Marathon. Drake and Cartier 
previously *1064 held positions as program directors for 
other radio stations in the Pasco cluster. As program 
directors, Drake and Catiier were responsible for the 
content and presentation of KORD. 
Due to the change in management and the impending 
station changes that it was bound to bring, Stegall inquired 
with Marathon about the security of her employment at 
KORD on several occasions before she was terminated. 
Shortly after Van Winkle became manager and Drake 
became co-program director, Stegall stopped by their 
individual offices to ask whether her job was secure. Both 
responded affirmatively. 
In early December 1999, Stegall and Drake, now her direct 
supervisor at KORD, had a "get to know you" meeting 
during which Stegall relayed to Drake the complaints of 
gender discrimination that she had made to Citadel's 
managers in the past, and the problems she had been 
having with Citadel up until Marathon's purchase of 
KORD. Stegall stated in her deposition that she brought 
Drake up to speed about her prior concerns, and expressed 
a desire to see Marathon conduct things differently and 
remedy the gender inequities. Stegall noted that Drake did 
not speak much during this meeting and, as a result, she felt 
very uncomfortable. 
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Nine days after Stegall complained to Drake, on December 
15, 1999, Marathon fired Stegall and one other female 
employee, Kristin Crume. Stegall was told during a 
meeting with Van Winkle, Drake and Cartier that they 
were planning changes for KORD which did not include 
her and, as a result, she was being terminated. At this time, 
Stegall inquired if anything she had done brought on the 
decision to fire her, and she was explicitly told that it had 
not. Rather, the decision, she was told, was solely about the 
future of KORD. 
Similarly, when Stegall later applied for unemployment 
benefits, Marathon informed the state Employment 
Security Department that a business decision based on 
changing the programing and formatting was responsible 
for Stegall's termination, and that nothing she had done 
caused the discharge. However, after the commencement 
of this litigation, Van Winkle and Drake stated in their 
depositions that Stegall was fired in part because they were 
not satisfied with her overall attitude during the brief 
period oftime3 she was employed by Marathon. 
After Stegall's termination, Marathon began making 
changes to KORD. KORD was switched from 
station-selected music to a computerized music service; 
Marathon brought in Leah Knight, a syndicated host from 
Seattle; changed each of the shows and did on-air 
promotions about the format changes; stressed a different 
"brand" of country music;4 removed all of the daily on-air 
personalities; and replaced seven announcers on five shifts 
including every morning show host. The only former daily 
on-air personality who remained at KORD after the broad 
station change was Ed Dailey, who was removed from 
daily duties and given a four-hour Sunday morning 
"oldies" show. However, Stegall and one other woman5 
were the only employees *1065 who were fired from 
KORD and not re-assigned to another station within the 
Pasco cluster.6 
B. Procedural history 
On August 2, 2000, Stegall filed this litigation against 
Citadel and Marathon, alleging gender discrimination, 
sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of both Title 
VII and WLAD. On Decem ber 19, 2001, Stegall stipulated 
to the dismissal of all claims of sexual harassment and 
retaliation against Citadel, and stipulated to the dismissal 
of all claims of sexual harassment against Marathon. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to Marathon on 
Stegall's Title VII and WLAD claims of illegal retaliation, 
finding that Stegall was unable to demonstrate that 
Marathon's legitimate reasons for terminating her were 
pretextual. Because Stegall has proffered a substantial 
amount of specific circumstantial evidence that 
Marathon's reasons for terminating her were motivated by 
retaliation, we reverse the District Court's decision. 
II STANDARD OF REVIEW 
II] We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.c. § 1291 (2000). The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Marathon, finding that, although 
Stegall made a prima facie showing of retaliation, she 
could not rebut the legitimate reasons put forth by 
Marathon for terminating her. "We review the district 
court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo." 
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (9th 
Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Stegall, we must determine whether 
any genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether the 
district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. 
Id. at 1220. In doing so, "[t]he evidence of the 
[nonmoving] party is to be believed, and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before 
the court must be drawn in the light most favorable 
to[her]." Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th 
Cir.1991). 
III DISCUSSION 
]2] Stegall contends that she was illegally terminated in 
retaliation for making wage discrimination complaints to 
Marathon that she believed to be the result of gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the WLAD. 
Because Washington courts look to federal law when 
analyzing retaliation claims, we consider Stegall's 
Washington state law claim and federal claim together. See 
Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 30 I F.3d 958, 969 
(9th Cir.2002); Graves v. Dep'l of Game, 76 Wash.App. 
705,887 P.2d 424, 428 (1994). 
A. Primajacie case of retaliation 
]3] Stegall alleges that Marathon terminated her 
employment in retaliation for complaining to Marathon of 
a disparity in pay and bonuses between herself and her 
male counterparts. Under § 704 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
[Title VII]." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3 (2000). To make out a 
primafacie case of retaliation under Title VII, Stegall must 
demonstrate that "( 1) she engaged in a protected activity, 
(2) she *1066 suffered an adverse employment action, and 
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(3) there was a causal link between her activity and the 
employment decision." Raad V. Fairbanks North Slar 
Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1 185, 1196-97 (9th 
Cir.2003). If Stegall is able to assert a prima facie 
retaliation claim, the "burden shifting" scheme articulated 
in McDonnell Douglas COJp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies. See Villiarimo 
V. Aloha Island Air, [nc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th 
Cir.2002). 
141 Under McDonnell Douglas, once Stegall makes out a 
prima facie case of retaliation, "the burden shifts to 
[Marathon] to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action." Manatt V. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.2003). If 
Marathon articulates such a reason, Stegall "bears the 
ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was 
merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive." ld. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
B. Pretext 
151 Stegall has two avenues available for showing that 
Marathon's legitimate explanation for firing her is actually 
a pretext for retaliation. The first is by "directly persuading 
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer[,] or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) 
(citation omitted). 
161171 As in all civil cases, Stegall can prosecute her case 
using either direct or circumstantial evidence tending to 
prove that Marathon terminated her employment in 
retaliation for making complaints of gender discrimination. 
" 'Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves 
the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or 
presumption.'" Godwin V. Hunt Wesson, [nc., 150 F.3d at 
122 I (quoting Davis V. Chevron, USA., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 
1085 (5th Cir.1994». "When the plaintiff offers direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the 
actual motivation of the employer is created even if the 
evidence is not substantial." Id. In contrast, when direct 
evidence is unavailable, the Godwin court noted, and the 
plaintiff proffers only circumstantial evidence that the 
employer's motives were different from its stated motives, 
we require "specific" and "substantial" evidence of pretext 
to survive summary judgment. Id. at 1222. 
Although we note that the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Desert Palace, Inc. V. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 
2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (U.S.2003), may undermine Godwin 
to the extent that it implies that direct evidence is more 
probative than circumstantial evidence, we agree with the 
Godwin court that Stegall must proffer "specific" and 
"substantial" evidence of pretext to overcome Marathon's 
summary judgment motion. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 801 
("Because Manatt failed to introduce any direct or specific 
and substantial circumstantial evidence of pretext, 
summary judgment forthe [employer] must be affinned."); 
Brown V. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181,1188 (9th 
Cir.2003); Bradley V. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 
267, 270(9th Cir.1996) ("To avoid summary judgment, 
Bradley must do more than establish a primafacie case and 
deny the credibility of the [defendant's] witnesses. She 
must produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext.") 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Desert Palace 
affirmed the value and import of circumstantial evidence in 
all cases. In the course of affirming a decision of our * 1 067 
circuit sitting en banc that, "[i]n order to obtain an 
instruction under § 2000e-2(m) [of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act], a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice [,r " 
123 S.Ct. at 2155, the Court stressed "the utility of 
circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases." Id. at 
2154. The Court stated that "[t]he reason for treating 
circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and 
deep-rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only 
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and 
persuasive than direct evidence.' " I d. (quoting Rogers V. 
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17, 77 S.Ct. 
443, I L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)). 
Moreover, the Court also recognized the critical role that 
circumstantial evidence plays even in criminal cases: "The 
adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond 
civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal 
conviction, even though proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is required." Id. Finally, the Court noted that "juries are 
routinely instructed that 'the law makes no distinction 
between the weight or value to be given to either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.' " I d. (quoting I A K. 0 'Malley, J. 
Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
Criminal § 12.04(5th ed.2000)). Accordingly, we refuse to 
make such a distinction in Stegall's case. 
C. "Single motive" versus "mixed motive" cases 
Further complicating the inquiry in a Title VII case is the 
varying terminology that courts routinely utilize. As we 
explained in Costa V. Desert Palace, [nc., 299 FJd 838 
(9th Cir.2002) (en banc), courts often categorize cases as 
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either "mixed motive" or "single motive" (sometimes also 
termed "pretext" cases). The distinction between the two 
types of cases is as follows: 
"In [single-motive] cases, 'the issue is whether either 
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' 
motives behind the decision.' In mixed-motive cases, 
however, there is no one 'true' motive behind the 
decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple 
factors, at least one of which is legitimate." 
ld. at 856(citing Price Waterhouse V. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228,260,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989». The 
significance of the distinction between "single motive" and 
"mixed motive" is most often seen towards the end of a 
trial when the district court must instruct the jury. 
18) In mixed motive cases, of which Stegall's case is 
arguably one, it does not make sense to ask if the 
employer's stated reason for terminating an employee is a 
pretext for retaliation, when the employer has offered more 
than one reason for the action that it took. Rather, the 
relevant inquiry in a "mixed motive" case is distinct from 
that of a "single motive" or pretext case. We articulated the 
proper framework in our en banc opinion Costa V. Desert 
Palace: 
[I]n cases in which the evidence could 
support a finding that discrimination is 
one of two or more reasons for the 
challenged decision, at least one of which 
may be legitimate, the jury should be 
instructed to determine first whether the 
discriminatory reason was "a motivating 
factor" in the challenged action. If the 
jury's answer to this question is in the 
affirmative, then the employer has 
violated Title VII. 
299 F.3d at 856-57. 
Similarly, our opinion in Sischo-Nownejad V. Merced 
Community College District summarizes the test as 
follows: 
*1068 The analysis in a case involving mixed motives is 
somewhat different. The Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)] 
plurality found the [Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 
v.] Burdine, [450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 
207 (1981 ),] formula unsuitable for mixed motive 
cases .... Instead, it adopted a simpler approach. Under 
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff must show that it is more 
likely than not that a protected characteristic "played a 
motivating part in [the] employment decision." Once 
that is done, the employer may escape liability only by 
proving by way of an affirmative defense that the 
employment decision would have been the same even if 
the characteristic had played no role. 
934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.199l ) (citations omitted). 
In the end, the inquiry is straightforward: "[p]ut simply, the 
plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation 
through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or 
circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played 'a 
motivating factor.' " Costa, 299 F.3d at 853-54. Even at 
summary judgment, it is important not to lose sight of the 
ultimate question that will be before the court, should the 
plaintiff survive summary judgment. See Costa, 299 F.3d 
at 857("The employee's ultimate burden of proof in all 
cases remains the same: to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the challenged employment decision was 
'because or discrimination [or, in this case, retaliation]."). 
With these general principles of law in mind, we now turn 
to the merits of Stegall's retaliation claim. We analyze 
Stegall's case as both a pretext case and a mixed motives 
case, and find that her case survives summary judgment 
under either theory. 
D. Stegall's retaliation claim 
191 The District Court found, and Marathon concedes, that 
Stegall established a prima facie case of retaliation. 
Therefore, we embark upon our analysis of Stegall's 
retaliation claim by examining Marathon's stated reasons 
for terminating her employment. Marathon has offered two 
reasons to justify its firing of Stegall. At the time it 
terminated her, Marathon's management stated that it was 
due to changes that were being made to KORD overall. 
This was consistent with what Marathon told the state 
Employment Security Department in response to its 
inquiry about Stegall's application for benefits. However, 
after Stegall commenced this lawsuit, Marathon's 
managers also stated that she was terminated because she 
had a negative attitude about her job. These are legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for Marathon'S termination of 
Stegall. Therefore, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden 
now shifts to Stegall to put forth evidence that Marathon's 
reasons are pretextual. ,~/anatt, 339 FJd at 800. 
Stegall offers myriad circumstantial evidence to show that 
Marathon's explanations for her termination are pretextual. 
Under Burdine, Stegall can show pretext in two ways: 
either "directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer 
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of 
Cmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. 
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Stegall's circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact because it demonstrates that 
an illegitimate reason more likely motivated Marathon, or 
was at least a motivating factor in her dismissal. 
Furthermore, Stegall has raised a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Marathon's second reason *1069 for 
firing her, her allegedly negative attitude, is unworthy of 
credence. 
While it is true that Stegall must "produce evidence in 
addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie 
case in order to rebut [Marathon),s showing [,J" Godwin, 
150 F.3d at 1220, it is improper to ignore the evidence in 
support ofStegall'sprimafacie case. See Lowe, 775 F.2d 
at 1008. Thus, the District Court erred by examining each 
piece of Stegall's evidence in isolation, and failing to 
consider the timing of Stegall's termination in its pretext 
analysis. 
1. The timing of Stegall's termination 
Stegall argues that the timing of her termination, which 
occurred nine days after her discrimination complaints, 
supports her claim that Marathon's explanations were 
pretextuaL We recently reaffirmed that the timing of 
adverse employment action can provide strong evidence of 
retaliation. "Temporal proximity between protected 
activity and an adverse employment action can by itself 
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation 
in some cases." Be!! v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 
865 (9th Cir.2003) (finding sufficient evidence to support 
retaliation claim where low performance reviews 
immediately followed plaintiffs complaints). Although 
we have refused to infer causation from timing alone 
where the gap between plaintiffs protected activity and the 
adverse employment action extended to 18 months, 
Villiarimo v. Aloha island Air, inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 
(9th Cir.2002), we have found timing highly probative 
even when the period between the employee's complaints 
and adverse action far exceeded the time interval in 
Stegall's case. See, e.g., Yart?ojJ V. Thomas, 809 F.2d 
1371,1376 (9th Cir.1987). 
Here, a mere nine days lapsed between Stegall's 
complaints of discrimination to her new manager, Paul 
Drake, and 16933 her termination. Although Marathon 
disputes that Stegall actually informed Drake of her 
complaints, Stegall asserts that she did so, and we must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. See 
Godwin, ISO F.3d at 1220. In addition, both Marathon and 
Stegall admit that many station employees were aware of 
Stegall's complaints, and gender discrimination was one of 
them. Stegall had made it known throughout the station 
over the course of her employment with KORD that she 
resented her lower pay because she believed it was due to 
her gender. It is clear that Stegall presented credible 
evidence that she had a discussion with Drake, her new 
manager, about discriminatory gender pay. Still, setting 
aside the implausibility of Marathon's contentions that 
Drake was unaware of Stegall's complaints of gender 
discrimination, we must resolve issues of credibility in 
favor of the non-moving party. See Su?uki Motor Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of us., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1132 (9th 
Cir.2003) ("we 'must draw all justifiable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of 
credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular 
evidence.' ") (quoting Masson V. New Yorker Magazine, 
inc., SOl U.S. 496, 520, III S.Ct. 2419, lIS L.Ed.2d 447 
(1991)). 
Marathon attempts to explain the timing of Stegall's 
termination by noting that it coincided with the other 
station wide changes. However, in almost the same breath, 
Marathon asserts that KORD's change phase continued a 
year and a half after Stegall's termination, when they 
offered the termination of another employee, Gary 
Mitchell, to counter Stegall's contention that she and 
another female employee were the only people terminated 
from KORD. Marathon cannot have it both ways. 
*1070 The brief period of time that Marathon supervised 
Stegall before terminating her, merely 24 days, also 
undermines Marathon's assertion that it terminated her 
because she had a negative attitude and was not a team 
player. Although both sides vigorously dispute this issue, it 
nevertheless casts doubt on Marathon's ability to fairly 
assess Stegall's performance and attitude accurately, thus 
strengthening Stegall's contention that illegitimate 
considerations informed Marathon's decision. 
2. Stegall's relationship with Cartier 
Although timing, standing alone, may be insufficient to 
raise a genuine issue with respect to pretext, we do not 
need to rely solely on timing in this case because there 
exists substantially more. Of significance is Stegall's 
evidence of her tumultuous relationship with Cartier and 
his subsequent role in Stegall's termination. Although 
Marathon disputes that Cartier was aware of Stegall's prior 
complaints of gender discrimination to Citadel, the record 
is otherwise. Stegall alleged and offered deposition 
testimony that not only did she personally tell Cartier of 
her complaints of gender discrimination, but also that 
Cartier markedly changed after Stegall took two weeks off 
of work to protest the inequities at KORD. 
Upon her return to work, Cartier's relations with Stegall 
took a tum for the worse. Stegall asserts that, although they 
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were friends before she took time off, he refused to speak 
with her at all when she came back to work. Stegall 
attempted to discuss her walk out with Cartier, but he 
refused to hear her out. During an argument shortly after 
her return to work, he denigrated her based on her gender 
(calling her a "slut," "bitch," and "whore"). 
Furthermore, Marathon admits that during discussions 
amongst its management, which included Cartier, about 
the station's re-structuring, Cartier was "adamant" that 
Stegall be terminated, despite her positive traits.7 Cartier's 
insistence that Stegall and Kristin Crume, another 
employee who also complained of gender discrimination, 
be fired was attested to by Drake, Cartier's co-program 
director. Moreover, both Van Winkle and Drake assured 
Stegall shortly before she was terminated that her job was 
secure, giving rise to the inference that Cartier's input may 
have been determinative of Marathon's decision to fire 
Stegall. 
Stegall was not alone in her observations of Cartier's 
animosity towards her. Tamara Peterson, a former KORD 
employee, testified in her deposition that Cartier told her 
that he was angered by Stegall's leave of absence and 
subsequent return to work.8 According to Peterson, Cartier 
called Stegall "a spoiled brat" and resented the fact that she 
had walked out, yet was nonetheless allowed to return to 
work. Furthermore, Kristin Crume testified in her 
deposition that Cartier stated, shortly after learning of 
Marathon's purchase of KORD, that he would not be 
surprised *1071 "when the new company comes in that 
Lynda [Stegall)'s ass would be blown out of the water." 
Although not yet a manager at the time he made the 
comment to Crume, the evidence thus far demonstrates 
that it is probable Cartier decided to do just that once he 
became Stegall's manager, because of ill will that he 
harbored against Stegall due to her complaints. See 
Winarto V. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 
1276, 1286 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that defendant's 
"exasperation, lack of sympathy, and even animosity 
towards [the plaintiff]" provided additional support for the 
jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff). 
Add to Cartier'S animosity circumstantial evidence that 
Drake was also not supportive of Stegall's facts of gender 
discrimination,9 and there can be no other outcome than to 
allow this case to go to a jury. 
3. The station overhaul and Stegall's "negative 
attitude" 
Marathon asserts that it fired Stegall due to its overhaul of 
KORD. However, Marathon distorts and exaggerates the 
extent of the overhaul. While Marathon asserts that all 
employees were removed, this is simply not true. Most 
employees either left of their own accord or were 
re-assigned to another position at KORD, or at another one 
of the Pasco cluster stations. Only Stegall and Crume were 
expressly terminated. In short, the only employees 
terminated by KORD were the two women who had 
complained of gender discrimination. 
Moreover, Marathon elaborated on the station overhaul by 
adding Stegall's negative attitude as a further reason she 
was terminated. Although Marathon did not offer this 
reason until after the start of litigation, it has now gone to 
great lengths to find evidentiary support that Stegall was a 
problem employee. However, cutting against Marathon are 
its assurances to Stegall that her job was secure, shortly 
before her termination. Although Marathon attempts to 
explain its assurances to Stegall, by arguing that it did so 
out of necessity to ensure Stegall's radio broadcasts would 
be free of bias, we reiterate that it is not within our 
province to delve into these factual disputes; rather, we 
leave them for the trier of fact. We note, however, that this 
does not explain why Marathon continued to tell the 
Employment Security Department that Stegall was not at 
fault for the termination, even after she was no longer on 
the airwaves. 
Finally, although Stegall does not expressly designate her 
case a "mixed motives" case, both her brief and the record 
reveal that it can be construed as one. Indeed, a plaintiff 
need not decide what kind of a case she is bringing at the 
outset. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 
S.Ct. 1775 ("Nothing in this opinion should be taken to 
suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as either a 
"pretext" case or a "mixed-motives" case from the 
beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that 
plaintiffs will often allege, in the alternative, that their 
cases are both .... At some point in the proceedings, of 
course, the District Court must decide whether a particular 
case involves mixed motives."). Accordingly, it is 
common to have an employer's reasons for terminating an 
employee fleshed out during the course of litigation. See, 
e.g., Lindahl V. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.1991) 
(Noting that "[s]imply because an explanation comes after 
the beginning of litigation does not make it inherently 
*1072 incredible[,J" but finding on the facts of the case 
before it that the employer's differing reasons suggested 
the later reason was fabricated.). 
Since it is uncontroverted that Marathon has offered two 
reasons for firing Stegall, yet we hold that the record in this 
case would support a finding that Marathon had 
illegitimate motives, it is logical to examine the case as one 
involving "mixed motives." See Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775. The timing of Stegall's 
termination, the evidence of Stegall's problems with 
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Cartier, and a probe of the station's proffered reasons for 
terminating Stegall reveal that her protected activity was 
most likely "a motivating factor" in her termination. See 
Costa, 299 FJd at 853-54. At the very least, Stegall has 
raised a triable issue about Marathon's motivations. Stegall 
has also made the requisite showing that Marathon's 
legitimate reasons for terminating her were pretextual, 
because she has persuaded us that "a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated [Marathon)." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Thus, Stegall is entitled to a trial on 
this basis as well. 
Analyzed as either a straightforward "pretext" case or a 
mixed motives case, the record reveals that it is probable 
that Stegall's protected activity motivated, at least in part, 
Marathon's decision to terminate her. Whether or not one 
accepts one or both of Marathon's explanations for 
terminating Stegall, one cannot ignore the evidence, albeit 
circumstantial, that Cartier, who resented Stegall for 
complaining of gender discrimination, played a significant 
role in her termination, thus raising a genuine issue of 
material fact about whether Stegall's termination was in 
fact retaliatory. 
Lastly, our decision comes after careful scrutiny of the 
record and in due regard of the history of discrimination 
against women in the workplace. Throughout the record, 
both Marathon and Citadel management repeatedly echoed 
the all too familiar complaints about assertive, strong 
women who speak up for themselves: "difficult," 
"negative attitude," "not a team player," "problematic." 
The district courts must reject such sexual stereotypes and 
learn to identify the oft employed rhetoric that could reveal 
illegitimate motives. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The record in this case raises a triable issue as to whether 
Stegall's termination was influenced by improper motives 
on the part of Marathon. The standard is relatively low: 
[I]n evaluating whether the defendant's 
articulated reason is pretextual, the trier 
of fact must, at a minimum, consider the 
same evidence that the plaintiff 
introduced to establish her prima facie 
case. When that evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, consists of more than the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption, a 
factual question will almost always exist 
with respect to any claim of a 
nondiscriminatory reason. The existence 
of this question of material fact will 
ordinarily preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. 
Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at IIII (citations omitted). 
Moreover, "[w]e require very little evidence to survive 
summary judgment precisely because the ultimate question 
is one that can only be resolved through a 'searching 
inquiry' -one that is most appropriately conducted by a 
factfinder, upon a full record." Jd. We have often stated 
that, because motivations are difficult to ascertain, such an 
inquiry should be left to the trier offact: "[A]n employer's 
true motive in an employment decision is rarely easy to 
discern. As we have previously noted, '[w]ithout a 
searching inquiry into *1073 these motives, those [acting 
for impermissible motives] could easily mask their 
behavior behind a complex web of post hoc 
rationalizations .... ' " Jd. (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
Our opinion seeks only to allow Stegall the opportunity to 
prove Marathon's motivations for terminating her. 
Because Stegall has marshaled specific and substantial 
evidence of improper motives on the part of Marathon, we 
REVERSE the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Marathon, and REMAND for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
A summary judgment rejected plaintiff's employment 
retaliation claim, and we decide if trial is needed to 
determine whether the termination of an employee who 
was an on-air personality at a radio station, as part of a 
format change and overhaul of the radio station, was in 
reality a pretext for retaliation for her prior complaint 
about asserted gender-based wage discrimination at the 
radio station. I conclude that no genuine issue of fact is 
presented on pretext in the context of the station's 
undisputably broad changes of on-air personalities after a 
new owner took control after an acquisition. 
Marathon Media, L.P. ("Marathon"), defendant-appellee, 
acquired a group of radio stations and promptly thereafter 
changed the format of the flagship radio station that it 
acquired, KORD, from modem country music to more 
traditional country music. Lynda Stegall, 
plaintiff-appellant, an on-air personality at KORD before 
the Marathon acquisition and during a transition period of 
about six weeks thereafter, was terminated when Marathon 
changed KORD's format and did a station overhaul that 
included replacement of every daily on-air personality. 
Stegall brought suit contending that her employment was 
terminated in retaliation for gender-based wage 
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discrimination complaints that she made during a meeting 
with Marathon's new management of KORD shortly 
before the format change at KORD. Marathon, on the other 
hand, contends that Stegall was fired because of a broad 
station change of format and personalities and because of 
Stegall's poor attitude during Marathon's management of 
KORD. Because Marathon's articulated reasons for 
terminating Stegall's employment with KORD are 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, we must determine 
if genuine fact issues were presented whether Marathon's 
articulated reasons were a pretext for an illegal 
employment action. 
On November 9, 1999, Marathon Media bought five 
Pasco, Washington radio stations from Citadel 
Broadcasting, including KORD, a country music station 
that played recent country music hits. Marathon at first 
kept most employees at KORD, in order to maintain radio 
broadcasts at KORD. Lynda Stegall was one of the 
employees at first retained. She had been employed as an 
on-air personality at KORD since 1993. After Marathon 
acquired KORD, Marathon hired a new general manager 
("GM"), Eric Van Winkle, to supervise KORD and other 
acquired stations. Van Winkle hired Paul Drake and Curt 
Cartier as co-program directors of KORD under Marathon. 
Drake and Cartier had been program directors at other of 
the acquired radio stations. Drake and Cartier then 
controlled KORD's content and presentation. 
Neither Van Winkle, Drake, nor Cartier supervised Stegall 
before Marathon's acquisition ofKORD. However, Stegall 
testified that Cartier treated her "very badly" after Stegall 
returned from a two week leave of absence that she took to 
protest *1074 wage discrimination at KORD, when KORD 
was under Citadel management. On December 6, 1999, 
after Marathon's acquisition, Stegall told Drake, now her 
supervisor, about prior complaints she had made to Citadel 
complaining that she was paid less than on-air male 
personalities because of her gender. 
Nine days later, on December 15, 1999, KORD fired 
Stegall and another woman announcer, Kristin Crume, 
because Van Winkle, Drake and Cartier, according to 
Stegall's testimony, were planning "big changes" for 
KORD. When Stegall later applied for unemployment 
benefits, KORD said that "a business decision based on 
changing the programing and formatting," led to Stegall's 
termination. 
After Stegall's termination, Marathon management 
switched KORD from station-selected music to a 
computerized music service; brought in Leah Knight, a 
syndicated host from Seattle; changed the morning show; 
midday show; afternoon show; nighttime show and 
overnight show; did on-air promotions about the format 
changes; stressed a different and more traditional, less 
contemporary, type of country music broadcast; removed 
all the daily on-air personalities; and replaced seven 
announcers on five shifts including every morning show 
host. The only former daily on-air personality who 
remained at the station after the broad station change was 
Ed Dailey, removed from daily duties and given a 
four-hour Sunday morning "oldies" show. Later, during 
this litigation, Van Winkle and Drake testified that Stegall 
was also fired because they did not like parts of Stegall's 
performance during their brief supervision of KORD and 
that this influenced their decision not to retain Stegall 
during the station overhaul. 
On December 19,2001, Stegall stipulated to dismissal of 
her sexual harassment and retaliation claims against 
Citadel, 16942 and to dismissal of her sexual harassment 
claims against Marathon. The district court gave Marathon 
summary judgment rejecting Stegall's Title VII and state 
law claims of retaliation. The district court was correct and 
we should affirm. 
II 
Stegall argues that she was illegally terminated in 
retaliation for making wage discrimination complaints to 
Marathon about lower pay she was receiving because of 
her gender in violation of Title VII and the Washington 
Law against Discrimination ("WLAD"). Because 
Washington courts look to federal law when analyzing 
retaliation claims, we analyze Stegall's Washington state 
law claims and federal claims together. See Little v. 
Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th 
Cir.2002); Graves v. Dep't of Game, 76 Wash.App. 705, 
887 P.2d 424, 428 (1994). 
Under § 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it 
is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of 
his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title 
VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." 42 
U.s.c. § 2000e-3. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 
532 U.S. 268, 269, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 
(2001); see also Trent v. Valley Electric Association, Inc., 
41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir.1994) ("Courts have interpreted 
'unlawful employment practices' to include a panoply of 
actions involving discrimination and sexual harassment."). 
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Because the district court granted summary judgment to 
Marathon we review Stegall's claims de novo. Oliver V. 
Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir.2002). In doing so, we 
*1075 view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
Stegall and determine whether there are any genuine issues 
of material fact precluding summary judgment. Id. 
To prevail on a retaliation claim brought under Title VII, 
Stegall must first establish a prima facie case of illegal 
retaliation by showing that (I) she was engaging in a 
protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment 
decision; and; (3) a causal link exists between her activity 
and the employment decision. Trent, 41 F.3d at 526; see 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.s. 792, 802-03, 
93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In an appropriate 
case, "[t]he causal link may be established by an inference 
derived from circumstantial evidence." jordan V. Clark, 
847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.1988). If Stegall establishes a 
prima facie case of illegal retaliation, the burden of 
production shifts to Marathon to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Stegall's 
employment. Wrighten V. Metro. Hosps. Inc., 726 F.2d 
1346, 1 354(9th Cir.1984). If Marathon gives such a reason, 
the burden of production shifts to Stegall to prove that 
Marathon's articulated reason is a pretext for illegal 
retaliation, with pretext shown "either directly persuading 
the cOUli that a discrim inatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Texas Dep't of Cmty. AfTairs V. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1980) 
(citation omitted). If Stegall satisfies her burden of 
producing evidence that Marathon's reasons are pretextual, 
summary judgment is inappropriate and ajury is entitled to 
infer that the motive for Marathon's employment action 
was retaliatory. Reeves V. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 
(2000). 
A 
Because Marathon does not question that Stegall has 
established a prima facie case of retaliation, I begin 
analysis by looking at Marathon's actions and testimony to 
determine whether Marathon has satisfied its burden, of 
production, to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for terminating Stegall's employment. Despite 
Stegall's argument that Marathon's reasons are not 
legitimate, the reasons extended by Marathon, if asserted 
in good faith and not as a pretext, are legitimate business 
interests sufficient to support the termination of an 
employee. 
Marathon otTers two reasons for terminating Stegall's 
employment. First, Marathon states that it terminated 
Stegall's employment because of its decision to overhaul 
the programming of KORD from a modem country station 
that played the latest country hits to a more traditional 
country music radio station that played older country 
songs. Second, Marathon states that it terminated Stegall 
because of a perception among Marathon management that 
Stegall did not place a priority on maintaining strong 
working relationships and thus displayed a poor attitude 
toward her job and her co-workers. The reasons articulated 
by Marathon satisfY Marathon's burden of production to 
articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 
terminating Stegall's employment. See Aragon V. Republic 
Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir.2002). 
B 
Because Marathon has articulated legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Stegall, the 
burden shifts back to Stegall to prove that Marathon's 
articulated reasons are a pretext for illegal retaliation by 
"either directly persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly 
*1076 by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of 
Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1980). 
First, Stegall argues that we should infer pretext because 
the timing of Marathon's decision to terminate her 
occurred shortly after she made a wage complaint to 
Marathon management. Although Stegall previously made 
gender-based wage discrimination complaints to Citadel 
management at KORD, she renewed her gender-based 
wage discrimination complaints to Drake, her immediate 
supervisor under Marathon management of KORD, on 
December 6, 1999, and was fired 9 days later on December 
15, 1999. Stegall argues that the timing of Marathon's 
decision to fire her after her wage discrimination complaint 
to Marathon management shows pretext because her 
performance at KORD was good and because one of the 
persons responsible for deciding to fire her, Curt Cartier, 
was upset that Stegall took a two week leave of absence to 
protest wage discrimination while KORD was under 
Citadel ownership. 
As for her first point, tlmmg of a termination can be 
significant, and with other evidence of pretext in an 
appropriate case may be persuasive to show pretext. In 
Little V. Windermere Relocation, Inc., we stated that 
evidence of pretext was shown from the timing of the 
employer's decision to fire the employee because the 
employee was fired "within minutes" of her complaint, 
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because the employee had a documented record of superior 
performance, and because the employee's supervisor was 
suspiciously uninvolved in the employer's decision to 
terminate the plaintiff 30 I F.3d 958 (9th Cir.2002). 
Stegall's case against Marathon as to significance of 
timing to show pretext is nothing like the case presented by 
the terminated employee in Little. Unlike the employee in 
Little, Stegall has presented no substantial evidence that 
the timing of her termination provides evidence of 
Marathon's pretext. Marathon terminated StegaIl about six 
weeks after it purchased KORD from Citadel, whereas in 
Little the plaintiffs termination occurred minutes after the 
employee's complaint about a rape by a customer. Further, 
while the employee's termination in Little stood alone, 
within weeks of Stegall's termination, Marathon replaced 
every daily on-air personality at KORD with new talent in 
an effort to increase KORD's ratings. As Drake testified: 
I wanted to make changes. And I think 
Eric [Van Winkle] described wholesale 
changes. KORD was hurting financially. 
It was not billing what it should. We 
wanted to make a splash .... We changed 
the morning show. We changed the 
midday. We changed the afternoon. We 
changed the nighttime show. We 
changed the overnight show. We 
changed the music. We made complete 
changes around the clock. 
Further, the supervisor of the employee in Little was not 
consulted about the termination, whereas here Stegall's 
direct supervisor, Drake, was involved in the decision to 
terminate Stegall's employment. And Stegall has not 
presented any evidence that Cartier knew of any of 
Stegall's prior complaints to Citadel or that he knew that 
Stegall was making complaints about gender-based wage 
discrimination.l 
*1077 That Stegall's employment was terminated nine 
days after making a gender-based wage discrimination 
complaint, in the context of undisputed facts presented 
including the wholesale changes at the station, does not 
raise any genuine issue of fact on pretext by the employer. 
Although Marathon's decision to fire Stegall was not 
remote to her wage discrimination complaint to Marathon 
management, there was insufficient evidence of pretext 
based on the timing of Marathon's decision because the 
timing of Marathon's decision to fire Stegall is 
incontestably supported by its articulated reason of 
instituting a broad overhaul of KORD. 
Second, Stegall argues that Marathon's two reasons for 
terminating her-the need to conduct a broad format change 
and her poor attitude-are shifting and inconsistent reasons 
which provide evidence of pretext. Stegall also argues that 
Marathon's second articulated reason for laying her off, 
her poor work attitude, supports a finding of pretext since 
Marathon did not articulate this reason until the 
commencement of litigation. It is correct that 
"fundamentally different justifications for an employer's 
action ... give rise to a genuine issue of fact with respect to 
pretext since they suggest the possibility that neither of the 
official reasons was the true reason." Washington V. 
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. I 994). But different 
justifications for an adverse employment action will not 
defeat summary judgment if those reasons are "not 
incompatible." See Nidds V. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 
F .3d 912, 918 (9th Cir.1996). See also Aragon, 292 F.3d at 
661 ("We do not infer pretext from the simple fact that [an 
employer] has two different, although consistent, reasons 
for laying off[an employee.]"). 
I conclude that Marathon's reasons for terminating Stegall 
are not inconsistent and do not support a showing of 
pretext. That Stegall's work attitude was perceived by 
Marathon to be poor is not inconsistent with Marathon's 
articulated reason that it fired Stegall to effect a broader 
station overhaul. The articulated reason of Stegall's poor 
attitude supports Marathon's decision not to retain Stegall 
during the overhaul that replaced every daily on-air 
personality at KORD. Also, as we have previously held, 
that an employer has given an explanation not previously 
stated until after the commencement of litigation does not 
by itself create sufficient evidence of pretext. See Lindahl 
V. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438(9th Cir.1991) ( 
"Simply because an explanation comes after the beginning 
of litigation does not make it inherently incredible."). See 
also Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1286 
(9th Cir.2000) (holding that employer's reasons for 
termination which "mainly detaiI[ed] the earlier one [it 
gave ]," was not sufficient evidence of pretext). 
Third, Stegall argues that one of the underlying reasons for 
Marathon's termination of Stegall-the broad station 
overhaul of KORD-is not worthy of credence. Stegall 
argues in support of this position * 1 078 that a change in 
"the programming and format" of a radio station is 
common in radio and that a change in format does not 
usually require a change of on-air personalities. Stegall 
also asserts that the "overhaul" claimed by Marathon 
involved nothing more than routine changes. But even if 
some format changes of radio stations are done without 
personnel changes, that cannot be said to render 
illegitimate a radio station's new management's business 
objective if it prefers to have fresh faces and talent to 
advance its chosen format. 
Marathon's reason that it was overhauling KORD is 
supported by its actions during and after Stegall's 
v. Citadei Co" 350 F.3d 1061 (2003) 
92 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1769, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 10,332 ... 
termination: Although some on-air personalities were 
transferred to other stations, some resigned, and others 
were terminated, Marathon did replace every daily on-air 
personality, not merely Stegall, soon after Marathon 
bought KORD. KORD under Marathon moved from 
having a station-selected music format to a 
computer-automated music selection, a system that 
reduced KORD's reliance on its employee announcers to 
select music. KORD changed its station format from 
modern country to older country music. These changes of 
personnel, operation, and program format at KORD 
strongly support Marathon's articulated reason that it 
conducted a broad station overhaul of KORD and on the 
undisputed evidence foreclose Stegall's assertion of 
pretext. 
III 
Footnotes 
Stegall submitted insufficient evidence that Marathon's 
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
terminating her were a pretext for illegal retaliation to 
avoid a summary judgment based on Marathon's 
legitimate reasons for termination. I would affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Marathon 
Media on Stegall's illegal retaliation claims under Title VII 
and Washington Law. Accordingly, I must respectfully 
dissent.2 
Parallel Citations 
92 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1769, 03 Cal. Daily Op. 
Servo 10,332,2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,006 
* Honorable Donald P. Lay. Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit. sitting by designation. 
1 The five Pasco radio stations that Marathon acquired from Citadel were KORD (a country music station); KEYW (an adult 
contemporary station); KXRX (a classic rock station); KTHK (a roek station); and KFLD (an AM radio station). 
2 The only employees who were not initially retained by Marathon at KORD were management-level employees who chose to accept 
positions with Citadel at other locations in the United States. 
3 Stegall was employed by Marathon for only 24 days. 
4 The format was changed from "contemporary" country to "classici today's" country. Van Winkle eharacterized the old format as 
"way too contemporary." "a teenybopper thing." and "too hip for the audience." The new management broad east more classic 
country music that included singers such as Gcorge Strait. 
5 Kristin Crume was the other employee terminated on the same day as Stegall. She also previously eomplained of gender 
discrimination at KORD. 
6 Although Marathon eites the termination of another employee. Gary Mitchell, that employee was fired nearly a year and a half after 
Stegall. 
7 Marathon admitted that Stegall had name recognition and thus. visibility. and performed well at "remotes," olTsite station promotion 
activities. 
8 Although Marathon objects to Peterson's deposition testimony on the grounds that it is inadmissible hearsay. Such statements fall 
squarely outside of the definition of hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 reads, in relevant part. as follows: 
"(d) Statements which arc not hcarsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party that is (A) the party's own statement, in either an 
individual or a representative capacity .... " 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 801 (2002). 
9 Stegall asserted that during her meeting with Drake in which she discussed her complaints of gender discrimination, he was virtually 
non-responsive. 
1 The majority also relies on Bell v. Clackamas COlln~v, 341 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.2003). holding in that case that temporal proximity 
between protected activity and adverse employment action might be suffieient circumstantial evidence of retaliation. Bell adds 
nothing to analysis based on Little. for in Bell. as in Little, an adverse employment action. in the case of Bell it was negative 
Stegali v. Citadei Co., 350 F.3d 1061 (2003) 
92 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1769, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 10,332 ... 
performance reviews, "immediately followed plaintiffs complaint" in the majority's words. The majority also cites YartzolT V. 
Thomas, 809 F.2d 137l. 1376 (9th Cir.1987). which the majority contends found "highly probative" timing between employee 
complaint and adverse action that "far exceeded" the 9 day interval between Stegall's complaint and her termination. Although 
YartzoJTheld that the negative performance ratings in that case coming three weeks after protected activity ofYartzoffs complaints 
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case on causation, each case turns on its facts and the majority here ignores the undisputed 
evidence proving that Stegall's termination was part ofa broader set of terminations incidental to a new ownership's desire to change 
programming and on-air personalities. That all on-air announcers were terminated from their full-time positions precludes the 
negative inference that the majority draws under a rational interpretation of the evidence. 
2 Apart from my disagreement with the majority's pretext assessment, I also regret to say that the majority's analysis distorts and 
misunderstands our law. First, though circumstantial evidence was approved by the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), as a way to show mixed motive, rejecting the prior view of many circuits that 
direct evidence was required for a mixed motive jury instruction, that has nothing to do with this case which deals with the traditional 
and long-established assessment of the three-part test required by the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas precedent to assess 
whether a summary judgment may be given in a Title VII case. It has always been the law, in our circuit and elsewhere, that 
circumstantial evidence is admissible and can be considered on the issues of whether a prima facie case has been made, whether the 
employer has shown legitimate reasons for a termination, and whether the reasons given are pretextual. Nothing is new in that regard. 
I fully accept that Stegall can argue circumstantial evidence. It is simply not sufficient in the context of the station'S broad change of 
program and personalities after an acquisition and the entry of new management. 
Second, the majority appears to be "tutoring" Stegall's counsel to attempt to present this case as a mixed motive case, when the 
majority asserts of mixed motive cases that "Stegall's case is arguably one." This case however was dismissed on summary 
judgment. No issue was presented about any request for a mixed motive jury instruction. which was premature. The majority's 
dicta about mixed motive cases properly has nothing to do with analysis of whether the record before the court when it granted 
summary judgment showed a genuine issue of fact on pretext. 
Third, the majority makes much of Stegall's problems with Cartier which occurred long before the change of management. No 
genuine dispute on pretext of the termination as part of broad station change is shown by Cartier's dissatisfaction expressed when 
Stegall previously walked off the job. 
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Thomas Y. Medical Center 
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P A, 138 Idaho 200 (2(02) 
138 Idaho 200 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, November 2001 Term. 
Richard V. THOMAS, M.D., 
PlaintijJ-Counterdefendant-Appellant, 
v. 
MEDICAL CENTER PHYSICIANS, P.A., 
Richm'dAguilar, M.D., Fredric W. 
Birkeland, M.D., Gary Botimer, M.D., 
Eugene Brown, M.D., MichaelA. Chenore, 
M.D., Michael T. Crane, Elaine Davidson, 
M.D., Michael Dee, M.D., Michael R. 
Djernes, M.D., James R. Dzur, M.D., 
Robert J. Emerson, M.D., Je.ffrey A. 
Hansen, M.D., Leo S. Harf, M.D., Ross S. 
Higgins, John Hlavinka, M.D., Timothy 
Hodges, D.O., Robert J. Hurst, Miers C. 
Johnson, M.D., Hal'old V. Kunz, M.D., 
James E. Loveless, M.D., Sean Lynn, M.D., 
Timothy Mc Hugh, M.D., David Jl;Iartin, 
M.D., Warren N. Miller, M.D., Randell L. 
Page, D.O., Joseph L. Papiez, M.D., Andrea 
Thompson, M.D., Brett Troyer, M.D., 
Richard C. Troyer, M.D., Jim Valentine, 
M.D., Chris Vetsch, M.D., Michael Widmer, 
llf.D., And Steven Wynder, M.D., 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondent 
s. 
No. 26372. I Dec. 27,2002. 
Physician brought action against professional corporation 
for wrongful discharge. The District Court, Fourth Judicial 
District, Ada County, D. Duff McKee, J., granted summary 
judgment for professional corporation, and physician 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Schroeder, J., held that: (I) 
physician waived objections to technical defects in 
termination procedure; (2) professional corporation did not 
tortiously interfere with contract; (3) professional 
corporation did not engage in intentional 
misrepresentation; (4) genuine issue of material fact, 
whether physician was eligible for public-policy exception 
to employment at will doctrine, precluded summary 
judgment on that issue; (S) physician'S failure to report 
allegations of misconduct of another physician to state 
Board of Medicine did not constitute an unclean hands 
defense for professional corporation; and (6) physician was 
entitled to amend complaint to add claims for emotional 
distress. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
West Headnotes (37) 
II) 
12) 
131 
14) 
Appeal and Error 
\,"""Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
In an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment, Supreme Court's standard of review is 
the same as the standard used by district court in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment 
Judgment 
'SP"Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
All allegations of fact in the record and all 
reasonable inferences from the record are 
construed in the light most favorable to party 
opposing a summary judgment motion. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
si,,,Existence or Non-Existence of Fact Issue 
When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary 
judgment is not proper if conflicting inferences 
could be drawn from the record and reasonable 
people might reach different conclusions. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
II Cases that cite this headnote 
Judgment 
>\CPresumptions and Burden of Proof 
Burden of proving the absence of material facts is 
upon the party moving for summary judgment 
Thomas v. Medical Center 
61 P.3d 557 
P.A., 138 Idaho 200 (2002) 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
151 Judgment 
16) 
171 
[81 
,~·""Existence or Non-Existence of Fact Issue 
Party moving for summary judgment is entitled 
to judgment when nonmoving party fails to make 
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c). 
Appeal and Error 
,,,,··Amended and Supplemental Pleadings 
Pleading 
<"'"Affected by Time of Application in General 
The grant or denial of leave to amend after a 
responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that 
is within the discretion of the trial court, and is 
subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of 
that discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a). 
Appeal and Error 
: •• Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
An appellate court exercises free review over a 
district court's conclusions of law. 
Appeal and Error 
v""Form and Requisites in General 
Appeal and Error 
,t:-wPoints and Arguments 
An appellate court will not review the actions of a 
district court which have not been specifically 
[91 
assigned as error, especially where there are no 
authorities cited nor argument contained in the 
briefs upon the question. 
Appeal and Error 
,;",Reply Briefs 
An appellate court will not consider arguments 
raised for the first time in an appellant's reply 
brief. 
PO) Contracts 
.c.····Waiver 
Under the law of waiver, a party to a contract 
generally cannot accept a benefit from a 
procedure or action and then claim that the 
procedure or act is invalid. 
[III Health 
v,,,Adverse Employment Action; Wrongful 
Discharge 
Physician waived objection to any technical 
defects in termination procedure and ratified the 
action of professional corporation in firing him, 
where physician executed purchase agreements 
for shareholder and partnership interests, and 
accepted additional consideration. 
[I2) Labor and Employment 
,·?Persons Liable 
Professional corporation did not tortiously 
interfere with its employment contract with 
ph)'sician; corporation could not tortious I)' 
Thomas v. Medical Center 
61 P.3d 557 
138 Idaho 200 (2002) 
interfere with its own contract. 
1131 Labor and Employment 
rDefinite or Indefinite Term; Employment 
At-Will 
Labor and Employment 
",,"Termination; Cause or Reason in General 
Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a 
contract which specifies the duration of the 
employment, or limits the reasons why the 
employee may be discharged, the employee is 
at-will. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1141 Labor and Employment 
· ...• ,·Termination; Cause or Reason in General 
statement was true, (8) the hearer's right to rely 
on the truthfulness, and (9) the hearer's 
proximate injury. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1171 Fraud 
';;;=Existing Facts or Expectations or Promises 
Physician failed to establish, for purposes of 
misrepresentation claim against professional 
corporation, that corporation did not have a 
present intent to act on its promises to require 
physicians to maintain appropriate standards of 
care, to maintain quality-control measures, and to 
enforce standards of care; promises were policy 
statements and statements of future conduct. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
118) Fraud 
An at-wiII employee can be terminated for anYw=Existing Facts or Expectations or Promises 
reason or no reason at all. 
An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not 
I Cases that cite this headnote lie for statements of future events; the law 
requires the plaintiff to form his or her own 
conclusions regarding the occurrence of future 
events. 
115) Torts 
w'"T0I1feasor as Stranger to Contract or 
Relationship, in General 
A party cannot tortiously interfere with his own 
contract. 
)16) Fraud 
<·,Elements of Actual Fraud 
Actionable misrepresentation requires: (I) a 
representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, (5) the 
speaker's intent that the representation be acted 
upon by the hearer, (6) the hearer's ignorance of 
the falsitY': (7) the hearer's reliance that the 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
1191 Fraud 
~>"Relations and Means of Knowledge of Parties 
Physician failed to establish, for purposes of 
misrepresentation claim against professional 
corporation, that he relied on corporation's 
promises to require physicians to maintain 
appropriate standards of care, to maintain 
quality-control measures, and to enforce 
standards of care; physician worked for a year 
before signing employment agreement, and was 
aware that corporation was taking no action on 
his complaints about these issues. 
Thomas v. Medical Center 
61 P.3d 557 
[20[ Labor and Employment 
·/··Questions of Law or Fact 
PA, 138 Idaho 200 
The determination of what constitutes public 
policy sufficient to protect an at-will employee 
from termination for whistle blowing should be 
considered a question of law. 
[21[ Judgment 
.• >~Employees, Cases Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact, whether 
physician's actions in reporting alleged 
misconduct by another physician were in 
furtherance of public policy, and thus subject to 
an exception to the doctrine of employment at 
will, precluded summary judgment in physician's 
wrongful-discharge action against professional 
corporation. 
[22[ Labor and Employment 
~"~Exercise of Rights or Duties; Retaliation 
Labor and Employment 
.;·~Refusal to Engage in Wrongdoing 
In order for the public policy exception to 
employment at wilI to apply, a discharged 
employee must: (I) refuse to commit an unlawful 
act, (2) perform an important public obligation, 
or (3) exercise certain rights or privileges. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[23J Labor and Employment 
·~:=Protected Activities 
Physician employees are protected under the 
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine for 
reporting the falsification of medical records and 
the performance of unnecessary operations to 
bolster a physician's income. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[24[ Labor and Employment 
"·,,Protected Activities 
An employee who reports wrongful conduct that 
is protected under the public policy exception to 
employment at will is protected by reporting the 
conduct to superiors within the company. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[2S[ Health 
[26[ 
".·Records and Duty to Report; Confidentiality 
in General 
Statute governing reporting of violations by 
physicians requires licensed physicians to report, 
to state Board of Medicine, the conduct of other 
licensed physicians that violates the provisions of 
statute setting forth grounds for medical 
discipline. I.e. §§ 54-1814, 54-1818. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Health 
,,·,Adverse Employment Action; Wrongful 
Discharge 
Licensed physician's failure to report allegations 
of misconduct of another doctor in medical 
center to state Board of Medicine, as required by 
statute, did not constitute an unclean hands 
defense for medical center to physician's claim 
of wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy; while physician had a duty to report to 
Board, it was prerogative of Board itself to 
censure such a failure, even if failure was 
evidence of an intent on part of physician to 
coerce medical center to acquiesce to his 
demands. I.e. §§ 54-1814,54-1818. 
Thomas v. Medica! Center Physicians, PA, 138 idaho 200 (2002) 
61 P.3d 557 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1271 Statutes 
i/"cEffect and Consequences 
Statutes 
'v,.Meaning of Language 
Statutes 
i 0;·Existence of Ambiguity 
Statutes 
\,c··Construction with Reference to Other Statutes 
Supreme Court interprets statutes according to 
the plain, express meaning of the provision in 
question and will resort to judicial construction 
only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, 
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. 
1281 Statutes 
_Implied Amendment 
Supreme Court disfavors 
by implication absent 
legislative intent. 
1291 Equity 
statutory amendment 
clear, unequivocal 
'~'AHe Who Comes Into Equity Must Come with 
Clean Hands 
Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, 
the Supreme Court has the discretion to evaluate 
the relative conduct of both parties and to 
determine whether the party seeking equitable 
relief should in the light of all the circumstances 
be precluded from such relief. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1301 Appeal and Error 
,.'·Amendment Increasing Demand, or Adding 
Cause of Action or Defense 
The denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a 
complaint to add another cause of action is 
governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a). 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
1311 Appeal and Error 
•• ~Amended and Supplemental Pleadings 
The test for determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion in denying a motion to 
amend a pleading is: (I) whether the court 
correctly perceived that the issue was one of 
discretion, (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
1321 Pleading 
,,,,,,Statutory Provisions 
The dual purposes of rule governing amendment 
of pleadings are to allow claims to be determined 
on the merits rather than technicalities, and to 
make pleadings serve the limited role of 
providing notice of the nature of the claim and 
the facts that are at issue. Rules Civ.Proc .. Rule 
IS(a). 
1331 Pleading 
.F"Sufficiency of Amendment 
A court may consider whether the allegations 
sought to be added to a complaint state a valid 
claim in determining whether to grant leave to 
amend the complaint; a court, however, may not 
consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 idaho 200 (2002) 
61 P.3d 557 
the claim sought to be added in determining leave 
to amend because that is more properly 
determined at the summary judgment stage. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
[34[ Pleading 
(~"'·New or Different Cause of Action or Defense 
Pleading 
.,,~Sufficiency of Amendment 
Trial court abused its discretion in denying 
physician's motion to amend his complaint for 
wrongful discharge against professional 
corporation to include claims of intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, where 
court considered the merits of the added claims. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[35) Damages 
'.""Breach of Contract or Warranty 
Damages 
.. ·~(Breach of Contract 
Plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress 
in breach of contract cases, but punitive damages 
might be appropriate if the defendant's conduct is 
sufficiently egregious. 
136) Damages 
·.,;""Breach of Contract or Warranty 
Claim for infliction of emotional distress is not 
prohibited any time a breach of contract claim is 
involved; for plaintiff to state a claim for 
infliction of emotional distress, the conduct 
complained of must arise independently of the 
breach of contract claim. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[37[ Damages 
.i>~Termination in General 
In wrongful discharge cases, claims of infliction 
of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of 
the case support such a claim in addition to the 
contractual claim. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**560 *203 Cosho, Humphrey, Greener & Welsh, Boise, 
for appellant. Thomas G. Walker, Jr. argued. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondents. Phillip J. 
Collaer argued. 
Opinion 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 12, 
2002 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
ON REHEARING 
This is an appeal from an award of summary judgment in 
favor of Medical Center Physicians et al. (Medical Center) 
against Richard V. Thomas, M.D.'s (Thomas) claim for 
wrongful termination. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 30, 1993, Thomas entered into a probationary 
agreement with Medical Center to be employed as a 
physician. Subsequently, Thomas and Medical Center 
entered into an agreement in which Thomas became a 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, PA, 138 idaho 200 (2002) 
61 P.3d 557 
shareholder in Medical Center and a partner in Nampa 
Medical Dental Properties, a partnership created by 
Medical Center. Prior to signing the 1994 agreement, 
Thomas believed that he had observed certain instances of 
misconduct by another doctor in this department (the 
Doctor) and reported to administrators within Medical 
Center what he considered to be breaches of the standard of 
care. He reported that the Doctor had bartered with patients 
for personal gifts in exchange for medical services, 
performed unnecessary treatment and testing for the 
purpose of boosting his income, falsified medical records, 
and acted unprofessionally by driving his vehicle across 
Medical Center's lawn. 
A Medical Center executive committee considered the 
complaints and concluded that the allegations of breach of 
the standard of care by the Doctor were simply differences 
in medical opinions. The committee concluded, however, 
that the allegations of bartering had occurred, constituting 
dishonesty, and the continuation of such would result in the 
Doctor being dismissed from employment with Medical 
Center. 
Thomas treated one of the Doctor's patients in his absence, 
telling the patient that he did not agree with the treatment 
the Doctor had prescribed, and he referred the patient to a 
local urologist. Thomas did not notify the Doctor upon his 
return of the treatment he had rendered. After learning of 
the treatment, the Doctor presented the information to 
Medical Center's quality assurance committee, which 
admonished Thomas **561 *204 for his actions in a memo 
dated January 28, 1998, written by Dr. Aguilar (Aguilar). 
The memo criticized Thomas' conduct, specifically for the 
entry of information in the patient's chart that was 
"inflammatory." Thomas responded by telling Aguilar that 
he was going to report the events concerning the Doctor to 
individuals or entities outside the Medical Center. Aguilar 
asked Thomas to let Medical Center handle the situation 
internally. 
On February 17, 1998, Thomas distributed a memo 
addressed to Medical Center's quality assurance 
committee, Medical Center's chief administrator, and the 
chief executive officer and president of Mercy Medical 
Center. In the memo Thomas defended his conduct, stating 
that his entries were objective, he was not "in the business 
of trying to protect 'one of our own' from blatant, illegal 
actions," and he was morally obligated to report the facts 
accurately. He also alleged that the Doctor had erred in the 
treatment of a patient without first administering a 
pregnancy test, resulting in miscarriage of a viable 
fifteen-week-old fetus. Thomas concluded the memo, 
stating that "[i]f these issues are left unaddressed, I 
guarantee a copy of this letter will also be sent to the Idaho 
Medical Board." 
Following the February 17, 1999 memo, Aguilar informed 
Thomas that he and many others were very angry with 
Thomas for writing the memo. On February 23, 1998, less 
than a week after Thomas' memo was distributed, the 
Doctor resigned his position at Medical Center. About the 
same time, Thomas was interviewed by Kenneth Mallea 
(Mallea), legal counsel for Medical Center. Mallea 
reported that in his opinion, Thomas would not be satisfied 
until Drs. Birkland and Lynn, two other physicians at 
Medical center were no longer employed there. 
On February 26, 1998, Birkland signed and dated a 
document entitled "Consent of Directors," which was a 
vote in favor of terminating Thomas' employment at 
Medical Center. On March 3, 1998, written notice of a 
meeting scheduled for March 5, 1998 to consider Thomas' 
termination was distributed to some of Medical Center's 
board of directors. Thomas did not receive written notice 
of the meeting and, although he was actually aware of the 
meeting, he decided not to attend upon advice of his 
counsel. At the meeting all directors who were present, and 
all of Medical Center's directors except Thomas and Dr. 
McKinnon, signed the "Consent of Directors" in favor of 
Thomas' termination. The document stated that every 
director of Medical Center had consented to adopt 
Thomas' termination without a formal meeting, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Idaho Professional 
Service Corporation Act. Thomas disputes that all 
members of the board consented, because he, a director at 
the time, did not sign the document. Medical Center's 
articles of incorporation contained procedural 
requirements for termination, requiring an affirmative vote 
of at least 90% of the board of directors to terminate a 
director's employment. 
On March 7, 1998, Thomas was notified that his 
employment had been terminated. Thereafter, Medical 
Center and Thomas entered into agreements in which 
Medical Center bought out Thomas' stock in the 
corporation and his partnership interest. 
Following his termination, Thomas ran advertisements in 
local newspapers discussing particular aspects of the 
dispute. On April 21, 1998, he filed a complaint against 
Medical Center alleging wrongful termination/retaliatory 
discharge, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, a wage 
claim, intentional interference with an employment 
relationship, and interference with a prospective economic 
advantage. Medical Center answered and counterclaimed 
against Thomas for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
defamation, libel and slander per se. On October 6, 1999, 
Thomas filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to 
include claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and for punitive damages. 
Thomas v. Medica! Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200 (2002) 
61 P.3d 557 
Medical Center filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment to which Thomas responded by filing a motion 
for summary judgment with respect to Medical Center's 
counterclaims. Both motions were heard by the district 
judge on December 21, 1999, and at the conclusion of the 
hearing the judge granted Medical Center's motion for 
summary **562 *205 judgment with respect to most of 
Thomas' claims. The judge denied Thomas' motion for 
summary judgment against Medical Center's 
counterclaims and granted Thomas's motion to amend his 
complaint for punitive damages, but denied the motion 
with respect to the addition of the emotional distress 
claims. 
Medical Center filed a second motion for summary 
jUdgment regarding Thomas' remaining claims. Following 
oral argument, the district judge entered a memorandum 
decision granting Medical Center's motion and dismissing 
the remainder of Thomas' claims. Judgment was entered 
on March 20, 2000, and Thomas filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
111121 131 In an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as 
the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment. McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 
725, 727, 810 P.2d 259, 261 (1991); Meridian Bowling 
Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 512, 
670 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1983). Summary judgment is 
appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material 
issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a 
jUdgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badel! v. 
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,765 P.2d 126,127 (1988). In 
making this determination all allegations of fact in the 
record and all reasonable inferences from the record are 
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion. City of Kellogg v. A1ission Mountain Interests 
Ltd, Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 PJd 915, 919 (2000). 
When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary judgment 
is not proper if conflicting inferences could be drawn from 
the record and reasonable people might reach different 
conclusions. State Dept. of Fin. v. Res. Servo Co., lnc., 130 
Idaho 877, 880, 950 P.2d 249, 252 (1997). 
14J [51 The burden of proving the absence of material facts 
is upon the moving party. Petricevich V. Salmon River 
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868,452 P.2d 362, 365 (I 969). 
The adverse party, however, may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. I.R.C.P. 56( e). Therefore, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial. Badell, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 
P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (I 986)). 
16] "The grant or denial of leave to amend after a 
responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within 
the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on 
appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, lnc., v. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank, N.A., 
119 Idaho 17 I, 175,804 P.2d 900, 904 (199 I). 
17] "[T]his Court exercises free review over the district 
judge's conclusions ofIaw." Williamson V. City oflvlcCall, 
135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (200 I). 
III. 
THE DISTRICT JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED 
MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON SOME ISSUES BUT ERRED IN 
GRANTING THE MOTION ON THE VIOLATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM 
A. Thomas Failed To Preserve Certain Material Issues 
On Appeal 
181 J91ln order to be considered by this Court, the appellant 
is required to identify legal issues and provide authorities 
supporting the arguments in the opening brief. I.A.R. 35. 
"[T]his Court will not review the actions of the district 
court which have not been specifically assigned as error[,] 
[e ]specially where there are no authorities cited **563 
*206 nor argument contained in the briefs upon the 
question." Taylor V. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 
P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). 
Moreover, this Court will not consider arguments raised 
for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. State V. 
Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995). 
I. Waiver 
1101 III J Thomas argues that the procedural defects of his 
Thomas v. Medical Center 
61 P.3d 557 
PA, 138 idaho 200 (2002) 
termination by Medical Center and the individual directors 
constituted breach of contract, breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-821, 
interference with an existing contract and intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage. The 
district judge concluded that Thomas' action in executing 
the March 10, 1998, purchase agreements and accepting 
the additional consideration paid waived any technical 
defects in the termination procedure and ratified the action 
of the corporation. Under the law of waiver, a party 
generally cannot accept a benefit from a procedure or 
action and then claim that the procedure or act is invalid. 
Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 40 I, 700 P.2d 19, 23 
(1985). The first agreement provided for Thomas' 
resignation as a shareholder. The second effectuated his 
withdrawal from the partnership and the sale of his 
partnership interest. Both agreements stated that Thomas' 
employment had been terminated, and Thomas received 
over $23,000 in consideration pursuant to the agreements. 
The district judge also found that Thomas waived any 
procedural irregularities of his termination as a corporate 
director under Idaho Code §§ 30-1-823 and 30-1-824(4). 
Regardless of whether this ruling is correct, Thomas has 
not argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding 
that he waived his rights and ratified the termination 
procedure. Thomas simply argues that the termination 
procedure was flawed.l Even if flawed, if waived and 
ratified, it is effective. Because not raised on appeal, the 
district judge's ruling that Thomas waived and ratified the 
termination procedure that Medical Center used to 
terminate him is affirmed. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 
758,763,864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993). 
The district judge ruled that Thomas' breach of contract 
claim was barred by waiver, and the remainder of Thomas' 
claims were dismissed on the merits. However, Thomas 
argues that the procedural irregularities (the same conduct 
the district judge found he waived) impacted his claims for 
breach of good faith and fair dealing, interference with an 
existing contract, and interference with an economic 
advantage, and Idaho Code § 30-1-821. Because these 
claims are barred by waiver, there was no error in 
dismissing them as well. 
2. Employment At-Will 
1121113) 1141 The district judge ruled that Thomas was an 
at-will employee. "Unless an employee is hired pursuant to 
a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, 
or limits the reasons why the employee may be discharged, 
the employee is 'at-will.' " Nilsson v. Mapco, 115 Idaho 
18, 22, 764 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct.App.1988). An at-will 
employee can be terminated for any reason or no reason at 
all. Id. On appeal, however, Thomas did not raise the issue 
of whether the district judge was correct in determining 
that he was an at-will employee, and this Court will not 
consider the issue on appeal. Thomas only uses the term 
"at-will" in passing in his opening brief, stating that "[i]f 
this court finds that Thomas is an employee 'at-will,' the 
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage is applicable to individual defendants." Thomas 
does not argue or present authority showing that the district 
court erred in finding that Thomas was an at-will 
employee. Thomas does state that he "could only be 
terminated for reasons that were deemed to be in the 'best 
interests' of Medical Center ... upon an affirmative vote of 
ninety percent (90%) of the corporate directors." This 
argument, however, only goes to the procedural 
irregularities **564 *207 of the termination, not to 
whether there were substantive limitations imposed by the 
"best interests" clause, which would make Thomas an 
employee other than at-will. 
1151 As to the tortious interference claim, it is clearly 
established that a party cannot tortiously interfere with his 
own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993) 
(citations omitted). Because Medical Center's actions with 
respect to Thomas concerned Thomas' employment and 
arose out of his employment contract, Thomas has not 
stated a claim for tortious interference with contract. 
B. The District Judge Properly Granted Summary 
Judgment On The Misrepresentation Claim 
116) The waiver and ratification ruling does not bar 
Thomas' claim for misrepresentation because it relates to 
prior statements by Medical Center, not the procedural 
irregularities of his termination. However, the district 
judge properly granted summary judgment on the merits of 
the misrepresentation claim. Actionable misrepresentation 
requires: (I) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) 
the speaker's intent that the representation be acted upon 
by the hearer; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity; (7) 
the hearer's reliance that the statement was true; (8) the 
hearer's right to rely on the truthfulness; and (9) the 
hearer's proximate injury. Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 
387,389,613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980). 
117] Thomas asserts that Medical Center made 
representations to him that: (I) Medical Center would 
require its physicians to perform services for its patients at 
the applicable standard of care; (2) Medical Center would 
maintain appropriate quality control measures; and (3) 
Medical Center would enforce the requirements that its 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, PA, 138 Idaho 200 (2002) 
61 P.3d 557 
physicians meet the applicable standard of care. The 
district court ruled that the representations made were not 
actionable because they were: (I) policy statements; and 
(2) statements of future conduct. 
[18J An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie 
for statements of future events. Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 
Idaho 837,843,820 P.2d 707, 713 (Ct.App.1991) (citing 
Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504 
P.2d 386, 395 (1972». The law requires the plaintiff to 
form his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence 
offuture events. Id. Thomas was required to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that Medical Center had no 
present intention of following through on the 
representations he complains of at the time the statements 
were made in order for the statements to be actionable. 
Thomas presented no such evidence; therefore, the district 
judge's dismissal of his misrepresentation claim is 
affirmed. 
119] Moreover, Thomas had been working for Medical 
Center and making complaints about the Doctor's conduct 
for over a year prior to entering into the 1994 employment 
agreement in which the alleged misrepresentations 
occurred. The record demonstrates that Thomas was aware 
that Medical Center was taking no action as a result of his 
complaints, thus, Thomas has failed to demonstrate 
reliance on any representations made in the written 
contracts he signed. 
C. The District Judge Erred In Granting Summary 
Judgment On The Wrongful Termination/Retaliatory 
Discharge In Violation Of Public Policy Claim 
[20] The determination of what constitutes public policy 
sufficient to protect an at-will employee from termination 
for whistle blowing should be considered a question of 
law. See generally Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 
P.2d 695 (1997) (determination of what constitutes a 
violation of public policy in invalidating the terms of a 
contract is a question oflaw). The district judge in this case 
noted that once defined, the issue of whether the conduct in 
question violates public policy becomes an issue for the 
jury. The district judge found that Thomas' memo dated 
February 17, 1998, constituted a conditional threat, as 
Thomas implied that he would remain silent if Medical 
Center acceded to his demands. The district judge 
concluded **565 *208 that such conduct "as a matter of 
law ... does not constitute conduct protected by the public 
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in 
Idaho"; thus, Thomas' conduct precluded his ability to 
claim public policy exception. 
On appeal this Court conducts a two-part inquiry. First, the 
Court asks whether there is a public policy regarding 
reporting medical irregularities sufficient to create an 
exception to the employer's right to terminate an at-will 
employee. Second, the Court decides whether the behavior 
complained of by Thomas is protected under the public 
policy exception, and whether ajury could reasonably find 
that Thomas acted in a manner sufficiently in furtherance 
of that policy. 
I. The Conduct Thomas Complained of Falls Under the 
Public Policy Exception 
[21 J [22] In order for the public policy exception to apply, 
the discharged employee must: (I) refuse to commit an 
unlawful act; (2) perform an important public obligation; 
or (3) exercise certain rights or privileges. Sorensen v. 
Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 
(1990). The public policy exception has been protected in 
Idaho on several occasions. E.g., Watson v. Idaho Falls 
Conso!. Hosps .. Inc., III Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) 
(protecting participation in union activities); Ray v. Nampa 
Sch. Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117,814 P.2d 17 (1991) 
(protecting reports of electrical building code violations); 
Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996) 
(protecting compliance with a court issued subpoena). This 
Court has also indicated that the public policy exception 
would be applicable if an employee were discharged, for 
example for refusing to date her supervisor, for filing a 
worker's compensation claim, or for serving on jury duty. 
Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 668, 799 P.2d at 74 (citations 
omitted). In Sorensen, the Court stated that if the reported 
conduct constituted a statutory violation, it would be more 
likely fall under the protection of the public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine. Jd. 
[23] Thomas asserts that a fellow doctor falsified medical 
records and performed unnecessary operations on patients 
to bolster his income. Thomas asserts that his conduct in 
reporting the Doctor's actions falls under the exception 
listed in Sorensen for performing an important public 
obligation. Granting all reasonable inferences to the 
nonmoving party, this Court must accept that the Doctor's 
conduct occurred as alleged by Thomas. Reporting such 
misconduct falls under the public policy exception because 
the conduct alleged by Thomas is unlawful and it involves 
the health and welfare of the public. Crea v. FMC Corp., 
135 Idaho 175, 178,16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000). Employees 
are protected under the public policy exception to the 
at-will doctrine for reporting the falsification of medical 
records and the performance of unnecessary operations to 
bolster a physician's income. 
Thomas v. Medica! Center 
61 P.3d 557 
PA, 138 Idaho 200 
2. Thomas' Conduct of Reporting tile Violation Falls 
Within tlte Exception 
(24) Medical Center argues that Thomas was required to 
report the conduct to an outside entity in order to be 
protected under the public policy exception. In Crea, the 
plaintiff sought protection under the public policy 
exception following termination of his employment by 
FMC. Crea argued that he was fired because he disclosed 
to his supervisors documents indicating that activities of 
FMC had caused serious contamination, including arsenic 
that threatened ground water. This Court concluded that 
"Crea's claim for wrongful discharge would fall under the 
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine if facts 
supporting the claim were established." Id. at 178, 16 P.3d 
at 275. Thus, an employee who reports wrongful conduct 
that is protected under the public policy exception is 
protected by reporting the conduct to superiors within the 
company. 
Even if the Court were to require reporting to an outside 
entity, the February 17, 1998 memo was addressed to the 
chief executive officer and president of Mercy Medical 
Center. Sending the memo to the CEO of a hospital with 
whom Medical Center worked would satisfy any outside 
reporting requirement. 
**566 *209 Once the court defines the public policy, 
whether the public policy was violated is a question for the 
jury. Questions of fact remain as to whether Thomas' 
conduct in reporting what he considered the Doctor's 
misconduct, and whether his writing and distribution ofthe 
February 17, 1998, memo were in furtherance of the above 
defined public policy. There are also questions of fact 
regarding whether Thomas was terminated for acting in the 
furtherance of the public policy. 
3. Unclean HaJ1(l5 
(251 1261 Finally, Medical Center presents an "unclean 
hands" argument with regard to Thomas's claim for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, 
contending that Thomas was required to report the 
allegations of misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine 
under Idaho Code § 54-1818, and his failure to do so 
precludes his claim of discharge in violation of public 
policy. 
I daho Code § 54-1818 does require physicians to report 
violations by other physicians, but there is an ambiguity in 
the statute as to what violations are to be reported. The 
statute requires physicians to report violations of Idaho 
Code § 54-1810, but next to where the statute indicates that 
Idaho Code § 54-1810 is the appropriate provision, there 
are brackets containing Idaho Code § 54-1814, suggesting 
that it is the violation of this statute that must be reported. 
Compiler's notes to I.c. § 54-1818 state that the 
"bracketed section number' § 54-1814' was inserted by 
the compiler since § 54-1810 as it related to grounds for 
revocation or suspension of licenses was repealed and § 
54-1814 now deals with such subject matter." 
1271 128) This Court interprets statutes according to the 
plain, express meaning of the provision in question and 
will resort to judicial construction only if the provision is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict 
with other laws. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 
132 Idaho 732, 742, 979 P.2d 605,615 (1999). This Court 
disfavors statutory amendment by implication absent clear, 
unequivocal legislative intent. Wilkins v. Fireman's Fund 
American Life Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 1006, 695 P.2d 391 
(1985). However, the evidence indicates that the 
legislature intended Idaho Code § 54-1818 to refer to Idaho 
Code § 54-1814. Idaho Code § 54-1818 was passed in 
1976 as the reporting statute for malpractice as then 
defined by Idaho Code § 54-1810. Idaho Code § 54-1818 
has not been amended since 1976. However, in 1977, the 
legislature undertook an extensive rewriting of the Idaho 
Medical Malpractice Act, repealing, along with many other 
sections, Idaho Code § 54-18 10. In its place, the legislature 
passed Idaho Code § 54-1814, which is clearly the 
successor statute of Idaho Code § 54-1810 given their 
substantially, almost exactly, identical provisions. Also, 
current Idaho Code § 54-1810 merely demands that all 
licensed physicians take a written exam to be certified, and 
does not address what constitutes malpractice. 
Determining that Idaho Code § 54- I 8 18 still refers to 
Idaho Code § 54-1810 would frustrate and almost 
completely nUllify the effectiveness of Idaho Code § 
54-1818 and the responsibility of the medical field to 
police itself. The compiler's notes state an accurate 
correction of the statute. Idaho Code § 54-1818 requires 
licensed physicians to report the conduct of other licensed 
physicians that violates the provisions of Idaho Code § 
54-1814. 
129) As for Thomas's failure to report the allegations of 
misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine, the failure of 
Thomson to report the allegation of misconduct does not 
constitute a defense for the Medical Center. Under the 
equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," the Court has the 
discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties 
and to determine whether the party seeking equitable relief 
should in the light of all the circumstances be precluded 
from such relief. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 
350 (1997). While Thomas had a duty to report to the 
Medial Board, it is the prerogative of the Medial Board 
itself to censure such a failure. Thomas's failure to report 
Thomas v. Medica! Center Physicians, 
61 P.3d 557 
138 Idaho 200 (2002) 
the alleged misconduct to the Medical Center Board may 
be evidence of an intent to coerce the Medical Center to 
acquiesce to his demands, but the failure to meet his 
responsibilities to the Medical Board is not enough to 
preclude him from asserting his claim of **567 *210 
discharge against public policy against the Medical Center. 
Issues of material fact exist regarding whether Thomas is 
entitled to relieffor discharge in violation of public policy. 
He has provided sufficient evidence on the disputed issues 
to survive summary judgment, and the district J'udae's 
• b 
order IS therefore reversed and remanded on this claim. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
THOMAS' MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT 
TO ADD CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL AND 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS 
Amendments to complaints in civil cases are governed by 
I.R.C.P. 15(a). After a responsive pleading has been filed, 
leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party is 
required. The Rule provides that "leave shaIl be freely 
given when justice so requires." 
[30) 131) The denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a 
comp laint to add another cause of action is governed by an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. Raedlein v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 129 Idaho 627, 631, 931 P.2d 621,625 
(1996). The test for determining whether the district court 
abused its discretion is: (I) whether the court correctly 
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. Highland Enter., Inc., 
v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999) 
(citations omitted). 
In Idaho Schools for Equal Education Opportunity v. 
Idaho State Board olEducation, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 
P.2d 644, 652 (1996), this Court found that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to 
amend the complaint without articulating a reason for the 
denial. In that case, this Court wrote that under Rule 15(a): 
[i]fthe underlying facts or circumstances 
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, [the plaintiff] ought to 
be afforded an opportunity to test his 
claim on the merits. In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason-such as 
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive 
on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by 
amendments previously allowed, undue 
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 
of the allowance of the amendment, 
futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, "be 
freely given." Of course, the grant or 
denial of an opportunity to amend is 
within the discretion of the [d]istrict 
[c ]ourt, but outright refusal to grant the 
leave without any justifying reason 
appearing for the denial is not an exercise 
of discretion; it is merely abuse of that 
discretion .... 
Id. (quoting Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 
993,996 (1986). 
1321 133) The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow 
claims to be determined on the merits rather than 
technicalities and to make pleadings serve the limited role 
of providing notice of the nature ofthe claim and the facts 
that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 
133 Idaho 866, 871,993 P.2d 1197,1202 (1999) (citation 
omitted). A court may consider whether the allegations 
sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in 
determining whether to grant leave to amend the 
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho 
First Nat 'I Bank N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 
904 (1991). A court, however, may not consider the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be 
added in determining leave to amend because that is more 
properly determined at the summary judgment stage. 
Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d at 
1203. 
1341 Thomas sought to amend his complaint to add claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. In denying 
Thomas leave to amend his complaint, the district judge, 
regarding Medical Center's conduct that Thomas aIleged, 
wrote: "It doesn't seem to me that any of that reaches 
anywhere **568 *211 near the level of outrage that would 
be necessary to give rise to a separate cause of action for 
emotional distress." This language indicates that the 
district judge considered the merits of the emotional 
distress claims in denying leave to add such claims. 
The district judge also wrote, however: "And I can't see 
that the separate claims of emotional distress and tortious 
infliction of emotional distress go anyplace. If they're 
Thomas v. Medical Center 
61 P.3d 557 
P.A., 138 Idaho 200 
within the reach of contract damages so be it. But there is 
not a basis to convert what is a contract action into a tort 
action for emotional distress." 
1351 Medical Center contends that the district judge 
properly denied leave to amend because Thomas was 
improperly attempting to litigate a contract claim in tort 
because wrongful discharge sounds in contract, not in tort. 
Hummer, 129 Idaho at 280-81, 923 P.2d at 987-88. In 
Idaho, plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress in 
breach of contract cases, but punitive damages might be 
appropriate if the defendant's conduct is sufficiently 
egregious. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 
1371,1376 (1985). 
1361 1371 However, a claim for infliction of emotional 
distress is not prohibited any time a breach of contract 
claim is involved. In order for the plaintiff to state a claim 
for infliction of emotional distress, the conduct complained 
of must arise independently of the breach of contract claim. 
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138,483 P.2d 664, 669 
(197 I). In wrongful discharge cases, claims of infliction of 
emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case 
support such a claim in addition to the contractual claims. 
See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 
783-84,9 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2000). In Olson, this Court 
upheld ajury verdict in favor of the defendant employer on 
an emotional distress claim arising from an employee's 
termination. Id. 
Bearing in mind the policy behind Rule l5(a), this Court 
finds that the district judge acted outside the bounds of 
discretion in denying Thomas' motion to amend. 
V. 
THE A WARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IS VACATED 
Because this Court reverses and remands for further 
proceedings on the termination in violation of public 
policy and denial of leave to amend the complaint, we 
vacate the award of costs and fees below, reserving the 
issue for later determination by the trial court. 
Footnotes 
VI. 
NEITHER PARTY IS ENTITLED TO AN A WARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code § 12- I 20(3) provides for mandatory attorney 
fees on appeal and at trial to the prevailing party in disputes 
involving contracts for services. The present case involves 
a dispute relating to an employment relationship, which is 
inherently contractual in nature. In addition, most of 
Thomas' claims sounded in contract. However, because we 
remand for further proceedings, neither party is the 
prevailing party and the issue of fees is remanded for 
consideration at the conclusion of the case. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The district judge's order of summary judgment on the 
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The case 
is also remanded to allow Thomas to amend his complaint 
to add claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The award of costs and attorney fees is 
vacated and remanded for consideration at the conclusion 
of the case. No attorney fees are awarded on appeal. The 
appellant is awarded costs. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices W ALTERS and 
KIDWELL, and Justice Pro Tern MELANSON concur. 
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1 Thomas argues in his reply brief that the agreements only affected Thomas' status as shareholder and as a partner, not as a former 
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Thomson Heuters. to ongl!181 U.S Government VVorks 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1 
105 S.Ct.613, 36 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 977,35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,851 ... 
105 S.Ct. 613 
Supreme Court of the United States 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Harold H. THURSTON et al. 
AIR LINE PILOT'S ASSOCIATION, 
INTERNATIONAL, Petitioner, 
v. 
Harold H. THURSTON et al. 
Nos. 83-997,83-1325. I Argued Oct. 9,1984. 
I Decided Jan. 8,1985. 
In suit brought against airline by labor union and in suit 
brought by certain employees, appeal was taken from 
District Court judgments, and the Court of Appeals, 7 I 3 
F.2d 940,affirming in part and reversing in part, 547 
F.Supp. 1221, held that the airline was liable for 
"liquidated" or double damages for "willful" violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Airline 
sought writ of certiorari and labor union filed cross petition 
raising only the liability issue. The Supreme Court, Justice 
Powell, held that: (1) the airline's transfer policy 
discriminated against disqualified captains on basis of age; 
(2) age was not a "bona fide occupational qualification"; 
and (3) the discriminatory transfer policy was not part of a 
"bona fide seniority system"; and (4) to say that violation 
of Age Discrimination in Employment Act is "willful" if 
employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for 
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA 
was acceptable way to articulate definition of "willful," but 
where employer certainly did not know that its conduct 
violated the Act nor could it be said that employer adopted 
transfer policy in "reckless disregard" of requirements of 
the Act, but, rather, record made clear that employer's 
officers acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to 
determine whether their plan would violate Act, conduct 
was not "willful" and respondents were not entitled to 
liquidated damages. 
Affirmed as to violation of the ADEA, and reversed as to 
claim for double damages. 
West Headnotes (17) 
(1/ Federal Courts 
'J"Certiorari in general 
121 
131 
[4/ 
Prevailing party may advance any ground in 
Supreme Court in support of a judgment in his 
favor, but an argument that would modity 
judgment cannot be presented unless cross 
petition has been filed. 
16 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
<:.=Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act broadly 
prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the 
workplace based on age. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a), 
(a)(l),(c), (f)(1, 2), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 
62 I et seq., 623(a), (a)(l), (c), (f)(1, 2). 
22 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
... Pilots; airlines and other carriers 
Where many airline captains who obtained 
positions as flight engineers to avoid compulsory 
retirement at age 60 were forced to assume that 
position prior to reaching 60, they were adversely 
affected by discriminatory transfer policy, which 
did not apply to captains disqualified for reasons 
other than age; despite fact they obtained 
positions as flight engineers and employer's 
discriminatory transfer policy could violate Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act even though 
83% of the 60-year-old captains were able to 
obtain positions as fl ight engineers through 
bidding procedures. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
39 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.>"Pilots; airlines and other carriers 
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151 
161 
Where employer, an airline, granted some 
disqualified captains the "privilege" of 
"bumping" less senior flight engineers, it could 
not deny such opportunity to others because of 
their age, and where captains who became 
disqualified for any reason other than age were 
allowed to "bump" less senior flight engineers, 
airline's transfer policy was discriminatory on its 
face. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(1), (c), (f)(I, 2), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I), 
(c), (f)(1, 2). 
56 Cases that cite this headnote 
Statutes 
:'AConstruction with Reference to Other Statutes 
Because substantive prOVlSlons of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act were derived 
in haec verba from equal employment 
opportunity sections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, interpretation of Title VII as providing that 
benefit which is part and parcel of employment 
relationship may not be doled out in 
discriminatory fashion even if employer would 
be free not to provide the benefit at all applies 
with equal force in context of age discrimination. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(1), (c), (f)( 1,2), as amended, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
I 18 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.~cmAge discrimination 
Shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas were designed to assure that plaintiff 
have his day in court despite unavailability of 
direct evidence of employment discrimination, 
and where, in suit under Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, there was direct evidence that 
method of transfer available to disqualified 
captain depended upon his age, in suit under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, McDonnell 
Douglas test was not applicable. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2 
171 
181 
191 
et seq., 4(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2), as amended, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
564 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
"c"Practices prohibited or required in general; 
elements 
To be permissible under "bona fide occupational 
qualification" provlSlon of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, age-based 
discrimination must relate to "particular 
business." Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 4(f)(I, 2), as amended, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2). 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
''''~ •. Pilots; airlines and other carriers 
Where under airline's policy age-disqualified 
captains were not given transfer privileges 
afforded captains disqualified for other reasons, 
and where such policy did not operate to exclude 
protected individuals from position of captain but 
rather prevented qualified 60-year-olds from 
working as flight engineers, and where it was 
"particular" job of flight engineer from which 
respondents were excluded by discriminatory 
transfer policy, age under 60 was not a bona fide 
occupational qualification for position of flight 
engineer and the age-based discrimination at 
issue could not be justified. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1, 2), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2). 
54 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.;)=Pilots; airlines and other carriers 
Although Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act did not prohibit airline from retiring all 
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disqualified captains, including those 
incapacitated because of age, airline was not 
thereby authorized to make dependent upon age 
of individuals the availability of transfer to 
position for which age was not bona fide 
occupational qualification. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1, 2), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2); Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
(10) Civil Rights 
·.~=Defenses in general 
Where although Federal Aviation Administration 
"age 60 rule" might have caused respondents' 
retirement the airline's seniority plan certainly 
"permitted" it within meaning of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, and where 
captains disqualified for reasons other than age 
were allowed to "bump" less senior flight 
engineers, mandatory retirement was age based, 
and the "bona fide seniority system" defense was 
unavailable to airline. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4( f)(l, 2), as 
amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 623(f)(1, 2). 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
[ 111 Civil Rights 
>,=Age discrimination 
Legislative history of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act indicates that Congress 
intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in 
nature. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 7(b), as amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 
626(b); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 
16(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). 
76 Cases that cite this headnote 
112) Statutes 
-.=Construction with Reference to Other Statutes 
As to imposItIOn of penalty under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, manner in 
which correlative provision of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act has been interpreted is relevant. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 7(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b); Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(a, b), 29 
U.S.CA. § 216(a, b). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[I3) Civil Rights 
·v·",Age discrimination 
Want of intention on the part of employer to 
violate Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
does not necessarily make double damages 
inappropriate. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
§ 16(b), 29 U.S.c.A. § 216(a). 
36 Cases that cite this headnote 
[I4J Civil Rights 
,,,,Age discrimination 
In view of legislative history of liquidated 
damages provision of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, "reckless disregard" standard 
for imposition is reasonable. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), as amended, 
29 U.S.CA. § 626(b); Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938, § 16(a, b), 29 U.S.CA. § 216(a, b). 
88 Cases that cite this headnote 
[15J Civil Rights 
...••. Age discrimination 
Liquidated damages provIsIon of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act would not be 
interpreted in manner frustrating congressional 
intention for two-tiered liability scheme, and 
violation of the Act was not to be held "willful" 
merely because employer simply knew of 
potential applicability of the Act. Portal-to-Portal 
Act of 1947, §§ 6(a), 11,29 U.S.C.A. §§ 255(a), 
Trans World Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1 
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260; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 7(b), as amended, 29 USCA. § 626(b). 
207 Cases that cite this headnote 
1161 Civil Rights 
,",=Age discrimination 
Statutes 
,·"Construction with Reference to Other Statutes 
Penalty provision of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act does not incorporate 
Portal-to-Portal Act amendment of Fair Labor 
Standards Act enforcement provision, but same 
concerns are reflected in the proviso to the 
penalties provision of the ADEA; disagreeing 
with Hays v, Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 
1307. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § II, 29 
U.S.CA. § 260; Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), as amended, 29 
U.S.CA. § 626(b). 
47 Cases that cite this headnote 
/17) Civil Rights 
",~Age discrimination 
To say that violation of Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act is "willful" if employer either 
knew or showed reckless disregard for matter of 
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA 
was acceptable way to articulate definition of 
"willful," but where employer certainly did not 
know that its conduct violated the Act nor could 
it be said that employer adopted transfer policy in 
"reckless disregard" of requirements of the Act, 
but, rather, record made clear that employer's 
officers acted reasonably and in good faith in 
attempting to determine whether their plan would 
violate Act, conduct was not "willful" and 
respondents were not entitled to liquidated 
damages. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 11,29 
U.S.CA. § 260; Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1947, § 7(b), as amended, 29 
U.S.CA. § 626(b); Railway Labor Act, § 6, 45 
U.S.CA. § 156. 
674 Cases that cite this headnote 
*111 **616 Syllabus* 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was 
amended in 1978 to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a 
protected employee because of his age. Concerned that its 
retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, 
violated the ADEA, petitioner Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) adopted a plan permitting any employee in "flight 
engineer status" at age 60 to continue working in that 
capacity. The plan, however, does not give 60-year-old 
captains (pilots) the right automatically to begin training as 
flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain with the 
airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight engineer 
status" through the bidding procedures outlined in the 
collective-bargaining agreement between TWA and 
petitioner Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). These 
procedures require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to 
submit a "standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. 
When a vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior 
captain with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to 
his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid 
successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain 
is retired. Under the collective-bargaining agreement, a 
captain displaced for any reason besides age need not 
resort to the bidding procedure. For example, a captain 
who is medically disabled or whose position is eliminated 
due to reduced manpower may displace automatically, or 
"bump," a less senior flight engineer. Respondent former 
TWA captains (hereafter respondents) were retired upon 
reaching age 60. Each was denied an opportunity to 
"bump" a less senior flight engineer. Two of them were 
forced to retire before TWA adopted its new plan and thus 
were denied an opportunity to become flight engineers 
through the bidding procedures. The third filed a standing 
bid for the position of flight engineer but no vacancies 
occurred prior to his 60th birthday, and he too was forced 
to retire. Respondents filed an action against TWA and 
ALPA in Federal District Court, claiming that TWA's 
transfer policy violated § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA-which 
proscribes differential treatment of older **617 workers 
"with respect to [a] privileg[e] of 
employment"-because, while it allowed captains 
displaced for reasons *112 other than age to "bump" less 
senior flight engineers, it did not allow the same "privilege 
of employment" to captains compelled to vacate their 
positions upon reaching age 60. The District Court entered 
summary judgment in favor of TWA and ALP A, holding 
that respondents had failed to establish a prima facie case 
of age discrimination under the test set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 
L.Ed.2d 668, and that the affirmative defenses provided by 
Trans World inc. v. 469 U.S. 111 (1 
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§ 4(f)(I}-an employer may take "any action otherwise 
prohibited" where age is a "bona fide occupational 
qualification [BFOQ]"-and § 4(f)(2}-it is not unlawful 
for an employer to adopt a "bona fide seniority 
system"-of the ADEA justified TWA's transfer policy. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
McDonnell Douglas test was inapposite because 
respondents had adduced direct proof of age 
discrimination; that TWA was required by § 4(a)(I) to 
afford 60-year-old captains the same "privilege of 
employment," i.e., "bumping" less senior flight engineers, 
allowed captains disqualified for reasons other than age; 
that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify 
TWA's discriminatory transfer policy; and that TWA was 
liable for "liquidated" or double damages under § 7(b) of 
the ADEA, because its violation of the ADEA was 
"willful" within the meaning of that section. 
Held: 
I. TWA's transfer policy denies 60-year-old captains a 
"privilege of employment" on the basis of age in violation 
of § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA. Captains disqualified because of 
age are not afforded the same "bumping" privilege as 
captains disqualified for reasons other than age, but instead 
must resort to the bidding procedures. While the ADEA 
does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to 
disqualified captains, nevertheless, if it does grant some 
disqualified captains the "privilege" of "bumping" less 
senior flight engineers, it may not deny the opportunity to 
others because of their age. The McDonnell Douglas test is 
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of 
discrimination. Here, there is direct evidence that the 
transfer method available to a captain depends on his age. 
Since it allows captains disqualified for any reason other 
than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's 
transfer policy is discriminatory on its face. Pp. 621-622. 
2. The affirmative defenses provided by §§ 4(f)(1) and (2) 
do not support the argument that TWA's discriminatory 
transfer policy is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless 
because age is not a BFOQ for the position of flight 
engineer. Nor can TWA's policy be viewed as part of a 
bona fide seniority system. A system that includes this 
discriminatory transfer policy permits the forced 
retirement of captains on the basis of age. Pp. 622-623. 
* 113 3. TWA's violation of the ADEA was not willful 
within the meaning of § 7(b), and therefore respondents are 
not entitled to "liquidated" or double damages. A violation 
is "willful" within the meaning of § 7(b) if the employer 
knew its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA or showed a 
"reckless disregard" for whether it was prohibited, but not 
if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability 
of the ADEA or that ADEA was "in the picture." The latter 
broad standard would result in an award of double 
damages in almost every case. TWA certainly did not 
"know" that its conduct violated the ADEA. Nor can it 
fairly be said that the TWA adopted its transfer policy in 
"reckless disregard" of the ADEA's requirements. The 
record makes clear that TWA officials acted reasonably 
and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their 
policy would violate the ADEA. Pp. 623-626. 
713 F.2d 940 (CA2), affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
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Opinion 
*114 Justice POWELL delivered the opinion ofthe Court. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), a commercial airline, 
permits captains disqualified from serving in that capacity 
for reasons other than age to transfer automatically to the 
position of flight engineer. In this case, we must decide 
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U .S.c. § 621 
et seq., requires the airline to afford this same "privilege of 
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employment" to those captains disqualified by their age. 
We also must decide what constitutes a "willful" violation 
of the ADEA, entitling a plaintiff to "liquidated" or double 
damages. 
A 
TWA has approximately 3,000 employees who fill the 
three cockpit positions on most of its flights.] The 
"captain" is the pilot and controls the aircraft. He is 
responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first 
officer" is the copilot and assists the captain. The "flight 
engineer" usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. 
He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain 
and the first officer become incapacitated. 
In 1977, TWA and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, under 
which every employee in a cockpit position was required 
to retire when he reached the age of 60. This provision for 
mandatory retirement was lawful under the ADEA, as part 
of a "bona fide seniority system." See United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. McMann. 434 U.S. 192,98 S.Ct. 444,54 L.Ed.2d 
402 (1977). On April 6, 1978, however, the Act was 
amended to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a 
protected individual because of his age.2 TWA officials 
*115 became concerned that the company's retirement 
policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the 
amended ADEA.3 
On July 19, 1978, TWA announced that the amended 
ADEA prohibited the forced retirement of flight engineers 
at age 60. The company thus proposed a new policy, under 
which employees in all three cockpit positions, upon 
reaching age 60, would be allowed to continue working as 
flight engineers. TWA stated that it would not implement 
its new policy until it "had the benefit of [ALPA's] 
views."4 ALPA's views were not long in coming. The 
Union contended that the collective-bargaining agreement 
prohibited the employment of a flight engineer after his 
60th birthday and that the proposed change was not 
required by the recently amended ADEA. 
Despite opposition from the Union, TWA adopted a 
modified version of its proposal.5 **619 Under this plan, 
any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 is 
entitled to continue *116 working in that capacity. The 
new plan, unlike the initial proposal, does not give 
60-year-old captains6 the right automatically to begin 
training as flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain 
with the airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight 
engineer status" through the bidding procedures outlined in 
the collective-bargaining agreement. These procedures 
require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a 
"standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a 
vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain 
with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to his 60th 
birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid 
successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain 
is retired.7 
Under the collective-bargaining agreement, a captain 
displaced for any reason besides age need not resort to the 
bidding procedures. For example, a captain unable to 
maintain the requisite first-class medical certificate, see 14 
CFR § 67.13 (1984), may displace automatically, or 
"bump," a less senior flight engineer.8 The medically 
disabled captain's ability to bump does not depend upon 
the availability of a vacancy.9 Similarly, a captain whose 
position is eliminated due to reduced manpower needs can 
"bump" a less senior * 117 flight engineer.] 0 Even if a 
captain is found to be incompetent to serve in that capacity, 
he is not discharged,] I but is allowed to transfer to a 
position as flight engineer without resort to the bidding 
procedures. 12 
Respondents Harold Thurston, Christopher J. Clark, and 
Clifton A. Parkhill, former captains for TWA, were retired 
upon reaching the age of 60. Each was denied an 
opportunity to "bump" a less senior flight engineer. 
Thurston was forced to retire on May 26, 1978, before the 
company adopted its new policy. Clark did not attempt to 
bid because TWA had advised him that bidding would not 
affect his chances of obtaining a transfer. These two 
captains thus effectively were denied an opportunity to 
become flight engineers through the bidding procedures. 
The third captain, Parkhill, did file a standing bid for the 
position of flight engineer. No vacancies occurred prior to 
Parkhill's 60th birthday, however, and he too was forced to 
retire. 
**620 B 
Thurston, Clark, and Parkhill filed this action against TWA 
and ALP A in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York. They argued that the 
company's transfer policy violated ADEA § 4(a)(1), 81 
Stat. 603, *11829 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The airline allowed 
captains displaced for reasons other than age to "bump" 
less senior flight engineers. Captains compelled to vacate 
their positions upon reaching age 60, they claimed, should 
be afforded this same "privilege of employment." The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intervened 
on behalf of 10 other age-disqualified captains who had 
been discharged as a result of their inability to displace less 
senior flight engineers. I3 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1 
105 S.Ct 613, 36 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 977,35 EmpL Prac. Dec. P 34,851 ... 
III The District Court entered a summary judgment in 
favor of defendants TWA and ALP A. Air Line Pilots Assn. 
v. Trans World Air Lines, 547 F.Supp. 1221 (1982). The 
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima 
facie case of age discrimination under the test set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 LEd.2d 668 (1973). None could show that 
at the time of his transfer request a vacancy existed for the 
position of flight engineer. See id., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at 
1824. Furthermore, the court found that two affirmative 
defenses justified the company's transfer policy. 29 U .S.c. 
§§ 623(f)(1) and (f)(2). The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's 
judgment. 713 F.2d 940 (1983). It found the McDonnell 
Douglas formula inapposite because the plaintiffs had 
adduced direct proof of age discrimination. Captains * 119 
disqualified for reasons other than age were allowed to 
"bump" less senior flight engineers. Therefore, the 
company was required by ADEA § 4(a)(I), 29 U.s.c. § 
623(a)( I), to afford 60-year-old captains this same 
"privilege of employment." The Court of Appeals also 
held that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not 
justify the company's discriminatory transfer policY.14 713 
F.2d, at 949-951. TWA was held **621 liable for 
"liquidated" or double damages because its violation ofthe 
ADEA was found to be "wiIlful." According to the court, 
an employer's conduct is "willful" if it "knows or shows 
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct is 
prohibited by the ADEA." Id., at 956. Because "TWA was 
clearly aware of the 1978 ADEA amendments," the Court 
of Appeals found the respondents entitled to double 
damages. Id., at 956-957. 
* 120 TWA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in which 
it challenged the Court of Appeals' holding that the 
transfer policy violated the ADEA and that TWA's 
violation was "willfuL" The Union filed a cross-petition 
raising only the liability issue. We granted certiorari in 
both cases, and consolidated them for argument. 466 U.S. 
926, 104 S.D. 1706, 80 LEd.2d 179 (1984). We now 
affirm as to the violation of the ADEA, and reverse as to 
the claim for double damages. 
II 
A 
121 131 The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary 
discrimination in the workplace based on age." Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868, 55 LEd.2d 40 
(1978). Section 4(a)(l) of the Act proscribes differential 
treatment of older workers "with respect to ... [a] 
privileg[e] of employment." 29 U.S.c. § 623(a). Under 
TW A's transfer policy, 60-year-old captains are denied a 
"privilege of employment" on the basis of age. Captains 
who become disqualified from serving in that position for 
reasons other than age automatically are able to displace 
less senior flight engineers. Captains disqualified because 
of age are not afforded this same "bumping" privilege. 
Instead, they are forced to resort to the bidding procedures 
set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement. If there is 
no vacancy prior to a bidding captain's 60th birthday, he 
must retire.IS 
14J ISJ The Act does not require TWA to grant transfer 
privileges to disqualified captains. Nevertheless, if TWA 
does grant *121 some disqualified captains the "privilege" 
of "bumping" less senior flight engineers, it may not deny 
this opportunity to others because of their age. In Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 
59 (1984), we held that "[aJ benefit that is part and parcel 
of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a 
discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free 
... not to provide the benefit at all." /d, at 75, 104 S.Ct., at 
2233-2234. This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., applies with 
equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec 
verba from Title VI!." Lorillard v. Pons, supra, 434 U.S., 
at 584, 98 S.Ct., at 872.16 
161 TWA contends that the respondents failed to make out 
a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 LEd.2d 
668 (1973), because at the time they were retired, no flight 
engineer vacancies existed. This argument fails, for the 
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff 
presents direct evidence **622 of discrimination. See 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44, 97 
S.Ct. 1843, 1866, n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The 
shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
are designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his day in 
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." Loeb v. 
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (CAl 1979). In this 
case there is direct evidence that the method of transfer 
available to a disqualified captain depends upon his age. 
Since it allows captains who become disqualified for any 
reason other than age to "bump" less senior flight 
engineers, TWA's transfer policy is discriminatory on its 
face. Cf. Los Angeles Dept. o(Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 98 s.n 1370, 55 LEd.2d 657 (1978) 
(employer's policy requiring *122 female employees to 
make larger contribution to pension fund than male 
employees is discriminatory on its face). 
B 
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Although we find that TWA's transfer policy discriminates 
against disqualified captains on the basis of age, our 
inquiry cannot end here. Petitioners contend that the 
age-based transfer policy is justified by two of the ADEA's 
five affinnative defenses. Petitioners first argue that the 
discharge of respondents was lawful because age is a 
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) for the 
position of captain. 29 USc. § 623(f)(l). Furthermore, 
TWA claims that its retirement policy is part of a "bona 
fide seniority system," and thus exempt from the Act's 
coverage. 29 USc. § 623(f)(2). 
171 Section 4(f)(I) of the ADEA provides that an employer 
may take "any action otherwise prohibited" where age is a 
"bona fide occupational qualification." 29 U.S.c. § 
623(f)(l). In order to be permissible under § 4(f)(1), 
however, the age-based discrimination must relate to a 
"particular business." Ibid. Every court to consider the 
issue has assumed that the "particular business" to which 
the statute refers is the job from which the protected 
individual is excluded. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (CA5 1969), for example, the court 
considered the Title VII claim of a female employee who, 
because of her sex, had not been allowed to transfer to the 
position of switchman. In deciding that the BFOQ defense 
was not available to the defendant, the court considered 
only the job of switchman. 
181 TWA's discriminatory transfer policy is not 
permissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for 
the "particular" position of flight engineer. It is necessary 
to recognize that the airline has two age-based policies: (i) 
captains are not allowed to serve in that capacity after 
reaching the age of 60; and (ii) age-disqualified captains 
are not given the transfer privileges afforded captains 
disqualified for other reasons. * 123 The first policy, which 
precludes individuals from serving as captains, is not 
challenged by respondents. 17 The second practice does not 
operate to exclude protected individuals from the position 
of captain; rather it prevents qualified 60-year-olds from 
working as flight engineers. Thus, it is the "particular" job 
of flight engineer from which the respondents were 
excluded by the discriminatory transfer policy. Because 
age under 60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight 
engineer,I8 the age-based discrimination at issue in this 
case cannot be justified by § 4( f)( I). 
TW A nevertheless contends that its BFOQ argument is 
supported by the legislative history of the amendments to 
the ADEA. In 1978, Congress amended ADEA § 4(f)(2), 
29 USC. § 623(f)(2), to **623 prohibit the involuntary 
retirement of protected individuals on the basis of age. 
Some Members of Congress were concerned that this 
amendment might be construed as limiting the employer's 
ability to terminate workers subject to a valid BFOQ. The 
Senate proposed an amendment to § 4(f)(1) providing that 
an employer could establish a mandatory retirement age 
where age is a BFOQ. S.Rep. No. 95-493, pp. II, 24 
(1977), U .S.Code Congo & Admin.News 1978, p. 504. In 
the Conference Committee, however, the proposed 
amendment was withdrawn because "the [Senate] 
conferees agreed that ... [it] neither added to nor worked 
any change upon present law." H.R.ConfRep. No. 95-
950, p. 7 (1978), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News 1978, p. 
529. The House Committee Report also indicated that an 
individual could be compelled to retire from a position for 
which age was a BFOQ. H.R.Rep. No. 95-527, pt. I, p. 12 
(1977). 
19/ *124 The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments 
does not support petitioners' position. The history shows 
only that the ADEA does not prohibit TWA from retiring 
all disqualified captains, including those who are 
incapacitated because of age. This does not mean, 
however, that TWA can make dependent upon the age of 
the individual the availability of a transfer to a position for 
which age is not a BFOQ. Nothing in the legislative history 
cited by petitioners indicates a congressional intention to 
allow an employer to discriminate against an older worker 
seeking to transfer to another position, on the ground that 
age was a BFOQ for his former job. 
1101 TWA also contends that its discriminatory transfer 
policy is lawful under the Act because it is part of a "bona 
fide seniority system." 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(2). The Court of 
Appeals held that the airline's retirement policy is not 
mandated by the negotiated seniority plan. We need not 
address this finding; any seniority system that includes the 
challenged practice is not "bona fide" under the statute. 
The Act provides that a seniority system may not "require 
or penn it" the involuntary retirement of a protected 
individual because of his age. Ibid. Although the FAA "age 
60 rule" may have caused respondents' retirement, TWA's 
seniority plan certainly "permitted" it within the meaning 
of the ADEA. Ibid. Moreover, because captains 
disqualified for reasons other than age are allowed to 
"bump" less senior flight engineers, the mandatory 
retirement was age-based. Therefore, the "bona fide 
seniority system" defense is unavailable to the petitioners. 
In summary, TWA's transfer policy discriminates against 
protected individuals on the basis of age, and thereby 
violates the Act. The two statutory defenses raised by 
petitioners do not support the argument that this 
discrimination is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless 
because age is not a bona fide occupational qualification 
for the position of flight engineer, the job from which the 
respondents were excluded. Nor can TWA's policy be 
viewed as part of a bona *125 fide seniority system. A 
system that includes this discriminatory transfer policy 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. iii (1985) 
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permits the forced retirement of captains on the basis of 
age. 
III 
A 
Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 8 I Stat. 604, 29 U .S.c. § 
626(b), provides that the rights created by the Act are to be 
"enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and 
procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Lorillard 
v. Pons, 434 U.S., at 579, 98 S.Ct., at 869. But the remedial 
provisions of the two statutes are not identical. Congress 
declined to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA 
sections. Moreover, § 16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the 
award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly 
qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a proviso that a prevailing 
plaintiff is entitled to double damages "only in cases of 
willful violations." 29 USc. § 626(b). In this case, the 
Court of Appeals held that TWA's violation of the ADEA 
was "willful," and **624 that the respondents therefore 
were entitled to double damages. 713 F.2d, at 957. We 
granted certiorari to review this holding. 
Ill) The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that 
Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in 
nature. The original bill proposed by the administration 
incorporated § 16(a) of the FLSA, which imposes criminal 
liability for a willful violation. See 113 Cong.Rec. 2 I 99 
(1967). Senator Javits found "certain serious defects" in 
the administration bill. He stated that "difficult problems 
of proof ... would arise under a criminal provision," and 
that the employer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
might impede investigation, conciliation, and enforcement. 
Id., at 7076. Therefore, he proposed that "the [FLSA's] 
criminal penalty in cases of willful violation .. . [be] 
eliminated and a double damage liability substituted." Ibid. 
Senator Javits argued that his proposed amendment would 
"furnish an effective deterrent to willful violations [of the 
ADEA]," ibid., *126 and it was incorporated into the 
ADEA with only minor modification, S. 788, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1967). 
fI2) fl31 )141 This Court has recognized that in enacting 
the ADEA, "Congress exhibited ... a detailed knowledge of 
the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation .... " 
Lorillard v. Pons, supra, 58 I, 98 S.Ct., at 870. The manner 
in which FLSA § 16(a) has been interpreted therefore is 
relevant. In general, courts have found that an employer is 
subject to criminal penalties under the FLSA when he 
"wholly disregards the law... without making any 
reasonable effort to determine whether the plan he is 
following would constitute a violation of the law." Nabob 
Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (CAlO), cert. 
denied, 342 U.S. 876, 72 S.Ct. 167,96 L.Ed. 659 (1951); 
see also Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928 (CA5 
1943).19 This standard is substantially in accord with the 
interpretation of "willful" adopted by the Court of Appeals 
in interpreting the liquidated damages provision of the 
ADEA. The court below stated that a violation of the Act 
was "willful" if"the employer ... knew or showed reckless 
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was 
prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, at 956. Given the 
legislative history of the liquidated damages provision, we 
think the "reckless disregard" standard is reasonable. 
The definition of "willful" adopted by the above cited 
courts is consistent with the manner in which this Court has 
interpreted the term in other criminal and civil statutes. In 
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78 
L.Ed. 381 (1933), the defendant was prosecuted under the 
Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, which made it a 
misdemeanor for a person "willfully" to *127 fail to pay 
the required tax. The Murdock Court stated that conduct 
was "willful" within the meaning of this criminal statute if 
it was "marked by careless disregard [for] whether or not 
one has the right so to act." Id., at 395, 54 S.Ct., at 225. In 
United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 58 
S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773 (1938), the Court applied the 
Murdock definition of "willful" in a civil case. There, the 
defendant's failure to unload a cattle car was "willful," 
because it showed a disregard for the governing statute and 
an indifference to its requirements. 303 U.S., at 242-243, 
58 S.Ct., at 534-535.20 
115) 1]6) The respondents argue that an employer's 
conduct is willful if he is "cognizant **625 of an 
appreciable possibility that the employees involved were 
covered by the [ADEA]." In support of their position, the 
respondents cite § 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 
(PPA), 29 U.S.c. § 255(a), which is incorporated in both 
the ADEA and the FLSA. Section 6 of the PPA provides 
for a 2-year statute of limitations period unless the 
violation is willful, in which case the limitations period is 
extended to three years. 29 USc. § 255(a). Several courts 
have held that a violation is willful within the meaning of § 
6 if the employer knew that the ADEA was "in the 
picture." See, e.g., Coleman v. JiffY June Farms, Inc., 458 
F.2d 1139, 1142 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 
93 S.Ct. 292, 34 L.Ed.2d 219 (1972); EEOC v. Central 
Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1274 (CAlO 
1983). Respondents contend that the term "willful" should 
be interpreted in a similar manner in applying the 
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. 
We are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that a 
violation of the Act is "willful" if the employer simply 
knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA. Even if 
the "in *]28 the picture" standard were appropriate for the 
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statute of limitations, the same standard should not govern 
a provision dealing with liquidated damages.21 More 
importantly, the broad standard proposed by the 
respondents would result in an award of double damages in 
almost every case. As employers are required to post 
ADEA notices, it would be virtually impossible for an 
employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its 
potential applicability. Both the legislative history and the 
structure of the statute show that Congress intended a 
two-tiered liability scheme. We decline to interpret the 
liquidated damages provision of ADEA § 7(b) in a manner 
that frustrates this intent.22 
B 
117) As noted above, the Court of Appeals stated that a 
violation is "willful" if "the employer either knew or 
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its 
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, at 956. 
Although we *129 hold that this is an acceptable way to 
articulate a definition of "willful," the court below 
misapplied this standard. TWA certainly did not "know" 
that its conduct violated the Act. Nor can it fairly be said 
that TWA adopted its transfer policy in "reckless 
disregard" of the Act's requirements. The record makes 
clear that TWA officials acted reasonably and in good faith 
in attempting to determine whether their plan would 
violate the ADEA. See Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 
supra. 
Shortly after the ADEA was amended, TWA officials met 
with their lawyers to determine whether the mandatory 
retirement policy violated the Act. Concluding that the 
company's existing plan was inconsistent **626 with the 
ADEA, David Crombie, the airline's Senior Vice President 
for Administration, proposed a new policy. Despite 
opposition from the Union, the company adopted a 
modified version of this initial proposal. Under the plan 
adopted on August 10, 1978, any pilot in "flight engineer 
status" on his 60th birthday could continue to work for the 
airline. On the day the plan was adopted, the Union filed 
suit against the airline claiming that the new retirement 
policy constituted a "major" change in the 
collective-bargaining agreement, and thus was barred by § 
6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U .s.c. § 156. Nevertheless, 
TWA adhered to its new policy. 
As evidence of "willfulness," respondents point to 
comments made by J.E. Frankum, the Vice President of 
Flight Operations. After Crombie was hospitalized in 
August 1978, Frankum assumed responsibility for bringing 
Footnotes 
TWA's retirement policy into conformance with the 
ADEA. Despite legal advice to the contrary, Frankum 
initially believed that the company was not required to 
allow any pilot over 60 to work. Frankum later abandoned 
this position in favor of the plan approved on August 10, 
1978. Frankum apparently had been concerned only about 
whether flight engineers could work after reaching the age 
of60. There is no indication that TWA was ever advised by 
counsel that its new transfer policy discriminated against 
captains on the basis of age. 
*130 There simply is no evidence that TWA acted in 
"reckless disregard" of the requirements ofthe ADEA. The 
airline had obligations under the collective-bargaining 
agreement with the Air Line Pilots Association. In an 
attempt to bring its retirement policy into compliance with 
the ADEA, while at the same time observing the terms of 
the collective-bargaining agreement, TWA sought legal 
advice and consulted with the Union. Despite opposition 
from the Union, a plan was adopted that permitted cockpit 
employees to work as "flight engineers" after reaching age 
60. Apparently TWA officials and the airline's attorneys 
failed to focus specifically on the effect of each aspect of 
the new retirement policy for cockpit personnel. It is 
reasonable to believe that the parties involved, in focusing 
on the larger overall problem, simply overlooked the 
challenged aspect of the new plan.23 We conclude that 
TWA's violation of the Act was not willful within the 
meaning of § 7(b), and that respondents therefore are not 
entitled to liquidated damages. 
IV 
The ADEA requires TWA to afford 60-year-old captains 
the same transfer privileges that it gives to captains 
disqualified for reasons other than age. Therefore, we 
affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. We do not agree 
with its holding that TWA's violation of the Act was 
willful. We accordingly reverse its judgment that 
respondents are entitled to liquidated or double damages. 
It is so ordered. 
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Former employee brought action against his former 
employer, alleging employer violated the Age 
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Washington, Franklin D. Burgess, 1., 2000 WL 502829, 
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,~,~Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Employees need offer very little evidence of 
employment discrimination in order to defeat an 
employer's motion for summary judgment, 
because the ultimate question of determining the 
reason for the employer's actions requires a 
searching inquiry, one that is most appropriately 
12) 
13) 
14) 
conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record. 
Civil Rights 
··F~.EtTect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework for an employment discrimination 
claim: (I) the plaintiff must make a prima facie 
case of discrimination; (2) the burden of 
production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the 
defendant to offer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken 
against the plaintiff; and then (3) the plaintiff 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the legitimate reasons offered by the 
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a 
pretext for discrimination. 
Civil Rights 
/",Prima Facie Case 
Federal Civil Procedure 
./',Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
The burden of making a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination under McDonnell 
Doug/as is not onerous, and only minimal proof 
is required to survive summary judgment. 
Civil Rights 
,~=Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADEA by showing: (I) 
membership in a protected class, namely that he 
is at least 40 years old; (2) he was qualified for 
the position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse 
employment action; and (4) he was treated less 
V. Standard Ins. Co., 24 1;;,-,.1",1-'''''''. 801 (2001) 
favorably than similarly situated individuals 
outside of the protected class. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq. 
151 Federal Civil Procedure 
,.»,.,Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether former employer's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 
employee was pretext for discrimination, 
precluding summary judgment for employer in 
employee's action alleging violation of the 
ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 USCA § 621 et seq. 
*802 Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, Franklin D. Burgess, 
District Judge, Presiding. 
Before B. FLETCHER, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, 
Circuit Judges. 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM* 
Vernon Troy, a former sales representative for Standard 
Insurance Company, appeals the summary judgment in 
favor of the employer in a claim brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C 
§ 623(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 USC § 129 L We 
review the award of summary judgment de novo, 
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th CiL2001), 
and we reverse. Because the parties are familiar with the 
factual background, we do not recite the details here. 
III The district court did not have the benefit of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), at the time of its decision. Reeves 
requires that we reverse the summary judgment in favor of 
Standard and remand for trial. Employees need offer "very 
little evidence" of discrimination in order to defeat an 
employer's motion for summary judgment, Chuang v. 
Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.2000), 
because the ultimate question of determining the reason for 
the employer's actions requires a "searching inquiry-one 
that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a 
full record." Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 
1406, 1410 (9th CiL1996) (quoting Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 
40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th CiLI994)). 
*803 121 Under the McDonnell Doug/as burden-shifting 
framework (I) the plaintiffmust make a prima facie case of 
discrimination; (2) the burden of production, but not 
persuasion, then shifts to the defendant to offer a 
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the action taken 
against the plaintiff; and then (3) the plaintiff must "prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, 
but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
142-43 (citations omitted). 
131 141 The burden of making a prima facie case is "not 
onerous," Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 
1337, 1342 (9th CiLI981), so that only "minimal proof' is 
required to survive summary judgment Chuang, 225 F.3d 
at 1124. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADEA by showing he (1) belongs 
to a protected class (he is at least 40 years old); (2) was 
qualified for the position; (3) was subjected to an adverse 
employment action; and (4) was treated less favorably than 
similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class. 
See Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th 
CiLI994). Troy established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. 
In Troy's case, the parties only dispute the second 
factor-whether Troy was qualified for his position as a 
sales representative, or, as Standard puts it, whether he 
satisfactorily performed his duties. Troy offered evidence 
that he had worked for Standard for 23 years by the time he 
was given the choice to resign or be fired. He received two 
commendations, one from Standard's President and the 
other from its Vice President, upon completing 20 years of 
service, only three years earlier. Although Standard argues 
that Troy's past performance is not relevant to concerns 
about his performance during the last few years of his 
service with the company, its own Vice President 
acknowledged that "[t]rue success is measured by long 
term results." Moreover, even during the last few years, 
Troy consistently ranked in the top half of Standard's sales 
representatives nationally, fared well when compared to 
his regional peers, and, more often than not, beat his 
Seattle peers, except for his former manager, Dennis 
Dawson.l 
151 Neither party contests that Standard met its burden in 
providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
v. Standard ins. 24 801 (200i) 
terminating Troy's performance: Troy received two 
successive poor evaluations and failed to meet the action 
plan targets. Troy, however, met his burden of offering 
evidence that Standard's reason was a pretext for age 
discrimination. As Reeves states, in a motion for summary 
judgment, courts must (I) review the record as a whole but 
(2) do so in favor of the nonmovant so that (3) all 
reasonable inferences are made on behalf of the 
nonmovant. 530 U.S. at 149-50. 
Without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in 
Reeves, the district court discounted as "innocuous" 
comments referring to Troy's energy level, his manner of 
sitting in his chair, his need to "rejuvenate" his sales 
approach, and the "very seasoned/tenured reps" in the 
Seattle office. Such comments could be innocuous, but 
they could also be a sign of a bias favoring younger sales 
representatives. Determining whether the comments were, 
in fact, innocuous or, in fact, a sign of bias belongs to the 
jury. 
*804 Likewise, Standard may very well have had a 
nondiscrimatory reason for its method of allocating and 
reallocating territories as well as determining production 
targets. Nonetheless, a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that an employer who requires its senior workers 
(here, workers protected by the ADEA) to meet higher 
production targets because of their experience/age, who 
simultaneously takes away the territories that the senior 
workers have developed over the years (and that may allow 
them to meet their higher production targets), and who 
gives those territories to less experienced/younger 
employees, is engaging in a practice that is inherently 
discriminatory. To simply say it is a business model is to 
avoid the question of whether that business model is 
discriminatory.2 
Troy produced other evidence from which a jury could 
infer pretext: Troy's production targets were set much 
higher than his replacement's targets, even though his 
replacement had 17 years of experience selling insurance; 
Standard allowed its managers to arbitrarily assign 
Footnotes 
production targets; Standard's method of evaluating sales 
representatives involved subjectivity that could have 
allowed a manager's age-related bias to affect his or her 
rating of an employee; Standard's failure to fire all 
employees who missed production targets indicates that 
they were not "quotas;" Garry Montag, the younger 
manager who put Troy on the action plan that led to his 
termination, engaged in questionable conduct that hurt 
Troy's chance of meeting his production target but was not 
disciplined himself; Troy's original action plan would have 
been virtually impossible to achieve, while his revised plan 
was simply one that no employee had achieved in the 
previous four years; and Troy's problems began in 1994 
when Dawson, Troy's contemporary, accepted a demotion 
from manager to sales representative rather than face an 
action plan Dawson considered impossible to achieve. 
Troy did not have to prove his case at summary judgment 
but rather just raise a material issue of disputed fact. See 
Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1993) 
("If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue 
regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive, 
summary judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the 
trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed."). 
Looking at all the evidence presented, with the benefit of 
every reasonable inference, Troy has met his burden. 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "no rational 
factfinder could conclude that the [employer's] action was 
discriminatory." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. This is not such a 
case. Because there exist material issues of fact, the district 
court should not have awarded summary judgment to the 
defendant on Troy's age discrimination claim. 
REVERSED. 
Parallel Citations 
2001 WL 1646866 (C.A.9 (Wash.» 
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 
9th Cif. R. 36-3. 
1 Standard's attacks on Troy's performance, especially when based on subjective factors, should not be considered during step one of 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Lynn. 656 F.2d at 1344. 
2 While Standard is correet to say that not all practices that "discriminate" among workers, even those that are patently unfair, are 
actionable, at the summary judgment stage, eourts must draw inferenees in favor of the non movant. Here, those inferences suggest 
that Standard's motivation might have represented age-related bias. 
V. Standard Ins. Co., 24 801 (2001) 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Gary E. WALLIS, husband; Carol Wallis, 
wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Defendant-
Appellee. 
No. 92-36759. I Argued and Submitted Jan. 
6,1994. I Decided May 26, 1994. I As 
Amended on Denial of Rehearing July 14, 
1994· 
Discharged employee brought action claiming retaliatory 
discharge and age discrimination. The United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho, Marion 1. Callister, 
Chief Judge, granted summary judgment for employer and 
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, T.G. Nelson, 
Circuit Judge, held that summary judgment could be 
granted even though employee established prima facie case 
of discrimination where employee failed to present any 
evidence to refute employer's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (5) 
111 Federal Courts 
"",Time for Filing in General 
Application of amended version of rule providing 
that when notice of appeal is prematurely filed, it 
shall be in abeyance, and shaII become effective 
upon date of entry of order that disposes of last of 
all such motions, to appeal that was pending on 
effective date of rule, was "just and practicable"; 
appellee could not claim prejudice because it did 
not discover defect in notice until court ordered 
supplemental briefing on issue of jurisdiction 
after case had been set for oral argument 
F.R.A.P.Rule 4(a)( 4),28 U.S.CApp.(I988 Ed.). 
28 Cases that cite this headnote 
12) 
131 
141 
Federal Civil Procedure 
;,,,Burden of Proof 
Requisite degree of proof necessary to establish 
prima facie case for Title VII and Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
claims on summary judgment is minimal and 
does not even need to rise to level of 
preponderance of evidence; plaintiff need only 
offer evidence which gives rise to inference of 
unlawful discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.; 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA. 
540 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
~>.,.Prima Facie Case 
Civil Rights 
,."",.Age Discrimination 
Prima facie case for Title VII and Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
claims may be based either on presumption or on 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 
2000e et seq.; Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
56,28 U.S.CA. 
40 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
,.,.Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden 
Civil Rights 
_".Age Discrimination 
Once prima facie case has been made under Title 
VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), burden of production shifts to 
defendant, who must offer evidence that adverse 
action was taken for other than impermissibly 
discriminatory reasons; once defendant fulfiIIs 
this burden of production by offering legitimate, 
Wallis v. J.R. 26 F.3d 885 (1994) 
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151 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
decision, presumption of unlawful discrimination 
drops out of picture. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56,28 U.S.C.A. 
365 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
'~;~Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Even though employee established prima facie 
case to support his retaliatory discharge and age 
discrimination claims, when employee then 
failed to present any evidence to refute 
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for discharge, employee failed to establish triable 
issue of fact on ultimate question of whether 
employer intentionally discriminated or 
retaliated against him, and summary judgment 
for employer was proper. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
447 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*886 Robert C. Huntley, Givens Pursley & Huntley, Boise, 
ID, for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Rory R. Jones, Richard H. Greener, Cosho, Humphrey, 
Greener & Welsh, Boise, ID, for defendant-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District ofIdaho. 
Before: CANBY, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and 
SHUBB,' District Judge. 
Opinion 
Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON. 
OPINION 
T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge: 
I. 
OVERVIEW 
Gary and Carol Wallis appeal the district court's grant of 
summary judgment dismissing Wallis' claims for 
retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e, et seq., age 
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), *88729 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., 
and various state law claims. I We affirm. 
II. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Gary Wallis (Wallis) was hired in 1982 by J.R. Simplot 
Company (Simplot) as Director of Human Resources. 
Early in his tenure, a female employee of Simp lot made a 
charge of sexual harassment against a vice-president of 
Simplot. Wallis supported her in her claim by transferring 
her to another division. Later, a second employee was 
discharged by the vice-president for his support of the 
woman in the harassment claim. Wallis rehired this 
discharged employee for his own staff and made 
supportive public statements on behalf of the employee. 
These events occurred sometime during 1983, 1984 and 
1985. 
In late 1989 and early 1990, Gordon Smith (Smith), 
president of Simplot, decided to decentralize the human 
resources department so that it would function at the 
company's division level. Smith informed Wallis of the 
decision in June 1990. At that time, and on occasions 
thereafter, Smith told Wallis that Simplot would find a 
"new role" for him and that he would not be "hurt by the 
decentralization process." 
On September 12, 1990, Smith sent Wallis a letter 
terminating his employment. Wallis contends his 
termination closely followed hispresentation to Smith of a 
Wallis v. J.R. Co., 26 F.3d 885 (1994) 
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copy of a speech which he intended to give at an annual 
meeting of Simplot's management personnel. He contends 
that this speech was critical of Simplot's employment 
practices, and that his discharge was in retaliation for this 
proposed speech. On the basis of these allegations, Wallis 
filed suit in state court alleging violations of Title VII, the 
ADEA, and various state law claims. Simplot removed the 
case to federal district court. 
The district court granted summary judgment for Simplot 
on all claims as it saw them on February 12, 1992. Wallis 
moved for reconsideration of the judgment, claiming he 
had pleaded a claim of retaliatory discharge which had not 
been addressed by the district court. Although the 
complaint did not clearly allege this claim, the district 
court considered the retaliatory discharge claim, and on 
July 7, 1992, it entered a second summary judgment 
adverse to Wallis on that claim also. 
On July 15, 1992, Wallis moved the district court to alter or 
amend the second summary judgment pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Then, on August 4, 1992, Wallis filed a 
notice of appeal, appealing both summary judgments. 
Finally, on January 6, 1993, the district court entered an 
order denying the motion to alter or amend the second 
summary judgment. 
III. 
JURISDICTION 
111 At the time Wallis filed his notice of appeal, Rule 
4(a)(4)2 plainly stated that a notice of appeal filed during 
the pendency of a motion to alter or amend the judgment 
"shall have no effect." The Supreme Court, in Griggs v. 
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 6 I, 103 
S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982), held that a notice of 
appeal filed during the pendency of a Rule 59 motion is a 
nullity, as ifno notice of appeal were filed at all. However, 
Rule 4(a)( 4) was amended effective December I, 1993,3 to 
provide *888 that when a notice is prematurely filed, it 
"shall be in abeyance, and shall become effective upon the 
date of entry of an order that disposes of the last of all such 
motions." Under the old version of Rule 4(a)(4), applicable 
at the time Wallis filed the notice of appeal, the notice was 
a nullity. Thus, the issue becomes whether the notice may 
be resurrected by a retroactive application of the amended 
version of Rule 4(a)(4). See Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Indemnity Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 444, 445 (9th 
Cir.1994) (applying amended Rule retroactively); Burt v. 
Ware. 14 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir.1994) (holding amended 
rule applies retroactively unless it would work injustice). 
The Supreme Court's order adopting the 1993 amendments 
to the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
That the foregoing amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
shall take effect on December I, 1993, 
and shall govern all proceedings in 
appellate cases thereafter commenced 
and, insofar as just and practicable, all 
proceedings in appellate cases then 
pending. 
61 U.S.L.W. 5365 (U.S. Apr. 27,1993) (emphasis added). 
Wallis' appeal was pending on December I, 1993; thus, if 
the application of the 1993 amendment to this case is "just 
and practicable," we have jurisdiction. 
The parties briefed this case and were prepared to argue it 
as though the notice of appeal were valid. Simplot cannot 
claim prejudice because it did not discover the defect in the 
filing of the notice of appeal until this court ordered 
supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction after the 
case had already been set for oral argument. To allow the 
parties to proceed to present the appeal they have been 
working on since August 1992 is just. Further, practicality 
is no problem. No adjustments in briefing schedules or in 
calendaring of oral argument were required in order to 
address the issues raised by the parties. 
Under the circumstances ofthis case, we hold that it is "just 
and practicable" to apply the amended version of Rule 
4(a)(4) to this case. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"We review the district court's grant of summary judgment 
de novo to determine whether there are any genuine issues 
of material fact and whether the district court correctly 
applied the relevant substantive law." Sengupta v. 
Morrison~Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th 
Cir.1986). We do not weigh the evidence or determine the 
truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510~1 1,91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986). The record below is examined to determine 
whether there is any basis for affirmance. Lowe v. City of 
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended, 
784 F.2d 1407 (1986). If the result reached by the district 
court is correct, we will affirm even if the district court 
Wallis v. J.R. Simp!ot 26 F.3d 885 (1994) 
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relied on an erroneous ground. Id. 
V. 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE AND AGE 
DISCRIMINA TION 
We combine the Title VII and ADEA claims for analysis 
because the burdens of proof and persuasion are the same.4 
See *889 Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 
1420 (9th Cir.1990) ("The shifting burden of proof applied 
to a Title VII discrimination claim also applies to claims 
arising under ADEA."). The basic allocation of burdens 
and order of presentation of proof for such claims follows 
three steps: 
[AJ plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged 
reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext 
for another motive which is discriminatory. 
Lowe, 775 F .2d at 1005. 
12) The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a 
prima facie case for Title VII and ADEA claims on 
summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to 
rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. See 
YartzofJv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939, III S.Ct. 345, 112 L.Ed.2d 309 
(1990). The plaintiff need only offer evidence which 
"gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1005 (quotation omitted). "The amount 
[of evidence J that must be produced in order to create a 
prima facie case is 'very little.' " Sischo ..... Nownejad v. 
Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, IIII 
(9th Cir.1991); see also, Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009. 
"Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a 
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated 
against the employee." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 
L.Ed.2d 207 (198 I). 
(3) The prima facie case may be based either on a 
presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by more 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 
1009. In offering a prima facie case, of course, a plaintiff 
may present evidence going far beyond the minimum 
]"~quirements. 
141 Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant, who must offer 
evidence that the adverse action was taken for other than 
impermissibly discriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Once the defendant fulfills this 
burden of production by offering a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption of unlawful 
discrimination "simply drops out of the picture." St. 
Mmy's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, - ,113 S.Ct. 
2742,2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 
IS) The question before us is whether, after these steps 
have been taken, a summary judgment for the defendant 
employer can be sustained. We are convinced that as in 
any other summary judgment situation, the questi~n can 
only be answered in each case by a review of the actual 
evidence offered by each party, to see whether a genuine 
issue of material fact has been presented for trial. If a 
rational trier offact could, on all the evidence, find that the 
employer's action was taken for impermissibly 
discriminatory reasons, summary judgment for the defense 
is inappropriate. Before we analyze the record in this case, 
however, we deal with some of the more categorical 
arguments offered by the parties. 
Wallis relies on our decision in Sischo--Nownejad, 934 
F.2d at I 104, for the proposition that summary judgment 
for the employer is never appropriate after the plaintiff 
makes out a prima facie case. In that case, we noted: 
Even if the defendant articulates a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the challenged employment decision, 
thus shifting the burden to the plaintiff to 
prove that the articulated reason is 
pretextual, summary judgment is 
normally inappropriate. When a plaintiff 
has established aprimafacie inference of 
disparate treatment through direct or 
circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent, he will necessarily 
have raised a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to the legitimacy or 
bona fides of the employer's articulated 
reason for its employment decision. 
*890 Id. at I I II (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). However, we went on to state: 
[I]n evaluating whether the defendant's 
articulated reason is pretextual, the trier 
of fact must, at a minimum, consider the 
same evidence that the plaintiff 
introduced to establish her prima facie 
Wallis v. J.R Co., 26 F.3d 885 
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case. When that evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, consists of more than the 
[prima facie ] presumption, a factual 
question will almost always exist with 
respect to any claim of 
nondiscriminatory reason. 
Jd. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Sischo--
Nownejad, thus, read as a whole, stands for the proposition 
that in deciding whether an issue of fact has been created 
about the credibility of the employer's nondiscriminatory 
reasons, the district court must look at the evidence 
supporting the prima facie case, as well as the other 
evidence offered by the plaintiff to rebut the employer's 
offered reasons. And, in those cases where the prima facie 
case consists of no more than the minimum necessary to 
create a presumption of discrimination under McDonnell 
Douglas, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact 
Thus, the mere existence of a prima facie case, based on 
the minimum evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell 
Douglas presumption, does not preclude summary 
judgment Indeed, in Lindahlv. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 
1437 (9th Cir. 1991), we specifically held "a plaintiff 
cannot defeat summary judgment simply by making out a 
prima facie case." "[The plaintiff] must do more than 
establish a prima facie case and deny the credibility of the 
[defendant's] witnesses." Schuler v. Chronicle 
Broadcasting Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 10 II (9th Cir. 1986). In 
response to the defendant's offer of nondiscriminatory 
reasons, the plaintiff must produce "specific, substantial 
evidence of pretext" Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 
392,393 (9th Cir.1983). In other words, the plaintiff"must 
tender a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order 
to avoid summary judgment" Id. 
Wallis' assertion, that once a plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case summary judgment is impermissible, is 
untenable. His position would require a trial in every 
discrimination case, even where no genuine issue of 
material fact exists concerning the legitimacy of the 
employer's nondiscriminatory reasons. Such a result is not 
compelled by Sischo--Nownejad and would be contrary to 
other cases affirming summary judgment where the 
plaintiff failed to produce evidence of intentional 
discrimination. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 473 n. 16 (9th Cir.1991) 
(distinguishing Lowe and Sischo--Nownejad ); Lindahl. 
930 F.2d at 1437 (requiring more than mere primafacie 
case); Schuler, 793 F .2d at 101 I; (requiring more than 
prima facie case and denial of credibility of employer's 
witnesses); Steck!, 703 F.2d at 393 (failing to produce any 
facts, which if believed, would have shown pretext). 
There are a number of recent cases in other circuits that 
have required plaintiffs to come forth with evidence 
sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the 
employer's explanation to be pretextual; the mere fact that 
a bare prima facie case had been made out was not in itself 
sufficient. See Davis v. Chevron US.A., 14 F.3d 1082, 
1087 (5th Cir.1994) (failing to present more than mere 
refutation of employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring); Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 
836, 340 (I Otl1 Cir. 1994) (failing to offer sufficient 
evidence to support finding that reason was pretext); 
Anderson v. BCLr;ter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 
(7th Cir.1994) (requiring plaintiff to produce evidence 
from which rational fact finder could infer employer lied); 
Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th 
Cir.1993) (requiring evidence creating factual dispute 
about nondiscriminatory reason); Geary v. Visitation of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary, 7 F.3d 324, 332 (3rd Cir. 1993) 
(failing to offer facts showing genuine issue of fact as to 
reason); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 
(I st Cir.1993) (requiring evidence sufficient for fact finder 
to reasonably conclude discriminatory motive), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 
(1994). We hold that, when evidence to refute the 
defendant's legitimate explanation is totally lacking, 
summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff 
may have established a minimal prima facie *891 case 
based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption. 
We now tum to the specific facts of this case to determine 
whether Wallis met his requisite burden to overcome 
summary judgment Generally, to establish a prima facie 
case of an ADEA violation, the plaintiff must show he was: 
(I) a member of a protected class [age 40-70]; 
(2) performing his job in a satisfactory manner; 
(3) discharged; and 
(4) replaced by a substantially younger employee with 
equal or inferior qualifications. 
Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421. Proof of the replacement element 
is not always required, however. Where the discharge 
results from a reduction in work force, the plaintiff may 
show "through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence 
that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise 
to an inference of age discrimination." Id. Such an 
inference can be established by showing the employer had 
a "continuing need for his skills and services in that his 
various duties were still being performed." Id. (quoting 
Leichihman v. Pickwick lnt'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855,108 S.Ct. 161,98 L.Ed.2d 
I 16 (1987)); see also Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 
1434 (9th Cir.1993) (prima facie case established by 
WaHis v. J.R. Co., 26 F.3d 885 (1:l94) 
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proving others not in employee's protected class were 
treated more favorably). 
The first three elements of the prima facie case are not 
contested by Simplot. Regarding the fourth element, 
Wallis claimed that twelve of the thirteen functions he 
performed were retained at the corporate level, and that all 
his duties were assigned to persons younger and less 
qualified than he. Wallis was not replaced because his 
position was eliminated; instead, current employees of 
Simplot assumed Wallis' duties. In this respect, Wallis' 
claim is more analogous to a reduction in force situation 
which does not require proof of replacement, but allows 
alternative proof of an inference of age discrimination. 
Because very little evidence is required to establish a 
primafacie case, we conclude he has met this burden. 
We also find Wallis met his minimal burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for a Title VII claim. Proof 
of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge requires a 
showing that: 
(I) he was engaged in a protected activity; 
(2) he was thereafter subjected by his employer to an 
adverse employment action; and 
(3) a causal link exists between the protected activity 
and the adverse employment action. 
Yartzoff, 809 F .2d at 1375. 
Wallis contends his proposed speech, which he intended to 
give at an annual meeting of Simplot's management 
personnel and which he shared with Smith, constituted a 
protected activity.s Further, he contends he was discharged 
in retaliation for the proposed speech. The district court 
held the speech was not a protected activity because it was 
not critical of Simplot's actions. It read Wallis' proposed 
speech as merely setting forth perceptions of the company 
gained directly from employees during a recent facilities 
tour and providing suggestions to management on how to 
counter or ameliorate the adverse employee views 
expressed during the tour. 
The district court's view of the speech is supportable. 
When viewed in the context of the tour and Wallis' 
responsibilities, it can be fairly interpreted as not critical of 
Simplot, but simply descriptive of problems which 
employees relayed to Wallis. However, there are some 
isolated passages which can be read as critical of Simp lot, 
and Smith may have possibly interpreted the speech as 
critical. Therefore, we disagree with the district court and 
hold that Wallis established a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge. 
*892 Accordingly, because Wallis established prima facie 
cases to support his Title VII and ADEA claims, the 
burden shifts to Simplot to offer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for Wallis' termination. Simplot 
offers such a reason. In response to Wallis' claims, Simplot 
asserts Wallis was not terminated because of his age or in 
retaliation for the proposed speech. Instead, Simplot claims 
Wallis' termination was a result of its decision to 
decentralize the human resources function, and as a result 
of this decentralization, Wallis' supervisory duties were 
assumed by others at the corporate level, and the human 
resources function was moved to the division level. 
Because Simp lot offers this legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for Wallis' termination, it has carried its burden of 
production, and the presumptions created by the prima 
facie cases disappear. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at --, 113 
S.Ct. at 2749. This is true even though there has been no 
assessment of the credibility of Simplot at this stage. fd.; 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 10 I S.Ct. at 1094. 
The presumptions having dropped out of the picture, we 
are left with the ultimate question of whether Wallis has 
offered evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact 
to find that Simplot intentionally discriminated against him 
because of his age or retaliated against him for his 
proposed speech. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at· --,113 S.Ct. at 
2749. In determining whether there is a triable issue of fact, 
we must consider all the evidence, including that offered to 
establish the prima facie cases and to rebut Simplot's 
reason as pretextual together with any other evidence. 
Wallis' response to Simplot's nondiscriminatory reason is 
merely that the functions he performed continue to be 
performed by other Simp lot employees and that 
supervisory duties remained at the corporate level which is 
the same proof he offered to establish his prima facie case. 
Wallis offers no additional proof of age discrimination 
either direct, circumstantial or statistical.6 Further, he 
offers no additional proof of a retaliatory motive. Wallis' 
response that other employees assumed his duties merely 
serves to reinforce the Simplot's explanation for his 
termination: the company was decentralizing Wallis' 
function and downsizing by requiring other employees to 
assume his duties. In essence, Wallis has simply showed 
that an adverse employment decision was made under 
conditions that permitted him to invoke a McDonnell 
Douglas type of presumption of unlawful discrimination. 
That evidence, although it sufficed to establish a minimal 
prima facie case, is not enough now that Simp lot has 
offered a nondiscriminatory explanation, and nothing in 
Wallis' evidence controverts it. Because Wallis failed to 
present any evidence to refute Simplot's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge, we hold Wallis 
failed to carry his burden of establishing a triable issue of 
fact on the ultimate question of whether Simp lot 
WaHis v. J.R Co., 26 F.3d 885 (1994) 
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intentionally discriminated or retaliated against him. 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Simplot. 
Parallel Citations 
Footnotes 
64 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1507, 65 Fair 
EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1216, 65 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. 
(BNA) 1881, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,074, 28 
Fed.R.Serv.3d 1464 
* Honorable William B. Shubb, United States District Judge for Eastern District of California, sitting by designation. 
This court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Wallis' state law claims in a separate, unpublished 
decision. 
2 The version of Rule 4(a)(4) in effect at the time of Wallis' appeal stated: 
If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ... under Rule 59 ... , the 
time for appeal of all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying ... such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of {sllch motion} shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be tiled within the prescribed time measured from 
the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided above. 
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
3 A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the judgment but bcJore disposition of any of the above motions is ineffective 
to appeal from the judgment or order, or part thereof, specified in the notice of appeal until the date of the entry of the order disposing 
of the last such motion outstanding. Appellate review of an order disposing of any of the above motions requires the party, in 
compliance with Appellate Rule 3(c), to amend a previously filed notice of appeal. A party intending to challenge an alteration or 
amendment of the judgment shall file an amended notice of appeal within the time prescribed by this Rule 4 measured from the entry 
of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. No additional fees will be required for filing an amended notice. 
4 Wallis also makes a claim under the Idaho Human Rights Act (lHH.A), I.C § 67~590 1, et seq. The Idaho Supreme Court has held the 
analysis under Title VII applies to claims under IHRA. See Hoppe v. A/cDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644 P.2d 355. 358 (1982). See also 
Sengupta v. Alorrison- Knudsen Co., Inc .. 804 F.2d 1072. 1077 (9th Cir. 1 986). Accordingly. our decision resolving Wallis' Title VII 
claim also resolves his IlIRA claim. 
5 Wallis also contends his support of a female employee who brought a sexual harassment claim against a Simplot executive and of 
another employee who supported her in this claim was a protected activity. We need not resolve this issue. however, because Wallis 
concedes these events occurred sometime during 1983, 1984 and 1985, and were not in close proximity to his termination. 
6 After summary judgment on Wallis' ADEA claim, Wallis moved for reconsideration of the judgment under Rule 59. In support of the 
motion, Wallis' lawyer submitted an affidavit showing the ages of various people terminated by Simplot prior to Wallis' termination. 
No attempt was made to show why this information was not presented at the summary judgment hearing; Wallis did not claim the 
evidence was unavailable to him at the time of summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration without 
comment. Implicit in its denial was the rejection of the tardy affidavit. This r"jection was well within the district court's discretion. 
The district court is required only to consider the tardy affidavit ifit constituted "newly discovercd evidence" within the meaning of 
Rule 59. See Coastal Tramfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales. US.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir.1987). Evidence is not newly discovered 
if it was in the party's possession at the time of summary judgment or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See id. 
at 212. We similarly decline to accept the tardy afJidavit. 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 2008 Term. 
Joe C. WATERll1AN, Plaintfff-Appellant, 
v. 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and Allied Insurance Company, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 33883. I Jan. 22, 2009. 
Synopsis 
Background: Former employee brought action against 
employer alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967. After jury returned a verdict in 
favor of employee, awarding him $700,000.00 in damages, 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, D. Duff 
McKee, J., granted employer's motion for directed verdict 
and entered judgment for employer. Employee appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held that: 
[I] two stray comments that employer was a "young 
company" were insufficient to establish a discriminatory 
intent on the part of employer; 
[2] there was no evidence of a nexus between alleged 
adverse employment actions and a discriminatory intent, as 
required to support claim; and 
[3] employer was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (14) 
III Appeal and Error 
,F",Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Appeal and Error 
,;,=Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct 
Verdict 
In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion 
for directed verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Supreme 
Court applies the same standard as that applied 
by the trial court when originally ruling on the 
motion. 
12) 
13) 
14] 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
\.""Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
Appeal and Error 
s,=Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct 
Verdict 
When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a 
motion for directed verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Supreme 
Court conducts an independent review of the 
evidence and does not defer to the trial court's 
findings. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Trial 
".'-'BSubstantial Evidence 
Trial 
"" .• ,Hearing and Determination 
When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, 
court must determine whether, admitting the 
truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every 
legitimate inference most favorably to the 
opposing party, there exists substantial evidence 
to justify submitting the case to the jury. 
Trial 
,=Substantial Evidence 
The substantial evidence test for a directed 
verdict, i.e., whether substantial evidence exists 
to justify submitting the case to the jury, requires 
only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity 
and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that a verdict in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is made is proper. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 idaho 667 (2009) 
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151 
161 
Courts 
,,,"",Construction of Federal Constitution, Statutes, 
and Treaties 
Federal law guides state Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 claims. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Civil Rights 
.. ~Practices Prohibited or Required in General; 
Elements 
Civil Rights 
, .•• Discharge or Layotf 
To establish an age discrimination claim under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, employee had to demonstrate that he was a 
member of a protected class, meaning an 
employee at least 40 years of age, that he was 
performing his job in a satisfactory manner, that 
he was discharged or his employer took adverse 
employment action against him, and that his 
position was filled by a younger person of equal 
or lesser qualifications. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
171 Civil Rights 
,;>=Motive or Intent; Pretext 
There was no evidence of a nexus between the 
alleged adverse employment actions of which 
employee complained, including that he did not 
receive adequate training, had insufficient 
knowledge of company merger, was assigned an 
overwhelming number of claims, performed the 
work ofa two adjustor job, was forced to use two 
computers, and had to work in intolerable 
conditions, and age discrimination as a 
motivating factor, as required to support an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
claim; employer attempted to work with 
employee so he could gradually return to his job, 
employer offered to help employee find another 
position within company after he complained 
about his new position, and employer made a 
good faith offer for employee to participate in 
company's rehiring process after his benefits 
were set to expire. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
181 Labor and Employment 
<.;,,"Constructive Discharge 
191 
Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an 
employee's reasonable decision to resign 
because of unendurable working conditions is 
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial 
purposes. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Labor and Employment 
;;;;··Constructive Discharge 
The inquiry under the constructive discharge 
doctrine is objective: whether working 
conditions became so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee's position 
would have felt compelled to resign. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
1101 Civil Rights 
.. ··<Motive or Intent; Pretext 
Two stray comments that employer was a "young 
company" were insufficient to establish a 
discriminatory intent on the part of employer, in 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
case, where employee failed to put these 
comments into context and did not produce 
evidence of the intent behind the comments. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U .S.c.A. § 621 et seq. 
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III J Civil Rights 
iCf·,Disparate Treatment 
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by an 
employer in an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 case, liability depends 
on whether the protected trait, age, actually 
motivated the employer's decision. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 u.s.eA. § 621 et seq. 
/l2J Civil Rights 
,.",Disparate Treatment 
Whatever the employer's decisionmaking 
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot 
succeed unless the employee's protected trait 
actually played a role in that process and had a 
determinative influence on the outcome. 
I13J Civil Rights 
<.=Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
Stray remarks are insufficient to establish 
discrimination. 
Jl4J Costs 
,,·=Nature and Form of Judgment, Action, or 
Proceedings for Review 
Employee's appeal from district court's grant of 
employer's motion for directed verdict after jury 
awarded employee $700,000 in damages was not 
brought frivolously, and thus employer was not 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. West's LeA. 
§ 12-121. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**642 Kirkendall Law Office and Law Offices of Peter 
Desler, PC, Boise, for appellant. Peter Desler argued. 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, 
Boise, for respondent. Patricia M. Olsson argued. 
Opinion 
W. JONES, Justice. 
*669 NATURE OF CASE 
Joe Watennan (Appellant) brought an action against his 
fonner employer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
and Allied Insurance Company (collectively Respondent). 
Although Appellant initially filed several causes of action, 
the case proceeded to trial only on Respondent's alleged 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA). After the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Appellant, awarding him $700,000.00 in damages, the 
district court granted Respondent's motion for directed 
verdict. Appellant brings this appeal requesting this Court 
to reverse the district court's directed verdict ruling and to 
reinstate the jury verdict in his favor. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Nationwide hired Appellant in 1979 as an insurance claims 
adjustor and gave him "pretty intense" training during his 
first six months on the job. Appellant was the sole 
Nationwide adjustor in the Boise area until approximately 
1993, at which time the number of claims in the Boise area 
increased and Nationwide hired a second adjustor. Until 
that time, Appellant handled multiline claims, including 
homeowner, auto, property damage, and bodily injury and 
liability investigations. After the second adjustor was 
hired, Appellant's responsibility was limited to property 
damage claims. In 2000, the second adjustor left the Boise 
office, but Appellant continued to handle property damage 
claims exclusively until 200 I, which is when the alleged 
adverse employment actions commenced. 
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Nationwide purchased Allied Group Inc. in October 1998. 
The two companies began integrating in 2000. Prior to the 
merger, Nationwide used the Class software system to 
handle claims and Allied used the Passport software 
system. Mike Lex (Mr. Lex), Allied's Regional Vice-
President, testified that he was in charge of transitioning 
the companies to one common claims handling software 
system. He testified that the company chose to convert all 
claims handling processes to the Allied Passport model to 
achieve the goal of a lower loss expense ratio. 
Mr. Lex also testified he was part of the team that 
determined which adjustors would be retained after the 
merger. To accomplish this task, all employees were 
required to fill out a Technical Background Update 
explaining their technical competency and prior 
performance. In July of 2000, Appellant filled out a 
Technical Background Update wherein he listed 2 1.5 years 
experience in auto and property damage claims and 15 
years experience in med pay, bodily injury, litigation, 
general liability and personal injury protection. 
**643 *670 From June through October 2000, Appellant 
received a weekly company publication entitled "Up to 
Date: An Integration Update for Nationwide's Western 
States Claims Associates," which answered in-depth 
questions about the merger. Appellant first learned in early 
October of 2000 that he would have a position with the 
company after the merger as a multiline adjustor. 
Appellant testified that his supervisor never physically 
handed him a job description, but he also admitted that 
such materials were available online for review. 
Prior to the merger, Appellant worked out of an office, but 
in December 2000, he was required to move his office into 
his house. Appellant was expected to settle the Nationwide 
claims that existed prior to the merger on the Nationwide 
software system while simultaneously transitioning to the 
new Allied software system. This required Appellant to set 
up two separate computers in his home office because the 
Allied and Nationwide software systems could not run on 
the same computer. DSLI was not available at Appellant's 
home office at that time, so he had to use a dial-up line and 
completely shut down one computer and boot up the other 
computer any time that he needed to change between the 
two software systems. Appellant mentioned that the 
company gave another adjustor a switch that allowed her to 
go quickly and easily from one program to another. 
Appellant requested such a switch but was denied. 
Appellant testified that the company indicated "it's only a 
matter of time before you are done with the pending claims 
on Class and it's not within our affordability to do that." 
The parties dispute when Appellant began processing 
Allied claims. Appellant argues it was on January I, 200 I; 
Respondent claims it was not until February 2001. Either 
way, Appellant testified that the increased number of 
claims overwhelmed him and his requests for help went 
unanswered. However, Respondent put on evidence that 
Appellant was not meeting the company's expectations for 
workload or timeliness. On February 4, 2001, Appellant 
was given a verbal warning for failure to comply with 
claims handling criteria. In March 200 I, Respondent 
attempted to help Appellant by creating an action plan to 
improve his performance. 
Appellant argues that he did not receive proper training on 
the Allied Passport system. He testified that he attended 
two meetings in Denver, his boss visited him once in 
Boise, and he spent a few days job shadowing an adjustor 
in Colorado. Appellant stated that Respondent failed in 
each situation to provide him even the most basic training 
that would be required for him to perform the job 
adequately. However, on May 2, 200 I, during a conference 
call between Appellant and his supervisors that was set up 
to discuss Appellant's performance issues, Appellant 
indicated to Nita Dunn, Respondent's human resources 
consultant, that a lack oftraining was not the reason for his 
poor performance: 
Dunn: And it is not because, if I understand you 
correctly it is not because you feel that uh you haven't 
received enough training or that you don't have the 
proper tools to do your job. But simply that the workload 
is too heavy. 
Waterman: Correct. 
On May 22, 200 I, Appellant agreed to a work 
improvement plan that called for Appellant to become 
compliant with Respondent's claims handling standards by 
50% within one month and 75% within three months. 
Around this time Appellant requested a severance package 
from Respondent, which Respondent denied, stating "your 
request for consideration of a severance option was 
unusual, as your position with Allied has not been 
eliminated." 
From June 4, 200 I through June 14, 200 I, Appellant went 
on a preplanned vacation. Immediately following his 
vacation, Appellant took leave under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) due to depression and his 
doctor's advice not to work for four to six months. 
Appellant received a letter dated September 5, 2001 stating 
that his FMLA leave was exhausted and "based on 
business *671 **644 needs, a decision has been made to 
restaff your position. This decision does not reflect on your 
ability to do your job, but rather the company's need to 
ensure the job gets done despite your absence." On 
September 6, 2001, Respondent posted a position for a 
Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. ins. 146 idaho 667 (200S) 
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Boise area claims adjustor. On September 17, 2001, 
Appellant was specifically told that his position had not yet 
been restaffed and that he should try a gradual return to 
work, but he refused, stating he did not believe he could 
ever return to a normal workload. On September 24,200 I, 
Respondent filled the position with Tamyra Gent, age 4 I. 
As of the date Appellant's FMLA leave expired, 
Respondent placed him on long-term disability and he 
received approximately 60% of his salary. Appellant was 
subsequently found not to be disabled after an independent 
medical examination was conducted. On April 27, 2002, 
Respondent reinstated Appellant's full salary for two 
months and advised Appellant to search for a new job 
within the company, but there were no positions available 
in Boise and Appellant was not willing to relocate. 
Appellant was 51 years old as of his last day of 
employment with Respondent. 
On July 24, 2004, Appellant filed a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial against Respondent asserting 
various causes of action that primarily focused on age 
discrimination. Respondent filed an Answer, essentially 
denying the allegations made by Appellant and raising the 
following affirmative defenses, among others: defendant's 
actions were taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons and without regard to plaintiffs age, plaintiff 
failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective 
opportunities provided by defendant or to otherwise avoid 
harm, and defendant acted in good faith in applying 
policies of which plaintiff was aware when he was hired 
and during his employment. The jury trial commenced on 
December 13,2006, and lasted four days. 
During trial, Appellant presented testimony by a claims 
director that he was aware of "some statements made in 
group meetings where Allied was referred to as a young 
company." However, the claims director did not know 
what the statements meant. Appellant also presented 
testimony of a district claims manager that, in reference to 
a conversation with his supervisor about a job applicant 
who was in his sixties, his supervisor stated to him, "Well, 
you know, Allied is a young company." The inference was 
that the job applicant was too old for the position, but he 
was ultimately hired. 
After Appellant rested his case, Respondent moved for 
directed verdict, alleging Appellant failed to establish a 
prima facie case of age discrimination because a 
reasonable person could not find the second, third, or 
fourth elements of an ADEA claim. The district court 
denied Respondent's motion for directed verdict, but noted 
that Respondent could renew its motion at the end of trial. 
Respondent then presented its defense case. 
On December 20,2006, both sides rested and Respondent 
renewed its motion for directed verdict. The court took it 
under advisement. The jury returned a 9-3 verdict in favor 
of Appellant and awarded $700,000.00 in damages. After 
the district court dismissed the jury, Respondent again 
renewed its motion for directed verdict. The court granted 
the motion, stating, "I've considered this carefully. I fully 
expected the jury to take me off the hook on this, but they 
have not. I'm satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish the requisite elements and that a properly 
deliberative jury could not have reached the verdict that 
they did." On December 21, 2006, the court issued its 
written Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict. On 
December 27, 2006, the court entered judgment against 
Appellant and in favor of Respondent. There is no 
evidence in the record that either party requested or 
received attorney fees below. Appellant brought this 
appeal seeking reinstatement of the jury verdict in the 
amount of $700,000.00, plus interest. Respondent requests 
attorney fees on appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the district court err in granting Respondent's 
motion for directed verdict?2 
**645 *672 2. Is Respondent entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
IlJ 12113114J In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a 
motion for directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that 
applied by the trial court when originally ruling on the 
motion. Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 14 I Idaho 16, 
27, 105 P.3d 676,687 (2005) (citation omitted). This Court 
conducts an independent review of the evidence and does 
not defer to the trial court's findings. fd. This Court must 
determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse 
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most 
favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial 
evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury. fd. The 
substantial evidence test does not require the evidence be 
uncontradicted. fd. It requires only that the evidence be of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is made is proper. Jd. 
15J 16J Federal law guides this Court in its interpretation of 
ADEA claims. See 0 'Del! v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 81 I, 
810 P.2d 1082, 1097(199 I) (citations omitted). Different 
Waterman v. Nationwide Mut Ins. 146 Idaho 667 (2009) 
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jurisdictions, both within and outside the state of Idaho, 
recite the elements of an ADEA claim differently. To 
establish an age discrimination claim for the purposes of 
this case, Appellant must first demonstrate that he was a 
member of a protected class, which here is an employee at 
least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.c. § 63I(a); Wallis v. JR. 
Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 89 I (9th Cir.1994). Second, he 
must demonstrate that he was performing his job in a 
satisfactory manner. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.2004); Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891. 
Third, he must demonstrate that he was discharged or his 
employer took adverse employment action against him. id. 
Fourth, he must demonstrate that his position was filled by 
a younger person of equal or lesser qualifications. Wallis, 
26 F.3d at 891. In this case, the third element of 
Appellant's ADEA claim is dispositive, so we need not 
address elements one, two, or four. 
ANALYSIS 
The district court did not err in granting Respondent's 
motion for directed verdict. 
I7J 18J [9J To establish the third element of Appellant's 
ADEA claim, he must prove he was discharged or 
Respondent took adverse employment action against him. 
In this case, Appellant contends he was constructively 
discharged. "Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an 
employee's reasonable decision to resign because of 
unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal 
discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is objective: 
Did working conditions become so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee's position would have 
felt compelled to resign?" Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 
1174, 1184 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Penn. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351, 159 
L.Ed.2d 204, 216 (2004». Under the adverse employment 
action doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated, "A tangible employment action constitutes a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits." Burlington industries, inc. 
v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268, 141 
L.Ed.2d 633, 652-53 (1998) (comparing Crady v. Liberty 
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th 
Cir.1993) ("A materially adverse change might be 
indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion 
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly 
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that 
might be unique to a particular situation"), with Flaherty v. 
Gas Research institute, 31 F .3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1 994) (a 
"bruised ego" is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care 
Management, inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir.1996) 
(demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or 
prestige *673 **646 insufficient), and Harlston v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th 
Cir.1994) (reassignment to more inconvenient job 
insufficient». 
11 OJ 111 J ]12 J II 3 J When a plaintiff alleges disparate 
treatment by an employer in an ADEA case, "liability 
depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, 
age) actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves 
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, inc., 530 U.S. 133,141, 
120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, 116 (2000) 
(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 
113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 346 (1993»). 
Whatever the employer's decision making process, a 
disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the 
employee's protected trait actually played a role in that 
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome. 
Jd. Stray remarks are insufficient to establish 
discrimination. Nesbit v. Pepsico, inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 
(9th Cir.1993) (citing Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 
F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990». To establish the nexus 
between Respondent's allegedly discriminatory motive 
and the third element of Appellant's ADEA claim, 
Appellant cites to two stray comments that Nationwide-
Allied was a "young company." Appellant failed to put 
these comments into context and did not produce evidence 
of the intent behind the comments, thus the stray comments 
are insufficient to establish a discriminatory intent. 
Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence in the record 
that Appellant was constructively discharged or that 
Respondent took adverse employment action against him. 
Appellant presented evidence at trial that he was not happy 
with his new position after the merger and his 
responsibilities changed in a way he found unpleasant. 
However, he failed to establish a nexus between the 
alleged adverse employment actions of which he 
complains and any iota of evidence that age discrimination 
was a motivating factor. Appellant claims he satisfied this 
element of his ADEA claim by producing evidence at trial 
that he did not receive adequate training, he had 
insufficient knowledge of the merger, he was assigned an 
overwhelming number of claims, he performed the work of 
a two adjustor job, he was forced to use two computers, 
and he had to work in intolerable conditions. However, 
Respondent presented evidence that Appellant specifically 
denied training was an issue, he was not trained differently 
than other employees, his claim load was within normal 
limits, there is no evidence that Appellant did the work of 
two adjustors, the computer set-up in Appellant's home 
was nothing more than a temporary annoyance, and 
Appellant was on notice of the merger as early as February 
Waterman v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667 (lOOS) 
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2000 and kept advised of the merger by weekly updates. 
Moreover, Respondent attempted to work with Appellant 
so he could gradually return to his job, offered to help him 
find another position within the company after he 
complained about his new position, and made a good faith 
offer for him to participate in the company's rehiring 
process after his benefits were set to expire. 
Appellant essentially requests this Court to overturn the 
district court's entry of directed verdict based on 
conjecture and speculation that two stray comments 
provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus on 
the part of Respondent. We decline to do so. Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court's entry of directed verdict 
against Appellant. 
Respondent is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
[141 Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
to IC § 12-121. Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal 
under IC § 12-121 only if the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Teton Peaks fnv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 399, 
195 P.3d 1207, 1212 (2008). We cannot say Appellant 
frivolously brought this appeal where the jury found in 
favor of Appellant, awarded $700,000.00 in damages, and 
Footnotes 
the district court thereafter entered directed verdict against 
Appellant. Thus, we deny Respondent's request for 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
After drawing every legitimate inference in favor of 
Appellant, we find Appellant did not produce substantial 
evidence to establish the third element of this ADEA 
claim. *674 **647 Therefore, we affirm the district court's 
decision to grant Respondent's motion for directed verdict. 
We deny Respondent's request for attorney fees on appeal. 
Costs to Respondent. 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, HORTON and Justice pro 
tern WALTERS, concur. 
Parallel Citations 
201 P.3d 640,105 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 556 
1 "DSL" is shorthand for "digital subscriber line," which is a speedy medium for transferring data over regular phone lines and can be 
used to connect to the Internet. See The Tech Terms Computer Dictionary, http://www.techterms.com/definition/dsl (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2008). 
2 Aftcr the jury returned the verdict, Respondent should have movcd for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rather than renew its 
motion for directed verdict. See I.R.C.P. § 50. However, the two motions are reviewed under the same standard and for the purposes 
ofthis case any distinction between the motions is without a difference. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Martin T. WOHL, PlaintijJ-Appellant, 
v. 
SPECTRUM MANUFACTURING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 95-3610. I Argued Apri118, 1996. I 
DecidedAug. 28, 1996. I Rehearing and 
Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane Denied 
Nov. 21, 1996. 
Employee brought Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) action against his former employer. The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, James B. Zagel, .I., entered summary judgment for 
employer, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, 
Eschbach, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) employee 
established that he met employer's legitimate expectations 
so as to establish prima facie case of discrimination, and 
(2) material issue of fact as to whether employer's 
proffered reasons for firing employee were pretext for age 
discrimination precluded summary judgment for 
employer. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bauer, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion. 
West Headnotes (9) 
IlJ Federal Courts 
<= Trial De Novo 
Court of Appeals reviews de novo district court's 
grant of summary judgment. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
12J Federal Courts 
0~"Summary Judgment 
When reviewing district court's grant of 
summary judgment, Court of Appeals views 
~ ,-'" -- '" " 
13J 
14J 
151 
16J 
record in the light most favorable to nonmovant. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
=Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Court applies summary judgment standard 
rigorously in employment discrimination cases 
because intent and credibility are crucial issues. 
49 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
,~Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
plaintiff may defeat employer's summary 
judgment motion if plaintiff produces evidence 
that employer proffered phoney reasons for firing 
plaintiff. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
J~,Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
To defeat employer's summary judgment 
motion, ADEA plaintiff had to raise genuine 
issue of material fact regarding sincerity of 
employer's proffered reasons for plaintiffs 
discharge. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Woh! v. Mfg., !nc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996) 
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171 
181 
/91 
\=Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
Material issue of fact as to whether employer's 
proffered reasons for firing employee were 
pretext for age discrimination precluded 
summary judgment for employer on employee's 
ADEA claims. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
56, 18 U.S.C.A. 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
<,,;=Discharge or Layoff 
General elements of prima facie case of age 
discrimination are that plaintiff was in a 
protected class, plaintiff performed well enough 
to meet employer's legitimate expectations, 
plaintiff was discharged, and employer sought 
replacement for plaintiff. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.. :,-=Discharge or Layoff 
Employee established that he met employer's 
legitimate expectations so as to establish prima 
facie case of age discrimination; employer gave 
employee substantial raise just before he was 
fired and employer provided no documentary 
evidence that employee did not meet its 
legitimate expectations. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
Civil Rights 
.~~"'Prima Facie Case 
Prima facie case of employment discrimination is 
a flexible standard that is not intended to be 
rigidly applied. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*354 Aron D. Robinson, Bruce J. Goodhart, Matthew H. 
Berns (argued), Holstein, Mack & Klein, Chicago, IL, for 
p lainti ff-appe Ilant. 
Terry J. Smith, Barry C. Kessler (argued), Kessler, Smith 
& Powen, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee. 
Before BAUER, ESCHBACH, and FLAUM, Circuit 
Judges. 
Opinion 
ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Martin Wohl was hired as Controller of 
Defendant-Appellee Spectrum Manufacturing, Inc., in 
1988. In 1992, at the age of 54, Wohl was fired and 
replaced by Joe Holloway, who is approximately 20 years 
younger than Wohl. Wohl then filed suit against Spectrum, 
alleging that Spectrum fired him because of his age, in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as 
amended, 29 U.S.c. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA") . 
Spectrum filed a motion for summary judgment. The court 
analyzed Wohl's claim under the indirect, burdenshifting 
method of proof first established in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 
668 (1973), and later applied to ADEA claims. See McCoy 
v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 
(7th Cir.1992); see also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122-24 (7th Cir.1994) (discussing 
the particulars of the burden-shifting approach). The court 
found (or, more appropriately, presumed) that Wohl had 
made a prima facie case for age discrimination. The court 
also found that Spectrum had met its burden of rebutting 
the presumption of age discrimination by articulating a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The 
court, therefore, required Wohl to prove that Spectrum's 
"reasons" for firing Wohl were a pretext for age 
discrimination. The court held that Wohl failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact and the court granted 
Spectrum's motion for summary judgment. Wohl appeals 
Woh! v. Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996) 
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from that decision, arguing that he raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Spectrum's proffered reason for 
his firing was a *355 lie. We agree with Wohl and we 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
IlJ 121131 We review de novo the district court's grant ofa 
motion for summary judgment, Schultz v. General Electric 
Capital Corp., 37 FJd 329, 333 (7th Cir.1994), cert. 
denied sub nom. Alley v. General Electric Capital Corp., 
515 U.S. II45, 115 S.Ct. 2584, 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995), 
and we view the record in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 369. We apply the 
summary judgment standard rigorously in employment 
discrimination cases such as this because intent and 
credibility are crucial issues. Courtney v. Biosound, 42 
FJd 414, 419 (7th Cir.1994).1 
14J 151 A plaintiff in an age discrimination case may defeat 
a summary judgment motion brought by the employer if 
the plaintiff produces evidence that the employer proffered 
a phony reason for firing the employee. Anderson, 13 F.3d 
at 1123. The Supreme Court's opinion in Saint Mmy's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 
L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), specifically permits, but does not 
require, the fact-finder "to infer the ultimate act of 
intentional discrimination" based upon such evidence. Id. 
at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Therefore, to avoid summary 
judgment, Wohl must raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the sincerity of the proffered reasons for his 
discharge. With this framework in mind, we discuss the 
relevant facts in the instant case. 
II. 
Spectrum is a small manufacturing company that makes 
specialized machine parts. Wohl had a variety of 
responsibilities as Spectrum's Controller. These 
responsibilities included financial and cost accounting, 
payroll, coordination of liability insurance and 
administration of the company's 40 I K plan. 
Shortly after Wohl was hired, he investigated and 
purchased a new computer accounting program at the 
company's behest for approximately $3,000. Spectrum 
eventually outgrew this system and Wohl was directed to 
assess the purchase of a more sophisticated system that 
would permit management to track profitability by 
department and job lot. Wohl and Spectrum's president, 
James Ceriale, opted for a software accounting system 
called "OCO." The compan)' purchased the OCO software 
and the hardware necessary to implement the program at a 
cost of slightly more than $100,000. 
The company opted for this system because it was capable 
of sophisticated cost accounting. Cost accounting requires 
the company and its employees to input the variable costs 
associated with a single job (i. e., materials, labor, and 
machine overhead) along with proportionate fixed costs 
(general overhead and administration). These figures are 
then matched against billing for each job. The resultant 
analyses provide the company with detailed information 
regarding the company's efficiency, productivity, and 
sources of profit and loss. This system, like all computer 
systems and all accounting systems, is dependent on the 
input of accurate information. For example, the system 
requires production floor employees to log on to a 
computer terminal and input their personal identification 
number and a job account number before working on a 
particular job with a particular machine. The employee 
signs off after completing that period of work. If the 
information that the employee enters is inaccurate, the 
output data will be inaccurate. Garbage in, garbage out. 
16J In its motion for summary judgment, Spectrum 
suggested that it had fired Wohl for two reasons: (I) his 
failure to "get along with" general manager Greg Reuhs 
and (2) his inability to produce certain computer 
accounting reports-specifically, computer-generated job 
costing reports from the OCO system. The district court 
found that these were legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for Wohl's termination. The court also found that 
Wohl had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether *356 Spectrum's second reason2 was 
false-a pretext for age discrimination. Wohl admits that he 
did not produce accurate and reliable job costing reports 
for Spectrum. This is, however, only half of the story. 
Wohl alleges that general manager Greg Reuhs was 
responsible for the system's failure. Wohl also claims that 
he complained to Spectrum's management about Reuhs's 
actions and that Spectrum's management instructed him to 
get along with, and defer to, Reuhs. This allegation is 
significant because, if true (and we must assume for 
purposes of summary judgment that it is true), it creates a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Spectrum's proffered reason for firing Wohl was a pretext 
for age discrimination. 
The evidence indicates that Wohl and Reuhs had clashed 
early on in Wohl's tenure at Spectrum. Reuhs was 
primarily responsible for manufacturing, but he had 
assumed responsibility in a number of other areas and was 
given great deference by Spectrum's management. For 
example, Reuhs insisted on taking responsibility for 
billing, an area that ordinarily belongs under the 
supervision of the Controller. When Spectrum first hired 
Wohl v. Spectrum Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1 
71 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1081 
Wohl, Wohl had questioned some of the billing practices 
maintained by Reuhs. Reuhs had an unorthodox policy of 
keeping particular jobs open and refusing to abide by a 
standard month-end cutoff. By employing this unorthodox 
policy, Reuhs was able to manipulate department 
profitability and "steal" billing from, and allocate labor to, 
subsequent months. Reuhs's sleight of hand prevented 
management from obtaining an accurate picture of 
department profit and loss. 
Reuhs's tinkering with billing so concerned Wohl that he 
brought the matter to Spectrum's management's attention. 
Wohl informed Jim Ceriale, Tom Brandseth, and William 
Fricke about his concerns at a luncheon meeting. Ceriale, 
Brandseth, and Fricke were the founders and managers of 
the company and Ceriale was its president. At this 
luncheon meeting, Wohl was specifically directed to "get 
along with" Reuhs and to work out their differences. Wohl 
stated that it was clear to him "that the company considered 
Reuhs, who was the younger man, to be a key player in the 
organization, and that he was to be appeased." Following 
the meeting, Wohl learned to get along with Reuhs and 
performed his duties to the fullest extent without clashing 
with Reuhs. 
As part of his duties in implementing the DCD system, 
Wohl was responsible for setting up the computer with 
certain fixed information, including overhead, employee 
identification numbers and employees' rates of pay. Wohl 
entered this information but was unable to produce the 
desired reports because production floor employees were 
supposed to supply much of the variable cost data, but did 
not do so accurately. Wohl did not have authority to 
manage these production floor employees; the employees 
were supervised by Greg Reuhs. The reports were 
unreliable because these employees failed to enter the 
correct data. Reuhs further compromised the integrity of 
the reports by failing to close out completed jobs and 
deliberately manipUlating the billing cut-off dates. 
The facts create a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to both of Spectrum's proffered reasons for firing 
Wohl. First, Wohl claims that he learned to "get along 
with" Reuhs. Wohl's claim that he learned to "get along 
with" Reuhs is corroborated by Spectrum's own outside 
accountant, Charles Gries. Gries testified at his deposition 
that "Greg [Reuhs] never felt that he had a problem with 
Mr. W ohl" and that Reuhs "was always very 
complimentary of him." The evidence is more than 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Especially when looked at in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Wohl and Reuhs 
got along fine and that Spectrum did not fire W ohl for 
failing to get along with Reuhs. 
Second, Wohl has raised a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding Spectrum's second reason, failing to produce 
accurate and reliable computer reports. A reasonable jury 
could find that Spectrum's second reason was false 
because Spectrum knew that Reuhs's actions prevented 
Wohl from implementing *357 the DCD system,3 yet 
Spectrum failed to take any action to monitor or alter 
Reuhs's management of the production floor employees 
and failed to take action to prevent Reuhs from 
manipUlating data to produce artificially good results. In 
fact, Wohl had summoned sufficient courage to bring his 
specific concerns regarding Reuhs' s behavior to the 
highest level of management, but Spectrum's only 
response was to tell Wohl to get along with Reuhs. That 
Spectrum claimed that it fired W ohl for failing to "get 
along with" Reuhs further lends credence to Wohl's claim 
that Spectrum preferred him to defer to Reuhs rather than 
rocking the boat in order to obtain accurate data from the 
production floor employees. 
Wohl's claim is distinct from a simple attempt to pass the 
buck on responsibility for producing DCD rep0l1s to 
Reuhs. See Schultz v. General Electric Capital Corp., 37 
F.3d 329, 334 (7th Cir. I 994) (simply shifting the blame for 
a problem does not establish pretext). Wohl claims that 
Spectrum knew it was firing the wrong employee all along 
and pointed to the DCD system as an after-the-fact excuse. 
Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir.1995) 
(pretext established for summary judgment by evidence 
that employer did not honestly believe its proffered 
reason); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414,423 (7th 
Cir.1994) ("Given the conflicting evidence, a reasonable 
juror could conclude that [defendant] did not honestly 
believe that [plaintiff] was responsible for the mishap, but 
only claimed that the mishap was plaintiffs fault as an 
excuse not to hire him.").4 Wohl's claim "create [s] an 
issue as to whether [Spectrum] honestly believes in the 
reasons it offers, not whether [Spectrum] made a bad 
decision." Sample v. Aldi, Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 549 (7th 
Cir.1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also *358 Schultz, 37 F.3d at 334 (noting that evidence 
that employer knew that its reason for firing employee was 
based on erroneous or irrelevant information is distinct 
from evidence that merely shows that the employer made a 
mistake and would permit a fact-finder to find that the 
employer lied). 
W ohl points to a number of additional factors that support 
his claim that Spectrum's proffered reasons were a pretext 
for age discrimination: Spectrum's files contain no 
indication of any disciplinary action or informal concern 
with Wohl's performance and Wohl received a 25 percent 
pay raise less than 6 months before he was fired; Wohl 
provided substitute reports using less-sophisticated 
software that Spectrum's outside accountant, Gries, 
Wohl v. inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996) 
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admitted "were very good" and were more than sufficient 
to generate the company's year-end financial statements; 
and Wohl's "replacement," Holloway, experienced the 
same problems as Wohl in implementing the DCD system 
because Reuhs refused to adopt a standard billing cut-off 
and was unwilling to get cooperation from the production 
employees. These facts all support Wohl's contention that 
his failure to produce accurate and reliable reports was not 
the true reason that he was fired. We recognize that a 
reasonable fact-finder may infer contrary conclusions, but 
we reemphasize that all reasonable inferences must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
on summary judgment. 
171 [8) The facts also support the conclusion that Wohl had 
established a prima facie case, the first step in the 
burden shifting method of proof. The general elements of a 
primafacie case of age discrimination are that: (I) plaintiff 
was in the protected class, (2) plaintiff performed well 
enough to meet the employer's "legitimate expectations," 
(3) plaintiff was discharged, and (4) the employer sought a 
replacement for plaintiff. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122. 
Spectrum concedes that plaintiff established three of the 
four elements. Spectrum suggests, however, that summary 
judgment was appropriate in this case even if it lied about 
its reasons for firing Wohl because Wohl did not meet 
Spectrum's legitimate expectations. We disagree. 
Spectrum gave Wohl a substantial raise just before he was 
fired, Wohl produced financial reports as best he was able, 
and Spectrum provides no documentary evidence that 
Wohl did not meet their legitimate expectations. Plaintiff 
also stated in his affidavit that "[ u ]nti I I was fired, I had 
every reason to believe that the company was happy with 
my performance. I was never given any indication that 
Spectrum considered my efforts at implementing DCD to 
be deficient." See Courtney, 42 F.3d at 418 ("The 
nonmoving party's own affidavit or deposition can 
constitute affirmative evidence to defeat a summary 
judgment motion."); Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
864 F.2d 1359,1365 n. 7 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Williams 
v. Williams Electronics, 856 F.2d 920, 923 n. 6 (7th 
Cir.1988), for the proposition that plaintiff may establish 
that he performed the job well enough to meet the 
employer's legitimate expectations based solely upon 
plaintiffs own testimony regarding the quality of his 
work). This is essentially a swearing contest. Summary 
judgment is not the appropriate place to resolve this 
genuine dispute over a material fact. 
191 Finally, Spectrum's claim that it fired Wohl for failure 
to get along with Reuhs also cuts against Spectrum's 
suggestion that Wohl did not perform well enough to meet 
Spectrum's "legitimate expectations."5 Spectrum argues 
that Wohl cannot establish that he met Spectrum's 
legitimate expectations because "Plaintiff admitted he 
failed to perform key elements of his job, i.e., the 
production of job costing reports through *359 
implementation of DCD." Yet, there was an inherent 
tension between "getting along" with Greg Reuhs and 
compiling accurate and reliable information relating to job 
costing reports. Wohl pointed out this tension to 
Spectrum's management. Management indicated to Wohl 
that appeasing Reuhs should be his priority. Thus, 
Spectrum's expectations regarding the DCD system and 
the production of accurate and reliable reports are not 
"legitimate" unless they are viewed in isolation. "The 
prima facie case ... is a flexible standard that is not intended 
to be rigidly applied." Collier, 66 F.3d at 890 (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). Spectrum's "legitimate" 
expectations must include a balancing of priorities: The 
expectation that Wohl produce the DCD reports must be 
balanced against Spectrum's stated expectation that Wohl 
get along with Reuhs. Summary judgment is inappropriate 
because Wohl has produced sufficient evidence that he met 
all of Spectrum's "legitimate expectations." 
III. 
Wohl has established a prima facie case for age 
discrimination and a trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that Spectrum's proffered reasons for firing Wohl 
were false. Thus, Wohl has established a genuine issue of 
material fact. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Spectrum is therefore REVERSED 
and REMANDED. 
BAUER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. The opinion states: "Wohl admits 
that he did not produce accurate and reliable job costing 
reports for Spectrum. This is, however, only half of the 
story. Wohl alleges that general manager Greg Reuhs was 
responsible for the system's failure. Wohl also claims that 
he complained to Spectrum's management about Reuhs' 
actions and that Spectrum's management instructed him to 
get along with, and defer to, Reuhs. This allegation is 
significant because, if true (and we must assume for 
purposes of summary judgment that it is true), it creates a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Spectrum's proffered reason for firing Wohl was a pretext 
for age discrimination." 
I simply cannot accept this. The brief of appellant Wohl 
accurately reflects the complaint he made about Reuhs. 
Wohls' affidavit says that he questioned Reuhs' practices 
Wonl v. Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996) 
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as "manipulating department profitability" and 
"preventing management from seeing a true picture of 
department profit and loss." The affidavit recites that Wohl 
brought this matter to the attention of Spectrum 
management early on in his tenure, within 6 to 9 months 
after he was hired, "even before DCD was implemented." 
This was at the luncheon when Wohl was "specifically told 
to get along with and defer to Reuhs." There is nothing in 
the record to support the statement that "Spectrum knew 
that Reuhs' actions prevented Wohl from implementing 
the DCD system .... " The complaint about Reuhs from 
Wohl came many months before the DCD system was 
purchased. 
The fact is, the DCD system was put to 
work-satisfactorily-by Reuhs' successor. Wohl, who 
acknowledged in his deposition that it was his 
responsibility to implement the DCD equipment, also 
acknowledged that he was never capable of utilizing the 
$100,000 DCD to provide accurate and reliable costing 
reports for Spectrum. There is nothing to suggest that 
Spectrum was told by Wohl that the DCD problem was 
caused by some hanky-panky or shortcomings of 
Reuhs'-Wohl's beef about Reuhs was long before the 
company even acquired the DCD and that complaint could 
not possibly be considered as creating a fact question as to 
whether Spectrum's proffered reason was a pretext for age 
discrimination. 
There is simply no way of stretching a statement, "I didn't 
do what the company expected but it wasn't my fault," into 
an age discrimination claim. I do not know, nor is it 
significant in terms of this law suit, whether Reuhs was a 
terrible supervisor or Wohl a malcontent. Wohl admits that 
Footnotes 
he didn't produce "accurate and reliable job costing reports 
for Spectrum." That provides the basis for the firing and 
not any implication of age discrimination. 
And, in passing, I hesitate to join an opinion that would 
force a company to pause *360 before giving a pay raise to 
an employee lest it be used to create an element of job 
tenure that cannot be overcome in the event the employee 
bogs down and the company wishes to fire him or her. 
Giving an incentive pay raise to stimulate work is not 
unknown nor is it even suspicious. (Both Reuhs and W ohl 
received 25 percent pay raises.) The stimulus was a failure; 
three months later the job costing reports were still not 
produced. All of this is uncontroverted. Whether Wohl 
couldn't produce the work because he was inept or 
couldn't produce the work because it was Reuhs' fault is 
immaterial; the company believed-and Wohl admitted-that 
he couldn't do what the job required and so he got fired. 
And when Reuhs couldn't do it, he got fired. 
The record in this case, in the best light for the plaintiff, 
should not survive a motion for a directed verdict for the 
defendant if the case is tried. Whether Wohl agreed with 
the decision of the company to give him the gate and keep 
Reuhs and whether we agree with that business decision, is 
not relevant to the proceeding. I would affirm. 
Parallel Citations 
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1 This is not to say that there is a hierarchy of the rigor with which we review cases on summary judgment. There is one summary 
judgment standard and we apply it rigorously in all cases. It is, however, of particular import in cases that tum on intent and 
credibility. 
2 The district court nevcr reached the issue whether Wohl had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding Wohl's relationship 
with Reuhs. 
3 The dissent hangs its hat on its belief that Wohl's complaints about Reuhs's billing practices cannot create a question of material fact 
as to whether Spectrum's proffered reason was a lie. The dissent claims that "[t]here is nothing in the record to support the statement 
that 'Spectrum knew that Reuhs' actions prevented Wohl from implementing the OeD system ... ,' " noting that Wohl complained 
about Reuhs's phony billing practices before oeD was purchased. The dissent's position is untenable for two reasons. First. there is 
nothing unusual about inferring knowledge of a later fact (Reuhs' refusal to input accurate OeD data) from awareness of an earlier 
lact (Reuhs' refusal to input accurate data prior to purchase ofthe OeD). Furthermore. Wohl specifically raised this issue of fact. See, 
e.g, Plaintiff's Local Rule 12(n) Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts in Support of Summary Judgment, at para. 7 
("Answering further. Plaintiff alleges that Spectrum management was at all times aware of the true reasons for the problems with the 
reports and simply elected to back Reuhs. the younger man they viewed to be the future of the company .... " (emphasis added». As 
evidentiary support. Wohl cites to a Spectrum memo contained in the record: 
The new computer system will be used for Accounts payable, check preparation. and general Ledger starting July I st. Sometime 
during July Greg [ReuhsJ will start recording all work performed on jobs on the new system and go ofT the old system for that 
purpose. We should be able to start generating invoices off of the new system shortly thereafter. 
Nowhere does Spectrum claim that it was unaware ofReuhs's actions. On summary judgment we review the record in the light 
Woh! v. Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996) 
71 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1081 
most favorable to Wohl and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. There is clearly enough evidence to create a factual issue 
whether Spectrum knew that Greg Reuhs was responsible for the inability to produce accurate DCD reports. 
Second, the dissent ignores thc fact that Wohl complained to Spectrum management that Reuhs was rigging the billing system to 
create a pleasing, but inaccurate, picture of department of profit and loss and Spectrum 's only response was to instruct Wahl to 
get along with Reuhs. Spectrum's response supports an inference that they knew that Reuhs was responsible for the DCD reports 
because Spectrum's failure to stop the practice indicated that Spectrum actually condoned Reuhs's billing data high jinks. 
Spectrum not only had knowledge of Reuhs's actions, they also authorized his actions. If Wohl had eontinued to conflict with 
Reuhs, Spectrum would have had a legitimate reason to fire him. The record reflects that Wohl chose to get along with Reuhs. 
Under the dissent's view ofthe matter, there would be no such thing as a pretext, because the company could always instruct an 
employee to satisfy two mutually exclusive mandates. Heads I win, tails you lose. We do not support such a position. 
4 The dissent states that "[t]here is simply no way of stretching a statement, 'I didn't do what the company expected but it wasn't my 
fault,' into an age discrimination claim." The dissent ignores the facts and tells only half the story. Wohl's claim is that "1 didn't do 
what the company expected but it wasn't my fault and the company knew it wasn't my fault but fired me anyway!" 
5 The dissent states that "[t]he fact is. the DCD system was put to work-satisfactorily-by Reuhs' successor" in apparent support of its 
position that the company's reason for firing Wohl were legitimate. The full facts of the case, however. support Wohl's position. Joe 
Holloway, Wohl's replacement, did not have immediate success in implementing the DCD system. Initially. he experienced the same 
problems as Wohl, that is, Reuhs's refusal to adopt standard billing practices and his failure to get appropriate input from production 
floor employees. Holloway did eventually produce accurate DCD reports, but only after Reuhs was fired in August 1993, nine 
months after Wohl was terminated. Wohl maintains that management simply elected to back Holloway, who is even younger than 
Reuhs. 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 12 
COSTS AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
COSTS 
12-121. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided 
that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
History: 
[12-121, added 1976, ch. 349, sec. 1, p. 1158; am. 1987, ch. 263, sec. 
2, p. 555.] 
The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public 
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in 
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's 
copyright. 
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http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title67 IT67CH59SECT67 -5911 Prin .. , 
Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 67 
STATE GOVERNMENT AND STATE AFFAIRS 
CHAPTER 59 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
67-5911. REPRISALS FOR OPPOSING UNLAWFUL PRACTICES. It shall be unlawful 
for a person or any business entity subject to regulation by this chapter 
to discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any 
practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 
History: 
[67-5911, added 1982, ch. 83, sec. 5, p. 156; am. 2005, ch. 278, sec. 
6, p. 877.] 
The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public 
service, Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in 
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's 
copyright. 
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Rule 41. Attorney fees on appeal. 
(a) Application for Attorney Fees - Waiver. Any party seeking attorney 
fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in 
the first appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a) (5) 
and 35(b) (5); provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim 
for attorney fees under such conditions as it deems appropriate. 
(b) Oral Argument on Attorney Fees. At the time of oral argument of an 
appeal, the parties may present argument as to whether or not the party 
claiming attorney fees has a legal right thereto. 
(c) Adjudication of Right to Attorney Fees. The Supreme Court in its 
decision on appeal shall include its determination of a claimed right to 
attorney fees, but such ruling will not contain the amount of attorney fees 
allowed. 
(d) Amount of Attorney Fees. If the Court determines that a party is 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal, the party claiming attorney fees shall 
file a claim concurrently with, or as part of, the memorandum of costs 
provided for by Rule 40. The claim for attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees shall be accompanied 
by an affidavit setting forth the method of computation of the attorney 
fees claimed. Attorney fees may also include the reasonable cost of automated 
legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it 
was reasonably necessary in preparing the party's case. The opposing party 
may object to the amount of attorney fees claimed in the same manner as 
provided for objections to a memorandum of costs in Rule 40. The Court 
shall determine the amount of attorney fees or remand this question to the 
district court or agency to hear additional evidence and determine the 
amount of attorney fees to be allowed. Upon the determination of the amount 
of attorney fees, the Clerk shall insert the amount thereof in the 
remittitur in the same manner as the Clerk inserts costs pursuant to Rule 
40 (f) . 
(e) Number of Copies. An original and six copies of the claim or 
memorandum for attorney fees, objections to attorney fees, and briefs in 
support of or in opposition thereto shall be filed with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 30, 1984, 
effective July 1, 1984; amended March 23, 1990, effective July 1, 1990.) 
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http://www.isc.idaho.gov/rules/ircp56.tx 
Rule 56(a). Summary judgment - For claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after 
the expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process upon 
the adverse party or that party's appearance in the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
that party's favor upon all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion 
for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days before the 
trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order 
setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. 
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July I, 1986; amended June 15, 
1987, effective November 1, 1987.) 
Rule 56(b). Summary judgment - For defending party. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
that party's favor as to all or any part thereof. Provided, a 
motion for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days before 
the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order 
setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. 
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; amended June 15, 
1987, effective November I, 1987.) 
Rule 56(c). Motion for summary judgment and proceedings thereon. 
The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at 
least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party 
must do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The 
adverse party shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days 
prior to the date of the hearing. The moving party may thereafter 
serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the 
hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Such judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the 
action. The court may alter or shorten the time periods and 
requirements of this rule for good cause shown, may continue the 
hearing, and may impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against 
a party or the party's attorney, or both. 
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; amended June 14, 
1987, effective November 1, 1987.) 
Rule 56(d). Case not fully adjudicated on motion for summary 
judgment. 
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the 
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, 
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
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42 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
Chapter 21. Civil Rights (Refs & Annos) 
§ 
Subchapter VI. Equal Employment Opportunities (Refs & Annos) 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 
§ 2oooe-2. Unlawful employment practices 
Currentness 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) Employment agency practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise 
to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(c) Labor organization practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization--
(l) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for 
employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, 
or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. 
(d) Training programs 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee 
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any 
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established 
to provide apprenticeship or other training. 
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions 
with personnel of particular religion 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor 
organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to 
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, 
university, or other educational institution or institution ofleaming to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such 
school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, 
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if 
the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward 
the propagation of a particular religion. 
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or Communist-front organizations 
As used in this subchapter, the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any action or measure 
taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency with respect to an 
individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a 
Communist-action or Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.]. 
(g) National security 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail 
or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or 
for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization 
to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if--
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is 
performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United 
States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute ofthe United States or any Executive 
order of the President; and 
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement 
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized 
by minimum wage provisions 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work 
in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the 
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not 
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount 
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the 
provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29. 
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to Indians 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to 
any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to 
any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation. 
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage imbalance 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or 
joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may 
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any 
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or 
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison 
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, 
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area. 
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases 
(l)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if--
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment 
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 
(B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in 
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes 
a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's 
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one 
employment practice. 
(ii) Ifthe respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity. 
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, 
with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice". 
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim 
of intentional discrimination under this subchapter. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the employment of an individual who currently 
and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.c. 802(6», other than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health 
care professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.] or 
any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if such 
rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(I) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or 
candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results 
of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice. 
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments or orders 
USCA § 2000e-2 
(I)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that 
implements and is within the scope ofa litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination 
under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B). 
(8) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights 
laws--
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had--
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order might 
adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections 
to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and 
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or 
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment 
or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law 
or fact. 
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to--
(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties 
who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened; 
(8) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members 
of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought 
in such action by the Federal Government; 
(e) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained 
through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or 
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution. 
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in 
paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in 
this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of Title 28. 
Credits 
(Pub.L 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 255; Pub.L. 92-261, § 8(a), (b), Mar. 24, 1972,86 Stat. 109; Pub.L. 
102-166, Title I, §§ 105(a), 106, 107(a), 108, Nov. 21,1991,105 Stat. 1074-1076.) 
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